archy/.planning/RELEASE-1.7.121-TASKS.md

# Release 1.7.121 — task list

Opened 2026-08-03, immediately after v1.7.120-alpha shipped. Everything the operator has
asked for since, plus the items v1.7.120 deliberately left open. Ordered by severity.

Status key: **DONE** (committed) · **READY** (written, not yet committed/tested) ·
**OPEN** (not started) · **BLOCKED** (needs an operator decision)

---

## P0 — Security

### 1. App ports are reachable with no login, on every transport — **OPEN**
> "if I'm logged out I can reach every app port on tailscale and LAN, this can not be
> allowed… it must present the login to access the app with an app icon of what you're
> accessing to confirm, and 2FA if present" — operator, 2026-08-03

- Applies to **Tailscale, LAN, Tor, FIPS** alike, and to "ssh access to that port or whatever".
- Required behaviour: an unauthenticated request to any app port serves a **login page
  naming and showing the icon of the app being accessed**, then honours **2FA when set**.
- **Research first:** how umbrelOS and StartOS gate app access (operator asked explicitly).
  Both are open source — `getumbrel/umbrel` and `Start9Labs/start-os`. Do not guess at
  their model; read it.
- This is the same class as the v1.7.120 `/lnd-connect-info` + `/bitcoin-rpc/` leaks, but
  **fleet-wide across every app port** rather than two endpoints. Those two were closed by
  moving authorisation to the resource; this needs a general gate.
- Scope note: `fips/app_ports.rs` holds the mesh allowlist; `is_peer_allowed_path` in
  `server.rs` holds the peer HTTP allowlist. Neither currently authenticates app ports.

#### Research — umbrelOS (verified from their docs/source, 2026-08-03)

umbrelOS solves this **architecturally, not per-app**: the app's own port is never
published. Each app gets a sidecar `app_proxy` container that owns the published port and
forwards to the app on the internal network.

- `containers/app-proxy` is described as *"a transparent HTTP proxy to add authentication
  to Umbrel apps"* — **every** HTTP request and WebSocket upgrade passes through it and
  has its session token checked.
- Tokens come from a separate `app-auth` service; the proxy talks to it over a local port
  (default 2000) with a shared secret (`UMBREL_AUTH_SECRET`). Two JWTs exist: an **API
  token** in localStorage (`{loggedIn: true}`) for the dashboard's own API, and a
  **proxy token** in an **HttpOnly cookie** (`{proxyToken: true}`) for app access. Both
  HS256, 7-day expiry.
- Unauthenticated requests are redirected to the login screen.
- Per-app escape hatches, all env vars on the proxy: `PROXY_AUTH_ADD` (bool, **default
  true** — so apps are protected unless opted out), `PROXY_AUTH_WHITELIST` (paths exempt,
  e.g. `/public/*`), `PROXY_AUTH_BLACKLIST` (paths that must be authed, e.g. `/admin/*`).
- Known friction worth designing around: apps with their own login (Frigate, and the
  `PROXY_AUTH_ADD=false` tracker issue) end up double-authenticating, and non-browser API
  clients (Home Assistant hitting an app's API) break because they have no cookie. Any
  gate we build needs a story for machine clients, not just browsers.

**The lesson for us:** the reason umbrel doesn't have this bug class is that there is no
unauthenticated path to bind to in the first place. Our apps publish their own ports
directly, so a gate bolted onto one transport leaves the others open — which is exactly
the shape of the `/lnd-connect-info` + `/bitcoin-rpc/` leaks. The fix likely has to move
the port binding, not just add a check.

#### Reproduced ON archi-dev-box, 2026-08-03 — baseline before the fix

No session cookie, over the Tailscale IP `100.69.68.39`:

```
port 18083  HTTP 200  LND - Archipelago
port 8334   HTTP 200
port 8175   HTTP 200  Fedimint Guardian - Archipelago
port 8336   HTTP 200  FIPS Mesh
port 8090   HTTP 200
port 7777   HTTP 200
```

`ss -tlnp` confirms these are bound `0.0.0.0`, so the same responses are served on the LAN
IP and every other host address. Re-run this exact loop after the fix: every one must
become the login page, and the ports listed as protocol exemptions (item 1b) must be the
*only* ones still answering.

#### Exposure map — how app ports are reachable TODAY (verified in source, 2026-08-03)

All four transports converge on `127.0.0.1:<app_port>`. This is the whole reason the fix
is tractable: it is **one gate, not four**.

| Transport | Path to the app | Code |
|---|---|---|
| LAN / Tailscale | container publishes the port on the host (`--network host`, so `0.0.0.0:<port>`) — reachable on *every* host IP | `scripts/container-specs.sh`, `first-boot-containers.sh` |
| FIPS mesh | daemon binds `[fips0-ULA]:<port>` and raw-TCP-forwards to `127.0.0.1:<port>` | `server.rs:1130` `app_port_v6_relay_loop` |
| FIPS firewall | `tcp dport { …APP_LAUNCH_PORTS… } accept` drop-in opens them all | `fips/config.rs:274`, `fips/app_ports.rs` |
| Tor | `HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:<local_port>` per service | `api/rpc/tor/mod.rs:243` |

#### Design decision (operator, 2026-08-03)

**Gate app UIs + bearer tokens; protocol ports exempt.** HTTP app UIs get the login gate
(app name + icon, 2FA honoured). Protocol ports (LND gRPC 10009 + REST, electrum 50002,
bitcoin p2p 8333) stay open but MUST be declared `auth: none` with a rationale in the
manifest, so the exceptions are a grep rather than a discovery — see item 1b. Per-app
long-lived bearer tokens cover machine clients that speak HTTP (Home Assistant). **Zeus
and electrum wallets keep working untouched** — that was the deciding constraint.

The gate lives in the **daemon**, not a per-app sidecar container (umbrel's `app_proxy`
model): rootless, no extra containers per app, one place to update, and it can reuse the
existing `app_port_v6_relay_loop` rather than fight it.

#### ⚠️ Trap found while designing — an nft-only gate FAILS OPEN

The obvious implementation is an nft redirect of inbound app-port traffic to the gate.
But `/etc/fips/fips.nft` is **provisioned out-of-band** and `fips/config.rs:290` treats its
absence as a no-op (`if try_exists("/etc/fips/fips.nft")`). A gate shipped as a `fips.d`
drop-in would therefore be **silently absent on every node without the hardening
baseline** — i.e. it fails open, which is exactly the failure class this item exists to
close.

Two viable shapes, both fail-closed:
- **(a) Apps bind loopback only**, daemon owns every external bind. Airtight, the true
  umbrel model, but requires touching each app's own listen config (nginx.conf etc.).
  Note you *cannot* half-do this: while an app holds `0.0.0.0:<port>`, the daemon cannot
  bind `<lan-ip>:<port>` at all.
- **(b) Daemon owns a dedicated `archipelago-appgate` nft table** with its own
  default-deny + redirect, independent of whether `fips.nft` exists, and refuses to start
  / alarms loudly if it cannot install it. Non-invasive to apps.

#### Enabler found — `PortMapping.bind` already does half of (a)

`core/container/src/manifest.rs:518` — `PortMapping` has a `bind` field, documented as
*"Host address to bind the publish to. Empty = all interfaces (0.0.0.0). Set `127.0.0.1`
to keep a port host-local"*. So for **bridge apps that declare `ports:`**, going
loopback-only is a **manifest edit, not app surgery**, and the daemon can then own the
external bind. That is most of the catalog.

The exception is **host-networked apps** (`security.network_policy: host` — `lnd-ui`,
`bitcoin-ui`, `electrs-ui`): host networking bypasses port mapping entirely, so `bind` has
no effect and `ports:` is deliberately empty. Those bind whatever their internal nginx
binds. We build those images ourselves, so the fix is a `listen 127.0.0.1:<port>;` change
in each `docker/*-ui/nginx.conf` — still no third-party surgery.

Watch the rootless trap documented at `manifest.rs:532`: a publish bound to an address the
host cannot actually bind crash-loops the whole unit (took bitcoin down fleet-wide on .228,
2026-07-09). Loopback binds are explicitly always accepted without probing, so this
direction is safe.

**Tor needs separate handling either way**: the onion connects *from* localhost, so a
redirect that exempts loopback will not catch it. `HiddenServicePort` must be repointed at
the gate, and since that mapping loses the original destination port, each app needs its
own gate port (or an HTTP-level Host mapping).

#### Primitives that already exist — do NOT build these from scratch

The gate is mostly assembly, not invention:

| Need | Existing API |
|---|---|
| Read the session cookie off a request | `session::extract_session_cookie(&HeaderMap) -> Option<String>` (`session.rs:479`) |
| Validate a session | `SessionStore::validate(&token) -> bool` (`session.rs:194`) |
| **Honour 2FA** | Already modelled: `create_pending(totp_secret)` (`:176`) + `upgrade_to_full` (`:247`). A session still pending 2FA **fails `validate()`**, so the gate gets 2FA for free by calling `validate` — no TOTP code in the gate itself |
| **Machine-client bearer tokens** | `device_tokens::create/verify` (`device_tokens.rs:63/:90`) — long-lived, minted from an authenticated session, only the SHA-256 persisted, plaintext returned once. Built for the companion pairing QR; needs **per-app scoping** added for this use |
| Rate limiting | `device_tokens` verification already rides `auth.login`'s limiter |

So the new code is: the listener/redirect, the app-identification step (which app is this port?),
the login page render (app name + icon), and per-app scoping on `device_tokens`.

#### Research — StartOS: **NOT YET VERIFIED**

Their public docs cover the *addressing* model (per-service `.onion` and `.local`
addresses, an explicit "make public" opt-in for clearnet) but do not state whether a
universal auth layer sits in front of service interfaces, and the source could not be
read from this box (`gh` is not installed, and raw GitHub paths 404'd). **Do not assume
they delegate auth to each service — read `Start9Labs/start-os` before designing.**

### 2. Filebrowser ships an insecure default login — **OPEN**
- Change the default credential **without breaking the dashboard's Cloud view**, which
  authenticates to filebrowser on the user's behalf.
- Related prior art: FED-07 rotated the shipped Fedimint gateway credential and had to
  recreate the running container for it to take effect (`06e0e695`) — the same trap
  applies here.

### 3. Federation trust escalation — **DONE** (`c0cfc72a`, pushed)
Two independent fail-open paths granted `Trusted` without any operator decision:

- `federation.peer-joined` is **unauthenticated** (middleware no-session list) and
  peer-reachable on `/rpc/v1`. Its ed25519 check verifies the caller against **the pubkey
  the caller supplied**, so it proves key possession, never authorisation. A join with no
  `invite_token` fell through to `TrustLevel::Trusted.min(claimed_trust)`, and
  `claimed_trust` defaults to `Trusted` — so anyone able to reach the node could
  self-grant Trusted. **Now capped at `Observer`.**
- `merge_transitive_peers` added every peer advertised by a Trusted source as `Trusted`,
  making trust viral across the whole federation graph. **Now `Observer`** — which is what
  `NodeStateSnapshot.federated_peers`' own doc comment always said it should be
  ("adds them as Observers on her side… doesn't auto-promote to Trusted"). The code
  contradicted its own spec.
- Added `FederatedNode.trust_source` (`invite` | `uninvited-join` | `transitive-merge` |
  `manual`, `None` = pre-existing/unknown) so existing grants are **auditable**. Per
  operator decision: existing peers are **left alone, not auto-demoted**.
- `trust_source` is now **surfaced** in `federation.list-nodes` (as an explicit `null`
  when unknown, not omitted — "recorded before this was tracked" is the population that
  needs review, so the UI must be able to tell it apart from a field it didn't read) and
  rendered under the trust dropdown in the node detail modal as "Granted via:".

### 3b. Granting Trusted must require the node password — **DONE** (uncommitted at time of writing)
> "to make someone trusted must require the node password to generate the code or change
> in the modal dropdown when you click a node" — operator, 2026-08-03

Re-authentication on privilege escalation. Both entry points are covered:

- **Minting a Trusted invite** (`federation.invite`) — gated on the **resolved** level,
  which matters because "Link Your Nodes" sends no `trust_level` at all and falls through
  to the `Trusted` default. The invite is a bearer grant of Trusted to whoever redeems
  it, so minting it *is* the escalation. Observer invites are untouched.
- **Changing a node's level in the UI dropdown** (`federation.set-trust`) — gated only
  when the peer is **not already** Trusted, so the dropdown re-emitting its own value
  doesn't demand a password for a no-op.

Demotion is NOT gated: making something less privileged must never be harder than leaving
it, or the safe action becomes the inconvenient one. The operator path stamps
`TrustSource::Manual`; `set_trust_level` grew an `Option<TrustSource>` so automatic
adjustments (the discovery-handshake demotion safety net) pass `None` and leave the
recorded provenance alone rather than laundering an `uninvited-join` peer into looking
operator-approved.

Wiring: the backend is the sole authority on what counts as an escalation — it returns a
`PASSWORD_REQUIRED:` prefixed error, and the UI prompts and retries only on that. The
frontend never pre-judges, so the rule lives in exactly one place.
`TrustPasswordModal.vue` (modelled on `RotateDidModal.vue`) serves both flows.
`NodeDetailModal`'s select now snaps back to the node's real level on change, because a
cancelled or failed promotion would otherwise leave the dropdown displaying a level the
node never accepted.

**Follow-up, deliberately not done here:** `federation.join` also grants Trusted (when
redeeming someone else's Trusted invite) with no re-auth. It is an explicit operator
paste rather than a UI toggle, and was outside the two entry points specified — but it is
the third way a node reaches Trusted and should be reviewed.

---

## P1 — Correctness the operator hit directly

### 4. LND UI never updates over OTA — **DONE** (`5088aef5`, pushed)
- `LND_UI_IMAGE` was `lnd-ui:latest` while `BITCOIN_UI_IMAGE` was pinned to
  `1.7.119-alpha`. Podman will not re-pull a tag it already holds locally, so nodes kept a
  stale lnd-ui forever. **Now pinned to `1.7.119-alpha`.**
- `scripts/first-boot-containers.sh` declared lnd-ui as bridge `-p 18083:80`. That is the
  **third copy** of the declaration the UI agent already corrected in
  `scripts/container-specs.sh` and `apps/lnd-ui/manifest.yml` — so **fresh installs** still
  produced the reproduced `HTTP 000`. **Now `--network host`, ports empty.**
- Root cause worth fixing separately: the same container spec is declared in three places.

### 5. Federated/peered nodes must message without a LoRa hop first — **OPEN**
> "make it so federated/peered nodes can message without needing to connect on Lora first
> once connected"

- Investigate the split contact model (radio contact vs federation peer) — there is prior
  art in memory: `project_archy_lora_e2e_rootcause` ("split contact model; don't touch
  federation") and `mesh::seed_federation_peers_into_mesh` /
  `upsert_federation_peer`, which already mirror federation peers into the mesh table.
- Likely the gap is addressing/route selection rather than transport availability.

### 6. In-app app updates, independent of OTA — **OPEN**
> "we need app update to see updates in the registry, whether UI or not… show the update
> mechanism in the app… a modal and update now / cancel… same in the detail page… the
> update button should show 'see update' and a different graphic for just ui, app, or both
> together. All pushed through the signed-catalog flow." … "This has to show independent of
> OTA updates as a separate pipeline, I think we've done a lot of work on it."

- **Operator says much of this already exists — research the codebase before building.**
  Known groundwork: the signed catalog (`releases/app-catalog.json`, `sign-catalog.sh`),
  catalog→manifest runtime reload, `package.update` RPC, `check-app-catalog-drift.py`,
  and `scripts/image-versions.sh` pinning.

#### What already exists (verified in source, 2026-08-03) — the operator was right

The whole update *pipeline* is built and is already independent of OTA:

- `package.check-updates` (`api/rpc/package/update.rs:180`) refreshes the signed catalog
  and hot-reloads manifests when it changed — no daemon restart, no OTA involved.
- `package.update` (`spawn_package_update`), `package.versions`, `package.set-config`
  version pinning, and `execute_update` (stop → pull → remove → recreate → verify).
- Version awareness: `app_catalog::catalog_versions(app_id)` vs `installed_version()`
  (`api/rpc/package/set_config.rs:46`).
- Frontend: `AppCard.vue` already renders an Update button off `pkg['available-update']`
  (`:48`, `:128`) and emits `update`.

#### What is actually MISSING (this is the real scope of item 6)

1. **The UI-vs-app-vs-both distinction does not exist.** `available-update` is a single
   version string — nothing classifies whether the change is the app image, its `*-ui`
   image, or both. This is the core of the operator's ask ("a different graphic for just
   ui, app, or both together") and needs a backend change, not just an icon.
   ⚠️ Compounding factor: per `reference_app_ui_delivery_model`, `*-ui` apps are **not in
   the signed catalog** at all — so "is there a UI update" cannot be answered from the
   catalog today. That gap has to be closed first or the UI half is unanswerable.
2. **The modal** (Update now / Cancel) — the card currently updates on click, no confirm.
3. **The detail-page affordance** — same treatment as the card.
4. **Button copy**: "See update" rather than "Update".

---

## P2 — Carried over from v1.7.120

### 7. `create-release.sh` commits the manifest BEFORE signing — **OPEN**
Release commit always carries an **unsigned** manifest; nodes fetch it from branch `main`
and refuse to auto-apply. Caught manually this cycle. Fix the ordering so it cannot ship.

### 8. `gitea-vps2` remote is dead, and is the same server as `gitea-ai` — **OPEN**
Stored token fails auth. `source.archipelago-foundation.org` == `146.59.87.168`, so
`git push gitea-ai` already publishes to the "primary" OTA host. Ties into the existing
"migrate VPS2 IP to domain" todo.

### 9. Fleet SSH host-key rotation — **BLOCKED** (operator decision)
`archipelago-1`, `archy-x250-beta`, `archipelago` share all three SSH host keys; two also
share a TLS private key. Detection shipped; rotation deliberately not performed.

### 10. 5× lifecycle gate — **OPEN**
Not run for v1.7.120 (disclosed in its changelog). Needs repeated reboots of a live node.

### 11. `prod_orchestrator.rs:3181` unreachable code — **OPEN**
`bitcoin_host()` returns unconditionally at :3171, so the podman container-name lookup
below is dead on every path. Pre-existing; spotted in the v1.7.120 build warnings.

---

## Notes for whoever picks this up

- A separate agent is doing **AIUI planning with GSD** — do not touch AIUI.
- AIUI must always be built `VITE_BASE_PATH=/aiui/` (see the memory note); a hand-built
  bundle renders a black page.
- Verify security claims on the node, not from the source. v1.7.120's headline bug was a
  fix that shipped in the binary and silently never reached the running container.

---

## RESUME HERE — next session

**Landed this session (both pushed):**
- `c0cfc72a` federation trust escalation (items 3) — 42/42 federation tests green
- `5088aef5` lnd-ui OTA pin + host networking (item 4), and this task file

**v1.7.120-alpha is SHIPPED** — signed, published, assets verified live. Do not re-cut it.

### Start with item 3b (password gate) — groundwork already located

Everything needed to implement it, so the next session does not re-search:

- **The helper to use:** `self.auth_manager.verify_password(password).await?` — returns
  `bool`. Existing callers to copy the shape from: `api/rpc/node.rs:176`,
  `api/rpc/totp.rs:18` / `:66` / `:121`.
- **Entry point A — minting a Trusted invite:** `handle_federation_invite`,
  `api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs:58`. It reads `trust_level` from params and
  **defaults to `TrustLevel::Trusted` at :72**. Gate only when the resolved level is
  `Trusted`; leave Observer invites unchanged.
- **Entry point B — the UI dropdown:** `handle_federation_set_trust`,
  `api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs:326`, dispatched as `"federation.set-trust"`
  (`api/rpc/dispatcher.rs:353`). Its parse is at `:342`.
- **Rule:** gate PROMOTION to Trusted only. Demotion must stay ungated — making something
  less privileged must never be harder than leaving it.
- Set `TrustSource::Manual` on the operator path so the audit trail distinguishes a
  deliberate grant from the capped automatic ones.
- Frontend will need the password prompt in both places (invite modal, node dropdown).

### Then item 1 (app ports unauthenticated) — the big one

Start with the research the operator explicitly asked for: how **umbrelOS**
(`getumbrel/umbrel`) and **StartOS** (`Start9Labs/start-os`) gate app access. Read their
model rather than inventing one. Only then design the gate.

Give this a fresh session with real context — it is the largest item here and is the same
bug class as the `/lnd-connect-info` + `/bitcoin-rpc/` leaks fixed in v1.7.120, but across
every app port and every transport.

### Working notes
- A separate agent is doing **AIUI planning with GSD** — do not touch AIUI.
- The shared tree has concurrent agents: stage by explicit path, never `git add -A`.
- Verify security claims **on the node**, not from source. v1.7.120's headline bug was a
  fix that shipped in the binary and silently never reached the running container.
- A piped command's exit code is the pipe's, not the script's — redirect to a log file and
  read the content.