diff --git a/docs/1.8.0-RELEASE-HARDENING-PLAN.md b/docs/1.8.0-RELEASE-HARDENING-PLAN.md
index cd154ce6..115753da 100644
--- a/docs/1.8.0-RELEASE-HARDENING-PLAN.md
+++ b/docs/1.8.0-RELEASE-HARDENING-PLAN.md
@@ -141,15 +141,14 @@ modules; production request/boot paths are essentially panic-free. The real risk
 The untrusted mesh/LoRa chat path is **safe** (interpolation, no `v-html` — good).
 The real issues are the app-bridge origin model and a bloated bundle.
 
-- [ ] 🟠 **Validate `event.origin` + add consent gates in the NIP-07 nostr bridge.**
-      `stores/appLauncher.ts:385-490` derives the caller from the launcher's own URL, never
-      `event.origin`, and `getPublicKey`/`nip04.decrypt`/`nip44.decrypt` have no consent gate →
-      any co-resident iframe can deanonymize the nostr identity or use the node as a decryption
-      oracle while an app is open. Check `event.origin` against the open app's real origin; key
-      approvals on it; gate decrypt/getPublicKey like `signEvent`.
-- [ ] 🟠 **Origin-check the `share-to-mesh` handler.** `App.vue:450-464` acts on
-      `{type:'share-to-mesh', cid}` from any sender and force-navigates to `/mesh` with the CID
-      pre-staged. Add `ev.origin === window.location.origin` (as `Chat.vue:95` already does).
+- [x] 🟠 **Validate `event.origin` + add consent gates in the NIP-07 nostr bridge.**
+      DONE 2026-07-02: `handleNostrRequest` rejects senders whose `event.origin` doesn't match
+      the open app's URL origin, and ALL identity-sensitive methods (`getPublicKey`, `signEvent`,
+      `nip04`/`nip44` encrypt+decrypt) now go through the consent/approved-origins gate, not just
+      `signEvent`. Verified present in the built bundle.
+- [x] 🟠 **Origin-check the `share-to-mesh` handler.** DONE 2026-07-02: `App.vue`
+      `onShareToMeshMessage` now requires `ev.origin === window.location.origin` (matching
+      `Chat.vue`).
 - [ ] 🟡 **Decide the app-iframe isolation model.** `AppSessionFrame.vue:54` /
       `AppLauncherOverlay.vue:79` embed apps same-origin with no meaningful `sandbox`; a
       same-origin app can read the CSRF cookie + `localStorage`. Ideal fix (serve apps from a
diff --git a/neode-ui/src/App.vue b/neode-ui/src/App.vue
index 69c2ed23..e5f3231a 100644
--- a/neode-ui/src/App.vue
+++ b/neode-ui/src/App.vue
@@ -448,6 +448,9 @@ onBeforeUnmount(() => {
  * stash on mount and stages it as a pending attachment.
  */
 function onShareToMeshMessage(ev: MessageEvent) {
+  // Same-origin senders only (matches Chat.vue's handler) — otherwise any
+  // embedded frame can force-navigate the UI to /mesh with a staged CID.
+  if (ev.origin !== window.location.origin) return
   const data = ev.data as { type?: string; cid?: string } | null
   if (!data || data.type !== 'share-to-mesh' || !data.cid) return
   try {
diff --git a/neode-ui/src/stores/appLauncher.ts b/neode-ui/src/stores/appLauncher.ts
index a0bb146f..68f3f43b 100644
--- a/neode-ui/src/stores/appLauncher.ts
+++ b/neode-ui/src/stores/appLauncher.ts
@@ -388,6 +388,18 @@ export const useAppLauncherStore = defineStore('appLauncher', () => {
     const source = event.source as Window | null
     if (!source) return
 
+    // Only the app we actually opened may drive this bridge. The sender's
+    // real origin must match the open app's URL origin — without this, any
+    // co-resident iframe could deanonymize the nostr identity or use the
+    // node as a decryption oracle while an app happened to be open.
+    let expectedOrigin: string
+    try {
+      expectedOrigin = new URL(url.value, window.location.href).origin
+    } catch {
+      return
+    }
+    if (event.origin !== expectedOrigin) return
+
     const origin = url.value || 'unknown'
 
     // Check if app has a per-app identity stored (from identity picker)
@@ -405,6 +417,26 @@ export const useAppLauncherStore = defineStore('appLauncher', () => {
       }
     } catch { /* ignore */ }
 
+    // Every identity-sensitive method needs consent (or a remembered
+    // approval for this origin) — not just signEvent. getPublicKey
+    // deanonymizes; the decrypts turn the node into a decryption oracle.
+    const CONSENT_METHODS = new Set([
+      'getPublicKey', 'signEvent',
+      'nip04.encrypt', 'nip04.decrypt',
+      'nip44.encrypt', 'nip44.decrypt',
+    ])
+    if (CONSENT_METHODS.has(method) && !getApprovedOrigins().has(origin)) {
+      const eventKind = method === 'signEvent' ? (params?.event?.kind as number | undefined) : undefined
+      const content = method === 'signEvent' ? (params?.event?.content as string | undefined) : undefined
+      try {
+        const remember = await requestConsent(title.value || 'App', method, eventKind, content)
+        if (remember) saveApprovedOrigin(origin)
+      } catch {
+        source.postMessage({ type: 'nostr-response', id, error: `User denied ${method} request` }, origin || '*')
+        return
+      }
+    }
+
     try {
       let result: unknown
 
@@ -420,19 +452,6 @@ export const useAppLauncherStore = defineStore('appLauncher', () => {
           result = res.nostr_pubkey
         }
       } else if (method === 'signEvent') {
-        // Check if origin is pre-approved
-        const approved = getApprovedOrigins()
-        if (!approved.has(origin)) {
-          const eventKind = params?.event?.kind as number | undefined
-          const content = params?.event?.content as string | undefined
-          try {
-            const remember = await requestConsent(title.value || 'App', 'signEvent', eventKind, content)
-            if (remember) saveApprovedOrigin(origin)
-          } catch {
-            source.postMessage({ type: 'nostr-response', id, error: 'User denied signing request' }, origin || '*')
-            return
-          }
-        }
         if (appIdentityId) {
           // Sign with the app-specific identity's Nostr key
           const res = await rpcClient.call<unknown>({