feat(trust): wire Phase 0 signed-catalog verification + pin release-root KAT

Completes the parked trust module and wires it into the live build:
- main.rs: register `mod trust`
- app_catalog::fetch_one: verify the release-root detached signature when
  present (verify against raw JSON so forward-compat fields stay in the
  signed preimage); accept unsigned during the migration window, hard-reject
  a present-but-bad signature so a tampering mirror can't pass altered bytes
- seed: pin release-root Ed25519 known-answer test (priv+pub) for the
  signing ceremony / pinned-anchor / external-verifier cross-check
- signed_doc: drop unused import

20/20 Phase 0 unit tests pass (trust::canonical/did/signed_doc/anchor,
seed release-root, app_catalog). Crate compiles clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

core/archipelago/src/container/app_catalog.rs

@@ -268,9 +268,32 @@ async fn fetch_one(client: &reqwest::Client, url: &str) -> anyhow::Result<AppCat
     }
     let body = resp.text().await?;
     let catalog: AppCatalog = serde_json::from_str(&body)?;
-    // NOTE (DHT Phase 0): when `catalog.signature` is present, verify it against
+
-    // the seed-derived release-root pubkey here before accepting. Until signing
+    // DHT Phase 0 authenticity: verify the release-root signature when present.
-    // ships we accept unsigned catalogs (same trust level as today's manifest).
+    // We verify against the raw JSON (the exact bytes the publisher signed),
+    // not a re-serialization of the typed struct, so unknown forward-compat
+    // fields stay part of the signed preimage. Unsigned catalogs are still
+    // accepted during the migration window — same trust level as today's
+    // manifest — but a *present* signature that fails is a hard reject so a
+    // tampering mirror cannot pass off altered bytes.
+    let raw: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&body)?;
+    match crate::trust::verify_detached(&raw)? {
+        crate::trust::SignatureStatus::Unsigned => {
+            debug!("app-catalog: unsigned (accepted during migration window)");
+        }
+        crate::trust::SignatureStatus::Verified { signer_did, anchored } => {
+            if anchored {
+                info!("app-catalog: release-root signature verified ({})", signer_did);
+            } else {
+                warn!(
+                    "app-catalog: signature self-consistent but release-root anchor \
+                     not pinned ({}); cannot confirm signer identity",
+                    signer_did
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     Ok(catalog)
 }
 

core/archipelago/src/main.rs

@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ mod storage_crypto;
 mod streaming;
 mod totp;
 mod transport;
+mod trust;
 mod update;
 mod vpn;
 mod wallet;

core/archipelago/src/seed.rs

@@ -606,12 +606,12 @@ mod tests {
         let key = derive_release_root_ed25519(&seed).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(
             hex::encode(key.to_bytes()),
-            "__RELEASE_ROOT_PRIV_HEX__",
+            "613ab879e5fbd4fcded32bc7ffad662fff1ce0f744c69baa63e7416ffabe7b71",
             "release-root private key KAT"
         );
         assert_eq!(
             hex::encode(key.verifying_key().to_bytes()),
-            "__RELEASE_ROOT_PUB_HEX__",
+            "995eaf9188617f0ecbcff9cd44d57adb9aa7dd5f34db2733e97f3e317fb0aba2",
             "release-root public key KAT"
         );
     }

core/archipelago/src/trust/signed_doc.rs

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 //! them*. The DHT plan requires both.
 
 use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
-use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, VerifyingKey};
+use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey};
 use serde_json::Value;
 
 use super::anchor;