fix(mesh): native Meshtastic unicast DMs + driver-level E2E status
Meshtastic DMs were falling back to a channel broadcast, so every node on the LoRa channel saw a "direct" message. Send a directed MeshPacket (to = node num, decoded from the synthetic pubkey's node-id bytes) instead — the Meshtastic analog of the meshcore CMD_SEND_TXT_MSG fix. DMs now reach only the recipient; firmware auto-PKC-encrypts them end-to-end once NodeInfo keys are exchanged. Capture E2E status at the driver level (no shared-type/UI change): - learn each peer's real Curve25519 key from User.public_key (field 8) and inbound MeshPacket.public_key (16), kept in a side-map separate from the synthetic routing key so unicast routing is untouched - detect inbound MeshPacket.pki_encrypted (17) to tell a true E2E DM from a channel-PSK fallback - peer_is_pkc_capable() seam for a future mesh-tab E2E badge Hot-swap preserved: no dispatched MeshRadioDevice signature or the shared ParsedContact changed, so meshcore and meshtastic stay interchangeable behind the listener. Adds tests/multinode/meshtastic.sh, a two/three-radio on-air parity harness (detect, discover, DM round-trip, DM privacy, channel broadcast, typed envelope, reachability). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
archipelago
parent
f636c5d505
commit
298595069d
@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ pub struct MeshtasticDevice {
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long_name: Option<String>,
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short_name: Option<String>,
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contacts: HashMap<u32, ParsedContact>,
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/// Real Curve25519 public keys, keyed by node-num, as learned from NodeInfo
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/// (`User.public_key`) or PKC-encrypted inbound packets (`MeshPacket
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/// .public_key`). Kept SEPARATE from `contacts[*].public_key_hex`, which is
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/// the synthetic node-num-derived routing key that `send_text_msg` relies
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/// on — we must not overwrite that or unicast routing breaks. This map only
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/// records which peers are PKC-capable, so we can tell a true end-to-end
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/// (PKI) DM from a channel-PSK fallback.
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peer_pubkeys: HashMap<u32, Vec<u8>>,
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device_path: String,
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}
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@ -68,6 +76,7 @@ impl MeshtasticDevice {
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long_name: None,
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short_name: None,
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contacts: HashMap::new(),
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peer_pubkeys: HashMap::new(),
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device_path: path.to_string(),
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})
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}
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@ -150,12 +159,32 @@ impl MeshtasticDevice {
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.await
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}
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/// Meshtastic addresses by numeric node-id, not a meshcore pubkey prefix,
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/// so there's no direct unicast mapping here. Best-effort fallback to a
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/// channel send keeps the device interface uniform; native unicast is only
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/// meaningful on the Meshcore transport.
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pub async fn send_text_msg(&mut self, _dest_pubkey_prefix: &[u8; 6], msg: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
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self.send_channel_text(0, msg).await
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/// Native Meshtastic unicast DM. Our synthetic Meshtastic pubkeys carry the
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/// numeric node-id in their first 4 bytes (little-endian, see
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/// `synthetic_pubkey`), so `dest_pubkey_prefix` directly yields the
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/// destination node number. We send a directed MeshPacket (`to` = node num)
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/// rather than a `BROADCAST_NUM` channel blast — this is the Meshtastic
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/// analog of the meshcore `CMD_SEND_TXT_MSG` fix: the message is delivered
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/// as a real DM (only the recipient's client surfaces it) instead of
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/// polluting the shared primary channel where every node would see it.
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///
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/// If the prefix decodes to node 0 / broadcast (e.g. a non-Meshtastic
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/// synthetic key routed here by mistake), fall back to a channel send so the
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/// device interface stays uniform and the message still goes out.
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pub async fn send_text_msg(&mut self, dest_pubkey_prefix: &[u8; 6], msg: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
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let node_num = u32::from_le_bytes([
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dest_pubkey_prefix[0],
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dest_pubkey_prefix[1],
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dest_pubkey_prefix[2],
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dest_pubkey_prefix[3],
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]);
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if node_num == 0 || node_num == BROADCAST_NUM {
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return self.send_channel_text(0, msg).await;
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}
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let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(msg);
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let packet = encode_mesh_packet(node_num, TEXT_MESSAGE_APP, text.as_bytes());
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self.send_to_radio(&encode_to_radio_variant(TO_RADIO_PACKET, &packet))
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.await
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}
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/// Meshtastic has no meshcore-style contact table; these are no-ops so the
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@ -214,6 +243,19 @@ impl MeshtasticDevice {
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Ok(self.handle_from_radio(&frame))
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}
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/// Whether we've learned `node_num`'s real PKI (Curve25519) key — from a
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/// NodeInfo `public_key` or an inbound PKC DM — meaning the firmware can
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/// deliver DMs to/from it end-to-end encrypted instead of falling back to
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/// the channel PSK. Driver-internal for now; lets a future mesh-tab badge
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/// distinguish a true E2E DM from a channel-encrypted one without changing
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/// the shared device interface (which would break meshcore hot-swap).
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#[allow(dead_code)] // seam: consumed when the mesh-tab E2E badge lands
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pub fn peer_is_pkc_capable(&self, node_num: u32) -> bool {
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self.peer_pubkeys
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.get(&node_num)
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.is_some_and(|k| !k.is_empty())
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}
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pub fn advert_name(&self) -> Option<String> {
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self.long_name
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.clone()
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@ -286,6 +328,15 @@ impl MeshtasticDevice {
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fn update_node_info(&mut self, data: &[u8]) {
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if let Some(node) = parse_node_info(data) {
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if let Some(pk) = node.public_key.as_ref() {
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if self.peer_pubkeys.insert(node.num, pk.clone()).is_none() {
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debug!(
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node = node.num,
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key_len = pk.len(),
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"Meshtastic peer is PKC-capable (NodeInfo public_key)"
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);
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}
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}
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let key = synthetic_pubkey(node.num);
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let name = node
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.long_name
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@ -318,6 +369,18 @@ impl MeshtasticDevice {
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if Some(from) == self.node_num {
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return None;
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}
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// Record E2E status: a `pki_encrypted` packet (or one carrying the
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// sender's `public_key`) proves this DM arrived end-to-end encrypted via
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// the PKI, not the shared channel PSK. We learn the sender's key here too
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// — but keep it OUT of the routing `public_key_hex` (synthetic) so the
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// device interface stays identical to meshcore's and the two remain
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// hot-swappable behind the mesh listener.
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if let Some(pk) = packet.public_key.as_ref() {
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self.peer_pubkeys.entry(from).or_insert_with(|| pk.clone());
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}
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if packet.pki_encrypted {
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debug!(node = from, "Meshtastic DM received end-to-end encrypted (PKI)");
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}
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let from_key = synthetic_pubkey(from);
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self.contacts.entry(from).or_insert_with(|| ParsedContact {
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public_key_hex: hex::encode(synthetic_pubkey(from)),
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@ -444,6 +507,7 @@ struct ParsedNode {
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long_name: Option<String>,
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short_name: Option<String>,
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last_heard: Option<u32>,
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public_key: Option<Vec<u8>>,
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}
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fn parse_node_info(data: &[u8]) -> Option<ParsedNode> {
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@ -454,6 +518,7 @@ fn parse_node_info(data: &[u8]) -> Option<ParsedNode> {
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long_name: None,
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short_name: None,
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last_heard: None,
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public_key: None,
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};
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while idx < data.len() {
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let (field, value, next) = next_field(data, idx)?;
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@ -466,6 +531,7 @@ fn parse_node_info(data: &[u8]) -> Option<ParsedNode> {
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node.id = user.id;
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node.long_name = user.long_name;
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node.short_name = user.short_name;
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node.public_key = user.public_key;
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}
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}
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(5, FieldValue::Fixed32(v)) => node.last_heard = Some(v),
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@ -483,6 +549,7 @@ struct ParsedUser {
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id: Option<String>,
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long_name: Option<String>,
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short_name: Option<String>,
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public_key: Option<Vec<u8>>,
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}
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fn parse_user(data: &[u8]) -> Option<ParsedUser> {
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@ -491,6 +558,7 @@ fn parse_user(data: &[u8]) -> Option<ParsedUser> {
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id: None,
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long_name: None,
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short_name: None,
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public_key: None,
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};
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while idx < data.len() {
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let (field, value, next) = next_field(data, idx)?;
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@ -499,6 +567,9 @@ fn parse_user(data: &[u8]) -> Option<ParsedUser> {
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(1, FieldValue::Bytes(b)) => user.id = string_field(b),
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(2, FieldValue::Bytes(b)) => user.long_name = string_field(b),
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(3, FieldValue::Bytes(b)) => user.short_name = string_field(b),
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// User.public_key (field 8): the peer's Curve25519 key. Its presence
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// means the radio can PKC-encrypt DMs to this node end-to-end.
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(8, FieldValue::Bytes(b)) if !b.is_empty() => user.public_key = Some(b.to_vec()),
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_ => {}
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}
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}
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@ -509,18 +580,28 @@ struct ParsedPacket {
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from: Option<u32>,
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portnum: u32,
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payload: Vec<u8>,
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/// MeshPacket.pki_encrypted (field 17): the firmware decrypted this packet
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/// with the PKI (Curve25519) key, i.e. it arrived end-to-end encrypted
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/// rather than via the shared channel PSK.
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pki_encrypted: bool,
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/// MeshPacket.public_key (field 16): the sender's key, carried on PKC DMs.
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public_key: Option<Vec<u8>>,
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}
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fn parse_mesh_packet(data: &[u8]) -> Option<ParsedPacket> {
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let mut idx = 0;
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let mut from = None;
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let mut decoded = None;
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let mut pki_encrypted = false;
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let mut public_key = None;
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while idx < data.len() {
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let (field, value, next) = next_field(data, idx)?;
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idx = next;
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match (field, value) {
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(1, FieldValue::Fixed32(v)) => from = Some(v),
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(4, FieldValue::Bytes(b)) => decoded = Some(b),
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(16, FieldValue::Bytes(b)) if !b.is_empty() => public_key = Some(b.to_vec()),
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(17, FieldValue::Varint(v)) => pki_encrypted = v != 0,
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_ => {}
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}
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}
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@ -541,6 +622,8 @@ fn parse_mesh_packet(data: &[u8]) -> Option<ParsedPacket> {
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from,
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portnum,
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payload,
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pki_encrypted,
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public_key,
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})
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}
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264
tests/multinode/meshtastic.sh
Executable file
264
tests/multinode/meshtastic.sh
Executable file
@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# tests/multinode/meshtastic.sh — two-/three-radio Meshtastic parity harness.
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#
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# Validates that Meshtastic radios have the SAME mesh-tab features Meshcore got,
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# done over the real wire. It drives 2 (optionally 3) archipelago nodes, each
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# with a Meshtastic radio attached, and exercises the full message pipeline:
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#
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# 1. detect — each node reports a connected meshtastic device
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# 2. discover — A sees B as a peer (NodeInfo discovery), and vice-versa
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# 3. dm — A → B direct message round-trips (native unicast)
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# 4. privacy — a third listener C does NOT see the A→B DM (proves the
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# directed-unicast fix: DMs are not broadcast on the channel)
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# 5. channel — A's channel broadcast IS seen by both B and C
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# 6. typed — a typed envelope (reaction) round-trips with message_type set
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# 7. assistant — (optional) an !ai query gets a PRIVATE reply, not a channel
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# blast (gated on ASSIST=1 + assistant enabled on B)
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# 8. reachable — reports each peer's `reachable`/`last_advert` so the ambiguous
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# Meshtastic reachability semantics can be eyeballed on-air
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# before anyone "fixes" them
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#
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# The privacy test (4) is the on-air proof of the meshtastic.rs send_text_msg
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# unicast change. Without it, A→B DMs land on every node's channel feed.
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#
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# Nodes override via env (each must have a Meshtastic radio on the SAME LoRa
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# channel/region so they can actually hear each other):
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# MA_URL MA_PW node A (sender) default .116 http / ThisIsWeb54321@
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# MB_URL MB_PW node B (receiver) default .228 https / password123
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# MC_URL MC_PW node C (eavesdrop) OPTIONAL — enables privacy test (4)
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#
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# MB_NAME B's mesh node name, if A's peer list is ambiguous (>1 peer)
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# PROP_WAIT seconds to wait for LoRa propagation per step (default 45)
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# ASSIST set =1 to run the assistant private-reply test (7)
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#
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# Usage:
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# tests/multinode/meshtastic.sh
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# MA_URL=http://192.168.1.116 MB_URL=https://192.168.1.228 \
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# MC_URL=https://192.168.1.198 tests/multinode/meshtastic.sh
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#
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# Requires: curl, jq. Exit code = number of failed assertions (0 = all green).
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set -uo pipefail
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HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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# shellcheck source=lib/multinode.bash
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source "$HERE/lib/multinode.bash"
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# ── node registration ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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MA_URL="${MA_URL:-http://192.168.1.116}"; MA_PW="${MA_PW:-ThisIsWeb54321@}"
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MB_URL="${MB_URL:-https://192.168.1.228}"; MB_PW="${MB_PW:-password123}"
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MC_URL="${MC_URL:-}"; MC_PW="${MC_PW:-password123}"
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PROP_WAIT="${PROP_WAIT:-45}"
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MB_NAME="${MB_NAME:-}"
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ASSIST="${ASSIST:-0}"
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node_register A "$MA_URL" "$MA_PW"
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node_register B "$MB_URL" "$MB_PW"
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HAVE_C=0
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if [[ -n "$MC_URL" ]]; then node_register C "$MC_URL" "$MC_PW"; HAVE_C=1; fi
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# ── tiny assert framework (mirrors smoke.sh) ───────────────────────────────
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if [[ -t 1 ]]; then
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green() { printf '\033[32m%s\033[0m' "$*"; }
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red() { printf '\033[31m%s\033[0m' "$*"; }
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yellow() { printf '\033[33m%s\033[0m' "$*"; }
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else
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green() { printf '%s' "$*"; }; red() { printf '%s' "$*"; }; yellow() { printf '%s' "$*"; }
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fi
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PASS=0; FAIL=0; SKIP=0; declare -a FAILED_NAMES
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ok() { printf ' %s %s\n' "$(green ✓)" "$1"; PASS=$((PASS+1)); }
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no() { printf ' %s %s\n' "$(red ✗)" "$1"; FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); FAILED_NAMES+=("$1"); }
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skip() { printf ' %s %s (%s)\n' "$(yellow —)" "$1" "${2:-skipped}"; SKIP=$((SKIP+1)); }
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assert_true() { [[ "$2" == "true" ]] && ok "$1" || no "$1 (got '$2')"; }
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section() { printf '\n%s\n' "$(yellow "── $* ──")"; }
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# nonce for this run so message matches can't collide with stale history
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NONCE="mtparity-$$-${RANDOM}"
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# ── helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# mesh_connected HANDLE -> "true" if a meshtastic device is connected
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mesh_connected() {
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local s; s=$(node_result "$1" mesh.status 2>/dev/null) || { echo false; return; }
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local conn type
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conn=$(echo "$s" | jq -r '.device_connected // false')
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type=$(echo "$s" | jq -r '.device_type // "unknown"')
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[[ "$conn" == "true" && "$type" == "meshtastic" ]] && echo true || echo false
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}
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# self_name HANDLE -> this node's meshtastic long-name (from firmware_version)
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self_name() {
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node_result "$1" mesh.status 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.firmware_version // empty'
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}
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# contact_id_for HANDLE NAME -> the contact_id of the peer whose advert_name
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# matches NAME (case-insensitive substring); empty if not found / ambiguous.
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contact_id_for() {
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local h="$1" want="$2"
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node_result "$h" mesh.peers 2>/dev/null | jq -r --arg w "$want" '
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[.peers[] | select((.advert_name // "" | ascii_downcase)
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| contains($w | ascii_downcase))] as $m
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| if ($m|length)==1 then ($m[0].contact_id|tostring) else "" end'
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}
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# peer_count_excl_self HANDLE -> number of peers
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peer_count() { node_result "$1" mesh.peers 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.count // 0'; }
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# saw_text HANDLE NEEDLE [direction] -> "true" if a message whose plaintext
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# contains NEEDLE exists (optionally filtered to a direction: sent/received)
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saw_text() {
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local h="$1" needle="$2" dir="${3:-}"
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node_result "$h" mesh.messages '{"limit":200}' 2>/dev/null | jq -r --arg n "$needle" --arg d "$dir" '
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[.messages[] | select((.plaintext // "") | contains($n))
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| select($d=="" or (.direction==$d))] | length > 0'
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}
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# wait_text HANDLE NEEDLE — poll up to PROP_WAIT for a received message
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wait_text() {
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local h="$1" needle="$2" waited=0
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while (( waited < PROP_WAIT )); do
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[[ "$(saw_text "$h" "$needle" received)" == "true" ]] && return 0
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sleep 3; waited=$((waited+3))
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done
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return 1
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}
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# ── login ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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section "login"
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node_login A && ok "A login ($MA_URL)" || { no "A unreachable ($MA_URL)"; echo; exit 1; }
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node_login B && ok "B login ($MB_URL)" || { no "B unreachable ($MB_URL)"; echo; exit 1; }
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if (( HAVE_C )); then
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node_login C && ok "C login ($MC_URL)" || { skip "C login" "unreachable — privacy test disabled"; HAVE_C=0; }
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fi
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# ── 1. detect ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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section "1. device detection"
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A_CONN=$(mesh_connected A); B_CONN=$(mesh_connected B)
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assert_true "A has a connected meshtastic radio" "$A_CONN"
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assert_true "B has a connected meshtastic radio" "$B_CONN"
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if [[ "$A_CONN" != "true" || "$B_CONN" != "true" ]]; then
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printf '\n%s\n' "$(yellow 'Both A and B need a Meshtastic radio attached & mesh enabled.')"
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printf '%s\n' "$(yellow 'Aborting on-air tests; see mesh.status output above.')"
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echo; printf 'PASS=%d FAIL=%d SKIP=%d\n' "$PASS" "$FAIL" "$SKIP"; exit "$FAIL"
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fi
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A_NAME=$(self_name A); B_NAME=$(self_name B)
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printf ' A=%s B=%s\n' "${A_NAME:-?}" "${B_NAME:-?}"
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[[ -n "$MB_NAME" ]] && B_NAME="$MB_NAME"
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# ── 2. peer discovery ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
section "2. peer discovery (NodeInfo)"
|
||||
DISCO=0; waited=0
|
||||
while (( waited < PROP_WAIT )); do
|
||||
CID=$(contact_id_for A "${B_NAME:-Meshtastic}")
|
||||
[[ -n "$CID" ]] && { DISCO=1; break; }
|
||||
# fall back: any single non-channel peer
|
||||
if [[ -z "$MB_NAME" && "$(peer_count A)" == "1" ]]; then
|
||||
CID=$(node_result A mesh.peers | jq -r '.peers[0].contact_id'); DISCO=1; break
|
||||
fi
|
||||
sleep 3; waited=$((waited+3))
|
||||
done
|
||||
if (( DISCO )); then ok "A discovered B as a peer (contact_id=$CID)"
|
||||
else
|
||||
no "A did not discover B within ${PROP_WAIT}s"
|
||||
printf ' A peers: %s\n' "$(node_result A mesh.peers | jq -c '.peers[]? | {contact_id,advert_name}')"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 3. direct message round-trip ───────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
section "3. direct message (native unicast)"
|
||||
if (( DISCO )); then
|
||||
DM="$NONCE-dm hello-from-A"
|
||||
if node_result A mesh.send "$(jq -nc --argjson c "$CID" --arg m "$DM" '{contact_id:$c,message:$m}')" >/dev/null; then
|
||||
ok "A sent DM to B (contact_id=$CID)"
|
||||
if wait_text B "$NONCE-dm"; then ok "B received the DM"
|
||||
else no "B did not receive the DM within ${PROP_WAIT}s"; fi
|
||||
else no "mesh.send failed on A"; fi
|
||||
else skip "DM round-trip" "B not discovered"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 4. privacy: third node must NOT see the DM ─────────────────────────────
|
||||
section "4. DM privacy (directed, not broadcast)"
|
||||
if (( HAVE_C )) && (( DISCO )); then
|
||||
C_CONN=$(mesh_connected C)
|
||||
if [[ "$C_CONN" != "true" ]]; then
|
||||
skip "DM privacy" "C has no meshtastic radio"
|
||||
else
|
||||
# Give C the same window the DM had to propagate, then assert absence.
|
||||
sleep "$PROP_WAIT"
|
||||
if [[ "$(saw_text C "$NONCE-dm")" == "true" ]]; then
|
||||
no "C (eavesdropper) saw the A→B DM — it is being BROADCAST, not unicast"
|
||||
else
|
||||
ok "C did NOT see the A→B DM (directed unicast confirmed)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
skip "DM privacy" "needs MC_URL (third radio) + discovered peer"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 5. channel broadcast reaches everyone ──────────────────────────────────
|
||||
section "5. channel broadcast"
|
||||
CH="$NONCE-chan broadcast-to-all"
|
||||
if node_result A mesh.send-channel "$(jq -nc --arg m "$CH" '{channel:0,message:$m}')" >/dev/null; then
|
||||
ok "A sent a channel broadcast"
|
||||
if wait_text B "$NONCE-chan"; then ok "B received the broadcast"; else no "B missed the broadcast"; fi
|
||||
if (( HAVE_C )) && [[ "$(mesh_connected C)" == "true" ]]; then
|
||||
if [[ "$(saw_text C "$NONCE-chan")" == "true" ]]; then ok "C also received the broadcast"
|
||||
else no "C missed the broadcast (it should reach all channel members)"; fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else no "mesh.send-channel failed on A"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 6. typed envelope round-trip ───────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
section "6. typed message (reaction envelope)"
|
||||
if (( DISCO )); then
|
||||
# A reaction is the smallest typed envelope; it should arrive with a
|
||||
# non-"text" message_type, proving the typed pipeline works over Meshtastic.
|
||||
REACT_PARAMS=$(jq -nc --argjson c "$CID" --arg n "$NONCE" \
|
||||
'{contact_id:$c, emoji:"👍", target_seq:0, note:$n}')
|
||||
if node_result A mesh.send-reaction "$REACT_PARAMS" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
ok "A sent a reaction (typed envelope)"
|
||||
sleep "$PROP_WAIT"
|
||||
TYPED=$(node_result B mesh.messages '{"limit":200}' 2>/dev/null \
|
||||
| jq -r '[.messages[] | select(.message_type != null and .message_type != "text")] | length > 0')
|
||||
assert_true "B received a non-text typed message" "$TYPED"
|
||||
else
|
||||
skip "typed message" "mesh.send-reaction rejected params (check handler signature)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else skip "typed message" "B not discovered"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 7. assistant private reply (optional) ──────────────────────────────────
|
||||
section "7. AI assistant private reply (optional)"
|
||||
if [[ "$ASSIST" == "1" ]] && (( DISCO )); then
|
||||
AST=$(node_result B mesh.assistant-status 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.enabled // false')
|
||||
if [[ "$AST" != "true" ]]; then
|
||||
skip "assistant reply" "assistant not enabled on B"
|
||||
else
|
||||
Q="$NONCE-ai !ai are you there"
|
||||
node_result A mesh.send-channel "$(jq -nc --arg m "$Q" '{channel:0,message:$m}')" >/dev/null
|
||||
sleep "$PROP_WAIT"
|
||||
# A should get a private DM reply; C (if present) should NOT.
|
||||
if [[ "$(saw_text A "$NONCE-ai-reply")" == "true" || "$(node_result A mesh.messages '{"limit":50}' | jq -r '[.messages[]|select(.direction=="received")]|length>0')" == "true" ]]; then
|
||||
ok "A received an assistant reply"
|
||||
else
|
||||
no "A did not receive an assistant reply within ${PROP_WAIT}s"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if (( HAVE_C )) && [[ "$(mesh_connected C)" == "true" ]]; then
|
||||
# heuristic: the reply text shouldn't be on C's channel feed
|
||||
skip "assistant reply privacy" "eyeball C's feed — automated check is heuristic"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
skip "assistant reply" "set ASSIST=1 and enable the assistant on B to run"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# ── 8. reachability snapshot (report-only) ─────────────────────────────────
|
||||
section "8. reachability snapshot (report-only)"
|
||||
node_result A mesh.peers 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.peers[]?
|
||||
| " \(.advert_name // "?") reachable=\(.reachable) last_advert=\(.last_advert // 0)"'
|
||||
printf '%s\n' "$(yellow ' NOTE: Meshtastic flood-routes; path_len is always 0xff, so `reachable`')"
|
||||
printf '%s\n' "$(yellow ' may read true even for stale nodes. Confirm desired semantics here')"
|
||||
printf '%s\n' "$(yellow ' before changing the refresh_contacts reachability rule.')"
|
||||
|
||||
# ── summary ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
section "summary"
|
||||
printf 'PASS=%s FAIL=%s SKIP=%s\n' "$(green "$PASS")" "$( ((FAIL)) && red "$FAIL" || green 0 )" "$(yellow "$SKIP")"
|
||||
if (( FAIL )); then
|
||||
printf 'failed:\n'; for n in "${FAILED_NAMES[@]}"; do printf ' - %s\n' "$n"; done
|
||||
fi
|
||||
exit "$FAIL"
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user