fix(federation): end the perpetual peer-joined "Invalid signature" storm

Root cause observed live 2026-08-16: onboarding/seed-restore rewrite
identity/node_key on disk but server_info.pubkey is only seeded at boot,
so until the next restart every peer-joined advertised the stale boot key
while signing with the new seed-derived key — deterministically rejected
by every receiver, once per 90s heal tick, forever.

- seed.generate / seed.restore now refresh server_info.pubkey in the live
  snapshot immediately (mirrors the DID-rotation handler).
- The 90s heal loop advertises the SAME key it signs with (disk identity,
  like federation sync already did) instead of the boot snapshot.
- notify_join no longer logs "delivered" for an HTTP-200 JSON-RPC
  rejection; in-band errors are terminal (identical signed bytes can
  never succeed on retry).
- The heal loop backs off per peer (doubling toward a daily re-assert)
  instead of re-notifying every 90s forever — Observer-held peers never
  appear in Trusted-only exported hints, so they_list_us could never
  become true for them.
- Receiver now binds the DID to the advertised pubkey (the old check was
  self-referential) and logs malformed signatures distinctly from
  genuine mismatches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
archipelago
2026-08-16 04:45:39 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent 809f7649a4
commit 519fa68c72
4 changed files with 134 additions and 26 deletions
@@ -696,6 +696,22 @@ impl RpcHandler {
anyhow::bail!("Refusing to peer with self");
}
// Bind the DID to the advertised pubkey. Without this the signature
// check below is self-referential (the caller signs over a pubkey it
// also supplies), so a consistent-but-unrelated keypair would pass.
// The DID-rotation handler already enforces the same invariant.
match identity::did_key_from_pubkey_hex(pubkey) {
Ok(derived) if derived == did => {}
Ok(derived) => {
tracing::warn!(peer_did = %did, derived_did = %derived, "Rejected peer-joined: DID does not match pubkey");
anyhow::bail!("DID does not match pubkey");
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(peer_did = %did, error = %e, "Rejected peer-joined: invalid pubkey");
anyhow::bail!("Invalid pubkey");
}
}
// Verify ed25519 signature to prevent federation spoofing (H2 security fix)
let signature = params.get("signature").and_then(|v| v.as_str());
match signature {
@@ -703,10 +719,16 @@ impl RpcHandler {
let sign_data = format!("peer-joined:{}:{}:{}", did, onion, pubkey);
match identity::NodeIdentity::verify(pubkey, sign_data.as_bytes(), sig) {
Ok(true) => {}
_ => {
Ok(false) => {
tracing::warn!(peer_did = %did, "Rejected peer-joined: invalid signature");
anyhow::bail!("Invalid signature");
}
Err(e) => {
// Malformed hex / wrong length — distinguish from a
// genuine mismatch so the log tells us which it was.
tracing::warn!(peer_did = %did, error = %e, "Rejected peer-joined: malformed signature");
anyhow::bail!("Invalid signature");
}
}
}
None => {