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Revert "fix(fedimint): run fmcd with seccomp=unconfined so its DHT can start (#7)"

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This reverts commit 409543c41e78025354acbdde5ffc6445895d4508.
This commit is contained in:
archipelago 2026-06-20 14:37:24 -04:00
parent 409543c41e
commit 63b98599e8
4 changed files with 0 additions and 31 deletions
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6
apps/fedimint-clientd/manifest.yml
View File

@ -42,12 +42,6 @@ app:
# skip this whole manifest, so fmcd never ran and federations never joined.)
# Lock down once the default federation's reachability model is finalized.
network_policy: bridge
# fmcd's Mainline-DHT / iroh transport uses syscalls the default rootless
# seccomp profile blocks on some kernels (e.g. .116, kernel 6.12.74), where
# fmcd crash-loops "Operation not permitted (os error 1)" and never serves
# its REST API — so federations can't be joined (#7). Verified: with
# seccomp=unconfined fmcd boots and answers /v2/* (HTTP 401 vs dead 000).
seccomp_unconfined: true
ports:
# fmcd REST bound to 8080 in-container; 8080 collides with LND REST on the

7
core/archipelago/src/container/quadlet.rs
View File

@ -149,9 +149,6 @@ pub struct QuadletUnit {
pub command: Vec<String>,
pub read_only_root: bool,
pub no_new_privileges: bool,
/// Render `SeccompProfile=unconfined` — for daemons whose networking needs
/// syscalls the default rootless seccomp profile blocks (e.g. fmcd, #7).
pub seccomp_unconfined: bool,
pub cpu_quota: Option<u32>,
pub restart_policy: RestartPolicy,
}
@ -255,9 +252,6 @@ impl QuadletUnit {
if self.no_new_privileges {
let _ = writeln!(s, "NoNewPrivileges=true");
}
if self.seccomp_unconfined {
let _ = writeln!(s, "SeccompProfile=unconfined");
}
if let Some(cpus) = self.cpu_quota {
let _ = writeln!(s, "PodmanArgs=--cpus={cpus}");
}
@ -414,7 +408,6 @@ impl QuadletUnit {
command: app.container.custom_args.clone(),
read_only_root: app.security.readonly_root,
no_new_privileges: app.security.no_new_privileges,
seccomp_unconfined: app.security.seccomp_unconfined,
cpu_quota: app.resources.cpu_limit,
restart_policy: RestartPolicy::OnFailure,
}

7
core/container/src/manifest.rs
View File

@ -228,13 +228,6 @@ pub struct SecurityPolicy {
pub network_policy: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub apparmor_profile: Option<String>,
/// Run the container with `seccomp=unconfined`. Needed by daemons whose
/// networking uses syscalls blocked by the default rootless seccomp profile
/// on some kernels — e.g. fmcd's Mainline-DHT/iroh transport, which otherwise
/// crash-loops with "Operation not permitted (os error 1)" (#7). Opt-in only;
/// a mild relaxation, so reserve it for apps that genuinely need it.
#[serde(default)]
pub seccomp_unconfined: bool,
}
fn default_true() -> bool {

11
core/container/src/podman_client.rs
View File

@ -384,17 +384,6 @@ impl PodmanClient {
"nsmode": net_mode
},
});
// seccomp=unconfined for apps that need syscalls the default rootless
// profile blocks (e.g. fmcd's DHT) — libpod takes the literal "unconfined"
// as the profile path, mirroring `--security-opt seccomp=unconfined` (#7).
if manifest.app.security.seccomp_unconfined {
body.as_object_mut()
.expect("container create body is a JSON object")
.insert(
"seccomp_profile_path".to_string(),
serde_json::json!("unconfined"),
);
}
if let Some(network) = custom_network {
body.as_object_mut()
.expect("container create body is a JSON object")