fix: Phase 3 — command injection, unwrap/expect panics, unsigned image acceptance

- VPN key gen: replaced sh -c with format string (command injection) with
  safe stdin piping to wg pubkey
- Secrets manager: replaced .unwrap() on path.parent() with proper error
- Tor proxy: replaced .expect("valid proxy") with continue on error
- Image verifier: added require_signatures flag, strict mode rejects
  unsigned images and missing cosign binary

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Dorian 2026-03-18 00:45:15 +00:00
parent 430d174389
commit 7bbb9cc5cd
5 changed files with 51 additions and 28 deletions

View File

@ -522,7 +522,11 @@ async fn notify_federation_peers_address_change(
});
let url = format!("http://{}/rpc/v1", &peer.onion);
let client = match reqwest::Client::builder()
.proxy(reqwest::Proxy::all(format!("socks5h://{}", proxy)).unwrap_or_else(|_| reqwest::Proxy::all("socks5h://127.0.0.1:9050").expect("valid proxy")))
.proxy(match reqwest::Proxy::all(format!("socks5h://{}", proxy))
.or_else(|_| reqwest::Proxy::all("socks5h://127.0.0.1:9050")) {
Ok(p) => p,
Err(_) => continue,
})
.timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
.build()
{

View File

@ -121,30 +121,29 @@ pub async fn generate_wireguard_keypair() -> Result<(String, String)> {
.trim()
.to_string();
let _pubkey_output = tokio::process::Command::new("wg")
let mut child = tokio::process::Command::new("wg")
.arg("pubkey")
.stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.context("Failed to spawn wg pubkey")?;
// Use echo + pipe approach instead
let pubkey_output = tokio::process::Command::new("sh")
.arg("-c")
.arg(format!("echo '{}' | wg pubkey", private_key))
.output()
.await
.context("Failed to derive public key")?;
if !pubkey_output.status.success() {
anyhow::bail!(
"wg pubkey failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&pubkey_output.stderr)
);
if let Some(mut stdin) = child.stdin.take() {
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
stdin.write_all(private_key.as_bytes()).await
.context("Failed to write private key to wg stdin")?;
}
let public_key = String::from_utf8(pubkey_output.stdout)
.context("Invalid UTF-8 from wg pubkey")?
let output = child.wait_with_output().await
.context("wg pubkey process failed")?;
if !output.status.success() {
anyhow::bail!("wg pubkey failed: {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr));
}
let public_key = String::from_utf8(output.stdout)
.context("wg pubkey output is not valid UTF-8")?
.trim()
.to_string();

View File

@ -6,17 +6,30 @@ use std::process::Command;
use tracing::{info, warn};
pub struct ImageVerifier {
cosign_public_key: Option<String>, // Public key for verification
cosign_public_key: Option<String>,
require_signatures: bool,
}
impl ImageVerifier {
pub fn new(cosign_public_key: Option<String>) -> Self {
Self { cosign_public_key }
Self { cosign_public_key, require_signatures: false }
}
/// Create a verifier that requires all images to be signed.
pub fn new_strict(cosign_public_key: Option<String>) -> Self {
Self { cosign_public_key, require_signatures: true }
}
/// Verify a container image signature
pub async fn verify_image(&self, image: &str, signature: Option<&str>) -> Result<bool> {
if signature.is_none() && self.cosign_public_key.is_none() {
if self.require_signatures {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
"Image '{}' has no signature and no cosign key is configured. \
All container images must be signed for production use.",
image
));
}
warn!("No signature provided for image: {}", image);
return Ok(false);
}
@ -28,6 +41,11 @@ impl ImageVerifier {
.is_ok();
if !cosign_available {
if self.require_signatures {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
"Cosign binary not found. Install cosign to verify container image signatures."
));
}
warn!("Cosign not available, skipping signature verification");
return Ok(false);
}

View File

@ -109,7 +109,9 @@ impl SecretsManager {
.join(app_id)
.join(format!("{}.secret", secret_id));
fs::create_dir_all(secret_path.parent().unwrap()).await?;
let parent = secret_path.parent()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid secret path: no parent directory for {:?}", secret_path))?;
fs::create_dir_all(parent).await?;
let encrypted = self
.encrypt(value.as_bytes())

View File

@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
> server (command injection) or crash your entire node at will (unwrap panic). These are the most
> dangerous code-level bugs found.
- [ ] **Fix command injection in VPN key generation**: In `core/archipelago/src/vpn.rs`, find lines 132-137 where `sh -c` is used with `format!("echo '{}' | wg pubkey", private_key)`. This is a textbook command injection vulnerability. Replace the entire block with safe stdin piping:
- [x] **Fix command injection in VPN key generation**: In `core/archipelago/src/vpn.rs`, find lines 132-137 where `sh -c` is used with `format!("echo '{}' | wg pubkey", private_key)`. This is a textbook command injection vulnerability. Replace the entire block with safe stdin piping:
```rust
let mut child = tokio::process::Command::new("wg")
.arg("pubkey")
@ -223,7 +223,7 @@
Build: `cd ~/archy/core && cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features`.
Test: If VPN setup is available in the UI, test generating a WireGuard key.
- [ ] **Fix unwrap crash in secrets manager**: In `core/security/src/secrets_manager.rs`, find line 112 with `secret_path.parent().unwrap()`. Replace with:
- [x] **Fix unwrap crash in secrets manager**: In `core/security/src/secrets_manager.rs`, find line 112 with `secret_path.parent().unwrap()`. Replace with:
```rust
let parent = secret_path.parent()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid secret path: no parent directory for {:?}", secret_path))?;
@ -232,7 +232,7 @@
Search for ALL `.unwrap()` calls in the file: `grep -n "unwrap()" core/security/src/secrets_manager.rs`. For each one in a non-test function, evaluate whether it can actually fail and replace with `?` or `.ok_or_else()` if so. Common safe unwraps (e.g., after a `.is_some()` check) can stay but should get a comment explaining why they're safe.
Build and deploy.
- [ ] **Fix expect crash in Tor proxy fallback**: In `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/tor.rs`, find line ~525 with `.expect("valid proxy")`. Replace the entire proxy chain with proper error handling:
- [x] **Fix expect crash in Tor proxy fallback**: In `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/tor.rs`, find line ~525 with `.expect("valid proxy")`. Replace the entire proxy chain with proper error handling:
```rust
let proxy_url = format!("socks5h://{}", proxy);
let proxy = reqwest::Proxy::all(&proxy_url)
@ -242,7 +242,7 @@
Search for ALL `.expect(` calls in non-test code: `grep -rn "\.expect(" core/archipelago/src/ --include="*.rs" | grep -v "#\[cfg(test)\]" | grep -v "mod tests"`. List them and fix any that could realistically fail in production.
Build: `cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features`.
- [ ] **Fix image verifier accepting unsigned images**: In `core/security/src/image_verifier.rs`, find lines 18-22 where the verifier returns `Ok(false)` for unsigned images. Change to:
- [x] **Fix image verifier accepting unsigned images**: In `core/security/src/image_verifier.rs`, find lines 18-22 where the verifier returns `Ok(false)` for unsigned images. Change to:
```rust
if signature.is_none() && self.cosign_public_key.is_none() {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
@ -262,7 +262,7 @@
```
Build and test. Note: this may cause existing unsigned images to fail verification. If the system doesn't use cosign yet, add a config flag `require_signatures: bool` that defaults to `false` for now but can be flipped to `true` when cosign is deployed.
- [ ] **Verify Phase 3 — No more crash vectors**: Run these checks:
- [x] **Verify Phase 3 — No more crash vectors**: Run these checks:
1. `grep -rn 'Command::new("sh")' core/ --include="*.rs"` — should return zero results.
2. `grep -rn "\.unwrap()" core/security/src/secrets_manager.rs | grep -v test` — should be minimal/commented.
3. `grep -rn "\.expect(" core/archipelago/src/api/ --include="*.rs" | grep -v test | grep -v "// SAFE:"` — review each remaining expect.