Merge agent-trust-wip (DHT Phases 0–4) into main

Integrates the DHT/peer-distribution line with the v1.7.98-alpha release
fixes:
- Phase 0 signed-catalog trust + release-root key (KAT-pinned)
- Phase 1 BLAKE3 content addressing alongside SHA-256
- Phase 2 swarm-assist fetch seam (origin always wins) + iroh-blobs
  provider — heavy iroh deps stay behind the off-by-default `iroh-swarm`
  feature, so the default build/deploy is unaffected
- Phase 3 signed Nostr seed-advertisement + discovery glue + paid swarm
  serving + "Networking Profits" Settings page
- Phase 4 paid swarm streaming (cross-mint ecash, Shape-A paid ALPN,
  streaming.prepare-payment), also iroh-swarm-gated

Conflicts resolved: seed.rs (kept release-root KAT tests), update.rs
(comment-only, OTA logic identical), Cargo.lock (regenerated against the
merged Cargo.toml). Default-feature build is clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

core/archipelago/Cargo.toml

@@ -9,6 +9,16 @@ authors = ["Archipelago Team"]
 name = "archipelago"
 path = "src/main.rs"
 
+[features]
+default = []
+# DHT Phase 2: iroh-blobs peer swarm engine. OFF by default — it pulls a heavy
+# QUIC dependency tree, so it ships behind a flag for PoC/measurement on a
+# scratch node before any fleet rollout. With the flag off, swarm::providers()
+# is empty and every fetch goes straight to the origin HTTP path (today's
+# behaviour). Attach the optional iroh / iroh-blobs deps to this feature when
+# wiring the IrohProvider.
+iroh-swarm = ["dep:iroh", "dep:iroh-blobs"]
+
 [dependencies]
 # Core dependencies
 tokio = { version = "1", features = ["full"] }
@@ -42,6 +52,7 @@ archipelago-performance = { path = "../performance" }
 # Authentication
 bcrypt = "0.15"
 sha2 = "0.10.9"
+blake3 = "1"
 hmac = "0.12.1"
 uuid = { version = "1.0", features = ["v4"] }
 regex = "1.10"
@@ -106,6 +117,12 @@ sd-notify = "0.4"
 # Trait objects for async methods (container orchestrator trait, Step 4)
 async-trait = "0.1"
 
+# DHT Phase 2: iroh-blobs peer swarm engine. OPTIONAL — only pulled in by the
+# `iroh-swarm` feature (off by default). Heavy QUIC dep tree; kept behind the
+# flag so the default fleet build is unaffected until the PoC is measured.
+iroh = { version = "1", optional = true }
+iroh-blobs = { version = "0.103", optional = true }
+
 [dev-dependencies]
 tokio-test = "0.4"
 tempfile = "3.10"

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs

@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             "streaming.configure-service" => self.handle_streaming_configure_service(params).await,
             "streaming.toggle-service" => self.handle_streaming_toggle_service(params).await,
             "streaming.pay" => self.handle_streaming_pay(params).await,
+            "streaming.prepare-payment" => self.handle_streaming_prepare_payment(params).await,
             "streaming.discover" => self.handle_streaming_discover().await,
             "streaming.usage" => self.handle_streaming_usage(params).await,
             "streaming.session" => self.handle_streaming_session(params).await,

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/streaming.rs

@@ -205,6 +205,64 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Build a payment token for a remote seeder (payer side, cross-mint aware).
+    ///
+    /// Given the seeder's advertised `accepted_mints` and `price_sats`, builds a
+    /// `cashuA` token denominated in one of those mints — paying directly if we
+    /// already hold the right mint, else auto-swapping into a trusted accepted
+    /// mint (within `max_fee_sats`). If the price is over `budget_sats`, the
+    /// wallet can't cover it, or the swap is too costly, returns `declined` so
+    /// the caller falls back to the free origin (origin always wins).
+    pub(super) async fn handle_streaming_prepare_payment(
+        &self,
+        params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
+    ) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
+        let params = params.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing params"))?;
+        let accepted_mints: Vec<String> = params
+            .get("accepted_mints")
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_array())
+            .map(|arr| {
+                arr.iter()
+                    .filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(|s| s.to_string()))
+                    .collect()
+            })
+            .unwrap_or_default();
+        let price_sats = params
+            .get("price_sats")
+            .or_else(|| params.get("amount_sats"))
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing price_sats"))?;
+        // Default budget = the asked price (willing to pay exactly what's quoted).
+        let budget_sats = params
+            .get("budget_sats")
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
+            .unwrap_or(price_sats);
+        let max_fee_sats = params
+            .get("max_fee_sats")
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
+            .unwrap_or(0);
+
+        let policy = crate::swarm::payment::PaymentPolicy::with_budget(budget_sats, max_fee_sats);
+        match crate::swarm::payment::auto_pay_token(
+            &self.config.data_dir,
+            &policy,
+            &accepted_mints,
+            price_sats,
+        )
+        .await?
+        {
+            Some(token) => Ok(serde_json::json!({
+                "status": "ready",
+                "token": token,
+                "paid_sats": price_sats,
+            })),
+            None => Ok(serde_json::json!({
+                "status": "declined",
+                "message": "payment declined (over budget, unpayable, or swap too costly) — use free origin",
+            })),
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Discover available streaming services (pricing info).
     /// This is the unauthenticated discovery endpoint.
     pub(super) async fn handle_streaming_discover(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {

core/archipelago/src/blobs.rs

@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@ pub const MAX_BLOB_SIZE: u64 = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct BlobMeta {
     pub cid: String,
+    /// DHT Phase 1: BLAKE3 hash of the content (iroh-native swarm address).
+    /// The on-disk path stays SHA-256-keyed (`cid`) for back-compat; this
+    /// advertises the hash a peer swarm can fetch/range-verify by. Absent in
+    /// legacy metadata written before Phase 1.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub blake3: Option<String>,
     pub size: u64,
     pub mime: String,
     #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
@@ -88,6 +94,7 @@ impl BlobStore {
         let cid = hex::encode(hasher.finalize());
         let meta = BlobMeta {
             cid: cid.clone(),
+            blake3: Some(crate::content_hash::blake3_hex(bytes)),
             size: bytes.len() as u64,
             mime: mime.to_string(),
             filename,

core/archipelago/src/config.rs

@@ -70,6 +70,13 @@ pub struct Config {
     /// on .228 + .198. See `project_v1_7_52_phase3_quadlet_design`.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub use_quadlet_backends: bool,
+    /// DHT swarm-assist (Phase 3): when true AND the binary was built with the
+    /// `iroh-swarm` feature, stand up an iroh-blobs provider that fetches release
+    /// blobs peer-to-peer (origin always wins) and seeds them via signed Nostr
+    /// adverts. Off by default; with the feature absent this is inert. Reuses
+    /// `nostr_relays` + `nostr_tor_proxy` for discovery transport.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub swarm_enabled: bool,
 }
 
 impl Config {
@@ -182,6 +189,12 @@ impl Config {
             config.nostr_tor_proxy = if s.is_empty() { None } else { Some(s) };
         }
 
+        // DHT swarm-assist (Phase 3). Opt-in: only takes effect when the binary
+        // was also built with the `iroh-swarm` feature; otherwise inert.
+        if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("ARCHIPELAGO_SWARM_ENABLED") {
+            config.swarm_enabled = parse_truthy_env(&v);
+        }
+
         // Phase 3.2 of v1.7.52. Truthy values (1, true, yes, on — case-insensitive)
         // route backend installs through the Quadlet path without requiring a
         // config.json edit + archipelago.service restart (which would trigger
@@ -241,6 +254,7 @@ impl Default for Config {
             ],
             nostr_tor_proxy: Some("127.0.0.1:9050".into()),
             use_quadlet_backends: false,
+            swarm_enabled: false,
         }
     }
 }

core/archipelago/src/container/app_catalog.rs

@@ -268,9 +268,32 @@ async fn fetch_one(client: &reqwest::Client, url: &str) -> anyhow::Result<AppCat
     }
     let body = resp.text().await?;
     let catalog: AppCatalog = serde_json::from_str(&body)?;
-    // NOTE (DHT Phase 0): when `catalog.signature` is present, verify it against
-    // the seed-derived release-root pubkey here before accepting. Until signing
-    // ships we accept unsigned catalogs (same trust level as today's manifest).
+
+    // DHT Phase 0 authenticity: verify the release-root signature when present.
+    // We verify against the raw JSON (the exact bytes the publisher signed),
+    // not a re-serialization of the typed struct, so unknown forward-compat
+    // fields stay part of the signed preimage. Unsigned catalogs are still
+    // accepted during the migration window — same trust level as today's
+    // manifest — but a *present* signature that fails is a hard reject so a
+    // tampering mirror cannot pass off altered bytes.
+    let raw: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&body)?;
+    match crate::trust::verify_detached(&raw)? {
+        crate::trust::SignatureStatus::Unsigned => {
+            debug!("app-catalog: unsigned (accepted during migration window)");
+        }
+        crate::trust::SignatureStatus::Verified { signer_did, anchored } => {
+            if anchored {
+                info!("app-catalog: release-root signature verified ({})", signer_did);
+            } else {
+                warn!(
+                    "app-catalog: signature self-consistent but release-root anchor \
+                     not pinned ({}); cannot confirm signer identity",
+                    signer_did
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     Ok(catalog)
 }
 

core/archipelago/src/content_hash.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+//! Content hashing for the DHT distribution plan's *integrity & addressing*
+//! tier (`docs/dht-distribution-design.md` §4).
+//!
+//! SHA-256 is the incumbent: it keys `blobs.rs` and verifies OTA components
+//! today. BLAKE3 is introduced **alongside** it because iroh-blobs addresses
+//! and *range-verifies* content by BLAKE3 — essential for resumable downloads
+//! and HLS streaming. During the migration window both may be present; SHA-256
+//! stays mandatory and BLAKE3 is verified when supplied.
+//!
+//! Digests are written multihash-style as `"<alg>:<hex>"`, e.g.
+//! `"blake3:ab12…"` / `"sha256:cd34…"`, matching the app-catalog `digest` field.
+//! Both algorithms emit 32-byte (64-hex-char) digests.
+
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+
+const DIGEST_LEN: usize = 32;
+
+/// Supported content-hash algorithms.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum HashAlg {
+    Sha256,
+    Blake3,
+}
+
+impl HashAlg {
+    pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            HashAlg::Sha256 => "sha256",
+            HashAlg::Blake3 => "blake3",
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Hex-encoded SHA-256 of `bytes`.
+pub fn sha256_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
+    hex::encode(Sha256::digest(bytes))
+}
+
+/// Hex-encoded BLAKE3 of `bytes`.
+pub fn blake3_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
+    blake3::hash(bytes).to_hex().to_string()
+}
+
+/// A parsed `"<alg>:<hex>"` content digest.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ContentDigest {
+    pub alg: HashAlg,
+    /// Lowercase hex, validated to the algorithm's length.
+    pub hex: String,
+}
+
+impl ContentDigest {
+    /// Parse a multihash-style `"<alg>:<hex>"` string.
+    pub fn parse(s: &str) -> Result<Self> {
+        let (alg_part, hex_part) = s
+            .split_once(':')
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("digest must be '<alg>:<hex>', got: {}", s))?;
+        let alg = match alg_part {
+            "sha256" => HashAlg::Sha256,
+            "blake3" => HashAlg::Blake3,
+            other => bail!("unsupported hash algorithm: {}", other),
+        };
+        let raw = hex::decode(hex_part).context("digest hex is invalid")?;
+        if raw.len() != DIGEST_LEN {
+            bail!(
+                "{} digest must be {} bytes, got {}",
+                alg.as_str(),
+                DIGEST_LEN,
+                raw.len()
+            );
+        }
+        Ok(Self {
+            alg,
+            hex: hex_part.to_ascii_lowercase(),
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Compute the digest of `bytes` under this digest's algorithm.
+    pub fn compute_hex(&self, bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
+        match self.alg {
+            HashAlg::Sha256 => sha256_hex(bytes),
+            HashAlg::Blake3 => blake3_hex(bytes),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Verify `bytes` hash to this digest. Errors (does not panic) on mismatch.
+    pub fn verify(&self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+        let actual = self.compute_hex(bytes);
+        if actual.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&self.hex) {
+            Ok(())
+        } else {
+            bail!(
+                "{} mismatch: expected {}, got {}",
+                self.alg.as_str(),
+                self.hex,
+                actual
+            )
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for ContentDigest {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "{}:{}", self.alg.as_str(), self.hex)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn digest_lengths_are_32_bytes() {
+        assert_eq!(sha256_hex(b"hi").len(), 64);
+        assert_eq!(blake3_hex(b"hi").len(), 64);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blake3_known_answer() {
+        // BLAKE3 of the empty input — RFC/reference vector.
+        assert_eq!(
+            blake3_hex(b""),
+            "af1349b9f5f9a1a6a0404dea36dcc9499bcb25c9adc112b7cc9a93cae41f3262"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_roundtrip() {
+        let d = ContentDigest::parse(&format!("blake3:{}", blake3_hex(b"x"))).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(d.alg, HashAlg::Blake3);
+        assert_eq!(d.to_string(), format!("blake3:{}", blake3_hex(b"x")));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_accepts_and_rejects() {
+        let d = ContentDigest::parse(&format!("sha256:{}", sha256_hex(b"payload"))).unwrap();
+        assert!(d.verify(b"payload").is_ok());
+        assert!(d.verify(b"tampered").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_rejects_bad_input() {
+        assert!(ContentDigest::parse("nocolon").is_err());
+        assert!(ContentDigest::parse("md5:abcd").is_err());
+        assert!(ContentDigest::parse("blake3:nothex").is_err());
+        assert!(ContentDigest::parse("blake3:ab").is_err()); // too short
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/main.rs

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ mod bootstrap;
 mod config;
 mod constants;
 mod container;
+mod content_hash;
 mod content_server;
 mod crash_recovery;
 mod credentials;
@@ -66,8 +67,10 @@ mod settings;
 mod state;
 mod storage_crypto;
 mod streaming;
+mod swarm;
 mod totp;
 mod transport;
+mod trust;
 mod update;
 mod vpn;
 mod wallet;

core/archipelago/src/nostr_discovery.rs

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ const D_TAG: &str = "archipelago-node";
 const LEGACY_RELAYS: &[&str] = &["wss://relay.damus.io", "wss://relay.nostr.info"];
 
 /// Load or create Nostr keys (secp256k1) for node discovery.
-async fn load_or_create_nostr_keys(identity_dir: &Path) -> Result<Keys> {
+pub(crate) async fn load_or_create_nostr_keys(identity_dir: &Path) -> Result<Keys> {
     let secret_path = identity_dir.join(NOSTR_SECRET_FILE);
     let pub_path = identity_dir.join(NOSTR_PUB_FILE);
 
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ async fn load_nostr_keys_if_exists(identity_dir: &Path) -> Result<Option<Keys>>
 /// Publish a replaceable event with empty content to overwrite/revoke previously published data.
 /// Uses NIP-33: same kind + d-tag + author = latest replaces. Sends to LEGACY_RELAYS only.
 /// Requires tor_proxy to avoid leaking IP to relay operators.
-fn build_nostr_client(keys: Keys, tor_proxy: Option<&str>) -> Result<Client> {
+pub(crate) fn build_nostr_client(keys: Keys, tor_proxy: Option<&str>) -> Result<Client> {
     let client = if let Some(proxy_str) = tor_proxy {
         let addr = parse_proxy_addr(proxy_str)
             .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid Nostr Tor proxy: {}", proxy_str))?;

core/archipelago/src/seed.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 //!       ├── HKDF(seed, "archipelago/node/ed25519/v1")             → Node Ed25519 → did:key
 //!       ├── HKDF(seed, "archipelago/nostr-node/secp256k1/v1")     → Node Nostr key
 //!       ├── HKDF(seed, "archipelago/fips/secp256k1/v1")           → FIPS mesh transport key
+//!       ├── HKDF(seed, "archipelago/release/root/ed25519/v1")     → Release-root signing key
+//!       │      (publisher-only; nodes pin the PUBLIC key — see trust::anchor)
 //!       ├── HKDF(seed, "archipelago/identity/{i}/ed25519/v1")     → Identity i Ed25519
 //!       ├── BIP-32 m/44'/1237'/0'/0/{i}                           → Identity i Nostr (NIP-06)
 //!       ├── BIP-32 m/84'/0'/0'                                    → Bitcoin Core wallet
@@ -34,6 +36,7 @@ const NODE_ED25519_INFO: &[u8] = b"archipelago/node/ed25519/v1";
 const NODE_NOSTR_INFO: &[u8] = b"archipelago/nostr-node/secp256k1/v1";
 const FIPS_KEY_INFO: &[u8] = b"archipelago/fips/secp256k1/v1";
 const LND_ENTROPY_INFO: &[u8] = b"archipelago/lnd/entropy/v1";
+const RELEASE_ROOT_ED25519_INFO: &[u8] = b"archipelago/release/root/ed25519/v1";
 
 // ─── MasterSeed ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -88,6 +91,21 @@ pub fn derive_node_ed25519(seed: &MasterSeed) -> Result<SigningKey> {
     Ok(SigningKey::from_bytes(&derived))
 }
 
+/// Derive the fleet **release-root** Ed25519 signing key.
+///
+/// This is a *publisher-side* derivation: only the holder of the release master
+/// seed runs it (e.g. in the signing ceremony). Fleet nodes never derive this —
+/// they pin the corresponding PUBLIC key as a trust anchor (see
+/// `crate::trust::anchor`) and use it to verify signed manifests/catalogs.
+///
+/// Keeping it seed-derived means the signing key is reproducible from a
+/// backed-up mnemonic (disaster recovery) rather than a loose key file, and it
+/// is domain-separated from every node/identity key by its HKDF info string.
+pub fn derive_release_root_ed25519(seed: &MasterSeed) -> Result<SigningKey> {
+    let derived = hkdf_derive_32(seed.as_bytes(), RELEASE_ROOT_ED25519_INFO)?;
+    Ok(SigningKey::from_bytes(&derived))
+}
+
 /// Derive an identity's Ed25519 signing key by index.
 pub fn derive_identity_ed25519(seed: &MasterSeed, index: u32) -> Result<SigningKey> {
     let info = format!("archipelago/identity/{}/ed25519/v1", index);
@@ -560,4 +578,41 @@ mod tests {
             "3a94fb32efab2a5025401d53fd7d82b41323a5c06ad14ce528ebe3a813d88831"
         );
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_release_root_deterministic_and_domain_separated() {
+        let (_, seed) = MasterSeed::from_mnemonic_words(TEST_MNEMONIC).unwrap();
+        let a = derive_release_root_ed25519(&seed).unwrap();
+        let b = derive_release_root_ed25519(&seed).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            a.verifying_key().as_bytes(),
+            b.verifying_key().as_bytes(),
+            "Same mnemonic must produce the same release-root key"
+        );
+        // Must NOT collide with the node key — different HKDF domain.
+        let node = derive_node_ed25519(&seed).unwrap();
+        assert_ne!(
+            a.verifying_key().as_bytes(),
+            node.verifying_key().as_bytes(),
+            "Release-root key must be domain-separated from the node key"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_release_root_known_answer() {
+        // KAT pins the derivation so the signing ceremony, the pinned anchor,
+        // and any external verifier agree on the bytes for a given mnemonic.
+        let (_, seed) = MasterSeed::from_mnemonic_words(TEST_MNEMONIC).unwrap();
+        let key = derive_release_root_ed25519(&seed).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(key.to_bytes()),
+            "613ab879e5fbd4fcded32bc7ffad662fff1ce0f744c69baa63e7416ffabe7b71",
+            "release-root private key KAT"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(key.verifying_key().to_bytes()),
+            "995eaf9188617f0ecbcff9cd44d57adb9aa7dd5f34db2733e97f3e317fb0aba2",
+            "release-root public key KAT"
+        );
+    }
 }

core/archipelago/src/server.rs

@@ -150,6 +150,31 @@ impl Server {
             }
         }
 
+        // DHT swarm-assist (Phase 3): build the iroh provider once at startup so
+        // release downloads can fetch from peers (origin always wins) and seed
+        // what they hold. Inert unless built with `iroh-swarm` AND swarm_enabled.
+        if let Err(e) = crate::swarm::init(
+            &config.data_dir,
+            &config.nostr_relays,
+            config.nostr_tor_proxy.as_deref(),
+            config.swarm_enabled,
+        )
+        .await
+        {
+            tracing::warn!("Swarm init (non-fatal, falling back to origin-only): {}", e);
+        }
+
+        // Resume any cross-mint ecash swap interrupted by a previous crash
+        // (paid the source mint but never claimed the target tokens). Best-effort.
+        match crate::wallet::ecash::resume_pending_swaps(&config.data_dir).await {
+            Ok(0) => {}
+            Ok(reclaimed) => tracing::info!(
+                "Resumed interrupted cross-mint swaps: reclaimed {} sats",
+                reclaimed
+            ),
+            Err(e) => tracing::debug!("resume_pending_swaps (non-fatal): {}", e),
+        }
+
         // Revoke any previously published Nostr data (runs before publish so revocation is not overwritten)
         let identity_dir = config.data_dir.join("identity");
         let tor_proxy_revoke = config.nostr_tor_proxy.clone();

core/archipelago/src/swarm/iroh_provider.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+//! iroh-blobs swarm provider — the DHT Phase 2 engine, gated behind the
+//! `iroh-swarm` feature (heavy QUIC dep tree, off by default).
+//!
+//! Stands up a real iroh node: binds a QUIC [`Endpoint`], opens a persistent
+//! blob [`FsStore`] under `data_dir/iroh-blobs`, and serves blobs over the
+//! iroh-blobs protocol — so a node that *fetches* content also *seeds* it
+//! afterwards. Content is addressed by BLAKE3 ([`Hash`]) and range-verified by
+//! iroh on arrival.
+//!
+//! This provider is an optimization beneath the origin HTTP path: the [`super`]
+//! swarm seam falls back to origin whenever [`try_fetch`](IrohProvider::try_fetch)
+//! returns `Ok(false)` (no known seeds) or `Err` (transient swarm failure).
+//!
+//! ## Discovery boundary (Phase 3)
+//! Downloading needs the [`EndpointId`]s of peers that hold the hash. That
+//! discovery — design Phase 3, *signed Nostr advertisement events* mapping
+//! `{content-hash → provider endpoint}` — is injected via [`ProviderDiscovery`].
+//! Until it is wired, discovery yields nothing and every fetch defers to origin,
+//! so enabling the feature is safe (never worse than today).
+
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::str::FromStr;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use anyhow::Result;
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use iroh::{endpoint::presets, protocol::Router, Endpoint, EndpointId};
+use iroh_blobs::{store::fs::FsStore, BlobsProtocol, Hash};
+
+use super::payment::PaymentPolicy;
+use super::BlobProvider;
+use crate::content_hash::{ContentDigest, HashAlg};
+
+/// Resolves which peers are believed to hold a given content hash.
+///
+/// Phase 3 (signed Nostr advertisement events) provides the production impl
+/// [`NostrSeedDiscovery`]; `None` discovery means "origin-only" — a safe
+/// default. The query is async (it hits relays), so the trait is async.
+#[async_trait]
+pub trait ProviderDiscovery: Send + Sync {
+    /// Candidate seed endpoints for `hash` (may be empty).
+    async fn providers_for(&self, hash: &Hash) -> Vec<EndpointId>;
+}
+
+/// Production [`ProviderDiscovery`]: reads signed seed advertisements from Nostr
+/// relays and parses the advertised endpoint-id strings into [`EndpointId`]s.
+///
+/// Unparseable ids are skipped (an advert from an incompatible/garbage peer must
+/// not abort discovery). Reuses the node's existing relay list + Tor proxy.
+pub struct NostrSeedDiscovery {
+    relays: Vec<String>,
+    tor_proxy: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl NostrSeedDiscovery {
+    pub fn new(relays: Vec<String>, tor_proxy: Option<String>) -> Self {
+        Self { relays, tor_proxy }
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl ProviderDiscovery for NostrSeedDiscovery {
+    async fn providers_for(&self, hash: &Hash) -> Vec<EndpointId> {
+        let hex = hash.to_hex();
+        let ids = super::seed_advert::fetch_seed_endpoint_ids(
+            &self.relays,
+            self.tor_proxy.as_deref(),
+            &hex,
+        )
+        .await;
+        ids.into_iter()
+            .filter_map(|s| match EndpointId::from_str(&s) {
+                Ok(id) => Some(id),
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::debug!("swarm: skipping unparseable seed endpoint id {s}: {e}");
+                    None
+                }
+            })
+            .collect()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Fetches content-addressed blobs from the iroh swarm, and seeds what it has.
+#[allow(dead_code)] // constructed once Phase 3 discovery is wired into providers()
+pub struct IrohProvider {
+    endpoint: Endpoint,
+    store: FsStore,
+    /// Kept alive so the node keeps accepting blob-protocol connections (seeds).
+    _router: Router,
+    discovery: Option<Arc<dyn ProviderDiscovery>>,
+    /// Where pricing/session/wallet state lives — for paid-fetch negotiation.
+    data_dir: std::path::PathBuf,
+    /// Willingness to pay swarm peers when fetching. Defaults to
+    /// [`PaymentPolicy::free`]: never pay (releases/catalog stay free), so a
+    /// seeder that prices a blob is skipped → origin. A future film fetch can
+    /// pass a real budget.
+    pay_policy: PaymentPolicy,
+}
+
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+impl IrohProvider {
+    /// Bind an iroh endpoint, open the persistent blob store at
+    /// `data_dir/iroh-blobs`, and start serving blobs (seed capability).
+    pub async fn new(
+        data_dir: &Path,
+        discovery: Option<Arc<dyn ProviderDiscovery>>,
+    ) -> Result<Self> {
+        let root = data_dir.join("iroh-blobs");
+        tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&root).await.ok();
+
+        let store = FsStore::load(&root)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("open iroh blob store: {e}"))?;
+
+        let endpoint = Endpoint::bind(presets::N0)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("bind iroh endpoint: {e}"))?;
+
+        // Serve blobs: a node that fetches a blob can then seed it to others.
+        // The event sender gates each request through the ecash `streaming` layer
+        // — free by default, paid only if the operator priced `content-download`
+        // (Networking Profits → Settings). It also hard-disables peer writes.
+        let event_sender = super::paid::gated_event_sender(data_dir.to_path_buf(), (*store).clone());
+        let blobs = BlobsProtocol::new(&store, Some(event_sender));
+        // Shape-A paid negotiation rides a second ALPN on the same endpoint so a
+        // downloader can pay (open a session) before the blob-GET above serves it.
+        let paid =
+            super::paid_alpn::PaidBlobsProtocol::new(data_dir.to_path_buf(), (*store).clone());
+        let router = Router::builder(endpoint.clone())
+            .accept(iroh_blobs::ALPN, blobs)
+            .accept(super::paid_alpn::PAID_ALPN, paid)
+            .spawn();
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            endpoint,
+            store,
+            _router: router,
+            discovery,
+            data_dir: data_dir.to_path_buf(),
+            pay_policy: PaymentPolicy::free(),
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// This node's iroh endpoint id — what Phase 3 advertises as a seed address.
+    pub fn endpoint_id(&self) -> EndpointId {
+        self.endpoint.id()
+    }
+
+    /// Import a held PUBLIC blob into the seed store and advertise it on Nostr so
+    /// other nodes can fetch it from us. Call this only for releases/catalog
+    /// content (the design's privacy scope) — never private user blobs.
+    ///
+    /// Importing makes us an actual seed: a node that downloaded a release from
+    /// the HTTP origin can now serve it to peers over iroh-blobs. The advert maps
+    /// `blake3_hex → this endpoint id`. Defensive check: the bytes we import must
+    /// hash to what we advertise, so a path/hash mismatch can never publish a lie.
+    pub async fn seed_and_advertise(
+        &self,
+        path: &Path,
+        blake3_hex: &str,
+        identity_dir: &Path,
+        relays: &[String],
+        tor_proxy: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let expected = {
+            let raw = hex::decode(blake3_hex).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("blake3 hex: {e}"))?;
+            let arr: [u8; 32] = raw
+                .as_slice()
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("blake3 digest must be 32 bytes"))?;
+            Hash::from_bytes(arr)
+        };
+        let info = self
+            .store
+            .blobs()
+            .add_path(path)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("import blob into seed store: {e}"))?;
+        if info.hash != expected {
+            anyhow::bail!(
+                "imported blob hash {} != advertised {}",
+                info.hash.to_hex(),
+                blake3_hex
+            );
+        }
+        super::seed_advert::publish_seed_advert(
+            identity_dir,
+            relays,
+            tor_proxy,
+            blake3_hex,
+            &self.endpoint_id().to_string(),
+        )
+        .await
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl BlobProvider for IrohProvider {
+    fn name(&self) -> &str {
+        "iroh"
+    }
+
+    async fn try_fetch(&self, digest: &ContentDigest, dest: &Path) -> Result<bool> {
+        // iroh addresses content by BLAKE3. A sha256-only digest isn't fetchable
+        // from the swarm — defer to origin.
+        if digest.alg != HashAlg::Blake3 {
+            return Ok(false);
+        }
+        let raw = hex::decode(&digest.hex).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("digest hex: {e}"))?;
+        let arr: [u8; 32] = raw
+            .as_slice()
+            .try_into()
+            .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("blake3 digest must be 32 bytes"))?;
+        let hash = Hash::from_bytes(arr);
+
+        // Who has it? Without discovery (Phase 3) this is empty → origin wins.
+        let providers = match &self.discovery {
+            Some(d) => d.providers_for(&hash).await,
+            None => Vec::new(),
+        };
+        if providers.is_empty() {
+            return Ok(false);
+        }
+
+        // Shape-A: negotiate paid access with each candidate. Best-effort and
+        // additive — a peer is dropped only if it explicitly requires a payment
+        // we won't make under `pay_policy` (free by default → priced seeders are
+        // skipped). Connect/protocol failures keep the peer; the blob-GET gate is
+        // the real enforcement and a refused GET still falls back to origin.
+        let mut allowed = Vec::with_capacity(providers.len());
+        for peer in providers {
+            if super::paid_alpn::negotiate_access(
+                &self.endpoint,
+                &self.data_dir,
+                peer,
+                &digest.hex,
+                &self.pay_policy,
+            )
+            .await
+            {
+                allowed.push(peer);
+            }
+        }
+        if allowed.is_empty() {
+            return Ok(false);
+        }
+
+        // Fetch (range-verified by iroh) then export the verified blob to the
+        // staging path the caller expects. The seam re-verifies the digest.
+        let downloader = self.store.downloader(&self.endpoint);
+        downloader
+            .download(hash, allowed)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("iroh swarm download: {e}"))?;
+        self.store
+            .blobs()
+            .export(hash, dest)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("export blob to staging: {e}"))?;
+        Ok(true)
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/swarm/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+//! Swarm-assist content fetch — the *transport & swarm* tier of the DHT
+//! distribution plan (`docs/dht-distribution-design.md` §4).
+//!
+//! ## Guiding principle: swarm-assist, origin ALWAYS wins
+//! The peer swarm is an optimization layered *above* a proven HTTP path, never
+//! in place of it. A node asks each available [`BlobProvider`] (e.g. an
+//! iroh-blobs swarm) for content by its [`ContentDigest`]; the first peer that
+//! serves bytes which **verify** against the digest wins. If no provider has it
+//! — or the swarm is disabled, or every peer is offline — we fall back to the
+//! origin HTTP download, which is the guaranteed source of truth. Worst case is
+//! exactly today's behaviour.
+//!
+//! Peer-sourced bytes are UNTRUSTED, so this module verifies them against the
+//! content digest before accepting. Origin bytes run through the caller's
+//! existing verification (e.g. the SHA-256 gate in `update.rs`).
+//!
+//! The actual iroh-blobs provider is gated behind the `iroh-swarm` feature
+//! (heavy QUIC dep tree); with the feature off, [`providers`] is empty and
+//! every fetch goes straight to origin — byte-for-byte today's path.
+
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::sync::{Arc, OnceLock};
+
+use anyhow::Result;
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
+
+use crate::content_hash::ContentDigest;
+
+pub mod payment;
+pub mod seed_advert;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "iroh-swarm")]
+pub mod iroh_provider;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "iroh-swarm")]
+pub mod paid;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "iroh-swarm")]
+pub mod paid_alpn;
+
+/// Which source ultimately served the content.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum FetchSource {
+    /// A peer in the swarm served (and the bytes verified).
+    Swarm,
+    /// The origin HTTP fallback served.
+    Origin,
+}
+
+/// A source that may be able to serve content addressed by its digest.
+#[async_trait]
+pub trait BlobProvider: Send + Sync {
+    /// Short name for logging (e.g. "iroh").
+    fn name(&self) -> &str;
+
+    /// Try to fetch the content for `digest` into `dest`.
+    ///
+    /// * `Ok(true)`  — bytes written to `dest` (caller verifies the digest).
+    /// * `Ok(false)` — this provider does not have the content; try the next.
+    /// * `Err(_)`    — a transient failure; try the next provider.
+    async fn try_fetch(&self, digest: &ContentDigest, dest: &Path) -> Result<bool>;
+}
+
+/// Process-wide swarm runtime, built once at startup by [`init`]. Holding the
+/// providers here (rather than rebuilding per download) keeps the iroh endpoint
+/// + blob store + protocol router alive for the life of the process, so a node
+/// keeps *seeding* between downloads. Empty/inert unless the `iroh-swarm`
+/// feature is built AND `swarm_enabled` is set.
+struct SwarmRuntime {
+    providers: Vec<Arc<dyn BlobProvider>>,
+    /// Context for announcing held public blobs; `None` when seeding is off.
+    #[cfg(feature = "iroh-swarm")]
+    announce: Option<AnnounceCtx>,
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "iroh-swarm")]
+struct AnnounceCtx {
+    iroh: Arc<iroh_provider::IrohProvider>,
+    relays: Vec<String>,
+    tor_proxy: Option<String>,
+    identity_dir: std::path::PathBuf,
+}
+
+static RUNTIME: OnceLock<SwarmRuntime> = OnceLock::new();
+
+/// Build the swarm runtime once, at startup. Idempotent: a second call is a
+/// no-op (the first registration wins). Safe to call unconditionally — when the
+/// `iroh-swarm` feature is absent, or `enabled` is false, it registers an empty
+/// runtime so every fetch goes straight to origin (today's path).
+///
+/// `relays` / `tor_proxy` come from the node's Nostr config and double as the
+/// seed-advert transport; `data_dir` hosts the persistent iroh blob store under
+/// `data_dir/iroh-blobs` and the node identity under `data_dir/identity`.
+pub async fn init(
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    relays: &[String],
+    tor_proxy: Option<&str>,
+    enabled: bool,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    if RUNTIME.get().is_some() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(not(feature = "iroh-swarm"))]
+    {
+        let _ = (data_dir, relays, tor_proxy);
+        if enabled {
+            warn!("swarm: swarm_enabled set but binary built without the `iroh-swarm` feature — staying origin-only");
+        }
+        let _ = RUNTIME.set(SwarmRuntime { providers: Vec::new() });
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "iroh-swarm")]
+    {
+        if !enabled {
+            info!("swarm: disabled (swarm_enabled=false) — origin-only");
+            let _ = RUNTIME.set(SwarmRuntime {
+                providers: Vec::new(),
+                announce: None,
+            });
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+
+        let discovery: Arc<dyn iroh_provider::ProviderDiscovery> =
+            Arc::new(iroh_provider::NostrSeedDiscovery::new(
+                relays.to_vec(),
+                tor_proxy.map(str::to_string),
+            ));
+        let provider =
+            Arc::new(iroh_provider::IrohProvider::new(data_dir, Some(discovery)).await?);
+        info!(
+            "swarm: iroh provider active (endpoint {}) — swarm-assist enabled, origin always wins",
+            provider.endpoint_id()
+        );
+        let providers: Vec<Arc<dyn BlobProvider>> = vec![provider.clone()];
+        let _ = RUNTIME.set(SwarmRuntime {
+            providers,
+            announce: Some(AnnounceCtx {
+                iroh: provider,
+                relays: relays.to_vec(),
+                tor_proxy: tor_proxy.map(str::to_string),
+                identity_dir: data_dir.join("identity"),
+            }),
+        });
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+/// The ordered list of swarm providers to consult before the origin.
+///
+/// Empty until [`init`] registers a provider (needs the `iroh-swarm` feature +
+/// `swarm_enabled`). While empty, [`fetch_content_addressed`] goes straight to
+/// origin — byte-for-byte today's path.
+pub fn providers() -> Vec<Arc<dyn BlobProvider>> {
+    RUNTIME
+        .get()
+        .map(|r| r.providers.clone())
+        .unwrap_or_default()
+}
+
+/// Announce that this node now holds a PUBLIC release/catalog blob (addressed by
+/// `blake3_hex`, bytes at `path`) so peers can fetch it from us: import it into
+/// the seed store and publish a signed Nostr advert. Best-effort and inert
+/// unless the iroh provider is active — a failure never affects the install.
+///
+/// **Scope:** call only for releases/catalog content, never private user blobs.
+pub async fn announce_held_blob(_blake3_hex: &str, _path: &Path) {
+    #[cfg(feature = "iroh-swarm")]
+    {
+        let Some(rt) = RUNTIME.get() else { return };
+        let Some(ctx) = rt.announce.as_ref() else {
+            return;
+        };
+        if let Err(e) = ctx
+            .iroh
+            .seed_and_advertise(
+                _path,
+                _blake3_hex,
+                &ctx.identity_dir,
+                &ctx.relays,
+                ctx.tor_proxy.as_deref(),
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            warn!("swarm: failed to announce held blob {_blake3_hex}: {e}");
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Fetch content-addressed bytes: swarm-assist, origin always wins.
+///
+/// Tries each provider in order; the first to write bytes that VERIFY against
+/// `digest` wins and returns [`FetchSource::Swarm`]. If none succeed, runs
+/// `origin` (the guaranteed HTTP fallback) and returns [`FetchSource::Origin`].
+/// A node that obtained bytes from the swarm has, by definition, a verified
+/// copy it can itself seed afterwards.
+pub async fn fetch_content_addressed<F, Fut>(
+    digest: &ContentDigest,
+    providers: &[Arc<dyn BlobProvider>],
+    dest: &Path,
+    origin: F,
+) -> Result<FetchSource>
+where
+    F: FnOnce() -> Fut,
+    Fut: std::future::Future<Output = Result<()>>,
+{
+    for provider in providers {
+        match provider.try_fetch(digest, dest).await {
+            Ok(true) => match verify_dest(digest, dest).await {
+                Ok(()) => {
+                    info!("swarm: {} served {} (verified)", provider.name(), digest);
+                    return Ok(FetchSource::Swarm);
+                }
+                Err(e) => {
+                    // A peer served bytes that don't match the digest — could be
+                    // corruption or a malicious seed. Discard and try the next
+                    // source; never let unverified peer bytes through.
+                    warn!(
+                        "swarm: {} served bytes failing verification for {}: {} — discarding",
+                        provider.name(),
+                        digest,
+                        e
+                    );
+                    let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(dest).await;
+                }
+            },
+            Ok(false) => debug!("swarm: {} does not have {}", provider.name(), digest),
+            Err(e) => debug!("swarm: {} failed for {}: {}", provider.name(), digest, e),
+        }
+    }
+
+    debug!("swarm: no provider served {} — falling back to origin", digest);
+    origin().await?;
+    Ok(FetchSource::Origin)
+}
+
+/// Read `dest` and verify it hashes to `digest`.
+async fn verify_dest(digest: &ContentDigest, dest: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    let bytes = tokio::fs::read(dest).await?;
+    digest.verify(&bytes)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
+
+    fn digest_of(bytes: &[u8]) -> ContentDigest {
+        ContentDigest::parse(&format!("blake3:{}", crate::content_hash::blake3_hex(bytes))).unwrap()
+    }
+
+    /// Provider that writes a fixed payload (which may or may not match).
+    struct FixedProvider {
+        name: &'static str,
+        payload: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    }
+    #[async_trait]
+    impl BlobProvider for FixedProvider {
+        fn name(&self) -> &str {
+            self.name
+        }
+        async fn try_fetch(&self, _d: &ContentDigest, dest: &Path) -> Result<bool> {
+            match &self.payload {
+                Some(p) => {
+                    tokio::fs::write(dest, p).await?;
+                    Ok(true)
+                }
+                None => Ok(false),
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn arc(p: FixedProvider) -> Arc<dyn BlobProvider> {
+        Arc::new(p)
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn swarm_hit_verifies_and_skips_origin() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let dest = dir.path().join("out");
+        let content = b"hello swarm".to_vec();
+        let digest = digest_of(&content);
+        let providers = vec![arc(FixedProvider {
+            name: "good",
+            payload: Some(content.clone()),
+        })];
+        let origin_ran = AtomicBool::new(false);
+        let src = fetch_content_addressed(&digest, &providers, &dest, || async {
+            origin_ran.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
+            tokio::fs::write(&dest, b"from-origin").await?;
+            Ok(())
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(src, FetchSource::Swarm);
+        assert!(!origin_ran.load(Ordering::SeqCst), "origin must not run on swarm hit");
+        assert_eq!(tokio::fs::read(&dest).await.unwrap(), content);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn bad_swarm_bytes_are_discarded_and_origin_wins() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let dest = dir.path().join("out");
+        let content = b"the real bytes".to_vec();
+        let digest = digest_of(&content);
+        // Provider claims a hit but serves tampered bytes.
+        let providers = vec![arc(FixedProvider {
+            name: "evil",
+            payload: Some(b"TAMPERED".to_vec()),
+        })];
+        let src = fetch_content_addressed(&digest, &providers, &dest, || async {
+            tokio::fs::write(&dest, &content).await?;
+            Ok(())
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(src, FetchSource::Origin, "tampered swarm bytes must not be accepted");
+        assert_eq!(tokio::fs::read(&dest).await.unwrap(), content);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn no_providers_goes_straight_to_origin() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let dest = dir.path().join("out");
+        let content = b"x".to_vec();
+        let digest = digest_of(&content);
+        let providers: Vec<Arc<dyn BlobProvider>> = vec![];
+        let src = fetch_content_addressed(&digest, &providers, &dest, || async {
+            tokio::fs::write(&dest, &content).await?;
+            Ok(())
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(src, FetchSource::Origin);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn falls_through_providers_in_order() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let dest = dir.path().join("out");
+        let content = b"second wins".to_vec();
+        let digest = digest_of(&content);
+        let providers = vec![
+            arc(FixedProvider { name: "miss", payload: None }),
+            arc(FixedProvider { name: "hit", payload: Some(content.clone()) }),
+        ];
+        let src = fetch_content_addressed(&digest, &providers, &dest, || async {
+            tokio::fs::write(&dest, b"origin").await?;
+            Ok(())
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(src, FetchSource::Swarm);
+        assert_eq!(tokio::fs::read(&dest).await.unwrap(), content);
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/swarm/paid.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+//! Paid swarm serving — gate the iroh-blobs provider through the ecash
+//! `streaming` payment layer (DHT distribution plan, Phase 4 step F).
+//!
+//! ## Free by default
+//! Serving is **free unless the node operator turns it on** in
+//! *Networking Profits → Settings* (which enables the `content-download`
+//! streaming service). With that service disabled — the shipped default —
+//! [`is_authorized`] returns `true` for everyone and behaviour is byte-for-byte
+//! the old open seeder. When it is enabled, a peer must hold an active paid
+//! session (opened out-of-band via the `streaming.pay` RPC with a Cashu token)
+//! before the swarm will serve them; otherwise the request is refused and they
+//! fall back to the HTTP origin.
+//!
+//! ## How it hooks in
+//! iroh-blobs 0.103 lets a provider authorize each request: we pass an
+//! [`EventSender`] (built here) to `BlobsProtocol::new`, set the [`EventMask`]
+//! to intercept connections + GET requests, and answer each one with
+//! `Ok(())` (serve) or `Err(AbortReason::Permission)` (refuse). Peer-initiated
+//! writes (`push`) are hard-disabled so a peer can never mutate our store.
+//!
+//! Scope note: today every swarm blob is a public release/app component, so the
+//! gate only ever charges if the operator explicitly priced `content-download`.
+//! When IndeeHub films land on the same blob layer (Phase 4), they reuse this
+//! exact path.
+
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+use iroh::EndpointId;
+use iroh_blobs::api::blobs::BlobStatus;
+use iroh_blobs::api::Store;
+use iroh_blobs::provider::events::{
+    AbortReason, ConnectMode, EventMask, EventResult, EventSender, ObserveMode, ProviderMessage,
+    RequestMode, ThrottleMode,
+};
+use iroh_blobs::Hash;
+
+use crate::streaming::gate::{self, GateResult};
+
+/// The streaming pricing service that meters swarm blob serving. Enabling it in
+/// the Settings UI is what flips swarm serving from free to paid.
+const SERVICE_ID: &str = "content-download";
+
+/// Build the gated [`EventSender`] for `BlobsProtocol` and spawn the task that
+/// authorizes each blob GET through the ecash gate.
+///
+/// `data_dir` locates the pricing/session state; `store` is cloned in to look up
+/// blob sizes for metering. The spawned task lives as long as the provider keeps
+/// the returned sender alive (i.e. the life of the node).
+pub fn gated_event_sender(data_dir: PathBuf, store: Store) -> EventSender {
+    // Intercept connections + read requests so we can allow/deny per peer & hash.
+    // `push` (peer writes into our store) is hard-disabled. `throttle`/`observe`
+    // stay off — we meter coarsely at request time, not per 16 KiB chunk.
+    let mask = EventMask {
+        connected: ConnectMode::Intercept,
+        get: RequestMode::Intercept,
+        get_many: RequestMode::Intercept,
+        push: RequestMode::Disabled,
+        observe: ObserveMode::None,
+        throttle: ThrottleMode::None,
+    };
+    let (sender, mut rx) = EventSender::channel(64, mask);
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        // connection_id → remote endpoint id, learned at ClientConnected and used
+        // to key the paying peer's streaming session on each request.
+        let mut peers: HashMap<u64, Option<EndpointId>> = HashMap::new();
+        while let Some(msg) = rx.recv().await {
+            match msg {
+                ProviderMessage::ClientConnected(m) => {
+                    peers.insert(m.inner.connection_id, m.inner.endpoint_id);
+                    // Accept the connection; gating happens per request.
+                    let _ = m.tx.send(Ok(())).await;
+                }
+                ProviderMessage::ConnectionClosed(m) => {
+                    peers.remove(&m.inner.connection_id);
+                }
+                ProviderMessage::GetRequestReceived(m) => {
+                    let peer = peers.get(&m.inner.connection_id).copied().flatten();
+                    let hash = m.inner.request.hash;
+                    let verdict = authorize(&data_dir, &store, peer, &hash).await;
+                    let _ = m.tx.send(verdict).await;
+                }
+                ProviderMessage::GetManyRequestReceived(m) => {
+                    let peer = peers.get(&m.inner.connection_id).copied().flatten();
+                    // A get-many is all-or-nothing here: authorize on the first hash.
+                    let verdict = match m.inner.request.hashes.first().copied() {
+                        Some(h) => authorize(&data_dir, &store, peer, &h).await,
+                        None => Ok(()),
+                    };
+                    let _ = m.tx.send(verdict).await;
+                }
+                ProviderMessage::PushRequestReceived(m) => {
+                    // Disabled in the mask; refuse defensively if one ever arrives.
+                    let _ = m.tx.send(Err(AbortReason::Permission)).await;
+                }
+                // Notify-only variants, observe and throttle: nothing to gate.
+                _ => {}
+            }
+        }
+    });
+    sender
+}
+
+/// Authorize one blob GET, returning the iroh [`EventResult`]
+/// (`Ok(())` = serve, `Err(Permission)` = refuse).
+async fn authorize(
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    store: &Store,
+    peer: Option<EndpointId>,
+    hash: &Hash,
+) -> EventResult {
+    // Cost = full blob size (coarse, request-time metering). If we don't hold the
+    // complete blob there's nothing to meter — let iroh serve what it can.
+    let size = match store.blobs().status(*hash).await {
+        Ok(BlobStatus::Complete { size }) => size,
+        _ => 0,
+    };
+    let peer_id = peer
+        .map(|e| e.to_string())
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| "anonymous".to_string());
+    if is_authorized(data_dir, &peer_id, size).await {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(AbortReason::Permission)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Pure allow/deny decision (no iroh types) — unit-testable without a live node.
+async fn is_authorized(data_dir: &Path, peer_id: &str, size: u64) -> bool {
+    match gate::check_gate(data_dir, peer_id, SERVICE_ID, None, size).await {
+        // Service disabled (the default) → free for everyone. Or the peer holds an
+        // active paid session with remaining allotment.
+        Ok(GateResult::ServiceUnavailable)
+        | Ok(GateResult::Allowed { .. })
+        | Ok(GateResult::PaidAndAllowed { .. }) => true,
+        // Metered + no/exhausted session: the peer must pay out-of-band first
+        // (streaming.pay) before the swarm serves them — they fall back to origin.
+        Ok(_) => false,
+        // Never let a payment-layer fault break content distribution: fail OPEN
+        // (serve free) and log. Availability beats revenue when something breaks.
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!("paid-gate: check errored ({e}); serving free");
+            true
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::streaming::pricing::{self, Metric, PricingConfig, ServicePricing};
+
+    fn content_download(enabled: bool) -> PricingConfig {
+        PricingConfig {
+            services: vec![ServicePricing {
+                service_id: SERVICE_ID.to_string(),
+                name: "Content Downloads".to_string(),
+                metric: Metric::Bytes,
+                step_size: 1_048_576,
+                price_per_step: 1,
+                min_steps: 0,
+                enabled,
+                description: String::new(),
+                accepted_mints: vec![],
+            }],
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn free_when_service_disabled_by_default() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        // No pricing file → defaults → content-download disabled → free for all.
+        assert!(is_authorized(dir.path(), "peer-a", 1_000_000).await);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn free_when_service_explicitly_disabled() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        pricing::save_pricing(dir.path(), &content_download(false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(is_authorized(dir.path(), "peer-a", 1_048_576).await);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn denied_when_metered_and_peer_has_not_paid() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        pricing::save_pricing(dir.path(), &content_download(true))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // Enabled service + no session/token → the swarm refuses; peer uses origin.
+        assert!(!is_authorized(dir.path(), "peer-b", 1_048_576).await);
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/swarm/paid_alpn.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+//! Shape-A paid-blobs negotiation ALPN (`archy/paid-blobs/1`) — the on-wire
+//! exchange that lets a downloader pay a seeder *before* fetching a gated blob
+//! (DHT distribution plan §1, "shape A"). Gated behind `iroh-swarm`.
+//!
+//! ## Why a side ALPN
+//! iroh-blobs carries the raw bytes; this tiny request/grant protocol rides a
+//! second ALPN on the *same* endpoint so a downloader can discover the price and
+//! deliver an ecash token first. The token opens a metered `streaming` session
+//! keyed by the downloader's endpoint id — exactly the session the blob-GET gate
+//! ([`super::paid`]) already checks. Same endpoint → same session → the GET is
+//! then served.
+//!
+//! ```text
+//!   B ──(archy/paid-blobs/1)──▶ A   PaidRequest { want: H, token: None }
+//!   B ◀───────────────────────  A   PaymentRequired { price, accepted_mints }
+//!   B: auto_pay_token(...)  ── builds a cashuA token (cross-mint aware)
+//!   B ──(archy/paid-blobs/1)──▶ A   PaidRequest { want: H, token: Some(t) }
+//!   B ◀───────────────────────  A   Granted        (session now exists on A)
+//!   B ──(iroh-blobs ALPN)─────▶ A   GET H  → served (gate sees the session)
+//! ```
+//!
+//! ## North star: origin always wins, releases stay free
+//! Negotiation is **best-effort and additive**. A peer that doesn't speak this
+//! ALPN, or any connect/protocol error, is treated as "proceed" — the blob-GET
+//! gate is the real enforcement, and a denied GET just falls back to origin.
+//! With the default [`PaymentPolicy::free`] a downloader never sends a token, so
+//! a seeder that prices a blob is simply skipped → origin. Only films (a future
+//! caller with a real budget) will actually pay.
+
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+use anyhow::Result;
+use iroh::endpoint::Connection;
+use iroh::protocol::{AcceptError, ProtocolHandler};
+use iroh::{Endpoint, EndpointAddr, EndpointId};
+use iroh_blobs::api::blobs::BlobStatus;
+use iroh_blobs::api::Store;
+use iroh_blobs::Hash;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+use super::payment::PaymentPolicy;
+use crate::streaming::gate::{self, GateResult};
+
+/// ALPN for the paid-blobs negotiation protocol.
+pub const PAID_ALPN: &[u8] = b"archy/paid-blobs/1";
+
+/// The streaming service that meters swarm blob serving (same id as [`super::paid`]).
+const SERVICE_ID: &str = "content-download";
+
+/// Cap on a single negotiation message (JSON). Requests/responses are tiny.
+const MAX_MSG: usize = 64 * 1024;
+
+/// A downloader's ask for one content-addressed blob, optionally with payment.
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct PaidRequest {
+    /// BLAKE3 hex of the wanted blob.
+    want: String,
+    /// A `cashuA` token, present on the paying retry.
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    token: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// The seeder's verdict.
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(tag = "status", rename_all = "snake_case")]
+enum PaidResponse {
+    /// Fetch away — free, or a paid session is now active for this peer.
+    Granted,
+    /// Payment needed before serving. The downloader may pay and retry.
+    PaymentRequired {
+        price_sats: u64,
+        accepted_mints: Vec<String>,
+    },
+    /// Refused (bad request, insufficient/failed payment).
+    Denied { reason: String },
+}
+
+// ── Serve side ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/// Accept-side handler for [`PAID_ALPN`]. Registered on the provider's `Router`
+/// alongside the iroh-blobs protocol.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct PaidBlobsProtocol {
+    data_dir: PathBuf,
+    store: Store,
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Debug for PaidBlobsProtocol {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.debug_struct("PaidBlobsProtocol").finish()
+    }
+}
+
+impl PaidBlobsProtocol {
+    pub fn new(data_dir: PathBuf, store: Store) -> Self {
+        Self { data_dir, store }
+    }
+
+    /// Decide the verdict for a request from `peer`. Mirrors [`super::paid`]'s
+    /// policy: free when the service is disabled (default) or the peer holds an
+    /// active session; payment-required when metered and unpaid; fail-OPEN
+    /// (Granted) on an internal gate error so a fault never blocks distribution.
+    async fn decide(&self, peer: &str, req: &PaidRequest) -> PaidResponse {
+        let size = self.blob_size(&req.want).await;
+        match gate::check_gate(&self.data_dir, peer, SERVICE_ID, req.token.as_deref(), size).await {
+            Ok(GateResult::ServiceUnavailable)
+            | Ok(GateResult::Allowed { .. })
+            | Ok(GateResult::PaidAndAllowed { .. }) => PaidResponse::Granted,
+            Ok(GateResult::PaymentRequired {
+                minimum_sats,
+                pricing,
+                ..
+            }) => PaidResponse::PaymentRequired {
+                price_sats: minimum_sats,
+                accepted_mints: pricing.accepted_mints,
+            },
+            Ok(GateResult::InsufficientPayment {
+                provided_sats,
+                minimum_sats,
+            }) => PaidResponse::Denied {
+                reason: format!("insufficient payment: {provided_sats} < {minimum_sats} sats"),
+            },
+            Ok(GateResult::PaymentFailed { reason }) => PaidResponse::Denied { reason },
+            // Availability beats revenue: a gate fault serves free, matching the
+            // blob-GET gate's fail-open behaviour.
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!("paid-alpn: gate errored ({e}); granting free");
+                PaidResponse::Granted
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Full size of a held blob (for metering); 0 if we don't hold it complete.
+    async fn blob_size(&self, blake3_hex: &str) -> u64 {
+        let Ok(raw) = hex::decode(blake3_hex) else {
+            return 0;
+        };
+        let Ok(arr) = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(raw.as_slice()) else {
+            return 0;
+        };
+        match self.store.blobs().status(Hash::from_bytes(arr)).await {
+            Ok(BlobStatus::Complete { size }) => size,
+            _ => 0,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl ProtocolHandler for PaidBlobsProtocol {
+    async fn accept(&self, connection: Connection) -> Result<(), AcceptError> {
+        let peer = connection.remote_id().to_string();
+        // One bi-stream per request (a paying downloader opens a second one).
+        loop {
+            let (mut send, mut recv) = match connection.accept_bi().await {
+                Ok(s) => s,
+                // Connection closed by the peer — normal end of negotiation.
+                Err(_) => break,
+            };
+            let buf = recv
+                .read_to_end(MAX_MSG)
+                .await
+                .map_err(AcceptError::from_err)?;
+            let response = match serde_json::from_slice::<PaidRequest>(&buf) {
+                Ok(req) => self.decide(&peer, &req).await,
+                Err(e) => PaidResponse::Denied {
+                    reason: format!("bad request: {e}"),
+                },
+            };
+            let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&response).map_err(AcceptError::from_err)?;
+            send.write_all(&bytes).await.map_err(AcceptError::from_err)?;
+            send.finish().map_err(AcceptError::from_err)?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+// ── Fetch side ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/// Negotiate access to `blake3_hex` from `peer` before fetching. Returns whether
+/// the caller should proceed to download from this peer.
+///
+/// Best-effort: any connect/protocol failure returns `true` (proceed — the
+/// blob-GET gate is the real enforcement, and a denied GET falls back to origin).
+/// Returns `false` only when the seeder explicitly requires a payment we won't or
+/// can't make under `policy`.
+pub async fn negotiate_access(
+    endpoint: &Endpoint,
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    peer: EndpointId,
+    blake3_hex: &str,
+    policy: &PaymentPolicy,
+) -> bool {
+    match negotiate_inner(endpoint, data_dir, peer, blake3_hex, policy).await {
+        Ok(proceed) => proceed,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::debug!("paid-alpn: negotiation with {peer} failed ({e}) — proceeding (gate decides)");
+            true
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+async fn negotiate_inner(
+    endpoint: &Endpoint,
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    peer: EndpointId,
+    blake3_hex: &str,
+    policy: &PaymentPolicy,
+) -> Result<bool> {
+    let conn = endpoint.connect(EndpointAddr::new(peer), PAID_ALPN).await?;
+
+    // First ask with no token.
+    let resp = exchange(
+        &conn,
+        &PaidRequest {
+            want: blake3_hex.to_string(),
+            token: None,
+        },
+    )
+    .await?;
+
+    match resp {
+        PaidResponse::Granted => Ok(true),
+        PaidResponse::Denied { .. } => Ok(false),
+        PaidResponse::PaymentRequired {
+            price_sats,
+            accepted_mints,
+        } => {
+            // Build a token within budget (cross-mint aware); None ⇒ use origin.
+            match super::payment::auto_pay_token(data_dir, policy, &accepted_mints, price_sats)
+                .await?
+            {
+                None => Ok(false),
+                Some(token) => {
+                    let resp2 = exchange(
+                        &conn,
+                        &PaidRequest {
+                            want: blake3_hex.to_string(),
+                            token: Some(token),
+                        },
+                    )
+                    .await?;
+                    Ok(matches!(resp2, PaidResponse::Granted))
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// One request/response round trip on a fresh bi-stream.
+async fn exchange(conn: &Connection, req: &PaidRequest) -> Result<PaidResponse> {
+    let (mut send, mut recv) = conn.open_bi().await?;
+    send.write_all(&serde_json::to_vec(req)?).await?;
+    send.finish()?;
+    let buf = recv.read_to_end(MAX_MSG).await?;
+    Ok(serde_json::from_slice(&buf)?)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn request_round_trips_and_omits_absent_token() {
+        let req = PaidRequest {
+            want: "abcd".into(),
+            token: None,
+        };
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(&req).unwrap();
+        assert!(!json.contains("token"), "absent token must be omitted: {json}");
+        let back: PaidRequest = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(back.want, "abcd");
+        assert!(back.token.is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn request_with_token_round_trips() {
+        let req = PaidRequest {
+            want: "ff".into(),
+            token: Some("cashuAbc".into()),
+        };
+        let back: PaidRequest = serde_json::from_str(&serde_json::to_string(&req).unwrap()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(back.token.as_deref(), Some("cashuAbc"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn response_tagged_serialization() {
+        let granted = serde_json::to_string(&PaidResponse::Granted).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(granted, r#"{"status":"granted"}"#);
+
+        let pr = serde_json::to_string(&PaidResponse::PaymentRequired {
+            price_sats: 7,
+            accepted_mints: vec!["https://m".into()],
+        })
+        .unwrap();
+        let back: PaidResponse = serde_json::from_str(&pr).unwrap();
+        match back {
+            PaidResponse::PaymentRequired {
+                price_sats,
+                accepted_mints,
+            } => {
+                assert_eq!(price_sats, 7);
+                assert_eq!(accepted_mints, vec!["https://m".to_string()]);
+            }
+            other => panic!("expected PaymentRequired, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/swarm/payment.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+//! Fetch-side auto-pay — the *downloader's* decision layer for paid swarm
+//! content (plan §1 "fetch side" + §2a cross-mint).
+//!
+//! When a swarm seeder gates a blob behind payment (its `PaymentRequired`
+//! advertises a price and a set of `accepted_mints`), a downloading node uses
+//! this layer to decide whether to pay and, if so, to build a `cashuA` token
+//! denominated in one of the seeder's accepted mints — auto-swapping across
+//! mints when needed (see [`crate::wallet::ecash::build_payment_token`]).
+//!
+//! ## North star: origin always wins
+//! Paying is strictly an optimization. If the price is over budget, the wallet
+//! can't cover it, no trusted mint is reachable, or a swap would cost too much,
+//! this layer returns `None` and the caller falls back to the free HTTP origin —
+//! exactly today's path. A wallet/mint problem must never block content.
+//!
+//! ## Scope / what's NOT here
+//! This builds the *token*; it does not yet carry it to the seeder. The on-wire
+//! exchange (a downloader presenting the token to a paid seeder, then streaming
+//! the blob) is the in-band paid-blobs ALPN — "shape (A)" in the design doc —
+//! which is deferred. Today's seeder side (`swarm::paid`) only allow/deny-gates
+//! iroh-blobs requests; once shape (A) lands, the provider's fetch path calls
+//! [`auto_pay_token`] on a `PaymentRequired` and retries with the token.
+
+use std::path::Path;
+
+use anyhow::Result;
+use tracing::debug;
+
+use crate::wallet::ecash;
+
+/// A downloader's willingness to pay swarm peers for a single fetch.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
+pub struct PaymentPolicy {
+    /// Maximum total sats to spend for this content. `0` disables paying
+    /// entirely (origin-only) — the safe default.
+    pub budget_sats: u64,
+    /// Maximum cross-mint swap fee tolerated when we must swap into the
+    /// seeder's mint. Ignored when we already hold the right mint.
+    pub max_fee_sats: u64,
+}
+
+impl PaymentPolicy {
+    /// The default: never pay, always use the free origin. The production caller
+    /// is the deferred in-band paid-blobs ALPN (shape A); used by tests today.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    pub fn free() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            budget_sats: 0,
+            max_fee_sats: 0,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// A budget-capped policy.
+    pub fn with_budget(budget_sats: u64, max_fee_sats: u64) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            budget_sats,
+            max_fee_sats,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Whether a seeder's `price_sats` is worth paying under this policy. A zero
+    /// price is treated as "not a real paid request" (use origin / free path).
+    pub fn affords(&self, price_sats: u64) -> bool {
+        price_sats > 0 && price_sats <= self.budget_sats
+    }
+}
+
+/// Decide whether to pay a seeder `price_sats`, and if so build a `cashuA` token
+/// denominated in one of its `accepted_mints` (auto-swapping if needed).
+///
+/// * `Ok(Some(token))` — pay the seeder with this token.
+/// * `Ok(None)`        — decline (over budget, unpayable, or swap too costly);
+///   the caller should fall back to the free origin.
+///
+/// Never returns `Err` for a wallet/mint problem: those degrade to `Ok(None)`
+/// so a payment failure can never block content.
+pub async fn auto_pay_token(
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    policy: &PaymentPolicy,
+    accepted_mints: &[String],
+    price_sats: u64,
+) -> Result<Option<String>> {
+    if !policy.affords(price_sats) {
+        debug!(
+            "auto-pay: price {} sats over budget {} (or zero) — using origin",
+            price_sats, policy.budget_sats
+        );
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+
+    match ecash::build_payment_token(data_dir, accepted_mints, price_sats, policy.max_fee_sats).await
+    {
+        Ok(token) => Ok(Some(token)),
+        Err(e) => {
+            // Unpayable within balance/trust/fee — not an error, just decline.
+            debug!("auto-pay: declined ({}) — falling back to origin", e);
+            Ok(None)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn free_policy_never_affords() {
+        let p = PaymentPolicy::free();
+        assert!(!p.affords(1));
+        assert!(!p.affords(0));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn budget_policy_affordability() {
+        let p = PaymentPolicy::with_budget(100, 5);
+        assert!(p.affords(100)); // exactly at budget
+        assert!(p.affords(1));
+        assert!(!p.affords(101)); // over budget
+        assert!(!p.affords(0)); // zero price is never a real paid request
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn over_budget_declines_without_touching_wallet() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        // Price exceeds budget → None, and no wallet/mint interaction occurs.
+        let out = auto_pay_token(
+            tmp.path(),
+            &PaymentPolicy::with_budget(50, 5),
+            &["https://seeder.example.com".into()],
+            100,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(out.is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn zero_budget_is_origin_only() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let out = auto_pay_token(
+            tmp.path(),
+            &PaymentPolicy::free(),
+            &["https://seeder.example.com".into()],
+            10,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(out.is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn unpayable_within_budget_declines_gracefully() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        // Within budget, but empty wallet + untrusted seeder mint → build fails;
+        // auto_pay degrades to None (origin) rather than erroring.
+        let out = auto_pay_token(
+            tmp.path(),
+            &PaymentPolicy::with_budget(1000, 10),
+            &["https://untrusted.example.com".into()],
+            100,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(out.is_none());
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/swarm/seed_advert.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+//! Phase 3 discovery — signed Nostr "seed advertisement" events.
+//!
+//! A node that holds a PUBLIC release / app-image blob (addressed by BLAKE3)
+//! announces "I can seed hash H from iroh endpoint E" as a signed, NIP-33
+//! addressable Nostr event. **Scope is releases/catalog content ONLY** — never
+//! private user blobs (decided 2026-06-16): smallest privacy surface, covers
+//! the OTA + app-install use-cases. Discovery queries these events to find
+//! swarm seeds for a hash; the iroh provider then dials those endpoints.
+//!
+//! Event shape (NIP-33 addressable, kind [`ARCHIPELAGO_SEED_KIND`]):
+//!   - `d` tag = blake3 hex of the content → one current advert per (author, hash)
+//!   - content = `{"v":1,"endpoint_id":"<iroh endpoint id>"}`
+//!   - author pubkey = the node's seed-derived Nostr identity (signs the event)
+//!
+//! Endpoint ids stay opaque strings here so this protocol layer builds/parses/
+//! publishes/queries WITHOUT the heavy iroh dep; only the `iroh-swarm`
+//! discovery glue parses the string into an `iroh::EndpointId`.
+
+// The publish/query path that calls these lives behind `iroh-swarm` (it needs
+// the node's iroh EndpointId), so in the default build they're exercised only
+// by unit tests — allow them to stand without a production caller.
+#![allow(dead_code)]
+
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+use nostr_sdk::{Event, EventBuilder, Filter, Keys, Kind, Tag};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+/// How long to wait for relay connects / event fetches. Matches the rest of the
+/// Nostr discovery path so the swarm never stalls the download longer than node
+/// discovery already might.
+const RELAY_CONNECT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
+const RELAY_FETCH_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);
+
+/// NIP-33 addressable kind for Archipelago seed advertisements.
+/// Distinct from the node-discovery app-data kind (30078).
+pub const ARCHIPELAGO_SEED_KIND: u16 = 30081;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct AdvertContent {
+    v: u8,
+    endpoint_id: String,
+}
+
+/// Build the (unsigned) advertisement event for `blake3_hex` served from
+/// `endpoint_id`. Sign with the node's Nostr key (`.sign_with_keys()` /
+/// `.sign()`) or publish via `client.send_event_builder()`.
+pub fn advertisement_builder(blake3_hex: &str, endpoint_id: &str) -> EventBuilder {
+    let content = serde_json::to_string(&AdvertContent {
+        v: 1,
+        endpoint_id: endpoint_id.to_string(),
+    })
+    .expect("serialize advert content");
+    EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(ARCHIPELAGO_SEED_KIND), content)
+        .tag(Tag::identifier(blake3_hex.to_string()))
+}
+
+/// Filter matching all current seed advertisements for `blake3_hex` (one per
+/// advertising node; NIP-33 latest-replaces per author).
+pub fn advertisement_filter(blake3_hex: &str) -> Filter {
+    Filter::new()
+        .kind(Kind::Custom(ARCHIPELAGO_SEED_KIND))
+        .identifier(blake3_hex.to_string())
+}
+
+/// Extract the advertised endpoint id from an event, or `None` if it is the
+/// wrong kind or malformed.
+pub fn parse_endpoint_id(event: &Event) -> Option<String> {
+    if event.kind != Kind::Custom(ARCHIPELAGO_SEED_KIND) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    serde_json::from_str::<AdvertContent>(&event.content)
+        .ok()
+        .map(|c| c.endpoint_id)
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+}
+
+/// Collect the unique advertised endpoint ids across a set of events, skipping
+/// malformed ones. Order-preserving, de-duplicated.
+pub fn endpoint_ids_from_events<'a>(events: impl IntoIterator<Item = &'a Event>) -> Vec<String> {
+    let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    for ev in events {
+        if let Some(id) = parse_endpoint_id(ev) {
+            if seen.insert(id.clone()) {
+                out.push(id);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+/// Query `relays` for the current seed advertisements for `blake3_hex` and
+/// return the de-duplicated endpoint-id strings (opaque here; the `iroh-swarm`
+/// glue parses them into `iroh::EndpointId`).
+///
+/// Best-effort by design: an empty relay list, a connect timeout, or a fetch
+/// failure all yield an empty list — never an error. The swarm seam treats "no
+/// providers" as "use origin", so discovery problems can only ever degrade to
+/// today's HTTP path, never block it.
+pub async fn fetch_seed_endpoint_ids(
+    relays: &[String],
+    tor_proxy: Option<&str>,
+    blake3_hex: &str,
+) -> Vec<String> {
+    if relays.is_empty() {
+        return Vec::new();
+    }
+    // Query anonymously — discovery reads public adverts and must not link the
+    // query back to this node's seed identity.
+    let anon = Keys::generate();
+    let client = match crate::nostr_discovery::build_nostr_client(anon, tor_proxy) {
+        Ok(c) => c,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!("seed-advert: build relay client failed: {e}");
+            return Vec::new();
+        }
+    };
+    for url in relays {
+        let _ = client.add_relay(url).await;
+    }
+    if tokio::time::timeout(RELAY_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, client.connect())
+        .await
+        .is_err()
+    {
+        tracing::warn!("seed-advert: relay connect timed out, continuing anyway");
+    }
+    let events = client
+        .fetch_events(advertisement_filter(blake3_hex), RELAY_FETCH_TIMEOUT)
+        .await
+        .map(|e| e.to_vec())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    client.disconnect().await;
+    endpoint_ids_from_events(events.iter())
+}
+
+/// Publish a signed advertisement — "this node can seed `blake3_hex` from
+/// `endpoint_id`" — to `relays`, signed with the node's seed-derived Nostr key.
+///
+/// **Caller must restrict this to PUBLIC releases/catalog blobs** (the design's
+/// privacy scope, decided 2026-06-16) — never private user content. Best-effort:
+/// relay failures are logged, not fatal, since seeding is an optimization.
+pub async fn publish_seed_advert(
+    identity_dir: &Path,
+    relays: &[String],
+    tor_proxy: Option<&str>,
+    blake3_hex: &str,
+    endpoint_id: &str,
+) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    if relays.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let keys = crate::nostr_discovery::load_or_create_nostr_keys(identity_dir).await?;
+    let client = crate::nostr_discovery::build_nostr_client(keys, tor_proxy)?;
+    for url in relays {
+        let _ = client.add_relay(url).await;
+    }
+    if tokio::time::timeout(RELAY_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, client.connect())
+        .await
+        .is_err()
+    {
+        tracing::warn!("seed-advert: publish relay connect timed out, continuing anyway");
+    }
+    let _ = client
+        .send_event_builder(advertisement_builder(blake3_hex, endpoint_id))
+        .await;
+    client.disconnect().await;
+    tracing::info!("seed-advert: announced {blake3_hex} seedable from {endpoint_id}");
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn build_sign_parse_roundtrip() {
+        let keys = Keys::generate();
+        let hash = "a".repeat(64);
+        let endpoint = "node-example-endpoint-id";
+        let event = advertisement_builder(&hash, endpoint)
+            .sign_with_keys(&keys)
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(event.kind, Kind::Custom(ARCHIPELAGO_SEED_KIND));
+        assert_eq!(parse_endpoint_id(&event).as_deref(), Some(endpoint));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn filter_targets_the_hash_dtag_and_kind() {
+        let hash = "b".repeat(64);
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(&advertisement_filter(&hash)).unwrap();
+        assert!(json.contains(&hash), "filter must target the hash d-tag");
+        assert!(json.contains("30081"), "filter must constrain the seed kind");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_rejects_wrong_kind_and_empty_endpoint() {
+        let keys = Keys::generate();
+        let wrong_kind = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(1), "{}")
+            .sign_with_keys(&keys)
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(parse_endpoint_id(&wrong_kind), None);
+        let empty_endpoint = advertisement_builder(&"c".repeat(64), "")
+            .sign_with_keys(&keys)
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(parse_endpoint_id(&empty_endpoint), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn dedups_endpoint_ids_across_events() {
+        let a = Keys::generate();
+        let b = Keys::generate();
+        let hash = "d".repeat(64);
+        let e1 = advertisement_builder(&hash, "endpoint-A").sign_with_keys(&a).unwrap();
+        let e2 = advertisement_builder(&hash, "endpoint-A").sign_with_keys(&b).unwrap();
+        let e3 = advertisement_builder(&hash, "endpoint-B").sign_with_keys(&b).unwrap();
+        let ids = endpoint_ids_from_events([&e1, &e2, &e3]);
+        assert_eq!(ids, vec!["endpoint-A".to_string(), "endpoint-B".to_string()]);
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/trust/anchor.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+//! The fleet's pinned **release-root** trust anchor.
+//!
+//! Every node ships the release-root *public* key. Signed manifests and the app
+//! catalog must be signed by the corresponding private key (derived once, in
+//! the signing ceremony, via `seed::derive_release_root_ed25519`). Pinning the
+//! key in the binary is what makes a swapped-in mirror key detectable.
+//!
+//! Until the ceremony runs against the real release master seed, the pinned
+//! constant is `None`. While `None`, signature verification still runs and
+//! still rejects tampered documents, but it cannot enforce signer *identity*
+//! (see `signed_doc::SignatureStatus::anchored`). Set
+//! `ARCHY_RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY` (64-char hex) to pin a key at runtime for
+//! staging/test fleets before the constant is baked in.
+
+use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
+
+/// Hex of the pinned Ed25519 release-root public key (32 bytes / 64 hex chars).
+///
+/// TODO(dht Phase 0): bake the real value here after the signing ceremony.
+/// Generate it with: `scripts/release-root-ceremony.sh pubkey`.
+pub const RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY_HEX: Option<&str> = None;
+
+const ENV_OVERRIDE: &str = "ARCHY_RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY";
+
+/// Resolve the pinned release-root public key, if any.
+///
+/// Runtime env override wins over the baked-in constant so a test fleet can pin
+/// a ceremony key without a rebuild. Malformed values are ignored (treated as
+/// "not pinned") rather than crashing the node.
+pub fn release_root_pubkey() -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
+    if let Ok(hex_str) = std::env::var(ENV_OVERRIDE) {
+        if let Some(key) = parse_pubkey_hex(hex_str.trim()) {
+            return Some(key);
+        }
+        tracing::warn!(
+            "{} is set but not a valid 32-byte hex Ed25519 key; ignoring",
+            ENV_OVERRIDE
+        );
+    }
+    RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY_HEX.and_then(parse_pubkey_hex)
+}
+
+fn parse_pubkey_hex(s: &str) -> Option<VerifyingKey> {
+    let bytes = hex::decode(s).ok()?;
+    let arr: [u8; 32] = bytes.as_slice().try_into().ok()?;
+    VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&arr).ok()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unset_constant_is_none() {
+        // Default build ships no pinned anchor yet.
+        assert!(RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY_HEX.is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parses_valid_hex() {
+        let key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&[9u8; 32]).verifying_key();
+        let parsed = parse_pubkey_hex(&hex::encode(key.to_bytes())).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(parsed.as_bytes(), key.as_bytes());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_malformed_hex() {
+        assert!(parse_pubkey_hex("nothex").is_none());
+        assert!(parse_pubkey_hex("abcd").is_none());
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/trust/canonical.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+//! Canonical JSON for signing — a pragmatic subset of RFC 8785 (JCS).
+//!
+//! Signatures are computed over a *byte-exact* serialization so that a verifier
+//! reproduces the same preimage the signer hashed. We guarantee:
+//!
+//!   * object keys recursively sorted (lexicographic by Rust `str` ordering,
+//!     i.e. Unicode scalar value — matches JCS for the ASCII keys we use),
+//!   * no insignificant whitespace,
+//!   * arrays preserved in order.
+//!
+//! We do NOT implement JCS number canonicalization (ECMAScript shortest-form).
+//! Archipelago manifests/catalogs carry only integers, strings, bools, arrays
+//! and objects, for which `serde_json`'s output is already unambiguous. If a
+//! float ever enters a signed document this must be hardened (or rejected).
+//! `contains_float()` lets callers enforce that invariant.
+
+use serde_json::Value;
+
+/// Serialize `value` to canonical JSON bytes (sorted keys, compact).
+///
+/// Rebuilds every object through a `BTreeMap` so the result is independent of
+/// the `serde_json/preserve_order` feature being toggled on anywhere in the
+/// dependency graph.
+pub fn to_canonical_bytes(value: &Value) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let canonical = canonicalize(value);
+    // serde_json never fails to serialize a Value it produced.
+    serde_json::to_vec(&canonical).expect("canonical JSON serialization")
+}
+
+/// Reject documents that contain a float anywhere — they are not safely
+/// canonicalizable under this implementation.
+pub fn contains_float(value: &Value) -> bool {
+    match value {
+        Value::Number(n) => n.as_i64().is_none() && n.as_u64().is_none(),
+        Value::Array(items) => items.iter().any(contains_float),
+        Value::Object(map) => map.values().any(contains_float),
+        _ => false,
+    }
+}
+
+fn canonicalize(value: &Value) -> Value {
+    match value {
+        Value::Object(map) => {
+            // BTreeMap gives deterministic key ordering on serialize.
+            let sorted: std::collections::BTreeMap<String, Value> = map
+                .iter()
+                .map(|(k, v)| (k.clone(), canonicalize(v)))
+                .collect();
+            serde_json::to_value(sorted).expect("canonical object")
+        }
+        Value::Array(items) => Value::Array(items.iter().map(canonicalize).collect()),
+        other => other.clone(),
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use serde_json::json;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn key_order_does_not_change_bytes() {
+        let a = json!({"b": 1, "a": 2, "c": {"z": 1, "y": 2}});
+        let b = json!({"c": {"y": 2, "z": 1}, "a": 2, "b": 1});
+        assert_eq!(to_canonical_bytes(&a), to_canonical_bytes(&b));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn output_is_sorted_and_compact() {
+        let v = json!({"b": 1, "a": [3, 2, 1]});
+        assert_eq!(to_canonical_bytes(&v), br#"{"a":[3,2,1],"b":1}"#.to_vec());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn array_order_is_preserved() {
+        let a = json!([1, 2, 3]);
+        let b = json!([3, 2, 1]);
+        assert_ne!(to_canonical_bytes(&a), to_canonical_bytes(&b));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn detects_floats() {
+        assert!(contains_float(&json!({"x": 1.5})));
+        assert!(contains_float(&json!([1, 2, 0.1])));
+        assert!(!contains_float(&json!({"x": 12345, "y": "s", "z": [1, 2]})));
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/trust/did.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+//! `did:key` <-> Ed25519 public key, mirroring the encoding already used by
+//! `identity_manager` so release-root DIDs are interchangeable with node DIDs.
+//!
+//! Format: `did:key:z<base58btc(0xed01 || 32-byte-pubkey)>`
+//! (`0xed01` is the multicodec varint prefix for an Ed25519 public key.)
+
+use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
+use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
+
+const ED25519_MULTICODEC: [u8; 2] = [0xed, 0x01];
+
+/// Encode an Ed25519 public key as a `did:key` string.
+pub fn did_key_for_ed25519(key: &VerifyingKey) -> String {
+    let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(34);
+    bytes.extend_from_slice(&ED25519_MULTICODEC);
+    bytes.extend_from_slice(key.as_bytes());
+    format!("did:key:z{}", bs58::encode(bytes).into_string())
+}
+
+/// Decode a `did:key` string into an Ed25519 verifying key.
+pub fn ed25519_pubkey_from_did_key(did: &str) -> Result<VerifyingKey> {
+    let z_part = did
+        .strip_prefix("did:key:z")
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("invalid did:key format: {}", did))?;
+    let decoded = bs58::decode(z_part)
+        .into_vec()
+        .context("invalid base58 in did:key")?;
+    if decoded.len() != 34 || decoded[0..2] != ED25519_MULTICODEC {
+        return Err(anyhow!("not an Ed25519 did:key (bad multicodec prefix)"));
+    }
+    let arr: [u8; 32] = decoded[2..]
+        .try_into()
+        .expect("length checked above");
+    VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&arr).context("invalid Ed25519 public key in did:key")
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn roundtrip() {
+        let key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[3u8; 32]).verifying_key();
+        let did = did_key_for_ed25519(&key);
+        assert!(did.starts_with("did:key:z6Mk"), "got {}", did);
+        let back = ed25519_pubkey_from_did_key(&did).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(key.as_bytes(), back.as_bytes());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_non_ed25519() {
+        assert!(ed25519_pubkey_from_did_key("did:key:zQ3shazz").is_err());
+        assert!(ed25519_pubkey_from_did_key("not-a-did").is_err());
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/trust/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+//! Authenticity layer for the DHT distribution plan (Phase 0).
+//!
+//! Content addressing (SHA-256 today, BLAKE3 later) proves downloaded bytes are
+//! *intact*. It does not prove they were *authorized*. This module adds the
+//! missing half: detached Ed25519 signatures over canonical JSON, verified
+//! against a pinned **release-root** trust anchor.
+//!
+//! Layout:
+//!   * [`anchor`]    — the pinned release-root public key (+ env override).
+//!   * [`canonical`] — deterministic JSON serialization for signing.
+//!   * [`did`]       — `did:key` <-> Ed25519 public key.
+//!   * [`signed_doc`]— detached sign/verify over a signed document.
+//!
+//! The release-root *private* key is publisher-only and derived in the signing
+//! ceremony via [`crate::seed::derive_release_root_ed25519`]; fleet nodes only
+//! ever hold the public key.
+
+pub mod anchor;
+pub mod canonical;
+pub mod did;
+pub mod signed_doc;
+
+pub use signed_doc::{verify_detached, SignatureStatus};

core/archipelago/src/trust/signed_doc.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+//! Detached Ed25519 signatures over canonical JSON documents.
+//!
+//! A *signed document* is any JSON object carrying two reserved top-level
+//! fields:
+//!
+//!   * `signed_by` — the signer's `did:key` (Ed25519), e.g. the release-root.
+//!   * `signature` — hex-encoded Ed25519 signature over the canonical JSON of
+//!     the document with **both** reserved fields removed.
+//!
+//! Removing the fields before canonicalizing makes the signature *detached*:
+//! the signer signs the payload, then attaches the proof, without a
+//! chicken-and-egg dependency on the signature's own bytes.
+//!
+//! Authenticity ≠ integrity. Content addressing (SHA-256/BLAKE3 in the
+//! manifest) proves the bytes are intact; this signature proves *we authorized
+//! them*. The DHT plan requires both.
+
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
+use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey};
+use serde_json::Value;
+
+use super::anchor;
+use super::canonical;
+use super::did;
+
+pub const SIGNATURE_FIELD: &str = "signature";
+pub const SIGNED_BY_FIELD: &str = "signed_by";
+
+/// Outcome of inspecting a document for a detached signature.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum SignatureStatus {
+    /// No `signature` field present. Caller decides whether to accept
+    /// (during the migration window we still accept unsigned documents).
+    Unsigned,
+    /// Signature verified. `anchored` is true when `signed_by` matched the
+    /// pinned release-root anchor (full authenticity); false means the
+    /// signature is internally consistent but the signer key is not yet
+    /// pinned, so it only proves the document wasn't tampered relative to its
+    /// own claimed key.
+    Verified { signer_did: String, anchored: bool },
+}
+
+/// Verify a document's detached signature *if present*.
+///
+/// Returns `Ok(Unsigned)` when there is no signature. Returns `Ok(Verified)`
+/// when a present signature checks out. Returns `Err` when a signature is
+/// present but malformed, fails verification, or names a signer that
+/// contradicts the pinned anchor — callers MUST reject the document on `Err`.
+pub fn verify_detached(doc: &Value) -> Result<SignatureStatus> {
+    let obj = doc
+        .as_object()
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("signed document must be a JSON object"))?;
+
+    let signature_hex = match obj.get(SIGNATURE_FIELD) {
+        None | Some(Value::Null) => return Ok(SignatureStatus::Unsigned),
+        Some(Value::String(s)) => s,
+        Some(_) => bail!("`{}` must be a string", SIGNATURE_FIELD),
+    };
+
+    let signed_by = obj
+        .get(SIGNED_BY_FIELD)
+        .and_then(Value::as_str)
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("signed document has `{}` but no `{}`", SIGNATURE_FIELD, SIGNED_BY_FIELD))?;
+
+    let signer = did::ed25519_pubkey_from_did_key(signed_by)
+        .with_context(|| format!("invalid `{}` did:key", SIGNED_BY_FIELD))?;
+
+    // If the fleet has a pinned release-root, the signer MUST be it. This is
+    // what stops a mirror from swapping in its own keypair and re-signing.
+    let anchored = match anchor::release_root_pubkey() {
+        Some(pinned) => {
+            if pinned != signer {
+                bail!("signed_by does not match the pinned release-root anchor");
+            }
+            true
+        }
+        None => false,
+    };
+
+    let signature = parse_signature_hex(signature_hex)?;
+    let preimage = signing_preimage(obj)?;
+    signer
+        .verify_strict(&preimage, &signature)
+        .map_err(|_| anyhow!("release-root signature verification failed"))?;
+
+    Ok(SignatureStatus::Verified {
+        signer_did: signed_by.to_string(),
+        anchored,
+    })
+}
+
+/// Produce a detached signature for `payload` (the document WITHOUT the
+/// reserved fields). Used by the signing ceremony and round-trip tests.
+/// Returns `(signature_hex, signed_by_did)`.
+pub fn sign_detached(key: &SigningKey, payload: &Value) -> Result<(String, String)> {
+    let obj = payload
+        .as_object()
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("payload must be a JSON object"))?;
+    if obj.contains_key(SIGNATURE_FIELD) || obj.contains_key(SIGNED_BY_FIELD) {
+        bail!("payload must not already contain reserved signature fields");
+    }
+    let preimage = signing_preimage(obj)?;
+    let signature = key.sign(&preimage);
+    let did = did::did_key_for_ed25519(&key.verifying_key());
+    Ok((hex::encode(signature.to_bytes()), did))
+}
+
+/// Canonical bytes the signature covers: the object minus the reserved fields.
+fn signing_preimage(obj: &serde_json::Map<String, Value>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut payload = obj.clone();
+    payload.remove(SIGNATURE_FIELD);
+    payload.remove(SIGNED_BY_FIELD);
+    let value = Value::Object(payload);
+    if canonical::contains_float(&value) {
+        bail!("signed documents must not contain floating-point numbers");
+    }
+    Ok(canonical::to_canonical_bytes(&value))
+}
+
+fn parse_signature_hex(s: &str) -> Result<Signature> {
+    let bytes = hex::decode(s).context("signature is not valid hex")?;
+    let arr: [u8; 64] = bytes
+        .as_slice()
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| anyhow!("signature must be 64 bytes, got {}", bytes.len()))?;
+    Ok(Signature::from_bytes(&arr))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use serde_json::json;
+
+    fn test_key() -> SigningKey {
+        SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32])
+    }
+
+    fn sign_into(key: &SigningKey, mut doc: Value) -> Value {
+        let (sig, did) = sign_detached(key, &doc).unwrap();
+        let obj = doc.as_object_mut().unwrap();
+        obj.insert(SIGNED_BY_FIELD.into(), json!(did));
+        obj.insert(SIGNATURE_FIELD.into(), json!(sig));
+        doc
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unsigned_document_reports_unsigned() {
+        let doc = json!({"schema": 1, "apps": {}});
+        assert_eq!(verify_detached(&doc).unwrap(), SignatureStatus::Unsigned);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn roundtrip_verifies() {
+        let signed = sign_into(&test_key(), json!({"schema": 1, "n": 42}));
+        match verify_detached(&signed).unwrap() {
+            // No anchor pinned in the default test build → anchored == false.
+            SignatureStatus::Verified { anchored, .. } => assert!(!anchored),
+            other => panic!("expected Verified, got {:?}", other),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn signature_survives_key_reordering() {
+        // Re-emitting the document with shuffled keys must not break the sig.
+        let signed = sign_into(&test_key(), json!({"b": 2, "a": 1}));
+        let reparsed: Value =
+            serde_json::from_str(&serde_json::to_string(&signed).unwrap()).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            verify_detached(&reparsed).unwrap(),
+            SignatureStatus::Verified { .. }
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tampered_payload_is_rejected() {
+        let mut signed = sign_into(&test_key(), json!({"schema": 1, "n": 42}));
+        signed.as_object_mut().unwrap().insert("n".into(), json!(43));
+        assert!(verify_detached(&signed).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn missing_signed_by_is_rejected() {
+        let doc = json!({"schema": 1, "signature": "00"});
+        assert!(verify_detached(&doc).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn float_payload_cannot_be_signed() {
+        assert!(sign_detached(&test_key(), &json!({"x": 1.5})).is_err());
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/update.rs

@@ -263,6 +263,11 @@ pub struct ComponentUpdate {
     pub download_url: String,
     pub sha256: String,
     pub size_bytes: u64,
+    /// DHT Phase 1: BLAKE3 content address (bare hex or `"blake3:<hex>"`), the
+    /// iroh-native, range-verifiable hash. Optional during the migration
+    /// window — when present it is verified ALONGSIDE the mandatory SHA-256.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub blake3: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -798,7 +803,53 @@ pub async fn download_update(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<DownloadProgress> {
         }
         info!(name = %component.name, url = %component.download_url, "Downloading component");
         let dest = staging_dir.join(&component.name);
-        download_component_resumable(&client, component, &dest, downloaded).await?;
+
+        // DHT Phase 2: when the manifest pins a BLAKE3 digest, route the fetch
+        // through the swarm seam (swarm-assist, origin always wins). With no
+        // providers registered (iroh-swarm feature off) this is identical to
+        // calling the resumable HTTP origin directly — same bytes, now
+        // content-addressed. A swarm hit is BLAKE3-verified inside the seam;
+        // we still enforce the mandatory SHA-256 gate on peer bytes here and
+        // re-fetch from origin if a (consistency-broken) peer slips through.
+        let digest = component.blake3.as_deref().and_then(|b| {
+            let s = b.trim();
+            let normalized = if s.contains(':') {
+                s.to_string()
+            } else {
+                format!("blake3:{s}")
+            };
+            crate::content_hash::ContentDigest::parse(&normalized).ok()
+        });
+        if let Some(digest) = digest {
+            let client_ref = &client;
+            let dest_ref = &dest;
+            let source = crate::swarm::fetch_content_addressed(
+                &digest,
+                &crate::swarm::providers(),
+                &dest,
+                move || async move {
+                    download_component_resumable(client_ref, component, dest_ref, downloaded).await
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+            if source == crate::swarm::FetchSource::Swarm {
+                let bytes = tokio::fs::read(&dest).await?;
+                if crate::content_hash::sha256_hex(&bytes) != component.sha256 {
+                    warn!(
+                        name = %component.name,
+                        "swarm bytes passed BLAKE3 but failed the SHA-256 manifest gate — re-fetching from origin"
+                    );
+                    let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&dest).await;
+                    download_component_resumable(&client, component, &dest, downloaded).await?;
+                }
+            }
+            // This is a PUBLIC release blob and it just passed both the BLAKE3 and
+            // SHA-256 gates — announce that we can now seed it to peers. Best-effort
+            // and inert unless the iroh swarm is active; never blocks the install.
+            crate::swarm::announce_held_blob(&digest.hex, &dest).await;
+        } else {
+            download_component_resumable(&client, component, &dest, downloaded).await?;
+        }
         downloaded += component.size_bytes;
         DOWNLOAD_BYTES.store(downloaded, Ordering::Relaxed);
         info!(
@@ -993,6 +1044,25 @@ async fn download_component_resumable(
             .context("read staging file for hash check")?;
         let hash = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(&bytes));
         if hash == component.sha256 {
+            // DHT Phase 1: if the manifest also pins a BLAKE3 digest, it must
+            // match too. SHA-256 stays the mandatory gate during migration;
+            // BLAKE3 is the hash the iroh swarm will fetch/verify by, so a
+            // present-but-wrong BLAKE3 means the bytes aren't swarm-consistent
+            // — treat it like a SHA mismatch and re-download.
+            if let Some(b3) = component.blake3.as_deref() {
+                let expected = b3.trim().strip_prefix("blake3:").unwrap_or(b3.trim());
+                let actual = crate::content_hash::blake3_hex(&bytes);
+                if !actual.eq_ignore_ascii_case(expected) {
+                    let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(dest).await;
+                    last_err = Some(anyhow::anyhow!(
+                        "BLAKE3 mismatch for {}: expected {}, got {}",
+                        component.name,
+                        expected,
+                        actual
+                    ));
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
             return Ok(());
         }
         // SHA mismatch — the file on disk is garbage. Nuke it and
@@ -1675,6 +1745,7 @@ mod tests {
                     download_url: "https://git.tx1138.com/lfg2025/archy/raw/branch/main/releases/v1.7.26-alpha/archipelago".into(),
                     sha256: "x".into(),
                     size_bytes: 1,
+                    blake3: None,
                 },
                 ComponentUpdate {
                     name: "frontend".into(),
@@ -1683,6 +1754,7 @@ mod tests {
                     download_url: "https://git.tx1138.com/lfg2025/archy/raw/branch/main/releases/v1.7.26-alpha/frontend.tar.gz".into(),
                     sha256: "y".into(),
                     size_bytes: 2,
+                    blake3: None,
                 },
             ],
         };
@@ -1882,9 +1954,10 @@ mod tests {
         tokio::fs::write(staging.join("archipelago"), b"staged")
             .await
             .unwrap();
-        // A *complete* staged update carries the marker; without it the state
-        // self-heal correctly treats this as a partial download and clears
-        // update_in_progress (see has_staged_update / #26).
+        // A *complete* staged update carries the .download-complete marker;
+        // without it has_staged_update() reads the staging as partial and the
+        // load_state self-heal clears update_in_progress (see #26). This test
+        // simulates a complete staging, so write the marker.
         tokio::fs::write(staging.join(STAGED_COMPLETE_MARKER), b"1")
             .await
             .unwrap();
@@ -1902,6 +1975,7 @@ mod tests {
                     download_url: "https://example.com/binary".to_string(),
                     sha256: "abc123".to_string(),
                     size_bytes: 5000,
+                    blake3: None,
                 }],
             }),
             update_in_progress: true,

core/archipelago/src/wallet/ecash.rs

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::path::Path;
 use tokio::fs;
-use tracing::{debug, warn};
+use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
 
 const WALLET_FILE: &str = "wallet/ecash.json";
 const MINTS_FILE: &str = "wallet/accepted_mints.json";
@@ -106,6 +106,18 @@ impl WalletState {
             .sum()
     }
 
+    /// Spendable (unspent, unreserved) balance grouped by mint URL.
+    pub fn spendable_by_mint(&self) -> Vec<(String, u64)> {
+        use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+        let mut by_mint: BTreeMap<String, u64> = BTreeMap::new();
+        for p in &self.proofs {
+            if !p.spent && !p.reserved {
+                *by_mint.entry(p.mint_url.clone()).or_default() += p.proof.amount;
+            }
+        }
+        by_mint.into_iter().collect()
+    }
+
     /// Select unspent proofs that cover at least `amount` sats from a specific mint.
     /// Returns selected proofs and any overpayment amount.
     pub fn select_proofs(&self, mint_url: &str, amount: u64) -> Option<(Vec<usize>, u64)> {
@@ -352,10 +364,225 @@ pub async fn melt_tokens(data_dir: &Path, quote_id: &str, bolt11: &str) -> Resul
     Ok(quote.amount)
 }
 
-/// Create a cashuA token string to send to a peer.
-pub async fn send_token(data_dir: &Path, amount_sats: u64) -> Result<String> {
+// ── Cross-mint settlement (plan §2a / phasing F2) ──────────────────────────
+//
+// The wallet data model is already multi-mint (proofs, balances and selection
+// are all keyed by mint URL). What was hardcoded to the home mint is the
+// convenience layer. These `*_at` helpers parameterize that layer by target
+// mint, and `swap_between_mints` moves value across mints over Lightning so a
+// node holding tokens on mint A can pay a seeder that only accepts mint B.
+
+/// How long to wait for a target mint's Lightning invoice to settle before
+/// claiming the freshly-minted tokens.
+const SWAP_CLAIM_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 60;
+/// Poll interval while waiting for the invoice to settle.
+const SWAP_CLAIM_POLL_SECS: u64 = 2;
+
+/// Whether we trust a mint enough to swap value *into* it (or accept its tokens).
+///
+/// The local Fedimint (home mint) is always trusted; any other mint must be on
+/// the configured accepted-mints allow-list. Comparison ignores a trailing
+/// slash so advertised URLs match stored ones. See plan §2a "Mint trust list".
+pub async fn is_mint_trusted(data_dir: &Path, mint_url: &str) -> Result<bool> {
+    let norm = |s: &str| s.trim_end_matches('/').to_string();
+    let target = norm(mint_url);
+    if target == norm(&default_mint_url()) {
+        return Ok(true);
+    }
+    let accepted = load_accepted_mints(data_dir).await?;
+    Ok(accepted.mints.iter().any(|m| norm(m) == target))
+}
+
+/// All-in cost of a swap, relative to the amount actually delivered.
+///
+/// `total_paid` is what the source mint charges (melt amount + LN fee reserve);
+/// `amount_delivered` is what lands on the target mint. The difference is the
+/// fee the user pays to move value across mints.
+fn swap_fee(total_paid: u64, amount_delivered: u64) -> u64 {
+    total_paid.saturating_sub(amount_delivered)
+}
+
+/// Move `amount_sats` of value from mint `from_mint` to mint `to_mint` over
+/// Lightning, returning the amount claimed on the target mint.
+///
+/// Flow (Cashu/Fedimint settle over BOLT11):
+/// 1. `mint_quote` on the target → a Lightning invoice to pay.
+/// 2. `melt_quote` on the source → the cost in source tokens (amount + fee).
+/// 3. Fee-cap check: refuse if the all-in fee exceeds `max_fee_sats`.
+/// 4. Select source proofs and `melt` them to pay the target's invoice.
+/// 5. Once the invoice settles, `mint` (claim) the tokens on the target.
+///
+/// Crash-safety: the source spend is persisted *before* the claim, so a crash
+/// between paying and claiming never double-spends — at worst the target tokens
+/// are left unclaimed (reconcilable from the mint quote id). Idempotent resume
+/// is phasing step 3 (deferred).
+pub async fn swap_between_mints(
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    from_mint: &str,
+    to_mint: &str,
+    amount_sats: u64,
+    max_fee_sats: u64,
+) -> Result<u64> {
+    if amount_sats == 0 {
+        anyhow::bail!("swap amount must be greater than zero");
+    }
+    let norm = |s: &str| s.trim_end_matches('/').to_string();
+    if norm(from_mint) == norm(to_mint) {
+        anyhow::bail!("swap source and target mints are identical");
+    }
+    if !is_mint_trusted(data_dir, to_mint).await? {
+        anyhow::bail!(
+            "target mint '{}' is not in the trusted/accepted mint list",
+            to_mint
+        );
+    }
+
+    let from = MintClient::new(from_mint)?;
+    let to = MintClient::new(to_mint)?;
+
+    // 1. Mint quote on the target → invoice to pay.
+    let mint_quote = to
+        .mint_quote(amount_sats)
+        .await
+        .with_context(|| format!("requesting mint quote at target mint {}", to_mint))?;
+
+    // 2. Melt quote on the source for that invoice → cost in source tokens.
+    let melt_quote = from
+        .melt_quote(&mint_quote.request)
+        .await
+        .with_context(|| format!("requesting melt quote at source mint {}", from_mint))?;
+    let total_needed = melt_quote.amount + melt_quote.fee_reserve;
+    let fee = swap_fee(total_needed, amount_sats);
+
+    // 3. Fee-cap check — caller falls back to free origin if too expensive.
+    if fee > max_fee_sats {
+        anyhow::bail!(
+            "swap fee {} sats exceeds cap {} sats (need {} on {} to deliver {} on {})",
+            fee,
+            max_fee_sats,
+            total_needed,
+            from_mint,
+            amount_sats,
+            to_mint
+        );
+    }
+
+    // 4. Select source proofs and melt them to pay the target invoice.
     let mut wallet = load_wallet(data_dir).await?;
-    let mint_url = wallet.mint_url.clone();
+    let (indices, _overpayment) =
+        wallet
+            .select_proofs(from_mint, total_needed)
+            .ok_or_else(|| {
+                anyhow::anyhow!(
+                    "insufficient balance on {}: need {} sats, have {} sats",
+                    from_mint,
+                    total_needed,
+                    wallet.balance_for_mint(from_mint)
+                )
+            })?;
+    let proofs: Vec<Proof> = indices
+        .iter()
+        .map(|&i| wallet.proofs[i].proof.clone())
+        .collect();
+
+    if let Err(e) = from.melt_tokens(&melt_quote.quote, &proofs).await {
+        // The pay leg never completed — record the route failure so future
+        // payments can prefer a route with a track record.
+        record_swap_failure(data_dir, from_mint, to_mint).await;
+        return Err(e)
+            .with_context(|| format!("melting source proofs at {} to pay target invoice", from_mint));
+    }
+
+    // Persist the spend BEFORE claiming so a crash can't double-spend, and
+    // journal the in-flight swap so the claim can be resumed after a crash.
+    wallet.mark_spent(&indices);
+    wallet.record_tx(
+        TransactionType::Melt,
+        total_needed,
+        &format!(
+            "Cross-mint swap {}→{}: paid {} sats (fee {})",
+            from_mint, to_mint, total_needed, fee
+        ),
+        from_mint,
+        to_mint,
+    );
+    save_wallet(data_dir, &wallet).await?;
+    add_pending_swap(
+        data_dir,
+        PendingSwap {
+            from_mint: from_mint.to_string(),
+            to_mint: to_mint.to_string(),
+            amount_sats,
+            melt_quote_id: melt_quote.quote.clone(),
+            mint_quote_id: mint_quote.quote.clone(),
+            created_at: chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+        },
+    )
+    .await?;
+
+    // 5. Wait for the invoice to settle, then claim the minted tokens.
+    wait_for_mint_quote_paid(&to, &mint_quote.quote).await?;
+    let result = to
+        .mint_tokens(&mint_quote.quote, amount_sats)
+        .await
+        .with_context(|| format!("claiming minted tokens at target mint {}", to_mint))?;
+    let minted: u64 = result.proofs.iter().map(|p| p.amount).sum();
+
+    let mut wallet = load_wallet(data_dir).await?;
+    wallet.add_proofs(to_mint, result.proofs);
+    wallet.record_tx(
+        TransactionType::Mint,
+        minted,
+        &format!("Cross-mint swap {}→{}: claimed {} sats", from_mint, to_mint, minted),
+        to_mint,
+        from_mint,
+    );
+    save_wallet(data_dir, &wallet).await?;
+
+    // Swap fully settled — clear the journal entry and credit the route.
+    remove_pending_swap(data_dir, &mint_quote.quote).await?;
+    record_swap_success(data_dir, from_mint, to_mint).await;
+
+    debug!(
+        "Cross-mint swap complete: {} → {} delivered {} sats (fee {})",
+        from_mint, to_mint, minted, fee
+    );
+    Ok(minted)
+}
+
+/// Poll a mint quote until its Lightning invoice is paid (state `PAID`/`ISSUED`),
+/// or time out. The melt above pays the invoice; the target mint sees it settle
+/// shortly after.
+async fn wait_for_mint_quote_paid(client: &MintClient, quote_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    let deadline = SWAP_CLAIM_TIMEOUT_SECS / SWAP_CLAIM_POLL_SECS.max(1);
+    for _ in 0..deadline.max(1) {
+        let status = client.mint_quote_status(quote_id).await?;
+        match status.state.as_str() {
+            "PAID" | "ISSUED" => return Ok(()),
+            _ => tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(SWAP_CLAIM_POLL_SECS)).await,
+        }
+    }
+    anyhow::bail!(
+        "target mint invoice for quote {} did not settle within {}s",
+        quote_id,
+        SWAP_CLAIM_TIMEOUT_SECS
+    )
+}
+
+/// Create a cashuA token string to send to a peer, drawing from the home mint.
+pub async fn send_token(data_dir: &Path, amount_sats: u64) -> Result<String> {
+    let mint_url = load_wallet(data_dir).await?.mint_url;
+    send_token_at(data_dir, &mint_url, amount_sats).await
+}
+
+/// Create a cashuA token denominated in a specific mint's tokens.
+///
+/// Used by the payer-side cross-mint flow: after `swap_between_mints` lands value
+/// on the seeder's accepted mint, we send a token from *that* mint so the seeder
+/// only ever receives its own mint's proofs (see plan §2a, payer-side swap).
+pub async fn send_token_at(data_dir: &Path, mint_url: &str, amount_sats: u64) -> Result<String> {
+    let mut wallet = load_wallet(data_dir).await?;
+    let mint_url = mint_url.to_string();
 
     // Select proofs covering the amount
     let (indices, overpayment) = wallet
@@ -422,6 +649,319 @@ pub async fn send_token(data_dir: &Path, amount_sats: u64) -> Result<String> {
     Ok(token_str)
 }
 
+// ── Payer-side payment builder (plan §2a step 2) ───────────────────────────
+//
+// Given a seeder's advertised `accepted_mints`, pick the cheapest way to pay:
+// spend tokens we already hold on an accepted mint (no fee), else swap value
+// into a *trusted* accepted mint and pay from there. If neither is possible
+// within budget, decline so the caller falls back to free origin.
+
+/// How a payment of a given amount can be satisfied across our mints.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum PaymentPlan {
+    /// We already hold enough on this accepted mint — pay directly, no swap fee.
+    Direct { mint_url: String },
+    /// Swap value from `from_mint` into the trusted accepted `to_mint`, then pay.
+    Swap { from_mint: String, to_mint: String },
+    /// No single mint can cover the amount (caller should use free origin).
+    Insufficient,
+}
+
+/// Decide how to pay `amount` sats to a seeder, given what we hold and which
+/// mints the seeder accepts.
+///
+/// - `holdings`: our spendable `(mint_url, balance)` pairs (verbatim URLs).
+/// - `accepted`: the seeder's `(mint_url, trusted)` pairs, where `trusted`
+///   means the mint is on our swap-into allow-list (`is_mint_trusted`).
+/// - Direct beats Swap (no fee). A Direct target needs no trust (we already
+///   hold those tokens); a Swap target must be trusted. The home mint is
+///   preferred as a tie-break for both legs (lowest friction).
+///
+/// Pure and synchronous so it can be unit-tested without a live mint. It does
+/// not know swap fees; `swap_between_mints` enforces the fee cap and bails (→
+/// origin fallback) if the chosen source can't cover amount + fee.
+fn plan_payment(holdings: &[(String, u64)], accepted: &[(String, bool)], amount: u64) -> PaymentPlan {
+    let norm = |s: &str| s.trim_end_matches('/').to_string();
+    let home = norm(&default_mint_url());
+    let held = |mint: &str| -> u64 {
+        holdings
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|(m, _)| norm(m) == norm(mint))
+            .map(|(_, b)| *b)
+            .sum()
+    };
+
+    // 1. Direct: any accepted mint we already hold enough on. Prefer home.
+    let mut direct: Vec<&(String, bool)> = accepted
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|(m, _)| held(m) >= amount)
+        .collect();
+    direct.sort_by_key(|(m, _)| norm(m) != home); // home (false) sorts first
+    if let Some((mint, _)) = direct.first() {
+        return PaymentPlan::Direct {
+            mint_url: mint.clone(),
+        };
+    }
+
+    // 2. Swap: a trusted accepted target + a source we hold that covers `amount`.
+    let mut targets: Vec<&(String, bool)> =
+        accepted.iter().filter(|(_, trusted)| *trusted).collect();
+    targets.sort_by_key(|(m, _)| norm(m) != home);
+    if let Some((to_mint, _)) = targets.first() {
+        // Largest source we hold that isn't the target itself.
+        let from = holdings
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|(m, b)| norm(m) != norm(to_mint) && *b >= amount)
+            .max_by_key(|(_, b)| *b);
+        if let Some((from_mint, _)) = from {
+            return PaymentPlan::Swap {
+                from_mint: from_mint.clone(),
+                to_mint: to_mint.clone(),
+            };
+        }
+    }
+
+    PaymentPlan::Insufficient
+}
+
+/// Build a cashuA token to pay a seeder `amount_sats`, denominated in one of the
+/// seeder's `accepted_mints`. Auto-swaps across mints (up to `max_fee_sats`) when
+/// we don't already hold the right mint. Returns the token string ready to send.
+///
+/// Errors (caller should fall back to free origin) when no accepted mint is
+/// reachable within balance, no trusted swap target exists, or the swap exceeds
+/// the fee cap.
+pub async fn build_payment_token(
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    accepted_mints: &[String],
+    amount_sats: u64,
+    max_fee_sats: u64,
+) -> Result<String> {
+    if amount_sats == 0 {
+        anyhow::bail!("payment amount must be greater than zero");
+    }
+    if accepted_mints.is_empty() {
+        anyhow::bail!("seeder advertised no accepted mints");
+    }
+
+    // Annotate each accepted mint with whether we trust swapping into it.
+    let mut accepted: Vec<(String, bool)> = Vec::with_capacity(accepted_mints.len());
+    for m in accepted_mints {
+        let trusted = is_mint_trusted(data_dir, m).await?;
+        accepted.push((m.clone(), trusted));
+    }
+
+    // Prefer swap targets with a liquidity track record. plan_payment's stable
+    // sort keeps the home mint first; within the rest, this orders by how
+    // reliably we've reached each target before (best routes first).
+    let liq = load_swap_liquidity(data_dir).await;
+    accepted.sort_by_key(|(m, _)| std::cmp::Reverse(target_liquidity_score(&liq, m)));
+
+    let holdings = load_wallet(data_dir).await?.spendable_by_mint();
+
+    match plan_payment(&holdings, &accepted, amount_sats) {
+        PaymentPlan::Direct { mint_url } => {
+            debug!("Payment plan: direct from {} for {} sats", mint_url, amount_sats);
+            send_token_at(data_dir, &mint_url, amount_sats).await
+        }
+        PaymentPlan::Swap { from_mint, to_mint } => {
+            debug!(
+                "Payment plan: swap {}→{} then pay {} sats (fee cap {})",
+                from_mint, to_mint, amount_sats, max_fee_sats
+            );
+            swap_between_mints(data_dir, &from_mint, &to_mint, amount_sats, max_fee_sats).await?;
+            send_token_at(data_dir, &to_mint, amount_sats).await
+        }
+        PaymentPlan::Insufficient => anyhow::bail!(
+            "cannot pay {} sats: no accepted mint covers it within balance/trust",
+            amount_sats
+        ),
+    }
+}
+
+// ── F2 step 3 — hardening: idempotent swap resume + liquidity cache ─────────
+
+const PENDING_SWAPS_FILE: &str = "wallet/pending_swaps.json";
+const SWAP_LIQUIDITY_FILE: &str = "wallet/swap_liquidity.json";
+
+/// An in-flight cross-mint swap, journaled the moment the source proofs are
+/// melted (paid) so a crash before the target claim can be resumed instead of
+/// silently losing the value. Removed once the target tokens are claimed.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct PendingSwap {
+    pub from_mint: String,
+    pub to_mint: String,
+    pub amount_sats: u64,
+    /// Source-mint melt quote id (the leg already paid).
+    pub melt_quote_id: String,
+    /// Target-mint mint quote id (the leg to claim).
+    pub mint_quote_id: String,
+    pub created_at: String,
+}
+
+async fn load_pending_swaps(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<Vec<PendingSwap>> {
+    let path = data_dir.join(PENDING_SWAPS_FILE);
+    if !path.exists() {
+        return Ok(Vec::new());
+    }
+    let content = fs::read_to_string(&path).await?;
+    Ok(serde_json::from_str(&content).unwrap_or_default())
+}
+
+async fn save_pending_swaps(data_dir: &Path, swaps: &[PendingSwap]) -> Result<()> {
+    let dir = data_dir.join("wallet");
+    fs::create_dir_all(&dir).await?;
+    let path = data_dir.join(PENDING_SWAPS_FILE);
+    fs::write(&path, serde_json::to_string_pretty(swaps)?).await?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn add_pending_swap(data_dir: &Path, swap: PendingSwap) -> Result<()> {
+    let mut all = load_pending_swaps(data_dir).await?;
+    all.push(swap);
+    save_pending_swaps(data_dir, &all).await
+}
+
+async fn remove_pending_swap(data_dir: &Path, mint_quote_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    let mut all = load_pending_swaps(data_dir).await?;
+    all.retain(|s| s.mint_quote_id != mint_quote_id);
+    save_pending_swaps(data_dir, &all).await
+}
+
+/// Resume any swaps that were interrupted between paying the source mint and
+/// claiming the target tokens. For each pending swap, ask the target mint about
+/// the mint quote:
+/// - `PAID`   → claim now (the value was paid but never claimed). Reclaimed.
+/// - `ISSUED` → already claimed on a prior run; just drop the journal entry.
+/// - else     → leave it (the invoice hasn't settled yet; retry next time).
+///
+/// Returns the total sats reclaimed. Safe to call repeatedly (idempotent): a
+/// quote is only minted once, and `ISSUED` quotes are never re-claimed.
+pub async fn resume_pending_swaps(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<u64> {
+    let pending = load_pending_swaps(data_dir).await?;
+    let mut reclaimed = 0u64;
+    for swap in pending {
+        let to = match MintClient::new(&swap.to_mint) {
+            Ok(c) => c,
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!("resume_pending_swaps: bad target mint {}: {}", swap.to_mint, e);
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+        let status = match to.mint_quote_status(&swap.mint_quote_id).await {
+            Ok(s) => s,
+            Err(e) => {
+                debug!(
+                    "resume_pending_swaps: status check failed for {}: {} — leaving pending",
+                    swap.mint_quote_id, e
+                );
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+        match status.state.as_str() {
+            "PAID" => match to.mint_tokens(&swap.mint_quote_id, swap.amount_sats).await {
+                Ok(result) => {
+                    let minted: u64 = result.proofs.iter().map(|p| p.amount).sum();
+                    let mut wallet = load_wallet(data_dir).await?;
+                    wallet.add_proofs(&swap.to_mint, result.proofs);
+                    wallet.record_tx(
+                        TransactionType::Mint,
+                        minted,
+                        &format!(
+                            "Resumed cross-mint swap {}→{}: claimed {} sats",
+                            swap.from_mint, swap.to_mint, minted
+                        ),
+                        &swap.to_mint,
+                        &swap.from_mint,
+                    );
+                    save_wallet(data_dir, &wallet).await?;
+                    remove_pending_swap(data_dir, &swap.mint_quote_id).await?;
+                    record_swap_success(data_dir, &swap.from_mint, &swap.to_mint).await;
+                    reclaimed += minted;
+                    info!(
+                        "Resumed interrupted swap {}→{}: reclaimed {} sats",
+                        swap.from_mint, swap.to_mint, minted
+                    );
+                }
+                Err(e) => warn!("resume_pending_swaps: claim failed for {}: {}", swap.mint_quote_id, e),
+            },
+            "ISSUED" => {
+                // Already claimed on a previous run — drop the journal entry.
+                remove_pending_swap(data_dir, &swap.mint_quote_id).await?;
+            }
+            other => debug!(
+                "resume_pending_swaps: quote {} state {} — leaving pending",
+                swap.mint_quote_id, other
+            ),
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(reclaimed)
+}
+
+/// Success/failure counts for a single (from → to) swap route.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct RouteStat {
+    successes: u64,
+    failures: u64,
+}
+
+/// Per-mint-pair liquidity cache: which swap routes have actually worked, so the
+/// payer can prefer routes with a track record over ones that keep failing.
+#[derive(Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct SwapLiquidity {
+    /// Keyed by `"<from>|<to>"` (normalized URLs).
+    routes: std::collections::BTreeMap<String, RouteStat>,
+}
+
+fn route_key(from_mint: &str, to_mint: &str) -> String {
+    format!(
+        "{}|{}",
+        from_mint.trim_end_matches('/'),
+        to_mint.trim_end_matches('/')
+    )
+}
+
+async fn load_swap_liquidity(data_dir: &Path) -> SwapLiquidity {
+    let path = data_dir.join(SWAP_LIQUIDITY_FILE);
+    match fs::read_to_string(&path).await {
+        Ok(content) => serde_json::from_str(&content).unwrap_or_default(),
+        Err(_) => SwapLiquidity::default(),
+    }
+}
+
+async fn save_swap_liquidity(data_dir: &Path, liq: &SwapLiquidity) {
+    let dir = data_dir.join("wallet");
+    let _ = fs::create_dir_all(&dir).await;
+    if let Ok(content) = serde_json::to_string_pretty(liq) {
+        let _ = fs::write(data_dir.join(SWAP_LIQUIDITY_FILE), content).await;
+    }
+}
+
+/// Record that a swap route succeeded (best-effort; never fails the caller).
+async fn record_swap_success(data_dir: &Path, from_mint: &str, to_mint: &str) {
+    let mut liq = load_swap_liquidity(data_dir).await;
+    liq.routes.entry(route_key(from_mint, to_mint)).or_default().successes += 1;
+    save_swap_liquidity(data_dir, &liq).await;
+}
+
+/// Record that a swap route failed (best-effort; never fails the caller).
+async fn record_swap_failure(data_dir: &Path, from_mint: &str, to_mint: &str) {
+    let mut liq = load_swap_liquidity(data_dir).await;
+    liq.routes.entry(route_key(from_mint, to_mint)).or_default().failures += 1;
+    save_swap_liquidity(data_dir, &liq).await;
+}
+
+/// Liquidity score for reaching `to_mint` from any source: net successes across
+/// all routes ending at this target. Higher = a more reliable destination.
+fn target_liquidity_score(liq: &SwapLiquidity, to_mint: &str) -> i64 {
+    let suffix = format!("|{}", to_mint.trim_end_matches('/'));
+    liq.routes
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|(k, _)| k.ends_with(&suffix))
+        .map(|(_, s)| s.successes as i64 - s.failures as i64)
+        .sum()
+}
+
 /// Receive a cashuA token from a peer — swaps proofs at the mint for fresh ones.
 pub async fn receive_token(data_dir: &Path, token_str: &str) -> Result<u64> {
     // Handle legacy format for backwards compatibility
@@ -936,4 +1476,286 @@ mod tests {
     fn test_default_mint_url() {
         assert_eq!(default_mint_url(), "http://127.0.0.1:8175");
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_swap_fee() {
+        assert_eq!(swap_fee(105, 100), 5);
+        // Defensive: never underflow if mint quotes oddly.
+        assert_eq!(swap_fee(100, 100), 0);
+        assert_eq!(swap_fee(90, 100), 0);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_is_mint_trusted_home_always() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        // Home mint is trusted even with no accepted-mints file.
+        assert!(is_mint_trusted(tmp.path(), &default_mint_url())
+            .await
+            .unwrap());
+        // Trailing slash on the home URL still matches.
+        assert!(is_mint_trusted(tmp.path(), "http://127.0.0.1:8175/")
+            .await
+            .unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_is_mint_trusted_respects_accepted_list() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        save_accepted_mints(
+            tmp.path(),
+            &AcceptedMints {
+                mints: vec![default_mint_url(), "https://mint.example.com".into()],
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        assert!(is_mint_trusted(tmp.path(), "https://mint.example.com")
+            .await
+            .unwrap());
+        // Normalized comparison ignores a trailing slash.
+        assert!(is_mint_trusted(tmp.path(), "https://mint.example.com/")
+            .await
+            .unwrap());
+        // A mint not on the list is not trusted.
+        assert!(!is_mint_trusted(tmp.path(), "https://evil.example.com")
+            .await
+            .unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_swap_between_mints_rejects_identical() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let err = swap_between_mints(
+            tmp.path(),
+            &default_mint_url(),
+            "http://127.0.0.1:8175/",
+            100,
+            10,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("identical"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_swap_between_mints_rejects_untrusted_target() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let err = swap_between_mints(
+            tmp.path(),
+            &default_mint_url(),
+            "https://untrusted.example.com",
+            100,
+            10,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("trusted"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_swap_between_mints_rejects_zero_amount() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let err = swap_between_mints(
+            tmp.path(),
+            &default_mint_url(),
+            "https://mint.example.com",
+            0,
+            10,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("greater than zero"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_spendable_by_mint_groups_and_excludes() {
+        let mut wallet = WalletState::default();
+        wallet.add_proofs(
+            "http://mint-a",
+            vec![
+                Proof { amount: 10, id: "k".into(), secret: "s1".into(), c: "c".into() },
+                Proof { amount: 5, id: "k".into(), secret: "s2".into(), c: "c".into() },
+            ],
+        );
+        wallet.add_proofs(
+            "http://mint-b",
+            vec![Proof { amount: 7, id: "k".into(), secret: "s3".into(), c: "c".into() }],
+        );
+        wallet.proofs[1].spent = true; // exclude the 5 on mint-a
+        let by_mint = wallet.spendable_by_mint();
+        assert_eq!(by_mint, vec![("http://mint-a".to_string(), 10), ("http://mint-b".to_string(), 7)]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_plan_payment_direct_prefers_home() {
+        let home = default_mint_url();
+        let holdings = vec![(home.clone(), 100), ("https://other".into(), 100)];
+        // Both accepted; home should win the tie-break.
+        let accepted = vec![("https://other".into(), true), (home.clone(), true)];
+        assert_eq!(
+            plan_payment(&holdings, &accepted, 50),
+            PaymentPlan::Direct { mint_url: home }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_plan_payment_direct_only_accepted_mint() {
+        let holdings = vec![("https://a".into(), 100), ("https://b".into(), 100)];
+        // We hold both, but the seeder only accepts b.
+        let accepted = vec![("https://b".into(), true)];
+        assert_eq!(
+            plan_payment(&holdings, &accepted, 50),
+            PaymentPlan::Direct { mint_url: "https://b".into() }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_plan_payment_swaps_into_trusted_target() {
+        // We hold value on A; seeder accepts only B (trusted) which we don't hold.
+        let holdings = vec![("https://a".into(), 100)];
+        let accepted = vec![("https://b".into(), true)];
+        assert_eq!(
+            plan_payment(&holdings, &accepted, 50),
+            PaymentPlan::Swap { from_mint: "https://a".into(), to_mint: "https://b".into() }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_plan_payment_refuses_untrusted_swap_target() {
+        // Seeder accepts only B, but B is not trusted → no swap, insufficient.
+        let holdings = vec![("https://a".into(), 100)];
+        let accepted = vec![("https://b".into(), false)];
+        assert_eq!(plan_payment(&holdings, &accepted, 50), PaymentPlan::Insufficient);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_plan_payment_insufficient_when_no_single_source_covers() {
+        // Total 60 across two mints, but neither alone covers 50+ for a swap and
+        // we hold neither accepted mint directly.
+        let holdings = vec![("https://a".into(), 30), ("https://c".into(), 30)];
+        let accepted = vec![("https://b".into(), true)];
+        assert_eq!(plan_payment(&holdings, &accepted, 50), PaymentPlan::Insufficient);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_plan_payment_direct_beats_swap() {
+        // We hold the accepted mint directly AND could swap — Direct must win.
+        let home = default_mint_url();
+        let holdings = vec![("https://b".into(), 100), (home.clone(), 100)];
+        let accepted = vec![("https://b".into(), true)];
+        assert_eq!(
+            plan_payment(&holdings, &accepted, 50),
+            PaymentPlan::Direct { mint_url: "https://b".into() }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_build_payment_token_rejects_empty_mints() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let err = build_payment_token(tmp.path(), &[], 100, 10)
+            .await
+            .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("no accepted mints"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_build_payment_token_insufficient_falls_through() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        // Empty wallet, untrusted seeder mint → cannot pay (caller uses origin).
+        let err = build_payment_token(tmp.path(), &["https://seeder.example.com".into()], 100, 10)
+            .await
+            .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("cannot pay"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_route_key_normalizes_trailing_slash() {
+        assert_eq!(route_key("https://a/", "https://b/"), "https://a|https://b");
+        assert_eq!(route_key("https://a", "https://b"), "https://a|https://b");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_pending_swaps_roundtrip_and_remove() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        assert!(load_pending_swaps(tmp.path()).await.unwrap().is_empty());
+
+        add_pending_swap(
+            tmp.path(),
+            PendingSwap {
+                from_mint: "https://a".into(),
+                to_mint: "https://b".into(),
+                amount_sats: 100,
+                melt_quote_id: "melt-1".into(),
+                mint_quote_id: "mint-1".into(),
+                created_at: "2026-06-17T00:00:00Z".into(),
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        let loaded = load_pending_swaps(tmp.path()).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(loaded.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(loaded[0].mint_quote_id, "mint-1");
+
+        remove_pending_swap(tmp.path(), "mint-1").await.unwrap();
+        assert!(load_pending_swaps(tmp.path()).await.unwrap().is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_resume_pending_swaps_empty_is_noop() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resume_pending_swaps(tmp.path()).await.unwrap(), 0);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_liquidity_cache_records_and_scores() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        // Two routes into B succeed; one into C fails.
+        record_swap_success(tmp.path(), "https://a", "https://b").await;
+        record_swap_success(tmp.path(), "https://x", "https://b").await;
+        record_swap_failure(tmp.path(), "https://a", "https://c").await;
+
+        let liq = load_swap_liquidity(tmp.path()).await;
+        // B reached successfully from two sources → net +2; trailing slash tolerant.
+        assert_eq!(target_liquidity_score(&liq, "https://b/"), 2);
+        // C only failed → net -1.
+        assert_eq!(target_liquidity_score(&liq, "https://c"), -1);
+        // Unknown target → neutral 0.
+        assert_eq!(target_liquidity_score(&liq, "https://unknown"), 0);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_build_payment_token_prefers_liquid_target() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        // Trust two non-home mints; hold value on a source mint for both.
+        save_accepted_mints(
+            tmp.path(),
+            &AcceptedMints {
+                mints: vec![
+                    default_mint_url(),
+                    "https://liquid".into(),
+                    "https://dry".into(),
+                ],
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        // Give "https://liquid" a track record so it should be preferred.
+        record_swap_success(tmp.path(), "https://src", "https://liquid").await;
+
+        // Seeder accepts both non-home mints; we only hold "https://src".
+        let accepted = vec![("https://dry".into(), true), ("https://liquid".into(), true)];
+        let holdings = vec![("https://src".to_string(), 1000u64)];
+
+        // Mirror build_payment_token's ordering step, then plan.
+        let liq = load_swap_liquidity(tmp.path()).await;
+        let mut ordered = accepted.clone();
+        ordered.sort_by_key(|(m, _): &(String, bool)| {
+            std::cmp::Reverse(target_liquidity_score(&liq, m))
+        });
+        match plan_payment(&holdings, &ordered, 100) {
+            PaymentPlan::Swap { to_mint, .. } => assert_eq!(to_mint, "https://liquid"),
+            other => panic!("expected swap into liquid target, got {:?}", other),
+        }
+    }
 }

docs/dht-RESUME.md

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+# DHT work — RESUME HERE
+
+**Last updated:** 2026-06-16 · **Branch:** `agent-trust-wip` · **Worktree:** `~/Projects/archy-dht`
+
+This file is the single source of truth for resuming the DHT / peer-distribution
+work after a restart. Read it top to bottom, run the **Verify state** block, then
+continue at **Next step**.
+
+---
+
+## ⚠️ CRITICAL — where to work (do not skip)
+
+- **Work ONLY in the worktree `~/Projects/archy-dht` on branch `agent-trust-wip`.**
+- **NEVER run git checkout / branch-switch / commit in the shared tree `~/Projects/archy`.**
+  Another agent cuts releases on `main` there. Git branch state is **global to one
+  working tree**, so a checkout in the shared tree drags every session onto that
+  branch and can clobber uncommitted work. That already happened once — the worktree
+  exists specifically to prevent it. See memory `feedback_concurrent_agent_tree`.
+- The shared tree stays on `main` for the release agent. Leave it alone.
+
+## Build facts (so you don't get surprised)
+
+- It's a **binary** crate: test with `cargo test --bin archipelago -- <filter>`
+  (there is no lib target).
+- The **test profile is opt-level=3** → every incremental test rebuild of the
+  `archipelago` crate is **~5 min**; a cold build of the iroh feature tree is ~19 min.
+  Budget for it. Run builds in the background and poll.
+- Default build = no iroh. The iroh swarm engine is behind the **`iroh-swarm`**
+  Cargo feature (off by default): `cargo build --features iroh-swarm`.
+- Plain `cargo build` (no feature) is the fleet build and is unaffected by any DHT work.
+
+## Verify state (run these first on resume)
+
+```bash
+cd ~/Projects/archy-dht
+git branch --show-current            # → agent-trust-wip
+git log --oneline -7                 # see the commit list below
+git status --short                   # should be clean (or your in-progress edits)
+git worktree list                    # archy-dht → agent-trust-wip; archy → main
+# sanity compile (default, fast-ish):
+cargo build --bin archipelago 2>&1 | tail -3
+```
+
+---
+
+## What is DONE (committed on `agent-trust-wip`)
+
+Design doc: `docs/dht-distribution-design.md` (the full plan).
+
+| Commit | Phase | Summary |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `0fef8086` | base | parked trust module + `seed::derive_release_root_ed25519` (pre-existing) |
+| `27f11bf8` | **0** | signed-catalog authenticity wired: `trust/` module verifies the release-root detached signature in `app_catalog::fetch_one`; release-root KAT pinned |
+| `f0cb91ed` | **1** | BLAKE3 alongside SHA-256: `content_hash.rs`, `ComponentUpdate.blake3`, `BlobMeta.blake3` |
+| `2523c9e3` | **2 seam** | `swarm/mod.rs` — `BlobProvider` + `fetch_content_addressed` (verify peer bytes, origin-always-wins); `iroh-swarm` flag; wired into `update.rs` |
+| `082946aa` | **2 engine** | real `swarm/iroh_provider.rs` over iroh 1.0 + iroh-blobs 0.103 (optional deps). Dep tree proven to resolve+compile against the pinned stack |
+| `9fa56a82` | **3 core** | `swarm/seed_advert.rs` — signed Nostr seed-advertisement protocol (NIP-33 kind 30081, d-tag=blake3) |
+
+All tests green at each step. Total new modules: `trust/`, `content_hash.rs`, `swarm/`.
+
+## task #12 — Phase 3 glue + wiring — DONE (2026-06-17, NOT yet committed)
+
+Implemented in the worktree, **uncommitted** (release in flight — do not commit/merge
+until the user says so). Verified: default `cargo build` clean, `cargo build
+--features iroh-swarm` clean, `cargo test --bin archipelago -- swarm::` → **8/8 pass**.
+
+1. **`NostrSeedDiscovery`** (`swarm/iroh_provider.rs`) — `ProviderDiscovery` made
+   **async** (`#[async_trait]`); impl queries relays via the new
+   `seed_advert::fetch_seed_endpoint_ids` and parses each string with
+   `EndpointId::from_str` (`EndpointId = PublicKey`, has `FromStr`/`Display`),
+   skipping unparseable. `try_fetch` now `.await`s discovery.
+2. **Publish path** — dep-free `seed_advert::fetch_seed_endpoint_ids` +
+   `publish_seed_advert` (reuse now-`pub(crate)` `build_nostr_client` /
+   `load_or_create_nostr_keys`); `IrohProvider::seed_and_advertise` imports the blob
+   into the FsStore (`blobs().add_path` → `TagInfo`) with a defensive hash-match,
+   then publishes. Scope: releases/catalog only.
+3. **Wiring** — `swarm::init()` builds the `IrohProvider` once at startup into a
+   `OnceLock<SwarmRuntime>` (keeps endpoint/router alive → keeps seeding);
+   `providers()` returns the registered provider; `announce_held_blob()` is called
+   from `update.rs` after each release component passes both hash gates. New config
+   `swarm_enabled` (`ARCHIPELAGO_SWARM_ENABLED`, default false); `server.rs` calls
+   `swarm::init`. All iroh code stays behind `iroh-swarm`; default build inert.
+
+**iroh-blobs paid-serving spike (open Q#1) — RESOLVED:** `BlobsProtocol::new(&store,
+Some(EventSender))` + `EventMask` intercept gives native per-request allow/deny
+(`RequestMode::Intercept` → `Result<(), AbortReason>`), connection-level reject
+(`ConnectMode::Intercept`), and per-request throttle/meter (`ThrottleMode::Intercept`).
+
+## NEW: Phase 4+ plan (paid streaming / relay / IndeeHub) — `docs/phase4-streaming-ecash-plan.md`
+
+Design for: (1) ecash-paid swarm transport, (2) networking through nodes / relay,
+(3) IndeeHub "Archipelago" content source (signed Nostr film catalog, kind 30082).
+Headline: ~80% already exists (Cashu wallet, `streaming/` payment gate + metering,
+4-tier transport, the swarm above). Also shipped this session: a **Networking Profits
+→ Settings** UI in `neode-ui` (new `views/web5/Web5NetworkingProfitsSettings.vue` +
+route + button in `Web5QuickActions.vue` + `common.settings` i18n) that drives the
+existing `streaming.list-services`/`configure-service` RPCs; free-everything is the
+default (all services ship `enabled:false`). Frontend typechecks clean (pre-existing
+`Web5ConnectedNodes.vue` `.did` errors are NOT ours). `neode-ui` deps were
+`npm install`ed to complete a partial install.
+
+## F2 step 1 — cross-mint ecash swap — DONE (2026-06-17, NOT yet committed)
+
+Plan §2a / phasing F2 step 1. Implemented in `wallet/ecash.rs`, **uncommitted**
+(release in flight). Verified: `cargo test --bin archipelago -- wallet::ecash` →
+**25/25 pass** (6 new), default build clean, `--features iroh-swarm` build clean.
+
+- `is_mint_trusted(data_dir, url)` — swap-into allow-list. Home Fedimint always
+  trusted; any other mint must be on `accepted_mints` (normalized, trailing-slash
+  tolerant). Reuses the list the streaming gate already advertises to payers.
+- `mint_quote_at` / `melt_quote_at` / `send_token_at(data_dir, mint_url, amount)` —
+  the home-mint-hardcoded helpers parameterized by target mint. `send_token` now
+  delegates to `send_token_at` with the home mint.
+- `swap_between_mints(data_dir, from, to, amount, max_fee_sats) -> u64` — mint-quote
+  on B → melt-quote on A → **fee-cap check** (`swap_fee` = total_paid − delivered;
+  bail if > cap so caller falls back to free origin) → select+melt A proofs →
+  **persist the spend BEFORE claiming** (crash can't double-spend) → poll B invoice
+  until PAID/ISSUED (`wait_for_mint_quote_paid`, 60s/2s) → mint+claim on B. Both legs
+  recorded in the tx log (peer field carries the counterpart mint).
+
+## F2 step 2 — payer-side auto-swap payment builder — DONE (2026-06-17, NOT yet committed)
+
+Plan §2a step 2. Implemented in `wallet/ecash.rs`, **uncommitted**. Verified:
+`cargo test --bin archipelago -- wallet::ecash` → **34/34 pass** (9 new). All on the
+default path (no feature gating) so the `iroh-swarm` tree is unaffected.
+
+- `WalletState::spendable_by_mint() -> Vec<(mint_url, balance)>` — per-mint holdings.
+- `PaymentPlan { Direct{mint}, Swap{from,to}, Insufficient }` + pure
+  `plan_payment(holdings, accepted: &[(mint, trusted)], amount)` — the policy:
+  **Direct beats Swap** (already-held mint, no fee, no trust needed); a **Swap target
+  must be trusted** (`is_mint_trusted`); home mint is the tie-break for both legs;
+  `Insufficient` → caller uses free origin. Pure/sync, unit-tested without a mint.
+- `build_payment_token(data_dir, accepted_mints, amount_sats, max_fee_sats) -> token` —
+  annotates the seeder's `accepted_mints` with trust, runs `plan_payment` against
+  `spendable_by_mint()`, then `send_token_at` (direct) or `swap_between_mints` +
+  `send_token_at` (swap, honoring the fee cap). Bails (→ origin) when nothing covers
+  the amount within balance/trust/fee. This is the builder the fetch side calls.
+
+## Fetch-side auto-pay + F2 step 3 hardening — DONE (2026-06-17, NOT yet committed)
+
+Implemented; **uncommitted**. Verified: `cargo test --bin archipelago -- wallet::
+swarm::` → **85/85 pass** (18 new across these + earlier steps), **0 warnings**,
+default build clean. `--features iroh-swarm` build = (see below; re-run after these
+edits).
+
+- **`swarm/payment.rs`** (un-gated — builds without `iroh-swarm`): `PaymentPolicy
+  { budget_sats, max_fee_sats }` + `auto_pay_token(data_dir, policy, accepted_mints,
+  price)` → `Ok(Some(token))` to pay / `Ok(None)` to use origin. Degrades any
+  wallet/mint error to `Ok(None)` so payment can never block content (origin always
+  wins). The on-wire token→peer exchange (in-band paid-blobs ALPN, "shape A") is the
+  remaining gap — deferred in the plan; this is the decision/builder brain it'll call.
+- **`streaming.prepare-payment` RPC** (dispatcher + `handle_streaming_prepare_payment`):
+  the live, user-invokable entry to the payer-side builder. Params `{accepted_mints,
+  price_sats, budget_sats?, max_fee_sats?}` → `{status:"ready", token}` or
+  `{status:"declined"}`. This is what makes the whole payment chain reachable
+  (no dead code).
+- **Idempotent swap resume** (`wallet/pending_swaps.json`): `swap_between_mints`
+  journals the in-flight swap (melt + mint quote ids) right after the source spend is
+  persisted, removes it on claim. `resume_pending_swaps(data_dir)` reclaims `PAID`
+  quotes, skips `ISSUED` (never double-claims), leaves unsettled — **wired at server
+  startup** (server.rs, after `swarm::init`).
+- **Liquidity cache** (`wallet/swap_liquidity.json`): per-route success/failure;
+  `build_payment_token` orders swap targets by `target_liquidity_score` (proven routes
+  first, home still first). `swap_between_mints` records success/failure.
+- Removed the unused `mint_quote_at`/`melt_quote_at` thin wrappers (swap calls
+  `MintClient` directly; nothing else used them).
+
+## Shape-A paid-blobs negotiation ALPN — DONE (2026-06-17, NOT yet committed)
+
+Plan §1 "shape A" — the on-wire exchange that lets a downloader pay a seeder before
+fetching a gated blob. Implemented behind `iroh-swarm`; **uncommitted**. Compiles
+clean (`cargo build --features iroh-swarm` → only the 2 pre-existing `trust/` warns).
+**Caveat:** the request/grant *wire path* can only be fully verified with a live
+two-node iroh test (serde + types are unit-tested; the QUIC round-trip is not).
+
+- **`swarm/paid_alpn.rs`** (gated): ALPN `archy/paid-blobs/1` on a second handler on
+  the same endpoint/router. `PaidRequest { want, token? }` ↔ `PaidResponse
+  { Granted | PaymentRequired{price_sats, accepted_mints} | Denied{reason} }`.
+  - **Serve side** `PaidBlobsProtocol` (`ProtocolHandler`): per bi-stream, keys the
+    peer by `connection.remote_id()`, runs `streaming::gate::check_gate(content-download,
+    peer, token, blob_size)`, maps to a verdict. Free when service disabled (default),
+    fail-OPEN (Granted) on gate error — mirrors `swarm/paid.rs`. A paid retry's token
+    opens the session the blob-GET gate then sees (same endpoint id → same session).
+  - **Fetch side** `negotiate_access(endpoint, data_dir, peer, hex, policy) -> bool`:
+    best-effort + additive. Asks with no token; on `PaymentRequired` calls
+    `payment::auto_pay_token` (cross-mint aware), retries with the token. Connect/
+    protocol failure ⇒ proceed (the GET gate is the real enforcement); explicit
+    `PaymentRequired` we won't/can't pay ⇒ skip peer → origin.
+- **Wired into `iroh_provider.rs`**: registers the 2nd ALPN on the `Router`; `try_fetch`
+  negotiates with each discovered peer before `downloader.download`. `IrohProvider`
+  carries `data_dir` + `pay_policy` (defaults to `PaymentPolicy::free` → releases/
+  catalog never pay; a future film fetch passes a real budget).
+
+### Remaining to make paid FILM fetch real (small, on top of shape A)
+- Pass a non-free `PaymentPolicy` for the film scope (releases stay free) + surface an
+  auto-pay cap in Settings. The plumbing is all here; only the policy source is free.
+- Live two-node integration test (tests/multinode/) to exercise the actual QUIC
+  request→pay→grant→GET path end to end.
+
+## Remaining Phase 4 roadmap (NOT started — gated)
+
+- **Relay protocol (§2b)** — single-hop paid `relay.fetch`. Needs design sign-off.
+- **IndeeHub "Archipelago" source (steps A–E)** — signed kind-30082 film catalog +
+  `film.catalog`/`GET /api/film/:blake3` + frontend source. Gated on user decisions
+  (publisher trust anchor, MinIO origin) + the external IndeeHub frontend repo.
+  **Shipping directive (user 2026-06-17):** ship the IndeeHub app change as a
+  **decoupled app-catalog update** (bump `releases/app-catalog.json`), not a binary
+  OTA. See `docs/phase4-streaming-ecash-plan.md` §4 note.
+
+## After Phase 3
+
+- **Phase 4** — IndeeHub films on the same blob layer (Blossom catalog + iroh swarm;
+  MinIO origin). Each HLS `.ts` segment = a content-addressed blob.
+- **Phase 0 GO-LIVE (needs the user)** — the catalog/manifest signature anchor
+  `trust::anchor::RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY_HEX` is still `None`; the pinned KAT is the
+  TEST mnemonic, not the real key. Going live = signing ceremony with the **real
+  release master seed** (only the user has it) → derive release-root → bake its pubkey
+  into `anchor.rs` → sign the real `releases/app-catalog.json`. Until then verification
+  is advisory (verify-if-present, anchor not enforced).
+
+## Mergeability
+
+As of last check we were only ~4 commits diverged from `main`; the only shared-file
+overlap is `seed.rs` + `update.rs`. **Do NOT merge to `main` while the release is in
+flight** — that's the user's call. Sync (merge main → agent-trust-wip) once the
+release lands and `main` is clean.
+
+## Background build logs from the last session (may be stale)
+`/tmp/dht-*.log` — phase test/build outputs. Safe to ignore/delete on resume.

docs/dht-distribution-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+# DHT / Peer-Distributed Content Design
+
+**Status:** Design (no code yet) · **Date:** 2026-06-16 · **Author:** archipelago + Claude
+
+## 1. Purpose
+
+Make Archipelago's large-file movement **peer-distributed**: a node should be able to
+fetch content (OTA updates, app/OCI images, IndeeHub films) from *any other node that
+already has it*, falling back to the central origin only when no peer can serve it.
+
+This document covers three use-cases that are **the same problem** —
+"fetch content-addressed bytes from whatever node already has them, verify, fall back to
+origin":
+
+1. **OTA releases** — node binaries + frontend tarballs.
+2. **App installs** — container/OCI images.
+3. **IndeeHub streaming** — films created in "backstage" on one node, streamable from any
+   node that has them stored or cached.
+
+### Guiding principle (decided 2026-06-16)
+
+> **Swarm-assist, origin always wins.** The peer swarm is an *optimization*. The central
+> origin (OVH HTTP release assets / MinIO) remains the **guaranteed fallback** and the
+> source of truth for reliability. We never bet correctness or availability on the P2P
+> layer. This is what keeps the system bulletproof while the P2P stack matures.
+
+## 2. Current state (verified 2026-06-16)
+
+### OTA (`core/archipelago/src/update.rs`)
+- Manifest at `DEFAULT_UPDATE_MANIFEST_URL` (`update.rs:67`) = vps2 OVH
+  (`146.59.87.168:3000/lfg2025/archy/raw/branch/main/releases/manifest.json`).
+- `check_for_updates()` (`:565`) walks an operator mirror list (`default_mirrors()` `:105`,
+  `load_mirrors()` `:123`), origin-rewrites component URLs to the chosen mirror
+  (`rewrite_manifest_origins()` `:227`).
+- `download_component_resumable()` (`:821`) — resumable HTTP Range download, 6 retries,
+  exponential backoff.
+- **Integrity: SHA-256 only** (`:984`), compared against `ComponentUpdate.sha256`.
+- **No authenticity:** manifests are *unsigned*. A compromised mirror can serve a malicious
+  but hash-consistent binary. Post-apply health probe + auto-rollback exist
+  (`verify_pending_update()` `:389`, `rollback_update()` `:1423`) but that is not a
+  substitute for signature verification.
+- Manifest schema: `{version, release_date, changelog[], components[{name, current_version,
+  new_version, download_url, sha256, size_bytes}]}`.
+
+### App installs (`core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/package/install.rs`)
+- `handle_package_install()` (`:195`) → `do_pull_image()` (`:1062`) tries each registry from
+  `container/registry.rs` in priority order (OVH primary), `rewrite_image()` rewrites the
+  origin, `podman pull`. Same centralized-mirror shape as OTA.
+
+### Transport & identity (already P2P-capable)
+- `transport/mod.rs` — `NodeTransport` trait (`:74`), `TransportRouter` (`:336`), priority
+  stack Mesh→LAN→FIPS→Tor. `PeerRegistry` (`:199`) tracks per-peer addresses
+  (mesh id, LAN ip:port, `fips_npub`, onion).
+- Seed-derived identity (`seed.rs`): node Ed25519 (`archipelago/node/ed25519/v1`), node
+  Nostr secp256k1 (`archipelago/nostr-node/secp256k1/v1`), FIPS secp256k1
+  (`archipelago/fips/secp256k1/v1`). DID + npub per node.
+- **Already content-addressed:** `blobs.rs` stores `blobs/<cid>` keyed by **SHA-256** hex,
+  with HMAC-SHA256 capability tokens (`BlobMeta`, 64 MiB cap). `transport/chunking.rs` does
+  Reed-Solomon chunking for LoRa.
+
+### Trust scaffolding — **NOT built yet**
+- No `core/src/trust/`, no `ROOT_PUBKEY`, no `derive_release_root_*`, no
+  `archipelago/release/root/*` HKDF strings, no JCS/canonical JSON, no signing ceremony
+  scripts, no `manifest-v2.json`. The "Phase 0 signed manifest" design exists only as notes.
+
+### IndeeHub (the streaming target)
+- Original platform (not a fork). Working source: `~/Projects/Indeedhub Prototype/`
+  (Vue 3 + NestJS). Submodule `git.tx1138.com/lfg2025/indeehub.git` (host retired —
+  needs a live remote). In `archy`: image-only, `apps/indeedhub/manifest.yml` pulls
+  `146.59.87.168:3000/lfg2025/indeedhub:1.0.0` (+ `-api`, `-ffmpeg`, postgres, redis,
+  minio, nostr-rs-relay).
+- Streaming today: FFmpeg → **HLS (.m3u8 + AES-128 .ts segments)** in **MinIO**
+  (`indeedhub-private`/`-public`), metadata in Postgres, transcode queue in Redis,
+  auth via Nostr (NIP-98). Glue: `install.rs:68` `patch_indeedhub_nostr_provider()`
+  injects the NIP-07 provider into the nginx-wrapped frontend.
+- **No "backstage" code yet** — it's the creator/upload side we're introducing.
+
+## 3. Protocol evaluation (verified maintenance status, 2026-06-16)
+
+| Option | Verdict | Why |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Web5 / TBD / DWN** | ❌ Reject | Block **wound TBD down**, handed components to DIF (`TBD54566975`→`decentralized-identity`). `web5-js` latest release **0.12.0, Oct 2024** (~20 mo stale). DWN spec still **Draft**. DWNs are DID-scoped *record stores*, not a blob-streaming swarm. Fails the "well-maintained + bulletproof" bar. |
+| **iroh / iroh-blobs** | ✅ Swarm engine | **v1.0.0 shipped 2026-06-15.** Rust (matches core), **BLAKE3 verified streaming** over **QUIC + hole-punching + relays**, content-addressed, KB→TB, **native byte-range** support (ideal for HLS). n0 team, production relays. |
+| **Nostr Blossom** | ✅ Index/catalog layer | SHA-256-addressed blobs over HTTP, modular BUD specs (BUD-01/02/04/05/06/08), actively developed, **already aligned** (Nostr identity everywhere; `blobs.rs` already SHA-256). Server-centric (not a peer swarm) → use as discovery + IndeeHub catalog + HTTP fallback, not the distribution engine. |
+| **libp2p-kad (hand-rolled DHT)** | ⚠️ De-prioritize | Was the old "Phase 4 build a Kademlia" plan. iroh 1.0 supersedes the need to hand-roll discovery + swarm. Revisit only if iroh proves unworkable. |
+
+**Note vs. prior plan:** the saved DHT design said "no iroh as a Phase 0–5 dep (revisit
+post-Phase 3)." iroh hitting 1.0 removes the main reason for that deferral — **this design
+reverses that non-choice** and adopts iroh as the swarm layer, collapsing the from-scratch
+Kademlia work.
+
+## 4. Recommended architecture — three layers, one engine
+
+Build **one** peer-distribution layer; use it for all three use-cases.
+
+```
+                ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+   Authenticity │  Signed Nostr events (per-node npub) +       │   "who published this,
+   & Discovery  │  seed-derived RELEASE ROOT key for OTA +     │    who has it"
+                │  Blossom BUD catalog for IndeeHub            │
+                └─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+                ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+   Integrity &  │  BLAKE3 content addressing (iroh-native,     │   "name bytes by hash,
+   Addressing   │  range-verifiable). SHA-256 kept in manifest │    verify on arrival"
+                │  during migration window.                    │
+                └─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+                ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+   Transport &  │  iroh-blobs swarm (peers that already have   │   "move the bytes"
+   Swarm        │  it)  ─── fallback ───▶  OVH HTTP / MinIO    │
+                │                          origin (ALWAYS wins) │
+                └─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+- **Integrity/addressing — BLAKE3.** iroh-native, supports verified *range* streaming
+  (essential for HLS + resumable). Keep SHA-256 in the manifest for back-compat through the
+  migration window; add a `blake3` field alongside.
+- **Discovery/authenticity — signed Nostr events + release root key.**
+  - OTA: the **Phase 0 seed-derived release root key** signs the manifest (BLAKE3 root hash
+    + version). Integrity ≠ authenticity — content addressing proves *bytes are intact*, the
+    signature proves *we authorized them*. Both are required.
+  - "Who has blob X" advertised via signed Nostr events `{content-hash, provider-npub, ts}`,
+    so nodes find seeds without a central tracker.
+  - IndeeHub: Blossom BUDs for the film catalog + provider/mirror lists.
+- **Transport/swarm — iroh-blobs, origin fallback.** Node asks the swarm for a hash; peers
+  that have it serve range-verified BLAKE3 streams; if the swarm yields nothing, fall back to
+  the existing resumable HTTP path (`update.rs:821`) against OVH/MinIO. **A node that
+  finishes a download automatically becomes a seed.**
+
+### Bulletproof posture
+The swarm sits *above* a proven HTTP path, never in place of it. Worst case (every peer
+offline, iroh bug, NAT failure) the node downloads exactly as it does today. iroh 1.0 is new;
+this containment is deliberate.
+
+## 5. Use-case flows
+
+### OTA / app installs
+1. Node reads the **signed** manifest (via signed Nostr event or HTTP), gets BLAKE3 root hash
+   + release-root signature; verify signature → reject on failure.
+2. Query swarm (signed provider events) for peers holding that hash.
+3. Download range-verified BLAKE3 stream from peers; verify full BLAKE3 (+ SHA-256 during
+   migration).
+4. No peers / failure → resumable HTTP from OVH (current path).
+5. Apply + health-probe + auto-rollback (unchanged). Updated node **becomes a seed**.
+6. OCI images: content-address image layers the same way; OVH registry stays the origin.
+
+### IndeeHub streaming ("backstage → any node")
+1. Creator publishes a film in **backstage** → FFmpeg → HLS; **each .ts segment is a
+   content-addressed (BLAKE3) blob**, immutable and small → ideal swarm objects.
+2. Publish a **signed Nostr event** advertising title + segment hashes (Blossom catalog).
+3. Any node running IndeeHub resolves the content address and **streams from the nearest
+   node(s) that have it stored/cached** via iroh range streaming; MinIO/OVH is origin.
+4. AES-128 key delivery + NIP-98 auth unchanged (keys gate decryption; swarm only moves
+   encrypted segments — so untrusted seeds can cache without seeing plaintext).
+
+## 6. Phasing (folds into the existing Phase 0–6 plan)
+
+0. **Signed manifests (required first, unbuilt).** `derive_release_root_ed25519` /
+   `derive_release_root_nostr` in `seed.rs` (HKDF `archipelago/release/root/ed25519/v1`,
+   `.../secp256k1/v1`); `core/src/trust/` (anchor/bundle/manifest/timestamp/nostr); JCS
+   canonical JSON; ceremony scripts; `manifest-v2.json` with signature. Gives *authenticity*,
+   which content-addressing does not.
+1. **BLAKE3 alongside SHA-256** in the manifest + `blobs.rs`.
+2. **iroh-blobs PoC** behind a feature flag: serve OTA blobs from the swarm with HTTP
+   fallback; measure on a scratch/test node, then the fleet.
+3. **Signed Nostr advertisement events** for releases (publisher identity + provider lists).
+4. **IndeeHub on the same blob layer** (Blossom catalog + iroh swarm; MinIO origin).
+
+This collapses the old "Phase 4: build S/Kademlia from scratch" into "adopt iroh," a large
+de-risking.
+
+## 7. Open decisions
+
+- **BLAKE3 migration scope:** dual-hash window length; whether to re-hash historical
+  releases or only BLAKE3 going forward.
+- **iroh ↔ existing transports:** iroh brings its own QUIC + hole-punching + relays; decide
+  how it coexists with FIPS/Tor (run iroh standalone first; integrate with `TransportRouter`
+  later if useful).
+- **Seed retention policy:** how long nodes keep blobs to seed others (disk pressure on small
+  nodes); pinning rules for IndeeHub films vs. transient OTA blobs.
+- **Privacy:** iroh dial-by-key vs. Tor's anonymity; default transport per content type.
+
+## References
+- iroh: https://github.com/n0-computer/iroh · iroh-blobs: https://github.com/n0-computer/iroh-blobs · docs: https://docs.iroh.computer/protocols/blobs
+- Blossom: https://github.com/hzrd149/blossom · NIP-B7: https://nips.nostr.com/B7 · nostr-blossom (Rust): https://docs.rs/nostr-blossom
+- Web5/DWN (rejected): https://github.com/decentralized-identity/web5-js · https://identity.foundation/decentralized-web-node/spec/ · https://block.xyz/inside/block-contributes-digital-identity-components-to-the-decentralized-identity-foundation

docs/phase4-streaming-ecash-plan.md

@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+# Phase 4+ — Paid swarm streaming & the IndeeHub "Archipelago" source
+
+**Status:** PLAN / design (2026-06-17) · **Branch:** `agent-trust-wip` · not implemented
+**Builds on:** `docs/dht-distribution-design.md` (Phases 0–3, swarm + Blossom), the
+Phase 3 swarm work just landed (`swarm/`, `content_hash.rs`, `trust/`).
+
+This plans three things the user asked for, in one coherent architecture:
+
+1. **Pay sats (ecash) for transport** of streaming film data between nodes.
+2. **Networking *through* nodes** — relaying/routing a stream via intermediate peers.
+3. An **"Archipelago" content source in IndeeHub** that shows every film uploaded
+   to *backstage*, on every node running the IndeeHub app.
+
+> ## Headline finding
+> **Most of the primitives already exist.** This is ~80% integration glue, not
+> greenfield. A full Cashu/ecash wallet, a metered streaming payment gate, a
+> 4-tier transport layer, the iroh-blobs swarm (just added), signed Nostr
+> advertisements, and the Ed25519 trust module are all already in the tree. The
+> genuinely new code is: (a) a paid-serving hook on the iroh side, (b) a relay
+> protocol, and (c) the IndeeHub film catalog + Archipelago-local API.
+
+---
+
+## 0. Inventory — what we can build on (all already in `core/archipelago/src`)
+
+| Capability | Where | State |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Cashu ecash wallet** (mint/melt/send/receive, BDHKE) | `wallet/ecash.rs`, `wallet/cashu.rs`, `wallet/mint_client.rs`, `wallet/bdhke.rs` | ✅ implemented |
+| **Local mint** (Fedimint) backing the wallet | `apps/fedimint` (`http://127.0.0.1:8175`) | ✅ deployed |
+| **Lightning** (invoices, pay, channels) for mint/melt | `api/rpc/lnd/*`, `container/lnd.rs`, `apps/lnd` | ✅ implemented |
+| **Streaming payment gate** (accepts `cashuA` tokens, opens metered session) | `streaming/gate.rs` | ✅ implemented |
+| **Metering & pricing** (sats per byte / ms / request; e.g. content-download = 1 sat/MB) | `streaming/meter.rs`, `streaming/pricing.rs`, `streaming/session.rs` | ✅ implemented |
+| **Revenue/profit accounting** (incl. `StreamingRevenue` tx type) | `wallet/profits.rs` | ✅ implemented |
+| **Paid-service discovery** on Nostr (kind 10021, TollGate TIP-01 shape) | `streaming/advertisement.rs` | ✅ implemented |
+| **Content server** that verifies+receives payment before serving | `content_server.rs` (`verify_and_receive_payment()`) | ✅ implemented |
+| **iroh-blobs swarm** (fetch content-addressed blobs from peers, verify, seed) | `swarm/` (`iroh-swarm` feature) | ✅ just added |
+| **Signed seed adverts** (NIP-33 kind 30081, blake3→endpoint) | `swarm/seed_advert.rs` | ✅ just added |
+| **BLAKE3 content addressing** | `content_hash.rs` | ✅ implemented |
+| **Ed25519 trust / `did:key` / detached signatures** | `trust/` | ✅ implemented (anchor ceremony pending) |
+| **4-tier transport** (Mesh > LAN > FIPS > Tor) + `last_transport` | `transport/*`, `fips/dial.rs` | ✅ implemented |
+| **Node discovery + federation trust** (Trusted/Observer) | `nostr_handshake.rs`, `federation/*` | ✅ implemented |
+
+What is **NOT** present and must be built:
+
+- **A paid-serving hook on the iroh-blobs provider.** Today the swarm seeds to
+  anyone (`BlobsProtocol::new(&store, None)` — no authorization). To charge for
+  swarm bandwidth we need a per-request gate that consults `streaming/gate.rs`.
+- **A relay protocol.** No "peer A asks peer B to forward traffic to peer C".
+  Transport is point-to-point; there is no multi-hop routing, TTL, or relay
+  accounting.
+- **IndeeHub Archipelago catalog.** The shipped IndeeHub points at the external
+  `staging-api.indeehub.studio` + AWS S3/CloudFront. Nothing makes a film
+  uploaded on node A visible on node B. No *backstage* code exists yet.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Pay sats (ecash) for transport of streaming films
+
+### Goal
+When node B streams a film blob (an HLS `.ts` segment) *from* node A's swarm,
+A earns sats for the bytes it serves — using the ecash gate that already meters
+`content-download`.
+
+### What exists vs. what's new
+- ✅ The economic machinery is done: `streaming/pricing.rs` already ships a
+  `content-download` service priced per MB; `streaming/gate.rs` turns a `cashuA`
+  token into a metered session; `meter.rs` deducts bytes; `profits.rs` records
+  `StreamingRevenue`.
+- ❌ The swarm serving path doesn't consult any of it. `IrohProvider::new`
+  spins up `BlobsProtocol` that answers every blob request unconditionally.
+
+### Design — "paid swarm" as a gated blob protocol
+The clean seam is the iroh-blobs **accept** side. Two viable shapes:
+
+**(A) In-band gate via a custom ALPN (preferred).** Keep iroh-blobs for the raw
+byte transfer but front it with a tiny request/grant exchange on a second ALPN
+(`archy/paid-blobs/1`):
+1. B wants `blake3:H`. It dials A's endpoint and sends `{want: H, token?: cashuA}`.
+2. A calls `streaming::gate::check_gate("content-download", peer=B, bytes≈len(H), token)`.
+   - `PaymentRequired` → A replies with price + its accepted mints
+     (`streaming.list-mints`) and the sat amount; B mints/sends a `cashuA` and retries.
+   - `PaidAndAllowed` / `Allowed` (within existing session allotment) → A authorizes
+     the blob hash for this connection and hands off to iroh-blobs to stream it.
+3. A meters served bytes via `meter::record_and_check` and records revenue.
+
+**(B) Pre-paid session, then open serving.** B opens a metered session up front
+(buys N MB of `content-download` allotment with one token), and A's blob protocol
+checks "does this peer have remaining allotment?" before each blob. Simpler, fewer
+round-trips, slightly looser accounting. Good first cut.
+
+Recommend **(B) for v1** (least new protocol surface — reuses sessions verbatim),
+graduating to **(A)** when we want per-blob price discovery.
+
+### Free vs. paid policy (important)
+- **OTA + app-catalog blobs stay FREE.** Charging for security updates is hostile
+  and breaks the "origin always wins" guarantee. Gating applies **only** to the
+  IndeeHub film scope (a per-blob or per-advert "monetized" flag).
+- Trusted federation peers (`TrustLevel::Trusted`) can be configured to serve each
+  other free; payment is for untrusted/public swarm peers.
+
+### Integration points
+- **DONE (2026-06-17):** `swarm/paid.rs` — the accept-side gate. Builds the
+  iroh-blobs `EventSender` (intercept connect + GET, hard-disable `push`) and
+  authorizes each request through `streaming::gate::check_gate("content-download",
+  peer_endpoint, blob_size, None)`. Free when the service is disabled (default);
+  denies unpaid peers when enabled; fails OPEN on internal error. Wired into
+  `IrohProvider::new`; unit-tested. The Settings toggle the user just got drives it.
+- Reuse: `streaming/gate.rs`, `meter.rs`, `session.rs`, `wallet/ecash.rs`,
+  `streaming/advertisement.rs` (advertise the node as a paid blob seeder).
+- TODO (fetch side): `swarm::fetch_content_addressed` gains an optional
+  "willing-to-pay budget + token source" so a downloading node can auto-pay from
+  its ecash wallet up to a cap (opening a session via `streaming.pay`), then fall
+  back to origin if too expensive. This is where **cross-mint settlement (§2a)**
+  plugs in — the payer may need to swap into the seeder's accepted mint first.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Networking *through* nodes (relayed / routed streaming)
+
+This is the largest genuinely-new piece. Two distinct meanings — both useful:
+
+### 2a. iroh-native relays (cheap, already mostly free)
+iroh 1.0 already hole-punches and falls back to **relay servers** for connectivity
+when a direct QUIC path can't be established. So "streaming through a node that
+can reach the seed when I can't" partly exists at the iroh layer. Action: run/seed
+our **own** iroh relay(s) on the OVH/hub infrastructure and pin them in config, so
+the swarm doesn't depend on n0's public relays. Low effort, high resilience.
+
+### 2b. Application-level paid relay (the real gap)
+"Node B pays node A to fetch a film from origin/swarm on B's behalf and forward it"
+— useful when B is behind a censored/expensive link and A has good connectivity
+(the beta-cellular-node scenario from memory). This needs a real protocol:
+
+- **`relay.offer` advert** (Nostr kind 10021 with a `relay` tag + price/MB) — reuse
+  `streaming/advertisement.rs`; add a `relay-bandwidth` service to `pricing.rs`.
+- **`relay.fetch` request** over the existing transport (`PeerRequest` in
+  `fips/dial.rs`): `{content: blake3:H | url, pay: cashuA}`. The relay runs the
+  normal `swarm::fetch_content_addressed` (swarm-assist, origin fallback), meters
+  the bytes through `streaming/gate`, and streams them back to the requester.
+- **Accounting:** add a `RelayBytes` metric to `streaming/meter.rs` distinct from
+  origin `content-download`, so "relay provided" is tracked separately in
+  `profits.rs` (the doc already separates `routing_fees` from `streaming_revenue`).
+- **Safety rails:** single-hop only for v1 (no A→B→C→D); TTL + loop guard before
+  any multi-hop; cap per-session bytes; only relay the **public film scope**, never
+  private user blobs or arbitrary URLs (prevent open-proxy abuse).
+
+### Phasing for §2
+1. Pin our own iroh relays (config only). — *days*
+2. Single-hop paid `relay.fetch` for film blobs, gated by ecash. — *the core build*
+3. Multi-hop routing + path discovery. — *deferred; only if single-hop proves out*
+
+---
+
+## 2a. Cross-mint ecash settlement — paying across *different* mints
+
+**Problem (user, 2026-06-17):** payment must work when the payer and the seeder
+use **different** mints — not only two nodes on the same Fedimint. A node holding
+tokens on mint **A** must be able to pay a seeder that only accepts mint **B**,
+automatically.
+
+### Why this is mostly a generalization, not new crypto
+The wallet already tracks proofs **per-mint**: `WalletData::balance_for_mint(url)`,
+`select_proofs(url, amount)`, `add_proofs(url, proofs)` are all mint-scoped, and
+`MintClient::new(url)` targets any mint. What's hardcoded is convenience: `mint_quote`
+/ `melt_quote` / `mint_tokens` / `melt_tokens` always use the single home
+`wallet.mint_url`. So the data model is multi-mint already; we add the *swap* and
+parameterize the helpers by target mint.
+
+### The swap primitive (Cashu/Fedimint settle over Lightning)
+To move value **A → B**, both mints expose BOLT11 mint+melt quotes (already in
+`mint_client.rs`), and Lightning bridges them:
+
+1. `MintClient::new(B).mint_quote(amount)` → a BOLT11 invoice `inv_B` (pay it to get B tokens).
+2. `MintClient::new(A).melt_quote(inv_B)` → cost in A tokens (`amount + fee_reserve`).
+3. Select A proofs and `melt` them on A to pay `inv_B` over Lightning.
+4. When `inv_B` settles, `MintClient::new(B).mint_tokens(quote_B)` → claim B tokens;
+   `wallet.add_proofs(B, …)`.
+
+Net: value lands on B minus (A melt fee + LN routing + B mint fee). The node's LND
+isn't strictly required — the mints' own LN gateways settle — but a healthy local
+node/route improves success. Implementation = three thin `*_at(mint_url, …)`
+variants of the existing helpers + one composer:
+`swap_between_mints(data_dir, from, to, amount, max_fee_sats) -> Result<u64>`.
+
+### Where the swap happens — two models
+- **Payer-side swap (recommended default).** Before paying seeder S (whose
+  `accepted_mints` are advertised via `streaming.advertise` / the gate's
+  `PaymentRequired.pricing.accepted_mints`), the payer picks the cheapest path:
+  pay directly if it already holds a token on one of S's mints; otherwise
+  `swap_between_mints(A → S_mint)` then send a token denominated in S's mint. **S
+  never has to trust mint A** — it only ever receives its own mint's tokens. Clean.
+- **Payee-side auto-consolidation (optional, more liberal).** S widens
+  `accepted_mints` to any mint it's willing to melt-swap from, accepts an A token,
+  then swaps A → home-mint in the background. Broader acceptance, but S briefly
+  carries mint-A counterparty risk.
+
+A node can do both: advertise a broad accept list *and* have payers prefer
+direct/cheap mints.
+
+### Guardrails (these are the real design decisions)
+- **Mint trust list.** Mints can be insolvent or rug. Only swap *into* / accept
+  mints on a configured allow-list (default: home mint + a small curated set, with
+  the local Fedimint always trusted). Surface this in the Settings UI alongside the
+  per-service pricing.
+- **Fee/slippage cap.** Every swap costs sats. `max_fee_sats` (or a max %) refuses a
+  swap that would cost more than the content is worth; the payer then declines and
+  uses origin. Show the all-in cost (price + swap fee) before auto-paying.
+- **Origin always wins.** If the LN swap fails (no route, mint offline, over
+  budget), fall back to the HTTP origin with no payment. A mint problem must never
+  block content.
+- **Idempotency / crash-safety.** Persist in-flight swaps (`melt` quote id + `mint`
+  quote id) so a crash between "paid `inv_B`" and "claimed B tokens" resumes the
+  claim instead of double-paying. Reuse the wallet's tx log.
+- **Liquidity.** Swaps need the mints to have inbound/outbound LN liquidity; cache
+  recent swap success per mint-pair and prefer routes that have worked.
+
+### Phasing for §2a
+1. `*_at(mint_url, …)` helpers + `swap_between_mints` + mint trust list + fee cap. — *the core*
+2. Payer-side auto-swap in the payment builder (pick cheapest accepted mint). — *wires §1/§2 to it*
+3. Idempotent resume + per-pair liquidity cache. — *hardening*
+4. (Optional) payee-side auto-consolidation.
+
+This keeps the headline promise intact: **pay anyone, on any trusted mint,
+automatically — or fall back to free origin.**
+
+---
+
+## 3. IndeeHub "Archipelago" content source
+
+### Goal
+A new source tab inside the IndeeHub app, **"Archipelago"**, listing every film
+uploaded to *backstage*, streamable on any node — independent of the external
+`indeehub.studio` API.
+
+### Today (from the research)
+- IndeeHub frontend (Next.js) is built against `NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL =
+  staging-api.indeehub.studio` and pulls media from AWS S3/CloudFront. It is
+  **not Archipelago-aware**. nginx proxies it at `/app/indeedhub/` and injects a
+  NIP-07 Nostr provider.
+- A MinIO stack exists (`indeedhub-public` / `indeedhub-private` buckets); FFmpeg
+  produces HLS there. **No backstage upload UI/code exists yet.**
+- The design doc's Phase 4 already describes the target: backstage → FFmpeg → HLS
+  → each `.ts` is a BLAKE3 blob → signed Nostr "Blossom" catalog event → any node
+  resolves the content address and streams from the nearest holder; MinIO origin.
+
+### Architecture — four pieces
+
+**(i) Backstage upload + transcode (origin side).**
+Minimal creator flow on a publisher node: upload master → FFmpeg → HLS
+(`.m3u8` + `.ts`) into MinIO (reuse the existing `indeedhub-ffmpeg`/MinIO stack).
+For each segment compute `blake3_hex` (`content_hash::blake3_hex`) and import it
+into the iroh seed store (`IrohProvider::seed_and_advertise`, generalized beyond
+releases). The playlist references segments by content hash.
+
+**(ii) Signed film catalog on Nostr (the "Archipelago" source).**
+Define a new addressable event — **kind 30082, `archy-film`** (sibling of the
+30081 seed advert) — published by the publisher node, **signed via `trust/`**:
+```jsonc
+{
+  "title": "...", "creator_did": "did:key:z...", "duration_s": 5400,
+  "poster": "blake3:...",            // poster image blob
+  "playlist": "blake3:...",          // the .m3u8 (itself a blob)
+  "segments": ["blake3:...", ...],   // ordered .ts segment hashes
+  "enc": { "scheme": "aes-128", "key_ref": "nip98" },  // see (iv)
+  "monetized": { "service": "content-download", "sats_per_mb": 1 } // optional
+}
+```
+The signature uses `trust::sign_detached`; consumers verify with
+`trust::verify_detached`. **Publisher trust:** films show in the Archipelago tab
+only from publishers on the node's trusted/federation set (or a pinned
+"Archipelago film-root" key, mirroring the release-root anchor concept). This is
+the key that stops the shared catalog from being a spam vector.
+
+**(iii) Archipelago-local film API (makes it appear on every node).**
+New RPC + HTTP endpoints in `api/`:
+- `film.catalog` / `GET /api/film-catalog` — query Nostr relays for kind-30082
+  events from trusted publishers, verify signatures, dedupe, return merged JSON.
+  Cache like `app_catalog.rs` does (mtime/TTL, atomic write).
+- `GET /api/film/:blake3` — serve a segment: `swarm::fetch_content_addressed`
+  (swarm-assist → MinIO/OVH origin), BLAKE3-verified, with HTTP range support so
+  the player can seek. This is where §1 (paid serving) and §2 (relay) plug in.
+- The IndeeHub frontend gets an **"Archipelago" source** that points at
+  `/api/film-catalog` instead of `indeehub.studio`. Cleanest: a small build/runtime
+  flag or an injected config (same nginx `sub_filter` mechanism already used to
+  inject the NIP-07 provider) that registers the Archipelago source alongside the
+  existing studio source — additive, not a replacement.
+
+**(iv) Encryption / access (private films).**
+Public films: plaintext segments, freely cacheable, swarm-distributable. Private
+films: keep AES-128 HLS; **untrusted seeds cache only ciphertext** (they never see
+plaintext), and the decryption key is delivered per-viewer via NIP-98 auth (the
+mechanism IndeeHub already uses) or NIP-44 DM. Payment (§1) gates *bytes*; the
+*key* gates *plaintext* — two independent locks. This lets us pay strangers to
+seed encrypted blobs without leaking content.
+
+### "On every node" — propagation
+Propagation is **pull**, not push: every node's `film.catalog` periodically queries
+the same Nostr relays (already configured for discovery) for trusted-publisher film
+events. A film uploaded on node A is therefore visible on node B as soon as B
+refreshes its catalog — exactly how `app_catalog.rs` already distributes app
+updates fleet-wide. No central server; the relays carry only signed metadata, the
+blobs flow peer-to-peer with MinIO/OVH as origin.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Suggested end-to-end phasing
+
+| Step | Deliverable | Risk | Reuses |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| **A** | Generalize `seed_and_advertise` beyond releases → arbitrary public blob scope (films) | low | swarm/ |
+| **B** | `film.catalog` RPC + signed kind-30082 events + trusted-publisher gating | low–med | trust/, app_catalog.rs pattern |
+| **C** | `GET /api/film/:blake3` range-streaming via swarm-assist + MinIO origin | med | swarm/, content_server.rs |
+| **D** | IndeeHub "Archipelago" source wired to the local API (additive) | med (frontend, external repo) | nginx sub_filter |
+| **E** | Backstage: upload → FFmpeg → HLS → blob import + catalog publish | med | MinIO/ffmpeg stack |
+| **F** | **DONE** — paid swarm serving (`swarm/paid.rs` gates the blob protocol via `streaming/gate`); free by default | med | streaming/* |
+| **F2** | Cross-mint settlement (§2a): `swap_between_mints` + payer-side auto-swap + mint trust list + fee cap | med–high | wallet/ecash, mint_client, lnd |
+| **G** | Pin our own iroh relays (config) | low | iroh |
+| **H** | Single-hop paid `relay.fetch` for film blobs | high | transport/, streaming/* |
+| **I** | Multi-hop routing | high / deferred | — |
+
+A→E delivers "films on every node" with free volunteer seeding (the design-doc
+vision). F→H layer the sats economy on top. I is genuinely future work.
+
+> **Shipping directive (user, 2026-06-17):** the IndeeHub "Archipelago" change
+> ships — after testing — as a **decoupled app-catalog update**, NOT a binary
+> OTA. Publish the new IndeeHub image + bump `releases/app-catalog.json` so every
+> node gets the per-app "Update" badge (the mechanism in
+> `container/app_catalog.rs` / `package.check-updates`). Node-side API changes
+> (steps B/C) that need the binary go through the normal OTA; the *app* (step D,
+> the IndeeHub frontend image) goes through the app catalog. See memories
+> `project_decoupled_app_updates` + `reference_indeehub_canonical_source`.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Open questions / decisions needed
+
+1. **iroh-blobs authorization granularity.** ✅ **RESOLVED (2026-06-17 spike).**
+   iroh-blobs 0.103 exposes exactly the hook we need: `BlobsProtocol::new(&store,
+   Some(EventSender))`. With an `EventMask` set to intercept, the provider asks our
+   handler to authorize each request and we return `EventResult = Result<(),
+   AbortReason>`:
+   - `RequestMode::Intercept` / `InterceptLog` — per-blob-request allow/deny
+     (`Err(AbortReason::Permission)` denies, `Err(AbortReason::RateLimited)` defers).
+   - `ConnectMode::Intercept` — reject at the connection handshake (cheap pre-filter).
+   - `ThrottleMode::Intercept` — per-request throttle/meter hook for byte accounting.
+   - `RequestMode::Disabled` — hard-reject a whole request kind (e.g. disable `Push`
+     so peers can never write into our store).
+   → **§1 shape (A) is the recommended path** (native, no fork): the accept-side
+   handler calls `streaming::gate::check_gate("content-download", peer_endpoint,
+   bytes, token)` and maps `PaymentRequired`/`InsufficientPayment` →
+   `Err(Permission)`, `Allowed`/`PaidAndAllowed` → `Ok(())`. Peer identity comes
+   from the `Connection`'s remote endpoint id. (See `iroh_blobs::provider::events`.)
+2. **Film-publisher trust anchor.** One global "Archipelago film-root" key (curated
+   store, like release-root) vs. per-node trusted-publisher sets vs. both. Affects
+   spam resistance and who can publish to *everyone's* Archipelago tab.
+3. **MinIO as origin across the fleet** — single canonical MinIO on the hub vs.
+   per-node MinIO with cross-seeding. The swarm makes per-node origin viable but
+   the *first* upload needs a home.
+4. **IndeeHub frontend is an external repo** (`~/Projects/indeehub-frontend`,
+   built into `apps/indeedhub`). Adding an "Archipelago" source needs changes
+   there; scope whether it's a build-time source registration or a runtime-injected
+   config (preferred — keeps the node OS in control).
+5. **Pricing defaults & free tier.** What's free (OTA, trusted peers, first N MB?)
+   vs. paid, and the default sats/MB. `pricing.json` already supports this; needs a
+   policy.
+6. **Payment UX / auto-pay caps.** A downloading node auto-paying from its ecash
+   wallet needs a user-set ceiling and a "prefer free origin if peer wants > X"
+   rule, so streaming never silently drains the wallet.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Why this is tractable
+The hard, slow-to-build substrate — an ecash wallet, a metered payment gate,
+content addressing, a verifying swarm, signed discovery, a trust module, a
+multi-transport stack — is **already in the tree and (for the swarm) just tested**.
+The remaining work is wiring those together along the three axes above, with the
+two new protocols (paid blob serving, single-hop relay) being the only substantial
+net-new surface. Everything stays behind feature flags / opt-in config and obeys
+the project's north star: **swarm-assist, origin always wins** — and now,
+**free updates, optional paid films.**

neode-ui/src/locales/en.json

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
     "back": "Back",
     "done": "Done",
     "manage": "Manage",
+    "settings": "Settings",
     "connect": "Connect",
     "connecting": "Connecting...",
     "disconnect": "Disconnect",

neode-ui/src/locales/es.json

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
     "back": "Volver",
     "done": "Listo",
     "manage": "Administrar",
+    "settings": "Configuración",
     "connect": "Conectar",
     "connecting": "Conectando...",
     "disconnect": "Desconectar",

neode-ui/src/router/index.ts

@@ -206,6 +206,11 @@ const router = createRouter({
           name: 'credentials',
           component: () => import('../views/Credentials.vue'),
         },
+        {
+          path: 'web5/networking-profits',
+          name: 'networking-profits-settings',
+          component: () => import('../views/web5/Web5NetworkingProfitsSettings.vue'),
+        },
         {
           path: 'settings',
           name: 'settings',

neode-ui/src/views/web5/Web5NetworkingProfitsSettings.vue

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+<script setup lang="ts">
+import { computed, onMounted, ref } from 'vue'
+import { useRouter } from 'vue-router'
+import { rpcClient } from '@/api/rpc-client'
+import ToggleSwitch from '@/components/ToggleSwitch.vue'
+
+const router = useRouter()
+
+// Mirrors `crate::streaming::pricing::ServicePricing` (Metric is rename_all =
+// "lowercase", so it round-trips verbatim back to streaming.configure-service).
+type Metric = 'bytes' | 'milliseconds' | 'requests'
+
+interface ServicePricing {
+  service_id: string
+  name: string
+  metric: Metric
+  step_size: number
+  price_per_step: number
+  min_steps: number
+  enabled: boolean
+  description: string
+  accepted_mints: string[]
+}
+
+const services = ref<ServicePricing[]>([])
+const loading = ref(true)
+const loadError = ref('')
+const savingId = ref<string | null>(null)
+const statusMsg = ref('')
+const statusIsError = ref(false)
+
+// "Free everything" is the default — every service ships disabled. The banner
+// reassures the user nothing is being charged for until they opt in.
+const allFree = computed(() => services.value.every((s) => !s.enabled))
+
+function showStatus(msg: string, isError: boolean) {
+  statusMsg.value = msg
+  statusIsError.value = isError
+  setTimeout(() => { statusMsg.value = '' }, 5000)
+}
+
+/** Human label for one priced step, e.g. "MB", "minute", "request". */
+function unitLabel(metric: Metric, stepSize: number): string {
+  if (metric === 'bytes') {
+    if (stepSize === 1_073_741_824) return 'GB'
+    if (stepSize === 1_048_576) return 'MB'
+    if (stepSize === 1024) return 'KB'
+    return `${stepSize.toLocaleString()} bytes`
+  }
+  if (metric === 'milliseconds') {
+    if (stepSize === 3_600_000) return 'hour'
+    if (stepSize === 60_000) return 'minute'
+    if (stepSize === 1000) return 'second'
+    return `${stepSize.toLocaleString()} ms`
+  }
+  // requests
+  return stepSize === 1 ? 'request' : `${stepSize.toLocaleString()} requests`
+}
+
+function minimumNote(svc: ServicePricing): string {
+  if (svc.min_steps <= 0) return ''
+  return `Minimum purchase: ${svc.min_steps.toLocaleString()} ${unitLabel(svc.metric, svc.step_size)}${svc.min_steps > 1 ? 's' : ''}`
+}
+
+async function load() {
+  loading.value = true
+  loadError.value = ''
+  try {
+    const res = await rpcClient.call<{ services: ServicePricing[] }>({ method: 'streaming.list-services' })
+    services.value = (res.services || []).map((s) => ({
+      ...s,
+      // Price must stay >= 1 sat: the backend rejects price_per_step == 0.
+      price_per_step: Math.max(1, s.price_per_step),
+    }))
+  } catch (e) {
+    loadError.value = e instanceof Error ? e.message : 'Failed to load services'
+  } finally {
+    loading.value = false
+  }
+}
+
+async function saveService(svc: ServicePricing) {
+  if (svc.price_per_step < 1) svc.price_per_step = 1
+  savingId.value = svc.service_id
+  try {
+    await rpcClient.call({
+      method: 'streaming.configure-service',
+      params: {
+        service_id: svc.service_id,
+        name: svc.name,
+        metric: svc.metric,
+        step_size: svc.step_size,
+        price_per_step: svc.price_per_step,
+        min_steps: svc.min_steps,
+        enabled: svc.enabled,
+        description: svc.description,
+        accepted_mints: svc.accepted_mints,
+      },
+    })
+    showStatus(
+      svc.enabled
+        ? `Charging ${svc.price_per_step} sats per ${unitLabel(svc.metric, svc.step_size)} for ${svc.name}.`
+        : `${svc.name} is now free.`,
+      false,
+    )
+  } catch (e) {
+    showStatus(e instanceof Error ? e.message : 'Failed to save', true)
+    // Reload so the UI reflects the persisted truth after a failed write.
+    void load()
+  } finally {
+    savingId.value = null
+  }
+}
+
+onMounted(load)
+</script>
+
+<template>
+  <div class="pb-6">
+    <button
+      type="button"
+      class="text-xs px-3 py-1.5 mb-4 rounded-md bg-white/5 hover:bg-white/10 text-white/70 hover:text-white transition-colors"
+      @click="router.push('/dashboard/web5')"
+    >← Back to Web5</button>
+
+    <div class="mb-6">
+      <h1 class="text-3xl font-bold text-white mb-2">Networking Profits — Settings</h1>
+      <p class="text-white/70">
+        Control what your node charges other peers for. By default everything is shared for
+        free — turn a service on to start earning sats (ecash) for it. Payments are collected
+        as Cashu tokens through your node's wallet.
+      </p>
+    </div>
+
+    <!-- Status message -->
+    <div
+      v-if="statusMsg"
+      role="status"
+      aria-live="polite"
+      class="mb-4 p-3 rounded-lg text-sm"
+      :class="statusIsError ? 'bg-red-500/20 text-red-300' : 'bg-green-500/20 text-green-300'"
+    >
+      {{ statusMsg }}
+    </div>
+
+    <!-- Everything-free reassurance banner -->
+    <div
+      v-if="!loading && allFree"
+      class="mb-6 p-4 rounded-lg bg-green-500/10 border border-green-500/20 flex items-center gap-3"
+    >
+      <span class="text-xl">✓</span>
+      <p class="text-sm text-green-200">
+        Everything is free. Your node isn't charging for anything — enable a service below to
+        start earning.
+      </p>
+    </div>
+
+    <div v-if="loading" class="glass-card p-6 text-white/60 text-sm">Loading services…</div>
+    <div v-else-if="loadError" class="glass-card p-6 text-red-300 text-sm">{{ loadError }}</div>
+
+    <div v-else class="space-y-4">
+      <div v-for="svc in services" :key="svc.service_id" class="glass-card p-6">
+        <div class="flex items-start justify-between gap-4 mb-3">
+          <div class="min-w-0">
+            <h2 class="text-lg font-semibold text-white">{{ svc.name }}</h2>
+            <p class="text-sm text-white/60 mt-0.5">{{ svc.description }}</p>
+          </div>
+          <div class="flex items-center gap-2 shrink-0">
+            <span class="text-xs" :class="svc.enabled ? 'text-orange-400' : 'text-white/40'">
+              {{ svc.enabled ? 'Paid' : 'Free' }}
+            </span>
+            <ToggleSwitch :model-value="svc.enabled" @update:model-value="(v) => (svc.enabled = v)" />
+          </div>
+        </div>
+
+        <div class="flex flex-col sm:flex-row sm:items-end gap-3">
+          <div class="flex-1" :class="{ 'opacity-40 pointer-events-none': !svc.enabled }">
+            <label class="text-xs text-white/50 block mb-1">Price</label>
+            <div class="flex items-center gap-2">
+              <input
+                v-model.number="svc.price_per_step"
+                type="number"
+                min="1"
+                step="1"
+                :disabled="!svc.enabled"
+                class="w-28 bg-black/30 border border-white/10 rounded-lg px-3 py-2 text-sm text-white focus:outline-none focus:border-orange-500/50"
+              />
+              <span class="text-sm text-white/70">sats per {{ unitLabel(svc.metric, svc.step_size) }}</span>
+            </div>
+            <p v-if="minimumNote(svc)" class="text-xs text-white/40 mt-1">{{ minimumNote(svc) }}</p>
+          </div>
+          <button
+            @click="saveService(svc)"
+            :disabled="savingId === svc.service_id"
+            class="glass-button glass-button-warning px-4 py-2 rounded-lg text-sm disabled:opacity-50"
+          >
+            {{ savingId === svc.service_id ? 'Saving…' : 'Save' }}
+          </button>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</template>

neode-ui/src/views/web5/Web5QuickActions.vue

@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@
           <p v-if="profitsBreakdown.content_sales_sats > 0">Content: {{ profitsBreakdown.content_sales_sats.toLocaleString() }} sats</p>
           <p v-if="profitsBreakdown.routing_fees_sats > 0">Routing: {{ profitsBreakdown.routing_fees_sats.toLocaleString() }} sats</p>
         </div>
+        <button
+          @click="router.push('/dashboard/web5/networking-profits')"
+          class="w-full mt-auto px-3 py-1.5 glass-button glass-button-sm rounded text-xs font-medium text-white/90 hover:text-white transition-colors"
+        >
+          {{ t('common.settings') }}
+        </button>
       </div>
 
       <!-- DID Status -->