Prepare and recover Cashu swaps from exact persisted request material

This commit is contained in:
archipelago
2026-10-06 15:58:22 -04:00
parent 9c95b8732f
commit a4ede20204
3 changed files with 382 additions and 31 deletions
+199 -27
View File
@@ -57,6 +57,31 @@ pub struct SwapResult {
pub new_proofs: Vec<Proof>,
}
/// Exact private request material to persist before a remote swap. Debug
/// deliberately omits bearer secrets and blinding factors.
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct PreparedSwap {
mint_url: String,
inputs: Vec<Proof>,
keyset: MintKeyset,
outputs: Vec<BlindedMessageRequest>,
blinding: Vec<PreparedBlinding>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct PreparedBlinding {
secret: Vec<u8>,
factor: [u8; 32],
amount: u64,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for PreparedSwap {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("PreparedSwap")
.field("input_count", &self.inputs.len())
.field("output_count", &self.outputs.len())
.finish_non_exhaustive()
}
}
/// Result of a mint operation.
pub struct MintResult {
pub proofs: Vec<Proof>,
@@ -537,6 +562,19 @@ impl MintClient {
target_amounts: &[u64],
minimum: u64,
) -> Result<SwapResult> {
let prepared = self
.prepare_swap_at_least(inputs, target_amounts, minimum)
.await?;
self.execute_prepared_swap(&prepared).await
}
/// Read mint metadata and derive outputs, but do not consume any input.
pub async fn prepare_swap_at_least(
&self,
inputs: &[Proof],
target_amounts: &[u64],
minimum: u64,
) -> Result<PreparedSwap> {
// V4 tokens carry short keyset IDs. Every swap path (including paid
// files and streams) must expand these, not only wallet imports.
let resolved = self.resolve_truncated_keyset_ids(inputs).await?;
@@ -599,13 +637,102 @@ impl MintClient {
let (blinded_messages, blinding_data) =
self.blinded_outputs(&keyset.id, target_amounts).await?;
let prepared = PreparedSwap {
mint_url: self.url.clone(),
inputs: inputs.to_vec(),
keyset,
outputs: blinded_messages,
blinding: blinding_data
.into_iter()
.map(|(secret, factor, amount)| PreparedBlinding {
secret,
factor: factor.secret_bytes(),
amount,
})
.collect(),
};
self.validate_prepared_swap(&prepared)?;
Ok(prepared)
}
fn validate_prepared_swap(&self, prepared: &PreparedSwap) -> Result<()> {
anyhow::ensure!(
prepared.mint_url == self.url,
"Prepared swap belongs to a different mint"
);
anyhow::ensure!(
!prepared.inputs.is_empty()
&& !prepared.outputs.is_empty()
&& prepared.outputs.len() == prepared.blinding.len(),
"Invalid prepared swap structure"
);
let commitments: std::collections::HashSet<_> = prepared
.outputs
.iter()
.map(|output| output.b_prime.as_str())
.collect();
anyhow::ensure!(
commitments.len() == prepared.outputs.len(),
"Prepared swap contains duplicate outputs"
);
let input_secrets: std::collections::HashSet<_> = prepared
.inputs
.iter()
.map(|proof| proof.secret.as_str())
.collect();
anyhow::ensure!(
input_secrets.len() == prepared.inputs.len(),
"Prepared swap contains duplicate inputs"
);
anyhow::ensure!(
prepared.keyset.unit == "sat",
"Prepared swap is not denominated in sats"
);
let input_total = prepared
.inputs
.iter()
.try_fold(0u64, |sum, proof| sum.checked_add(proof.amount))
.context("Prepared input amount overflow")?;
let output_total = prepared
.outputs
.iter()
.try_fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum.checked_add(output.amount))
.context("Prepared output amount overflow")?;
anyhow::ensure!(
output_total <= input_total,
"Prepared swap output value exceeds its inputs"
);
for (output, secret) in prepared.outputs.iter().zip(&prepared.blinding) {
anyhow::ensure!(
output.id == prepared.keyset.id
&& output.amount == secret.amount
&& output.amount.is_power_of_two(),
"Prepared swap output metadata changed"
);
let factor = secp256k1::SecretKey::from_slice(&secret.factor)
.context("Invalid prepared blinding factor")?;
let blinded = bdhke::blind_message(&secret.secret, &factor)?;
anyhow::ensure!(
output.b_prime == hex::encode(blinded.b_prime.serialize()),
"Prepared swap output commitment changed"
);
std::str::from_utf8(&secret.secret).context("Invalid prepared secret encoding")?;
prepared.keyset.key_for_amount(output.amount)?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Execute only an already prepared request. Callers implementing recovery
/// must save it before invoking this method, and retain it on any error.
pub async fn execute_prepared_swap(&self, prepared: &PreparedSwap) -> Result<SwapResult> {
self.validate_prepared_swap(prepared)?;
let url = format!("{}/v1/swap", self.url);
let res = self
.client
.post(&url)
.json(&serde_json::json!({
"inputs": inputs,
"outputs": blinded_messages,
"inputs": prepared.inputs,
"outputs": prepared.outputs,
}))
.send()
.await
@@ -625,39 +752,84 @@ impl MintClient {
)
.context("Failed to parse swap signatures")?;
if signatures.len() != blinding_data.len() {
anyhow::bail!(
"Swap returned {} signatures, expected {}",
signatures.len(),
blinding_data.len()
self.unblind_prepared_swap(prepared, &signatures)
}
fn unblind_prepared_swap(
&self,
prepared: &PreparedSwap,
signatures: &[BlindSignature],
) -> Result<SwapResult> {
anyhow::ensure!(
signatures.len() == prepared.blinding.len(),
"Swap returned an incomplete signature set; preserve the prepared operation"
);
let mut new_proofs = Vec::with_capacity(signatures.len());
for (sig, secret) in signatures.iter().zip(&prepared.blinding) {
anyhow::ensure!(
sig.amount == secret.amount && sig.id == prepared.keyset.id,
"Mint returned a swap signature for an unexpected amount or keyset"
);
}
let mut new_proofs = Vec::new();
for (sig, (secret, r, amount)) in signatures.iter().zip(blinding_data.iter()) {
if sig.amount != *amount || sig.id != keyset.id {
anyhow::bail!("Mint returned a swap signature for an unexpected amount or keyset");
}
let c_prime = sig.c_prime_as_pubkey()?;
let mint_key = keyset.key_for_amount(*amount)?;
let c = bdhke::unblind_signature(&c_prime, r, &mint_key)?;
let factor = secp256k1::SecretKey::from_slice(&secret.factor)?;
let c = bdhke::unblind_signature(
&sig.c_prime_as_pubkey()?,
&factor,
&prepared.keyset.key_for_amount(secret.amount)?,
)?;
new_proofs.push(Proof {
amount: *amount,
id: keyset.id.clone(),
secret: String::from_utf8_lossy(secret).to_string(),
amount: secret.amount,
id: prepared.keyset.id.clone(),
secret: std::str::from_utf8(&secret.secret)?.to_owned(),
c: hex::encode(c.serialize()),
});
}
debug!(
"Swapped {} inputs for {} new proofs",
inputs.len(),
new_proofs.len()
);
Ok(SwapResult { new_proofs })
}
/// Recover signatures for the exact persisted outputs after a lost reply.
/// No result is not proof of failure; callers must retain the reservation.
pub async fn restore_prepared_swap(
&self,
prepared: &PreparedSwap,
) -> Result<Option<SwapResult>> {
self.validate_prepared_swap(prepared)?;
let returned = self.restore(&prepared.outputs).await?;
if returned.is_empty() {
return Ok(None);
}
let mut by_output = std::collections::HashMap::new();
for (commitment, signature) in returned {
// Hex case is not part of the curve-point identity.
let commitment = hex::encode(
commitment
.parse::<secp256k1::PublicKey>()
.context("Mint restored an invalid output commitment")?
.serialize(),
);
anyhow::ensure!(
prepared
.outputs
.iter()
.any(|output| output.b_prime == commitment),
"Mint restored an unknown output"
);
anyhow::ensure!(
by_output.insert(commitment, signature).is_none(),
"Mint restored duplicate outputs"
);
}
let ordered: Vec<_> = prepared
.outputs
.iter()
.map(|output| {
by_output
.remove(&output.b_prime)
.context("Mint restored only part of the prepared swap")
})
.collect::<Result<_>>()?;
Ok(Some(self.unblind_prepared_swap(prepared, &ordered)?))
}
// ── Check state (NUT-07) ──
/// Check whether proofs are spent, unspent, or pending.