fix(cuprate): stop publishing the unauthenticated unrestricted RPC

The manifest bound cuprated's unrestricted RPC (full node control) to
0.0.0.0 inside the container with
i_know_what_im_doing_allow_public_unrestricted_rpc = true, relying on
ports[].bind: 127.0.0.1 to keep it private. That only restricts the HOST
side. Verified live on archi-dev-box 2026-08-22: a peer container got a
valid unauthenticated get_info off container port 18081 — and still did
after cuprate was moved to its own network, because podman bridges route
to each other unless created with --opt isolate=true, which the
orchestrator's auto-create does not pass. Every app on the node could
therefore drive full node control with no credential.

The PR justified this as the pattern bitcoin-knots already uses, but
knots writes rpcuser/rpcpassword from generated secrets, so a 0.0.0.0
bind there still is not control without credentials. cuprated has no RPC
authentication at all, so the two are not equivalent.

Unrestricted RPC is now left at cuprated's own default — container
loopback only, published nowhere, reachable by nothing — which is what
upstream intends by refusing a non-local bind without an explicit
override. Restricted RPC (the safe-for-public subset wallets use) and p2p
are unchanged, and health_check moves to 18089 since 18184 is gone.

Re-verified after the change: peer container gets connection refused on
18081 (exit 7), restricted RPC and the health endpoint still answer, the
node still syncs, validator APPROVED, 76/76 container tests pass
including the unauthenticated-port canary (still 28 — an auth: local
port was removed, not an auth: none one).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/cuprate/manifest.yml

@@ -67,17 +67,18 @@ app:
       auth: none
       auth_rationale: >-
         Monero p2p gossip. Peers are anonymous by design and speak the Monero wire protocol, not HTTP.
-    # Unrestricted RPC: full node control (mining, wallet-adjacent calls).
-    # cuprated enables this by default bound to 127.0.0.1 and refuses to
-    # start if pointed at a non-local address without an explicit opt-in
-    # flag — this mirrors that intent at the gate too. Host port differs
-    # from Monero's canonical 18081 for the same reason as P2P above
-    # (nostr-rs-relay already holds 18081 on this fleet).
-    - host: 18184
-      container: 18081
-      protocol: tcp
-      bind: 127.0.0.1
-      auth: local
+    # Unrestricted RPC (full node control) is deliberately NOT published.
+    # cuprated has no RPC authentication, and for a published port to reach
+    # it the service would have to bind 0.0.0.0 inside the container — at
+    # which point every other app can reach it directly on 18081, since
+    # ports[].bind only restricts the HOST side and podman bridges route to
+    # each other (verified live 2026-08-22: a peer container on archy-net
+    # got an unauthenticated get_info, from a *different* network). That is
+    # unlike bitcoin-knots, whose 0.0.0.0 RPC still demands the rpcuser /
+    # rpcpassword it writes from generated secrets. So unrestricted RPC is
+    # left at cuprated's own default — container loopback only, reachable by
+    # nothing — which is also what upstream intends by refusing a non-local
+    # bind without an explicit i_know_what_im_doing override.
     # Restricted RPC: Monero's own purpose-built safe-for-public subset —
     # what wallets use when connecting to a "remote node". Disabled by
     # cuprated's own default; enabled via files[] below. A dashboard login
@@ -128,17 +129,14 @@ app:
         network = "Mainnet"
         target_max_memory = 3000000000
 
-        [rpc.unrestricted]
-        address = "0.0.0.0"
-        i_know_what_im_doing_allow_public_unrestricted_rpc = true
-
         [rpc.restricted]
         enable = true
       overwrite: false
 
   health_check:
     type: tcp
-    endpoint: localhost:18184
+    # Restricted RPC — the only RPC surface published now.
+    endpoint: localhost:18089
     interval: 30s
     timeout: 5s
     retries: 3