BTCPay 2.4.2 fixes a critical vulnerability that upstream reports as actively
exploited: a TOTP two-factor bypass via Greenfield Basic authentication
(btcpayserver/btcpayserver#7491).
Checked the 2.3.9 -> 2.4.2 breaking changes against how Archipelago actually
configures BTCPay; both are inert here:
- 2.4.0 removed the LNBank and Lightning Charge backends. Ours is a direct LND
connection built by container::lnd::ensure_btcpay_lnd_connection_secret.
- 2.4.2 disables Greenfield Basic auth five minutes after account creation.
Nothing in the daemon or frontend consumes BTCPay's API.
The manifest bump alone does NOT reach nodes: catalog_image_override makes the
signed catalog authoritative whenever the image repo matches, so a node would
be forced back to 2.3.9. The catalog edit is held locally until the signing
ceremony runs, because an unsigned catalog published to main would be accepted
by nodes (absent signatures are allowed) and would quietly drop authenticity.
check-app-catalog-drift.py only understood app-catalog/catalog.json, where
`apps` is a list. releases/app-catalog.json — the SIGNED catalog nodes actually
resolve apps through — keys `apps` by id and wraps each app's full manifest
under manifest.app. So the checker parsed the file that governs nothing and
raised ValueError on the file that governs everything. It now reads both shapes.
Running it against the release catalog shows the repo and the catalog agree on
content: of 34 image differences, all 34 are the registry host alone and every
tag is identical. The remaining version-string drift (v1.18.0 vs 1.18.0,
1.30.0-alpine vs 1.30.0) is cosmetic metadata, not image drift.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes 4 test failures introduced by 8e814ca0, which I pushed after running
only the container-crate tests while the full suite was still compiling. Both
failures were real defects, not stale assertions.
1. Catalog-driven installs would have failed fleet-wide.
8e814ca0 dropped the old registry address from TRUSTED_REGISTRIES, but the
signed catalog still advertises image refs on it — deliberately, since
rewriting a signed artifact invalidates its signature. Nodes resolve apps
through the catalog, so every install would have been refused with "not
from a trusted registry". Reinstated as LEGACY_REGISTRY_HOST, documented
as transitional and removable only once the catalog is re-signed.
2. The update fallback lost the property it exists for.
update.rs keeps two mirrors on purpose: the domain as primary, and the
old IP over plain HTTP as a fallback, because a node whose DNS or clock is
wrong (both break TLS) must still be able to update itself — the signature,
not the transport, is what makes either source safe. The bulk rewrite
pointed both constants at the domain, leaving the escape hatch dependent on
exactly what it exists to survive. Restored to its original value.
Separately, validate-app-manifest.sh is ported from ruby to python3+PyYAML.
It shelled out to ruby with stderr discarded, so on any machine without ruby
a missing interpreter was reported as "Valid YAML with top-level app block:
FAIL" and every manifest came back REJECTED. This is the first tool an app
developer runs, and it sent them to fix YAML that was never broken. Ruby was
also the odd dependency out — the repo already ships three python scripts.
It now checks for python3 and PyYAML up front and names what is missing, then
parses with PyYAML. Missing keys resolve to an absent-value object that
indexes to itself and prints empty, so call sites lost their per-hop guards:
(((app["container"] || {})["build"] || {})["context"])
becomes app["container"]["build"]["context"]. Booleans still print as
true/false rather than Python's True/False — call sites compare == "true",
so Python's capitalisation would have silently inverted the readonly_root
and no_new_privileges security checks.
Verified: full rust suite 1148/1148, 0 failed. All 56 app manifests validate
(0 rejected, 0 errored) where previously every one was rejected. No signed
artifact modified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
RC1's aiui/index.html pointed at the stale checked-in demo bundle while
today's dist sat beside it unreferenced: demo/aiui was tried first, and the
rsync without --delete merged it over the fresh capture from /opt. Now the
newest index.html across all candidates wins (demo/aiui remains the
fresh-clone fallback) and the copy deletes before writing.
Found by mounting the RC1 ISO and diffing bundle hashes against the tree —
exactly the 'verify the frontend INSIDE the ISO' rule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Live evidence, two ways: the 9abc1623 banner never fired because D-16 hides
ungranted tools (model never calls → refused_categories always empty), and
the [[needs:id>]] marker fix failed because a small local model answers with
a workaround narrative instead of emitting structured markers.
The model's reliable, trained behavior is tool CALLING — so disabled tools
are now listed in a DISABLED prompt section and remain in the schema. A call
hits the execution gate, which refuses and records the category → the
trusted chrome offers Settings → AI Data Access. Deterministic and
model-independent. The prompt split is UX/attack-surface shaping; the
security boundary remains the server-side grant re-check in execute_tool
(loop_.rs), unchanged and now the single enforcement layer by design.
Tests: ungranted_tool_only_ever_in_disabled_section (section-aware),
disabled_tools_are_listed_as_callable_but_refused, marker extraction kept
as a harmless safety net. 127/127 assistant suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the registry host across 86 files: 309 references, covering all 40
app manifests, the orchestrator and container crates, the release and catalog
scripts, both demo-images workflows, the ISO builder, demo-deploy, and the
frontend marketplace data.
Verified the domain actually serves the registry before rewriting anything,
rather than assuming the web host implies the registry:
- TLS verifies clean, HTTP/2 on the web root
- an anonymous token grants a manifest fetch (HTTP 200) with no credentials
- skopeo inspect --no-creds resolves an image and lists its tags
That last check is the one that matters: an outside developer with no account
can now pull, which was the functional blocker for publishing at all.
Plain-HTTP references become HTTPS in the same pass, so OTA downloads stop
crossing the network in the clear.
Deliberately NOT rewritten:
- The public FIPS anchor on port 8444. It is a functional network endpoint
every node dials to bootstrap the mesh — closer to Bitcoin Core's hardcoded
seeds than to leaked infrastructure. The domain does resolve to the same
host, so it could become a hostname, but that adds a DNS dependency to the
path used precisely when things are broken. Worth a deliberate decision,
not a side effect of this change.
- The companion APK on port 2100. The domain returns 404 for that path, so
rewriting it would swap a working URL for a broken one. The Releases page
does serve (200), which is where the plan already wants those binaries.
- releases/app-catalog.json, releases/manifest.json and release-manifest.json.
These carry `signature` and `signed_by`; editing their contents invalidates
the signature and the fleet refuses artifacts that fail verification. They
were rewritten in a first pass and reverted — they must be regenerated and
re-signed through the signing ceremony instead, which needs the mnemonic.
So the catalog still advertises the old host until that ceremony runs. Nodes
resolve images through the signed catalog, not the on-disk manifests, so this
commit alone does not change what a node pulls.
Verified: archipelago-container 75/75; every manifest still parses with a
top-level app block; no signed artifact modified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 9abc1623 banner waited on refused_categories, but refused_categories
only fills when the model CALLS a gated tool — and D-16 hides ungranted
tools from the prompt, so the model never calls: it answered 'I can't do
that' in prose and the banner never fired. Live-verified: revoke media,
ask for content, no banner.
- build_system_prompt takes the disabled categories and teaches a marker:
'say it can be switched on in Settings → AI Data Access and end with
[[needs:<id>]]' — category names only, never tool names (D-16 holds)
- extract_needs_markers strips the markers from the reply and folds them
into refused_categories; unknown ids pass through as text (an offer is
the worst a bad marker can cause — never a grant)
- egress's seed-screen test now covers the new paragraph too
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Keeps the dev and test tooling an outside contributor would want, and takes
our node addresses out of it.
Scripts that silently defaulted to one of our nodes now require an explicit
host and exit 2 without one: smoke-test.sh, trust-archipelago-cert.sh,
dev-container-test.sh (which also derives its RPC and health URLs from the
SSH target instead of a second hardcoded copy), and image-recipe/dev-branding.sh.
A default that points at a machine the user does not own is worse than no
default: it fails confusingly, or reaches a stranger's device.
Usage examples, mock data and test fixtures move to the RFC 5737
documentation range (192.0.2.0/24). CGNAT test values stay inside
100.64.0.0/10 so the range-check semantics they exercise still hold, and
192.168.1.0/.1/.254 are left alone — those are gateway logic and UI
placeholders, not our addresses.
Playwright and the perf spec defaulted their baseURL to one of our nodes;
they now default to localhost:8100, the local dev server.
Removed neode-ui APP_URLS entirely. It is dead code — exported, never
imported — and it pinned fedimint's *prod* launch URL to 192.168.1.228:8175.
Had anything consumed it, every user's node would have tried to reach an
address that on their LAN is either nothing or someone else's machine.
Deleting beats sanitizing dead config.
Verified: frontend 868/868 vitest across 108 files; archipelago-container
75/75; mesh tests 9/9; audit-secrets 5/5. Zero node addresses and zero node
names remain in tracked files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The repo is source code and guidelines only. Nothing about how Archipelago's
own fleet is run, or how the team works, stays in it.
Untracked (kept on disk, gitignored) — 250 files:
- .planning/ (199) and loop/ — internal development process
- fleet operations tooling that targets specific nodes: deploy-to-target,
deploy-tailscale, deploy-config-defaults, setup-target-dev, setup-aiui-server,
setup-https-dev, debug-frontend, node-profile, fleet-fips-pair/unpair,
image-recipe/sync-from-live.sh
- image-recipe/INTEGRATION-GUIDE.md and docs/multinode-testing-plan.md, both of
which are live-server workflow and fleet node inventories
- the Phase 10 on-node verification and evidence records, which cite .planning/
as their evidence base
KEY-05-ENTROPY-ENFORCEMENT.md was initially moved out with the other Phase 10
docs and then put back: it is cited as normative rationale from ten places in
the codebase, including core/clippy.toml, which bans rand::thread_rng and
points at it for the reason. That makes it a guideline, not an internal record.
Node names removed from source (48 occurrences across comments, manifests and
test fixtures): archi-dev-box, archy-x250*, shorty-s, framework-pt,
zaza-optiplex, archi-thinkpad. Comments keep the engineering context and the
date, which is what carried the meaning; the machine name did not.
Three of those were live test values rather than comments and were replaced
with valid stand-ins, not prose: two mDNS hostnames and a mesh peer name.
An earlier pass substituted "a test node" into a hostname assertion, producing
an invalid hostname; caught and fixed as test-node.local.
Wipe mechanism: .local-only/manifest.txt inventories every local-only path and
.local-only/wipe.sh deletes them on one confirmation, refusing to touch
anything git still tracks. Both are themselves untracked, so the public repo
does not carry a map of internal filenames.
Verified: cargo check -p archipelago --all-features clean; archipelago-container
75/75 tests pass; appOrigin vitest 7/7; audit-secrets 5/5; every relative link
in tracked markdown resolves (0 broken).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
usePlayer.play() never looked at song.sources[] — a real library track went
straight to (CSP-blocked) Wavlake and reported 'Not found on Wavlake' while
its bytes sat on the operator's disk. Node sources (same-origin /content/<id>,
Range-streamed) now play first; Wavlake is the metadata-only fallback.
FilmDetail likewise only played YouTube sources; own/peer/IndeeHub sources
(same-origin, media-src 'self') now win, YouTube stays the free-films
fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Untracking the ops docs broke every reference to them. Repoints or removes
those references across README, architecture, ROADMAP, the archive index,
lifecycle TESTING, the hardening plan, and the security docs — pointing at
the issue tracker where a live task list was meant, and dropping the entry
entirely where it only existed to link an internal file.
Also fixes two pre-existing broken links found by validating every relative
link in the tracked docs:
- README linked docs/OPEN_SOURCE_READINESS.md, which never existed
(underscores vs hyphens).
- reticulum-daemon/README.md linked a local Claude session plan at
../../.claude/plans/enchanted-strolling-rocket.md — outside the repo, and
a path that would have shipped publicly pointing at nothing.
All relative links in tracked markdown now resolve: 0 broken.
audit-secrets.sh still 5/5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operations docs move out of git entirely rather than being sanitized. They
stay on disk for local use and are gitignored, so the Phase 6 export (which
takes HEAD) can never carry them. 15 files: the fleet runbook, hotfix
process, node inventories, internal trackers, session handoffs, the key
rotation/signing-posture records, and the open-source plan itself.
For the docs that remain public, infra identifiers are replaced with things
that are better documentation rather than placeholders: curl examples now
use `archipelago.local`, the product's own mDNS name, so a reader can run
them as-is instead of substituting an address that was never theirs.
Deliberately NOT scrubbed, both verified as functional rather than leaked:
- `tx1138.com` is the shipped default block explorer (DEFAULT_TX_EXPLORER in
useTxExplorer.ts, surfaced in WalletSettingsModal). Product behavior.
- `git.tx1138.com` in core/container/{image_policy,registry}.rs is a retired-
registry constant the code matches on to strip stale entries from legacy
node configs. Removing it would break migration for older nodes.
- `192.168.1.254` in bulletproof-containers.md is the LAN gateway in a podman
bug description, and `192.168.1.x` in user-walkthrough.md is already generic.
Whether a personal domain should be the shipped explorer default in a public
product is a separate product question, not a security one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sequencing change per user decision: credential rotation/revocation runs
last, immediately before Phase 6, instead of first. Safe under fresh-history
publish — the scrub commits never become public — but recorded as a HARD
blocking gate on Phase 6, with an explicit rotation sign-off added as a
numbered pre-publish step so "scrubbed" cannot be mistaken for "rotated".
Also corrects the plan against what execution actually found:
- the fleet password was in 8 tracked files, not 7 (3 in .planning/)
- both Gitea tokens are already dead (401); only the `ai` password is live
- the Framework node's SSH password was rotated out-of-band and is unrecorded,
which would block it from receiving the fleet rotation
- .planning/ is 199 tracked files of internal agent state — added to Phase 2
as the largest un-triaged internal block still in the tree
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Scrubs the fleet SSH/UI password from every tracked file (22 occurrences)
and removes inline credentials from the code paths that used them.
Docs and trackers keep the surrounding context — these are published under
docs/history/ per the open-source plan — with the literals replaced by
<FLEET_PW> / <FLEET_PW_ALT> so the "two variants exist" detail survives
without the values.
Three of the eight files were in .planning/ and were NOT in the plan's
enumerated list; the reworked audit-secrets.sh found them.
Code changes:
- neode-ui/test-openwrt.mjs: node URL and password come from ARCHY_NODE_URL /
ARCHY_NODE_PW; the SSH target derives from the URL instead of a hardcoded
tailnet IP; exits 2 when unset.
- scripts/run-post-install-tests.sh: drops the built-in "testpass123!"
default and adds --password-stdin; refuses to run unauthenticated instead
of silently trying a known password. --phase1-only still needs no password.
- .gitea/workflows/post-install-tests.yml: sshpass with an inline literal
replaced by key auth (NODE_SSH_KEY secret); password comes from the
NODE_UI_PASSWORD secret and is piped over stdin rather than argv, so it
stays out of the node's process list and the job log. Default target IP
removed.
scripts/audit-secrets.sh now reports 5/5 pass, 0 fail.
Note: rotation of the exposed credentials is deliberately deferred to the
pre-publish gate and is NOT done by this commit — these values are still
live. See Phase 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The audit passed for months while two live Anthropic keys and the fleet
SSH password sat in tracked files. Three independent reasons:
- ALLOW_PATTERNS was matched against the whole "file:line:content" string,
not the path, so bare words like "test", "demo" and "example" dropped any
hit whose *content* merely mentioned them.
- `\.md$` was in that same allowlist and `--include` never listed *.md or
*.yml, so docs and CI workflows — where every real leak has lived — were
never scanned at all.
- The false-positive filter spelled the single-quote class `\x27\x27`, which
GNU grep does not expand in an ERE, so the empty-string rule never fired.
Now: scans tracked files via `git ls-files` (exactly the set that would be
published), covers md/yml/mjs/kt/toml, allowlists by path only, and adds
patterns for credentialed URLs and inline `sshpass -p`. Test fixtures under
testdata/ are exempted narrowly rather than by substring.
Verified by planting canary secrets in docs/api-reference.md and
.gitea/workflows/build-iso.yml — both file types the old version ignored —
and confirming the audit fails on them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The archy content latch was global and permanent: once mount-time content
latched archyContentActive, no extracted [[film_ext:…]] recommendation card
could ever render again, and an empty tool result kept the latch — so a
'recommend me films' turn beside an empty catalogue showed prose only, with
'Nothing found' overwriting nothing. The chat had lost its rich previews.
- setArchyContent records which buckets the node actually supplied
(archySupplied) and latches active only on a non-empty delivery
- updatePanelFromText's no-overwrite guard is now per-bucket: node truth
wins buckets it filled; empty buckets stay writable for extracted previews
- the extraction fallback title no longer clobbers 'Nothing found'/'Loading…'
Regression tests: previews render in an empty bucket, node truth survives
tags in a filled bucket, 'Nothing found' survives a both-empty turn.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two reasons the content surface 'often doesn't surface the content':
- content.indeehub-projects items carried no mime/filename, so the UI
adapter classified every film 'excluded' and the films grid could never
render. They are films: they now declare video/mp4.
- apps_list surfaced the container-list RPC's BARE ARRAY; the broker reads
{ items: [...] }, so the apps grid was silently dropped every turn.
Wrapped at the tool boundary — the shared RPC's own shape is untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
'recommend me 10 scifi films' answered prose-only and OFFERED to check the
catalogue — the preamble invited knowledge recommendations (paragraph 2) but
only ordered tool calls for existence questions (paragraph 3), so the model
never ran the tool and emitted none of the tags the iframe renders as rich
preview cards.
- discovery of a kind the node could hold (films/music/books…) now gets a
catalogue-and-peers check FIRST, knowledge picks on top
- the 'would you like me to look?' stall is banned outright — looking is
one tool call, do it then answer
- the preamble teaches the exact [[film_ext:Title|Year|Director]] /
tv_ext / song_ext / book_ext / podcast_ext formats, same-line with the
one-line reason, real titles only, never for items the tool returned
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
vue-tsc rejected the double cast; vitest strips types so it slipped
through. Narrow once into a local instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- serve_content takes owner_session: a validated operator session skips the
availability/paid gates (Availability::Nobody stays delisted); the cookie
is re-validated in the content handler, same discipline as the model proxy
- the Tor proxy serves already-purchased items from the local content_owned
cache with Range slicing (206) instead of re-hitting the seller's 402 —
the buyer-side store exists so an owned item is never bought twice, and
its cards were rendering as permanent placeholders
- adapter: 'own'-scope items never render locked (a locked card suppresses
the playable URL — the placeholder-only grid the operator reported)
- broker: normalize 'purchased' OwnedRpcItems per item with the seller's
onion, and group 'peers' items per seller onion, so buildMediaUrl gets a
peerOnion and card URLs stop coming out empty
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reproduced live: 'show me paid for peer files' returned surfaces=1 with 3
purchased images over the bridge, then updatePanelFromText set panelOpen
from the REGEX-inferred tab list — a plain markdown list matches nothing,
so the panel closed and the user saw prose only. panelOpen now follows
orderedTabs (Archy tabs lead). Regression test pins the exact turn.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
S4: /aiui/api/web-search proxied straight to SearXNG with no auth — anyone
reaching the web port ran searches attributed to the node's IP. Now routed
through the daemon's session-gated model proxy like the claude/ollama legs
(both nginx server blocks), forcing format=json upstream (the client never
sent it — search could 200 with HTML that parsed as nothing).
S3: the forwarder also serves the STANDALONE frontend, whose bodies carry
full history/images with no assistant loop behind them — a pasted seed
phrase went to Anthropic unscreened. The forwarder now runs the egress
secret-shape scan (G-B1) with the node's own secrets dir as deny corpus on
Claude bodies and search queries; blocked requests get a plain-language 400.
Also fixes a REAL gap in the egress tokenizer found by these tests: a JSON
key glued to a string value's first word ('content":"abandon...') dropped
that word, so an exactly-12-word seed pasted as a bare message yielded an
11-member run — checksum misses, backstop misses. Non-member words now
rescan within the token. egress 15/15 + model_proxy 10/10 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The browser broker redacted log lines (password=/token=/macaroon key=value,
64+ hex, 64+ base64) while the node-side tool only untrusted-wrapped — so a
log line carrying rpcpassword=<32-hex> crossed to cloud backends below the
egress screen's threshold. Port the broker's three patterns to the tool
boundary as a pure line redactor + JSON walker; unit-tested (124 assistant
tests green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
ai_grants_unified UNIONED the assistant grants.json with the legacy
settings/ai_permissions.json on every read. On archi-dev-box legacy held
all-ten and grants.json held four, so the Settings UI and the AIUI frame
saw every category ON while the assistant refused six — and no UI toggle
could fix it, because both write paths existed but only ai.permissions.set
synced both files. Now: an existing grants.json answers alone; the legacy
file is consulted only when no grants file exists (pre-unification
upgrade), and that read migrates forward and persists the authority.
assistant.grants-set now also rewrites the legacy file in step. Regression
tests: authority is not widened by legacy; migration folds forward once.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per operator decision 2026-08-07 (mock content is isolated to
demo.archipelago-foundation.org, never in shipped code): the auto-seeded
'node-demo' conversation (invented balances, file listings, bitcoin.conf)
no longer ships on nodes — a VITE_DEMO_CONTENT build flag (or dev) gates
it, /seed, and the Guide 'Load Demo' button. The genuine onboarding guide
still seeds everywhere. The fixture's bitcoin.conf rpcpassword is now
unmistakably example-shaped: fake must never look like a real credential.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The key rode the wholesale settings→localStorage save, sitting at rest
readable by any same-origin script, while the AES-256-GCM key-vault built
for exactly this sat bypassed. Now: the key lives in a memory-only store
ref, persists only into the encrypted vault when a passphrase session is
active (migrating into the vault on unlock), and a one-time migration lifts
any existing plaintext key out of localStorage and re-saves the scrubbed
settings object immediately. Settings UI reports honestly how the key is
held. Typecheck clean; test suite unchanged (348 pass, 3 pre-existing fails).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Network permission's Settings label promises 'no IP addresses', and the
browser-side broker honours it — but the node-side tool forwarded
network.diagnostics verbatim, so a granted Network category sent the node's
WAN IP and SSID (both location-identifying) to cloud model backends. Strip
both at the tool boundary; NAT/UPnP/Tor/DNS connectivity shape stays.
Pure helper + unit test (123 assistant tests green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Handoff carries the peer-files correction, the podman-lifecycle trap, the
concurrent-agent warning, and the release-binary drift that blocks the ISO.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Carries the full task list with per-item status, the three commits'
rationale, the live measurements that overturned the earlier
peers-have-no-content conclusion, the browser-verification recipe, and
the binary-drift blocker that must clear before the ISO.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Browser-verified on archi-dev-box; all three were only visible by
driving the real UI.
The tab bar. `setArchyContent` put the node's grids up, then
`updatePanelFromText` replaced the bar with tabs inferred from the reply
text. "show me my own shared content" therefore landed on an "AI Brief"
— a prose restatement of the answer already on the left — with the
populated image grid no longer reachable. Guarding the panel arrays was
not enough: they held the right data while the tab bar had discarded the
way to see it. Archy tabs now lead, and the title follows the leading
tab. The prose stays; it just is not the only thing shown.
Tab order follows bucket size. A node with 13 photos and 2 tracks opened
on Songs and titled itself "2 Songs" for a 15-item answer.
Web search never worked embedded. `searchWeb` hardcoded
`/api/web-search` while every other call is built from BASE_URL. Under
`/aiui/` that asked the HOST for a path only the AIUI-scoped nginx
location serves, so it hit the node's API gate for a 403 and the CSP
refused the connection on top. Now BASE-relative. Additionally, the
embedded path skips the client-side search entirely: `streamViaArchy`
sends only the user's text, so the system prompt those results were
folded into is never transmitted — it was a round trip and a console
error per turn whose output provably reached no model. Web search for
the embedded path belongs node-side, with the other tools.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SearXNG defaults to `formats: [html]`. Its JSON API answers 403 —
and JSON is the only thing AIUI's web search speaks, since
`/aiui/api/web-search` proxies straight through to `/search`. Both
places that seed settings.yml (the first-boot script and the installer)
omitted `search.formats`, so web search has never worked on a node
whose SearXNG was installed, running and healthy. It reads as the
assistant being unable to search rather than as one missing config key.
Verified on archi-dev-box: `format=json` went 403 -> 200, returning 28
results for "bitcoin halving" from Brave and DuckDuckGo. Google and
Startpage self-suspend on a self-hosted instance (access denied /
CAPTCHA), which is expected and costs little given Brave's independent
index.
Existing nodes need the same two lines added to
/var/lib/archipelago/searxng/settings.yml and a restart; this commit
only fixes what new installs get.
Also fixes a build break: `fetchLibraryContent` built a bundle literal
that predates the images bucket.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four defects, one visible symptom: a correct prose answer beside an
empty grid.
1. The assistant's curated RPC bridge had an arm only for
`content.list-mine`. `tools.rs` mapped the `peers`, `purchased` and
`films` scopes onto three real, dispatcher-registered handlers that
`assistant_dispatch_tool` had never heard of, so every non-"own"
scope died on its catch-all. Downstream that read as "the peers have
no content" — it was a missing match arm, and the tool never ran.
Regression test added: every scope the schema advertises must reach a
real handler.
2. `content.browse-all-peers` wrapped its whole fan-out in one
`timeout(..).unwrap_or_default()`, which DISCARDED every completed
batch the moment the budget expired. One slow peer turned a
partly-successful browse into "0 reached, 16 unreachable". Observed
live on archi-dev-box: back-to-back calls returned real peer items,
then nothing. Now accumulates per batch and checks a deadline between
them, so partial results always survive. Budget 20s -> 45s: two
batches of eight at a 10s per-peer timeout had no headroom at all.
3. `assistant.chat` returned only `{ text }`. The structured results of
any content tool the turn ran were dropped inside the loop, so the
surface had nothing to render. The turn now carries them through
(captured raw, before the untrusted wrap, since they go to a renderer
that treats every field as inert data, never back into the prompt).
4. The adapter classified images as 'excluded' and dropped them. A node
sharing mostly photos rendered as an empty grid while AIUI's image
grid sat unused. Images now have a bucket, with the paid-lock and
extension-fallback handling audio and video already had.
Also: the panel says "Loading…" while a turn is in flight and "Nothing
found" when it comes back empty, instead of leaving the previous
query's heading standing as though it answered this one; the system
prompt tells the model to call the content tool and summarise rather
than re-list what the cards already show; and a refused tool now names
its permission category so the trusted chrome can offer the settings
screen instead of leaving "I don't have a tool for that" as the only
clue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
"What films are there from my peers" has three causes behind one answer, and
only one is being worked. The tool gap is in flight in a concurrent session
(content_list + SURFACE_TOOLS). Separately and unowned: AIUI declares six
context categories while the broker serves ten, so media/search/ai-local/notes
cannot be requested by AIUI at all — sanitizeMedia sits behind a door AIUI
cannot open, which is likely why the model claimed no capability rather than
reporting an empty library.
And the part neither fixes: measured with a real node-signed Nostr session
through the gate, /api/projects and /api/projects/private both return 0 items.
A correct "0 results" will be indistinguishable from a broken tool, so seed a
project or verify against a peer that has content before calling it done.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Persists the 17-item session task list so it can be rebuilt in a fresh session
(the task tool is session-scoped and would otherwise evaporate), with what
shipped and what each remaining item actually is.
Records the findings that change expectations rather than leaving them to be
rediscovered: the 16 federated peers are not serving content so peers_reached 0
is correct, IndeeHub's catalogue is genuinely empty, two AI permission stores
existed for the same ten categories, and tailscaled owns :443 so nginx must
bind LAN addresses explicitly or it fails EADDRINUSE and silently keeps the old
config.
STATE.md's stopped_at points at it, so /gsd-resume-work lands correctly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
UNIFIED GRANTS. There were two stores for the same ten categories:
settings/ai_permissions.json (what Settings wrote) and
assistant/grants.json (what actually gates the tool list). Toggling Settings
did nothing for the assistant, so with grants stuck at {"apps","system"} the
model truthfully answered "I don't have a tool for that" no matter what the
operator enabled — the real cause behind "the settings I enable keep
disabling". Their serde forms already matched one-for-one, so this is a
duplicate rather than two concepts. ai.permissions.get/set now read and write
the assistant's grants; the legacy file is still written so a downgrade does
not lose grants, and anything recorded only there is folded in on read.
PEER BROWSE now mirrors Cloud.vue's peer-files fan-out, as the operator asked:
concurrent with a cap and a per-peer timeout, rather than sequential. Cloud
caps at 3 because CHROMIUM's connection pool was starved (02-08) — a browser
constraint the daemon does not share, and measurably wrong here: at 3 a 20s
budget got through 2 batches of 16 peers and reached none. At 8 every peer is
attempted inside the budget.
Measured after deploying: 20.0s, peers_total 16, peers_reached 0. FIPS itself
is healthy (anchor connected, 3 authenticated peers, 4 fips_ok dials) but 14
dials fall back and fail, so the peers are not serving /content. The empty
film list is therefore correct — the transport works and the peers are down.
Reported as partial with counts so the assistant can say so instead of
implying the peers have nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
content.browse-all-peers had a per-peer timeout but no OVERALL budget. On this
node that meant >45s with no answer, which the assistant reported to the
operator as "having trouble accessing the peer content list". Measured cause:
16 federated peers, 1 reachable. Now bounded to 20s total, returning partial
results with peers_reached / peers_total / peers_unreachable / partial, so the
assistant can say "1 of 16 peers answered" instead of implying the rest have
nothing. Verified on the node: 20.015s, was >45s.
NodeCertificateSection had no container — I copied a section that sits INSIDE a
card rather than one that provides its own. Now uses the same
`glass-card px-6 py-6 mb-6` shell and heading level as every other settings
section, so it matches on desktop and mobile.
setup-node-ca.sh now also ensures the nginx HTTPS listener, because a CA is
useless if nothing serves TLS. It binds LAN addresses ONLY: tailscaled already
owns :443 on the tailnet addresses with its own Let's Encrypt cert, so a plain
`listen 443 default_server` binds 0.0.0.0 and fails EADDRINUSE — and nginx then
keeps running the OLD config while the reload reports success. Hit exactly that
on archi-dev-box. Port 80 keeps serving: nodes are reached by IP on LANs where
forcing a redirect would strand anyone who has not installed the CA.
Live now: https://192.168.63.240/ and https://<host>.local/ both 200 with
verify=0 against the node CA, http still 200, tailscaled's 443 untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
"[Vue Error] ReferenceError: Cannot access 'b' before initialization" from
Ye.immediate, taking the whole Mesh view down.
A watcher with `immediate: true` runs DURING setup. This one calls
handleFetchContent, whose body touches consts declared further down the setup
block — so on any session where history already contained an inline
content_ref, it dereferenced a binding that did not exist yet. handleFetchContent
itself is a hoisted `function`, which is why the call site looked innocent.
The initial pass moves to onMounted, which runs after setup completes: every
binding is initialized, and already-loaded history still gets the same
treatment as new messages, which is what `immediate` was there for.
Also adds .planning/todos/pending/2026-08-07-open-task-list.md — one flat list
of everything open, including the app-lifecycle reports (fedimint guardian
installs but does not work, BTCPay wipe not wiping, Bitcoin Knots vanishing,
fedimint gateway dying at 88%), the missing app_install tool behind
"!ai install bitcoin knots", and the LND UI 401s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator asked "what films are there to watch from my peers" and the model
answered, honestly, that it had no tool for it. It was right: content_list
mapped only to content.list-mine — this node's own shared files. Peer
catalogues and IndeeHub were unreachable from the assistant entirely.
content_list now takes scope: own | peers | purchased | films, dispatching to
content.list-mine / content.browse-all-peers / content.owned-list /
content.indeehub-projects. The model picks from a closed enum and never names
a method, so an invented scope falls back to "own" rather than reaching
anything it was not granted (T-13-34).
Two new RPCs behind it:
- content.browse-all-peers aggregates every federated peer in ONE call. The
dashboard fans this out client-side, but asking a model to enumerate peers
and loop is how it ends up claiming it has no tool. Rides FIPS —
PeerRequest::new(fips_npub, onion, "/content") with a 6s FIPS fast-fail then
Tor — so the onion is the peer's identity and FIPS is the transport.
Sequential with a per-peer timeout, not an unbounded fan-out: 02-08 traced a
real UI stall to browse-peer starving the connection pool. One peer being
down is the normal case and contributes nothing rather than failing the call.
- content.indeehub-projects fetches IndeeHub's catalogue, public plus (via a
node-signed NIP-98 login) the operator's private titles. Node-side because
signing that in the browser would put identity material next to the model,
which this phase rules out by name. Tolerant of IndeeHub's field spellings
across versions, and absent/stopped/empty all yield an empty list rather
than failing the caller.
action_key includes the scope, so listing peers cannot be replayed as listing
own files. 15/15 assistant::tools.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Regression from wiring the peers scope: requestArchyAllContent awaited all
three scopes together, so the grid waited on the slowest. `peers` browses every
federated node over FIPS (Tor fallback) and routinely takes tens of seconds or
times out when a peer is offline. On-device that read as
"content(peers) failed: Content request timed out" plus an AIUI that felt very
slow to open — with nothing rendered meanwhile, even though local content was
ready immediately.
Now `own` paints as soon as it lands and `owned`/`peers` fold in as they
arrive. A scope that times out costs only its own results.
Also records the operator's console findings as tasks: the `files` context
timeout, the web-search CSP block (13-09, now firing on every query), the
strfry icon 404, IndeeHub's relay.nostr.band socket, and the ask that `!archy`
over mesh be able to action container commands with text responses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator-reported via a Bitcoin-films transcript: "Banking on Bitcoin" was
captioned with *The Rise and Rise of Bitcoin*'s description, "Cryptopia" with
*The Bitcoin Standard*'s, and the section header "Documentaries:" bled into the
first card of each group. Read as the model talking nonsense; the model's prose
was correct throughout and only the pairing was wrong.
Several patterns anchor with `(?:^|\n)` so they fire only at a line start.
That makes m.index point at the NEWLINE — one character before the line the
match is really on — so extractDescriptionForTag's window, which walks back
from `matchIndex - 1`, landed on the PREVIOUS line. The description became
"previous line + this item's own text".
Normalised inside the helper rather than at each of its nine call sites, so a
pattern that gains a `(?:^|\n)` anchor later cannot silently reintroduce it.
Fault-injected to prove the tests are not vacuous: with the fix removed, two
fail with exactly the reported strings — 'Documentaries: – Early documentary
fo…' and 'The Rise and Rise of Bitcoin – Early …'. 26/26 with it restored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator: "the AI Data Access settings are not persistent through sessions,
often turns them all off."
They were stored in localStorage, which is scoped to an ORIGIN — and a node
answers on several: LAN address, Tailscale address, <host>.local, hostname.
Granting Media over the LAN and returning over Tailscale showed every switch
off again. Not reset: never set *there*. It also made a working content path
look broken, because every scope silently returns nothing without a grant, so
an ungranted permission is indistinguishable from an empty library — that is
exactly what an empty films search turned out to be.
The grant answers "what may the assistant read about THIS NODE", which is a
property of the node, not of one browser at one address. New
settings/ai_permissions.rs (same shape as session_policy: atomic temp+rename,
sanitised on read and write, fails closed on a corrupt file — an unreadable
grant file must never read as "everything allowed"). New ai.permissions.get /
.set, absent from the unauthenticated allowlist so they require a session.
Migration, not replacement: if this browser holds grants and the node holds
none, the local set is pushed UP rather than wiped. Without that, upgrading
would silently revoke the grants of everyone who set them before this change.
The node still wins in every other direction, so a revocation made on one
device takes effect everywhere — otherwise revoking would be impossible from a
second device.
Unknown category ids are stored verbatim rather than validated against a
hardcoded list: a third copy of that list would silently drop a new category on
upgrade. Storing a category grants nothing by itself — the broker checks before
fetching and the node re-checks before answering (T-13-33).
Hydration happens ONCE at broker start, not inside each permission gate: the
gates are hot-path, and awaiting there adds an RPC to every content and context
request. The first attempt did it per-gate and the existing broker tests caught
it by failing on consumed mocks.
Rust 7/7, store 18/18, broker 23/23.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The node signed a real NIP-98 event with its own key and presented it to
IndeeHub through the gate: 200, with a real JWT pair issued. The app's own
bearer token then rides back through the gate — /api/auth/me,
/api/projects/private and /api/projects all 200, matching loopback.
/api/projects/private was the endpoint recorded as unreachable without a
Nostr session, so item 4's private-films path is unblocked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
secret_shaped_content_never_reaches_the_stub was RED because its fixture was
the first twelve wordlist entries — not a parseable mnemonic. The 2026-08-06
precision rewrite of screen_outbound moved from a word-run shape rule to BIP-39
checksum validation (the shape rule had blocked legitimate turns on a live node
twice); egress.rs's own test was updated to a checksum-valid fixture and this
copy was not, so it asserted behaviour that had been deliberately retired.
The named behaviour was intact throughout: screen_outbound runs on the Routstr
paid leg before any body is sent, a real mnemonic is blocked, and
checksum-invalid runs of 20+ wordlist members are still caught by
IMPLAUSIBLE_MEMBER_RUN. Fixture is now a checksum-valid mnemonic, asserted as
parseable so it cannot silently rot the same way again.
Also records the operator's rendering contract in the surfaces todo: chat gets
the mini version, the content/context surfaces expand it, nothing rich may
overflow the bubble at mobile width.
Nine of ten turns in the exported transcript answered in markdown prose where
the content surface (grids/cards) and context surface should have carried it.
Records each turn against the surface it should drive, plus two security items
found in the same evidence: a cleartext rpcpassword rendered into the chat, and
the RED screen_outbound test that lets a seed-shaped body reach a third-party
inference provider.
