Dorian
|
39c7ac1924
|
feat: rootless podman, session hardening, boot stability, sidebar fix
Rootless podman migration (TASK-11):
- Remove sudo from all podman calls in PodmanClient + 8 backend files
- Remove sudo from all podman/docker calls in deploy script
- Restore full systemd security hardening: NoNewPrivileges,
RestrictAddressFamilies, MemoryDenyWriteExecute, RestrictRealtime,
RestrictNamespaces, RestrictSUIDSGID, SystemCallFilter, ProtectSystem=strict
- Enable loginctl linger for rootless container persistence
- Remove Ollama from auto-deploy (marketplace-only)
Session & auth hardening:
- Increase MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS 20→50 (prevents eviction storms)
- Debounced 401 redirect in rpc-client.ts (prevents redirect storms)
Boot stability:
- optimize-debian.sh: adds chrony, swap, removes policy-rc.d
- deploy script: pre-restart chrony + swap setup
- ISO build: chrony package, swap file creation
- BootScreen: no longer clears localStorage (prevents splash replay)
- RootRedirect: sole owner of localStorage clearing on server ready
UI fixes:
- Sidebar opacity default changed from 0→visible (fixes missing sidebar
after page-persistence login without entrance animation)
- Console.log/error wrapped in import.meta.env.DEV guards
- Remove unused route import from RootRedirect
Beta tracking:
- CLAUDE.md: beta freeze protocol added
- MASTER_PLAN.md: TASK-11, TASK-17, phase structure
- BETA-PROGRESS.md: initial tracking doc
- Tagged v1.2.0-alpha.1 as pre-rootless baseline
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
2026-03-18 13:53:27 +00:00 |
|
Dorian
|
367b483a72
|
feat: bitcoin-ui CSS fix, HTTPS proxy support, deploy script improvements
Bitcoin UI:
- Replace cdn.tailwindcss.com with locally bundled tailwind.css (CSP blocks external scripts)
- Make all asset paths relative for nginx proxy compatibility
- Add bitcoin-ui build/deploy to deploy-to-target.sh (was missing entirely)
- Use --network host (bitcoin-ui proxies Bitcoin RPC at 127.0.0.1:8332)
HTTPS mixed content fix:
- Add HTTPS_PROXY_PATHS in AppSession.vue — when parent page is HTTPS,
iframe loads through nginx proxy instead of direct HTTP port
- Prevents browser blocking HTTP iframes inside HTTPS pages
- All Tailscale servers use HTTPS, this was breaking all app iframes
Deploy & first-boot improvements:
- first-boot-containers.sh auto-detects disk size for pruning vs txindex
- first-boot-containers.sh checks fallback source path for UI containers
- Added mempool-electrs to APP_PORTS mapping
- ElectrumX container creation in first-boot
- Podman doctor/fix/uptime skills added
Also includes: session persistence, identity management, LND transactions,
ElectrumX status UI, nostr-provider improvements, Web5 enhancements
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
2026-03-16 12:58:35 +00:00 |
|
Dorian
|
aa6c7c2e6a
|
fix: harden input validation across all RPC endpoints (PENTEST-02)
Manual security audit of 130+ RPC endpoints. Critical fixes:
- LND: validate pubkey (66-char hex), Bitcoin addresses, channel points,
amount bounds, payment request format, memo length, peer address
- Package: validate_app_id on start/stop/restart/bundled-app handlers,
validate volume host paths (must be under /var/lib/archipelago/),
validate Docker image in bundled-app-start
- Container: validate_app_id on all 6 handlers, canonicalize manifest paths
- Network: path traversal prevention in connection request deletion
- Backup: backup ID validation in delete handler
- Webhooks: URL scheme validation, SSRF prevention for private IPs
- Security: validate app_id in secret rotation
- Interfaces: WiFi password length/null validation, strict IP/gateway/DNS
parsing for static ethernet config
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
2026-03-11 14:32:49 +00:00 |
|
Dorian
|
6656d2f1d9
|
fix: implement 22 security pentest remediation fixes
Server-side session management with SHA-256 hashed tokens and HttpOnly
cookies. Auth middleware gating all RPC/WS/proxy routes with method
allowlist. Login rate limiting (5/60s per IP). CORS restricted to
config origin. Docker registry allowlist. App ID and path validation.
P2P message sanitization (HTML + log injection). Onion address and
known-peer validation. Nginx security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options,
etc.) and AIUI proxy auth. Systemd hardening (non-root, NoNewPrivileges,
ProtectSystem).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
2026-03-06 03:26:56 +00:00 |
|
Dorian
|
486fc39249
|
feat: complete Phase 1 foundation hardening + three-mode UI design doc
Phase 1a — Gradient Removal:
- Replaced all gradient-button/gradient-card with glass-button/path-option-card
- Removed banned gradient CSS classes
Phase 1b — Security Hardening:
- SecretsManager: AES-256-GCM encryption (core/security)
- electrs_status: credentials from env vars instead of hardcoded
- port_manager: RwLock proper error handling (no unwrap)
- Pinned all 11 :latest manifest images to specific versions
- parmanode converter: pinned inferred image versions
Phase 1c — Code Quality:
- Split rpc.rs (1795 lines) into 6 handler modules (auth, node, container, package, peers)
- Removed sideload code (UI, store, RPC client, 3 doc files)
- Fixed body background flash on logout/refresh
- Replaced 30 TypeScript `any` types with proper types
- Deleted HelloWorld.vue, removed TODO comments
- Added set -euo pipefail to all shell scripts
- Made deploy script verbose with timestamps and elapsed time
Also adds:
- CLAUDE.md project guide
- docs/three-mode-ui-design.md — design spec for Easy/Pro/Chat UI modes
- OnlineStatusPill component
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
2026-03-04 05:23:42 +00:00 |
|