6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Dorian
94f2de4a64 refactor: centralize constants, eliminate unwraps, remove dead code, resolve TODOs
- R13+R16: Replace .expect() with .context()? in main.rs and identity.rs
- R17+R18+R19: Fix unwrap() calls in helpers and js-engine
- R20+R21: Remove #[allow(dead_code)] annotations and delete truly dead code
- R22-R26: Create constants.rs module, replace 21 hardcoded values across 12 files
- R28+R29: LND/DWN timeouts already present — verified
- R30-R33: Remove TODO comments, implement marketplace payment check

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-21 01:54:35 +00:00
Dorian
2443ae6bba refactor: replace blocking std::fs and TCP I/O with async tokio equivalents
- R6: Convert 6 std::fs calls in session.rs to tokio::fs async
- R7: Convert std::fs::read_to_string in docker_packages.rs to async
- R8: Convert 3 std::fs calls in port_allocator.rs to async, switch to tokio::sync::Mutex
- R9+R10+R11: Fix blocking I/O in node_message.rs and nostr_discovery.rs
- R12: Convert electrs_status.rs from sync TCP to async tokio::net with 5s timeouts
- R4+R5: Spawn periodic cleanup tasks for endpoint and login rate limiters

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-21 01:21:08 +00:00
Dorian
1f81a0d804 feat: E2E encrypted Tor channel messages (ChaCha20-Poly1305)
Messages between federated nodes are now end-to-end encrypted:
- X25519 ECDH key agreement from existing ed25519 node identities
- HKDF-SHA256 key derivation with domain separation
- ChaCha20-Poly1305 authenticated encryption per message
- Random 12-byte nonce per message via OsRng (CSPRNG)
- Graceful fallback to plaintext if encryption fails
- Receiver auto-detects encrypted vs plaintext messages

The Tor transport was already encrypted (onion routing), this adds
application-layer E2E encryption so even a compromised receiving
backend can't read messages without the node's private key.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-20 09:04:43 +00:00
Dorian
3aa37137ed fix: persistent Tor channel messages, bulletproof Tor after deploys
- Messages persisted to disk (messages.json) — survive restarts
- Sent messages stored on backend via node-store-sent RPC
- Message deduplication (same pubkey + message within 30s)
- Max 200 messages in circular buffer
- Direction field (sent/received) for proper UI display
- Container doctor: prefer system Tor, remove archy-tor container
- Deploy torrc generator: read from tor-config/services.json,
  web apps map port 80→local port for clean .onion URLs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-20 08:26:40 +00:00
Dorian
6656d2f1d9 fix: implement 22 security pentest remediation fixes
Server-side session management with SHA-256 hashed tokens and HttpOnly
cookies. Auth middleware gating all RPC/WS/proxy routes with method
allowlist. Login rate limiting (5/60s per IP). CORS restricted to
config origin. Docker registry allowlist. App ID and path validation.
P2P message sanitization (HTML + log injection). Onion address and
known-peer validation. Nginx security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options,
etc.) and AIUI proxy auth. Systemd hardening (non-root, NoNewPrivileges,
ProtectSystem).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-06 03:26:56 +00:00
Dorian
1073d9fd2c Update Fedimint configuration and enhance onboarding process
- Upgraded Fedimint version to v0.10.0 in docker-compose.yml and manifest.yml, adding support for the built-in Guardian UI.
- Modified .gitignore to exclude deploy-config.sh script.
- Enhanced onboarding process in AuthManager to persist onboarding state and validate password strength during user setup.
- Updated API to handle onboarding completion and password change requests, ensuring a smoother user experience.
- Improved configuration management to support Nostr discovery and Tor proxy settings, enhancing node identity features.
2026-02-17 15:03:34 +00:00