Nginx Proxy Manager, Tailscale, Ollama, CryptPad, and AdGuard Home now
carry full manifests: the app gate fronts their web ports (TLS on the
same port, node login where appropriate), installs run through the
orchestrator, and pins live in the signed catalog. Tailscale mirrors its
legacy shape exactly (userspace networking, web console on 8240, plain
HTTP for the gate to front). Ollama stays loopback-only — the
assistant's local model backend, not a web app.
Retires the four already-removed apps for good (FIPS, Nostr VPN,
Routstr, Penpot pins dropped from image-versions.sh, the generator map,
and image_versions.rs), fixes Cuprate's duplicated metadata block that
strict YAML parsers reject, and updates the port-inventory review gates
for the new open (3 own-login consoles) and exempt (2 DNS) ports.
Full-node daemon: P2P + Monero's own restricted RPC (the safe-for-public
subset wallets use as a "remote node") are auth:none like bitcoin/electrumx's
equivalents; unrestricted RPC (full node control) stays gated auth:local.
readonly_root works cleanly since the upstream image is FROM scratch with
ownership fixed at build time — no runtime chown/setuid needed, unlike
bitcoin-knots/core.
Verified locally end-to-end before committing: built the upstream Dockerfile,
confirmed the generated Cuprated.toml against `cuprated --generate-config`/
`--dry-run`, and ran the real image with the manifest's exact ports/volumes —
including discovering that cuprated's own 127.0.0.1-default RPC bind is
unreachable through a published host port and needs to bind 0.0.0.0
internally with ports[].bind:127.0.0.1 doing the actual restriction, the
same pattern bitcoin-knots' RPC port already uses in this repo.
Bumps the unauthenticated_ports_are_all_accounted_for canary (26 -> 28) for
cuprate's two auth:none ports, per that test's own review-before-updating
contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Some apps carry a complete account system and are broken by an upstream
challenge: git clients speak basic-auth (not browser cookies), and a
BTCPay checkout link handed to a customer must open for that customer.
Both were behind the gate's login page — the "non-browser clients need an
access token" gap disclosed in five consecutive releases.
- New manifest port policy `auth: open`: the daemon still fronts the port
exactly like `gated` (loopback pin, external binds, frame-header fixes,
app-down retry page, Tor upstream) but serves it without the login
challenge. Requires auth_rationale, same burden of proof as `none`.
Gitea 3001 and BTCPay 23000 declare it.
- Runtime operator override per app (security.set-app-gate → app-configs/
<id>.json "gateEnabled"), surfaced as Settings → app → Access control.
Wins over the manifest in both directions and applies on the next
request — no restart, and it works today on catalog-covered apps whose
signed manifest still says `gated`.
- The gate resolves policy per-request from the live port map, so a
toggle takes effect without waiting for the 60s rebind sweep. "Off"
never releases the port: gated apps are loopback-pinned, so releasing
would strand them, not open them.
- security.app-gate-status now reports gate_enabled + any override.
- New guard test pins the `auth: open` set (both entries reviewed); the
`auth: none` count moves 25 → 26, absorbing pre-existing drift from the
phoenixd onboarding (loopback JSON API with its own generated password).
- Docs: the manifest spec's ports row documented only host/container/
protocol — bind, auth, auth_rationale and session_passthrough were
undocumented. Added a full "Ports & the app gate" section plus a
developer-guide entry telling app authors to enforce their own auth
regardless, since the operator can flip the gate either way.
Verified live on archi-dev-box from an external address: gated → 401 gate
page; override off → Gitea 200 own page, BTCPay 302 to its own login,
git-over-HTTP info/refs 200; override on → 401 again; clear → default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
archipelago
ssmithxandClaude Sonnet 5