Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
archipelago 7b88ba59b2 chore(apps): bump the pins that need no mirroring; curate Cuprate's store entry
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 40s
Pin bumps (all verified pullable from their public registries before
editing, so none can become an image-not-found on a node):

  strfry           1.1.1 -> 1.1.2              (dockurr/strfry, direct pull)
  btcpay-server    2.4.2 -> 2.4.3             (docker.io/btcpayserver, direct pull)
  netbird (nginx)  1.31.3-alpine -> 1.31.4-alpine
  pine   (nginx)   1.31.3-alpine -> 1.31.4-alpine

image-versions.sh moved in lockstep for BTCPAY_IMAGE — it is the baseline
the update badge compares against. Held back deliberately, per the risk
policy from the Aug-17 pass: gitea (four minors of DB migrations),
portainer (six minors), filebrowser (2.27 -> 2.63), fedimint/gateway
(0.8 -> 0.12, real migrations), lnd (money-critical), netbird-server/
netbird-dashboard (0.x, must move in lockstep), and everything with a
major jump or a data migration.

Cuprate also gets its curated store entry (category money, tier optional,
icon, repo) — same shape as the Alby Hub / phoenixd entries — synced
through generate-app-catalog.py into both store catalogs and the
app-session config. The fips launch-port list is unchanged (Cuprate has
no UI port; the generated file round-trips to the committed bytes after
cargo fmt).

Three further bumps are prepared and parked on the
app-bumps-mirror-pending branch, blocked only on a registry-push token:
vaultwarden 1.37.2-alpine, archy-nbxplorer 2.6.11, home-assistant
2026.8.3 — all mirror-backed, and the push credential on record for the
lfg2025 namespace is dead.

Drift gate: check-app-catalog-drift.py --release --strict clean
(31 store entries, 0 drift, 0 missing). appSessionConfig tests 7/7.
2026-08-30 16:22:26 -04:00
archipelago 37a82fd2f9 fix(cuprate): avoid Penpot RPC port collision 2026-08-23 01:43:09 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 f1b5d2d267 fix(cuprate): stop publishing the unauthenticated unrestricted RPC
The manifest bound cuprated's unrestricted RPC (full node control) to
0.0.0.0 inside the container with
i_know_what_im_doing_allow_public_unrestricted_rpc = true, relying on
ports[].bind: 127.0.0.1 to keep it private. That only restricts the HOST
side. Verified live on archi-dev-box 2026-08-22: a peer container got a
valid unauthenticated get_info off container port 18081 — and still did
after cuprate was moved to its own network, because podman bridges route
to each other unless created with --opt isolate=true, which the
orchestrator's auto-create does not pass. Every app on the node could
therefore drive full node control with no credential.

The PR justified this as the pattern bitcoin-knots already uses, but
knots writes rpcuser/rpcpassword from generated secrets, so a 0.0.0.0
bind there still is not control without credentials. cuprated has no RPC
authentication at all, so the two are not equivalent.

Unrestricted RPC is now left at cuprated's own default — container
loopback only, published nowhere, reachable by nothing — which is what
upstream intends by refusing a non-local bind without an explicit
override. Restricted RPC (the safe-for-public subset wallets use) and p2p
are unchanged, and health_check moves to 18089 since 18184 is gone.

Re-verified after the change: peer container gets connection refused on
18081 (exit 7), restricted RPC and the health endpoint still answer, the
node still syncs, validator APPROVED, 76/76 container tests pass
including the unauthenticated-port canary (still 28 — an auth: local
port was removed, not an auth: none one).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 03:10:53 -04:00
ssmithxandClaude Sonnet 5 d6b48ce095 feat(apps): package Cuprate, an alternative Monero node
Full-node daemon: P2P + Monero's own restricted RPC (the safe-for-public
subset wallets use as a "remote node") are auth:none like bitcoin/electrumx's
equivalents; unrestricted RPC (full node control) stays gated auth:local.
readonly_root works cleanly since the upstream image is FROM scratch with
ownership fixed at build time — no runtime chown/setuid needed, unlike
bitcoin-knots/core.

Verified locally end-to-end before committing: built the upstream Dockerfile,
confirmed the generated Cuprated.toml against `cuprated --generate-config`/
`--dry-run`, and ran the real image with the manifest's exact ports/volumes —
including discovering that cuprated's own 127.0.0.1-default RPC bind is
unreachable through a published host port and needs to bind 0.0.0.0
internally with ports[].bind:127.0.0.1 doing the actual restriction, the
same pattern bitcoin-knots' RPC port already uses in this repo.

Bumps the unauthenticated_ports_are_all_accounted_for canary (26 -> 28) for
cuprate's two auth:none ports, per that test's own review-before-updating
contract.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 13:58:06 +00:00