A Minibits /claim response consumes the payment server-side the instant
it's returned — it can never be re-fetched. claim_and_redeem previously
decrypted/redeemed each claim inline and just warn!-logged any failure,
so a mint-unreachable blip, a stale cached server key, or an operator
who'd edited their accepted-mints list to drop the default mint (via
streaming.configure-mints) could make a real payment vanish with
nothing but a log line to show for it — claimed_count/received_sats
still came back as a clean 0, identical to "nothing arrived."
Now: every fetched claim is persisted to MinibitsState.pending_claims
before decrypt/redeem is attempted, survives failures across polls
instead of being dropped, and claim_and_redeem no longer bails out on a
fetch error without first retrying whatever was already pending.
ensure_mint_accepted self-heals the accepted-mints allow-list so the
Minibits mint (the address is inherently backed by it) can't be
excluded out from under a claim. ClaimOutcome gains failed_count,
threaded through wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim and shown in
ReceiveBitcoinModal so a stuck claim is visible instead of silent.
Also fixes the server_nostur_pubkey field-name typo (no live state to
migrate — this feature hasn't shipped yet).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EawZPP9iidXj6Tvg3EpG3a
The wallet used Minibits only as a Cashu mint, so the node could hold and
swap ecash there but had no addressable name at it. This derives a LUD-16
Lightning address (name@minibits.cash) from the node's own ecash wallet and
surfaces it in the ecash Receive tab above the existing paste-token box.
Identity reuses the NUT-13 ecash phrase, so there is no second secret:
- seedHash = sha256(mnemonic.to_seed("")) — the exact hash the Minibits app
stores, so restoring the same phrase recovers the same address both ways;
- Nostr keys via NIP-06 at m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0 (nostr-sdk Keys::from_mnemonic,
pinned by a unit test against the NIP-06 vector so a bump cannot silently
move the derivation and orphan the profile).
Backend (wallet/minibits.rs) implements the verified live /v3 flow: NIP-42
challenge/verify -> JWT, idempotent /profile registration with collision
retry, and /claim polling that NIP-04-decrypts each token (service pubkey read
from the address's own LUD-16 metadata, constant fallback) and redeems it
through ecash::receive_token. Mainnet-only; state cached 0600 in
wallet/minibits.json.
New RPC: wallet.ecash-lnaddress (register-or-read, idempotent) and
wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim (sweep Lightning payments into ecash). The modal
fetches the address on tab open, renders QR + copy, and sweeps claims while
open; a registration failure is non-fatal so paste-token still works.
Verified end-to-end against production: registered a disposable
@minibits.cash address, confirmed it resolves via /.well-known/lnurlp, and the
claim poll returns cleanly.
The release gate's first real stage is `cargo fmt --check`, and it had
44 diffs across 15 files — enough to abort `create-release.sh` at step 0
before it touched a version number. Some of that drift is mine from the
last two days, some predates it in files I never opened
(bootstrap.rs, ghost_reaper.rs, openwrt/router.rs), and one is the
regenerated fips/app_ports.rs.
No behaviour change — rustfmt only.
Gate now: 8 of 9 green. The remaining red is cargo-test-weekly exiting
124, which is the 25-minute `timeout` expiring during a cold
CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 rebuild on a loaded node — the tests never started.
Not a test failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bring-your-own, the open question the migration plan left. Point this
wallet at a phrase you already hold — Minibits, Nutstash, cdk-cli — and
its coins become restorable here, which is the other half of "these
words are portable".
Replacing an established phrase is the one genuinely lossy thing this
module can do, so it is treated that way. The coins already held stay
spendable: they are proofs, not derivations, and nothing here touches
`ecash.json`. But they were minted under the *old* phrase, so a restore
will no longer find them. Hence an explicit confirm, a prompt to reveal
and write down the current phrase first, and — most importantly — the
replaced phrase is archived beside the wallet, never overwritten. It may
be the last copy of the words a balance was minted under, and quietly
destroying that is precisely what this module exists to prevent.
Re-importing the phrase already in use is a no-op rather than a
replacement, so it archives nothing.
Counters are deliberately left alone. They are per-keyset and
seed-relative, so under a new seed they merely start high, which costs
nothing because a restore scans from zero regardless. Resetting them
would be the dangerous choice on the day someone imports the phrase they
were already using.
`imported` is its own provenance rather than reusing `independent`: both
mean the node's recovery phrase does not cover the wallet, but only one
of them means the operator already knows where else the words live.
15 NUT-13 tests green, 1000 frontend tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Running the route suite on this box surfaced that the backup was
unreachable here: `identity/master_seed.enc` is written during
onboarding, and any node onboarded before that step existed simply does
not have one. Reveal bailed with "this node has no encrypted seed
backup", and restore followed it down.
But the choice on such a node was never "derived phrase or independent
phrase" — it was "independent phrase or no backup at all", and a wallet
whose coins can be restored from words the operator holds beats one
whose coins die with a single file. So it now generates one, recorded as
`independent`, and every surface that shows it says plainly that
restoring the node will not bring the ecash back — only these words
will. `derivable_from_node_seed` lets the card say which kind you are
about to get *before* you write anything down.
Also: a mint that never implemented NUT-09 answered restore with a bare
404, which surfaced as "mint returned 404 with no further detail" —
true, and useless to someone trying to get their coins back. It now
names the limitation.
The route suite was reading `result.amount_sats` from mint-claim, which
answers with `minted_sats`. A working claim had been reporting as a
failure; that was one of the two reds carried over from yesterday.
The real gap, though, was that "recovered 0 sats" passes on a wallet
with nothing to find — exactly the shape of a backup that looks fine
until the day you need it. test-ecash-restore.sh does the test that
settles it: mint, **delete the wallet file**, restore, check the coins
came back. On this box: 87 sats before the wipe, 0 after, 61 recovered
from the phrase alone — every coin minted since the phrase existed, and
none of the 26 sats minted before it, which used random secrets and
never could come back. Testnet only, and it refuses to run otherwise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Until now every Cashu proof this node held was backed by a secret drawn
from OsRng and written to exactly one file. Losing wallet/ecash.json
lost the coins outright — no phrase to write down, and nothing the mint
could do about it. Ecash is a bearer instrument, so "one file, no
backup" was the sharpest edge in the wallet.
NUT-13 derives each proof's secret and blinding factor from (seed,
keyset id, counter) instead. The wallet becomes a phrase, and the coins
can be re-derived and re-claimed — here or in any other NUT-13 wallet.
The phrase is its own 24 words, derived from the node master seed over a
fixed HKDF path. Both halves matter: it is still covered by the node's
recovery phrase, so there is nothing extra to write down; but it is
portable, so restoring ecash into Minibits or cdk-cli does not mean
handing over the key to the entire node.
It sits on disk unencrypted, deliberately. The master seed needs the
operator's password to open, which no background mint or swap can ask
for; and this file lives beside wallet/ecash.json, which already holds
spendable bearer secrets in plaintext. It regenerates exactly those
secrets, so it is the same sensitivity class as the file next to it.
0600, like identity/nostr_secret, which is derived and persisted the
same way.
Counters are reserved *before* the mint call and never rolled back. A
gap costs a restore scan a few extra probes; a reused counter costs a
coin, because two proofs with the same secret can only be spent once.
Restore is the half that cannot be done offline: a re-derived secret is
not money until the mint's signature over it exists. /v1/restore returns
those signatures; unblinding reconstitutes the proofs. It is additive
and idempotent — coins already held are skipped by secret, spent ones
are counted but not added — so it is safe to press on a working wallet,
which is when someone is most likely to reach for it.
Existing nodes activate on the first visit to Settings → Ecash backup
phrase: that password prompt is the only moment the master seed can
legitimately be opened. New nodes get it at onboarding. Until then the
behaviour is exactly as before — valid proofs, no backup — and the card
says so rather than implying a backup already exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Redeeming ecash reported success as one line of small green text, while an
on-chain or Lightning payment got the full moment — amount, verb, and the
identifiers you can copy. That asymmetry matters most for ecash: it leaves
no public ledger entry, so if the payment is ever questioned there is
nothing to look up afterwards. Whatever isn't copyable at that instant is
simply gone.
The success pane is extracted from SendBitcoinModal into a shared
PaymentSuccessPane so Cashu and Fedimint show the *same* screen rather
than a lookalike, and the copyable-row treatment is defined once. Each
caller passes the identifiers its protocol actually has; ecash receive now
shows the issuing mint (newly returned by wallet.ecash-receive) and the
redeemed token itself, clamped so a long token doesn't flood the pane.
Also: the test-ecash switch is a proper toggle (role="switch", keyboard
focusable) rather than a checkbox — it selects which purse the wallet is
looking at, so it should read as a mode you are in.
SendBitcoinModal still carries its own copy of the markup; consolidating it
onto the shared component is a follow-up, deliberately not done in the same
change as the money-path wiring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Executes steps 1-3 of docs/cashu-cdk-migration-plan.md, plus the test-coin
switch needed to exercise these routes without spending real sats.
Protocol layer: depend on `cashu` 0.17.5 (MIT, the crate CDK is built on,
default-features off, `wallet` only). Keyset ids now go through upstream's
`Id::from_short_keyset_id` / `ShortKeysetId` instead of the prefix match
hand-rolled in 2277fc46 — same repair, but implemented by the reference
code that defines the rule, so the next spec turn is a version bump rather
than another incident. `MintClient` feeds it the mint's `/v1/keysets` in
upstream's own `KeySetInfo` shape, parsing entries individually so one
keyset in an unmodelled unit can't block resolving the id we need.
Adding the crate required relaxing `bip39 = "=2.1.0"` to `"2.1"` (resolves
2.2.2): the exact pin held `unicode-normalization` at 0.1.22 and no
resolution existed otherwise. The pin carried no recorded rationale; seed
tests cover the bump.
Network switch: `wallet.ecash-network` / `wallet.ecash-set-network`, with a
Test mode toggle in Wallet Settings → Cashu. Cashu has no testnet, so this
points the wallet at the public `testnut` mint — but crucially each network
gets its OWN wallet and accepted-mints file, because test and real proofs
in one purse would be spendable interchangeably and the balance would be a
lie. Mainnet keeps the original filenames, so existing funds files are
untouched and switching is reversible: tests assert a real balance survives
a round trip through test mode.
Headless coverage: scripts/test-ecash-routes.sh drives every ecash RPC over
the real HTTP path (network get/set, balance, history, mint quote + claim,
send, receive, double-redeem refusal, garbage input, melt quote), restores
the node's original network on exit, and exits non-zero with the failure
count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>