chore: prepare 1.8.22-alpha release candidate

fix: probe Angor IPv4 health endpoint inside the actual image
fix: prevent NPM tunnel collisions and false app health restarts
2026-09-30 16:45:43 -04:00 · 2026-09-30 16:40:16 -04:00 · 2026-09-30 16:30:40 -04:00 · 2026-09-30 16:12:04 -04:00 · 2026-09-30 13:46:50 -04:00 · 2026-09-30 13:46:16 -04:00
162 changed files with 13887 additions and 4921 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Blocking incident: Framework LND startup and false zero balance
+
+Before starting or resuming work in this repository, read
+`docs/incident-framework-lnd-startup.md` and check its status.
+
+The user explicitly required this incident to take priority over later work.
+While its status is OPEN:
+
+- Surface this blocker at session start, including when the user asks for unrelated work.
+- Prioritize investigation and repair on the actual Framework node. If access is
+  unavailable, ask for it and continue useful offline investigation; defer unrelated
+  work unless the user explicitly overrides this priority.
+- A manual LND restart, a source patch, passing local tests, or publishing an OTA
+  does not resolve the incident. Do not mark it fixed until the Framework's startup,
+  Receive flow, and balance behavior are verified on the node, including a controlled
+  reboot with access and recovery arrangements in place.
+- Preserve wallet identity, wallet/channel databases, credentials, and backups.
+  Never run wallet wipe/recreation as an automatic investigation or recovery step.
+- Record evidence, changes, validation, and remaining work in the incident document.
+
+This priority comes from the user's explicit instruction on 2026-09-15. It remains
+in effect across sessions until the documented acceptance criteria are met or the
+user explicitly changes it.
+
+## Unit tests on a live node
+
+Run backend unit tests through `scripts/test-backend-isolated.sh`. Do not run
+unrestricted `cargo test` on a node with installed apps: older mocked-runtime
+tests still reached real service commands. The runner isolates wallet data,
+service buses, container storage, networking, and process IDs. Compilation with
+`cargo test --no-run` is safe. Keep separately authorized live checks explicit.
@@ -1,6 +1,85 @@
 # Changelog

-## Unreleased
+## v1.8.22-alpha (2026-09-30)
+
+- Fixed Angor Indexer health checks choosing IPv6 localhost for an IPv4 listener and unnecessarily restarting the working service.
+
+- Prevented false app restarts by probing each published port at its actual bind address; Nginx Proxy Manager now checks its internal admin API.
+- Added a backed-up migration for the recognized legacy Nginx Proxy Manager tunnel/LND port conflict in both OTA and ISO startup paths.
+
+- Checked Bitcoin and Electrum companion dashboards instead of backend protocol ports, preserving dashboard access during initial sync.
+- Removed web-interface waiting messages from headless services such as Phoenixd and clarified which interface is unavailable for launchable apps.
+
+- Finished runtime app-file promotion before manifest loading, preventing startup catalog refresh from forgetting disk-only apps.
+
+- Named the app in compact readiness messages and kept app-card actions aligned at the bottom.
+- Removed duplicate Mempool cards caused by frontend container aliases in restored inventory.
+
+- Kept installed apps visible through restarts and hard refreshes, and delayed app launches until their web interface is ready.
+- Made Bitcoin version selection readable and usable in the ThinkPad kiosk, above the pruning settings.
+- Restored GitWorkshop build files in installation/update payloads and made slow image-pull progress clearer.
+- Fixed same-node Gitea access from Portainer, with persistent runtime migration, state backups and recovery after failed restarts.
+- Preserved Gitea configuration and SSH operation during fresh setup and upgrades.
+- Improved paid-file delivery, saved-file permissions and repeat-download compatibility; verified Tor-only payment with change, rejection refunds and free repeat downloads.
+- Added a headless Angor Indexer service using the existing Mempool/ElectrumX stack, and an optional separate Angor relay.
+- Prevented manifest command arguments containing apostrophes from being corrupted in generated services.
+
+## v1.8.21-alpha (2026-09-30)
+
+- Fixed Bitcoin and other containers being forcibly stopped after ten seconds during managed updates and restarts.
+- Existing installations now receive the same graceful shutdown allowance as new containers, without restarting apps just to apply this setting.
+- Prevented unnecessary Lightning restarts when Bitcoin has stayed running; dependency restarts now require an observed Bitcoin container change.
+- Includes the Cashu payment, optional Bitcoin pruning, Lightning readiness, and explorer improvements from 1.8.20.
+
+## v1.8.20-alpha (2026-09-29)
+
+- Fixed Cashu file payments rejected despite a shared mint, and preserved the payment amount when mint fees reduce change.
+- Payment failures now report whether a refund actually succeeded; missing files and unsupported payment methods are rejected before charging.
+- Improved saving paid files into Files and reopening purchases without paying again.
+- Bitcoin Core and Knots installation offers optional pruning on larger disks, using the same settings as automatic pruning.
+- Fixed false missing-port checks that unnecessarily restarted Bitcoin and LND; recovery now respects managed shutdown timeouts.
+- LND explains when it is waiting for Bitcoin installation, startup, or sync, without treating normal synchronization as a restart-worthy failure.
+- Bitcoin startup messages explain block-index loading without exposing raw RPC errors, and Lightning keeps known balances clearly marked during outages.
+- Changed the public transaction-explorer default to mempool.space while preserving local explorers and custom choices.
+
+## v1.8.19-alpha (2026-09-28)
+
+- Fixed the embedded AIUI chat page painting a second background and dark scrim over Archy’s dashboard background.
+- Embedded AIUI now stays transparent so the dashboard background appears once.
+- AIUI background fixes are now included reliably in OTA updates and fresh installations.
+
+## v1.8.18-alpha (2026-09-18)
+
+- Framework startup prioritizes Bitcoin and LND before unrelated containers, and unavailable LND balances remain unavailable instead of appearing as false zeroes.
+- Cashu Receive guides unseeded wallets through recovery-phrase setup, with shorter backup guidance and a single-column layout.
+- Added live Framework verification for automatic LND unlock, native balance preservation, Cashu address registration, and proof preservation.
+
+## v1.8.17-alpha (2026-09-15)
+
+- Minibits claims that every mint reports as already spent leave the retry queue, clearing repeated failure notices. Network errors and mixed mint failures remain queued for another attempt.
+- Minibits polls its primary relay first and connects to public fallback relays only when the primary is unreachable, reducing unnecessary connections.
+- Large payment backlogs are fetched from newest to oldest with a saved cursor, so polling can resume after interruptions or page limits. Payments sharing the same timestamp remain reachable.
+- Added regression coverage for spent-claim classification, wrapped and mixed mint errors, same-second payments, and interrupted or multi-poll backlogs.
+
+## v1.8.16-alpha (2026-09-15)
+
+- App updates refresh and verify the signed catalog before changing containers. A failed refresh or manifest reload cancels the update, and automatic updates wait for a successful refresh.
+- Fixed repeated Mempool update offers: downstream `-archyN` patches now sort above their upstream release, and moving a published image between registry namespaces does not hide a genuine upgrade.
+- Updates inspect installed component versions, refuse known downgrades, skip containers already at the target versions, and verify the resulting versions before reporting success.
+- Added regression coverage for stale catalogs, matching versions, publisher namespace changes, stack component updates, and keeping running containers untouched when no upgrade is needed.
+
+## v1.8.15-alpha (2026-09-13)
+
+- Cuprate is presented as one user-facing app in My Apps, including its UI launch button; the generated dashboard companion is hidden as an implementation detail instead of appearing under Services.
+- Added regression coverage for Cuprate install and installed-state grouping.
+- Release validation was rerun on the corrected tree before OTA and ISO publication.
+
+## v1.8.14-alpha (2026-09-13)
+
+- **Cuprate gains a first-party companion dashboard.** The Monero node now has a Bitcoin-style status UI, safe app grouping, a 450 GB disk-safety gate, and a restricted RPC that is never exposed as a launch page.
+- **Bitcoin Core Tor enrollment uses the correct protocol identity.** `bitcoin-core` is forwarded on port 8333 and resolves to its own hidden-service directory without disturbing legacy Bitcoin aliases.
+- **GitWorkshop opens Archipelago’s canonical ngit repository by default.** The launcher and registry promotion use the full maintainer/relay/`archy` coordinate, with regression coverage for Companion and browser-tab launches.
+- **Release validation is stricter.** The registry gate now checks the complete canonical source deep link, and the merged candidate passed the full frontend and focused backend test suites.

 ## v1.8.13-alpha (2026-09-12)

@@ -46,13 +46,14 @@ interface RateBucket {

 const rateBuckets = new Map<string, RateBucket>()

-// Clean up stale buckets every 5 minutes
+// Vite imports this module during builds too; cleanup must not keep the
+// process alive once compilation has finished.
 setInterval(() => {
  const now = Date.now()
  for (const [key, bucket] of rateBuckets) {
    if (now > bucket.resetAt) rateBuckets.delete(key)
  }
-}, 5 * 60_000)
+}, 5 * 60_000).unref()

 function getClientIp(req: IncomingMessage): string {
  return req.socket.remoteAddress ?? 'unknown'
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ const PWA_CACHE_VERSION = '2'
 // Only embedded when explicitly requested via ?embedded param
 const _embeddedFlag = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search).has('embedded')
 ;(window as unknown as Record<string, unknown>).__AIUI_EMBEDDED__ = _embeddedFlag
+document.documentElement.classList.toggle('aiui-embedded', _embeddedFlag)

 const router = createRouter({
  history: createWebHistory(import.meta.env.BASE_URL),
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
  <div
    class="h-full flex flex-col relative overflow-hidden transition-colors duration-300"
    :class="[]"
-    :style="isDark
-      ? { background: '#000 url(' + bgImageUrl + ') center center / cover no-repeat fixed' }
-      : isEmbedded
-        ? { background: 'transparent' }
+    :style="isEmbedded
+      ? { background: 'transparent' }
+      : isDark
+        ? { background: '#000 url(' + bgImageUrl + ') center center / cover no-repeat fixed' }
        : { backgroundColor: '#f5f4f1' }"
  >
-    <div v-if="isDark" class="absolute inset-0 pointer-events-none bg-black/20" />
+    <div v-if="isDark && !isEmbedded" class="absolute inset-0 pointer-events-none bg-black/20" />

    <!-- Desktop layout -->
    <div
@@ -57,12 +57,8 @@ body {
  width: 100%;
  height: 100%;
  overflow: hidden;
-  /* Every page paints its own explicit background (bg-[#0a0a0a] / bg-[#faf9f6])
-     EXCEPT the embedded Chat page, which intentionally goes transparent so
-     Archy's own dark chrome can show behind it (Chat.vue's iframe host). With
-     no background-color here, "transparent" fell through to the browser's
-     default white canvas instead. Match the theme's own dark/light default so
-     nothing above this ever needs to guess. */
+  /* Standalone canvas fallback. Embedded mode overrides this below so
+     Archy's wallpaper remains visible through the iframe. */
  background-color: #0a0a0a;
 }

@@ -70,6 +66,19 @@ html.light body {
  background-color: #faf9f6;
 }

+/* The host owns the wallpaper when AIUI is embedded. The document canvas
+   must be transparent too, otherwise it hides the host behind ChatPage. */
+html.aiui-embedded {
+  /* Match Archy's dark canvas scheme. Browsers otherwise give an iframe
+     with a different scheme an opaque canvas despite transparent CSS. */
+  color-scheme: dark;
+}
+
+html.aiui-embedded,
+html.aiui-embedded body {
+  background: transparent;
+}
+
 /* ===== DARK MODE GLASSMORPHISM — from Archy ===== */

@layer components {
@@ -378,13 +378,13 @@
    {
      "id": "mempool",
      "title": "Mempool Explorer",
-      "version": "3.0.0",
+      "version": "3.3.1-archy1",
      "description": "Bitcoin mempool and blockchain explorer. Real-time transaction and block visualization.",
      "icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/mempool.webp",
      "author": "Mempool",
      "category": "money",
      "tier": "core",
-      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1",
+      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1",
      "repoUrl": "https://github.com/mempool/mempool",
      "requires": [
        "bitcoin-knots",
@@ -644,6 +644,35 @@
          "/var/lib/archipelago/vaultwarden:/data"
        ]
      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "angor-indexer",
+      "title": "Angor Indexer",
+      "version": "1.0.1",
+      "description": "Headless Bitcoin indexer endpoint for Angor. Reuses this node’s Mempool and Electrum index; requires a synced, unpruned Bitcoin node. Add this service’s address as the custom indexer in Angor settings. A relay is optional and installed separately.",
+      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-indexer:1.0.1",
+      "author": "Angor / Archipelago",
+      "requires": [
+        "Mempool API",
+        "Unpruned Bitcoin"
+      ],
+      "category": "money",
+      "tier": "optional",
+      "icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/angor-green.png",
+      "repoUrl": "https://github.com/block-core/angor"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "angor-relay",
+      "title": "Angor Relay",
+      "version": "1.1.2",
+      "description": "Optional dedicated Nostr relay for Angor project metadata. Separate storage and access settings keep the node’s internal relay private. Add this service’s address to Angor’s relay settings; use WSS for browser clients.",
+      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-relay:1.1.2",
+      "author": "Angor / Archipelago",
+      "requires": [],
+      "category": "nostr",
+      "tier": "optional",
+      "icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/angor-green.png",
+      "repoUrl": "https://github.com/hoytech/strfry"
    }
  ]
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Angor Indexer
+
+Headless mainnet API endpoint for Angor. The service reuses this node's Mempool
+backend and Electrum index instead of creating a second blockchain database.
+An unpruned, fully synced Bitcoin node is required. Installing against a pruned
+node must show the existing archival-node requirement; it must never silently
+unprune or replace its Bitcoin data.
+
+## Connect Angor
+
+Install **Angor Indexer** in the store. Its API appears under **Services**.
+In Angor settings, use `http://<node-address>:8998/` as the custom indexer origin.
+The `/health` endpoint reports readiness against Mempool's indexed block height;
+it returns 503 while that backend is unavailable. Index building may take time.
+
+Browser clients require a reachable HTTPS origin with a trusted certificate.
+Configure your HTTPS reverse proxy to forward to port 8998, then use that HTTPS
+origin in Angor. Do not disable browser TLS checks. The API supports both
+`/api/v1/` and `/api/` paths, transaction broadcast, and CORS without cookies.
+
+This endpoint intentionally exposes public blockchain queries and transaction
+broadcast through the app gate without dashboard-cookie login. It has no Bitcoin
+RPC password, wallet keys, or persistent wallet data. The backend stays on the
+managed container network; its private port does not become publicly exposed.
+You can change network access using the node's normal access controls.
+
+## Relay
+
+A relay is optional. Angor can continue using its configured external relays.
+Install **Angor Relay** separately to host project metadata locally, then add
+`ws://<node-address>:8091/` in Angor, or a trusted `wss://` proxy origin for browser
+clients. Its storage and configuration are separate from the node's internal
+relay; installing or uninstalling it does not change the internal relay.
+
+## Packaging
+
+Build the pinned image with:
+
+```
+podman build -t source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-indexer:1.0.1 apps/angor-indexer/container
+```
+
+The image runs as UID 101 with a read-only root filesystem and no capabilities.
+Only temporary nginx state is writable. Runtime DNS is read from resolv.conf so
+Mempool recreation does not require editing IP addresses or restarting this app.
+No app-specific Rust installer is required.
+
+Source documentation: [Angor's official deployment guide](https://github.com/block-core/angor/blob/869dd43cf38332dd7128a284a6bf4c1cac44c1a7/docker/DEPLOY-INDEXER-AND-RELAY.md).
+The app icon is based on [Angor’s dark-mode app icon](https://angor.io/images/app-icon-dark-mode.png), retrieved 2026-09-30. At the operator’s request, the outer corners use the same green as the background. The built-in imagegen edit preserved the black mark and filled the square green; the project asset is `neode-ui/public/assets/img/app-icons/angor-green.png`.
+
+Tests and release acceptance are recorded in the next-release checklist. The
+health probe establishes backend availability, not a guarantee that every
+address query is indexed at the latest Bitcoin tip.
+
+Install Mempool Explorer first. The declarative `install_prerequisites` check
+refuses a new adapter installation if its Mempool API component is absent, before
+creating an installed-app record. It does not install or resync Bitcoin for you.
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+FROM docker.io/library/nginx:1.31.3-alpine@sha256:1d40e3eb3bf4f138de1d67193f2aa5309fcaf343eb5ffadbf5e9439de1eb1ebb
+COPY nginx.conf /etc/angor-nginx.conf.template
+COPY entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/angor-indexer
+USER 101:101
+EXPOSE 8080
+ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/angor-indexer"]
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+# Resolve through the container runtime's DNS, including after dependency
+# recreation. Never bake a container IP into the indexer endpoint.
+DNS_RESOLVER=$(awk '/^nameserver[[:space:]]/ {print $2; exit}' /etc/resolv.conf)
+case "$DNS_RESOLVER" in
+  ''|*[!0-9a-fA-F.:]*) echo 'Container DNS resolver is unavailable' >&2; exit 1 ;;
+esac
+case "$DNS_RESOLVER" in *:*) DNS_RESOLVER="[$DNS_RESOLVER]" ;; esac
+export DNS_RESOLVER
+envsubst '${DNS_RESOLVER}' < /etc/angor-nginx.conf.template > /tmp/nginx.conf
+exec nginx -c /tmp/nginx.conf -g 'daemon off;'
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+worker_processes 1;
+pid /tmp/nginx.pid;
+error_log /dev/stderr warn;
+events { worker_connections 512; }
+http {
+    access_log off;
+    server_tokens off;
+    client_body_temp_path /tmp/client_temp;
+    proxy_temp_path /tmp/proxy_temp;
+    fastcgi_temp_path /tmp/fastcgi_temp;
+    uwsgi_temp_path /tmp/uwsgi_temp;
+    scgi_temp_path /tmp/scgi_temp;
+    resolver ${DNS_RESOLVER} valid=10s ipv6=off;
+    upstream mempool_backend {
+        zone mempool_backend 64k;
+        server mempool-api:8999 resolve;
+    }
+    server {
+        listen 8080;
+        client_max_body_size 4m;
+        proxy_connect_timeout 5s;
+        proxy_read_timeout 60s;
+        proxy_send_timeout 30s;
+        proxy_http_version 1.1;
+        proxy_set_header Host $host;
+        proxy_set_header Connection "";
+        proxy_set_header Authorization "";
+        proxy_set_header Cookie "";
+        proxy_hide_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin;
+        add_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin '*' always;
+        add_header Access-Control-Allow-Methods 'GET, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS' always;
+        add_header Access-Control-Allow-Headers 'Content-Type' always;
+        add_header Cache-Control 'no-store' always;
+        if ($request_method = OPTIONS) { return 204; }
+        # Mempool's backend uses /api/v1. Match its frontend's shorter /api
+        # surface too, without doubling already-versioned Angor URLs.
+        rewrite ^/api/(?!v1/)(.*)$ /api/v1/$1 last;
+        location = / {
+            default_type application/json;
+            return 200 '{"service":"Angor Indexer","network":"mainnet","api":"/api/v1","health":"/health"}\n';
+        }
+        # Readiness checks the indexing backend, not this gateway's process.
+        location = /health {
+            limit_except GET { deny all; }
+            proxy_pass http://mempool_backend/api/v1/blocks/tip/height;
+            proxy_intercept_errors on;
+            error_page 500 502 503 504 =503 @waiting;
+        }
+        location @waiting {
+            default_type application/json;
+            return 503 '{"status":"waiting","message":"Waiting for Bitcoin and Mempool indexing"}\n';
+        }
+        location ~ ^/api/(v1/)?tx$ {
+            limit_except GET POST { deny all; }
+            proxy_pass http://mempool_backend;
+        }
+        location /api/ {
+            limit_except GET { deny all; }
+            proxy_pass http://mempool_backend;
+        }
+        location / { return 404; }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+app:
+  id: angor-indexer
+  name: Angor Indexer
+  version: 1.0.1
+  description: Headless Bitcoin indexer endpoint for Angor. Reuses this node’s Mempool
+    and Electrum index; requires a synced, unpruned Bitcoin node. Add this service’s
+    address as the custom indexer in Angor settings. A relay is optional and installed
+    separately.
+  category: money
+  install_prerequisites:
+  - mempool-api
+  upstream:
+    kind: github
+    repo: block-core/angor
+  container:
+    image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-indexer:1.0.1
+    pull_policy: if-not-present
+    network: archy-net
+  dependencies:
+  - app_id: mempool-api
+    version: '>=3.0.0'
+  - bitcoin:archival
+  resources:
+    cpu_limit: 1
+    memory_limit: 128Mi
+    disk_limit: 128Mi
+  security:
+    capabilities: []
+    readonly_root: true
+    no_new_privileges: true
+    user: 101
+    network_policy: isolated
+  ports:
+  - host: 8998
+    container: 8080
+    protocol: tcp
+    bind: 127.0.0.1
+    auth: open
+    auth_rationale: Public Bitcoin chain-data API and validated transaction broadcast for Angor clients; no wallet keys or node RPC credentials are exposed. Browser cookie login would break machine clients.
+  interfaces:
+    main:
+      name: Angor Indexer API
+      description: Use this origin as Angor’s custom mainnet indexer URL. HTTPS is
+        required for browser clients.
+      type: api
+      port: 8998
+      protocol: http
+      path: /
+  health_check:
+    type: http
+    endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8080
+    path: /health
+    interval: 30s
+    timeout: 8s
+    retries: 3
+  bitcoin_integration:
+    rpc_access: none
+    sync_required: true
+    pruning_support: false
+  metadata:
+    icon: /assets/img/app-icons/angor-green.png
+    tier: optional
+    repo: https://github.com/block-core/angor
+    features:
+    - Angor mainnet API
+    - Reuses existing Mempool indexing
+    - No separate blockchain database
+    - Optional independent relay
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Angor Relay
+
+Optional standalone strfry relay for Angor's public project metadata. See
+[Angor Indexer setup](../angor-indexer/README.md) for client URLs and HTTPS/WSS.
+
+The gate exposes port 8091 for Nostr clients. strfry validates event signatures;
+this is a public relay, not a private messaging archive. It mounts only
+`/var/lib/archipelago/angor-relay` and its separate configuration directory.
+It never opens, reconfigures or shares the node's internal strfry database.
+
+The configuration is seeded only when absent, preserving operator changes.
+Stop the service before making a consistent backup of its event database.
+Ordinary start/restart/recreation preserves both mounts. Use the standard app
+lifecycle; do not manually recreate a systemd-managed container.
+
+## Image provenance
+
+Mirrored from `docker.io/dockurr/strfry:1.1.2`, upstream manifest digest
+`sha256:e81d238db13507f6ef24c49d47cd0b0ea58ff207961f10581fa2a7c901054df4`.
+The public Angor policy is supplied by this app's own configuration; it does not
+reuse the internal relay's event whitelist.
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+app:
+  id: angor-relay
+  name: Angor Relay
+  version: 1.1.2
+  upstream:
+    kind: github
+    repo: hoytech/strfry
+  description: Optional dedicated Nostr relay for Angor project metadata. Separate
+    storage and access settings keep the node’s internal relay private. Add this service’s
+    address to Angor’s relay settings; use WSS for browser clients.
+  container:
+    image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-relay:1.1.2
+    pull_policy: if-not-present
+  dependencies:
+  - storage: 5Gi
+  resources:
+    cpu_limit: 1
+    memory_limit: 512Mi
+    disk_limit: 5Gi
+  security:
+    capabilities: []
+    readonly_root: true
+    no_new_privileges: true
+    seccomp_profile: default
+    network_policy: isolated
+    apparmor_profile: nostr-relay
+  ports:
+  - host: 8091
+    container: 7777
+    protocol: tcp
+    bind: 127.0.0.1
+    auth: open
+    auth_rationale: Dedicated public Nostr relay for Angor project metadata; strfry verifies event signatures. It has separate storage from the private node relay and no wallet or node credentials.
+  volumes:
+  - type: bind
+    source: /var/lib/archipelago/angor-relay
+    target: /app/strfry-db
+    options:
+    - rw
+  - type: bind
+    source: /var/lib/archipelago/angor-relay-config/angor-relay.conf
+    target: /etc/strfry.conf
+    options:
+    - ro
+  files:
+  - path: /var/lib/archipelago/angor-relay-config/angor-relay.conf
+    overwrite: false
+    content: |
+      ##
+      ## Default strfry config
+      ##
+
+      # Directory that contains the strfry LMDB database (restart required)
+      db = "./strfry-db/"
+
+      dbParams {
+          # Maximum number of threads/processes that can simultaneously have LMDB transactions open (restart required)
+          maxreaders = 256
+
+          # Size of mmap() to use when loading LMDB (default is 10TB, does *not* correspond to disk-space used) (restart required)
+          mapsize = 10995116277760
+
+          # Disables read-ahead when accessing the LMDB mapping. Reduces IO activity when DB size is larger than RAM. (restart required)
+          noReadAhead = false
+      }
+
+      events {
+          # Maximum size of normalised JSON, in bytes
+          maxEventSize = 65536
+
+          # Events newer than this will be rejected
+          rejectEventsNewerThanSeconds = 900
+
+          # Events older than this will be rejected
+          rejectEventsOlderThanSeconds = 94608000
+
+          # Ephemeral events older than this will be rejected
+          rejectEphemeralEventsOlderThanSeconds = 60
+
+          # Ephemeral events will be deleted from the DB when older than this
+          ephemeralEventsLifetimeSeconds = 300
+
+          # Maximum number of tags allowed
+          maxNumTags = 2000
+
+          # Maximum size for tag values, in bytes
+          maxTagValSize = 1024
+      }
+
+      relay {
+          # Interface to listen on. Use 0.0.0.0 to listen on all interfaces (restart required)
+          bind = "0.0.0.0"
+
+          # Port to open for the nostr websocket protocol (restart required)
+          port = 7777
+
+          # Set OS-limit on maximum number of open files/sockets (if 0, don't attempt to set) (restart required)
+          nofiles = 0
+
+          # HTTP header that contains the client's real IP, before reverse proxying (ie x-real-ip) (MUST be all lower-case)
+          realIpHeader = ""
+
+          info {
+              # NIP-11: Name of this server. Short/descriptive (< 30 characters)
+              name = "Angor Relay"
+
+              # NIP-11: Detailed information about relay, free-form
+              description = "Dedicated public relay for Angor project metadata."
+
+              # NIP-11: Administrative nostr pubkey, for contact purposes
+              pubkey = ""
+
+              # NIP-11: Alternative administrative contact (email, website, etc)
+              contact = ""
+
+              # NIP-11: URL pointing to an image to be used as an icon for the relay
+              icon = ""
+
+              # List of supported lists as JSON array, or empty string to use default. Example: "[1,2]"
+              nips = ""
+          }
+
+          # Maximum accepted incoming websocket frame size (should be larger than max event) (restart required)
+          maxWebsocketPayloadSize = 131072
+
+          # Maximum number of filters allowed in a REQ
+          maxReqFilterSize = 200
+
+          # Websocket-level PING message frequency (should be less than any reverse proxy idle timeouts) (restart required)
+          autoPingSeconds = 55
+
+          # If TCP keep-alive should be enabled (detect dropped connections to upstream reverse proxy)
+          enableTcpKeepalive = false
+
+          # How much uninterrupted CPU time a REQ query should get during its DB scan
+          queryTimesliceBudgetMicroseconds = 10000
+
+          # Maximum records that can be returned per filter
+          maxFilterLimit = 500
+
+          # Maximum number of subscriptions (concurrent REQs) a connection can have open at any time
+          maxSubsPerConnection = 20
+
+          writePolicy {
+              # If non-empty, path to an executable script that implements the writePolicy plugin logic
+              plugin = ""
+          }
+
+          compression {
+              # Use permessage-deflate compression if supported by client. Reduces bandwidth, but slight increase in CPU (restart required)
+              enabled = true
+
+              # Maintain a sliding window buffer for each connection. Improves compression, but uses more memory (restart required)
+              slidingWindow = true
+          }
+
+          logging {
+              # Dump all incoming messages
+              dumpInAll = false
+
+              # Dump all incoming EVENT messages
+              dumpInEvents = false
+
+              # Dump all incoming REQ/CLOSE messages
+              dumpInReqs = false
+
+              # Log performance metrics for initial REQ database scans
+              dbScanPerf = false
+
+              # Log reason for invalid event rejection? Can be disabled to silence excessive logging
+              invalidEvents = true
+          }
+
+          numThreads {
+              # Ingester threads: route incoming requests, validate events/sigs (restart required)
+              ingester = 3
+
+              # reqWorker threads: Handle initial DB scan for events (restart required)
+              reqWorker = 3
+
+              # reqMonitor threads: Handle filtering of new events (restart required)
+              reqMonitor = 3
+
+              # negentropy threads: Handle negentropy protocol messages (restart required)
+              negentropy = 2
+          }
+
+          negentropy {
+              # Support negentropy protocol messages
+              enabled = true
+
+              # Maximum records that sync will process before returning an error
+              maxSyncEvents = 1000000
+          }
+      }
+  health_check:
+    type: http
+    endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:7777
+    path: /health
+    interval: 30s
+    timeout: 5s
+    retries: 3
+  nostr_integration:
+    relay_type: public
+    monetization_enabled: false
+  category: nostr
+  interfaces:
+    main:
+      name: Angor Relay
+      description: Nostr WebSocket endpoint; use ws:// for LAN or wss:// through your
+        HTTPS domain.
+      type: api
+      port: 8091
+      protocol: http
+      path: /
+  metadata:
+    icon: /assets/img/app-icons/angor-green.png
+    tier: optional
+    repo: https://github.com/hoytech/strfry
+    features:
+    - Angor project metadata
+    - Separate from the node relay
+    - Persistent Nostr event storage
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 app:
  id: archy-mempool-web
  name: Mempool Web
-  version: 3.0.1
+  version: 3.3.1-archy1
  # Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
  # tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
  # container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ app:
  container_name: mempool

  container:
-    image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1
+    image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1
    pull_policy: if-not-present
    network: archy-net

@@ -45,7 +45,9 @@ app:
    # first, but nginx binds 0.0.0.0:8080 (IPv4) only -> localhost probe gets
    # "connection refused" -> perpetual unhealthy -> health_monitor restart loop.
    endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8080
-    path: /
+    # Probe the backend through nginx: a static page can be healthy while
+    # every API/WebSocket request is stuck on a dead backend address.
+    path: /api/v1/backend-info
    interval: 30s
    timeout: 5s
    retries: 3
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ app:
        if [ -n "$RPC_TXRELAY_AUTH" ]; then
          RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS="$RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS -rpcauth=$RPC_TXRELAY_AUTH -rpcwhitelist=txrelay:sendrawtransaction,submitpackage,testmempoolaccept,getmempoolinfo,getrawmempool,getmempoolentry,getnetworkinfo,getblockchaininfo,getblockcount,getblockhash,getblock,getblockheader,getrawtransaction,gettxout,gettxspendingprevout,decoderawtransaction,decodescript,estimatesmartfee,uptime,ping,getconnectioncount,getpeerinfo,getindexinfo,getdeploymentinfo,getchaintips";
        fi;
-        if [ "${DISK_GB_VALUE:-0}" -lt 1000 ]; then
+        if [ "${BITCOIN_PRUNE:-0}" = "1" ] || [ "${DISK_GB_VALUE:-0}" -lt 1000 ]; then
          exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -prune=50000 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=1024 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
        else
          exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -txindex=1 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=4096 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ app:
        if [ -n "$RPC_TXRELAY_AUTH" ]; then
          RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS="$RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS -rpcauth=$RPC_TXRELAY_AUTH -rpcwhitelist=txrelay:sendrawtransaction,submitpackage,testmempoolaccept,getmempoolinfo,getrawmempool,getmempoolentry,getnetworkinfo,getblockchaininfo,getblockcount,getblockhash,getblock,getblockheader,getrawtransaction,gettxout,gettxspendingprevout,decoderawtransaction,decodescript,estimatesmartfee,uptime,ping,getconnectioncount,getpeerinfo,getindexinfo,getdeploymentinfo,getchaintips";
        fi;
-        if [ "${DISK_GB_VALUE:-0}" -lt 1000 ]; then
+        if [ "${BITCOIN_PRUNE:-0}" = "1" ] || [ "${DISK_GB_VALUE:-0}" -lt 1000 ]; then
          exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -prune=50000 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=2048 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
        else
          exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -txindex=1 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=4096 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ app:
    image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/gitea:1.27.3
    pull_policy: if-not-present

+  # Preserve repositories, database, keys and configuration during runtime repairs.
+  backup_before_runtime_change: true
+
  dependencies:
    # Source history, LFS objects, release artifacts and OCI layers all share
    # this persistent store. 500Mi was only suitable for an empty demo node.
@@ -25,7 +28,7 @@ app:
    disk_limit: 50Gi

  security:
-    capabilities: [CHOWN, FOWNER, SETUID, SETGID, DAC_OVERRIDE, NET_BIND_SERVICE]
+    capabilities: [CHOWN, FOWNER, SETUID, SETGID, DAC_OVERRIDE, NET_BIND_SERVICE, SYS_CHROOT]
    readonly_root: false
    no_new_privileges: false
    network_policy: bridge
@@ -62,6 +65,17 @@ app:
      target: /etc/gitea
      options: [rw]

+  # Seed a fresh installation with the same origin advertised by the app gate.
+  # Existing app.ini (including custom HTTPS/domain settings) is never replaced.
+  files:
+    - path: /var/lib/archipelago/gitea/data/gitea/conf/app.ini
+      overwrite: false
+      content: |
+        [server]
+        DOMAIN = {{HOST_IP}}
+        SSH_DOMAIN = {{HOST_IP}}
+        ROOT_URL = http://{{HOST_IP}}:3001/
+
  environment:
    - GITEA__database__DB_TYPE=sqlite3
    - GITEA__server__SSH_PORT=2222
@@ -106,10 +120,3 @@ app:
      - Issue tracking and pull requests
      - CI/CD via Gitea Actions
      - Lightweight SQLite deployment
-
-  nginx_proxy:
-    listen: 3000
-    proxy_pass: http://127.0.0.1:3001
-    extra_headers:
-      - proxy_hide_header X-Frame-Options
-      - proxy_hide_header Content-Security-Policy
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 app:
  id: mempool
  name: Mempool Explorer
-  version: 3.0.0
+  version: 3.3.1-archy1
  # Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
  # tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
  # container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ app:
  description: Bitcoin mempool and blockchain explorer. Real-time transaction and block visualization.
  
  container:
-    image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1
+    image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1
    image_signature: cosign://...
    pull_policy: if-not-present
    
@@ -64,9 +64,11 @@ app:

  environment: []

+  # Probe the admin API inside the container, independent of optional
+  # tunnel listeners. This also verifies the Node backend is ready.
  health_check:
-    type: tcp
-    endpoint: localhost:81
+    type: http
+    endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:81/api/
    interval: 30s
    timeout: 5s
    retries: 3
@@ -14,8 +14,16 @@ app:
  container:
    image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/portainer:2.45.0
    pull_policy: if-not-present
+    # Portainer fetches Git sources and images from services on this same node.
+    # Rootless pasta copies the host LAN address into its namespace, so a LAN
+    # URL points back at Portainer itself. Give it a private address with the
+    # supported rootless slirp backend; public app URLs still traverse the gate.
+    network: slirp4netns
    data_uid: "1000:1000"

+  # Snapshot state before an upgrade recreates this app with new networking.
+  backup_before_runtime_change: true
+
  dependencies:
    - storage: 1Gi

@@ -67,13 +67,13 @@
    {
      "id": "mempool",
      "title": "Mempool Explorer",
-      "version": "3.0.0",
+      "version": "3.3.1-archy1",
      "description": "Bitcoin mempool and blockchain explorer. Real-time transaction and block visualization.",
      "icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/mempool.webp",
      "author": "Mempool",
      "category": "money",
      "tier": "core",
-      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1",
+      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1",
      "repoUrl": "https://github.com/mempool/mempool",
      "requires": [
        "bitcoin-knots",
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "archipelago"
-version = "1.8.13-alpha"
+version = "1.8.22-alpha"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "archipelago-container",
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "archipelago"
-version = "1.8.13-alpha"
+version = "1.8.22-alpha"
 edition = "2021"
 license.workspace = true
 description = "Archipelago Bitcoin Node OS - Native backend"
@@ -162,11 +162,33 @@ impl ApiHandler {
                    r#"{"error":"This file is shared with the host's federation peers only. Federate with that node (exchange invites) so it recognizes you, then try again."}"#,
                ),
            )),
-            Ok(content_server::ServeResult::NotFound) | Err(_) => Ok(build_response(
+            Ok(content_server::ServeResult::Unavailable) => Ok(build_response(
+                StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+                "application/json",
+                hyper::Body::from(
+                    r#"{"error":"The seller's node can't read this file right now. This request did not redeem an ecash payment."}"#,
+                ),
+            )),
+            Ok(content_server::ServeResult::RangeNotSatisfiable(total)) => Ok(Response::builder()
+                .status(StatusCode::RANGE_NOT_SATISFIABLE)
+                .header("Content-Range", format!("bytes */{total}"))
+                .body(hyper::Body::empty())
+                .unwrap()),
+            Ok(content_server::ServeResult::NotFound) => Ok(build_response(
                StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
                "text/plain",
                hyper::Body::from("Content not found"),
            )),
+            // Not a 404: a paid request may already have been charged by the
+            // time this fails, and "not found" hid the real error entirely.
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::error!("Serving content {content_id} failed: {e:#}");
+                Ok(build_response(
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    "text/plain",
+                    hyper::Body::from("Failed to serve content"),
+                ))
+            }
        }
    }

@@ -138,6 +138,19 @@ impl ApiHandler {
        cors_origin: &str,
    ) -> Result<Response<hyper::Body>> {
        let suffix = path.strip_prefix("/proxy/lnd").unwrap_or("/");
+        if suffix == "/archy-status" {
+            return Ok(Response::builder()
+                .status(StatusCode::OK)
+                .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+                .header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+                .header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", cors_origin)
+                .header("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
+                .header("Vary", "Origin")
+                .body(hyper::Body::from(
+                    rpc.handle_lnd_readiness().await.to_string(),
+                ))?);
+        }
+
        let url = format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}{suffix}");
        // LND REST serves a self-signed cert and requires the admin macaroon.
        // A bare reqwest::get() uses the default client, which rejects the
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ const FILE_CATALOG_PROTOCOL: &str = "https://archipelago.dev/protocols/file-cata
 /// Best-effort reclaim of an ecash payment token that was minted but the sale
 /// didn't complete (seller unreachable or couldn't redeem it), so the buyer
 /// doesn't lose the value. For Fedimint the spender can reissue its own
-/// un-redeemed notes; for Cashu the proofs are received back. Fails silently if
-/// the seller already claimed the token (then the value is genuinely gone).
-async fn reclaim_spent_ecash(data_dir: &std::path::Path, token: &str, backend: &str) {
+/// un-redeemed notes; for Cashu the proofs are received back. Report the actual
+/// recovered amount, or explicitly say when a refund could not be confirmed.
+async fn reclaim_spent_ecash(data_dir: &std::path::Path, token: &str, backend: &str) -> String {
    let res = match backend {
        "fedimint" => crate::wallet::fedimint_client::reissue_into_any(data_dir, token)
            .await
@@ -32,16 +32,81 @@ async fn reclaim_spent_ecash(data_dir: &std::path::Path, token: &str, backend: &
        _ => ecash::receive_token(data_dir, token).await,
    };
    match res {
-        Ok(sats) => tracing::info!(
-            "paid download: reclaimed {sats} sats of unspent {backend} ecash after a failed sale"
-        ),
-        Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
-            "paid download: could not reclaim {backend} ecash (the peer may have already \
-             claimed it): {e:#}"
-        ),
+        Ok(sats) => {
+            tracing::info!("paid download: reclaimed {sats} sats after failed sale");
+            format!("Refunded {sats} sats to your wallet.")
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!("paid download: refund not confirmed: {e}");
+            "Your refund could not be confirmed. The seller may have received the payment. Do not pay again until this is checked.".to_string()
+        }
    }
 }

+/// Only pass through the peer's bounded, printable explanation; refund status
+/// is always determined locally and must never come from the peer's wording.
+fn seller_error_message(status: reqwest::StatusCode, body: &str) -> String {
+    let reason = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(body)
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|v| v.get("error").and_then(|e| e.as_str()).map(str::to_owned));
+    match reason {
+        Some(reason) if !reason.trim().is_empty() => {
+            let clean: String = reason
+                .chars()
+                .filter(|c| !c.is_control())
+                .take(240)
+                .collect();
+            format!("Seller response ({status}): {clean}")
+        }
+        _ => format!("Peer returned an error ({status})."),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Keep first purchases and cached repeats compatible with both existing clients.
+fn paid_content_response(bytes: &[u8], mime: &str, paid_sats: u64) -> serde_json::Value {
+    use base64::Engine;
+    let data = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(bytes);
+    serde_json::json!({
+        "data": data, "data_base64": data,
+        "size": bytes.len(), "size_bytes": bytes.len(),
+        "mime_type": mime, "paid_sats": paid_sats, "owned": true,
+    })
+}
+
+/// File purchases through an atomic no-clobber write in Files' own namespace.
+async fn file_purchase_in_files(
+    data_dir: &std::path::Path,
+    filename: &str,
+    mime: &str,
+    bytes: &[u8],
+) -> Result<String> {
+    let folder = if mime.starts_with("image/") || mime.starts_with("video/") {
+        "Photos"
+    } else if mime.starts_with("audio/") {
+        "Music"
+    } else {
+        "Documents"
+    };
+    let root = data_dir.join("filebrowser");
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        tokio::fs::metadata(&root).await?.is_dir(),
+        "Files storage is unavailable"
+    );
+    let name = std::path::Path::new(filename)
+        .file_name()
+        .and_then(|n| n.to_str())
+        .filter(|n| !n.is_empty())
+        .unwrap_or("download");
+    let path =
+        crate::container::filebrowser::save_new_file(&root.join(folder), name, bytes).await?;
+    Ok(format!(
+        "{folder}/{}",
+        path.file_name()
+            .and_then(|n| n.to_str())
+            .context("Invalid Files name")?
+    ))
+}
+
 impl RpcHandler {
    /// List content I'm sharing.
    pub(super) async fn handle_content_list_mine(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
@@ -463,17 +528,10 @@ impl RpcHandler {
                    crate::content_owned::read_owned(&self.config.data_dir, &o.onion, &o.content_id)
                        .await
                {
-                    use base64::Engine;
-                    return Ok(serde_json::json!({
-                        "owned": true,
-                        "already_owned": true,
-                        "filename": o.filename,
-                        "mime_type": mime,
-                        "size_bytes": bytes.len(),
-                        "paid_sats": 0,
-                        "data_base64":
-                            base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&bytes),
-                    }));
+                    let mut result = paid_content_response(&bytes, &mime, 0);
+                    result["already_owned"] = serde_json::json!(true);
+                    result["filename"] = serde_json::json!(o.filename);
+                    return Ok(result);
                }
                // Cache record exists but bytes are gone — fall through and
                // repurchase rather than stranding the user.
@@ -545,31 +603,30 @@ impl RpcHandler {

        let path = format!("/content/{}", content_id);
        // Surface a real reason instead of the generic sanitized error (#30):
-        // the dial already tries FIPS/mesh then falls back to Tor, so a failure
-        // here means the peer is genuinely unreachable on both transports.
-        let (response, transport) = match crate::fips::dial::PeerRequest::new(
-            fips_npub.as_deref(),
-            onion,
-            &path,
-        )
-        .service(crate::settings::transport::PeerService::PeerFiles)
-        .header("X-Federation-DID", local_did)
-        .header("X-Payment-Token", token_str.clone())
-        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(900))
-        .send_get()
-        .await
-        {
-            Ok(v) => v,
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!("paid peer download dial failed for {}: {:#}", onion, e);
-                // The token was already minted/spent — reclaim it so the buyer
-                // doesn't lose the value when the seller was simply unreachable.
-                reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
-                return Ok(serde_json::json!({
-                    "error": "Could not reach the peer over mesh or Tor — it may be offline. Your ecash was refunded to your wallet. Please try again."
-                }));
-            }
-        };
+        // A bearer token must not be replayed after an ambiguous delivery.
+        // A transport error can mean the seller received it without replying.
+        let (response, transport) =
+            match crate::fips::dial::PeerRequest::new(fips_npub.as_deref(), onion, &path)
+                .service(crate::settings::transport::PeerService::PeerFiles)
+                .header("X-Federation-DID", local_did)
+                .header("X-Payment-Token", token_str.clone())
+                .single_delivery()
+                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(900))
+                .send_get()
+                .await
+            {
+                Ok(v) => v,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::warn!("paid peer download dial failed for {}: {:#}", onion, e);
+                    // The token was already minted/spent — reclaim it so the buyer
+                    // doesn't lose the value when the seller was simply unreachable.
+                    let refund =
+                        reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
+                    return Ok(serde_json::json!({
+                        "error": format!("The purchase could not be completed. {refund}")
+                    }));
+                }
+            };
        // Record which transport actually reached the peer (B14).
        if let Err(e) = crate::federation::record_peer_transport(
            &self.config.data_dir,
@@ -583,25 +640,17 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        }

        if response.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::PAYMENT_REQUIRED {
-            // Payment was rejected by the seller. Surface the most likely cause
-            // per backend — for ecash both sides must share a redemption network
-            // (a Cashu mint, or a Fedimint federation).
+            // A 402 can mean mint validation, network failure, underpayment,
+            // or an unaccepted mint. Do not invent a mint-mismatch diagnosis.
            let body = response.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
            tracing::warn!(
                "paid download: seller {onion} rejected {used_backend} payment of {price_sats} sats: {body}"
            );
            // Seller couldn't redeem the token — reclaim it so the buyer keeps
            // their funds (the spent-but-unredeemed-notes case the user hit).
-            reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
-            let hint = match used_backend {
-                "fedimint" => "the seller isn't in the same Fedimint federation as you",
-                _ => "the seller doesn't accept your Cashu mint",
-            };
+            let refund = reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
            return Ok(serde_json::json!({
-                "error": format!(
-                    "Payment rejected by the seller — {hint}. Your ecash was refunded to \
-                     your wallet. Try the other ecash type, or use a shared mint/federation."
-                )
+                "error": format!("The seller could not verify the payment. {refund}")
            }));
        }

@@ -609,9 +658,9 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            let status = response.status();
            let body = response.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
            tracing::warn!("paid download: seller {onion} returned {status}: {body}");
-            reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
+            let refund = reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
            return Ok(serde_json::json!({
-                "error": format!("Peer returned an error ({status}). Your ecash was refunded to your wallet.")
+                "error": format!("{} {refund}", seller_error_message(status, &body))
            }));
        }

@@ -625,10 +674,17 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
            .unwrap_or_else(|| "application/octet-stream".to_string());

-        let bytes = response
-            .bytes()
-            .await
-            .context("Failed to read response body")?;
+        let bytes = match response.bytes().await {
+            Ok(bytes) => bytes,
+            Err(error) => {
+                tracing::warn!("paid download: response body failed: {error}");
+                let refund =
+                    reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
+                return Ok(serde_json::json!({
+                    "error": format!("The file transfer was interrupted after payment was sent. {refund}")
+                }));
+            }
+        };

        // Persist the purchase so it "stays unlocked" for this buyer: cache the
        // bytes + metadata keyed by (onion, content_id). The gallery then renders
@@ -658,63 +714,21 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            tracing::warn!("paid download: failed to cache purchased content (non-fatal): {e:#}");
        }

-        // Auto-file the purchase into the user's Files area (2026-07-22):
-        // Photos for images/video, Music for audio, Documents otherwise —
-        // same buckets the Cloud view uses. The in-app viewer still plays
-        // from the purchase cache; this makes the file ALSO show up where
-        // files live, on every device, without relying on a browser
-        // download. Best-effort: never fail a paid download over it.
-        {
-            let folder = if mime_type.starts_with("image/") || mime_type.starts_with("video/") {
-                "Photos"
-            } else if mime_type.starts_with("audio/") {
-                "Music"
-            } else {
-                "Documents"
-            };
-            let base = std::path::Path::new(&filename)
-                .file_name()
-                .and_then(|n| n.to_str())
-                .unwrap_or("download")
-                .to_string();
-            let dir = self.config.data_dir.join("filebrowser").join(folder);
-            if let Err(e) = tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).await {
-                tracing::warn!("paid download: cannot create {}: {e}", dir.display());
-            } else {
-                // Don't clobber an existing file of the same name: "x.jpg"
-                // → "x (2).jpg" etc.
-                let mut target = dir.join(&base);
-                let (stem, ext) = match base.rsplit_once('.') {
-                    Some((s, e)) if !s.is_empty() => (s.to_string(), format!(".{e}")),
-                    _ => (base.clone(), String::new()),
-                };
-                let mut n = 2;
-                while target.exists() {
-                    target = dir.join(format!("{stem} ({n}){ext}"));
-                    n += 1;
-                }
-                match tokio::fs::write(&target, &bytes).await {
-                    Ok(()) => tracing::info!("paid download: filed into {}", target.display()),
-                    Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
-                        "paid download: filing into {} failed (non-fatal): {e}",
-                        target.display()
-                    ),
-                }
-            }
+        // The durable purchased-content cache above is primary. A Files copy
+        // remains optional: a stopped FileBrowser must not undo a paid download.
+        let filed =
+            file_purchase_in_files(&self.config.data_dir, &filename, &mime_type, &bytes).await;
+        match filed {
+            Ok(path) => tracing::info!("paid download: filed into Files/{path}"),
+            Err(error) => tracing::warn!(
+                "paid download: optional Files copy failed; purchase cache retained: {error}"
+            ),
        }

-        use base64::Engine;
-        let encoded = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&bytes);
-
        tracing::info!("paid download: received {} bytes from {onion} (paid {price_sats} sats via {used_backend})", bytes.len());
-        Ok(serde_json::json!({
-            "data": encoded,
-            "size": bytes.len(),
-            "paid_sats": price_sats,
-            "ecash_backend": used_backend,
-            "mime_type": mime_type,
-            "owned": true,
-        }))
+        let mut result = paid_content_response(&bytes, &mime_type, price_sats);
+        result["ecash_backend"] = serde_json::json!(used_backend);
+        Ok(result)
    }

    /// Buyer side (#46): ask the selling node to mint a Lightning invoice for a
@@ -1387,3 +1401,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        }
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[path = "content_tests.rs"]
+mod tests;
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+use super::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn first_and_cached_paid_downloads_have_the_same_client_payload_contract() {
+    use base64::Engine;
+    for paid in [0, 1] {
+        let response = paid_content_response(&[0, 255, 123], "application/octet-stream", paid);
+        assert_eq!(response["data"], response["data_base64"]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
+                .decode(response["data"].as_str().unwrap())
+                .unwrap(),
+            [0, 255, 123]
+        );
+        assert_eq!(response["size"], 3);
+        assert_eq!(response["size_bytes"], 3);
+        assert_eq!(response["paid_sats"], paid);
+        assert_eq!(response["owned"], true);
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn files_copy_routes_media_and_sanitizes_the_filename() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    tokio::fs::create_dir(dir.path().join("filebrowser"))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    for (mime, folder) in [
+        ("image/png", "Photos"),
+        ("video/mp4", "Photos"),
+        ("audio/mpeg", "Music"),
+        ("text/plain", "Documents"),
+    ] {
+        let relative = file_purchase_in_files(dir.path(), "../name #?.bin", mime, b"paid")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(relative.starts_with(&format!("{folder}/name #?")));
+        assert_eq!(
+            tokio::fs::read(dir.path().join("filebrowser").join(relative))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            b"paid"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn unavailable_files_storage_is_reported_without_creating_a_fake_installation() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        file_purchase_in_files(dir.path(), "name", "text/plain", b"bytes")
+            .await
+            .is_err()
+    );
+    assert!(!dir.path().join("filebrowser").exists());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn seller_errors_are_bounded_printable_and_identified_as_peer_text() {
+    let status = reqwest::StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    let message = seller_error_message(status, r#"{"error":"Cannot read file\n\u0000"}"#);
+    assert!(message.starts_with("Seller response (503"));
+    assert!(message.ends_with("Cannot read file"));
+    assert!(!message.contains('\n') && !message.contains('\0'));
+    let body = serde_json::json!({"error": "é".repeat(1000)}).to_string();
+    assert!(seller_error_message(status, &body).chars().count() < 300);
+    for body in ["not JSON", r#"{"error": 7}"#, r#"{"error":"   "}"#] {
+        assert_eq!(
+            seller_error_message(status, body),
+            "Peer returned an error (503 Service Unavailable)."
+        );
+    }
+}
@@ -73,7 +73,86 @@ struct LndChannelBalanceResponse {
    pending_open_local_balance: Option<LndAmount>,
 }

+/// Reject unavailable LND data before it can be decoded as an empty, zero wallet.
+async fn get_lnd_json<T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>(
+    client: &reqwest::Client,
+    url: &str,
+    macaroon_hex: &str,
+) -> Result<T> {
+    client
+        .get(url)
+        .header("Grpc-Metadata-macaroon", macaroon_hex)
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .context("LND is unavailable; balance could not be checked")?
+        .error_for_status()
+        .context("LND is not ready; balance could not be checked")?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("LND returned invalid wallet data")
+}
+
+fn checked_balances(
+    wallet: LndBalanceResponse,
+    channels: LndChannelBalanceResponse,
+) -> Result<(i64, i64, i64)> {
+    fn sats(value: Option<String>) -> Result<i64> {
+        let value = value.context("LND omitted a balance; balance is unavailable")?;
+        let amount: i64 = value.parse().context("LND returned an invalid balance")?;
+        anyhow::ensure!(amount >= 0, "LND returned a negative balance");
+        Ok(amount)
+    }
+    Ok((
+        sats(wallet.total_balance)?,
+        sats(channels.local_balance.and_then(|a| a.sat))?,
+        sats(channels.pending_open_local_balance.and_then(|a| a.sat))?,
+    ))
+}
+
+fn bitcoin_wait_state(
+    installed: bool,
+    running: bool,
+    fresh: bool,
+    ibd: Option<bool>,
+) -> (&'static str, &'static str) {
+    if !installed {
+        ("waiting_install", "Waiting for Bitcoin to be installed")
+    } else if !running {
+        ("waiting_start", "Waiting for Bitcoin to start")
+    } else if !fresh || ibd.is_none() {
+        ("waiting_start", "Waiting for Bitcoin to start")
+    } else if ibd == Some(true) {
+        ("waiting_sync", "Waiting for Bitcoin to sync")
+    } else {
+        ("bitcoin_ready", "Bitcoin is ready")
+    }
+}
+
 impl RpcHandler {
+    pub(crate) async fn handle_lnd_readiness(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
+        let (data, _) = self.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
+        if !data.server_info.status_info.containers_scanned {
+            return serde_json::json!({"state":"checking", "message":"Checking Bitcoin availability"});
+        }
+        let nodes: Vec<_> = ["bitcoin-core", "bitcoin-knots", "bitcoin"]
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|id| data.package_data.get(*id))
+            .collect();
+        let installed = !nodes.is_empty();
+        let running = nodes
+            .iter()
+            .any(|p| p.state == crate::data_model::PackageState::Running);
+        let bitcoin = crate::bitcoin_status::get_bitcoin_status().await;
+        let ibd = bitcoin
+            .blockchain_info
+            .as_ref()
+            .and_then(|v| v.get("initialblockdownload"))
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_bool());
+        let (state, message) =
+            bitcoin_wait_state(installed, running, bitcoin.ok && !bitcoin.stale, ibd);
+        serde_json::json!({"state": state, "message": message})
+    }
+
    pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_lnd_getinfo(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
        let macaroon_bytes = read_lnd_admin_macaroon().await?;
        let macaroon_hex = hex::encode(&macaroon_bytes);
@@ -85,45 +164,26 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            .build()
            .context("Failed to create HTTP client")?;

-        let get_info: LndGetInfoResponse = client
-            .get(format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}/v1/getinfo"))
-            .header("Grpc-Metadata-macaroon", &macaroon_hex)
-            .send()
-            .await
-            .context("LND REST connection failed")?
-            .json()
-            .await
-            .context("Failed to parse LND getinfo response")?;
-
-        let channel_balance: LndChannelBalanceResponse = match client
-            .get(format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}/v1/balance/channels"))
-            .header("Grpc-Metadata-macaroon", &macaroon_hex)
-            .send()
-            .await
-        {
-            Ok(resp) => resp.json().await.unwrap_or(LndChannelBalanceResponse {
-                local_balance: None,
-                pending_open_local_balance: None,
-            }),
-            Err(_) => LndChannelBalanceResponse {
-                local_balance: None,
-                pending_open_local_balance: None,
-            },
-        };
-
-        let wallet_balance: LndBalanceResponse = match client
-            .get(format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}/v1/balance/blockchain"))
-            .header("Grpc-Metadata-macaroon", &macaroon_hex)
-            .send()
-            .await
-        {
-            Ok(resp) => resp.json().await.unwrap_or(LndBalanceResponse {
-                total_balance: None,
-            }),
-            Err(_) => LndBalanceResponse {
-                total_balance: None,
-            },
-        };
+        let get_info: LndGetInfoResponse = get_lnd_json(
+            &client,
+            &format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}/v1/getinfo"),
+            &macaroon_hex,
+        )
+        .await?;
+        let channel_balance: LndChannelBalanceResponse = get_lnd_json(
+            &client,
+            &format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}/v1/balance/channels"),
+            &macaroon_hex,
+        )
+        .await?;
+        let wallet_balance: LndBalanceResponse = get_lnd_json(
+            &client,
+            &format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}/v1/balance/blockchain"),
+            &macaroon_hex,
+        )
+        .await?;
+        let (balance_sats, channel_balance_sats, pending_open_balance) =
+            checked_balances(wallet_balance, channel_balance)?;

        let (identity_pubkey, uris) = map_identity(&get_info);

@@ -135,18 +195,9 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            num_peers: get_info.num_peers.unwrap_or(0),
            synced_to_chain: get_info.synced_to_chain.unwrap_or(false),
            block_height: get_info.block_height.unwrap_or(0),
-            balance_sats: wallet_balance
-                .total_balance
-                .and_then(|s| s.parse().ok())
-                .unwrap_or(0),
-            channel_balance_sats: channel_balance
-                .local_balance
-                .and_then(|a| a.sat.and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()))
-                .unwrap_or(0),
-            pending_open_balance: channel_balance
-                .pending_open_local_balance
-                .and_then(|a| a.sat.and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()))
-                .unwrap_or(0),
+            balance_sats,
+            channel_balance_sats,
+            pending_open_balance,
        };

        Ok(serde_json::to_value(info)?)
@@ -268,6 +319,76 @@ impl RpcHandler {
 mod tests {
    use super::*;

+    #[test]
+    fn unavailable_balances_are_not_zero() {
+        for body in [r#"{}"#, r#"{"code":14,"message":"wallet locked"}"#] {
+            assert!(checked_balances(
+                serde_json::from_str(body).unwrap(),
+                serde_json::from_str(body).unwrap(),
+            )
+            .is_err());
+        }
+        for value in ["bad", "-1", "9223372036854775808"] {
+            let wallet = LndBalanceResponse {
+                total_balance: Some(value.into()),
+            };
+            let channels = serde_json::from_str(
+                r#"{"local_balance":{"sat":"5"},"pending_open_local_balance":{"sat":"0"}}"#,
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+            assert!(checked_balances(wallet, channels).is_err());
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verified_zero_and_nonzero_balances_survive() {
+        for expected in [0, 42] {
+            let wallet = LndBalanceResponse {
+                total_balance: Some(expected.to_string()),
+            };
+            let channels = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
+                "local_balance":{"sat":expected.to_string()},
+                "pending_open_local_balance":{"sat":"0"}
+            }))
+            .unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(
+                checked_balances(wallet, channels).unwrap(),
+                (expected, expected, 0)
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn locked_wallet_http_response_is_not_successful_getinfo() {
+        use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+        let server = tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
+            let mut buf = [0; 2048];
+            stream.read(&mut buf).await.unwrap();
+            let body =
+                r#"{"code":9,"message":"wallet locked, unlock it to enable full RPC access"}"#;
+            stream.write_all(format!(
+                "HTTP/1.1 503 Service Unavailable\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n{}",
+                body.len(), body
+            ).as_bytes()).await.unwrap();
+        });
+        let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
+            .no_proxy()
+            .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2))
+            .build()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(get_lnd_json::<LndGetInfoResponse>(
+            &client,
+            &format!("http://{addr}/v1/getinfo"),
+            "test"
+        )
+        .await
+        .is_err());
+        server.await.unwrap();
+    }
+
    /// A real compressed secp256k1 pubkey shape: 66 hex characters.
    const GOOD_PUBKEY: &str = "03a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f90a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f90";

@@ -341,3 +462,44 @@ mod tests {
        assert!(!is_valid_identity_pubkey(&"g".repeat(66)));
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod dependency_readiness_tests {
+    use super::bitcoin_wait_state;
+    #[test]
+    fn waiting_states_cover_install_start_sync_outage_and_recovery() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            bitcoin_wait_state(false, false, false, None).0,
+            "waiting_install"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            bitcoin_wait_state(true, false, false, None).0,
+            "waiting_start"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            bitcoin_wait_state(true, true, false, None).0,
+            "waiting_start"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            bitcoin_wait_state(true, true, true, Some(true)).0,
+            "waiting_sync"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            bitcoin_wait_state(true, true, true, Some(false)).0,
+            "bitcoin_ready"
+        );
+        // Previously synced cached information must not hide a current outage.
+        assert_eq!(
+            bitcoin_wait_state(true, true, false, Some(false)).0,
+            "waiting_start"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            bitcoin_wait_state(true, true, true, None).0,
+            "waiting_start"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            bitcoin_wait_state(true, true, true, Some(false)).0,
+            "bitcoin_ready"
+        );
+    }
+}
@@ -133,12 +133,36 @@ async fn stream_lnd_transactions(sm: &crate::state::StateManager) -> Result<()>
 /// RPC-unreachable and locked-wallet states are deliberately NOT handled
 /// here — container-down is crash-recovery's job, and unlocking needs the
 /// operator.
+fn bitcoin_ready_for_lnd_watchdog(status: &crate::bitcoin_status::BitcoinNodeStatus) -> bool {
+    status.ok
+        && !status.stale
+        && status.age_ms < 30_000
+        && status
+            .blockchain_info
+            .as_ref()
+            .and_then(|v| v.get("initialblockdownload"))
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
+            == Some(false)
+}
+
 pub(crate) fn spawn_lnd_health_watchdog() {
    tokio::spawn(async move {
        let mut bad_minutes: u32 = 0;
        let mut last_restart: Option<tokio::time::Instant> = None;
+        let mut last_height: Option<u64> = None;
        loop {
            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(60)).await;
+            // Initial Bitcoin sync, warmup, and outages are dependencies to
+            // wait for, never evidence that LND is wedged. Do not accumulate
+            // restart pressure during a days-long initial block download.
+            let bitcoin = crate::bitcoin_status::get_bitcoin_status().await;
+            if !bitcoin_ready_for_lnd_watchdog(&bitcoin)
+                || crate::app_ops::lifecycle_op_in_flight("lnd")
+            {
+                bad_minutes = 0;
+                last_height = None;
+                continue;
+            }
            let Ok(bytes) = read_lnd_admin_macaroon().await else {
                bad_minutes = 0; // no LND on this node (or not set up yet)
                continue;
@@ -161,6 +185,10 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_lnd_health_watchdog() {
                bad_minutes = 0; // down/locked — not the wedge signature
                continue;
            };
+            if !resp.status().is_success() {
+                bad_minutes = 0;
+                continue;
+            }
            let Ok(info) = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await else {
                bad_minutes = 0;
                continue;
@@ -182,7 +210,12 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_lnd_health_watchdog() {
                    .get("num_pending_channels")
                    .and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
                    .unwrap_or(0);
-            let wedged = !synced || (channels > 0 && peers == 0);
+            let height = info.get("block_height").and_then(|v| v.as_u64());
+            let progressing = height
+                .zip(last_height)
+                .is_some_and(|(now, before)| now > before);
+            last_height = height;
+            let wedged = !progressing && (!synced || (channels > 0 && peers == 0));
            if !wedged {
                bad_minutes = 0;
                continue;
@@ -239,3 +272,31 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        Ok((client, macaroon_hex))
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod watchdog_dependency_tests {
+    use super::bitcoin_ready_for_lnd_watchdog;
+    use crate::bitcoin_status::BitcoinNodeStatus;
+    use serde_json::json;
+    #[test]
+    fn initial_sync_warmup_outage_stale_and_unknown_never_trigger_lnd_restart() {
+        let mut status = BitcoinNodeStatus::default();
+        assert!(!bitcoin_ready_for_lnd_watchdog(&status));
+        status.ok = true;
+        status.blockchain_info = Some(json!({"initialblockdownload":true}));
+        assert!(!bitcoin_ready_for_lnd_watchdog(&status));
+        status.blockchain_info = Some(json!({"initialblockdownload":false}));
+        assert!(bitcoin_ready_for_lnd_watchdog(&status));
+        status.stale = true;
+        assert!(!bitcoin_ready_for_lnd_watchdog(&status));
+        status.stale = false;
+        status.ok = false;
+        assert!(!bitcoin_ready_for_lnd_watchdog(&status));
+        status.ok = true;
+        status.age_ms = 30_000;
+        assert!(!bitcoin_ready_for_lnd_watchdog(&status));
+        status.age_ms = 0;
+        status.blockchain_info = Some(json!({}));
+        assert!(!bitcoin_ready_for_lnd_watchdog(&status));
+    }
+}
@@ -89,6 +89,15 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            match handler.handle_package_install(params).await {
                Ok(_) => {
                    info!("package.install {}: complete", package_id_spawn);
+                    for id in [&package_id_spawn, &format!("archy-{}", package_id_spawn)] {
+                        crate::crash_recovery::clear_user_uninstalled(&handler.config.data_dir, id)
+                            .await;
+                    }
+                    crate::crash_recovery::mark_installed(
+                        &handler.config.data_dir,
+                        &package_id_spawn,
+                    )
+                    .await;
                    // The install pipeline has verified the container is up
                    // and healthy (see install.rs post-start exit check).
                    // Kick the scanner first so the fresh manifest (with
@@ -184,17 +193,20 @@ impl RpcHandler {
                    // phase is cleared (None) so no stale InstallPhase
                    // lingers on the card.
                    let err_msg = format!("Install failed: {:#}", e);
-                    let (mut data, _) = handler.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-                    if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(&package_id_spawn) {
-                        entry.state = PackageState::Stopped;
-                        entry.install_progress = Some(crate::data_model::InstallProgress {
-                            size: 0,
-                            downloaded: 0,
-                            phase: None,
-                            message: Some(err_msg),
-                        });
-                        handler.state_manager.update_data(data).await;
-                    }
+                    handler
+                        .state_manager
+                        .mutate_data(|data| {
+                            if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(&package_id_spawn) {
+                                entry.state = PackageState::Stopped;
+                                entry.install_progress = Some(crate::data_model::InstallProgress {
+                                    size: 0,
+                                    downloaded: 0,
+                                    phase: None,
+                                    message: Some(err_msg),
+                                });
+                            }
+                        })
+                        .await;
                }
            }
        });
@@ -252,6 +264,11 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            match handler.handle_package_uninstall(params).await {
                Ok(_) => {
                    info!("package.uninstall {}: complete", package_id_spawn);
+                    for id in [&package_id_spawn, &format!("archy-{}", package_id_spawn)] {
+                        crate::crash_recovery::mark_user_uninstalled(&handler.config.data_dir, id)
+                            .await;
+                        crate::crash_recovery::clear_installed(&handler.config.data_dir, id).await;
+                    }
                    // Inner handler already removed the package entry on
                    // success. Nothing more to do here.
                }
@@ -330,7 +347,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        let package_id_spawn = package_id.clone();
        tokio::spawn(async move {
            match handler.handle_package_update(params).await {
-                Ok(_) => {
+                Ok(result) => {
                    info!("package.update {}: complete", package_id_spawn);
                    // Same reasoning as install: the merge_preserving_transitional
                    // helper treats Updating as RPC-owned, so we MUST write the
@@ -345,7 +362,11 @@ impl RpcHandler {
                    set_package_state(
                        &handler.state_manager,
                        &package_id_spawn,
-                        PackageState::Running,
+                        if result.get("status").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) == Some("up-to-date") {
+                            pre_state.clone().unwrap_or(PackageState::Running)
+                        } else {
+                            PackageState::Running
+                        },
                    )
                    .await;
                }
@@ -378,52 +399,56 @@ impl RpcHandler {
 /// call, but fires before the spawn so the UI sees it immediately.
 async fn flip_to_installing(state_manager: &StateManager, package_id: &str) {
    use crate::data_model::{Description, Manifest, PackageDataEntry, StaticFiles};
-    let (mut data, _) = state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-    let entry = data
-        .package_data
-        .entry(package_id.to_string())
-        .or_insert_with(|| PackageDataEntry {
-            state: PackageState::Installing,
-            health: None,
-            exit_code: None,
-            static_files: StaticFiles {
-                license: String::new(),
-                instructions: String::new(),
-                // Leave icon empty during the transient Installing window:
-                // hardcoding `<id>.png` is wrong for ~half our apps (many use
-                // `.svg` / `.webp`), producing a broken-image flicker until
-                // the scanner refreshes the entry. The frontend's `icon`
-                // computed falls through to `curatedMap.get(id)?.icon` which
-                // has the correct extensions for known apps.
-                icon: String::new(),
-            },
-            manifest: Manifest {
-                id: package_id.to_string(),
-                title: package_id.to_string(),
-                version: String::new(),
-                description: Description {
-                    short: "Installing...".to_string(),
-                    long: String::new(),
-                },
-                release_notes: String::new(),
-                license: String::new(),
-                wrapper_repo: String::new(),
-                upstream_repo: String::new(),
-                support_site: String::new(),
-                marketing_site: String::new(),
-                donation_url: None,
-                author: None,
-                website: None,
-                interfaces: None,
-                tier: None,
-            },
-            installed: None,
-            install_progress: None,
-            uninstall_stage: None,
-            available_update: None,
-        });
-    entry.state = PackageState::Installing;
-    state_manager.update_data(data).await;
+    state_manager
+        .mutate_data(|data| {
+            let entry = data
+                .package_data
+                .entry(package_id.to_string())
+                .or_insert_with(|| PackageDataEntry {
+                    ui_ready: None,
+                    state: PackageState::Installing,
+                    health: None,
+                    exit_code: None,
+                    static_files: StaticFiles {
+                        license: String::new(),
+                        instructions: String::new(),
+                        // Leave icon empty during the transient Installing window:
+                        // hardcoding `<id>.png` is wrong for ~half our apps (many use
+                        // `.svg` / `.webp`), producing a broken-image flicker until
+                        // the scanner refreshes the entry. The frontend's `icon`
+                        // computed falls through to `curatedMap.get(id)?.icon` which
+                        // has the correct extensions for known apps.
+                        icon: String::new(),
+                    },
+                    manifest: Manifest {
+                        id: package_id.to_string(),
+                        title: package_id.to_string(),
+                        version: String::new(),
+                        description: Description {
+                            short: "Installing...".to_string(),
+                            long: String::new(),
+                        },
+                        release_notes: String::new(),
+                        license: String::new(),
+                        wrapper_repo: String::new(),
+                        upstream_repo: String::new(),
+                        support_site: String::new(),
+                        marketing_site: String::new(),
+                        donation_url: None,
+                        author: None,
+                        website: None,
+                        interfaces: None,
+                        tier: None,
+                    },
+                    installed: None,
+                    install_progress: None,
+                    uninstall_stage: None,
+                    available_update: None,
+                });
+            entry.ui_ready = Some(false);
+            entry.state = PackageState::Installing;
+        })
+        .await;
 }

 /// True when the failed install still has a real footprint: any container
@@ -481,20 +506,23 @@ async fn remove_entry_with_notification(
    id_prefix: &str,
    message: &str,
 ) {
-    let (mut data, _) = handler.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-    data.package_data.remove(package_id);
-    data.notifications.push(crate::data_model::Notification {
-        id: format!("{id_prefix}-{package_id}"),
-        level: crate::data_model::NotificationLevel::Error,
-        title: format!("Could not install {package_id}"),
-        message: message.to_string(),
-        timestamp: chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
-        app_id: Some(package_id.to_string()),
-    });
-    while data.notifications.len() > 20 {
-        data.notifications.remove(0);
-    }
-    handler.state_manager.update_data(data).await;
+    handler
+        .state_manager
+        .mutate_data(|data| {
+            data.package_data.remove(package_id);
+            data.notifications.push(crate::data_model::Notification {
+                id: format!("{id_prefix}-{package_id}"),
+                level: crate::data_model::NotificationLevel::Error,
+                title: format!("Could not install {package_id}"),
+                message: message.to_string(),
+                timestamp: chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+                app_id: Some(package_id.to_string()),
+            });
+            while data.notifications.len() > 20 {
+                data.notifications.remove(0);
+            }
+        })
+        .await;
 }

 /// Flip an existing entry's state and return the pre-flip value (or None if
@@ -504,18 +532,23 @@ async fn flip_package_state(
    package_id: &str,
    new_state: PackageState,
 ) -> Option<PackageState> {
-    let (mut data, _) = state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-    let prev = data.package_data.get(package_id).map(|e| e.state.clone());
-    if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
-        entry.state = new_state;
-        state_manager.update_data(data).await;
-    } else {
-        warn!(
-            "flip_package_state: no entry for {} — cannot flip",
-            package_id
-        );
-    }
-    prev
+    state_manager
+        .mutate_data(|data| {
+            let prev = data.package_data.get(package_id).map(|e| e.state.clone());
+            if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
+                if new_state != PackageState::Running {
+                    entry.ui_ready = Some(false);
+                }
+                entry.state = new_state;
+            } else {
+                warn!(
+                    "flip_package_state: no entry for {} — cannot flip",
+                    package_id
+                );
+            }
+            prev
+        })
+        .await
 }

 /// Set state unconditionally (no-op if entry no longer exists).
@@ -524,13 +557,18 @@ async fn set_package_state(
    package_id: &str,
    new_state: PackageState,
 ) {
-    let (mut data, _) = state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-    if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
-        if entry.state != new_state {
-            entry.state = new_state;
-            state_manager.update_data(data).await;
-        }
-    }
+    state_manager
+        .mutate_data(|data| {
+            if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
+                if entry.state != new_state {
+                    if new_state != PackageState::Running {
+                        entry.ui_ready = Some(false);
+                    }
+                    entry.state = new_state;
+                }
+            }
+        })
+        .await
 }

 /// Set state and clear the uninstall_stage label. Used when an uninstall
@@ -541,12 +579,17 @@ async fn set_package_state_and_clear_uninstall_stage(
    package_id: &str,
    new_state: PackageState,
 ) {
-    let (mut data, _) = state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-    if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
-        entry.state = new_state;
-        entry.uninstall_stage = None;
-        state_manager.update_data(data).await;
-    }
+    state_manager
+        .mutate_data(|data| {
+            if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
+                if new_state != PackageState::Running {
+                    entry.ui_ready = Some(false);
+                }
+                entry.state = new_state;
+                entry.uninstall_stage = None;
+            }
+        })
+        .await
 }

 /// Kick the container scanner to run immediately and wait for it to finish
@@ -22,6 +22,18 @@ const ARCHIVAL_BITCOIN_DEPENDENCY: &str = "bitcoin:archival";
 /// hardcoded id list below — a new app just declares the dependency instead
 /// of needing a code change here.
 fn manifest_declares_archival_bitcoin(package_id: &str) -> bool {
+    // Registry-only apps need the same guard as OTA-bundled manifests. Honor
+    // the verified catalog's effective manifest before the disk fallback.
+    if let Some((_, value)) = crate::container::app_catalog::catalog_manifest_values()
+        .into_iter()
+        .find(|(id, _)| id == package_id)
+    {
+        if let Some(manifest) =
+            crate::container::app_catalog::catalog_manifest_overlay(package_id, value)
+        {
+            return dependency_list_declares_archival_bitcoin(&manifest.app.dependencies);
+        }
+    }
    for apps_dir in manifest_apps_dirs() {
        let path = apps_dir.join(package_id).join("manifest.yml");
        let Ok(contents) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path) else {
@@ -1055,6 +1067,14 @@ mod tests {
        // edit to `requires_unpruned_bitcoin`.
        assert!(manifest_declares_archival_bitcoin("electrumx"));
        assert!(manifest_declares_archival_bitcoin("mempool"));
+        let angor = archipelago_container::AppManifest::parse(include_str!(concat!(
+            env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"),
+            "/../../apps/angor-indexer/manifest.yml"
+        )))
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(dependency_list_declares_archival_bitcoin(
+            &angor.app.dependencies
+        ));
        // An app whose manifest exists but never declares the marker.
        assert!(!manifest_declares_archival_bitcoin("bitcoin-knots"));
        // An id with no manifest on disk at all.
@@ -326,6 +326,10 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        // an older version pins it so install_fresh resolves that image and the
        // update badge stays suppressed. See docs/bitcoin-multi-version-design.md.
        if matches!(package_id, "bitcoin-core" | "bitcoin-knots") {
+            if let Some(value) = params.get("prune") {
+                let prune = value.as_bool().context("prune must be a boolean")?;
+                crate::settings::bitcoin_storage::save(&self.config.data_dir, prune).await?;
+            }
            if let Some(version) = params.get("version").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
                persist_install_version_selection(package_id, version).await;
            }
@@ -541,7 +545,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        // Keep legacy install flow as default while migration is in progress.
        if orchestrator_managed {
            let orchestrator_app_id = orchestrator_install_app_id(package_id);
-            self.set_install_phase(package_id, InstallPhase::CreatingContainer)
+            self.set_install_phase(package_id, InstallPhase::PreparingApp)
                .await;
            install_log(&format!(
                "INSTALL ORCH: {} — attempting orchestrator install as {}",
@@ -569,6 +573,9 @@ impl RpcHandler {
                            "message": format!("Package {} installed and started", package_id)
                        }));
                    }
+                    Err(e) if e.downcast_ref::<crate::container::prod_orchestrator::InstallPrerequisiteError>().is_some() => {
+                        return Err(super::dependencies::DependencyGateError(e.to_string()).into());
+                    }
                    Err(e) if is_unknown_app_id_error(&e) => {
                        info!(
                            "Install {}: orchestrator has no manifest mapping yet, falling back to legacy installer",
@@ -1695,32 +1702,10 @@ autopilot.active=false\n",
            patch_indeedhub_nostr_provider().await;
        }

-        // Gitea: keep it on its native host port (3001). The UI opens Gitea
-        // in a new tab on that direct port so absolute asset URLs must be
-        // rooted at the host port rather than Archipelago's /app/gitea/ path.
-        if package_id == "gitea" {
-            let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file("/etc/nginx/conf.d/gitea-iframe.conf").await;
-
-            // Set ROOT_URL to the direct launch route so links/assets stay
-            // anchored under the same origin Gitea is launched from.
-            let host_ip = &self.config.host_ip;
-            let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
-                .args(["exec", "gitea", "sh", "-c",
-                       &format!("grep -q ROOT_URL /data/gitea/conf/app.ini && sed -i 's|ROOT_URL.*|ROOT_URL = http://{}:3001/|' /data/gitea/conf/app.ini || true", host_ip)])
-                .output()
-                .await;
-            // Also ensure X_FRAME_OPTIONS is empty so Gitea doesn't send the header
-            let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
-                .args(["exec", "gitea", "sh", "-c",
-                       "grep -q X_FRAME_OPTIONS /data/gitea/conf/app.ini && sed -i 's|X_FRAME_OPTIONS.*|X_FRAME_OPTIONS =|' /data/gitea/conf/app.ini || sed -i '/^\\[security\\]/a X_FRAME_OPTIONS =' /data/gitea/conf/app.ini"])
-                .output()
-                .await;
-
-            info!(
-                "Gitea: ROOT_URL set to http://{}:3001/, X_FRAME_OPTIONS cleared",
-                host_ip
-            );
-        }
+        // Gitea owns its public URL and security settings in app.ini, including
+        // values chosen in its first-run setup. Do not rewrite operator values
+        // or claim success from best-effort grep/sed commands. The app gate
+        // fronts its declared HTTP port and handles frame headers separately.

        if package_id == "nextcloud" {
            let host_ip = &self.config.host_ip;
@@ -2049,25 +2034,8 @@ fn parse_setup_token(lines: &[&str]) -> Option<String> {
 }

 async fn cleanup_stale_package_ports(package_id: &str) {
-    match package_id {
-        "grafana" => cleanup_stale_pasta_port("3000").await,
-        "homeassistant" | "home-assistant" => cleanup_stale_pasta_port("8123").await,
-        "searxng" => cleanup_stale_pasta_port("8888").await,
-        "uptime-kuma" => cleanup_stale_pasta_port("3002").await,
-        "gitea" => {
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("3001").await;
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("2222").await;
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("3000").await;
-        }
-        "nginx-proxy-manager" => {
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("8081").await;
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("8084").await;
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("8444").await;
-        }
-        "nextcloud" => cleanup_stale_pasta_port("8085").await,
-        "portainer" => cleanup_stale_pasta_port("9000").await,
-        _ => {}
-    }
+    // Never kill by port: another app or the management gate may own it.
+    crate::container::ghost_reaper::reap_for_app(package_id).await;
 }

 fn install_command_tail(
@@ -2192,93 +2160,11 @@ async fn cleanup_start_conflict(package_id: &str, stderr: &str) -> bool {
        return true;
    }

-    match package_id {
-        "grafana"
-            if stderr.contains("pasta failed") || stderr.contains("address already in use") =>
-        {
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("3000").await;
-            true
-        }
-        "homeassistant" | "home-assistant"
-            if stderr.contains("pasta failed") || stderr.contains("address already in use") =>
-        {
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("8123").await;
-            true
-        }
-        "searxng"
-            if stderr.contains("pasta failed") || stderr.contains("address already in use") =>
-        {
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("8888").await;
-            true
-        }
-        "uptime-kuma"
-            if stderr.contains("pasta failed") || stderr.contains("address already in use") =>
-        {
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("3002").await;
-            true
-        }
-        "gitea" if stderr.contains("pasta failed") || stderr.contains("address already in use") => {
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("3001").await;
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("2222").await;
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("3000").await;
-            true
-        }
-        "nginx-proxy-manager"
-            if stderr.contains("pasta failed") || stderr.contains("address already in use") =>
-        {
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("8081").await;
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("8084").await;
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("8444").await;
-            true
-        }
-        "nextcloud"
-            if stderr.contains("pasta failed") || stderr.contains("address already in use") =>
-        {
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("8085").await;
-            true
-        }
-        "portainer"
-            if stderr.contains("pasta failed") || stderr.contains("address already in use") =>
-        {
-            cleanup_stale_pasta_port("9000").await;
-            true
-        }
-        _ => false,
+    if stderr.contains("pasta failed") || stderr.contains("address already in use") {
+        crate::container::ghost_reaper::reap_for_app(package_id).await;
+        return true;
    }
-}
-
-async fn cleanup_stale_pasta_port(port: &str) {
-    // NEVER kill our own process. The daemon holds catalog app ports over
-    // IPv6 (the mesh app-port relay), so a blunt `fuser -k <port>/tcp` would
-    // terminate archipelago itself mid-install — installs failed and apps
-    // vanished on a test node 2026-07-27. Kill every listener on the port
-    // EXCEPT our PID (and our process group), leaving the relay/daemon alive.
-    let self_pid = std::process::id();
-    let kill_listener = format!(
-        "ss -ltnp 'sport = :{port}' 2>/dev/null | sed -n 's/.*pid=\\([0-9]*\\).*/\\1/p' | \
-         while read p; do [ \"$p\" = \"{self_pid}\" ] || kill \"$p\" 2>/dev/null; done || true",
-    );
-    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("sh")
-        .args(["-c", &kill_listener])
-        .output()
-        .await;
-
-    // sudo fuser -k, but exclude our own PID: fuser prints the PIDs holding
-    // the port; kill each except self. (`fuser -k` has no exclusion flag.)
-    let fuser_kill = format!(
-        "for p in $(sudo fuser {port}/tcp 2>/dev/null); do [ \"$p\" = \"{self_pid}\" ] || sudo kill \"$p\" 2>/dev/null; done || true",
-    );
-    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("sh")
-        .args(["-c", &fuser_kill])
-        .output()
-        .await;
-
-    let pattern = format!("pasta.*{}", port);
-    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("pkill")
-        .args(["-f", &pattern])
-        .output()
-        .await;
-    tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
+    false
 }

 async fn repair_nextcloud_permissions() {
@@ -14,20 +14,23 @@ impl RpcHandler {
    /// the rare case where the pull stream actually parses, but podman
    /// almost never emits parseable progress on a piped stderr.
    pub(super) async fn set_install_progress(&self, package_id: &str, downloaded: u64, size: u64) {
-        let (mut data, _rev) = self.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-        let entry = data
-            .package_data
-            .entry(package_id.to_string())
-            .or_insert_with(|| create_installing_entry(package_id));
-        entry.state = PackageState::Installing;
-        let existing_phase = entry.install_progress.as_ref().and_then(|p| p.phase);
-        entry.install_progress = Some(InstallProgress {
-            size,
-            downloaded,
-            phase: existing_phase,
-            message: None,
-        });
-        self.state_manager.update_data(data).await;
+        self.state_manager
+            .mutate_data(|data| {
+                let entry = data
+                    .package_data
+                    .entry(package_id.to_string())
+                    .or_insert_with(|| create_installing_entry(package_id));
+                entry.ui_ready = Some(false);
+                entry.state = PackageState::Installing;
+                let existing_phase = entry.install_progress.as_ref().and_then(|p| p.phase);
+                entry.install_progress = Some(InstallProgress {
+                    size,
+                    downloaded,
+                    phase: existing_phase,
+                    message: None,
+                });
+            })
+            .await;
    }

    /// Set the install pipeline phase and broadcast. This is the
@@ -35,76 +38,86 @@ impl RpcHandler {
    /// percentage and a user-facing label. Byte counters are retained
    /// for the rare case podman emits parseable progress.
    pub(super) async fn set_install_phase(&self, package_id: &str, phase: InstallPhase) {
-        let (mut data, _rev) = self.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-        let entry = data
-            .package_data
-            .entry(package_id.to_string())
-            .or_insert_with(|| create_installing_entry(package_id));
-        // Preparing / PullingImage / CreatingContainer / StartingContainer /
-        // WaitingHealthy / PostInstall all map to the Installing state.
-        // Updates use Updating state — the wrapper has already flipped
-        // state to Updating, so don't clobber it.
-        if entry.state != PackageState::Updating {
-            entry.state = PackageState::Installing;
-        }
-        let (size, downloaded) = entry
-            .install_progress
-            .as_ref()
-            .map(|p| (p.size, p.downloaded))
-            .unwrap_or((0, 0));
-        entry.install_progress = Some(InstallProgress {
-            size,
-            downloaded,
-            phase: Some(phase),
-            message: None,
-        });
-        self.state_manager.update_data(data).await;
+        self.state_manager
+            .mutate_data(|data| {
+                let entry = data
+                    .package_data
+                    .entry(package_id.to_string())
+                    .or_insert_with(|| create_installing_entry(package_id));
+                // Preparing / PullingImage / CreatingContainer / StartingContainer /
+                // WaitingHealthy / PostInstall all map to the Installing state.
+                // Updates use Updating state — the wrapper has already flipped
+                // state to Updating, so don't clobber it.
+                if entry.state != PackageState::Updating {
+                    entry.ui_ready = Some(false);
+                    entry.state = PackageState::Installing;
+                }
+                let (size, downloaded) = entry
+                    .install_progress
+                    .as_ref()
+                    .map(|p| (p.size, p.downloaded))
+                    .unwrap_or((0, 0));
+                entry.install_progress = Some(InstallProgress {
+                    size,
+                    downloaded,
+                    phase: Some(phase),
+                    message: None,
+                });
+            })
+            .await;
    }

    /// Set a user-facing install status message (e.g. "Waiting for Bitcoin
    /// to start…") without disturbing the current phase/byte counters.
    pub(super) async fn set_install_message(&self, package_id: &str, message: &str) {
-        let (mut data, _rev) = self.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-        let entry = data
-            .package_data
-            .entry(package_id.to_string())
-            .or_insert_with(|| create_installing_entry(package_id));
-        if entry.state != PackageState::Updating {
-            entry.state = PackageState::Installing;
-        }
-        let (size, downloaded, phase) = entry
-            .install_progress
-            .as_ref()
-            .map(|p| (p.size, p.downloaded, p.phase))
-            .unwrap_or((0, 0, None));
-        entry.install_progress = Some(InstallProgress {
-            size,
-            downloaded,
-            phase,
-            message: Some(message.to_string()),
-        });
-        self.state_manager.update_data(data).await;
+        self.state_manager
+            .mutate_data(|data| {
+                let entry = data
+                    .package_data
+                    .entry(package_id.to_string())
+                    .or_insert_with(|| create_installing_entry(package_id));
+                if entry.state != PackageState::Updating {
+                    entry.ui_ready = Some(false);
+                    entry.state = PackageState::Installing;
+                }
+                let (size, downloaded, phase) = entry
+                    .install_progress
+                    .as_ref()
+                    .map(|p| (p.size, p.downloaded, p.phase))
+                    .unwrap_or((0, 0, None));
+                entry.install_progress = Some(InstallProgress {
+                    size,
+                    downloaded,
+                    phase,
+                    message: Some(message.to_string()),
+                });
+            })
+            .await;
    }

    /// Clear install progress after pull completes or fails.
    pub(super) async fn clear_install_progress(&self, package_id: &str) {
-        let (mut data, _rev) = self.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-        if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
-            entry.install_progress = None;
-        }
-        self.state_manager.update_data(data).await;
+        self.state_manager
+            .mutate_data(|data| {
+                if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
+                    entry.install_progress = None;
+                }
+            })
+            .await;
    }

    /// Set the uninstall stage label so the UI can show what's happening
    /// instead of a generic spinner. Each call broadcasts a state change
    /// — call sparingly (one per pipeline phase, not per container).
    pub(super) async fn set_uninstall_stage(&self, package_id: &str, stage: &str) {
-        let (mut data, _rev) = self.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-        if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
-            entry.uninstall_stage = Some(stage.to_string());
-            entry.state = crate::data_model::PackageState::Removing;
-        }
-        self.state_manager.update_data(data).await;
+        self.state_manager
+            .mutate_data(|data| {
+                if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
+                    entry.uninstall_stage = Some(stage.to_string());
+                    entry.state = crate::data_model::PackageState::Removing;
+                }
+            })
+            .await;
    }

    /// Update install progress (static method for use in async closures).
@@ -114,25 +127,28 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        downloaded: u64,
        total: u64,
    ) {
-        let (mut data, _rev) = state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-        let entry = data
-            .package_data
-            .entry(package_id.to_string())
-            .or_insert_with(|| create_installing_entry(package_id));
-        let existing_phase = entry.install_progress.as_ref().and_then(|p| p.phase);
-        entry.install_progress = Some(InstallProgress {
-            size: total,
-            downloaded,
-            phase: existing_phase,
-            message: None,
-        });
-        state_manager.update_data(data).await;
+        state_manager
+            .mutate_data(|data| {
+                let entry = data
+                    .package_data
+                    .entry(package_id.to_string())
+                    .or_insert_with(|| create_installing_entry(package_id));
+                let existing_phase = entry.install_progress.as_ref().and_then(|p| p.phase);
+                entry.install_progress = Some(InstallProgress {
+                    size: total,
+                    downloaded,
+                    phase: existing_phase,
+                    message: None,
+                });
+            })
+            .await;
    }
 }

 /// Create a minimal PackageDataEntry for a package being installed.
 fn create_installing_entry(package_id: &str) -> PackageDataEntry {
    PackageDataEntry {
+        ui_ready: None,
        state: PackageState::Installing,
        health: None,
        exit_code: None,
@@ -1431,10 +1431,9 @@ async fn repair_before_package_start(container_name: &str) {
    // published port and the data-dir file locks, so the replacement either
    // fails to bind (`address already in use`) or starts and dies on the
    // lock — and `Restart=always` loops it there forever. Ordered before
-    // the port cleanup below: killing the owner is what actually frees the
-    // port, and the port sweep alone cannot tell a ghost from a live app.
+    // starting the replacement. A port sweep cannot distinguish a ghost
+    // from the dashboard gate or another live app and must never kill it.
    crate::container::ghost_reaper::reap_for_app(container_name).await;
-    cleanup_runtime_host_ports(container_name).await;
 }

 async fn wait_before_package_start(container_name: &str) {
@@ -1579,7 +1578,6 @@ async fn repair_netbird_network() {
 async fn repair_nginx_proxy_manager_container() {
    repair_nginx_proxy_manager_dirs().await;
    if !nginx_proxy_manager_has_legacy_admin_port().await {
-        cleanup_nginx_proxy_manager_ports().await;
        return;
    }

@@ -1588,7 +1586,7 @@ async fn repair_nginx_proxy_manager_container() {
    )
    .await;
    let _ = podman_control(&["rm", "-f", "nginx-proxy-manager"]).await;
-    cleanup_nginx_proxy_manager_ports().await;
+    crate::container::ghost_reaper::reap_for_app("nginx-proxy-manager").await;
    if let Err(err) = recreate_nginx_proxy_manager_container().await {
        tracing::warn!(error = %err, "failed to recreate stale nginx-proxy-manager container");
    }
@@ -1812,6 +1810,9 @@ fn manifest_host_ports(container_name: &str) -> Vec<u16> {

 pub(super) fn manifest_apps_dirs() -> Vec<std::path::PathBuf> {
    let mut dirs = Vec::new();
+    if let Some(root) = std::env::var_os("ARCHIPELAGO_APPS_DIR") {
+        dirs.push(root.into());
+    }
    if let Ok(manifest_dir) = std::env::var("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR") {
        dirs.push(Path::new(&manifest_dir).join("../../apps"));
    }
@@ -2032,51 +2033,10 @@ async fn cleanup_start_conflict(container_name: &str, stderr: &str) {
        return;
    }

-    let ports = runtime_host_ports(container_name);
-    if !ports.is_empty() {
-        cleanup_ports(&ports).await;
-        return;
-    }
-}
-
-async fn cleanup_runtime_host_ports(container_name: &str) {
-    let ports = runtime_host_ports(container_name);
-    if !ports.is_empty() {
-        cleanup_ports(&ports).await;
-    }
-}
-
-async fn cleanup_nginx_proxy_manager_ports() {
-    cleanup_ports(&[8081, 8084, 8444]).await;
-}
-
-async fn cleanup_ports(ports: &[u16]) {
-    for port in ports {
-        cleanup_stale_pasta_port(&port.to_string()).await;
-    }
-}
-
-async fn cleanup_stale_pasta_port(port: &str) {
-    let kill_listener = format!(
-        "ss -ltnp 'sport = :{}' 2>/dev/null | sed -n 's/.*pid=\\([0-9]*\\).*/\\1/p' | xargs -r kill 2>/dev/null || true",
-        port
-    );
-    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("sh")
-        .args(["-c", &kill_listener])
-        .output()
-        .await;
-
-    let pattern = format!("pasta.*{}", port);
-    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("pkill")
-        .args(["-f", &pattern])
-        .output()
-        .await;
-    let pattern = format!("rootlessport.*{}", port);
-    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("pkill")
-        .args(["-f", &pattern])
-        .output()
-        .await;
-    tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
+    // Only reap processes proven to belong to an absent container. The app
+    // gate shares the app's port on other addresses and lives in this daemon;
+    // killing port owners (or matching argv with pkill) kills the dashboard.
+    crate::container::ghost_reaper::reap_for_app(container_name).await;
 }

 pub(super) fn is_missing_companion_ok(name: &str, stderr: &str) -> bool {
@@ -2095,13 +2055,16 @@ async fn flip_package_state(
    package_id: &str,
    transitional: PackageState,
 ) -> Option<PackageState> {
-    let (mut data, _) = state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-    let prev = data.package_data.get(package_id).map(|e| e.state.clone());
-    if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
-        entry.state = transitional;
-        state_manager.update_data(data).await;
-    }
-    prev
+    state_manager
+        .mutate_data(|data| {
+            let prev = data.package_data.get(package_id).map(|e| e.state.clone());
+            if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
+                entry.ui_ready = Some(false);
+                entry.state = transitional;
+            }
+            prev
+        })
+        .await
 }

 /// Write the package entry's final state. No-op if the entry has since
@@ -2111,13 +2074,18 @@ async fn set_package_state(
    package_id: &str,
    new_state: PackageState,
 ) {
-    let (mut data, _) = state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-    if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
-        if entry.state != new_state {
-            entry.state = new_state;
-            state_manager.update_data(data).await;
-        }
-    }
+    state_manager
+        .mutate_data(|data| {
+            if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(package_id) {
+                if entry.state != new_state {
+                    if new_state != PackageState::Running {
+                        entry.ui_ready = Some(false);
+                    }
+                    entry.state = new_state;
+                }
+            }
+        })
+        .await
 }

 pub(super) async fn reconcile_companions_for(package_id: &str) {
@@ -2185,6 +2153,20 @@ pub(super) fn orchestrator_uninstall_app_ids(package_id: &str) -> Vec<String> {
 mod tests {
    use super::*;

+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn port_conflict_cleanup_preserves_live_host_listener() {
+        // The previous ss|kill sweep terminated the daemon's app gate on a
+        // restart. Keep a real listening socket owned by this test process.
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.2:2342")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+        cleanup_start_conflict("photoprism", "address already in use").await;
+        let client = tokio::net::TcpStream::connect(addr).await.unwrap();
+        let _connection = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
+        drop(client);
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn missing_container_classifier_covers_podman5_phrasings() {
        // Regression (.228 gate 2026-07-08): podman 5.x `inspect` on a missing
@@ -153,8 +153,18 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        let default = app_catalog::catalog_default_version(app_id);
        let cfg = version_config::read(app_id);
        let installed = installed_version(app_id).await;
+        let bitcoin_prune = if matches!(app_id, "bitcoin-core" | "bitcoin-knots") {
+            Some(
+                crate::settings::bitcoin_storage::load(&self.config.data_dir)
+                    .await?
+                    .prune,
+            )
+        } else {
+            None
+        };

        Ok(serde_json::json!({
+            "bitcoinPrune": bitcoin_prune,
            "id": app_id,
            "supportsVersions": supports_versions(app_id),
            "default": default,
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ use tracing::{error, info, warn};
 const PODMAN_UPDATE_PULL_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(600);

 impl RpcHandler {
-    /// Update a package to the version pinned in image-versions.sh.
+    /// Update a package to the freshly verified catalog target.
    /// This is a manual operation — the user clicks "Update" in the UI.
    pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_package_update(
        &self,
@@ -32,6 +32,21 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing package id"))?;
        validate_app_id(package_id)?;

+        // An Update click must not act on an hourly cache that predates the
+        // button. Fetch and verify first; failure leaves running containers alone.
+        crate::container::app_catalog::refresh_catalog(&self.config.data_dir)
+            .await
+            .context(
+                "Cannot check the signed app catalog; update cancelled before changing containers",
+            )?;
+        if let Some(orch) = &self.orchestrator {
+            // Reload even when bytes did not change: a previous reload may have
+            // failed after the cache was written, or another refresher wrote it.
+            orch.reload_manifests()
+                .await
+                .context("Cannot load current app manifests; update cancelled")?;
+        }
+
        // Resolve the target image. Prefer the remote app catalog (decoupled
        // from the binary OTA), falling back to the image-versions.sh pin. This
        // is OPTIONAL for orchestrator-managed apps: the orchestrator resolves
@@ -42,6 +57,22 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        let pinned = crate::container::app_catalog::catalog_primary_image(package_id)
            .or_else(|| image_versions::pinned_image_for_app(package_id));

+        let targets = pinned
+            .as_ref()
+            .map(|target| self.resolve_images_to_pull(package_id, target));
+        if let Some(targets) = &targets {
+            let installed = inspect_update_images(package_id).await?;
+            if !update_targets_need_change(targets, &installed)? {
+                install_log(&format!(
+                    "UPDATE SKIP: {} — target versions already installed",
+                    package_id
+                ))
+                .await;
+                self.clear_install_progress(package_id).await;
+                return Ok(serde_json::json!({"status": "up-to-date", "package_id": package_id}));
+            }
+        }
+
        // Note: the `already updating` guard lives in `spawn_package_update`
        // (the async wrapper that dispatch actually routes to). By the time
        // this inner function runs, the wrapper has already flipped state to
@@ -80,6 +111,12 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            if let Some(orchestrator) = self.orchestrator.as_ref() {
                match orchestrator.upgrade(orchestrator_app_id).await {
                    Ok(()) => {
+                        if let Some(targets) = &targets {
+                            verify_update_targets(
+                                targets,
+                                &inspect_update_images(package_id).await?,
+                            )?;
+                        }
                        self.set_install_phase(package_id, InstallPhase::WaitingHealthy)
                            .await;
                        if let Ok(health) = orchestrator.health(orchestrator_app_id).await {
@@ -133,7 +170,8 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        };

        // Resolve images to pull — either a stack or single container
-        let images_to_pull = self.resolve_images_to_pull(package_id, &pinned);
+        let images_to_pull =
+            targets.unwrap_or_else(|| self.resolve_images_to_pull(package_id, &pinned));

        // Get all containers for this app
        let containers = get_containers_for_app(package_id).await?;
@@ -324,15 +362,22 @@ impl RpcHandler {
                .await;
            if let Ok(o) = status {
                let state = String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stdout).trim().to_string();
-                if state == "exited" {
-                    warn!(
-                        "Update {}: container {} exited after recreate",
-                        package_id, name
-                    );
-                }
+                anyhow::ensure!(
+                    o.status.success() && state == "running",
+                    "Update {}: container {} is not running after recreate",
+                    package_id,
+                    name
+                );
+            } else {
+                anyhow::bail!(
+                    "Update {}: cannot inspect recreated container {}",
+                    package_id,
+                    name
+                );
            }
        }

+        verify_update_targets(images_to_pull, &inspect_update_images(package_id).await?)?;
        Ok(())
    }

@@ -514,6 +559,98 @@ impl RpcHandler {
    }
 }

+async fn inspect_update_images(package_id: &str) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>> {
+    let containers = get_containers_for_app(package_id).await?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        !containers.is_empty(),
+        "No containers found for {}",
+        package_id
+    );
+    let mut command = tokio::process::Command::new("podman");
+    command.arg("inspect").args(&containers).kill_on_drop(true);
+    let output = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30), command.output())
+        .await
+        .context("Timed out checking installed images")??;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        output.status.success(),
+        "Cannot inspect installed images; update cancelled"
+    );
+    let inspected: Vec<serde_json::Value> = serde_json::from_slice(&output.stdout)?;
+    inspected
+        .iter()
+        .map(|entry| {
+            let name = entry
+                .get("Name")
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Container inspection omitted Name"))?;
+            let image = entry
+                .get("ImageName")
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Container inspection omitted ImageName"))?;
+            Ok((name.trim_start_matches('/').to_string(), image.to_string()))
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+fn installed_image_for_target<'a>(
+    app_id: &str,
+    installed: &'a [(String, String)],
+) -> Option<&'a str> {
+    installed
+        .iter()
+        .find(|(name, _)| {
+            candidate_app_ids_for_container(name)
+                .iter()
+                .any(|id| id == app_id)
+        })
+        .map(|(_, image)| image.as_str())
+}
+
+/// A successful recreate is not proof that it used the downloaded image.
+fn verify_update_targets(
+    targets: &[(String, String)],
+    installed: &[(String, String)],
+) -> Result<()> {
+    for (app_id, target) in targets {
+        let running = installed_image_for_target(app_id, installed).ok_or_else(|| {
+            anyhow::anyhow!("Update {}: target container missing after recreate", app_id)
+        })?;
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            image_versions::extract_version_from_image(target)
+                == image_versions::extract_version_from_image(running)
+                || image_versions::compare_image_versions(target, running)
+                    == Some(std::cmp::Ordering::Equal),
+            "Update {}: recreated container did not reach target version {}",
+            app_id,
+            image_versions::extract_version_from_image(target)
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Check every stack component, not just the version shown on its tile. A
+/// newer backend must still update when its frontend version is unchanged.
+/// A stale target for any component cancels before pulling or stopping anything.
+fn update_targets_need_change(
+    targets: &[(String, String)],
+    installed: &[(String, String)],
+) -> Result<bool> {
+    use std::cmp::Ordering;
+    let mut changed = false;
+    for (app_id, target) in targets {
+        let running = installed_image_for_target(app_id, installed);
+        match running.and_then(|image| image_versions::compare_image_versions(target, image)) {
+            Some(Ordering::Less) => anyhow::bail!(
+                "Catalog target for {} is older than the installed image; refusing downgrade",
+                app_id
+            ),
+            Some(Ordering::Equal) => {}
+            Some(Ordering::Greater) | None => changed = true,
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(changed)
+}
+
 fn should_try_orchestrator_update(package_id: &str, orchestrator_available: bool) -> bool {
    orchestrator_available && !uses_legacy_update_flow(package_id)
 }
@@ -526,11 +663,14 @@ fn orchestrator_update_app_id(package_id: &str) -> &str {
 }

 fn uses_legacy_update_flow(package_id: &str) -> bool {
-    matches!(
-        package_id,
-        // Multi-container stacks still updated via the stack-aware path.
-        "immich" | "penpot" | "penpot-frontend" | "indeedhub"
-    )
+    // A primary container already at its target does not mean its backend or
+    // database is current. Route every mapped stack through the component flow.
+    !image_versions::containers_for_stack(package_id).is_empty()
+        || matches!(
+            package_id,
+            // Multi-container stacks still updated via the stack-aware path.
+            "immich" | "penpot" | "penpot-frontend" | "indeedhub"
+        )
 }

 fn is_unknown_app_id_error(err: &anyhow::Error) -> bool {
@@ -554,7 +694,12 @@ fn candidate_app_ids_for_container(container_name: &str) -> Vec<String> {
        "archy-bitcoin-ui" => push("bitcoin-ui"),
        "archy-lnd-ui" => push("lnd-ui"),
        "archy-electrs-ui" => push("electrs-ui"),
-        "mempool" => {
+        "mysql-mempool" => push("archy-mempool-db"),
+        "btcpay" | "btcpayserver" | "archy-btcpay" => push("btcpay-server"),
+        "homeassistant" | "archy-homeassistant" => push("home-assistant"),
+        "fedimintd" => push("fedimint"),
+        "electrs" | "mempool-electrs" => push("electrumx"),
+        "mempool" | "mempool-web" => {
            push("archy-mempool-web");
            push("mempool");
        }
@@ -572,27 +717,89 @@ fn candidate_app_ids_for_container(container_name: &str) -> Vec<String> {
 mod tests {
    use super::{
        candidate_app_ids_for_container, orchestrator_update_app_id,
-        should_try_orchestrator_update, uses_legacy_update_flow,
+        should_try_orchestrator_update, update_targets_need_change, uses_legacy_update_flow,
+        verify_update_targets,
    };

+    #[test]
+    fn mempool_update_preflight_rejects_stale_catalog_without_reinstalling() {
+        let installed = vec![(
+            "mempool".into(),
+            "r.test/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1".into(),
+        )];
+        let stale = vec![(
+            "archy-mempool-web".into(),
+            "r.test/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1".into(),
+        )];
+        assert!(update_targets_need_change(&stale, &installed).is_err());
+        let current = vec![(
+            "archy-mempool-web".into(),
+            "r.test/chaum/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1".into(),
+        )];
+        assert!(!update_targets_need_change(&current, &installed).unwrap());
+        let legacy = vec![(
+            "mempool-web".into(),
+            "r.test/old/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1".into(),
+        )];
+        assert!(!update_targets_need_change(&current, &legacy).unwrap());
+        let newer = vec![(
+            "archy-mempool-web".into(),
+            "r.test/chaum/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy2".into(),
+        )];
+        assert!(update_targets_need_change(&newer, &installed).unwrap());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn stack_update_checks_backend_even_when_frontend_matches() {
+        let installed = vec![
+            ("mempool".into(), "r.test/team/web:3.3.1-archy1".into()),
+            ("mempool-api".into(), "r.test/team/api:3.3.1".into()),
+        ];
+        let mut targets = vec![
+            (
+                "archy-mempool-web".into(),
+                "r.test/team/web:3.3.1-archy1".into(),
+            ),
+            ("mempool-api".into(), "r.test/team/api:3.3.2".into()),
+        ];
+        assert!(update_targets_need_change(&targets, &installed).unwrap());
+        targets[0].1 = "r.test/team/web:3.3.1".into();
+        assert!(update_targets_need_change(&targets, &installed).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn update_completion_requires_the_target_version_to_be_installed() {
+        let targets = vec![(
+            "archy-mempool-web".into(),
+            "r.test/chaum/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1".into(),
+        )];
+        let mut installed = vec![(
+            "mempool".into(),
+            "r.test/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1".into(),
+        )];
+        assert!(verify_update_targets(&targets, &installed).is_err());
+        assert!(verify_update_targets(&targets, &[]).is_err());
+        installed[0].1 = "r.test/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1".into();
+        assert!(verify_update_targets(&targets, &installed).is_ok());
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn legacy_flow_for_stack_apps() {
-        for app in ["immich", "penpot", "indeedhub"] {
+        for app in [
+            "immich",
+            "penpot",
+            "indeedhub",
+            "mempool",
+            "btcpay-server",
+            "netbird",
+        ] {
            assert!(uses_legacy_update_flow(app), "{app} should stay legacy");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn orchestrator_flow_for_single_apps() {
-        for app in [
-            "lnd",
-            "bitcoin-core",
-            "searxng",
-            "grafana",
-            "btcpay-server",
-            "mempool",
-            "fedimint",
-        ] {
+        for app in ["lnd", "bitcoin-core", "searxng", "grafana", "fedimint"] {
            assert!(
                !uses_legacy_update_flow(app),
                "{app} should be orchestrator-first"
@@ -150,23 +150,31 @@ async fn flip_to_transitional(
    app_id: &str,
    transitional: PackageState,
 ) -> Option<PackageState> {
-    let (mut data, _) = state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-    let prev = data.package_data.get(app_id).map(|e| e.state.clone());
-    if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(app_id) {
-        entry.state = transitional;
-        state_manager.update_data(data).await;
-    }
-    prev
+    state_manager
+        .mutate_data(|data| {
+            let prev = data.package_data.get(app_id).map(|e| e.state.clone());
+            if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(app_id) {
+                entry.ui_ready = Some(false);
+                entry.state = transitional;
+            }
+            prev
+        })
+        .await
 }

 /// Set the entry's state to `new_state`. No-ops if the entry has since been
 /// removed (e.g. uninstall ran concurrently).
 async fn set_state(state_manager: &StateManager, app_id: &str, new_state: PackageState) {
-    let (mut data, _) = state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
-    if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(app_id) {
-        if entry.state != new_state {
-            entry.state = new_state;
-            state_manager.update_data(data).await;
-        }
-    }
+    state_manager
+        .mutate_data(|data| {
+            if let Some(entry) = data.package_data.get_mut(app_id) {
+                if entry.state != new_state {
+                    if new_state != PackageState::Running {
+                        entry.ui_ready = Some(false);
+                    }
+                    entry.state = new_state;
+                }
+            }
+        })
+        .await
 }
@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ impl PortMap {
 /// there.
 fn apps_dirs() -> Vec<PathBuf> {
    let mut dirs = Vec::new();
+    if let Some(root) = std::env::var_os("ARCHIPELAGO_APPS_DIR") {
+        dirs.push(root.into());
+    }
    if let Ok(manifest_dir) = std::env::var("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR") {
        dirs.push(PathBuf::from(manifest_dir).join("../../apps"));
    }
@@ -144,6 +144,34 @@ pub fn shared_status() -> Arc<RwLock<GateStatus>> {
        .clone()
 }

+static REFRESH_KICK: std::sync::LazyLock<tokio::sync::Notify> =
+    std::sync::LazyLock::new(tokio::sync::Notify::new);
+static REFRESH_REV: std::sync::LazyLock<tokio::sync::watch::Sender<u64>> =
+    std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| tokio::sync::watch::channel(0).0);
+
+/// Installation must not wait for the minute sweep before becoming reachable.
+/// Wait for a completed sweep, bounded if shutdown/startup prevents one.
+pub async fn refresh_now() {
+    let mut completed = REFRESH_REV.subscribe();
+    REFRESH_KICK.notify_one();
+    let _ = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(3), completed.changed()).await;
+}
+
+pub fn port_claimed(status: &GateStatus, port: u16) -> bool {
+    let mut external = false;
+    let mut tor = false;
+    for (claimed_port, address) in &status.claimed {
+        if *claimed_port != port {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if let Ok(ip) = address.parse::<IpAddr>() {
+            tor |= ip == GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM;
+            external |= !ip.is_loopback();
+        }
+    }
+    external && tor
+}
+
 /// Run the gate. Returns only on shutdown.
 pub async fn run(
    gate: Arc<AppGate>,
@@ -162,11 +190,12 @@ pub async fn run(

    loop {
        tokio::select! {
-            _ = interval.tick() => {
-                sweep(&gate, &status, &mut held, &shutdown_rx).await;
-            }
+            _ = interval.tick() => {}
+            _ = REFRESH_KICK.notified() => {}
            _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => return,
        }
+        sweep(&gate, &status, &mut held, &shutdown_rx).await;
+        REFRESH_REV.send_modify(|revision| *revision = revision.wrapping_add(1));
    }
 }

@@ -461,3 +490,19 @@ mod tests {
        assert!(!status.is_fully_enforced());
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod readiness_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    #[test]
+    fn readiness_requires_external_and_tor_claims_for_the_same_port() {
+        let mut status = GateStatus::default();
+        assert!(!port_claimed(&status, 3001));
+        status.claimed.push((3001, "127.0.0.2".into()));
+        assert!(!port_claimed(&status, 3001));
+        status.claimed.push((3002, "192.0.2.10".into()));
+        assert!(!port_claimed(&status, 3001));
+        status.claimed.push((3001, "192.0.2.10".into()));
+        assert!(port_claimed(&status, 3001));
+    }
+}
@@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ async fn eval_rpc_handler() -> (Arc<RpcHandler>, tempfile::TempDir) {
 fn installed_entry(app_id: &str) -> crate::data_model::PackageDataEntry {
    use crate::data_model::{Description, Manifest, PackageDataEntry, PackageState, StaticFiles};
    PackageDataEntry {
+        ui_ready: None,
        state: PackageState::Running,
        health: None,
        exit_code: None,
@@ -1069,6 +1069,7 @@ mod tests {
            Description, Manifest, PackageDataEntry, PackageState, StaticFiles,
        };
        PackageDataEntry {
+            ui_ready: None,
            state: PackageState::Running,
            health: None,
            exit_code: None,
@@ -100,7 +100,11 @@ fn friendly_transient_error(has_cached_state: bool, err_msg: &str) -> String {
        .trim()
        .trim_end_matches('.');
    let lower = detail.to_lowercase();
-    let state = if lower.contains("verifying blocks") {
+    let state = if lower.contains("loading block index") {
+        Some("loading its block index. This can take a while after installation or restart")
+    } else if lower.contains("replaying blocks") {
+        Some("checking saved blocks before startup completes")
+    } else if lower.contains("verifying blocks") {
        Some("verifying blocks after restart")
    } else if lower.contains("connection reset") {
        Some("starting up and not yet accepting RPC connections")
@@ -340,3 +344,21 @@ mod tests {
        assert!(msg.len() < 260);
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod startup_message_tests {
+    #[test]
+    fn loading_block_index_is_explained_without_rpc_error_dump() {
+        for cached in [false, true] {
+            let message = super::friendly_transient_error(
+                cached,
+                r#"getblockchaininfo: Bitcoin RPC returned 500 Internal Server Error: {"error":{"code":-28,"message":"Loading block index…"}}"#,
+            );
+            assert!(message.contains("loading its block index"));
+            for raw in ["500", "-28", "Detail:", "getblockchaininfo", "{", "RPC"] {
+                assert!(!message.contains(raw));
+            }
+            assert_eq!(message.contains("last known state"), cached);
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -138,6 +138,44 @@ const NGINX_FEDIMINT_NEW: &str = "        sub_filter_types text/css application/
 const NGINX_FEDIMINT_SNIPPET_ANCHOR: &str = "proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8175/;";
 const NGINX_FEDIMINT_SNIPPET_INSERT: &str = "proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8175/;\n    proxy_set_header Accept-Encoding \"\";\n    sub_filter_types text/css application/javascript application/json;\n    sub_filter_once off;\n    sub_filter 'href=\"/' 'href=\"/app/fedimint/';\n    sub_filter 'src=\"/' 'src=\"/app/fedimint/';\n    sub_filter \"href='/\" \"href='/app/fedimint/\";\n    sub_filter \"src='/\" \"src='/app/fedimint/\";\n    sub_filter 'url(\"/' 'url(\"/app/fedimint/';\n    sub_filter \"url('/\" \"url('/app/fedimint/\";\n    sub_filter '</head>' '<script src=\"/nostr-provider.js\"></script></head>';";

+/// Finish manifest promotion before constructing the orchestrator or starting
+/// catalog refresh/reconciliation. Replacing the app tree in the background
+/// could let a reload observe its temporary empty state and forget disk-only apps.
+pub async fn ensure_runtime_assets_ready() {
+    match run_runtime_assets().await {
+        Ok(changed) if changed => info!("Runtime assets synchronized from OTA payload"),
+        Ok(_) => debug!("No OTA runtime payload to synchronize"),
+        Err(e) => warn!("Runtime asset bootstrap failed (non-fatal): {:#}", e),
+    }
+    // Repair the narrowly recognized legacy NPM tunnel override before app
+    // reconciliation. The embedded script ships in both OTA and ISO binaries.
+    // It preserves native wallet services and refuses unknown custom routing.
+    match tokio::process::Command::new("python3")
+        .arg("-c")
+        .arg(include_str!("../../../scripts/repair-npm-tunnel.py"))
+        .output()
+        .await
+    {
+        Ok(output) if output.status.success() => {
+            if !output.stdout.is_empty() {
+                info!("{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim());
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(output) => warn!(
+            "NPM tunnel migration needs attention: {}",
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).trim()
+        ),
+        Err(error) => warn!("NPM tunnel migration could not run: {error}"),
+    }
+    match run_apps_dir_repair().await {
+        Ok(true) => {
+            info!("Populated /opt/archipelago/apps from installer copy at /etc/archipelago/apps")
+        }
+        Ok(false) => debug!("/opt/archipelago/apps already populated (or no installer copy)"),
+        Err(e) => warn!("Apps dir repair failed (non-fatal): {:#}", e),
+    }
+}
+
 /// Entry point called from main startup. Never returns an error to the caller —
 /// failing to bootstrap host artifacts must not prevent the backend from serving.
 pub async fn ensure_doctor_installed() {
@@ -146,11 +184,6 @@ pub async fn ensure_doctor_installed() {
        Ok(false) => debug!("No stale Archipelago dev-mode service override found"),
        Err(e) => warn!("Service override repair failed (non-fatal): {:#}", e),
    }
-    match run_runtime_assets().await {
-        Ok(changed) if changed => info!("Runtime assets synchronized from OTA payload"),
-        Ok(_) => debug!("No OTA runtime payload to synchronize"),
-        Err(e) => warn!("Runtime asset bootstrap failed (non-fatal): {:#}", e),
-    }
    match run().await {
        Ok(changed) if changed => info!("Doctor artifacts synchronized with binary"),
        Ok(_) => debug!("Doctor artifacts already in sync"),
@@ -168,13 +201,6 @@ pub async fn ensure_doctor_installed() {
        Ok(false) => debug!("No stale bitcoin.conf found"),
        Err(e) => warn!("Bitcoin RPC repair failed (non-fatal): {:#}", e),
    }
-    match run_apps_dir_repair().await {
-        Ok(true) => {
-            info!("Populated /opt/archipelago/apps from installer copy at /etc/archipelago/apps")
-        }
-        Ok(false) => debug!("/opt/archipelago/apps already populated (or no installer copy)"),
-        Err(e) => warn!("Apps dir repair failed (non-fatal): {:#}", e),
-    }
    match run_tor_helper_sync().await {
        Ok(true) => info!("tor-helper.sh synchronized with binary"),
        Ok(false) => debug!("tor-helper.sh already current"),
@@ -102,6 +102,31 @@ pub struct AppCatalogEntry {
    /// `docs/registry-manifest-design.md`.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub manifest: Option<serde_json::Value>,
+    /// Backward-compatible catalog rollout: old daemons ignore these and keep
+    /// the base manifest. New daemons choose only variants they can safely apply.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub manifest_variants: Vec<CatalogManifestVariant>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct CatalogManifestVariant {
+    pub requires: Vec<String>,
+    pub manifest: serde_json::Value,
+}
+
+fn selected_manifest(entry: AppCatalogEntry) -> Option<serde_json::Value> {
+    // Never let an unknown future requirement become an unsafe partial match.
+    for variant in entry.manifest_variants.into_iter().rev() {
+        if !variant.requires.is_empty()
+            && variant
+                .requires
+                .iter()
+                .all(|capability| capability == "runtime-migration-backup-v1")
+        {
+            return Some(variant.manifest);
+        }
+    }
+    entry.manifest
 }

 /// One selectable version in an app's `versions[]` list. The catalog carries a
@@ -234,7 +259,7 @@ pub fn catalog_manifest_values() -> Vec<(String, serde_json::Value)> {
    load_catalog()
        .apps
        .into_iter()
-        .filter_map(|(id, e)| e.manifest.map(|m| (id, m)))
+        .filter_map(|(id, e)| selected_manifest(e).map(|m| (id, m)))
        .collect()
 }

@@ -400,7 +425,7 @@ pub fn available_update_for_app(app_id: &str, running_image: &str) -> Option<Str
    }
    if let Some(catalog_image) = catalog_primary_image(app_id) {
        // Catalog covers this app with a concrete image -> authoritative.
-        return crate::container::image_versions::available_update_for_images(
+        return crate::container::image_versions::available_catalog_update_for_images(
            &catalog_image,
            running_image,
        );
@@ -557,6 +582,32 @@ fn write_cache(data_dir: &Path, body: &str) -> anyhow::Result<bool> {
 mod tests {
    use super::*;

+    #[test]
+    fn catalog_migration_variant_is_compatible_with_old_and_future_daemons() {
+        let raw = serde_json::json!({
+            "version": "2.45.0", "manifest": {"app": {"id": "portainer", "container": {}}},
+            "manifest_variants": [{"requires": ["runtime-migration-backup-v1"],
+                "manifest": {"app": {"id": "portainer", "container": {"network": "slirp4netns"}, "backup_before_runtime_change": true}}}]
+        });
+        #[derive(Deserialize)]
+        struct OldEntry {
+            manifest: serde_json::Value,
+        }
+        let old: OldEntry = serde_json::from_value(raw.clone()).unwrap();
+        assert!(old.manifest["app"]["container"].get("network").is_none());
+        let current: AppCatalogEntry = serde_json::from_value(raw.clone()).unwrap();
+        let chosen = selected_manifest(current).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(chosen["app"]["container"]["network"], "slirp4netns");
+        assert_eq!(chosen["app"]["backup_before_runtime_change"], true);
+        let mut future = raw;
+        future["manifest_variants"][0]["requires"]
+            .as_array_mut()
+            .unwrap()
+            .push(serde_json::json!("unknown-next-capability"));
+        let chosen = selected_manifest(serde_json::from_value(future).unwrap()).unwrap();
+        assert!(chosen["app"]["container"].get("network").is_none());
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn parses_and_ignores_unknown_fields() {
        let json = r#"{
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ async fn image_id(image_ref: &str) -> Option<String> {
 /// should reference (`localhost/<base>:latest` for build, registry
 /// URL for pull).
 async fn ensure_image_present(spec: &CompanionSpec) -> Result<String> {
-    let local_image = format!("localhost/{}:latest", spec.image_base);
+    let mut local_image = format!("localhost/{}:latest", spec.image_base);
    let local_image_compat = format!("localhost/{}:local", spec.image_base);
    let registry_image = format!("{}/{}:latest", COMPANION_REGISTRY, spec.image_base);

@@ -322,11 +322,13 @@ async fn ensure_image_present(spec: &CompanionSpec) -> Result<String> {
    for dir in spec.build_dir_candidates {
        let dockerfile = PathBuf::from(dir).join("Dockerfile");
        if fs::try_exists(&dockerfile).await.unwrap_or(false) {
-            // `:local` is a deliberate manual override — never auto-rebuild it.
+            // Older installers and self-update create :local themselves. It
+            // must receive source updates too; treating it as a permanent
+            // manual override silently kept the old LND UI after an OTA.
            if image_exists(&local_image_compat).await {
-                return Ok(local_image_compat);
+                local_image = local_image_compat.clone();
            }
-            // Reuse the auto-built `:latest` only when the build context has NOT
+            // Reuse either local tag only when the build context has NOT
            // changed since it was built. Without this staleness check an
            // already-present image is reused forever, so edits to the baked-in
            // context (Dockerfile, nginx.conf, …) never reach the node — this is
@@ -849,20 +851,43 @@ async fn needs_repair(spec: &CompanionSpec) -> Result<bool> {
    if !matches_known_shape {
        return Ok(true);
    }
-    if on_disk.contains(&local_image) && !on_disk.contains(&local_image_compat) {
+    if let Some(image) = managed_local_image(spec, &on_disk) {
        for dir in spec.build_dir_candidates {
            let dockerfile = PathBuf::from(dir).join("Dockerfile");
            if fs::try_exists(&dockerfile).await.unwrap_or(false) {
                // Conservative on any timeout/error inside: reuse the cache.
-                return Ok(context_is_newer_than_image(dir, &local_image).await);
+                return Ok(context_is_newer_than_image(dir, &image).await);
            }
        }
    }
    Ok(false)
 }

+fn managed_local_image(spec: &CompanionSpec, unit: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    ["latest", "local"]
+        .iter()
+        .map(|tag| format!("localhost/{}:{tag}", spec.image_base))
+        .find(|image| build_unit(spec, image).render() == unit)
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
+    #[test]
+    fn legacy_installer_local_tag_is_checked_for_source_updates_like_latest() {
+        for spec in ALL_COMPANIONS.iter().flat_map(|group| group.iter()) {
+            for tag in ["local", "latest"] {
+                let image = format!("localhost/{}:{tag}", spec.image_base);
+                let unit = build_unit(spec, &image).render();
+                assert_eq!(managed_local_image(spec, &unit), Some(image));
+            }
+            let registry = format!("{}/{}:latest", COMPANION_REGISTRY, spec.image_base);
+            assert_eq!(
+                managed_local_image(spec, &build_unit(spec, &registry).render()),
+                None
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
    use super::*;

    fn names(specs: &[&'static CompanionSpec]) -> Vec<&'static str> {
@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@

 use anyhow::Result;
 use archipelago_container::{
-    ContainerRuntime as ContainerRuntimeTrait, ContainerState, PodmanClient,
+    ContainerRuntime as ContainerRuntimeTrait, ContainerState, ContainerStatus, PodmanClient,
 };
+use futures_util::StreamExt;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use tracing::{debug, info};
@@ -15,6 +16,16 @@ use crate::data_model::{
    PackageDataEntry, PackageState, ServiceStatus, StaticFiles,
 };

+/// One displayed package for each known container/manifest alias. Keep the
+/// stopped-app restoration path in agreement with live-container discovery.
+fn canonical_package_id(name: &str) -> &str {
+    match name.strip_prefix("archy-").unwrap_or(name) {
+        "immich_server" => "immich",
+        "mempool-web" | "mempool-frontend" => "mempool",
+        name => name,
+    }
+}
+
 pub struct DockerPackageScanner {
    runtime: Arc<dyn ContainerRuntimeTrait>,
 }
@@ -25,8 +36,15 @@ impl DockerPackageScanner {
    }

    /// Scan Docker containers and convert to package data
-    pub async fn scan_containers(&self) -> Result<HashMap<String, PackageDataEntry>> {
-        let containers = self.runtime.list_containers().await?;
+    pub async fn scan_containers(
+        &self,
+        data_dir: &std::path::Path,
+        cached: &HashMap<String, PackageDataEntry>,
+    ) -> Result<HashMap<String, PackageDataEntry>> {
+        let mut containers = self.runtime.list_containers().await?;
+        let installed = crate::crash_recovery::load_installed_apps(data_dir).await;
+        let uninstalled = crate::crash_recovery::load_user_uninstalled(data_dir).await;
+        restore_absent_installed(&mut containers, &installed, &uninstalled);

        debug!("Found {} containers", containers.len());

@@ -91,24 +109,8 @@ impl DockerPackageScanner {
        debug!("Found {} UI containers", ui_containers.len());

        for container in containers {
-            // Extract app ID from container name
-            // Support both archy-* containers (docker-compose) and plain names (manual)
-            let app_id = if container.name.starts_with("archy-") {
-                container
-                    .name
-                    .strip_prefix("archy-")
-                    .unwrap_or(&container.name)
-                    .to_string()
-            } else {
-                // Use the container name as-is for manually started containers
-                container.name.clone()
-            };
-
-            // Normalize multi-container app IDs to their canonical names
-            let app_id = match app_id.as_str() {
-                "immich_server" => "immich".to_string(),
-                _ => app_id,
-            };
+            // Use the same alias mapping as stopped-app restoration.
+            let app_id = canonical_package_id(&container.name).to_owned();

            // Skip backend services (databases, APIs, etc.)
            if excluded_services.contains(&app_id.as_str()) {
@@ -139,6 +141,18 @@ impl DockerPackageScanner {
                continue;
            }

+            if container.id.is_empty() {
+                if let Some(previous) = cached.get(&app_id) {
+                    let mut held = previous.clone();
+                    held.state = PackageState::Stopped;
+                    held.ui_ready = Some(false);
+                    held.health = None;
+                    held.exit_code = None;
+                    packages.insert(app_id.clone(), held);
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+
            // Get metadata for this app
            let metadata = get_app_metadata(&app_id);
            // Manifest-owned metadata (icon) wins over the static table: the
@@ -158,13 +172,11 @@ impl DockerPackageScanner {
            } else {
                // Prefer the known web UI port over arbitrary first binding
                // (for example Gitea exposes SSH on 2222 before web on 3001).
-                let candidate = if uses_allocated_launch_port(&app_id) {
-                    extract_lan_address(&container.ports)
-                        .or_else(|| PodmanClient::lan_address_for(&app_id))
-                } else {
-                    PodmanClient::lan_address_for(&app_id)
-                        .or_else(|| extract_lan_address(&container.ports))
-                };
+                let candidate = package_launch_candidate(
+                    &app_id,
+                    &container.ports,
+                    PodmanClient::lan_address_for(&app_id),
+                );
                reachable_lan_address(&app_id, candidate).await
            };

@@ -179,14 +191,22 @@ impl DockerPackageScanner {
            let tor_address = read_tor_address(&app_id).await;

            // Extract actual version from container image tag
-            let running_version = image_versions::extract_version_from_image(&container.image);
+            let running_version = if container.id.is_empty() {
+                String::new() // Absence cannot establish the installed image version.
+            } else {
+                image_versions::extract_version_from_image(&container.image)
+            };

            // Decoupled from the binary OTA: prefer the remote app catalog,
            // falling back to the image-versions.sh pin when uncovered/offline.
-            let available_update =
-                crate::container::app_catalog::available_update_for_app(&app_id, &container.image);
+            let available_update = if container.id.is_empty() {
+                None
+            } else {
+                crate::container::app_catalog::available_update_for_app(&app_id, &container.image)
+            };

            let package = PackageDataEntry {
+                ui_ready: Some(false),
                state: package_state.clone(),
                health: container.health.clone(),
                exit_code: if package_state == PackageState::Exited {
@@ -283,10 +303,237 @@ impl DockerPackageScanner {
            );
        }

+        let probes: Vec<_> = packages
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|(id, pkg)| {
+                if pkg.state != PackageState::Running {
+                    return None;
+                }
+                let url = pkg
+                    .installed
+                    .as_ref()?
+                    .interface_addresses
+                    .get("main")?
+                    .lan_address
+                    .clone()?;
+                Some((id.clone(), url))
+            })
+            .collect();
+        let mut results = futures_util::stream::iter(
+            probes
+                .into_iter()
+                .map(|(id, url)| async move { (id, launch_http_ready(&url).await) }),
+        )
+        .buffer_unordered(8);
+        while let Some((id, ready)) = results.next().await {
+            if let Some(pkg) = packages.get_mut(&id) {
+                pkg.ui_ready = Some(ready);
+            }
+        }
+        // HTTP on loopback can precede the LAN/Tor listener after install.
+        let port_map = crate::appgate::identity::build_port_map();
+        let gated: Vec<_> = packages
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|(id, pkg)| {
+                if pkg.ui_ready != Some(true) {
+                    return None;
+                }
+                let url = pkg
+                    .installed
+                    .as_ref()?
+                    .interface_addresses
+                    .get("main")?
+                    .lan_address
+                    .as_deref()?;
+                let port = launch_url_port(url)?;
+                port_map
+                    .gated(port)
+                    .filter(|gate| gate.declared)
+                    .map(|_| (id.clone(), port))
+            })
+            .collect();
+        if !gated.is_empty() {
+            use crate::appgate::listener::{port_claimed, refresh_now, shared_status};
+            let status = shared_status();
+            let needs_refresh = {
+                let current = status.read().await;
+                gated.iter().any(|(_, port)| !port_claimed(&current, *port))
+            };
+            if needs_refresh {
+                refresh_now().await;
+            }
+            let current = status.read().await;
+            for (id, port) in gated {
+                if !port_claimed(&current, port) {
+                    packages.get_mut(&id).unwrap().ui_ready = Some(false);
+                }
+            }
+        }
        Ok(packages)
    }
 }

+/// Quadlet removes containers during ordinary stops/restarts. Rebuild installed
+/// entries even on the daemon's first scan; a runtime absence is not uninstall.
+fn restore_absent_installed(
+    containers: &mut Vec<ContainerStatus>,
+    installed: &std::collections::HashSet<String>,
+    uninstalled: &std::collections::HashSet<String>,
+) {
+    let mut present: std::collections::HashSet<String> = containers
+        .iter()
+        .map(|c| canonical_package_id(&c.name).to_owned())
+        .collect();
+    let removed: std::collections::HashSet<_> = uninstalled
+        .iter()
+        .map(|id| canonical_package_id(id))
+        .collect();
+    for name in installed {
+        let id = canonical_package_id(name);
+        if removed.contains(id) || !present.insert(id.to_owned()) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        containers.push(ContainerStatus {
+            id: String::new(),
+            name: id.to_owned(),
+            state: ContainerState::Stopped,
+            health: None,
+            exit_code: None,
+            started_at: None,
+            image: String::new(),
+            created: String::new(),
+            ports: Vec::new(),
+            lan_address: None,
+        });
+    }
+}
+
+/// Probe the actual loopback upstream, not the app gate's login page. A bound
+/// TCP socket alone can still reset requests or serve a startup 503.
+async fn launch_http_ready(candidate: &str) -> bool {
+    let Ok(mut url) = reqwest::Url::parse(candidate) else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    if !matches!(url.scheme(), "http" | "https") {
+        return false;
+    }
+    if url.set_host(Some("127.0.0.1")).is_err() {
+        return false;
+    }
+    static CLIENT: std::sync::OnceLock<reqwest::Client> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();
+    let client = CLIENT.get_or_init(|| {
+        reqwest::Client::builder()
+            .no_proxy()
+            .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2))
+            .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
+            // Self-signed local app certificates are normal. This client only
+            // contacts loopback and never sends credentials or follows redirects.
+            .danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)
+            .build()
+            .expect("local readiness client")
+    });
+    match client.get(url).send().await {
+        Ok(response) => matches!(response.status().as_u16(), 200..=399 | 401 | 403),
+        Err(_) => false,
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod lifecycle_regression_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn registry_survives_empty_runtime_and_deduplicates_aliases() {
+        let installed = ["archy-gitea", "gitea", "immich_server", "archy-removed"]
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(str::to_owned)
+            .collect();
+        let removed = ["removed".to_owned()].into_iter().collect();
+        let mut containers = Vec::new();
+        restore_absent_installed(&mut containers, &installed, &removed);
+        assert_eq!(containers.len(), 2);
+        assert!(containers
+            .iter()
+            .all(|c| c.state == ContainerState::Stopped));
+        containers[0].state = ContainerState::Running;
+        restore_absent_installed(&mut containers, &installed, &removed);
+        assert_eq!(containers.len(), 2);
+        assert_eq!(containers[0].state, ContainerState::Running);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn mempool_frontend_inventory_alias_does_not_create_a_second_package() {
+        let installed = ["mempool", "archy-mempool-web", "mempool-web"]
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(str::to_owned)
+            .collect();
+        let mut containers = Vec::new();
+        restore_absent_installed(&mut containers, &installed, &Default::default());
+        assert_eq!(containers.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(containers[0].name, "mempool");
+        containers[0].id = "live-frontend".into();
+        containers[0].state = ContainerState::Running;
+        restore_absent_installed(&mut containers, &installed, &Default::default());
+        assert_eq!(containers.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(containers[0].id, "live-frontend");
+        assert_eq!(containers[0].state, ContainerState::Running);
+        assert_eq!(canonical_package_id("archy-mempool-web"), "mempool");
+        assert_eq!(canonical_package_id("mempool-api"), "mempool-api");
+        containers.clear();
+        restore_absent_installed(
+            &mut containers,
+            &installed,
+            &["mempool".into()].into_iter().collect(),
+        );
+        assert!(containers.is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn readiness_rejects_startup_errors_and_accepts_auth_and_redirects() {
+        for (status, expected) in [
+            (200, true),
+            (302, true),
+            (401, true),
+            (403, true),
+            (404, false),
+            (500, false),
+            (502, false),
+            (503, false),
+        ] {
+            let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+            let port = listener.local_addr().unwrap().port();
+            let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
+                let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
+                let mut buf = [0; 2048];
+                let n = stream.read(&mut buf).await.unwrap();
+                assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..n]).starts_with("GET /start HTTP/1.1"));
+                stream.write_all(format!("HTTP/1.1 {status} Test\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n").as_bytes()).await.unwrap();
+            });
+            assert_eq!(
+                launch_http_ready(&format!("http://localhost:{port}/start")).await,
+                expected,
+                "status {status}"
+            );
+            task.await.unwrap();
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn readiness_rejects_tcp_accept_without_http() {
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let port = listener.local_addr().unwrap().port();
+        let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let (stream, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
+            drop(stream);
+        });
+        assert!(!launch_http_ready(&format!("http://localhost:{port}/")).await);
+        task.await.unwrap();
+        assert!(!launch_http_ready(&format!("http://localhost:{port}/")).await);
+        assert!(!launch_http_ready("file:///tmp/test").await);
+    }
+}
+
 struct AppMetadata {
    title: String,
    description: String,
@@ -856,6 +1103,23 @@ fn companion_lan_address(app_id: &str) -> Option<String> {
    }
 }

+/// Companion dashboards remain usable while their backend is syncing. Never
+/// probe a Bitcoin RPC or Electrum protocol socket as dashboard readiness.
+fn package_launch_candidate(
+    app_id: &str,
+    ports: &[String],
+    known: Option<String>,
+) -> Option<String> {
+    if let Some(companion) = companion_lan_address(app_id) {
+        return Some(companion);
+    }
+    if uses_allocated_launch_port(app_id) {
+        extract_lan_address(ports).or(known)
+    } else {
+        known.or_else(|| extract_lan_address(ports))
+    }
+}
+
 fn uses_allocated_launch_port(app_id: &str) -> bool {
    matches!(
        app_id,
@@ -940,7 +1204,42 @@ mod tor_service_name_tests {

 #[cfg(test)]
 mod extract_lan_address_tests {
-    use super::extract_lan_address;
+    use super::{extract_lan_address, package_launch_candidate};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn companion_dashboard_wins_over_backend_protocol_ports() {
+        for id in ["bitcoin", "bitcoin-core", "bitcoin-knots"] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                package_launch_candidate(
+                    id,
+                    &["127.0.0.1:8332->8332/tcp".into()],
+                    Some("http://localhost:8332".into())
+                )
+                .as_deref(),
+                Some("http://localhost:8334")
+            );
+        }
+        for id in ["electrumx", "electrs", "mempool-electrs"] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                package_launch_candidate(
+                    id,
+                    &["127.0.0.1:50001->50001/tcp".into()],
+                    Some("http://localhost:50001".into())
+                )
+                .as_deref(),
+                Some("http://localhost:50002")
+            );
+        }
+        assert_eq!(
+            package_launch_candidate(
+                "filebrowser",
+                &["127.0.0.1:19080->80/tcp".into()],
+                Some("http://localhost:8080".into())
+            )
+            .as_deref(),
+            Some("http://localhost:19080")
+        );
+    }

    #[test]
    fn skips_ssh_port_when_web_port_is_published() {
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 //! starting the container with `--config /data/.filebrowser.json`.

 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
-use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 use tokio::fs;

 use crate::update::host_sudo;
@@ -117,6 +117,197 @@ fn shell_quote(s: &str) -> String {
    s.replace('\'', "'\\''")
 }

+/// Save a complete purchase without overwriting any existing directory entry.
+/// Both host and rootless-namespace paths publish with a no-clobber hard link.
+pub async fn save_new_file(dir: &Path, name: &str, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    save_new_file_with(dir, name, bytes, write_via_userns).await
+}
+
+fn validate_filename(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        !name.is_empty()
+            && name != "."
+            && name != ".."
+            && !name.contains(['/', '\\', '\0'])
+            && name.len() <= 255,
+        "Invalid purchased filename"
+    );
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn save_new_file_with<F, Fut>(
+    dir: &Path,
+    name: &str,
+    bytes: &[u8],
+    fallback: F,
+) -> Result<PathBuf>
+where
+    F: FnOnce(PathBuf, String, Vec<u8>) -> Fut,
+    Fut: std::future::Future<Output = Result<PathBuf>>,
+{
+    validate_filename(name)?;
+    // Never follow a user-created destination directory symlink.
+    match fs::symlink_metadata(dir).await {
+        Ok(meta) => anyhow::ensure!(meta.is_dir(), "Files destination is not a directory"),
+        Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {}
+        Err(error) => return Err(error.into()),
+    }
+    save_after_direct_result(
+        write_direct(dir, name, bytes).await,
+        dir,
+        name,
+        bytes,
+        fallback,
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+async fn save_after_direct_result<F, Fut>(
+    result: std::io::Result<PathBuf>,
+    dir: &Path,
+    name: &str,
+    bytes: &[u8],
+    fallback: F,
+) -> Result<PathBuf>
+where
+    F: FnOnce(PathBuf, String, Vec<u8>) -> Fut,
+    Fut: std::future::Future<Output = Result<PathBuf>>,
+{
+    match result {
+        Ok(path) => Ok(path),
+        Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied => {
+            fallback(dir.to_owned(), name.to_owned(), bytes.to_vec())
+                .await
+                .context("Saving purchase in Files user namespace")
+        }
+        Err(error) => Err(error).context("Saving purchase in Files"),
+    }
+}
+
+fn numbered_name(name: &str, attempt: usize) -> String {
+    if attempt == 1 {
+        return name.to_owned();
+    }
+    match name.rsplit_once('.') {
+        Some((stem, extension)) if !stem.is_empty() => format!("{stem} ({attempt}).{extension}"),
+        _ => format!("{name} ({attempt})"),
+    }
+}
+
+struct PendingFile(PathBuf);
+impl Drop for PendingFile {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&self.0);
+    }
+}
+
+async fn write_direct(dir: &Path, name: &str, bytes: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<PathBuf> {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+    use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
+    fs::create_dir_all(dir).await?;
+    let temp_path = dir.join(format!(".archy-saving-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
+    let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
+        .write(true)
+        .create_new(true)
+        .mode(0o600)
+        .open(&temp_path)
+        .await?;
+    let temp = PendingFile(temp_path);
+    file.write_all(bytes).await?;
+    file.set_permissions(std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o644))
+        .await?;
+    file.sync_all().await?;
+    for attempt in 1..=100 {
+        let target = dir.join(numbered_name(name, attempt));
+        match fs::hard_link(&temp.0, &target).await {
+            Ok(()) => return Ok(target),
+            Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => continue,
+            Err(error) => return Err(error),
+        }
+    }
+    Err(std::io::Error::new(
+        std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists,
+        "Too many existing copies; purchase cache retained",
+    ))
+}
+
+// Positional arguments carry all user-controlled text. mktemp prevents temp-name
+// collisions; ln -T refuses files, symlinks and directories, including races.
+const WRITE_VIA_USERNS: &str = r#"set -eu
+dir=$1
+name=$2
+expected=$3
+[ ! -L "$dir" ] || exit 1
+if [ ! -d "$dir" ]; then
+    mkdir -p -- "$dir"
+    chown --reference="$(dirname -- "$dir")" -- "$dir"
+fi
+tmp=$(mktemp "$dir/.archy-saving.XXXXXXXXXX")
+trap 'rm -f -- "$tmp"' EXIT HUP INT TERM
+cat > "$tmp"
+[ "$(wc -c < "$tmp")" -eq "$expected" ] || exit 1
+chown --reference="$dir" -- "$tmp"
+chmod 0644 -- "$tmp"
+sync -f -- "$tmp"
+stem=$name
+ext=
+case "$name" in
+    *.*) prefix=${name%.*}; if [ -n "$prefix" ]; then stem=$prefix; ext=.${name##*.}; fi ;;
+esac
+n=1
+while [ "$n" -le 100 ]; do
+    candidate=$name
+    if [ "$n" -gt 1 ]; then candidate="$stem ($n)$ext"; fi
+    dst="$dir/$candidate"
+    if ln -T -- "$tmp" "$dst" 2>/dev/null; then
+        printf '%s' "$candidate"
+        exit 0
+    fi
+    # A conflict may be a dangling symlink; never follow it or overwrite it.
+    if [ ! -e "$dst" ] && [ ! -L "$dst" ]; then exit 1; fi
+    n=$((n + 1))
+done
+exit 1
+"#;
+
+async fn write_via_userns(dir: PathBuf, name: String, bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
+    let mut child = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
+        .args(["unshare", "sh", "-c", WRITE_VIA_USERNS, "sh"])
+        .arg(&dir)
+        .arg(&name)
+        .arg(bytes.len().to_string())
+        .kill_on_drop(true)
+        .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped())
+        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped())
+        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped())
+        .spawn()
+        .context("Starting Files namespace writer")?;
+    let mut stdin = child.stdin.take().context("Files writer stdin missing")?;
+    let operation = async {
+        let fed = stdin.write_all(&bytes).await;
+        drop(stdin);
+        let output = child.wait_with_output().await?;
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            output.status.success(),
+            "Files namespace writer failed: {}",
+            output.status
+        );
+        fed.context("Sending purchase bytes to Files")?;
+        let chosen =
+            String::from_utf8(output.stdout).context("Files writer returned an invalid name")?;
+        validate_filename(&chosen)?;
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            (1..=100).any(|n| numbered_name(&name, n) == chosen),
+            "Files writer returned an unexpected name"
+        );
+        Ok(dir.join(chosen))
+    };
+    tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(120), operation)
+        .await
+        .context("Files namespace writer timed out")?
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
@@ -152,3 +343,231 @@ mod tests {
        assert_eq!(second, EnsureOutcome::Unchanged);
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod purchase_write_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::{
+        collections::HashSet,
+        os::unix::fs::{symlink, PermissionsExt},
+    };
+
+    fn no_temps(dir: &Path) {
+        assert!(std::fs::read_dir(dir).unwrap().all(|e| !e
+            .unwrap()
+            .file_name()
+            .to_string_lossy()
+            .starts_with(".archy-saving")));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn direct_write_uses_complete_bytes_and_preserves_originals() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        fs::write(dir.path().join("song.mp3"), b"original")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let target = save_new_file(dir.path(), "song.mp3", b"new").await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(target.file_name().unwrap(), "song (2).mp3");
+        assert_eq!(fs::read(target).await.unwrap(), b"new");
+        assert_eq!(
+            fs::read(dir.path().join("song.mp3")).await.unwrap(),
+            b"original"
+        );
+        no_temps(dir.path());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn simultaneous_saves_publish_unique_complete_files() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let mut tasks = Vec::new();
+        for n in 0..24u8 {
+            let dir = dir.path().to_owned();
+            tasks.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
+                let bytes = vec![n; 32768];
+                let path = save_new_file(&dir, "same.bin", &bytes).await.unwrap();
+                assert_eq!(fs::read(&path).await.unwrap(), bytes);
+                path
+            }));
+        }
+        let mut paths = HashSet::new();
+        for task in tasks {
+            assert!(paths.insert(task.await.unwrap()));
+        }
+        assert_eq!(paths.len(), 24);
+        no_temps(dir.path());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn existing_directories_and_dangling_symlinks_are_conflicts() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        fs::create_dir(dir.path().join("name")).await.unwrap();
+        symlink("missing", dir.path().join("name (2)")).unwrap();
+        let path = save_new_file(dir.path(), "name", b"new").await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(path.file_name().unwrap(), "name (3)");
+        assert!(dir.path().join("name").is_dir());
+        assert!(fs::symlink_metadata(dir.path().join("name (2)"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_symlink());
+        no_temps(dir.path());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn invalid_names_and_symlink_destination_are_refused() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        for name in [
+            "",
+            ".",
+            "..",
+            "../escape",
+            "/absolute",
+            "a/b",
+            "a\\b",
+            "a\0b",
+        ] {
+            assert!(save_new_file(dir.path(), name, b"bytes").await.is_err());
+        }
+        let outside = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        symlink(outside.path(), dir.path().join("Music")).unwrap();
+        assert!(save_new_file(&dir.path().join("Music"), "song", b"bytes")
+            .await
+            .is_err());
+        assert_eq!(std::fs::read_dir(outside.path()).unwrap().count(), 0);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn collision_limit_preserves_all_files_and_cleans_temporary_data() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        for n in 1..=100 {
+            fs::write(dir.path().join(numbered_name("a.txt", n)), b"keep")
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+        }
+        assert!(save_new_file(dir.path(), "a.txt", b"new").await.is_err());
+        for n in 1..=100 {
+            assert_eq!(
+                fs::read(dir.path().join(numbered_name("a.txt", n)))
+                    .await
+                    .unwrap(),
+                b"keep"
+            );
+        }
+        no_temps(dir.path());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn permission_fallback_is_exercised_without_skipping_as_root() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let result = save_after_direct_result(
+            Err(std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied.into()),
+            dir.path(),
+            "a",
+            b"abc",
+            |dir, name, bytes| async move {
+                assert_eq!(bytes, b"abc");
+                Ok(dir.join(name))
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(result, dir.path().join("a"));
+        assert!(save_after_direct_result(
+            Err(std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied.into()),
+            dir.path(),
+            "a",
+            b"abc",
+            |_, _, _| async { anyhow::bail!("namespace unavailable") }
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err()
+        .to_string()
+        .contains("namespace"));
+        assert!(save_after_direct_result(
+            Err(std::io::ErrorKind::StorageFull.into()),
+            dir.path(),
+            "a",
+            b"abc",
+            |_, _, _| async { panic!("disk full must not trigger permission fallback") }
+        )
+        .await
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    async fn run_script(
+        dir: &Path,
+        name: &str,
+        bytes: &[u8],
+        expected: usize,
+    ) -> std::process::Output {
+        use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
+        let mut child = tokio::process::Command::new("sh")
+            .args(["-c", WRITE_VIA_USERNS, "sh"])
+            .arg(dir)
+            .arg(name)
+            .arg(expected.to_string())
+            .stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped())
+            .stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped())
+            .stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped())
+            .spawn()
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut input = child.stdin.take().unwrap();
+        input.write_all(bytes).await.unwrap();
+        drop(input);
+        child.wait_with_output().await.unwrap()
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn namespace_script_preserves_names_bytes_modes_and_existing_entries() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let folder = dir.path().join("Music");
+        let name = "song ' $() ; #.mp3";
+        for n in 1..=2 {
+            let output = run_script(&folder, name, b"abc", 3).await;
+            assert!(
+                output.status.success(),
+                "{}",
+                String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
+            );
+            let chosen = String::from_utf8(output.stdout).unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(chosen, numbered_name(name, n));
+            let path = folder.join(chosen);
+            assert_eq!(fs::read(&path).await.unwrap(), b"abc");
+            assert_eq!(
+                fs::metadata(path).await.unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777,
+                0o644
+            );
+        }
+        no_temps(&folder);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn namespace_script_refuses_truncated_input_and_cleans_up() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let output = run_script(dir.path(), "never.bin", b"partial", 100).await;
+        assert!(!output.status.success());
+        assert!(!dir.path().join("never.bin").exists());
+        no_temps(dir.path());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn namespace_script_does_not_link_inside_existing_directory() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        fs::create_dir(dir.path().join("name")).await.unwrap();
+        symlink("missing", dir.path().join("name (2)")).unwrap();
+        let output = run_script(dir.path(), "name", b"abc", 3).await;
+        assert!(output.status.success());
+        assert_eq!(output.stdout, b"name (3)");
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::read_dir(dir.path().join("name")).unwrap().count(),
+            0
+        );
+        no_temps(dir.path());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn names_keep_extensions_and_dotfiles() {
+        assert_eq!(numbered_name("a.tar.gz", 2), "a.tar (2).gz");
+        assert_eq!(numbered_name(".hidden", 2), ".hidden (2)");
+        assert_eq!(numbered_name("README", 2), "README (2)");
+    }
+}
@@ -100,6 +100,12 @@ fn parse_image_versions(content: &str) -> HashMap<String, String> {

        // Match VAR="value" or VAR=value
        if let Some((key, val)) = parse_assignment(line) {
+            // Read a self-default assignment without evaluating shell code.
+            let default_prefix = format!("${{{key}:-");
+            let val = val
+                .strip_prefix(&default_prefix)
+                .and_then(|v| v.strip_suffix('}'))
+                .unwrap_or(val);
            let expanded = val.replace("$ARCHY_REGISTRY", &registry);
            if key == "ARCHY_REGISTRY" {
                registry = expanded.clone();
@@ -205,48 +211,71 @@ pub fn available_update_for_app(app_id: &str, running_image: &str) -> Option<Str
 }

 pub fn available_update_for_images(pinned: &str, running_image: &str) -> Option<String> {
-    let pinned_version = extract_version_from_image(&pinned);
+    if image_without_registry_or_tag(pinned) != image_without_registry_or_tag(running_image) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    available_catalog_update_for_images(pinned, running_image)
+}
+
+/// A signed catalog binds the image to an app id, so a publisher namespace
+/// migration must not hide a real upgrade. Baseline pins still require the
+/// same repository via `available_update_for_images` above.
+pub fn available_catalog_update_for_images(pinned: &str, running_image: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let pinned_version = extract_version_from_image(pinned);
    if is_floating_tag(&pinned_version) {
        return None;
    }
-
-    let running_version = extract_version_from_image(running_image);
-    if pinned_version == running_version {
-        return None;
-    }
-
-    let pinned_repo = image_without_registry_or_tag(&pinned);
-    let running_repo = image_without_registry_or_tag(running_image);
-    if pinned_repo != running_repo {
-        return None;
-    }
-
-    // Never advertise a LOWER version as an update.
-    //
-    // Everything upstream of here is a version claim that can go stale: the
-    // signed catalog, a legacy catalog entry with no manifest, the
-    // image-versions.sh baseline pin. When one lags behind what a node is
-    // actually running, a bare `pinned != running` check turns that staleness
-    // into an "Update" button that rolls the node BACKWARDS — and a rollback
-    // to a version withdrawn for a vulnerability is precisely the case where
-    // that must not happen. Observed with BTCPay: 2.4.2 installed, a stale
-    // 2.3.9 pin, and the UI offering "update" to the exploited release.
-    //
-    // Only suppress when both tags parse as comparable version numbers, so
-    // apps with opaque tags (RELEASE.2024-11-07T00-52-20Z, 14-vectorchord0.4.3)
-    // keep the previous behaviour rather than silently losing updates.
-    if let (Some(p), Some(r)) = (
-        parse_version_parts(&pinned_version),
-        parse_version_parts(&running_version),
+    if matches!(
+        compare_image_versions(pinned, running_image),
+        Some(std::cmp::Ordering::Less | std::cmp::Ordering::Equal)
    ) {
-        if p < r {
-            return None;
-        }
+        return None;
    }
-
    Some(pinned_version)
 }

+/// Compare explicit image tags, ignoring registry and namespace. `None` means
+/// unknown ordering (including floating tags), never permission to downgrade.
+/// Archipelago's `-archyN` is a downstream patch revision ABOVE the upstream
+/// release, not a SemVer prerelease below it.
+pub fn compare_image_versions(target: &str, running: &str) -> Option<std::cmp::Ordering> {
+    use std::cmp::Ordering;
+    let target = extract_version_from_image(target);
+    let running = extract_version_from_image(running);
+    if is_floating_tag(&target) || is_floating_tag(&running) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let target = target.strip_prefix('v').unwrap_or(&target);
+    let running = running.strip_prefix('v').unwrap_or(&running);
+    if target == running {
+        return Some(Ordering::Equal);
+    }
+    let mut target_core = parse_version_parts(target)?;
+    let mut running_core = parse_version_parts(running)?;
+    while target_core.last() == Some(&0) {
+        target_core.pop();
+    }
+    while running_core.last() == Some(&0) {
+        running_core.pop();
+    }
+    match target_core.cmp(&running_core) {
+        Ordering::Equal => {
+            fn patch_revision(tag: &str) -> Option<u64> {
+                if let Some((base, revision)) = tag.rsplit_once("-archy") {
+                    if base.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit() || c == '.') {
+                        return revision.parse().ok();
+                    }
+                }
+                tag.chars()
+                    .all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit() || c == '.')
+                    .then_some(0)
+            }
+            Some(patch_revision(target)?.cmp(&patch_revision(running)?))
+        }
+        order => Some(order),
+    }
+}
+
 /// Numeric components of a version tag, for ordering comparisons only.
 ///
 /// Accepts a leading `v` and a trailing pre-release suffix (`v0.18.4-beta`),
@@ -423,6 +452,57 @@ mod tests {
        );
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn downstream_patch_is_newer_than_upstream_and_orders_revisions() {
+        let upstream = "registry.test/team/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1";
+        let patch1 = "registry.test/team/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1";
+        let patch2 = "registry.test/team/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy2";
+        assert_eq!(available_update_for_images(upstream, patch1), None);
+        assert_eq!(available_update_for_images(patch1, patch2), None);
+        assert_eq!(
+            available_update_for_images(patch1, upstream),
+            Some("v3.3.1-archy1".into())
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            available_update_for_images(patch2, patch1),
+            Some("v3.3.1-archy2".into())
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn catalog_namespace_migration_does_not_hide_patch_or_offer_reinstall() {
+        let old = "registry.test/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1";
+        let patched = "registry.test/chaum/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1";
+        assert_eq!(
+            available_catalog_update_for_images(patched, old),
+            Some("v3.3.1-archy1".into())
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            available_catalog_update_for_images(
+                patched,
+                "registry.test/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1"
+            ),
+            None
+        );
+        assert_eq!(available_update_for_images(patched, old), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn equivalent_version_spelling_does_not_offer_update() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            available_update_for_images("r.test/team/app:v3.3.1", "r.test/team/app:3.3.1"),
+            None
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            available_update_for_images("r.test/team/app:3.3.0", "r.test/team/app:3.3"),
+            None
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            compare_image_versions("r.test/team/app:latest", "r.test/team/app:latest"),
+            None
+        );
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn test_parse_image_versions() {
        let content = r#"
@@ -445,6 +525,22 @@ NOT_AN_IMAGE="something"
        assert!(!parsed.contains_key("ARCHY_REGISTRY"));
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn shipped_image_pins_expand_shell_defaults_to_concrete_refs() {
+        let images = parse_image_versions(include_str!("../../../../scripts/image-versions.sh"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            images["MEMPOOL_WEB_IMAGE"],
+            "source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            images["MEMPOOL_BACKEND_IMAGE"],
+            "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-backend:v3.3.1"
+        );
+        assert!(images
+            .values()
+            .all(|v| !v.contains('$') && !v.contains('}')));
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn test_image_var_mapping() {
        assert_eq!(image_var_for_app("lnd"), Some("LND_IMAGE"));
@@ -89,136 +89,84 @@ bitcoind.estimatemode=ECONOMICAL\n"
    Ok(EnsureOutcome::Written)
 }

+/// Bitcoin can accept TCP while returning RPC_IN_WARMUP for many minutes.
+/// Unlocking LND then triggers its short chain-backend timeout and a restart loop.
+/// Leave the wallet intact and locked; the next reconciliation retries readiness.
+async fn bitcoin_rpc_ready() -> bool {
+    let (user, password) = crate::bitcoin_rpc::bitcoin_rpc_credentials().await;
+    let client = match reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .no_proxy()
+        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
+        .build()
+    {
+        Ok(client) => client,
+        Err(_) => return false,
+    };
+    let response = client.post(crate::constants::BITCOIN_RPC_URL)
+        .basic_auth(user, Some(password))
+        .json(&serde_json::json!({"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":"lnd-readiness","method":"getblockchaininfo","params":[]}))
+        .send().await;
+    match response {
+        Ok(response) if response.status().is_success() => response
+            .json::<serde_json::Value>()
+            .await
+            .is_ok_and(|value| bitcoin_readiness_response(&value)),
+        _ => false,
+    }
+}
+
+fn bitcoin_readiness_response(value: &serde_json::Value) -> bool {
+    value.get("error").is_none_or(|e| e.is_null())
+        && value
+            .pointer("/result/blocks")
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
+            .is_some()
+        && value
+            .pointer("/result/initialblockdownload")
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
+            .is_some()
+}
+
 pub async fn ensure_wallet_initialized() -> Result<()> {
    let admin_macaroon = "/var/lib/archipelago/lnd/data/chain/bitcoin/mainnet/admin.macaroon";
    let wallet_db = "/var/lib/archipelago/lnd/data/chain/bitcoin/mainnet/wallet.db";
    if file_exists_as_root(wallet_db).await {
+        // GetInfo can wait for Bitcoin sync even though the wallet is already
+        // unlocked. State RPC stays available during that normal startup phase.
+        let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
+            .no_proxy()
+            .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
+            .danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)
+            .build()?;
+        if wallet_is_unlocked(wallet_state(&client).await.as_deref()) {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
        if file_exists_as_root(admin_macaroon).await && lnd_getinfo_ready(admin_macaroon).await {
            return Ok(());
        }
-        match unlock_existing_wallet().await? {
-            true => {
-                wait_for_admin_macaroon(admin_macaroon).await?;
-                return Ok(());
-            }
-            false => {
-                // Every candidate password was actively rejected: this wallet was
-                // created with a password this node no longer has, so it can never
-                // auto-unlock unattended. Alpha nodes hold no real funds and a wallet
-                // locked with an unknown password is already inaccessible, so wipe +
-                // recreate it on the per-node secret to self-heal at boot.
-                recreate_wallet_destructively().await?;
-                wait_for_admin_macaroon(admin_macaroon).await?;
-                return Ok(());
-            }
+        if !bitcoin_rpc_ready().await {
+            tracing::debug!("[lnd] waiting for Bitcoin RPC readiness before wallet unlock");
+            return Ok(());
        }
+        unlock_existing_wallet_no_wipe().await?;
+        wait_for_admin_macaroon(admin_macaroon).await?;
+        return Ok(());
    }

+    if !bitcoin_rpc_ready().await {
+        tracing::debug!("[lnd] waiting for Bitcoin RPC readiness before wallet initialization");
+        return Ok(());
+    }
    init_wallet_via_rest().await?;
    wait_for_admin_macaroon(admin_macaroon).await
 }

-/// LND data subdirectories holding wallet + channel + graph state. Removing them
-/// returns LND to a NON_EXISTING wallet state. Funds-bearing data lives here too,
-/// so deletion is destructive — only done once the wallet is already unrecoverable.
-const LND_STATE_DIRS: &[&str] = &[
-    "/var/lib/archipelago/lnd/data/chain",
-    "/var/lib/archipelago/lnd/data/graph",
-];
-
-/// Podman container name for the core LND app (see `compute_container_name`:
-/// non-UI core apps keep their bare id). LND runs as a plain bridge-network
-/// container, not a Quadlet unit, so it is restarted via `podman`, not systemctl.
-const LND_CONTAINER: &str = "lnd";
-
 /// Canonical on-host admin macaroon — same path the RPC layer reads.
 const LND_ADMIN_MACAROON: &str =
    "/var/lib/archipelago/lnd/data/chain/bitcoin/mainnet/admin.macaroon";

-/// Archipelago data dir (default; not overridden in prod). Holds the
-/// `user-stopped.json` that gates health-monitor auto-restart.
 const ARCHY_DATA_DIR: &str = "/var/lib/archipelago";

-/// Destroy an unrecoverable LND wallet and recreate a fresh one keyed to the
-/// per-node secret. Suppresses health-monitor auto-restart for the wipe window,
-/// stops LND, deletes its wallet/chain/graph state as root, restarts it, waits
-/// for NON_EXISTING, then inits a fresh wallet. Destructive — only called when no
-/// candidate password can open the existing wallet.
-async fn recreate_wallet_destructively() -> Result<()> {
-    tracing::warn!(
-        "[lnd] wallet is locked with an unknown password and cannot auto-unlock; \
-         wiping and recreating it on the per-node secret (DESTRUCTIVE)"
-    );
-
-    // The health monitor restarts any container it sees stopped; mark LND
-    // user-stopped so it doesn't re-launch (and re-open the wallet) mid-wipe.
-    // Always cleared below so LND auto-recovers normally afterwards.
-    let data_dir = std::path::Path::new(ARCHY_DATA_DIR);
-    crate::crash_recovery::mark_user_stopped(data_dir, LND_CONTAINER).await;
-    let result = wipe_and_reinit_wallet().await;
-    crate::crash_recovery::clear_user_stopped(data_dir, LND_CONTAINER).await;
-    result
-}
-
-async fn wipe_and_reinit_wallet() -> Result<()> {
-    podman_user_scoped(&["stop", LND_CONTAINER])
-        .await
-        .context("stopping lnd before wallet wipe")?;
-
-    for dir in LND_STATE_DIRS {
-        let status = host_sudo(&["rm", "-rf", dir])
-            .await
-            .with_context(|| format!("removing {dir}"))?;
-        if !status.success() {
-            anyhow::bail!("removing {dir} exited with {status}");
-        }
-    }
-
-    podman_user_scoped(&["start", LND_CONTAINER])
-        .await
-        .context("restarting lnd after wallet wipe")?;
-
-    wait_for_wallet_state("NON_EXISTING").await?;
-    init_wallet_via_rest().await
-}
-
-/// Run `podman <args>` inside a transient `systemd-run --user --scope`, matching
-/// how the orchestrator/health-monitor manage rootless containers (keeps the
-/// container out of the archipelago service's cgroup).
-async fn podman_user_scoped(args: &[&str]) -> Result<()> {
-    let out = tokio::process::Command::new("systemd-run")
-        .args(["--user", "--scope", "--quiet", "--collect", "podman"])
-        .args(args)
-        .output()
-        .await
-        .with_context(|| format!("systemd-run --user --scope podman {}", args.join(" ")))?;
-    if !out.status.success() {
-        anyhow::bail!(
-            "podman {} failed: {}",
-            args.join(" "),
-            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).trim()
-        );
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// Poll `/v1/state` until LND reports `target`, or time out after ~120s.
-async fn wait_for_wallet_state(target: &str) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
-        .no_proxy()
-        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
-        .danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)
-        .build()
-        .context("building LND REST client")?;
-    for _ in 0..120 {
-        if wallet_state(&client).await.as_deref() == Some(target) {
-            return Ok(());
-        }
-        tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
-    }
-    anyhow::bail!("LND did not reach state {target} after wallet wipe")
-}
-
 async fn file_exists_as_root(path: &str) -> bool {
    if std::path::Path::new(path).exists() {
        return true;
@@ -366,6 +314,9 @@ async fn unlock_existing_wallet_via_rest() -> Result<bool> {
    // exactly the nodes least able to afford it. Waiting longer costs nothing —
    // a wrong password still exits on the first pass via `all_rejected`.
    for _ in 0..UNLOCK_NOT_READY_ATTEMPTS {
+        if wallet_is_unlocked(wallet_state(&client).await.as_deref()) {
+            return Ok(true);
+        }
        let mut all_rejected = true;
        for pw in &candidates {
            match try_unlock_once(&client, pw).await {
@@ -390,14 +341,8 @@ async fn unlock_existing_wallet_via_rest() -> Result<bool> {
    )
 }

-/// Unlock an existing wallet WITHOUT the destructive fallback.
-///
-/// `ensure_wallet_initialized` wipes and recreates a wallet no candidate
-/// password can open — correct for a boot path that must self-heal, and exactly
-/// wrong for macaroon rotation, which restarts LND against a wallet the operator
-/// still wants. Rotation calls this instead, so there is no code path from
-/// "rotate my credentials" to "delete my wallet": a rejected password surfaces
-/// as an error the caller reports, never as a wipe.
+/// Unlock the existing wallet, preserving its identity and channel data when
+/// passwords are unavailable or rejected. Used by boot and credential rotation.
 pub(crate) async fn unlock_existing_wallet_no_wipe() -> Result<()> {
    match unlock_existing_wallet().await? {
        true => Ok(()),
@@ -408,6 +353,10 @@ pub(crate) async fn unlock_existing_wallet_no_wipe() -> Result<()> {
    }
 }

+fn wallet_is_unlocked(state: Option<&str>) -> bool {
+    matches!(state, Some("UNLOCKED" | "RPC_ACTIVE" | "SERVER_ACTIVE"))
+}
+
 /// Current LND wallet state via the unauthenticated `/v1/state` endpoint
 /// (NON_EXISTING / LOCKED / UNLOCKED / RPC_ACTIVE / …). None if unreachable.
 async fn wallet_state(client: &reqwest::Client) -> Option<String> {
@@ -538,7 +487,7 @@ async fn init_wallet_via_rest() -> Result<()> {
    {
        UnlockerResponse::Value(seed) => seed,
        UnlockerResponse::WalletAlreadyExists => {
-            unlock_existing_wallet().await?;
+            unlock_existing_wallet_no_wipe().await?;
            return Ok(());
        }
    };
@@ -569,7 +518,7 @@ async fn init_wallet_via_rest() -> Result<()> {
            .await;
        }
        UnlockerResponse::WalletAlreadyExists => {
-            unlock_existing_wallet().await?;
+            unlock_existing_wallet_no_wipe().await?;
        }
    }

@@ -1203,3 +1152,44 @@ mod tests {
        .is_empty());
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod bitcoin_readiness_tests {
+    use super::bitcoin_readiness_response;
+    use serde_json::json;
+    #[test]
+    fn only_usable_bitcoin_rpc_allows_wallet_unlock() {
+        for response in [
+            json!({}),
+            json!({"error":{"code":-28,"message":"Loading block index"},"result":null}),
+            json!({"result":{"blocks":null}}),
+        ] {
+            assert!(!bitcoin_readiness_response(&response));
+        }
+        // Initial sync is supported by LND. Loading the database is not.
+        for ibd in [true, false] {
+            assert!(bitcoin_readiness_response(
+                &json!({"result":{"blocks":100,"initialblockdownload":ibd},"error":null})
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod syncing_wallet_state_tests {
+    #[test]
+    fn an_unlocked_wallet_waiting_for_chain_sync_is_never_unlocked_again() {
+        for state in ["UNLOCKED", "RPC_ACTIVE", "SERVER_ACTIVE"] {
+            assert!(super::wallet_is_unlocked(Some(state)));
+        }
+        for state in [
+            None,
+            Some("LOCKED"),
+            Some("NON_EXISTING"),
+            Some("WAITING_TO_START"),
+            Some("unknown"),
+        ] {
+            assert!(!super::wallet_is_unlocked(state));
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+//! Consistent, private snapshots for declaratively opted-in runtime migrations.
+use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
+use archipelago_container::AppManifest;
+use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+pub fn enabled(manifest: &AppManifest) -> Result<bool> {
+    match manifest.app.extensions.get("backup_before_runtime_change") {
+        None => Ok(false),
+        Some(value) => value
+            .as_bool()
+            .context("backup_before_runtime_change must be boolean"),
+    }
+}
+
+fn relative_sources(manifest: &AppManifest, data_dir: &Path) -> Result<Vec<PathBuf>> {
+    let mut sources = Vec::new();
+    for volume in &manifest.app.volumes {
+        if volume.options.iter().any(|v| v == "ro") || volume.volume_type == "tmpfs" {
+            continue;
+        }
+        // A runtime socket is a connection, not application state.
+        if volume.source == "/run/user/1000/podman/podman.sock" {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if volume.volume_type != "bind" {
+            bail!("runtime migration backup requires bind-mounted persistent state");
+        }
+        let path = Path::new(&volume.source);
+        let relative = path
+            .strip_prefix(data_dir)
+            .context("runtime migration state must be inside the node data directory")?;
+        if relative.starts_with("migration-backups") {
+            bail!("migration backup cannot include its own archive directory");
+        }
+        if relative.as_os_str().is_empty()
+            || relative
+                .components()
+                .any(|c| !matches!(c, std::path::Component::Normal(_)))
+        {
+            bail!("invalid runtime migration state path");
+        }
+        sources.push(relative.to_path_buf());
+    }
+    sources.sort();
+    sources.dedup();
+    let mut roots: Vec<PathBuf> = Vec::new();
+    for source in sources {
+        if !roots.iter().any(|root| source.starts_with(root)) {
+            roots.push(source);
+        }
+    }
+    if roots.is_empty() {
+        bail!("runtime migration backup has no persistent state mounts");
+    }
+    Ok(roots)
+}
+
+/// Caller must gracefully stop the app before this function, and resume the old
+/// service if it fails. No source files are changed or deleted by this operation.
+pub async fn snapshot(
+    manifest: &AppManifest,
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    previous_unit: Option<&[u8]>,
+) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    let mut command = tokio::process::Command::new("podman");
+    command.args(["unshare", "tar"]);
+    snapshot_with_command(manifest, data_dir, previous_unit, command).await
+}
+
+async fn snapshot_with_command(
+    manifest: &AppManifest,
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    previous_unit: Option<&[u8]>,
+    mut command: tokio::process::Command,
+) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    let sources = relative_sources(manifest, data_dir)?;
+    let canonical_root = tokio::fs::canonicalize(data_dir).await?;
+    for source in &sources {
+        let path = data_dir.join(source);
+        if tokio::fs::symlink_metadata(&path)
+            .await?
+            .file_type()
+            .is_symlink()
+        {
+            bail!("runtime migration state mount is a symlink; explicit backup required");
+        }
+        let canonical = tokio::fs::canonicalize(&path).await?;
+        if !canonical.starts_with(&canonical_root) {
+            bail!("runtime migration state path resolves outside node data directory");
+        }
+    }
+    let root = data_dir.join("migration-backups");
+    tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&root).await?;
+    tokio::fs::set_permissions(&root, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).await?;
+    let dir = root.join(uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string());
+    tokio::fs::create_dir(&dir).await?;
+    tokio::fs::set_permissions(&dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).await?;
+    if let Some(unit) = previous_unit {
+        let path = dir.join("previous.container");
+        tokio::fs::write(&path, unit).await?;
+        tokio::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).await?;
+        tokio::fs::File::open(&path).await?.sync_all().await?;
+    }
+    let partial = dir.join("state.tar.partial");
+    let archive = dir.join("state.tar");
+    let output = command
+        .args([
+            "--create",
+            "--numeric-owner",
+            "--acls",
+            "--xattrs",
+            "--file",
+        ])
+        .arg(&partial)
+        .arg("--directory")
+        .arg(data_dir)
+        .arg("--")
+        .args(&sources)
+        .output()
+        .await
+        .context("start rootless migration snapshot")?;
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        // No tar stderr in public logs: it can contain private filenames.
+        let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&partial).await;
+        bail!("persistent-state snapshot failed; original state was left intact");
+    }
+    tokio::fs::set_permissions(&partial, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).await?;
+    tokio::fs::File::open(&partial).await?.sync_all().await?;
+    tokio::fs::rename(&partial, &archive).await?;
+    let metadata = serde_json::json!({"app": manifest.app.id, "version": manifest.app.version,
+        "network": manifest.app.container.network, "capabilities": manifest.app.security.capabilities, "sources": sources});
+    tokio::fs::write(
+        dir.join("metadata.json"),
+        serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&metadata)?,
+    )
+    .await?;
+    tokio::fs::File::open(&dir).await?.sync_all().await?;
+    Ok(archive)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    fn portainer() -> AppManifest {
+        AppManifest::parse(include_str!("../../../../apps/portainer/manifest.yml")).unwrap()
+    }
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn stopped_state_archive_round_trips_database_compose_and_old_unit() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let state = dir.path().join("portainer");
+        tokio::fs::create_dir_all(state.join("compose"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::write(state.join("portainer.db"), b"fixture database")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::write(state.join("compose/stack.yml"), b"services: {}\n")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut m = portainer();
+        m.app.volumes[0].source = state.display().to_string();
+        m.app.volumes[1].source = state.join("compose").display().to_string();
+        let archive = snapshot_with_command(
+            &m,
+            dir.path(),
+            Some(b"old unit"),
+            tokio::process::Command::new("tar"),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::metadata(&archive).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777,
+            0o600
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            tokio::fs::read(archive.parent().unwrap().join("previous.container"))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            b"old unit"
+        );
+        let restored = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        assert!(tokio::process::Command::new("tar")
+            .arg("-xf")
+            .arg(archive)
+            .arg("-C")
+            .arg(restored.path())
+            .status()
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .success());
+        assert_eq!(
+            tokio::fs::read(restored.path().join("portainer/portainer.db"))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            b"fixture database"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            tokio::fs::read(restored.path().join("portainer/compose/stack.yml"))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            b"services: {}\n"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            tokio::fs::read(state.join("portainer.db")).await.unwrap(),
+            b"fixture database"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn failed_snapshot_never_publishes_archive_or_changes_original_state() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let state = dir.path().join("portainer");
+        tokio::fs::create_dir_all(state.join("compose"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::write(state.join("portainer.db"), b"unchanged")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut m = portainer();
+        m.app.volumes[0].source = state.display().to_string();
+        m.app.volumes[1].source = state.join("compose").display().to_string();
+        assert!(
+            snapshot_with_command(&m, dir.path(), None, tokio::process::Command::new("false"))
+                .await
+                .is_err()
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            tokio::fs::read(state.join("portainer.db")).await.unwrap(),
+            b"unchanged"
+        );
+        for entry in std::fs::read_dir(dir.path().join("migration-backups")).unwrap() {
+            assert!(!entry.unwrap().path().join("state.tar").exists());
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn backup_covers_all_portainer_state_once_and_excludes_runtime_socket() {
+        let m = portainer();
+        assert!(enabled(&m).unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(
+            relative_sources(&m, Path::new("/var/lib/archipelago")).unwrap(),
+            vec![PathBuf::from("portainer")]
+        );
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn backup_refuses_unknown_state_locations_instead_of_silently_omitting_them() {
+        let mut m = portainer();
+        m.app.volumes[0].source = "/other/operator/state".into();
+        assert!(relative_sources(&m, Path::new("/var/lib/archipelago")).is_err());
+        m.app.volumes[0].source = "/var/lib/archipelago/../secret".into();
+        assert!(relative_sources(&m, Path::new("/var/lib/archipelago")).is_err());
+    }
+}
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ pub mod hooks;
 pub mod image_policy;
 pub mod image_versions;
 pub mod lnd;
+pub mod migration_backup;
 pub mod prod_orchestrator;
 pub mod quadlet;
 pub mod registry;
@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
 use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
 use tokio::sync::{Mutex, RwLock};

+/// Refusal before installation has created state or changed any dependency.
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+#[error("{0}")]
+pub struct InstallPrerequisiteError(pub String);
+
 use crate::config::{Config, ContainerRuntime as ConfigContainerRuntime};
 use crate::container::bitcoin_ui;
 use crate::container::quadlet;
@@ -91,6 +96,23 @@ fn is_builtin_network_mode(network: &str) -> bool {
    )
 }

+// Only an explicitly selected rootless mode establishes drift. An omitted
+// network delegates to Podman and must not recreate unrelated installed apps.
+fn rootless_network_mode_drifted(expected: Option<&str>, actual: &str) -> bool {
+    matches!(expected, Some("slirp4netns" | "pasta"))
+        && !actual.trim().is_empty()
+        && actual.trim().split(':').next() != expected
+}
+
+fn missing_declared_capability(expected: &[String], actual: &[String]) -> bool {
+    expected.iter().any(|required| {
+        let required = required.strip_prefix("CAP_").unwrap_or(required);
+        !actual
+            .iter()
+            .any(|cap| cap.strip_prefix("CAP_").unwrap_or(cap) == required)
+    })
+}
+
 fn uses_pasta_network(manifest: &AppManifest) -> bool {
    manifest.app.container.network.as_deref() == Some("pasta")
 }
@@ -798,6 +820,10 @@ fn host_port_bindings_drifted(
 }

 async fn ensure_user_podman_socket() -> Result<()> {
+    // Unit tests inject a runtime; they must not restart the host Podman API.
+    if cfg!(test) {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
    let socket_path = "/run/user/1000/podman/podman.sock";
    if podman_socket_accepts_connections(socket_path).await {
        return Ok(());
@@ -1170,15 +1196,21 @@ impl ReconcileReport {
 fn cascade_pairs_for_report<'r>(
    report: &'r ReconcileReport,
    user_stopped: &std::collections::HashSet<String>,
+    changed_backends: &HashSet<String>,
 ) -> Vec<(&'r str, &'static str)> {
    let mut pairs = Vec::new();
    for (backend, action) in &report.actions {
        if !matches!(
            action,
-            ReconcileAction::Installed | ReconcileAction::Started
+            ReconcileAction::NoOp | ReconcileAction::Started | ReconcileAction::Installed
        ) {
            continue;
        }
+        // A successful systemctl start can be a no-op after a transient
+        // Podman inspect failure. Require a witnessed lifecycle change.
+        if !changed_backends.contains(backend) {
+            continue;
+        }
        for dep in crate::app_ops::address_caching_dependents(backend) {
            let dep_untouched = report
                .actions
@@ -1192,6 +1224,25 @@ fn cascade_pairs_for_report<'r>(
    pairs
 }

+/// Only positive runtime evidence permits disrupting an address-caching wallet.
+/// A known absent/stopped backend becoming running, a new container ID, or a
+/// changed start timestamp qualifies. A failed observation never does.
+fn backend_instance_changed(before: Option<&ContainerStatus>, after: &ContainerStatus) -> bool {
+    if after.state != ContainerState::Running || after.id.is_empty() {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let Some(before) = before else {
+        return true;
+    };
+    if before.id.is_empty() {
+        return false;
+    }
+    if before.id != after.id || before.state != ContainerState::Running {
+        return true;
+    }
+    matches!((&before.started_at, &after.started_at), (Some(a), Some(b)) if !a.is_empty() && !b.is_empty() && a != b)
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Default)]
 pub struct AdoptionReport {
    pub adopted: Vec<String>,
@@ -1864,7 +1915,7 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
        // Durable installation record, consulted alongside the perishable
        // `was_running` snapshot for desired-state recovery below.
        let installed_apps = crate::crash_recovery::load_installed_apps(&self.data_dir).await;
-        let (manifests, container_name_by_app_id): (
+        let (mut manifests, container_name_by_app_id): (
            Vec<LoadedManifest>,
            std::collections::HashMap<String, String>,
        ) = {
@@ -1895,15 +1946,50 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                .collect();
            (filtered, names)
        };
+        // Wallet readiness must not wait behind unrelated image pulls/builds.
+        // A running LND container can still be locked after boot; its post-start
+        // hook must run promptly. Reconcile Bitcoin first, then LND, before the
+        // rest of the catalog. Each app still honors stopped/uninstalled markers.
+        manifests.sort_by_key(|lm| match lm.manifest.app.id.as_str() {
+            "bitcoin-knots" | "bitcoin-core" | "bitcoin" => 0,
+            "lnd" => 1,
+            _ => 2,
+        });
        // Live container names (any state), for the same recovery check.
-        let present_containers: std::collections::HashSet<String> = self
-            .runtime
-            .list_containers()
-            .await
-            .map(|cs| cs.into_iter().map(|c| c.name).collect())
+        let listed_containers = self.runtime.list_containers().await.ok();
+        let present_containers: HashSet<String> = listed_containers
+            .as_ref()
+            .map(|cs| cs.iter().map(|c| c.name.clone()).collect())
            .unwrap_or_default();
+        // Keep unknown distinct from confirmed absence. Runtime queries can
+        // fail under load while systemd still has a healthy running backend.
+        let mut backend_before: HashMap<String, Option<ContainerStatus>> = HashMap::new();
+        for lm in &manifests {
+            let id = &lm.manifest.app.id;
+            if crate::app_ops::address_caching_dependents(id).is_empty() {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let name = compute_container_name(&lm.manifest);
+            match self.runtime.get_container_status(&name).await {
+                Ok(status) => {
+                    backend_before.insert(id.clone(), Some(status));
+                }
+                Err(_) if listed_containers.is_some() && !present_containers.contains(&name) => {
+                    backend_before.insert(id.clone(), None);
+                }
+                Err(err) => {
+                    tracing::warn!(backend = %id, error = %err,
+                        "cannot observe backend before reconcile; will not infer a dependency restart from an action report");
+                }
+            }
+        }
        let mut report = ReconcileReport::default();
        let disk_gb = self.disk_gb().await;
+        let bitcoin_pruned = disk_gb < ARCHIVAL_BITCOIN_DISK_GB
+            || crate::settings::bitcoin_storage::load(&self.data_dir)
+                .await
+                .map(|settings| settings.prune)
+                .unwrap_or(true);
        // Register every candidate before the (sequential, possibly slow)
        // pass so the scanner overlays queued-but-down apps as Restarting
        // instead of Stopped. Each app is deregistered as its turn finishes,
@@ -1943,7 +2029,7 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
            }
            if mode == ReconcileMode::ExistingOnly
                && requires_archival_bitcoin(&app_id)
-                && disk_gb < ARCHIVAL_BITCOIN_DISK_GB
+                && bitcoin_pruned
            {
                report.record(
                    &app_id,
@@ -2078,7 +2164,20 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
        // state recovery, repair recreate, boot InstallMissing) moves the
        // address behind a running dependent's back — §C "restart lnd after
        // ANY bitcoin recreate".
-        for (backend, dep) in cascade_pairs_for_report(&report, &user_stopped) {
+        let mut changed_backends = HashSet::new();
+        for (backend, before) in &backend_before {
+            let Some(name) = container_name_by_app_id.get(backend) else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            if let Ok(after) = self.runtime.get_container_status(name).await {
+                if backend_instance_changed(before.as_ref(), &after) {
+                    changed_backends.insert(backend.clone());
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        // A user stop during a slow reconcile pass still takes precedence.
+        let user_stopped = crate::crash_recovery::load_user_stopped(&self.data_dir).await;
+        for (backend, dep) in cascade_pairs_for_report(&report, &user_stopped, &changed_backends) {
            // Same rule as the RPC cascade: hold the dependent's op lock
            // across the restart; skip when a worker is mid-sequence.
            let lock = crate::app_ops::op_lock(dep);
@@ -2387,6 +2486,8 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                            .await
                        {
                            tracing::info!(app_id = %app_id, container = %name, "container published-port drift detected — recreating");
+                            self.backup_runtime_change(&name, &resolved_manifest)
+                                .await?;
                            let _ = self.runtime.stop_container(&name).await;
                            let _ = self.runtime.remove_container(&name).await;
                            self.install_fresh(lm).await?;
@@ -2422,6 +2523,8 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                                return Ok(ReconcileAction::NoOp);
                            }
                            tracing::info!(app_id = %app_id, container = %name, "container env drift detected — recreating");
+                            self.backup_runtime_change(&name, &resolved_manifest)
+                                .await?;
                            let _ = self.runtime.stop_container(&name).await;
                            let _ = self.runtime.remove_container(&name).await;
                            self.install_fresh(lm).await?;
@@ -2478,6 +2581,8 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                                .await
                        {
                            tracing::info!(app_id = %app_id, container = %name, "stopped container env/port drift detected — recreating");
+                            self.backup_runtime_change(&name, &resolved_manifest)
+                                .await?;
                            let _ = self.runtime.remove_container(&name).await;
                            self.install_fresh(lm).await?;
                            return Ok(ReconcileAction::Installed);
@@ -2534,6 +2639,8 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                        self.prepare_for_start(&resolved_manifest).await?;
                        if self.container_env_drifted(&name, &resolved_manifest).await {
                            tracing::info!(app_id = %app_id, container = %name, "created container env drift detected — recreating");
+                            self.backup_runtime_change(&name, &resolved_manifest)
+                                .await?;
                            let _ = self.runtime.remove_container(&name).await;
                            self.install_fresh(lm).await?;
                            return Ok(ReconcileAction::Installed);
@@ -3003,13 +3110,9 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
    /// app is a companion (companion.rs owns those units), or when no
    /// unit file exists yet (install_via_quadlet handles first-write).
    ///
-    /// We DON'T restart the .service when content changes — running
-    /// containers keep their current config until an operator-initiated
-    /// restart picks up the new file. That's the right tradeoff: file
-    /// updates are cheap and non-destructive; service restarts are
-    /// destructive (the SIGKILL cascade we're trying to eliminate).
-    /// systemctl --user daemon-reload runs only when content actually
-    /// changed, so steady-state reconcile ticks pay just one fs read.
+    /// Ordinary metadata changes wait for an operator restart. Runtime-affecting
+    /// changes restart the service and retain a durable pending marker until
+    /// that succeeds, including across daemon restarts and failed reloads.
    async fn sync_quadlet_unit(&self, lm: &LoadedManifest, name: &str) -> Result<()> {
        // Companions: same reasoning as migrate_to_quadlet_if_needed —
        // companion.rs renders these units with a different shape, syncing
@@ -3029,7 +3132,7 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
        }
        let old_body = tokio::fs::read_to_string(&unit_path)
            .await
-            .unwrap_or_default();
+            .with_context(|| format!("read existing quadlet for {name}"))?;
        let restart_required = quadlet::contains_stale_health_gate(&old_body);

        let mut resolved = lm.manifest.clone();
@@ -3045,49 +3148,49 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
            quadlet::network_aliases_changed(&old_body, &new_body);
        let restart_for_exec_change = quadlet::exec_changed(&old_body, &new_body);
        let restart_for_health_change = quadlet::health_cmd_changed(&old_body, &new_body);
+        let restart_for_security_change = quadlet::security_changed(&old_body, &new_body);
+        let needs_restart = restart_required
+            || restart_for_port_change
+            || restart_for_network_alias_change
+            || restart_for_exec_change
+            || restart_for_health_change
+            || restart_for_security_change;
+        // Record the obligation BEFORE replacing the unit. A failed reload or
+        // restart must not become a no-op on the next tick just because the
+        // generated file already matches the manifest.
+        let pending = quadlet::RestartObligation::prepare(&unit_path, needs_restart).await?;
+        if pending.is_pending() {
+            self.ensure_resolved_source_available(lm).await?;
+        }
+        if needs_restart {
+            self.backup_runtime_change(name, &resolved).await?;
+        }
        let changed = quadlet::write_if_changed(&unit, &unit_dir)
            .await
            .with_context(|| format!("drift-sync quadlet unit for {name}"))?;
-        if changed {
+        if changed || pending.is_pending() {
            quadlet::daemon_reload_user()
                .await
                .context("systemctl --user daemon-reload after drift-syncing quadlet unit")?;
-            tracing::info!(
-                app_id = %lm.manifest.app.id,
-                container = %name,
-                "Quadlet unit drift-synced — file rewritten, .service NOT restarted (operator restart picks up new config)"
-            );
        }
-        if changed
-            && (restart_required
-                || restart_for_port_change
-                || restart_for_network_alias_change
-                || restart_for_exec_change
-                || restart_for_health_change)
-        {
-            self.ensure_resolved_source_available(lm).await?;
+        if pending.is_pending() {
            let service = unit.service_name();
-            let reason = if restart_required {
-                "stale health gate"
-            } else if restart_for_port_change {
-                "port binding drift"
-            } else if restart_for_network_alias_change {
-                "network alias drift"
-            } else if restart_for_health_change {
-                "health command drift"
-            } else {
-                "exec drift"
-            };
            tracing::info!(
                app_id = %lm.manifest.app.id,
                container = %name,
                service = %service,
-                reason = reason,
-                "Quadlet unit rewrite requires service restart"
+                "Applying pending Quadlet runtime change"
            );
            quadlet::restart_service(&service)
                .await
                .with_context(|| format!("restart drifted quadlet service {service}"))?;
+            pending.complete().await?;
+        } else if changed {
+            tracing::info!(
+                app_id = %lm.manifest.app.id,
+                container = %name,
+                "Quadlet metadata updated; operator restart will apply it"
+            );
        }
        Ok(())
    }
@@ -3217,6 +3320,9 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
    }

    async fn ensure_container_network(&self, manifest: &AppManifest) -> Result<()> {
+        if cfg!(test) {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
        let Some(network) = manifest.app.container.network.as_deref() else {
            return Ok(());
        };
@@ -3403,11 +3509,9 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
    }

    async fn cleanup_stale_grafana_port(&self) {
-        let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("pkill")
-            .args(["-f", "pasta.*3001"])
-            .output()
-            .await;
-        tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
+        // Port 3001 can belong to Gitea or the daemon's gate. Reap only a
+        // Grafana container proven absent from Podman's inventory.
+        crate::container::ghost_reaper::reap_for_app("grafana").await;
    }

    async fn detect_host_facts(&self) -> HostFacts {
@@ -3711,6 +3815,17 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
        }
        let mut env = manifest.app.environment.clone();
        env.extend(manifest.app.container.resolve_derived_env(&facts));
+        if matches!(manifest.app.id.as_str(), "bitcoin-core" | "bitcoin-knots") {
+            let storage = crate::settings::bitcoin_storage::load(&self.data_dir).await?;
+            env.retain(|entry| !entry.starts_with("BITCOIN_PRUNE="));
+            if storage.prune {
+                anyhow::ensure!(
+                    manifest.app.container.custom_args.iter().any(|arg| arg.contains("BITCOIN_PRUNE")),
+                    "This Bitcoin app definition cannot honor the pruning choice. Refresh the app catalog and try again."
+                );
+                env.push("BITCOIN_PRUNE=1".to_string());
+            }
+        }

        // FM_BITCOIND_URL now comes from the manifest's {{BITCOIN_HOST}}
        // derived_env (works on Knots/Core/any distro). The old hardcoded
@@ -3777,6 +3892,77 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
        Ok(())
    }

+    async fn backup_runtime_change(&self, name: &str, manifest: &AppManifest) -> Result<()> {
+        if !crate::container::migration_backup::enabled(manifest)? {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        // A persistent disk/permission failure must not repeatedly stop a
+        // working old service. Reuse the reconciler's bounded repair budget.
+        if !self.should_attempt_repair(name).await {
+            anyhow::bail!("runtime migration retry budget exhausted; original service retained, inspect backup failure before retrying");
+        }
+        // Called only before a known runtime change. No app-specific commands;
+        // opted-in manifests identify their persistent state through bind mounts.
+        let output = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
+            .args(["inspect", name, "--format", "{{.HostConfig.NetworkMode}}"])
+            .output()
+            .await
+            .context("inspect network before migration backup")?;
+        let present = if output.status.success() {
+            true
+        } else {
+            // A crash after gracefully stopping a --rm Quadlet container can
+            // leave only its data and old unit. Prove absence before snapshotting
+            // stopped state; an inspect/Podman failure is not proof of absence.
+            let exists = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
+                .args(["container", "exists", name])
+                .status()
+                .await?;
+            if exists.code() != Some(1) {
+                anyhow::bail!("cannot verify existing container before runtime migration backup");
+            }
+            false
+        };
+        let service = format!("{name}.service");
+        let managed = quadlet::unit_exists(name).await;
+        let previous_unit = if managed {
+            Some(
+                tokio::fs::read(quadlet::unit_dir().await?.join(format!("{name}.container")))
+                    .await?,
+            )
+        } else {
+            None
+        };
+        if managed {
+            quadlet::stop_service(&service).await?;
+        } else if present {
+            self.runtime.stop_container(name).await?;
+        }
+        match crate::container::migration_backup::snapshot(
+            manifest,
+            &self.data_dir,
+            previous_unit.as_deref(),
+        )
+        .await
+        {
+            Ok(archive) => {
+                tracing::info!(container = %name, backup = %archive.display(), "Persistent state saved before runtime migration");
+                Ok(())
+            }
+            Err(error) => {
+                // The unit has not been rewritten yet. Restore its previous
+                // service on backup failure and report the migration failure.
+                let restored = if managed {
+                    quadlet::enable_now(&service).await
+                } else {
+                    self.runtime.start_container(name).await
+                };
+                restored.context("restore original app after failed migration snapshot")?;
+                Err(error)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
    async fn container_env_drifted(&self, name: &str, manifest: &AppManifest) -> bool {
        if cfg!(test) {
            return false;
@@ -3786,6 +3972,52 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
            return true;
        }

+        // Generated-unit drift handles managed services; preserve deliberate
+        // systemd drop-in overrides instead of recreating them every tick.
+        let unmanaged = !quadlet::unit_exists(name).await;
+        // Podman's effective bounding set, not Docker-compatible CapAdd (which
+        // can be empty even when Quadlet supplied capabilities).
+        if unmanaged && !manifest.app.security.capabilities.is_empty() {
+            if let Ok(output) = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
+                .args(["inspect", name, "--format", "{{json .BoundingCaps}}"])
+                .output()
+                .await
+            {
+                if output.status.success() {
+                    if let Ok(actual) = serde_json::from_slice::<Vec<String>>(&output.stdout) {
+                        if missing_declared_capability(&manifest.app.security.capabilities, &actual)
+                        {
+                            return true;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Quadlet handles declarative Network= drift above. Legacy rootless
+        // Podman containers need the same convergence when no unit owns them.
+        if unmanaged
+            && matches!(
+                manifest.app.container.network.as_deref(),
+                Some("slirp4netns" | "pasta")
+            )
+        {
+            if let Ok(output) = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
+                .args(["inspect", name, "--format", "{{.HostConfig.NetworkMode}}"])
+                .output()
+                .await
+            {
+                if output.status.success()
+                    && rootless_network_mode_drifted(
+                        manifest.app.container.network.as_deref(),
+                        &String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout),
+                    )
+                {
+                    return true;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
        let inspect = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
            .args([
                "inspect",
@@ -4352,6 +4584,45 @@ impl ContainerOrchestrator for ProdContainerOrchestrator {
    }

    async fn install(&self, app_id: &str) -> Result<String> {
+        let lm = self.loaded(app_id).await?;
+        // Optional shared-service preconditions are checked before recording
+        // installation or creating anything. A headless adapter must not claim
+        // successful installation against a missing indexing stack.
+        if let Some(required) = lm
+            .manifest
+            .app
+            .extensions
+            .get("install_prerequisites")
+            .and_then(|value| value.as_sequence())
+        {
+            let present = self
+                .runtime
+                .list_containers()
+                .await
+                .context("check installed prerequisite services")?;
+            for id in required.iter().filter_map(|value| value.as_str()) {
+                let dependency = self.loaded(id).await.map_err(|_| InstallPrerequisiteError(
+                    format!("Required app {id} is unavailable. Refresh the app catalog before installing {}.",
+                        lm.manifest.app.name)))?;
+                let name = compute_container_name(&dependency.manifest);
+                if !present
+                    .iter()
+                    .any(|container| container.name.trim_start_matches('/') == name)
+                {
+                    let owner = crate::app_ops::owning_package(id);
+                    let title = self
+                        .loaded(owner)
+                        .await
+                        .map(|app| app.manifest.app.name)
+                        .unwrap_or(dependency.manifest.app.name);
+                    return Err(InstallPrerequisiteError(format!(
+                        "Install {title} first, then install {}.",
+                        lm.manifest.app.name
+                    ))
+                    .into());
+                }
+            }
+        }
        {
            let mut state = self.state.write().await;
            state.disabled.remove(app_id);
@@ -4378,7 +4649,6 @@ impl ContainerOrchestrator for ProdContainerOrchestrator {
        // health verification (the .228 "running but unreachable" failure
        // mode). Routing every install through here means the orchestrator
        // is the one source of truth for what "installed" means.
-        let lm = self.loaded(app_id).await?;
        let name = compute_container_name(&lm.manifest);
        // ensure_running takes the per-app lock itself; release the install
        // path lock first if we hold one (we don't — install is the entry
@@ -4667,6 +4937,27 @@ impl ContainerOrchestrator for ProdContainerOrchestrator {
        let lock = self.app_lock(app_id).await;
        let _guard = lock.lock().await;
        let name = compute_container_name(&lm.manifest);
+        let mut resolved = lm.manifest.clone();
+        resolve_catalog_image(&mut resolved);
+        if resolved.app.container.build.is_none() {
+            if let Some(target) = &resolved.app.container.image {
+                if let Ok(running) = self.runtime.get_container_status(&name).await {
+                    match crate::container::image_versions::compare_image_versions(
+                        target,
+                        &running.image,
+                    ) {
+                        Some(std::cmp::Ordering::Less) => anyhow::bail!(
+                            "Refusing to downgrade {} from {} to {} during update",
+                            app_id,
+                            running.image,
+                            target
+                        ),
+                        Some(std::cmp::Ordering::Equal) => return Ok(()),
+                        _ => {}
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
        let _ = self.runtime.stop_container(&name).await;
        let _ = self.runtime.remove_container(&name).await;
        self.install_fresh(&lm).await
@@ -4807,6 +5098,78 @@ mod tests {
    /// recovered when its siblings have live containers (the stack is
    /// installed), and left alone when the whole stack is gone or the app
    /// is not a stack member at all.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn gitea_fresh_url_seed_preserves_operator_config_and_reports_write_failure() {
+        let manifest =
+            AppManifest::parse(include_str!("../../../../apps/gitea/manifest.yml")).unwrap();
+        let seed = &manifest.app.files[0];
+        assert!(!seed.overwrite);
+        let content = seed.content.replace("{{HOST_IP}}", "192.0.2.1");
+        assert!(content.contains("ROOT_URL = http://192.0.2.1:3001/"));
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join("fresh/app.ini");
+        assert_eq!(
+            ensure_rendered_file(path.to_str().unwrap(), &content, seed.overwrite)
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            HookOutcome::Rewritten
+        );
+        assert!(tokio::fs::read_to_string(&path)
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .contains("ROOT_URL"));
+        let custom =
+            "[server]\nROOT_URL = https://git.example.test/\n[database]\nDB_TYPE = postgres\n";
+        tokio::fs::write(&path, custom).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            ensure_rendered_file(path.to_str().unwrap(), &content, seed.overwrite)
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            HookOutcome::Unchanged
+        );
+        assert_eq!(tokio::fs::read_to_string(&path).await.unwrap(), custom);
+        let impossible = path.join("app.ini");
+        assert!(
+            ensure_rendered_file(impossible.to_str().unwrap(), &content, seed.overwrite)
+                .await
+                .is_err()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssh_sandbox_capability_repair_uses_bounding_set_and_preserves_extra_overrides() {
+        let required = vec!["CHOWN".into(), "SYS_CHROOT".into()];
+        assert!(missing_declared_capability(
+            &required,
+            &["CAP_CHOWN".into()]
+        ));
+        assert!(!missing_declared_capability(
+            &required,
+            &["CAP_CHOWN".into(), "CAP_SYS_CHROOT".into()]
+        ));
+        assert!(!missing_declared_capability(
+            &required,
+            &["CHOWN".into(), "SYS_CHROOT".into(), "CAP_KILL".into()]
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn explicit_rootless_network_change_converges_without_guessing_defaults() {
+        assert!(rootless_network_mode_drifted(Some("slirp4netns"), "pasta"));
+        assert!(rootless_network_mode_drifted(Some("slirp4netns"), "bridge"));
+        assert!(!rootless_network_mode_drifted(
+            Some("slirp4netns"),
+            "slirp4netns"
+        ));
+        assert!(!rootless_network_mode_drifted(
+            Some("slirp4netns"),
+            "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true"
+        ));
+        assert!(!rootless_network_mode_drifted(None, "pasta"));
+        assert!(!rootless_network_mode_drifted(Some("slirp4netns"), ""));
+        assert!(!rootless_network_mode_drifted(Some("archy-net"), "bridge"));
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn absent_stack_member_recovery_requires_a_live_sibling() {
        let present: HashSet<String> = ["indeedhub-redis", "indeedhub-relay", "indeedhub"]
@@ -5076,6 +5439,7 @@ mod tests {
        calls: StdMutex<Vec<String>>,
        /// container_name -> ContainerState. Absence = "doesn't exist".
        containers: StdMutex<HashMap<String, ContainerState>>,
+        running_images: StdMutex<HashMap<String, String>>,
        /// container_name -> Podman health status.
        health: StdMutex<HashMap<String, String>>,
        /// image_ref -> present. Absence = "not present in local storage".
@@ -5200,7 +5564,13 @@ mod tests {
                health,
                exit_code: None,
                started_at: None,
-                image: "test-image".to_string(),
+                image: self
+                    .running_images
+                    .lock()
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .get(name)
+                    .cloned()
+                    .unwrap_or_else(|| "test-image".to_string()),
                created: "now".to_string(),
                ports: vec![],
                lan_address: None,
@@ -5481,6 +5851,38 @@ app:
        orch
    }

+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn missing_install_prerequisite_refuses_without_inventory_or_container_mutation() {
+        let rt = Arc::new(MockRuntime::default());
+        let orch = orch_with(rt.clone()).await;
+        let mut app = pull_manifest("indexer-adapter", "docker.io/library/alpine:3.20");
+        app.app.extensions.insert(
+            "install_prerequisites".into(),
+            serde_yaml::to_value(vec!["shared-index"]).unwrap(),
+        );
+        orch.insert_manifest_for_test(app, PathBuf::from("/tmp"))
+            .await;
+        orch.insert_manifest_for_test(
+            pull_manifest("shared-index", "index:1"),
+            PathBuf::from("/tmp"),
+        )
+        .await;
+        let error = orch.install("indexer-adapter").await.unwrap_err();
+        assert!(error.downcast_ref::<InstallPrerequisiteError>().is_some());
+        assert!(!crate::crash_recovery::load_installed_apps(&orch.data_dir)
+            .await
+            .contains("indexer-adapter"));
+        assert_eq!(rt.calls(), vec!["list_containers"]);
+        // An installed prerequisite satisfies the guard; it is never recreated
+        // or reconfigured as part of installing this adapter.
+        rt.set_state("shared-index", ContainerState::Running);
+        orch.install("indexer-adapter").await.unwrap();
+        assert!(!rt
+            .calls()
+            .iter()
+            .any(|c| c.starts_with("create_container:shared-index")));
+    }
+
    fn pull_manifest_with_dynamic_env(id: &str, image: &str) -> AppManifest {
        let yaml = format!(
            "app:\n  id: {id}\n  name: {id}\n  version: 1.0.0\n  container:\n    image: {image}\n    derived_env:\n      - key: FM_API_URL\n        template: \"ws://{{{{HOST_MDNS}}}}:8174\"\n    secret_env:\n      - key: FM_BITCOIND_PASSWORD\n        secret_file: bitcoin-rpc-password\n  environment:\n    - STATIC=1\n"
@@ -6036,6 +6438,48 @@ app:
        );
    }

+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn bitcoin_storage_choice_is_applied_and_old_catalog_cannot_silently_ignore_it() {
+        let rt = Arc::new(MockRuntime::default());
+        let mut orch = orch_with(rt).await;
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        orch.set_data_dir(dir.path().to_path_buf());
+        for id in ["bitcoin-core", "bitcoin-knots"] {
+            let mut old = pull_manifest(id, "docker.io/bitcoin/bitcoin:28");
+            // No preference: existing containers need no new environment flag.
+            crate::settings::bitcoin_storage::save(dir.path(), false)
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            orch.resolve_dynamic_env(&mut old).await.unwrap();
+            assert!(!old
+                .app
+                .environment
+                .iter()
+                .any(|s| s.starts_with("BITCOIN_PRUNE=")));
+            crate::settings::bitcoin_storage::save(dir.path(), true)
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            assert!(orch
+                .resolve_dynamic_env(&mut old)
+                .await
+                .unwrap_err()
+                .to_string()
+                .contains("cannot honor"));
+            let mut current = pull_manifest(id, "docker.io/bitcoin/bitcoin:28");
+            current
+                .app
+                .container
+                .custom_args
+                .push("if [ ${BITCOIN_PRUNE:-0} = 1 ]; then :; fi".into());
+            orch.resolve_dynamic_env(&mut current).await.unwrap();
+            assert!(current
+                .app
+                .environment
+                .iter()
+                .any(|s| s == "BITCOIN_PRUNE=1"));
+        }
+    }
+
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn install_resolves_derived_and_secret_env_before_create() {
        let rt = Arc::new(MockRuntime::default());
@@ -6307,6 +6751,67 @@ app:
        );
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn backend_cascade_requires_observed_instance_change() {
+        let running = ContainerStatus {
+            id: "container-1".into(),
+            name: "bitcoin-core".into(),
+            state: ContainerState::Running,
+            started_at: Some("start-1".into()),
+            health: None,
+            exit_code: None,
+            image: "bitcoin:1".into(),
+            created: "created-1".into(),
+            ports: vec![],
+            lan_address: None,
+        };
+        assert!(!backend_instance_changed(Some(&running), &running));
+        assert!(backend_instance_changed(None, &running));
+        let mut before = running.clone();
+        before.state = ContainerState::Exited;
+        assert!(backend_instance_changed(Some(&before), &running));
+        before = running.clone();
+        before.id = "old-container".into();
+        assert!(backend_instance_changed(Some(&before), &running));
+        before = running.clone();
+        before.started_at = Some("earlier-start".into());
+        assert!(backend_instance_changed(Some(&before), &running));
+        before.started_at = None;
+        assert!(!backend_instance_changed(Some(&before), &running));
+        before.id.clear();
+        assert!(!backend_instance_changed(Some(&before), &running));
+        let mut after = running.clone();
+        after.state = ContainerState::Exited;
+        assert!(!backend_instance_changed(None, &after));
+        after = running.clone();
+        after.id.clear();
+        assert!(!backend_instance_changed(None, &after));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cascade_ignores_false_started_report_but_detects_real_exec_drift() {
+        let none = HashSet::new();
+        let mut report = ReconcileReport {
+            actions: vec![
+                ("bitcoin-core".into(), ReconcileAction::Started),
+                ("lnd".into(), ReconcileAction::NoOp),
+            ],
+            failures: vec![],
+        };
+        // systemctl start of an already active unit does not move its address.
+        assert!(cascade_pairs_for_report(&report, &none, &none).is_empty());
+        // A unit exec rewrite can restart Bitcoin while the outer reconcile
+        // action remains NoOp. Runtime evidence still requires LND to reconnect.
+        let changed = ["bitcoin-core".into()].into();
+        report.actions[0].1 = ReconcileAction::NoOp;
+        assert_eq!(
+            cascade_pairs_for_report(&report, &none, &changed),
+            vec![("bitcoin-core", "lnd")]
+        );
+        report.actions[0].1 = ReconcileAction::Left("lifecycle-op-in-flight".into());
+        assert!(cascade_pairs_for_report(&report, &none, &changed).is_empty());
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn cascade_pairs_cover_backend_recreate_with_running_dependent() {
        use std::collections::HashSet;
@@ -6318,6 +6823,7 @@ app:
            failures: vec![],
        };
        let none = HashSet::new();
+        let changed: HashSet<String> = ["bitcoin-core".into(), "bitcoin-knots".into()].into();

        // Backend recreated while lnd sat running (NoOp) → cascade.
        let r = report(vec![
@@ -6325,7 +6831,7 @@ app:
            ("lnd", ReconcileAction::NoOp),
        ]);
        assert_eq!(
-            cascade_pairs_for_report(&r, &none),
+            cascade_pairs_for_report(&r, &none, &changed),
            vec![("bitcoin-knots", "lnd")]
        );

@@ -6335,7 +6841,7 @@ app:
            ("lnd", ReconcileAction::NoOp),
        ]);
        assert_eq!(
-            cascade_pairs_for_report(&r, &none),
+            cascade_pairs_for_report(&r, &none, &changed),
            vec![("bitcoin-core", "lnd")]
        );

@@ -6344,7 +6850,7 @@ app:
            ("bitcoin-knots", ReconcileAction::NoOp),
            ("lnd", ReconcileAction::NoOp),
        ]);
-        assert!(cascade_pairs_for_report(&r, &none).is_empty());
+        assert!(cascade_pairs_for_report(&r, &none, &none).is_empty());

        // Dependent itself (re)started this pass → it already resolved the
        // fresh address; no cascade.
@@ -6352,7 +6858,7 @@ app:
            ("bitcoin-knots", ReconcileAction::Installed),
            ("lnd", ReconcileAction::Started),
        ]);
-        assert!(cascade_pairs_for_report(&r, &none).is_empty());
+        assert!(cascade_pairs_for_report(&r, &none, &changed).is_empty());

        // User-stopped dependent is never bounced.
        let r = report(vec![
@@ -6360,14 +6866,50 @@ app:
            ("lnd", ReconcileAction::NoOp),
        ]);
        let stopped: HashSet<String> = ["lnd".to_string()].into();
-        assert!(cascade_pairs_for_report(&r, &stopped).is_empty());
+        assert!(cascade_pairs_for_report(&r, &stopped, &changed).is_empty());

        // Non-backend recreates don't cascade anything.
        let r = report(vec![
            ("grafana", ReconcileAction::Installed),
            ("lnd", ReconcileAction::NoOp),
        ]);
-        assert!(cascade_pairs_for_report(&r, &none).is_empty());
+        assert!(cascade_pairs_for_report(&r, &none, &changed).is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn reconcile_wallet_start_precedes_unrelated_failed_image_pull() {
+        let rt = Arc::new(MockRuntime::default());
+        rt.set_state("bitcoin-knots", ContainerState::Exited);
+        rt.set_state("lnd", ContainerState::Exited);
+        *rt.fail_pull.lock().unwrap() = Some("registry unreachable".into());
+        let mut orch = orch_with(rt.clone()).await;
+        orch.set_disk_gb_for_test(2000);
+        for id in ["unrelated", "lnd", "bitcoin-knots"] {
+            orch.insert_manifest_for_test(
+                pull_manifest(id, &format!("docker.io/example/{id}:1")),
+                PathBuf::from(format!("/tmp/{id}")),
+            )
+            .await;
+        }
+        let report = orch.reconcile_all().await;
+        assert!(report.failures.iter().any(|(id, _)| id == "unrelated"));
+        let calls = rt.calls();
+        let bitcoin = calls
+            .iter()
+            .position(|c| c == "start_container:bitcoin-knots")
+            .unwrap();
+        let lnd = calls
+            .iter()
+            .position(|c| c == "start_container:lnd")
+            .unwrap();
+        let pull = calls
+            .iter()
+            .position(|c| c.starts_with("pull_image:"))
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            bitcoin < lnd && lnd < pull,
+            "wallet startup was delayed by unrelated recovery: {calls:?}"
+        );
    }

    #[tokio::test]
@@ -6771,6 +7313,41 @@ app:
        assert_eq!(ids, vec!["bitcoin-knots", "bitcoin-ui"]);
    }

+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn upgrade_preserves_container_when_catalog_is_stale_or_already_installed() {
+        for (target, should_error) in [("v3.3.1", true), ("v3.3.1-archy1", false)] {
+            let rt = Arc::new(MockRuntime::default());
+            rt.set_state("update-regression", ContainerState::Running);
+            rt.running_images.lock().unwrap().insert(
+                "update-regression".into(),
+                "registry.test/old/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1".into(),
+            );
+            let orch = orch_with(rt.clone()).await;
+            orch.insert_manifest_for_test(
+                pull_manifest(
+                    "update-regression",
+                    &format!("registry.test/new/mempool-frontend:{target}"),
+                ),
+                PathBuf::from("/tmp/update-regression"),
+            )
+            .await;
+            assert_eq!(
+                orch.upgrade("update-regression").await.is_err(),
+                should_error
+            );
+            assert!(
+                !rt.calls()
+                    .iter()
+                    .any(|call| call.starts_with("stop_container:")
+                        || call.starts_with("remove_container:")
+                        || call.starts_with("pull_image:")
+                        || call.starts_with("create_container:")),
+                "{:?}",
+                rt.calls()
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn upgrade_removes_and_reinstalls() {
        let rt = Arc::new(MockRuntime::default());
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ pub struct QuadletUnit {
    pub no_new_privileges: bool,
    pub cpu_quota: Option<u32>,
    pub restart_policy: RestartPolicy,
+    pub stop_grace_secs: Option<u64>,
 }

 impl QuadletUnit {
@@ -216,6 +217,10 @@ impl QuadletUnit {
        let _ = writeln!(s, "[Container]");
        let _ = writeln!(s, "ContainerName={}", self.name);
        let _ = writeln!(s, "Image={}", self.image);
+        let grace = self
+            .stop_grace_secs
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| archipelago_container::runtime::stop_grace_secs_for(&self.name));
+        let _ = writeln!(s, "StopTimeout={grace}");
        // Pull=never: companions are pre-pulled or built. A missing image
        // must surface as a unit start failure, not a silent retry storm.
        let _ = writeln!(s, "Pull=never");
@@ -350,6 +355,15 @@ impl QuadletUnit {
        // the unit stuck in deactivating. Health/status remains app-level state,
        // not a systemd start gate.
        let _ = writeln!(s, "TimeoutStartSec=0");
+        let _ = writeln!(s, "TimeoutStopSec={}", grace.saturating_add(15));
+        // Stop explicitly before Quadlet's generated `podman rm -f`. The
+        // existing container may still carry Podman's old 10-second default;
+        // StopTimeout alone only protects containers created after migration.
+        let _ = writeln!(s, "ExecStop=");
+        let _ = writeln!(
+            s,
+            "ExecStop=/usr/bin/podman stop --ignore --time={grace} --cidfile=%t/%N.cid"
+        );
        // Restart policy + 10s backoff. RestartSec keeps a crash-loop
        // from saturating the journal. Companions: Always. Backends:
        // OnFailure (clean stops stay stopped).
@@ -376,7 +390,10 @@ fn shell_join(parts: &[String]) -> String {
        .iter()
        .map(|p| {
            let p = p.replace(['\r', '\n'], " ").replace('%', "%%");
-            if p.is_empty() || p.chars().any(|c| c.is_whitespace() || "\"\\$`".contains(c)) {
+            if p.is_empty()
+                || p.chars()
+                    .any(|c| c.is_whitespace() || "'\"\\$`".contains(c))
+            {
                let escaped = p
                    .replace('\\', "\\\\")
                    .replace('"', "\\\"")
@@ -396,7 +413,7 @@ fn quote_environment(env: &str) -> String {
    if env.is_empty()
        || env
            .chars()
-            .any(|c| c.is_whitespace() || "\"\\$`".contains(c))
+            .any(|c| c.is_whitespace() || "'\"\\$`".contains(c))
    {
        let escaped = env
            .replace('\\', "\\\\")
@@ -525,6 +542,9 @@ impl QuadletUnit {
            // Always, not OnFailure: with quadlet's `--rm`, OnFailure left a
            // cleanly-exited app deleted and unrestarted. See RestartPolicy.
            restart_policy: RestartPolicy::Always,
+            stop_grace_secs: Some(super::prod_orchestrator::resolve_stop_grace_secs(
+                manifest, name,
+            )),
        }
    }
 }
@@ -676,6 +696,13 @@ pub async fn unit_exists(name: &str) -> bool {

 /// Resolve the per-user quadlet dir under $HOME. Created if missing.
 pub async fn unit_dir() -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    {
+        static TEST_UNITS: std::sync::OnceLock<PathBuf> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();
+        return Ok(TEST_UNITS
+            .get_or_init(|| tempfile::tempdir().unwrap().keep())
+            .clone());
+    }
    let home = std::env::var_os("HOME")
        .map(PathBuf::from)
        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("HOME not set; cannot locate quadlet unit dir"))?;
@@ -785,7 +812,11 @@ pub async fn stop_service(service: &str) -> Result<()> {
 /// corruption — so the orchestrator passes the per-app grace here. Never waits
 /// less than `QUADLET_STOP_TIMEOUT`.
 pub async fn stop_service_with_timeout(service: &str, timeout: Duration) -> Result<()> {
-    let timeout = timeout.max(QUADLET_STOP_TIMEOUT);
+    let name = service.strip_suffix(".service").unwrap_or(service);
+    let body = fs::read_to_string(unit_dir().await?.join(format!("{name}.container")))
+        .await
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let timeout = timeout.max(stop_wait_timeout(name, &body));
    match systemctl_user_status(&["stop", service], timeout).await {
        Ok(status) if status.success() => Ok(()),
        Ok(status) => Err(anyhow!("systemctl --user stop {service} exited {status}")),
@@ -806,10 +837,29 @@ pub async fn stop_service_with_timeout(service: &str, timeout: Duration) -> Resu
    }
 }

+/// The command waiter must outlive both the container grace and systemd's
+/// stop deadline. Restart/repair callers must not kill Bitcoin at 45 seconds.
+fn stop_wait_timeout(name: &str, unit_body: &str) -> Duration {
+    Duration::from_secs(stop_grace_from_unit(name, unit_body).saturating_add(30))
+        .max(QUADLET_STOP_TIMEOUT)
+}
+
+fn stop_grace_from_unit(name: &str, unit_body: &str) -> u64 {
+    directive_values(unit_body, "StopTimeout=")
+        .last()
+        .and_then(|value| value.parse::<u64>().ok())
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| archipelago_container::runtime::stop_grace_secs_for(name))
+}
+
 async fn systemctl_user_status(
    args: &[&str],
    timeout: Duration,
 ) -> Result<std::process::ExitStatus> {
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::process::ExitStatusExt;
+        return Ok(std::process::ExitStatus::from_raw(0));
+    }
    let mut cmd = Command::new("systemctl");
    cmd.arg("--user").args(args);
    cmd.kill_on_drop(true);
@@ -856,6 +906,10 @@ async fn wait_not_deactivating(service: &str, timeout: Duration) -> bool {
 }

 async fn systemctl_user_output(args: &[&str], timeout: Duration) -> Result<std::process::Output> {
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    {
+        anyhow::bail!("Unit tests have no real user service manager");
+    }
    let mut cmd = Command::new("systemctl");
    cmd.arg("--user").args(args);
    cmd.kill_on_drop(true);
@@ -887,12 +941,77 @@ pub fn health_cmd_changed(old_body: &str, new_body: &str) -> bool {
            != directive_values(new_body, "HealthRetries=")
 }

+/// A unit rewrite and a successful systemd restart are separate operations.
+/// Keep the restart obligation across errors or a management-daemon restart.
+pub struct RestartObligation {
+    marker: PathBuf,
+    pending: bool,
+}
+
+impl RestartObligation {
+    pub async fn prepare(unit_path: &Path, newly_required: bool) -> Result<Self> {
+        let marker = unit_path.with_extension("restart-pending");
+        if newly_required {
+            // Contents contain no manifest environment or credentials. sync_all
+            // makes the obligation durable before the subsequent unit rename.
+            let file = tokio::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+                .write(true)
+                .create(true)
+                .truncate(false)
+                .open(&marker)
+                .await
+                .context("record pending Quadlet restart")?;
+            file.sync_all().await?;
+            if let Some(parent) = marker.parent() {
+                tokio::fs::File::open(parent).await?.sync_all().await?;
+            }
+        }
+        let pending = tokio::fs::try_exists(&marker).await?;
+        Ok(Self { marker, pending })
+    }
+
+    pub fn is_pending(&self) -> bool {
+        self.pending
+    }
+
+    /// Call only after systemd accepted the replacement service successfully.
+    pub async fn complete(self) -> Result<()> {
+        if self.pending {
+            tokio::fs::remove_file(&self.marker)
+                .await
+                .context("clear completed Quadlet restart")?;
+            if let Some(parent) = self.marker.parent() {
+                tokio::fs::File::open(parent).await?.sync_all().await?;
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
 pub fn publish_ports_changed(old_body: &str, new_body: &str) -> bool {
    let old_ports = directive_values(old_body, "PublishPort=");
    let new_ports = directive_values(new_body, "PublishPort=");
    old_ports != new_ports
 }

+pub fn security_changed(old_body: &str, new_body: &str) -> bool {
+    [
+        "AddCapability=",
+        "DropCapability=",
+        "NoNewPrivileges=",
+        "ReadOnly=",
+        "User=",
+    ]
+    .iter()
+    .any(|directive| {
+        let mut old = directive_values(old_body, directive);
+        let mut new = directive_values(new_body, directive);
+        old.sort();
+        new.sort();
+        old != new
+    })
+}
+
 pub fn network_aliases_changed(old_body: &str, new_body: &str) -> bool {
    let old_network = directive_values(old_body, "Network=");
    let new_network = directive_values(new_body, "Network=");
@@ -923,6 +1042,10 @@ fn directive_values(unit_body: &str, prefix: &str) -> Vec<String> {
 /// that systemd no longer knows about.
 pub async fn disable_remove(unit_name: &str, dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
    let svc = format!("{unit_name}.service");
+    let path = dir.join(format!("{unit_name}.container"));
+    let body = fs::read_to_string(&path).await.unwrap_or_default();
+    let timeout = stop_wait_timeout(unit_name, &body);
+    let grace = stop_grace_from_unit(unit_name, &body).to_string();
    // Stop first; ignore failure (unit may already be down). BOUNDED — on
    // rootless podman a generated unit can wedge in "deactivating" while
    // `podman rm -f` hangs underneath it, and an unbounded `systemctl stop`
@@ -930,13 +1053,12 @@ pub async fn disable_remove(unit_name: &str, dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
    // the package entry is stranded in `Removing` (a ghost in My Apps that also
    // blocks reinstall). If the graceful stop times out, escalate to
    // SIGKILL + reset-failed so teardown always proceeds.
-    if systemctl_user_status(&["stop", &svc], QUADLET_STOP_TIMEOUT)
+    if systemctl_user_status(&["stop", &svc], timeout)
        .await
        .is_err()
    {
        let _ = kill_and_reset_service(&svc).await;
    }
-    let path = dir.join(format!("{unit_name}.container"));
    if fs::try_exists(&path).await.unwrap_or(false) {
        match fs::remove_file(&path).await {
            Ok(()) => {}
@@ -949,9 +1071,9 @@ pub async fn disable_remove(unit_name: &str, dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
    // Bounded so a hung podman store can't re-introduce the stall this function
    // exists to avoid.
    let _ = tokio::time::timeout(
-        QUADLET_STOP_TIMEOUT,
+        timeout,
        Command::new("podman")
-            .args(["rm", "-f", unit_name])
+            .args(["rm", "-f", "--ignore", "--time", &grace, unit_name])
            .status(),
    )
    .await;
@@ -960,6 +1082,9 @@ pub async fn disable_remove(unit_name: &str, dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {

 /// Is the quadlet-generated service currently active?
 pub async fn is_active(service: &str) -> bool {
+    if cfg!(test) {
+        return false;
+    }
    Command::new("systemctl")
        .args(["--user", "is-active", "--quiet", service])
        .status()
@@ -973,6 +1098,118 @@ mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use tempfile::tempdir;

+    #[test]
+    fn shutdown_grace_covers_container_systemd_and_caller() {
+        for (name, grace) in [
+            ("bitcoin-core", 600),
+            ("bitcoin-knots", 600),
+            ("lnd", 330),
+            ("electrumx", 300),
+            ("other", 30),
+        ] {
+            let unit = QuadletUnit {
+                name: name.into(),
+                ..Default::default()
+            };
+            let body = unit.render();
+            assert!(body.contains(&format!("StopTimeout={grace}\n")));
+            assert!(body.contains(&format!("TimeoutStopSec={}\n", grace + 15)));
+            assert!(body.contains(&format!("podman stop --ignore --time={grace} --cidfile=")));
+            assert_eq!(
+                stop_wait_timeout(name, &body),
+                Duration::from_secs(grace + 30)
+            );
+            // Legacy units have no StopTimeout directive yet.
+            assert_eq!(stop_wait_timeout(name, ""), Duration::from_secs(grace + 30));
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn custom_stop_grace_survives_render_and_restart_budget() {
+        let manifest: AppManifest = serde_yaml::from_str(
+            r#"
+app:
+  id: custom-db
+  name: Custom database
+  version: 1.0.0
+  stop_grace_secs: 900
+  container:
+    image: example/db:1
+"#,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let unit = QuadletUnit::from_manifest(&manifest, "custom-db");
+        assert_eq!(unit.stop_grace_secs, Some(900));
+        assert_eq!(
+            stop_wait_timeout("custom-db", &unit.render()),
+            Duration::from_secs(930)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            stop_wait_timeout("lnd", "StopTimeout=invalid"),
+            Duration::from_secs(360)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn stop_grace_migration_does_not_request_an_execution_restart() {
+        let unit = sample_unit();
+        let new = unit.render();
+        let old = new
+            .lines()
+            .filter(|line| {
+                !line.starts_with("StopTimeout=")
+                    && !line.starts_with("TimeoutStopSec=")
+                    && !line.starts_with("ExecStop=")
+            })
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+            .join("\n");
+        assert!(!exec_changed(&old, &new));
+        assert!(!publish_ports_changed(&old, &new));
+        assert!(!network_aliases_changed(&old, &new));
+        assert!(!health_cmd_changed(&old, &new));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn actual_quadlet_generator_stops_before_forced_removal() {
+        let generator = Path::new("/usr/lib/systemd/system-generators/podman-system-generator");
+        if !generator.exists() {
+            eprintln!(
+                "Quadlet generator unavailable; run this regression on the Linux release host"
+            );
+            return;
+        }
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let unit = QuadletUnit {
+            name: "grace-test".into(),
+            image: "localhost/test:latest".into(),
+            stop_grace_secs: Some(600),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        std::fs::write(dir.path().join("grace-test.container"), unit.render()).unwrap();
+        let output = std::process::Command::new(generator)
+            .args(["--user", "--dryrun"])
+            .env("QUADLET_UNIT_DIRS", dir.path())
+            .output()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            output.status.success(),
+            "{}",
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
+        );
+        let generated = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).to_string()
+            + &String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
+        let stop = generated
+            .find("ExecStop=/usr/bin/podman stop --ignore --time=600")
+            .unwrap();
+        let remove = generated.find("ExecStop=/usr/bin/podman rm ").unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            stop < remove,
+            "Legacy container must stop gracefully before removal"
+        );
+        assert!(generated.contains("--stop-timeout 600"));
+        assert!(generated.contains("TimeoutStopSec=615"));
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn render_emits_secret_env_by_reference_never_value() {
        let u = QuadletUnit {
@@ -1160,6 +1397,18 @@ mod tests {
        );
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn apostrophes_survive_quadlet_argument_and_environment_parsing() {
+        // A whitespace-free Node script reproduced this in a real Quadlet:
+        // unquoted apostrophes were consumed by the parser, changing JS strings
+        // into identifiers and preventing the app from starting.
+        assert_eq!(
+            shell_join(&["require('http')".into()]),
+            "\"require('http')\""
+        );
+        assert_eq!(quote_environment("NAME=O'Brien"), "\"NAME=O'Brien\"");
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn quote_environment_quotes_values_with_spaces() {
        assert_eq!(
@@ -1372,6 +1621,26 @@ app:
        assert!(!s.contains("Network=host"));
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn portainer_catalog_network_repairs_same_node_routing_without_exposing_backend() {
+        let manifest = AppManifest::parse(include_str!("../../../../apps/portainer/manifest.yml"))
+            .expect("shipped Portainer manifest must parse");
+        let new = QuadletUnit::from_manifest(&manifest, "portainer").render();
+        assert!(new.contains("Network=slirp4netns\n"));
+        assert!(!new.contains("NetworkAlias="));
+        assert!(new.contains("PublishPort=127.0.0.1:9000:9000/tcp"));
+        assert!(!new.contains("PublishPort=0.0.0.0"));
+        // The upgrade changes networking only: retain both state mounts and the
+        // existing rootless socket, without an app.ini or repository rewrite.
+        assert!(new.contains("Volume=/var/lib/archipelago/portainer:/data"));
+        assert!(new.contains("Volume=/var/lib/archipelago/portainer/compose:/data/compose"));
+        assert!(new.contains("Volume=/run/user/1000/podman/podman.sock:/var/run/docker.sock"));
+        let old = new.replace("Network=slirp4netns\n", "");
+        assert!(network_aliases_changed(&old, &new));
+        assert!(!network_aliases_changed(&new, &new));
+        assert!(!publish_ports_changed(&old, &new));
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn from_manifest_slirp4netns_omits_network_alias() {
        let yaml = r#"
@@ -1722,6 +1991,59 @@ app:
        assert!(!network_aliases_changed(new, new));
    }

+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn failed_runtime_change_remains_pending_when_unit_already_matches() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let unit = dir.path().join("portainer.container");
+        tokio::fs::write(&unit, "[Container]\n").await.unwrap();
+        let pending = RestartObligation::prepare(&unit, true).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(pending.is_pending());
+        tokio::fs::write(&unit, "[Container]\nNetwork=slirp4netns\n")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // Simulate systemctl failure or daemon interruption after unit rewrite.
+        drop(pending);
+        let retry = RestartObligation::prepare(&unit, false).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            retry.is_pending(),
+            "matching unit must not discard failed restart"
+        );
+        retry.complete().await.unwrap();
+        assert!(!RestartObligation::prepare(&unit, false)
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_pending());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn pending_runtime_change_errors_are_not_reported_as_success() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let missing = dir.path().join("missing/app.container");
+        assert!(RestartObligation::prepare(&missing, true).await.is_err());
+        let unit = dir.path().join("app.container");
+        let pending = RestartObligation::prepare(&unit, true).await.unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::remove_file(unit.with_extension("restart-pending"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(pending.complete().await.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn gitea_ssh_sandbox_capability_is_applied_as_a_runtime_change() {
+        let manifest =
+            AppManifest::parse(include_str!("../../../../apps/gitea/manifest.yml")).unwrap();
+        manifest.validate().unwrap();
+        let new = QuadletUnit::from_manifest(&manifest, "gitea").render();
+        assert!(new.contains("AddCapability=SYS_CHROOT\n"));
+        let old = new.replace("AddCapability=SYS_CHROOT\n", "");
+        assert!(security_changed(&old, &new));
+        assert!(!security_changed(&new, &new));
+        assert!(!security_changed(
+            "AddCapability=CHOWN\nAddCapability=SETUID\n",
+            "AddCapability=SETUID\nAddCapability=CHOWN\n"
+        ));
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn network_aliases_changed_detects_network_mode_drift() {
        let old = "[Container]\nNetwork=slirp4netns\n";
@@ -238,6 +238,11 @@ pub enum ServeResult {
    Forbidden,
    /// Content not found.
    NotFound,
+    /// The catalog entry and file exist but this node can't read the file.
+    /// Returned before any payment is taken.
+    Unavailable,
+    /// Requested byte range cannot be served; no payment was taken.
+    RangeNotSatisfiable(u64),
 }

 /// Serve a content item by ID with access control and optional range request.
@@ -252,6 +257,39 @@ pub async fn serve_content(
    range: Option<ByteRange>,
    owner_session: bool,
 ) -> Result<ServeResult> {
+    serve_content_with(
+        data_dir,
+        id,
+        payment_token,
+        invoice_hash,
+        peer_did,
+        range,
+        owner_session,
+        |path, range, mime| prepare_content(data_dir, path, range, mime),
+        |token, amount| async move { verify_payment_token(data_dir, &token, amount).await },
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+// Inject only the read and payment boundaries, so tests can prove ordering
+// without mint access, file-permission assumptions or privileged commands.
+async fn serve_content_with<R, RF, V, VF>(
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    id: &str,
+    payment_token: Option<&str>,
+    invoice_hash: Option<&str>,
+    peer_did: Option<&str>,
+    range: Option<ByteRange>,
+    owner_session: bool,
+    read: R,
+    verify: V,
+) -> Result<ServeResult>
+where
+    R: FnOnce(PathBuf, Option<ByteRange>, String) -> RF,
+    RF: std::future::Future<Output = Result<ServeResult>>,
+    V: FnOnce(String, u64) -> VF,
+    VF: std::future::Future<Output = bool>,
+{
    let catalog = load_catalog(data_dir).await?;
    let item = match catalog.items.iter().find(|i| i.id == id) {
        Some(i) => i,
@@ -296,6 +334,47 @@ pub async fn serve_content(
        }
    }

+    let file_path = content_file_path(data_dir, item);
+    if !file_path.exists() {
+        // The catalog entry survived (it's a separate JSON file) but its
+        // backing file is gone — most likely lost in an unrelated data-dir
+        // reset (a shared filebrowser file, 2026-07-01: two catalog entries
+        // outlived a filebrowser reinstall that wiped the files themselves).
+        // Leaving the entry in place would keep advertising it as available
+        // to every peer forever, each hitting the exact same dead end this
+        // one just did. Prune it so it stops being offered.
+        warn!(
+            content_id = %id,
+            filename = %item.filename,
+            "content catalog entry's file is missing on disk — pruning the stale entry"
+        );
+        prune_missing_content_entry(data_dir, id).await;
+        return Ok(ServeResult::NotFound);
+    }
+
+    // Refuse unauthorized viewers before opening or reading any bytes.
+    if !owner_session && matches!(item.access, AccessControl::PeersOnly) && !is_known_peer {
+        return Ok(ServeResult::Forbidden);
+    }
+    if !owner_session {
+        if let AccessControl::Paid { price_sats, .. } = &item.access {
+            if payment_token.is_none() && invoice_hash.is_none() {
+                return Ok(ServeResult::PaymentRequired(*price_sats));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Finish all file I/O before consuming bearer payment. Merely opening then
+    // reopening after charging still lost payments on read errors or deletion.
+    let prepared = match read(file_path, range, item.mime_type.clone()).await {
+        Ok(result @ (ServeResult::Ok(..) | ServeResult::Partial { .. })) => result,
+        Ok(other) => return Ok(other),
+        Err(error) => {
+            warn!(content_id = %id, "Cannot prepare shared content: {error:#}");
+            return Ok(ServeResult::Unavailable);
+        }
+    };
+
    // Check access control
    if !owner_session {
        match &item.access {
@@ -307,9 +386,13 @@ pub async fn serve_content(
                // Each path only counts when the sharer accepts that method.
                let mut authorized = false;
                if let Some(token) = payment_token {
-                    if (method_accepted(&item.access, "ecash")
-                        || method_accepted(&item.access, "fedimint"))
-                        && verify_payment_token(data_dir, token, *price_sats).await
+                    let method = if token.trim().starts_with("cashu") {
+                        "ecash"
+                    } else {
+                        "fedimint"
+                    };
+                    if method_accepted(&item.access, method)
+                        && verify(token.to_owned(), *price_sats).await
                    {
                        authorized = true;
                    }
@@ -336,73 +419,127 @@ pub async fn serve_content(
        }
    }

-    let file_path = content_file_path(data_dir, item);
-    if !file_path.exists() {
-        // The catalog entry survived (it's a separate JSON file) but its
-        // backing file is gone — most likely lost in an unrelated data-dir
-        // reset (a shared filebrowser file, 2026-07-01: two catalog entries
-        // outlived a filebrowser reinstall that wiped the files themselves).
-        // Leaving the entry in place would keep advertising it as available
-        // to every peer forever, each hitting the exact same dead end this
-        // one just did. Prune it so it stops being offered.
-        warn!(
-            content_id = %id,
-            filename = %item.filename,
-            "content catalog entry's file is missing on disk — pruning the stale entry"
-        );
-        prune_missing_content_entry(data_dir, id).await;
-        return Ok(ServeResult::NotFound);
-    }
+    Ok(prepared)
+}

-    let metadata = fs::metadata(&file_path)
+async fn prepare_content(
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    path: PathBuf,
+    range: Option<ByteRange>,
+    mime: String,
+) -> Result<ServeResult> {
+    use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncSeekExt};
+    let mut file = match fs::OpenOptions::new()
+        .read(true)
+        .custom_flags(libc::O_NONBLOCK)
+        .open(&path)
        .await
-        .context("Failed to read file metadata")?;
-    let total_size = metadata.len();
-
-    // Handle range request for streaming
-    if let Some(range) = range {
-        let start = range.start.min(total_size.saturating_sub(1));
-        let end = range
-            .end
-            .map(|e| e.min(total_size - 1))
-            .unwrap_or(total_size - 1);
-
-        if start > end || start >= total_size {
-            return Ok(ServeResult::NotFound);
+    {
+        Ok(file) => file,
+        Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied => {
+            let bytes = read_filebrowser_via_userns(data_dir, &path).await?;
+            return slice_prepared_content(bytes, range, mime);
        }
-
-        let len = (end - start + 1) as usize;
-        use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncSeekExt};
-        let mut file = tokio::fs::File::open(&file_path)
+        Err(error) => return Err(error).context("Opening shared content"),
+    };
+    let metadata = file.metadata().await?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(metadata.is_file(), "Shared content is not a regular file");
+    let total = metadata.len();
+    if let Some(range) = range {
+        let Some((start, end)) = checked_range(&range, total) else {
+            return Ok(ServeResult::RangeNotSatisfiable(total));
+        };
+        file.seek(std::io::SeekFrom::Start(start)).await?;
+        let len = usize::try_from(end - start + 1).context("Content range is too large")?;
+        let mut bytes = vec![0; len];
+        file.read_exact(&mut bytes)
            .await
-            .context("Failed to open content file")?;
-        file.seek(std::io::SeekFrom::Start(start))
-            .await
-            .context("Failed to seek")?;
-        let mut buf = vec![0u8; len];
-        file.read_exact(&mut buf)
-            .await
-            .context("Failed to read range")?;
-
-        debug!(
-            "Serving content '{}' range {}-{}/{} ({} bytes)",
-            id, start, end, total_size, len
-        );
+            .context("Reading shared content range")?;
        return Ok(ServeResult::Partial {
-            bytes: buf,
-            mime_type: item.mime_type.clone(),
+            bytes,
+            mime_type: mime,
            start,
            end,
-            total: total_size,
+            total,
        });
    }
-
-    let bytes = fs::read(&file_path)
+    let mut bytes = Vec::new();
+    file.read_to_end(&mut bytes)
        .await
-        .context("Failed to read content file")?;
+        .context("Reading shared content")?;
+    Ok(ServeResult::Ok(bytes, mime))
+}

-    debug!("Serving content '{}' ({} bytes)", id, bytes.len());
-    Ok(ServeResult::Ok(bytes, item.mime_type.clone()))
+fn checked_range(range: &ByteRange, total: u64) -> Option<(u64, u64)> {
+    let last = total.checked_sub(1)?;
+    let end = range.end.unwrap_or(last).min(last);
+    (range.start <= end && range.start < total).then_some((range.start, end))
+}
+
+fn slice_prepared_content(
+    bytes: Vec<u8>,
+    range: Option<ByteRange>,
+    mime: String,
+) -> Result<ServeResult> {
+    let total = bytes.len() as u64;
+    match range {
+        None => Ok(ServeResult::Ok(bytes, mime)),
+        Some(range) => match checked_range(&range, total) {
+            Some((start, end)) => Ok(ServeResult::Partial {
+                bytes: bytes[start as usize..=end as usize].to_vec(),
+                mime_type: mime,
+                start,
+                end,
+                total,
+            }),
+            None => Ok(ServeResult::RangeNotSatisfiable(total)),
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+/// Read only an explicitly shared, regular file within FileBrowser storage.
+/// Do not change its mode or grant world-readable access to paid/private data.
+async fn filebrowser_read_path(data_dir: &Path, path: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    let root = fs::canonicalize(data_dir.join("filebrowser")).await?;
+    let target = fs::canonicalize(path).await?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        target.starts_with(&root) && target != root,
+        "Shared file is outside Files storage"
+    );
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        fs::metadata(&target).await?.is_file(),
+        "Shared content is not a regular file"
+    );
+    Ok(target)
+}
+
+async fn read_filebrowser_via_userns(data_dir: &Path, path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let path = filebrowser_read_path(data_dir, path).await?;
+    // Tests exercise the boundary explicitly; they never launch the host Podman.
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    {
+        let _ = path;
+        anyhow::bail!("Files namespace read disabled in unit tests")
+    }
+    #[cfg(not(test))]
+    {
+        let output = tokio::time::timeout(
+            std::time::Duration::from_secs(900),
+            tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
+                .args(["unshare", "cat", "--"])
+                .arg(path)
+                .kill_on_drop(true)
+                .output(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .context("Files namespace read timed out")??;
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            output.status.success(),
+            "Files namespace read failed: {}",
+            output.status
+        );
+        Ok(output.stdout)
+    }
 }

 /// Result of attempting to serve a preview.
@@ -573,7 +710,7 @@ pub async fn serve_content_preview(data_dir: &Path, id: &str) -> Result<PreviewR
 }

 /// Verify a payment token covers the required amount.
-/// Accepts both cashuA tokens (real Cashu) and legacy cashuSend_ format.
+/// Accepts real Cashu tokens and Fedimint notes.
 /// Swaps proofs at the mint to verify they're unspent before accepting.
 async fn verify_payment_token(data_dir: &Path, token: &str, required_sats: u64) -> bool {
    match crate::wallet::ecash::verify_and_receive_payment(data_dir, token, required_sats).await {
@@ -725,3 +862,301 @@ mod prune_missing_content_tests {
        assert_eq!(reloaded.items[0].id, "present-item");
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod paid_read_order_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+
+    async fn fixture(bytes: &[u8]) -> tempfile::TempDir {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        fs::create_dir_all(dir.path().join("content/files"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        fs::write(dir.path().join("content/files/test.bin"), bytes)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        save_catalog(
+            dir.path(),
+            &ContentCatalog {
+                items: vec![ContentItem {
+                    id: "paid".into(),
+                    filename: "test.bin".into(),
+                    mime_type: "application/octet-stream".into(),
+                    size_bytes: bytes.len() as u64,
+                    description: String::new(),
+                    access: AccessControl::Paid {
+                        price_sats: 10,
+                        accepted: vec!["ecash".into()],
+                    },
+                    availability: Availability::AllPeers,
+                    added_at: "2026-09-30".into(),
+                }],
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        dir
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn all_read_failures_precede_redemption_even_as_root() {
+        for kind in [
+            std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
+            std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof,
+            std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound,
+            std::io::ErrorKind::Other,
+        ] {
+            let dir = fixture(b"abc").await;
+            let charged = AtomicUsize::new(0);
+            let result = serve_content_with(
+                dir.path(),
+                "paid",
+                Some("cashuBtest"),
+                None,
+                None,
+                None,
+                false,
+                |_, _, _| async move { Err(std::io::Error::from(kind).into()) },
+                |_, _| async {
+                    charged.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
+                    true
+                },
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+            assert!(matches!(result, ServeResult::Unavailable));
+            assert_eq!(charged.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0);
+            assert_eq!(load_catalog(dir.path()).await.unwrap().items.len(), 1);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn deletion_during_payment_cannot_lose_prepared_bytes() {
+        let dir = fixture(b"original").await;
+        let result = serve_content_with(
+            dir.path(),
+            "paid",
+            Some("cashuBtest"),
+            None,
+            None,
+            None,
+            false,
+            |path, range, mime| prepare_content(dir.path(), path, range, mime),
+            |_, amount| {
+                assert_eq!(amount, 10);
+                async {
+                    fs::remove_file(dir.path().join("content/files/test.bin"))
+                        .await
+                        .unwrap();
+                    true
+                }
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(result, ServeResult::Ok(bytes, _) if bytes == b"original"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn empty_out_of_bounds_and_reversed_ranges_never_charge() {
+        for (bytes, start, end) in [
+            (b"".as_slice(), 0, None),
+            (b"abc".as_slice(), 3, None),
+            (b"abc".as_slice(), 2, Some(1)),
+        ] {
+            let dir = fixture(bytes).await;
+            let result = serve_content_with(
+                dir.path(),
+                "paid",
+                Some("cashuBtest"),
+                None,
+                None,
+                Some(ByteRange { start, end }),
+                false,
+                |path, range, mime| prepare_content(dir.path(), path, range, mime),
+                |_, _| async { panic!("invalid range reached payment") },
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+            assert!(
+                matches!(result, ServeResult::RangeNotSatisfiable(n) if n == bytes.len() as u64)
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn prepared_range_survives_file_change_while_payment_is_verified() {
+        let dir = fixture(b"abcdef").await;
+        let result = serve_content_with(
+            dir.path(),
+            "paid",
+            Some("cashuBtest"),
+            None,
+            None,
+            Some(ByteRange {
+                start: 2,
+                end: Some(999),
+            }),
+            false,
+            |path, range, mime| prepare_content(dir.path(), path, range, mime),
+            |_, _| async {
+                fs::write(dir.path().join("content/files/test.bin"), b"x")
+                    .await
+                    .unwrap();
+                true
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            matches!(result, ServeResult::Partial { bytes, start: 2, end: 5, total: 6, .. } if bytes == b"cdef")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn payment_denial_never_returns_prepared_content() {
+        let dir = fixture(b"secret").await;
+        let charged = AtomicUsize::new(0);
+        let result = serve_content_with(
+            dir.path(),
+            "paid",
+            Some("cashuBtest"),
+            None,
+            None,
+            None,
+            false,
+            |path, range, mime| prepare_content(dir.path(), path, range, mime),
+            |_, _| async {
+                charged.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
+                false
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(result, ServeResult::PaymentRequired(10)));
+        assert_eq!(charged.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn missing_payment_and_peer_restrictions_precede_file_reads() {
+        let dir = fixture(b"secret").await;
+        let result = serve_content_with(
+            dir.path(),
+            "paid",
+            None,
+            None,
+            None,
+            None,
+            false,
+            |_, _, _| async { panic!("unauthorized file read") },
+            |_, _| async { panic!("unexpected payment") },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(result, ServeResult::PaymentRequired(10)));
+        let mut catalog = load_catalog(dir.path()).await.unwrap();
+        catalog.items[0].access = AccessControl::PeersOnly;
+        save_catalog(dir.path(), &catalog).await.unwrap();
+        let result = serve_content_with(
+            dir.path(),
+            "paid",
+            None,
+            None,
+            None,
+            None,
+            false,
+            |_, _, _| async { panic!("unauthorized file read") },
+            |_, _| async { panic!("unexpected payment") },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(result, ServeResult::Forbidden));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn owner_reads_paid_content_without_redemption() {
+        let dir = fixture(b"own file").await;
+        let result = serve_content_with(
+            dir.path(),
+            "paid",
+            None,
+            None,
+            None,
+            None,
+            true,
+            |path, range, mime| prepare_content(dir.path(), path, range, mime),
+            |_, _| async { panic!("owner charged") },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(result, ServeResult::Ok(bytes, _) if bytes == b"own file"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn directory_in_place_of_file_does_not_charge() {
+        let dir = fixture(b"abc").await;
+        let path = dir.path().join("content/files/test.bin");
+        fs::remove_file(&path).await.unwrap();
+        fs::create_dir(&path).await.unwrap();
+        let result = serve_content_with(
+            dir.path(),
+            "paid",
+            Some("cashuBtest"),
+            None,
+            None,
+            None,
+            false,
+            |path, range, mime| prepare_content(dir.path(), path, range, mime),
+            |_, _| async { panic!("directory charged") },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(result, ServeResult::Unavailable));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn files_namespace_read_is_scoped_to_regular_files_and_keeps_mode() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::{symlink, PermissionsExt};
+        let dir = fixture(b"outside").await;
+        let root = dir.path().join("filebrowser");
+        fs::create_dir(&root).await.unwrap();
+        let inside = root.join("song");
+        fs::write(&inside, b"song").await.unwrap();
+        fs::set_permissions(&inside, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o640))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            filebrowser_read_path(dir.path(), &inside).await.unwrap(),
+            inside
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            fs::metadata(&inside).await.unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777,
+            0o640
+        );
+        let outside = dir.path().join("content/files/test.bin");
+        symlink(&outside, root.join("escape")).unwrap();
+        for path in [outside, root.join("escape"), root.clone()] {
+            assert!(filebrowser_read_path(dir.path(), &path).await.is_err());
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn user_namespace_bytes_use_the_same_range_rules() {
+        assert!(matches!(
+            slice_prepared_content(
+                vec![],
+                Some(ByteRange {
+                    start: 0,
+                    end: None
+                }),
+                "x".into()
+            )
+            .unwrap(),
+            ServeResult::RangeNotSatisfiable(0)
+        ));
+        assert!(
+            matches!(slice_prepared_content(b"abc".to_vec(), Some(ByteRange { start: 1, end: None }), "x".into()).unwrap(), ServeResult::Partial { bytes, start: 1, end: 2, total: 3, .. } if bytes == b"bc")
+        );
+    }
+}
@@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ pub async fn clear_user_stopped(data_dir: &Path, name: &str) {
 // Installation is a decision, not a runtime observation, so it gets a record
 // of its own that no amount of downtime erodes.
 const INSTALLED_APPS_FILE: &str = "installed-apps.json";
+static INSTALLED_APPS_LOCK: tokio::sync::Mutex<()> = tokio::sync::Mutex::const_new(());

 /// Load the durable set of installed app ids / container names.
 pub async fn load_installed_apps(data_dir: &Path) -> std::collections::HashSet<String> {
@@ -220,12 +221,23 @@ pub async fn load_installed_apps_if_recorded(
 async fn save_installed_apps(data_dir: &Path, installed: &std::collections::HashSet<String>) {
    let path = data_dir.join(INSTALLED_APPS_FILE);
    if let Ok(json) = serde_json::to_string_pretty(installed) {
-        let _ = fs::write(&path, json).await;
+        let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
+        let result = async {
+            fs::write(&tmp, json).await?;
+            fs::File::open(&tmp).await?.sync_all().await?;
+            fs::rename(&tmp, &path).await?;
+            fs::File::open(data_dir).await?.sync_all().await
+        }
+        .await;
+        if let Err(error) = result {
+            warn!(%error, "could not persist installed apps");
+        }
    }
 }

 /// Record that an app is installed. Called when an install succeeds.
 pub async fn mark_installed(data_dir: &Path, name: &str) {
+    let _guard = INSTALLED_APPS_LOCK.lock().await;
    let mut installed = load_installed_apps(data_dir).await;
    if installed.insert(name.to_string()) {
        save_installed_apps(data_dir, &installed).await;
@@ -235,6 +247,7 @@ pub async fn mark_installed(data_dir: &Path, name: &str) {
 /// Forget an app. Called on uninstall, beside `mark_user_uninstalled` — the
 /// two must move together or a reinstall-after-uninstall leaves a stale claim.
 pub async fn clear_installed(data_dir: &Path, name: &str) {
+    let _guard = INSTALLED_APPS_LOCK.lock().await;
    let mut installed = load_installed_apps(data_dir).await;
    if installed.remove(name) {
        save_installed_apps(data_dir, &installed).await;
@@ -252,6 +265,7 @@ pub async fn clear_installed(data_dir: &Path, name: &str) {
 /// need it. Runs on every boot, so an app installed before the upgrade is
 /// still picked up whenever it is next seen alive.
 pub async fn backfill_installed_apps(data_dir: &Path, present_container_names: &[String]) {
+    let _guard = INSTALLED_APPS_LOCK.lock().await;
    if present_container_names.is_empty() {
        return;
    }
@@ -1497,3 +1511,26 @@ mod tests {
        );
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod installed_concurrency_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn concurrent_install_records_are_not_lost() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let mut tasks = Vec::new();
+        for i in 0..24 {
+            let path = dir.path().to_owned();
+            tasks.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
+                mark_installed(&path, &format!("app-{i}")).await;
+            }));
+        }
+        for task in tasks {
+            task.await.unwrap();
+        }
+        assert_eq!(load_installed_apps(dir.path()).await.len(), 24);
+        clear_installed(dir.path(), "app-3").await;
+        assert_eq!(load_installed_apps(dir.path()).await.len(), 23);
+        assert!(!dir.path().join("installed-apps.json.tmp").exists());
+    }
+}
@@ -146,6 +146,10 @@ pub enum PackageState {

 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
 pub struct PackageDataEntry {
+    /// Whether the app's HTTP upstream answered this scan (independent of
+    /// container health and blockchain sync). Missing on older nodes.
+    #[serde(rename = "ui-ready", default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub ui_ready: Option<bool>,
    pub state: PackageState,
    /// Container health: "healthy", "unhealthy", "starting", or null
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
@@ -297,6 +301,8 @@ pub enum InstallPhase {
    /// `podman pull` in progress (the longest phase — up to several
    /// minutes for large images on slow networks).
    PullingImage,
+    /// Orchestrator owns download/build and startup as one operation.
+    PreparingApp,
    /// Creating data directories, writing app-specific configs
    /// (bitcoin.conf, lnd.conf, searxng settings.yml, chown).
    CreatingContainer,
@@ -5,8 +5,45 @@
 //! are reachable over the mesh; ports of apps that aren't installed have
 //! no listener, so allowing them is inert.

+#[rustfmt::skip]
 pub const APP_LAUNCH_PORTS: &[u16] = &[
-    2283, 2342, 3000, 3001, 3002, 4080, 5180, 7778, 8080, 8081, 8082, 8083, 8084, 8085, 8087, 8090,
-    8096, 8123, 8175, 8176, 8187, 8240, 8334, 8336, 8337, 8888, 8999, 9000, 9100, 10380, 11434,
-    18081, 18083, 18091, 23000, 32838, 50002,
+    2283,
+    2342,
+    3000,
+    3001,
+    3002,
+    4080,
+    5180,
+    7778,
+    8080,
+    8081,
+    8082,
+    8083,
+    8084,
+    8085,
+    8087,
+    8090,
+    8091,
+    8096,
+    8123,
+    8175,
+    8176,
+    8187,
+    8240,
+    8334,
+    8336,
+    8337,
+    8888,
+    8998,
+    8999,
+    9000,
+    9100,
+    10380,
+    11434,
+    18081,
+    18083,
+    18091,
+    23000,
+    32838,
+    50002,
 ];
@@ -46,6 +46,25 @@ fn fips_should_fall_back(status: reqwest::StatusCode) -> bool {
    status == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND || status.is_server_error()
 }

+/// Is this FIPS answer the final one, or should the request go again over
+/// Tor? A single-delivery request already reached the peer, so any answer
+/// is final: a Tor replay would carry the same (possibly spent) payload.
+fn fips_answer_is_final(
+    pref: crate::settings::transport::TransportPref,
+    single_delivery: bool,
+    status: reqwest::StatusCode,
+) -> bool {
+    pref == crate::settings::transport::TransportPref::Fips
+        || single_delivery
+        || !fips_should_fall_back(status)
+}
+
+/// May a failed FIPS attempt be sent again? Only a failed connect proves the
+/// peer never saw it; a timeout can land after the request was delivered.
+fn fips_retryable(single_delivery: bool, e: &reqwest::Error) -> bool {
+    e.is_connect() || (!single_delivery && e.is_timeout())
+}
+
 /// DNS suffix appended to a peer's bech32 npub.
 pub const FIPS_DNS_SUFFIX: &str = "fips";

@@ -113,7 +132,21 @@ pub fn client() -> reqwest::Client {
 /// before the Tor fallback ever gets a chance. The generous `connect_timeout`
 /// is preserved so a cold hole-punched path still gets time to establish.
 pub fn client_with_timeout(timeout: Duration) -> reqwest::Client {
+    client_with_delivery_policy(timeout, false)
+}
+
+fn delivery_redirect_policy(single: bool) -> reqwest::redirect::Policy {
+    if single {
+        reqwest::redirect::Policy::none()
+    } else {
+        reqwest::redirect::Policy::default()
+    }
+}
+
+fn client_with_delivery_policy(timeout: Duration, single: bool) -> reqwest::Client {
    reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .no_proxy()
+        .redirect(delivery_redirect_policy(single))
        .timeout(timeout)
        .connect_timeout(Duration::from_secs(8))
        .user_agent("archipelago-fips/1")
@@ -130,10 +163,18 @@ pub fn client_with_timeout(timeout: Duration) -> reqwest::Client {
 /// robust". Only connect/timeout errors are retried (a real HTTP response,
 /// including 4xx/5xx, is returned as-is for the caller to interpret).
 async fn send_with_retry(rb: reqwest::RequestBuilder) -> Result<reqwest::Response, reqwest::Error> {
+    send_with_retry_if(rb, |e| e.is_connect() || e.is_timeout()).await
+}
+
+/// [`send_with_retry`], retrying only on errors `retryable` accepts.
+async fn send_with_retry_if(
+    rb: reqwest::RequestBuilder,
+    retryable: impl Fn(&reqwest::Error) -> bool,
+) -> Result<reqwest::Response, reqwest::Error> {
    let retry = rb.try_clone();
    match rb.send().await {
        Ok(resp) => Ok(resp),
-        Err(e) if (e.is_connect() || e.is_timeout()) && retry.is_some() => {
+        Err(e) if retryable(&e) && retry.is_some() => {
            // Brief pause so the hole-punch packets from the first attempt can
            // traverse before we re-dial onto the warmed path.
            tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(600)).await;
@@ -350,6 +391,9 @@ pub struct PeerRequest<'a> {
    /// the per-peer FIPS/Tor badge reflects reality. Opt-in because not
    /// every caller has a data dir in scope.
    pub record_data_dir: Option<std::path::PathBuf>,
+    /// The request carries something that must reach the peer at most once
+    /// (a bearer ecash token). See [`PeerRequest::single_delivery`].
+    pub single_delivery: bool,
 }

 impl<'a> PeerRequest<'a> {
@@ -363,9 +407,25 @@ impl<'a> PeerRequest<'a> {
            fips_timeout: None,
            service: None,
            record_data_dir: None,
+            single_delivery: false,
        }
    }

+    /// Never send this request twice. A paid download carries a bearer ecash
+    /// token that the seller redeems on first sight; replaying it over Tor
+    /// after FIPS already delivered it hands the seller a spent token, so the
+    /// buyer is charged and gets a 402 instead of the file (2026-09-29: FIPS
+    /// answered 404 after the seller redeemed, the Tor retry got 402).
+    ///
+    /// With this set, whatever FIPS answers is final, the FIPS retry fires
+    /// only when the first attempt never connected, and Tor is used only when
+    /// FIPS could not have delivered the request. An attempt that may have
+    /// been delivered but timed out is an error, not a fallback.
+    pub fn single_delivery(mut self) -> Self {
+        self.single_delivery = true;
+        self
+    }
+
    /// Record the transport that serves this request into federation storage
    /// (matched by this request's onion host). Best-effort, off the hot path.
    pub fn record_transport(mut self, data_dir: impl Into<std::path::PathBuf>) -> Self {
@@ -442,7 +502,7 @@ impl<'a> PeerRequest<'a> {
                    // Use the FIPS reply unless it's one a Tor retry could
                    // fix (404 path-not-served / 5xx) and we're allowed to
                    // fall back. FIPS-only never falls back.
-                    if pref == TransportPref::Fips || !fips_should_fall_back(resp.status()) {
+                    if fips_answer_is_final(pref, self.single_delivery, resp.status()) {
                        telemetry::record_fips_ok();
                        self.spawn_record(crate::transport::TransportKind::Fips);
                        return Ok((resp, crate::transport::TransportKind::Fips));
@@ -481,7 +541,7 @@ impl<'a> PeerRequest<'a> {
        if matches!(pref, TransportPref::Auto | TransportPref::Fips) {
            match self.try_fips_get().await? {
                Some(resp) => {
-                    if pref == TransportPref::Fips || !fips_should_fall_back(resp.status()) {
+                    if fips_answer_is_final(pref, self.single_delivery, resp.status()) {
                        telemetry::record_fips_ok();
                        self.spawn_record(crate::transport::TransportKind::Fips);
                        return Ok((resp, crate::transport::TransportKind::Fips));
@@ -551,13 +611,21 @@ impl<'a> PeerRequest<'a> {
        } else {
            budget
        };
-        let c = client_with_timeout(per_attempt);
+        let c = client_with_delivery_policy(per_attempt, self.single_delivery);
        let mut rb = c.post(&url).json(body);
        for (k, v) in &self.headers {
            rb = rb.header(*k, v);
        }
-        match tokio::time::timeout(budget, send_with_retry(rb)).await {
+        let single = self.single_delivery;
+        let attempt = send_with_retry_if(rb, |e| fips_retryable(single, e));
+        match tokio::time::timeout(budget, attempt).await {
            Ok(Ok(r)) => Ok(Some(r)),
+            Ok(Err(e)) if single && !e.is_connect() => Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
+                "FIPS POST failed after possible delivery; not replaying: {e}"
+            )),
+            Err(_) if single => Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
+                "FIPS POST exceeded its budget after possible delivery; not replaying"
+            )),
            Ok(Err(e)) => {
                telemetry::record_fallback(FallbackReason::ConnectFail);
                tracing::info!(
@@ -612,13 +680,28 @@ impl<'a> PeerRequest<'a> {
        } else {
            budget
        };
-        let c = client_with_timeout(per_attempt);
+        let c = client_with_delivery_policy(per_attempt, self.single_delivery);
        let mut rb = c.get(&url);
        for (k, v) in &self.headers {
            rb = rb.header(*k, v);
        }
-        match tokio::time::timeout(budget, send_with_retry(rb)).await {
+        let single = self.single_delivery;
+        let attempt = send_with_retry_if(rb, |e| fips_retryable(single, e));
+        match tokio::time::timeout(budget, attempt).await {
            Ok(Ok(r)) => Ok(Some(r)),
+            // Anything but a failed connect may have reached the peer.
+            Ok(Err(e)) if single && !e.is_connect() => Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
+                "FIPS GET {} failed after the request may have been delivered \
+                 (not retrying over Tor): {}",
+                self.path,
+                e
+            )),
+            Err(_) if single => Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
+                "FIPS GET {} exceeded its {:?} budget after the request may have \
+                 been delivered (not retrying over Tor)",
+                self.path,
+                budget
+            )),
            Ok(Err(e)) => {
                telemetry::record_fallback(FallbackReason::ConnectFail);
                tracing::info!(
@@ -676,6 +759,7 @@ impl<'a> PeerRequest<'a> {
            .context("Invalid Tor SOCKS proxy URL")?;
        reqwest::Client::builder()
            .proxy(proxy)
+            .redirect(delivery_redirect_policy(self.single_delivery))
            .timeout(self.timeout)
            .build()
            .context("Build Tor HTTP client")
@@ -759,4 +843,181 @@ mod tests {
        let err = decode_response(0xAABB, &r, "x").unwrap_err();
        assert!(err.to_string().contains("no AAAA"));
    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_single_delivery_answer_is_final_whatever_its_status() {
+        use crate::settings::transport::TransportPref;
+        use reqwest::StatusCode;
+        // Regression (2026-09-29): the seller redeemed a paid download's
+        // token, answered 404, and the Tor fallback replayed the spent token.
+        for status in [
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+            StatusCode::OK,
+        ] {
+            assert!(fips_answer_is_final(TransportPref::Auto, true, status));
+        }
+        // Everything else keeps the existing fallback rules.
+        assert!(!fips_answer_is_final(
+            TransportPref::Auto,
+            false,
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND
+        ));
+        assert!(!fips_answer_is_final(
+            TransportPref::Auto,
+            false,
+            StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY
+        ));
+        assert!(fips_answer_is_final(
+            TransportPref::Auto,
+            false,
+            StatusCode::PAYMENT_REQUIRED
+        ));
+        assert!(fips_answer_is_final(
+            TransportPref::Fips,
+            false,
+            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND
+        ));
+    }
+
+    /// A listener that accepts connections and never answers, counting them.
+    async fn silent_peer() -> (String, std::sync::Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize>) {
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+        let seen = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
+        let counter = seen.clone();
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let mut held = Vec::new();
+            while let Ok((stream, _)) = listener.accept().await {
+                counter.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
+                held.push(stream); // keep it open, never reply
+            }
+        });
+        (format!("http://{addr}/content/x"), seen)
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_single_delivery_request_is_not_resent_after_a_timeout() {
+        let (url, seen) = silent_peer().await;
+        let c = client_with_timeout(Duration::from_millis(300));
+        let err = send_with_retry_if(c.get(&url), |e| fips_retryable(true, e))
+            .await
+            .expect_err("peer never answers");
+        assert!(err.is_timeout());
+        assert_eq!(seen.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn an_ordinary_request_is_still_retried_once_after_a_timeout() {
+        let (url, seen) = silent_peer().await;
+        let c = client_with_timeout(Duration::from_millis(300));
+        let _ = send_with_retry_if(c.get(&url), |e| fips_retryable(false, e)).await;
+        assert_eq!(seen.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst), 2);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_single_delivery_request_still_retries_a_refused_connect() {
+        // Nothing listening: the peer provably never saw the request.
+        let listener = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+        drop(listener);
+        let c = client_with_timeout(Duration::from_millis(500));
+        let err = send_with_retry_if(c.get(format!("http://{addr}/")), |e| {
+            fips_retryable(true, e)
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect_err("nothing listening");
+        assert!(err.is_connect());
+        assert!(fips_retryable(true, &err));
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod delivery_redirect_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use hyper::{
+        service::{make_service_fn, service_fn},
+        Body, Response, Server,
+    };
+    use std::{
+        convert::Infallible,
+        sync::{
+            atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering},
+            Arc,
+        },
+    };
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn paid_bearer_request_does_not_follow_redirects_but_normal_get_does() {
+        let seen = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
+        let counter = seen.clone();
+        let server = Server::bind(&([127, 0, 0, 1], 0).into());
+        let address = server.local_addr();
+        let service = make_service_fn(move |_| {
+            let counter = counter.clone();
+            async move {
+                Ok::<_, Infallible>(service_fn(move |request: hyper::Request<Body>| {
+                    let counter = counter.clone();
+                    async move {
+                        counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
+                        let response = if request.uri().path() == "/first" {
+                            Response::builder()
+                                .status(302)
+                                .header("Location", "/replay")
+                                .body(Body::empty())
+                                .unwrap()
+                        } else {
+                            Response::new(Body::from("replayed"))
+                        };
+                        Ok::<_, Infallible>(response)
+                    }
+                }))
+            }
+        });
+        let task = tokio::spawn(server.serve(service));
+        let url = format!("http://{address}/first");
+        let response = client_with_delivery_policy(Duration::from_secs(2), true)
+            .get(&url)
+            .header("X-Payment-Token", "dummy-test-token")
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(response.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::FOUND);
+        assert_eq!(seen.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
+        let response = client_with_delivery_policy(Duration::from_secs(2), false)
+            .get(url)
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(response.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(seen.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 3);
+        task.abort();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn paid_request_is_not_resent_when_peer_disconnects_after_reading_it() {
+        use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+        let seen = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
+        let counter = seen.clone();
+        let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
+            while let Ok((mut stream, _)) = listener.accept().await {
+                let mut buf = [0; 4096];
+                let _ = stream.read(&mut buf).await;
+                counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
+                drop(stream);
+            }
+        });
+        let c = client_with_delivery_policy(Duration::from_secs(2), true);
+        let error = send_with_retry_if(c.get(format!("http://{address}/")), |e| {
+            fips_retryable(true, e)
+        })
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(!error.is_connect());
+        assert_eq!(seen.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
+        task.abort();
+    }
 }
@@ -501,12 +501,12 @@ async fn check_containers() -> Vec<ContainerHealth> {
    out
 }

-fn host_tcp_ports_from_container(c: &serde_json::Value) -> Vec<u16> {
+fn host_tcp_ports_from_container(c: &serde_json::Value) -> Vec<std::net::SocketAddr> {
    let Some(ports) = c.get("Ports").and_then(|v| v.as_array()) else {
        return Vec::new();
    };

-    let mut out: Vec<u16> = ports
+    let mut out: Vec<std::net::SocketAddr> = ports
        .iter()
        .filter(|p| {
            p.get("protocol")
@@ -515,9 +515,19 @@ fn host_tcp_ports_from_container(c: &serde_json::Value) -> Vec<u16> {
                .eq_ignore_ascii_case("tcp")
        })
        .filter_map(|p| {
-            p.get("host_port")
-                .and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
-                .and_then(|port| u16::try_from(port).ok())
+            let port = p.get("host_port")?.as_u64()?;
+            let port = u16::try_from(port).ok().filter(|port| *port != 0)?;
+            let bind = p.get("host_ip").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
+            // Wildcard listeners are reachable through the corresponding
+            // loopback family. Explicit binds must be probed at that address:
+            // probing a WireGuard-only port on 127.0.0.1 creates false failures
+            // and endlessly restarts an otherwise healthy app.
+            let address: std::net::IpAddr = match bind {
+                "" | "0.0.0.0" => "127.0.0.1".parse().ok()?,
+                "::" => "::1".parse().ok()?,
+                explicit => explicit.parse().ok()?,
+            };
+            Some(std::net::SocketAddr::new(address, port))
        })
        .collect();
    out.sort_unstable();
@@ -525,11 +535,11 @@ fn host_tcp_ports_from_container(c: &serde_json::Value) -> Vec<u16> {
    out
 }

-async fn host_ports_ready(ports: &[u16]) -> bool {
+async fn host_ports_ready(ports: &[std::net::SocketAddr]) -> bool {
    for port in ports {
        let ready = tokio::time::timeout(
            std::time::Duration::from_secs(2),
-            tokio::net::TcpStream::connect(("127.0.0.1", *port)),
+            tokio::net::TcpStream::connect(*port),
        )
        .await
        .is_ok_and(|r| r.is_ok());
@@ -1662,4 +1672,51 @@ mod tests {
            "Prefetcher:catching up to daemon height 953,480"
        ));
    }
+    #[test]
+    fn published_port_probes_preserve_explicit_bind_addresses() {
+        let c = serde_json::json!({"Ports": [
+            {"host_ip":"127.0.0.1","host_port":8081,"protocol":"tcp"},
+            {"host_ip":"10.77.0.2","host_port":18081,"protocol":"tcp"},
+            {"host_ip":"10.77.0.2","host_port":18443,"protocol":"tcp"},
+            {"host_ip":"::1","host_port":8082,"protocol":"tcp"}
+        ]});
+        let targets = host_tcp_ports_from_container(&c);
+        for target in [
+            "127.0.0.1:8081",
+            "10.77.0.2:18081",
+            "10.77.0.2:18443",
+            "[::1]:8082",
+        ] {
+            assert!(targets.contains(&target.parse().unwrap()));
+        }
+        assert!(!targets.contains(&"127.0.0.1:18081".parse().unwrap()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn published_port_probes_normalize_wildcards_and_ignore_invalid_entries() {
+        let c = serde_json::json!({"Ports": [
+            {"host_ip":"0.0.0.0","host_port":8080},
+            {"host_ip":"","host_port":8080},
+            {"host_ip":"::","host_port":8080},
+            {"host_ip":"10.0.0.1","host_port":53,"protocol":"udp"},
+            {"host_ip":"bad","host_port":8080},
+            {"host_port":0}, {"host_port":65536}, {"container_port":80}
+        ]});
+        let targets = host_tcp_ports_from_container(&c);
+        assert_eq!(targets.len(), 2);
+        assert!(targets.contains(&"127.0.0.1:8080".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(targets.contains(&"[::1]:8080".parse().unwrap()));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn health_probe_reaches_non_default_loopback_and_detects_closed_port() {
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.2:0").await.unwrap();
+        let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+        assert!(host_ports_ready(&[address]).await);
+        // Same port, wrong local address reproduces the former false failure.
+        let wrong = std::net::SocketAddr::new("127.0.0.1".parse().unwrap(), address.port());
+        assert!(!host_ports_ready(&[wrong]).await);
+        drop(listener);
+        assert!(!host_ports_ready(&[address]).await);
+    }
 }
@@ -256,6 +256,10 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
            boot_report.recovered, boot_report.total, boot_report.failed
        );
    }
+    // Disk manifests must be stable before the initial load and all later
+    // catalog reloads. Do not move this into the background doctor bootstrap.
+    bootstrap::ensure_runtime_assets_ready().await;
+
    // Construct the container orchestrator once. In prod mode we load the
    // on-disk app manifests, do an initial adoption pass, and spawn the
    // BootReconciler loop (Step 5/6 of the rust-orchestrator migration).
@@ -1765,12 +1765,17 @@ fn merge_preserving_transitional(
    };

    crate::data_model::PackageDataEntry {
-        state,
+        state: state.clone(),
        // install_progress and uninstall_stage are also owned by the
        // initiating op (same reason as state) — keep them.
        install_progress: existing.install_progress.clone(),
        uninstall_stage: existing.uninstall_stage.clone(),
        // Everything else comes from the fresh scan.
+        ui_ready: if state == crate::data_model::PackageState::Running {
+            fresh.ui_ready
+        } else {
+            Some(false)
+        },
        health: fresh.health.clone(),
        exit_code: fresh.exit_code,
        static_files: fresh.static_files.clone(),
@@ -1809,7 +1814,10 @@ async fn scan_and_update_packages(
    absence_tracker: &mut HashMap<String, u32>,
    transitional_since: &mut HashMap<String, Instant>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
-    let mut packages = scanner.scan_containers().await?;
+    let (before_scan, _) = state.get_snapshot().await;
+    let mut packages = scanner
+        .scan_containers(data_dir, &before_scan.package_data)
+        .await?;
    let user_stopped = crate::crash_recovery::load_user_stopped(data_dir).await;
    for (id, pkg) in packages.iter_mut() {
        if pkg.state == crate::data_model::PackageState::Exited && user_stopped.contains(id) {
@@ -1870,11 +1878,14 @@ async fn scan_and_update_packages(
    // once at load ~2). Better to keep saying "scanning…" than to say "empty".
    if packages.is_empty() && (!first_scan || !installed_registry.is_empty()) {
        if tor_changed || update_changed {
-            let mut data = current_data;
-            data.server_info.tor_address = tor_addr.clone();
-            data.server_info.node_address = tor_addr.as_ref().map(|t| identity.node_address(t));
-            data.server_info.status_info.updated = update_available;
-            state.update_data(data).await;
+            state
+                .mutate_data(|data| {
+                    data.server_info.tor_address = tor_addr.clone();
+                    data.server_info.node_address =
+                        tor_addr.as_ref().map(|t| identity.node_address(t));
+                    data.server_info.status_info.updated = update_available;
+                })
+                .await;
        }
        return Ok(());
    }
@@ -1899,6 +1910,13 @@ async fn scan_and_update_packages(
    // died without cleanup and let the scan override it.
    let now = Instant::now();
    for (id, pkg) in &packages {
+        if user_uninstalled.contains(id)
+            || user_uninstalled.contains(&format!("archy-{id}"))
+            || (before_scan.package_data.contains_key(id)
+                && !current_data.package_data.contains_key(id))
+        {
+            continue;
+        }
        absence_tracker.remove(id);
        let existing = merged.get(id);
        let overwrite = match existing {
@@ -2054,22 +2072,40 @@ async fn scan_and_update_packages(
    }

    if changed || tor_changed || first_scan || update_changed {
-        let mut data = current_data;
-        data.package_data = merged;
-        data.server_info.tor_address = tor_addr.clone();
-        data.server_info.node_address = tor_addr.as_ref().map(|t| identity.node_address(t));
-        data.server_info.status_info.containers_scanned = true;
-        data.server_info.status_info.updated = update_available;
-        state.update_data(data).await;
-        debug!(
-            "📦 State changed (packages={}, tor={}, first_scan={}, update={}), broadcasting update",
-            changed, tor_changed, first_scan, update_changed
-        );
+        state
+            .mutate_data(|data| {
+                // A lifecycle operation may have started/finished while this scan
+                // awaited probes or disk I/O. Never overwrite that newer entry or
+                // resurrect one that an uninstall removed in the meantime.
+                apply_scanned_packages(&mut data.package_data, &current_data.package_data, &merged);
+                data.server_info.tor_address = tor_addr.clone();
+                data.server_info.node_address = tor_addr.as_ref().map(|t| identity.node_address(t));
+                data.server_info.status_info.containers_scanned = true;
+                data.server_info.status_info.updated = update_available;
+            })
+            .await;
    }

    Ok(())
 }

+fn apply_scanned_packages(
+    latest: &mut HashMap<String, crate::data_model::PackageDataEntry>,
+    base: &HashMap<String, crate::data_model::PackageDataEntry>,
+    scanned: &HashMap<String, crate::data_model::PackageDataEntry>,
+) {
+    for (id, fresh) in scanned {
+        if latest.get(id) == base.get(id) {
+            latest.insert(id.clone(), fresh.clone());
+        }
+    }
+    for id in base.keys() {
+        if !scanned.contains_key(id) && latest.get(id) == base.get(id) {
+            latest.remove(id);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 async fn normalize_reachable_package_health(
    packages: &mut HashMap<String, crate::data_model::PackageDataEntry>,
 ) {
@@ -2268,6 +2304,7 @@ mod merge_tests {

    fn make_entry(state: PackageState, health: Option<&str>) -> PackageDataEntry {
        PackageDataEntry {
+            ui_ready: None,
            state,
            health: health.map(|s| s.to_string()),
            exit_code: None,
@@ -2280,6 +2317,37 @@ mod merge_tests {
        }
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn stale_scan_cannot_remove_new_installs_or_overwrite_lifecycle_changes() {
+        let running = make_entry(PackageState::Running, Some("healthy"));
+        let restarting = make_entry(PackageState::Restarting, None);
+        let base = [
+            ("restart".into(), running.clone()),
+            ("uninstalled".into(), running.clone()),
+        ]
+        .into_iter()
+        .collect();
+        let mut latest = [
+            ("restart".into(), restarting.clone()),
+            ("new".into(), running.clone()),
+        ]
+        .into_iter()
+        .collect();
+        let scanned = [
+            ("restart".into(), running.clone()),
+            ("uninstalled".into(), running.clone()),
+        ]
+        .into_iter()
+        .collect();
+        apply_scanned_packages(&mut latest, &base, &scanned);
+        assert_eq!(latest.get("restart"), Some(&restarting));
+        assert_eq!(latest.get("new"), Some(&running));
+        assert!(!latest.contains_key("uninstalled"));
+        apply_scanned_packages(&mut latest, &base, &HashMap::new());
+        assert_eq!(latest.get("restart"), Some(&restarting));
+        assert!(latest.contains_key("new"));
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn peer_path_filter_allows_content_catalog_and_items() {
        // Regression: the content *catalog* is exactly "/content" (no trailing
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+//! Install-time pruning preference, shared by Bitcoin Core and Knots.
+//! Missing preference preserves the existing disk-based automatic selection.
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::path::Path;
+
+#[derive(Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct BitcoinStorage {
+    pub prune: bool,
+}
+
+pub async fn load(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<BitcoinStorage> {
+    match tokio::fs::read(data_dir.join("settings/bitcoin-storage.json")).await {
+        Ok(bytes) => serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).context("Invalid Bitcoin storage settings"),
+        Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(BitcoinStorage::default()),
+        Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn save(data_dir: &Path, prune: bool) -> Result<()> {
+    let dir = data_dir.join("settings");
+    tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).await?;
+    let path = dir.join("bitcoin-storage.json");
+    let temporary = dir.join("bitcoin-storage.json.tmp");
+    tokio::fs::write(&temporary, serde_json::to_vec(&BitcoinStorage { prune })?).await?;
+    tokio::fs::rename(temporary, path).await?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn missing_setting_keeps_auto_and_explicit_pruning_survives_reload() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        assert!(!load(dir.path()).await.unwrap().prune);
+        save(dir.path(), true).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(load(dir.path()).await.unwrap().prune);
+        save(dir.path(), false).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(!load(dir.path()).await.unwrap().prune);
+    }
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn corrupt_setting_is_not_silently_changed_to_archival() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        save(dir.path(), true).await.unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::write(dir.path().join("settings/bitcoin-storage.json"), "broken")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(load(dir.path()).await.is_err());
+    }
+}
@@ -7,3 +7,5 @@
 pub mod ai_permissions;
 pub mod session_policy;
 pub mod transport;
+
+pub mod bitcoin_storage;
@@ -54,6 +54,21 @@ impl StateManager {
        let _ = self.broadcast_tx.send(message);
    }

+    /// Apply a small state change while holding the write lock. A lifecycle
+    /// task must not replace the entire model from an earlier snapshot.
+    pub async fn mutate_data<T>(&self, change: impl FnOnce(&mut DataModel) -> T) -> T {
+        let mut data = self.data.write().await;
+        let result = change(&mut data);
+        let mut rev = self.revision.write().await;
+        *rev += 1;
+        let _ = self.broadcast_tx.send(WebSocketMessage {
+            rev: *rev,
+            data: Some(data.clone()),
+            patch: None,
+        });
+        result
+    }
+
    /// Get a WebSocket message with the current state
    pub async fn get_initial_message(&self) -> WebSocketMessage {
        let (data, rev) = self.get_snapshot().await;
@@ -190,3 +205,29 @@ mod tests {
        assert_eq!(rev, 1);
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod atomic_mutation_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn concurrent_updates_preserve_independent_entries() {
+        let state = Arc::new(StateManager::new());
+        let mut tasks = Vec::new();
+        for i in 0..24 {
+            let state = state.clone();
+            tasks.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
+                state
+                    .mutate_data(|data| {
+                        data.peer_health.insert(format!("peer-{i}"), true);
+                    })
+                    .await;
+            }));
+        }
+        for task in tasks {
+            task.await.unwrap();
+        }
+        let (data, revision) = state.get_snapshot().await;
+        assert_eq!(data.peer_health.len(), 24);
+        assert_eq!(revision, 24);
+    }
+}
@@ -1481,6 +1481,21 @@ pub async fn cancel_download(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
 /// service unit that inherits systemd's default protections (i.e. none
 /// of ours), escaping the namespace.
 pub(crate) async fn host_sudo(args: &[&str]) -> Result<std::process::ExitStatus> {
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    {
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            std::env::var("ARCHY_TEST_ISOLATED").as_deref() == Ok("1"),
+            "Host-operation tests require scripts/test-backend-isolated.sh"
+        );
+        let (program, args) = args.split_first().context("Missing test command")?;
+        // Run inside the test namespace, never escape through sudo/systemd-run.
+        return tokio::process::Command::new(program)
+            .args(args)
+            .status()
+            .await
+            .context("isolated test command failed");
+    }
+
    let mut full: Vec<&str> = vec![
        "systemd-run",
        "--wait",
@@ -1505,6 +1520,21 @@ pub(crate) async fn host_sudo(args: &[&str]) -> Result<std::process::ExitStatus>
 /// Same mechanism as `host_sudo` but captures stdout — for read-only probes
 /// (e.g. `stat`) where the answer is in the output, not the exit status.
 pub(crate) async fn host_sudo_output(args: &[&str]) -> Result<std::process::Output> {
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    {
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            std::env::var("ARCHY_TEST_ISOLATED").as_deref() == Ok("1"),
+            "Host-operation tests require scripts/test-backend-isolated.sh"
+        );
+        let (program, args) = args.split_first().context("Missing test command")?;
+        // Run inside the test namespace, never escape through sudo/systemd-run.
+        return tokio::process::Command::new(program)
+            .args(args)
+            .output()
+            .await
+            .context("isolated test command failed");
+    }
+
    let mut full: Vec<&str> = vec![
        "systemd-run",
        "--wait",
@@ -2159,20 +2189,25 @@ async fn apply_per_app_auto_updates(
    }
 }

-/// After a catalog refresh that changed the cached bytes, rebuild the
-/// orchestrator's manifest map so registry-shipped manifest changes take
-/// effect now instead of at the next service restart.
-async fn reload_manifests_if_changed(
-    refresh: crate::container::app_catalog::CatalogRefresh,
+/// Reload after every successful refresh, including unchanged bytes: the cache
+/// may have been written before a previous reload failed. Auto-updates only run
+/// when the catalog and the orchestrator's manifests are ready together.
+async fn reload_catalog_manifests(
+    _refresh: crate::container::app_catalog::CatalogRefresh,
    orchestrator: &Option<std::sync::Arc<dyn crate::container::traits::ContainerOrchestrator>>,
-) {
-    if !refresh.changed {
-        return;
-    }
-    let Some(orch) = orchestrator else { return };
+) -> bool {
+    let Some(orch) = orchestrator else {
+        return false;
+    };
    match orch.reload_manifests().await {
-        Ok(n) => info!("Update scheduler: catalog changed, reloaded {n} manifest(s)"),
-        Err(e) => warn!("Update scheduler: manifest reload after catalog change failed: {e}"),
+        Ok(n) => {
+            info!("Update scheduler: refreshed catalog, reloaded {n} manifest(s)");
+            true
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            warn!("Update scheduler: manifest reload failed; skipping auto-updates: {e}");
+            false
+        }
    }
 }

@@ -2188,7 +2223,9 @@ pub async fn run_update_scheduler(
    // Refresh the app catalog once at startup so per-app "update available"
    // badges appear without waiting for the first hourly tick.
    match crate::container::app_catalog::refresh_catalog(&data_dir).await {
-        Ok(refresh) => reload_manifests_if_changed(refresh, &orchestrator).await,
+        Ok(refresh) => {
+            reload_catalog_manifests(refresh, &orchestrator).await;
+        }
        Err(e) => debug!(
            "Update scheduler: initial app-catalog refresh failed: {}",
            e
@@ -2204,14 +2241,22 @@ pub async fn run_update_scheduler(
        // previously cached catalog stays in place (origin-always-wins).
        // A changed catalog also reloads the orchestrator's manifest overlay so
        // catalog-shipped manifest fixes apply without a service restart.
-        match crate::container::app_catalog::refresh_catalog(&data_dir).await {
-            Ok(refresh) => reload_manifests_if_changed(refresh, &orchestrator).await,
-            Err(e) => debug!("Update scheduler: app-catalog refresh failed: {}", e),
-        }
+        let catalog_ready = match crate::container::app_catalog::refresh_catalog(&data_dir).await {
+            Ok(refresh) => reload_catalog_manifests(refresh, &orchestrator).await,
+            Err(e) => {
+                debug!(
+                    "Update scheduler: app-catalog refresh failed; skipping auto-updates: {}",
+                    e
+                );
+                false
+            }
+        };

-        // Per-app auto-update-to-latest (multi-version support). Runs every tick
-        // regardless of the binary-OTA schedule below; opt-in + pin-respecting.
-        apply_per_app_auto_updates(&orchestrator).await;
+        // Per-app updates require fresh, loaded manifests; a failed refresh
+        // may still show cached badges but must not trigger container changes.
+        if catalog_ready {
+            apply_per_app_auto_updates(&orchestrator).await;
+        }

        let state = match load_state(&data_dir).await {
            Ok(s) => s,
@@ -775,7 +775,9 @@ pub async fn send_token_at(data_dir: &Path, mint_url: &str, amount_sats: u64) ->
        let mut all_target: Vec<u64> = send_denoms.clone();
        all_target.extend(&change_denoms);

-        let swap_result = client.swap(&selected_proofs, &all_target).await?;
+        let swap_result = client
+            .swap_at_least(&selected_proofs, &all_target, amount_sats)
+            .await?;

        // Mark original proofs as spent
        wallet.mark_spent(&indices);
@@ -1192,7 +1194,11 @@ pub async fn receive_token(data_dir: &Path, token_str: &str) -> Result<u64> {
    // Verify all mints in the token are accepted
    let accepted = load_accepted_mints(data_dir).await?;
    for mint_url in token.mint_urls() {
-        if !accepted.mints.iter().any(|m| m == mint_url) {
+        if !accepted
+            .mints
+            .iter()
+            .any(|m| m.trim_end_matches('/') == mint_url.trim_end_matches('/'))
+        {
            anyhow::bail!("Mint '{}' is not in accepted mints list", mint_url);
        }
    }
@@ -1205,6 +1211,7 @@ pub async fn receive_token(data_dir: &Path, token_str: &str) -> Result<u64> {
    // for the log. Remember the last one so a total failure can tell the user
    // *why* instead of just "nothing was received".
    let mut last_reason: Option<String> = None;
+    let mut all_already_redeemed = true;

    // Swap proofs at each mint
    for entry in &token.token {
@@ -1216,7 +1223,8 @@ pub async fn receive_token(data_dir: &Path, token_str: &str) -> Result<u64> {
                received_total += amount;
            }
            Err(e) => {
-                warn!("Failed to swap proofs from mint {}: {:#}", entry.mint, e);
+                warn!("Failed to swap proofs from mint {}: {}", entry.mint, e);
+                all_already_redeemed &= e.is::<super::mint_client::AlreadyRedeemed>();
                last_reason = Some(e.to_string());
                // Continue with other mints if any
            }
@@ -1224,10 +1232,7 @@ pub async fn receive_token(data_dir: &Path, token_str: &str) -> Result<u64> {
    }

    if received_total == 0 {
-        match last_reason {
-            Some(reason) => anyhow::bail!("Could not receive this ecash: {}", reason),
-            None => anyhow::bail!("Failed to receive any proofs from token"),
-        }
+        return Err(receive_failure(last_reason, all_already_redeemed));
    }

    wallet.record_tx(
@@ -1243,6 +1248,17 @@ pub async fn receive_token(data_dir: &Path, token_str: &str) -> Result<u64> {
    Ok(received_total)
 }

+fn receive_failure(last_reason: Option<String>, all_already_redeemed: bool) -> anyhow::Error {
+    match last_reason {
+        Some(reason) if all_already_redeemed => {
+            anyhow::Error::new(super::mint_client::AlreadyRedeemed)
+                .context(format!("Could not receive this ecash: {reason}"))
+        }
+        Some(reason) => anyhow::anyhow!("Could not receive this ecash: {reason}"),
+        None => anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to receive any proofs from token"),
+    }
+}
+
 /// Receive a legacy format token (cashuSend_{amount}_{uuid}_{timestamp}).
 /// For backwards compatibility during migration period.
 async fn receive_legacy_token(data_dir: &Path, token_str: &str) -> Result<u64> {
@@ -1288,22 +1304,10 @@ pub async fn verify_and_receive_payment(
    token_str: &str,
    required_sats: u64,
 ) -> Result<u64> {
-    // Handle legacy tokens
+    let token_str = token_str.trim();
+    // Synthetic legacy balances are not cryptographic proof of payment.
    if token_str.starts_with("cashuSend_") {
-        let amount = token_str
-            .split('_')
-            .nth(1)
-            .and_then(|s| s.parse::<u64>().ok())
-            .unwrap_or(0);
-        if amount < required_sats {
-            anyhow::bail!(
-                "Insufficient payment: {} sats, need {} sats",
-                amount,
-                required_sats
-            );
-        }
-        let received = receive_legacy_token(data_dir, token_str).await?;
-        return Ok(received);
+        anyhow::bail!("Legacy ecash cannot authorize a paid download");
    }

    // Fedimint notes (#3): a buyer whose balance is in Fedimint pays with notes
@@ -1326,52 +1330,45 @@ pub async fn verify_and_receive_payment(

    // Parse and validate the token (cashuA or cashuB)
    let token = CashuToken::deserialize(token_str)?;
-    let total = token.total_amount();
-
+    if token.unit.as_deref().unwrap_or("sat") != "sat" {
+        anyhow::bail!("Payment must be denominated in sats");
+    }
+    // A sale must redeem atomically at one mint. Otherwise a later mint
+    // failure can consume earlier inputs without delivering the purchase.
+    let entry = match token.token.as_slice() {
+        [entry] => entry,
+        _ => anyhow::bail!("Use a single-mint token for this payment"),
+    };
+    let total = entry
+        .proofs
+        .iter()
+        .try_fold(0u64, |sum, p| sum.checked_add(p.amount))
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Payment amount overflow"))?;
    if total < required_sats {
-        anyhow::bail!(
-            "Insufficient payment: {} sats, need {} sats",
-            total,
-            required_sats
-        );
+        anyhow::bail!("Insufficient payment: {total} sats, need {required_sats} sats");
    }
-
-    // Verify mints are accepted
    let accepted = load_accepted_mints(data_dir).await?;
-    for mint_url in token.mint_urls() {
-        if !accepted.mints.iter().any(|m| m == mint_url) {
-            anyhow::bail!("Mint '{}' not accepted", mint_url);
-        }
+    if !accepted
+        .mints
+        .iter()
+        .any(|m| m.trim_end_matches('/') == entry.mint.trim_end_matches('/'))
+    {
+        anyhow::bail!("Mint is not in the seller's accepted mints list");
    }

-    // Swap proofs at mint (this verifies they're unspent and gives us fresh proofs)
+    let client = mint_client(data_dir, &entry.mint).await?;
+    let result = client
+        .swap_at_least(
+            &entry.proofs,
+            &amount_to_denominations(total),
+            required_sats,
+        )
+        .await?;
+    let received_total = result.new_proofs.iter().map(|p| p.amount).sum();
+    // Load after the network call, so an unrelated wallet update during the
+    // swap is not overwritten with a pre-swap snapshot.
    let mut wallet = load_wallet(data_dir).await?;
-    let mut received_total = 0u64;
-
-    for entry in &token.token {
-        let client = mint_client(data_dir, &entry.mint).await?;
-        let entry_total: u64 = entry.proofs.iter().map(|p| p.amount).sum();
-        let target_amounts = amount_to_denominations(entry_total);
-
-        match client.swap(&entry.proofs, &target_amounts).await {
-            Ok(result) => {
-                let amount: u64 = result.new_proofs.iter().map(|p| p.amount).sum();
-                wallet.add_proofs(&entry.mint, result.new_proofs);
-                received_total += amount;
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                warn!("Payment verification failed at mint {}: {}", entry.mint, e);
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    if received_total < required_sats {
-        anyhow::bail!(
-            "Payment verification failed: only {} of {} sats verified",
-            received_total,
-            required_sats
-        );
-    }
+    wallet.add_proofs(entry.mint.trim_end_matches('/'), result.new_proofs);

    wallet.record_tx(
        TransactionType::Receive,
@@ -1632,6 +1629,18 @@ fn default_mint_url() -> String {

 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
+    #[test]
+    fn mixed_mint_failures_do_not_discard_a_retryable_claim() {
+        let reason = super::super::mint_client::ALREADY_REDEEMED_MSG.to_string();
+        assert!(super::receive_failure(Some(reason.clone()), true)
+            .is::<super::super::mint_client::AlreadyRedeemed>());
+        assert!(!super::receive_failure(Some(reason), false)
+            .is::<super::super::mint_client::AlreadyRedeemed>());
+        assert!(
+            !super::receive_failure(None, true).is::<super::super::mint_client::AlreadyRedeemed>()
+        );
+    }
+
    use super::*;
    use tempfile::TempDir;

@@ -2443,3 +2452,7 @@ mod tests {
        assert_eq!(w.mint_url, "https://mint.minibits.cash/Bitcoin");
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[path = "payment_tests.rs"]
+mod payment_tests;
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@
 //! key, a crash mid-loop) must not silently lose the coins, so every fetched
 //! token is persisted to `MinibitsState::pending_claims` *before* decrypt/
 //! redeem is attempted, and stays there — retried on every later poll — until
-//! it succeeds. `ClaimOutcome::failed_count` reports how many are still
+//! it succeeds or every mint reports that it was already spent.
+//! `ClaimOutcome::failed_count` reports how many are still
 //! stuck so the caller can surface it instead of it being a log-only event.
 //! Separately, `ensure_mint_accepted` keeps the Minibits mint on the node's
 //! accepted-mints allow-list: the address is inherently backed by that one
@@ -167,6 +168,9 @@ pub struct MinibitsState {
    /// already-spent token) but wasteful and noisy.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub last_dm_seen_at: u64,
+    /// Resume a bounded backward scan before advancing to newer relay events.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub relay_scan: Option<RelayScan>,
    /// Event ids already queued from the relay. `created_at` has only
    /// one-second resolution, so a strict `since = last + 1` watermark can
    /// permanently miss a second payment published later in the same second.
@@ -627,6 +631,7 @@ async fn register_new_state(
        created_at: chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
        pending_claims: Vec::new(),
        last_dm_seen_at: 0,
+        relay_scan: None,
        seen_dm_ids: Vec::new(),
        last_receipt_id: 0,
        last_receipt_sats: 0,
@@ -652,6 +657,16 @@ pub struct ClaimOutcome {
    pub receipt_at: u64,
 }

+/// True when `ecash::receive_token` failed because the token was already
+/// redeemed (mint error 11001, see `mint_client::describe_mint_error_code`) —
+/// a terminal condition, not a reason to retry. Seen on a deployed node,
+/// 2026-09-15: a claim that had already been swept kept failing this way on
+/// every poll forever, since nothing distinguished it from a transient
+/// failure worth retrying.
+fn is_already_redeemed(err: &anyhow::Error) -> bool {
+    err.is::<super::mint_client::AlreadyRedeemed>()
+}
+
 const NO_CLAIMS: ClaimOutcome = ClaimOutcome {
    claimed_count: 0,
    received_sats: 0,
@@ -697,38 +712,58 @@ fn outcome_with_latest_receipt(
 /// three real payments that `/claim` never surfaced. Best-effort: a relay
 /// error here must not abort the poll, since `pending_claims` may still hold
 /// earlier fetches worth retrying.
+///
+/// Queries `RELAY_URL` (the service's own relay) alone first — the happy
+/// path for a poll is one WebSocket connection, not three, and the wallet's
+/// derived Nostr pubkey isn't broadcast to the public fallback relays unless
+/// it's actually needed. Only when that relay is unreachable does it fall
+/// back to all of `CLAIM_RELAY_URLS`. Results are paged (capped at
+/// `CLAIM_MAX_PAGES`) since a relay returns only the newest `limit` events for
+/// a filter. A durable backward cursor keeps older pages reachable even after
+/// newly queued claims advance the normal forward watermark.
 async fn fetch_relay_dms(
    our_pubkey: nostr_sdk::PublicKey,
    server_pubkey: nostr_sdk::PublicKey,
    since: u64,
-) -> Vec<(String, u64, String, String)> {
+    resume: Option<RelayScan>,
+) -> RelayBatch {
    let client = Client::default();
-    for url in CLAIM_RELAY_URLS {
-        if let Err(e) = client.add_relay(*url).await {
-            warn!("Minibits: could not add relay {url}: {e}");
+    if let Err(e) = client.add_relay(RELAY_URL).await {
+        warn!("Minibits: could not add relay {RELAY_URL}: {e}");
+    }
+    let primary_reachable = client
+        .try_connect_relay(RELAY_URL, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3))
+        .await
+        .is_ok();
+    if !primary_reachable {
+        warn!("Minibits: primary relay {RELAY_URL} unreachable, falling back to public relays too");
+        for url in &CLAIM_RELAY_URLS[1..] {
+            if let Err(e) = client.add_relay(*url).await {
+                warn!("Minibits: could not add relay {url}: {e}");
+            }
        }
+        client.connect().await;
    }
-    client.connect().await;
    // Give relays a moment to finish the WebSocket handshake before the
    // fetch's own timeout starts consuming that time.
    tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(400)).await;

-    // Nostr timestamps have one-second resolution. Query the boundary second
-    // inclusively: a later-published payment may legitimately share that
-    // timestamp. `seen_dm_ids` performs the exact deduplication locally.
-    let filter = Filter::new()
-        .author(server_pubkey)
-        .pubkey(our_pubkey)
-        .kind(Kind::from(4u16))
-        .since(Timestamp::from(since))
-        .limit(200);
-
-    let result = match client
-        .fetch_events(filter, std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
-        .await
-    {
-        Ok(events) => {
-            let mut out: Vec<(String, u64, String, String)> = events
+    let batch = collect_relay_pages(since, resume, |scan| {
+        let client = &client;
+        async move {
+            let mut filter = Filter::new()
+                .author(server_pubkey)
+                .pubkey(our_pubkey)
+                .kind(Kind::from(4u16))
+                .since(Timestamp::from(scan.since))
+                .limit(scan.limit);
+            if let Some(until) = scan.until {
+                filter = filter.until(Timestamp::from(until));
+            }
+            let events = client
+                .fetch_events(filter, std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
+                .await?;
+            Ok(events
                .into_iter()
                .map(|e| {
                    (
@@ -738,18 +773,83 @@ async fn fetch_relay_dms(
                        e.id.to_hex(),
                    )
                })
-                .collect();
-            out.sort_by_key(|(_, created_at, _, _)| *created_at);
-            out
+                .collect())
        }
-        Err(e) => {
-            warn!("Minibits: relay fetch for claim DMs failed: {e}");
-            Vec::new()
-        }
-    };
-
+    })
+    .await;
    client.shutdown().await;
-    result
+    batch
+}
+
+const CLAIM_PAGE_LIMIT: usize = 200;
+const CLAIM_MAX_PAGES: usize = 5;
+type RelayDm = (String, u64, String, String);
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct RelayScan {
+    since: u64,
+    until: Option<u64>,
+    limit: usize,
+}
+
+struct RelayBatch {
+    dms: Vec<RelayDm>,
+    resume: Option<RelayScan>,
+}
+
+/// NIP-01 returns newest events first. Walk backward with an inclusive `until`
+/// boundary, deduplicating event ids. A full boundary second needs a larger
+/// limit, not `until - 1`, which would skip payments sharing that timestamp.
+/// Persist the cursor at the page cap or on failure so older claims cannot be
+/// hidden by the newest timestamp already queued in `last_dm_seen_at`.
+async fn collect_relay_pages<F, Fut>(
+    since: u64,
+    resume: Option<RelayScan>,
+    mut fetch: F,
+) -> RelayBatch
+where
+    F: FnMut(RelayScan) -> Fut,
+    Fut: std::future::Future<Output = Result<Vec<RelayDm>>>,
+{
+    let mut scan = resume.unwrap_or(RelayScan {
+        since,
+        until: None,
+        limit: CLAIM_PAGE_LIMIT,
+    });
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    let mut ids = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+    let mut resume = Some(scan);
+    for _ in 0..CLAIM_MAX_PAGES {
+        let events = match fetch(scan).await {
+            Ok(events) => events,
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!("Minibits: relay fetch failed; preserving scan cursor: {e}");
+                break;
+            }
+        };
+        let count = events.len();
+        let oldest = events.iter().map(|e| e.1).min();
+        for event in events {
+            if ids.insert(event.3.clone()) {
+                out.push(event);
+            }
+        }
+        if count < scan.limit {
+            resume = None;
+            break;
+        }
+        if let Some(oldest) = oldest {
+            if scan.until == Some(oldest) {
+                scan.limit = scan.limit.saturating_add(CLAIM_PAGE_LIMIT);
+            } else {
+                scan.until = Some(oldest);
+                scan.limit = CLAIM_PAGE_LIMIT;
+            }
+        }
+        resume = Some(scan);
+    }
+    out.sort_by(|a, b| (a.1, &a.3).cmp(&(b.1, &b.3)));
+    RelayBatch { dms: out, resume }
 }

 fn queue_relay_dm(
@@ -907,8 +1007,15 @@ pub async fn claim_and_redeem(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<ClaimOutcome> {
    // NIP-04 DM on relays, not via `/claim` above. `since` is our own
    // watermark (Nostr events never expire off a relay, so without it we'd
    // re-fetch and re-attempt every claim ever sent on every poll).
-    let dms = fetch_relay_dms(identity.keys.public_key(), server_pk, state.last_dm_seen_at).await;
-    for (content, created_at, author, event_id) in dms {
+    let batch = fetch_relay_dms(
+        identity.keys.public_key(),
+        server_pk,
+        state.last_dm_seen_at,
+        state.relay_scan,
+    )
+    .await;
+    state.relay_scan = batch.resume;
+    for (content, created_at, author, event_id) in batch.dms {
        if author != state.server_nostr_pubkey {
            warn!("Minibits: ignoring claim DM from unexpected pubkey {author}");
            continue;
@@ -964,6 +1071,14 @@ pub async fn claim_and_redeem(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<ClaimOutcome> {
                sats += got;
                info!("Minibits: redeemed a claimed payment ({got} sats)");
            }
+            Err(e) if is_already_redeemed(&e) => {
+                // Terminal: the value was already swept (a relay-watermark
+                // replay, or a claim redeemed by an earlier run before a
+                // crash lost track of it). Retrying can never succeed, so
+                // drop it instead of leaving `failed_count` stuck non-zero
+                // forever — see archy-x250-pa3, 2026-09-15.
+                info!("Minibits mint reports this claim was already redeemed; removing it from the retry queue");
+            }
            Err(e) => {
                warn!("Minibits claim decrypted but failed to redeem ({e}); will retry next poll");
                still_pending.push(claim.clone());
@@ -994,6 +1109,123 @@ pub async fn claim_and_redeem(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<ClaimOutcome> {

 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
+    fn simulated_relay_page(events: &[RelayDm], scan: RelayScan) -> Vec<RelayDm> {
+        let mut page: Vec<_> = events
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|e| e.1 >= scan.since && scan.until.is_none_or(|until| e.1 <= until))
+            .cloned()
+            .collect();
+        page.sort_by(|a, b| b.1.cmp(&a.1).then_with(|| a.3.cmp(&b.3)));
+        page.truncate(scan.limit);
+        page
+    }
+
+    fn relay_fixture(count: usize, same_second: bool) -> Vec<RelayDm> {
+        (1..=count)
+            .map(|n| {
+                (
+                    format!("claim-{n}"),
+                    if same_second { 100 } else { n as u64 },
+                    "service".into(),
+                    format!("id-{n:06}"),
+                )
+            })
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn relay_paging_fetches_older_claims_in_newest_first_backlog() {
+        let events = relay_fixture(450, false);
+        let batch = collect_relay_pages(0, None, |scan| {
+            std::future::ready(Ok(simulated_relay_page(&events, scan)))
+        })
+        .await;
+        assert_eq!(batch.dms.len(), 450);
+        assert!(batch.resume.is_none());
+        assert_eq!(batch.dms.first().unwrap().1, 1);
+        assert_eq!(batch.dms.last().unwrap().1, 450);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn relay_paging_preserves_payments_at_the_same_timestamp() {
+        let events = relay_fixture(250, true);
+        let batch = collect_relay_pages(100, None, |scan| {
+            std::future::ready(Ok(simulated_relay_page(&events, scan)))
+        })
+        .await;
+        assert_eq!(batch.dms.len(), 250);
+        assert!(batch.resume.is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn relay_page_cap_resumes_older_claims_after_watermark_advances() {
+        let events = relay_fixture(1300, false);
+        let mut state = MinibitsState::default();
+        let first = collect_relay_pages(0, None, |scan| {
+            std::future::ready(Ok(simulated_relay_page(&events, scan)))
+        })
+        .await;
+        assert!(first.resume.is_some());
+        state.relay_scan = first.resume;
+        let mut ids = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+        for (content, time, author, id) in first.dms {
+            ids.insert(id.clone());
+            queue_relay_dm(&mut state, content, time, id, author);
+        }
+        assert_eq!(state.last_dm_seen_at, 1300);
+        let state: MinibitsState =
+            serde_json::from_str(&serde_json::to_string(&state).unwrap()).unwrap();
+        let second = collect_relay_pages(state.last_dm_seen_at, state.relay_scan, |scan| {
+            std::future::ready(Ok(simulated_relay_page(&events, scan)))
+        })
+        .await;
+        assert!(second.resume.is_none());
+        ids.extend(second.dms.into_iter().map(|e| e.3));
+        assert_eq!(ids.len(), 1300);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn relay_fetch_failure_keeps_the_unfinished_page_cursor() {
+        let events = relay_fixture(450, false);
+        let mut requests = 0;
+        let first = collect_relay_pages(0, None, |scan| {
+            requests += 1;
+            std::future::ready(if requests == 1 {
+                Ok(simulated_relay_page(&events, scan))
+            } else {
+                Err(anyhow!("relay timeout"))
+            })
+        })
+        .await;
+        assert_eq!(first.dms.len(), 200);
+        assert_eq!(first.resume.unwrap().until, Some(251));
+        let second = collect_relay_pages(450, first.resume, |scan| {
+            std::future::ready(Ok(simulated_relay_page(&events, scan)))
+        })
+        .await;
+        let ids: std::collections::HashSet<_> = first
+            .dms
+            .into_iter()
+            .chain(second.dms)
+            .map(|e| e.3)
+            .collect();
+        assert_eq!(ids.len(), 450);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn only_typed_spent_claims_are_terminal_even_with_wrapped_errors() {
+        let spent = anyhow::Error::new(super::super::mint_client::AlreadyRedeemed)
+            .context("receive token")
+            .context("claim failed");
+        assert!(is_already_redeemed(&spent));
+        assert!(!is_already_redeemed(&anyhow!(
+            super::super::mint_client::ALREADY_REDEEMED_MSG
+        )));
+        assert!(!is_already_redeemed(&anyhow!(
+            "mint temporarily unreachable"
+        )));
+    }
+
    use super::*;

    #[test]
@@ -71,10 +71,28 @@ pub struct MintResult {
 /// keyset codes shared by NUT-02/03/04/05 — the codes a swap/melt/mint call
 /// can actually hit. Returns `None` for anything else (e.g. Lightning/quote
 /// codes in the 20000s) so the caller falls back to the mint's own `detail`.
+///
+/// Text of the NUT error-code-11001 translation, exposed so callers that
+/// received an `anyhow::Error` from a receive/redeem path (e.g. a replayed
+/// Minibits claim) can recognize an already-spent token as terminal rather
+/// than retrying it forever.
+pub const ALREADY_REDEEMED_MSG: &str =
+    "This ecash has already been redeemed — it can't be claimed twice.";
+
+/// Typed terminal condition: never infer spent proofs from a mint's free text.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub(super) struct AlreadyRedeemed;
+impl std::fmt::Display for AlreadyRedeemed {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.write_str(ALREADY_REDEEMED_MSG)
+    }
+}
+impl std::error::Error for AlreadyRedeemed {}
+
 fn describe_mint_error_code(code: i64) -> Option<&'static str> {
    Some(match code {
        10001 => "The mint rejected these coins as invalid.",
-        11001 => "This ecash has already been redeemed — it can't be claimed twice.",
+        11001 => ALREADY_REDEEMED_MSG,
        11002 => "This ecash is already being redeemed elsewhere — try again in a moment.",
        11003 => "The mint already issued new coins for this exact request — there's nothing left to redeem.",
        11004 => "This request is still being processed by the mint — try again in a moment.",
@@ -124,8 +142,29 @@ fn describe_mint_error_body(status: reqwest::StatusCode, body: &str) -> String {
 /// translation layered on top via `.context()` so `{}` — what reaches the
 /// wallet user — shows something actionable instead of raw mint JSON.
 fn mint_error(op: &str, status: reqwest::StatusCode, body: &str) -> anyhow::Error {
-    let friendly = describe_mint_error_body(status, body);
-    anyhow::anyhow!("{} failed ({}): {}", op, status, body).context(friendly)
+    let cause = anyhow::anyhow!("{} failed ({}): {}", op, status, body);
+    if serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(body)
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|v| v.get("code").and_then(|c| c.as_i64()))
+        == Some(11001)
+    {
+        return cause.context(AlreadyRedeemed);
+    }
+    cause.context(describe_mint_error_body(status, body))
+}
+
+fn fee_adjusted_targets(requested: &[u64], mut available: u64) -> Vec<u64> {
+    let mut outputs = Vec::new();
+    for &amount in requested {
+        if available >= amount {
+            outputs.push(amount);
+            available -= amount;
+        } else {
+            outputs.extend(amount_to_denominations(available));
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    outputs
 }

 /// HTTP client for a single Cashu mint.
@@ -487,6 +526,21 @@ impl MintClient {
    /// Swap proofs for new proofs of different denominations.
    /// This is how we "receive" a token — swap it for fresh proofs that only we know.
    pub async fn swap(&self, inputs: &[Proof], target_amounts: &[u64]) -> Result<SwapResult> {
+        self.swap_at_least(inputs, target_amounts, 0).await
+    }
+
+    /// Refuse a payment whose mint fees would leave the seller underpaid,
+    /// before consuming any input proofs.
+    pub async fn swap_at_least(
+        &self,
+        inputs: &[Proof],
+        target_amounts: &[u64],
+        minimum: u64,
+    ) -> Result<SwapResult> {
+        // V4 tokens carry short keyset IDs. Every swap path (including paid
+        // files and streams) must expand these, not only wallet imports.
+        let resolved = self.resolve_truncated_keyset_ids(inputs).await?;
+        let inputs = resolved.as_slice();
        let keyset = self.get_active_sat_keyset().await?;

        // NUT-02: a mint may charge a per-input fee, and it rejects the swap
@@ -494,16 +548,35 @@ impl MintClient {
        // should equal outputs less fee`). Applied here rather than at each
        // call site so send, receive and cross-mint swaps are all covered.
        // Fee-free mints (Minibits) compute 0 and are unaffected.
-        let inputs_total: u64 = inputs.iter().map(|p| p.amount).sum();
-        let fee = match self.get_keysets().await {
-            Ok(ks) => super::cashu::swap_fee_for(inputs, &ks),
-            Err(e) => {
-                debug!("Could not read keyset fees ({e:#}) — assuming fee-free mint");
-                0
-            }
-        };
+        anyhow::ensure!(!inputs.is_empty(), "No input proofs to swap");
+        let inputs_total = inputs
+            .iter()
+            .try_fold(0u64, |sum, p| sum.checked_add(p.amount))
+            .context("Input amount overflow")?;
+        let keysets = self.get_keysets().await?;
+        let mut fee_ppk = 0u64;
+        for proof in inputs {
+            let input_keyset = keysets
+                .iter()
+                .find(|k| k.id == proof.id)
+                .context("The mint does not recognize an input keyset")?;
+            anyhow::ensure!(
+                input_keyset.unit == "sat",
+                "Input keyset is not denominated in sats"
+            );
+            fee_ppk = fee_ppk
+                .checked_add(input_keyset.input_fee_ppk)
+                .context("Mint fee overflow")?;
+        }
+        let fee = fee_ppk.div_ceil(1000);
        let spendable = inputs_total.saturating_sub(fee);
-        let requested: u64 = target_amounts.iter().sum();
+        if spendable < minimum {
+            anyhow::bail!("Payment would leave {spendable} sats after mint fees; need {minimum} sats. No proofs were redeemed.");
+        }
+        let requested = target_amounts
+            .iter()
+            .try_fold(0u64, |sum, amount| sum.checked_add(*amount))
+            .context("Output amount overflow")?;
        let owned_targets: Vec<u64>;
        let target_amounts: &[u64] = if requested > spendable {
            if spendable == 0 {
@@ -514,7 +587,10 @@ impl MintClient {
            debug!(
                "Reducing swap outputs {requested} -> {spendable} to cover a {fee} sat mint fee"
            );
-            owned_targets = amount_to_denominations(spendable);
+            // Callers put payment outputs before change. Keep that prefix
+            // intact while fees reduce change; re-splitting the entire sum
+            // can omit a payment denomination after consuming the inputs.
+            owned_targets = fee_adjusted_targets(target_amounts, spendable);
            &owned_targets
        } else {
            target_amounts
@@ -559,6 +635,9 @@ impl MintClient {

        let mut new_proofs = Vec::new();
        for (sig, (secret, r, amount)) in signatures.iter().zip(blinding_data.iter()) {
+            if sig.amount != *amount || sig.id != keyset.id {
+                anyhow::bail!("Mint returned a swap signature for an unexpected amount or keyset");
+            }
            let c_prime = sig.c_prime_as_pubkey()?;
            let mint_key = keyset.key_for_amount(*amount)?;
            let c = bdhke::unblind_signature(&c_prime, r, &mint_key)?;
@@ -705,43 +784,35 @@ impl MintClient {
    /// Repair proofs whose keyset id is a truncated NUT-02 **v2** id.
    ///
    /// A v2 keyset id is 33 bytes (version byte `0x01` + 32-byte hash), but
-    /// wallets written against the original 8-byte format truncate it when
-    /// they build a token. The mint then reads the `0x01` version, expects 33
+    /// compact V4 tokens carry an 8-byte short ID. The swap endpoint needs
+    /// the full ID restored from the mint's keyset list. The mint then reads the `0x01` version, expects 33
    /// bytes, and rejects the swap — reported as
    /// `inputs[0].id: NUT02: ID length invalid` behind a bare 422 (seen with
    /// a Minibits-issued token, 2026-08-17).
    ///
    /// The id only names which keyset signed the proof, so restoring the full
    /// id the mint advertises is exactly what the sender meant. It is also
-    /// safe to attempt: an id that names the wrong keyset fails signature
-    /// verification at the mint and no coins move. Anything already valid, or
-    /// with no unambiguous match, is passed through untouched so the mint's
-    /// own error is what the operator sees.
-    async fn resolve_truncated_keyset_ids(&self, proofs: &[Proof]) -> Vec<Proof> {
+    /// safe to attempt: the mint still verifies the proof signature. Unknown
+    /// or ambiguous short IDs are rejected before redemption.
+    async fn resolve_truncated_keyset_ids(&self, proofs: &[Proof]) -> Result<Vec<Proof>> {
        let needs_repair = proofs.iter().any(|p| is_truncated_v2_keyset_id(&p.id));
        if !needs_repair {
-            return proofs.to_vec();
+            return Ok(proofs.to_vec());
        }

        // The mint's own keyset list, in the reference implementation's shape
        // so its NUT-02 resolver can consume it directly.
-        let known = match self.get_cdk_keysets().await {
-            Ok(k) => k,
-            Err(e) => {
-                debug!("Could not list keysets to repair truncated keyset ids: {e:#}");
-                return proofs.to_vec();
-            }
-        };
+        let known = self.get_cdk_keysets().await?;

        proofs
            .iter()
            .cloned()
            .map(|mut p| {
-                if let Some(full) = super::cashu::resolve_keyset_id(&p.id, &known) {
-                    debug!("Expanded short keyset id {} to {} for swap", p.id, full);
-                    p.id = full;
+                if is_truncated_v2_keyset_id(&p.id) {
+                    p.id = super::cashu::resolve_keyset_id(&p.id, &known)
+                        .context("The mint cannot resolve this short keyset ID unambiguously")?;
                }
-                p
+                Ok(p)
            })
            .collect()
    }
@@ -777,7 +848,7 @@ impl MintClient {
        let mut all_new_proofs = Vec::new();

        for entry in &token.token {
-            if entry.mint != self.url {
+            if entry.mint.trim_end_matches('/') != self.url {
                debug!(
                    "Skipping proofs from different mint {} (ours: {})",
                    entry.mint, self.url
@@ -788,8 +859,7 @@ impl MintClient {
            let total: u64 = entry.proofs.iter().map(|p| p.amount).sum();
            let target_amounts = amount_to_denominations(total);

-            let proofs = self.resolve_truncated_keyset_ids(&entry.proofs).await;
-            let result = self.swap(&proofs, &target_amounts).await?;
+            let result = self.swap(&entry.proofs, &target_amounts).await?;
            all_new_proofs.extend(result.new_proofs);
        }

@@ -803,6 +873,28 @@ impl MintClient {

 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
+    #[test]
+    fn spent_condition_comes_from_code_not_remote_text_and_survives_context() {
+        let spent = super::mint_error(
+            "Swap",
+            reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            r#"{"code":11001,"detail":"Token Already Spent"}"#,
+        )
+        .context("Receive failed");
+        assert!(spent.is::<super::AlreadyRedeemed>());
+        let body =
+            serde_json::json!({"code":11002,"detail":super::ALREADY_REDEEMED_MSG}).to_string();
+        assert!(
+            !super::mint_error("Swap", reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, &body)
+                .is::<super::AlreadyRedeemed>()
+        );
+        let body = serde_json::json!({"detail":super::ALREADY_REDEEMED_MSG}).to_string();
+        assert!(
+            !super::mint_error("Swap", reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY, &body)
+                .is::<super::AlreadyRedeemed>()
+        );
+    }
+
    use super::*;

    #[test]
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+//! Real HTTP/curve-signature regressions for paid Cashu redemption.
+use super::*;
+use crate::wallet::{bdhke, cashu::Proof};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
+use hyper::{
+    service::{make_service_fn, service_fn},
+    Body, Request, Response, Server,
+};
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::{
+    convert::Infallible,
+    sync::{Arc, Mutex},
+};
+
+const ACTIVE: &str = "0011223344556677";
+const V2: &str = "011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
+
+struct Mint {
+    url: String,
+    requests: Arc<Mutex<Vec<Value>>>,
+    task: tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>,
+    failure: Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicU16>,
+}
+impl Drop for Mint {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        self.task.abort();
+    }
+}
+
+fn signing_key() -> SecretKey {
+    SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap()
+}
+fn signed_point(point: PublicKey) -> String {
+    point
+        .mul_tweak(&Secp256k1::new(), &Scalar::from(signing_key()))
+        .unwrap()
+        .to_string()
+}
+fn proof(id: &str, amount: u64) -> Proof {
+    let secret = format!("test-{id}-{amount}");
+    Proof {
+        amount,
+        id: id.into(),
+        c: signed_point(bdhke::hash_to_curve(secret.as_bytes()).unwrap()),
+        secret,
+    }
+}
+impl Mint {
+    async fn start(fee: u64, failure: Option<u16>) -> Self {
+        let listener = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+        listener.set_nonblocking(true).unwrap();
+        let url = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
+        let requests = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
+        let seen = requests.clone();
+        let failure = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicU16::new(failure.unwrap_or(0)));
+        let rejection = failure.clone();
+        let spent = Arc::new(Mutex::new(std::collections::HashSet::<String>::new()));
+        let service = make_service_fn(move |_| {
+            let seen = seen.clone();
+            let rejection = rejection.clone();
+            let spent = spent.clone();
+            async move {
+                Ok::<_, Infallible>(service_fn(move |req: Request<Body>| {
+                    let seen = seen.clone();
+                    let rejection = rejection.clone();
+                    let spent = spent.clone();
+                    async move {
+                        let mut status = 200;
+                        let body = match req.uri().path() {
+                            "/v1/keysets" => json!({"keysets":[
+                                {"id": ACTIVE,"unit":"sat","active":true,"input_fee_ppk":fee},
+                                {"id": V2,"unit":"sat","active":false,"input_fee_ppk":fee}
+                            ]}),
+                            "/v1/keys" => {
+                                let public =
+                                    PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &signing_key())
+                                        .to_string();
+                                let keys: serde_json::Map<String, Value> = (0..16)
+                                    .map(|i| ((1u64 << i).to_string(), json!(public)))
+                                    .collect();
+                                json!({"keysets":[{"id": ACTIVE,"unit":"sat","keys":keys}]})
+                            }
+                            "/v1/swap" => {
+                                let body: Value = serde_json::from_slice(
+                                    &hyper::body::to_bytes(req.into_body()).await.unwrap(),
+                                )
+                                .unwrap();
+                                seen.lock().unwrap().push(body.clone());
+                                let inputs = body["inputs"].as_array().unwrap();
+                                let outputs = body["outputs"].as_array().unwrap();
+                                let code = rejection.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
+                                if code != 0 {
+                                    status = code;
+                                    json!({"detail":"mock mint rejection"})
+                                } else if inputs.iter().any(|p| p["id"] != V2 && p["id"] != ACTIVE)
+                                {
+                                    status = 422;
+                                    json!({"detail":[{"msg":"NUT02: ID length invalid"}]})
+                                } else if inputs.iter().any(|p| {
+                                    spent
+                                        .lock()
+                                        .unwrap()
+                                        .contains(p["secret"].as_str().unwrap())
+                                }) {
+                                    status = 400;
+                                    json!({"code":11001,"detail":"Token Already Spent"})
+                                } else {
+                                    let total: u64 =
+                                        inputs.iter().map(|p| p["amount"].as_u64().unwrap()).sum();
+                                    let out: u64 =
+                                        outputs.iter().map(|p| p["amount"].as_u64().unwrap()).sum();
+                                    assert_eq!(
+                                        out,
+                                        total - (inputs.len() as u64 * fee).div_ceil(1000)
+                                    );
+                                    for p in inputs {
+                                        spent
+                                            .lock()
+                                            .unwrap()
+                                            .insert(p["secret"].as_str().unwrap().into());
+                                    }
+                                    json!({"signatures":outputs.iter().map(|o| json!({
+                                    "amount":o["amount"],"id":ACTIVE,
+                                    "C_":signed_point(o["B_"].as_str().unwrap().parse().unwrap())
+                                })).collect::<Vec<_>>()})
+                                }
+                            }
+                            _ => {
+                                status = 404;
+                                json!({})
+                            }
+                        };
+                        Ok::<_, Infallible>(
+                            Response::builder()
+                                .status(status)
+                                .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+                                .body(Body::from(body.to_string()))
+                                .unwrap(),
+                        )
+                    }
+                }))
+            }
+        });
+        let server = Server::from_tcp(listener).unwrap().serve(service);
+        let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
+            server.await.unwrap();
+        });
+        Self {
+            url,
+            requests,
+            task,
+            failure,
+        }
+    }
+    async fn wallet(&self) -> tempfile::TempDir {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        save_accepted_mints(
+            dir.path(),
+            &AcceptedMints {
+                mints: vec![format!("{}/", self.url)],
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        dir
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn paid_v4_inactive_v2_keyset_is_expanded_and_cryptographic_proofs_saved() {
+    let mint = Mint::start(0, None).await;
+    let dir = mint.wallet().await;
+    let token = CashuToken::new(&mint.url, vec![proof(V2, 64), proof(V2, 32), proof(V2, 4)])
+        .serialize_v4()
+        .unwrap();
+    let decoded = CashuToken::deserialize(&token).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        decoded.token[0].proofs[0].id.len(),
+        16,
+        "reproduce the short V4 ID"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        verify_and_receive_payment(dir.path(), &token, 100)
+            .await
+            .unwrap(),
+        100
+    );
+    let wallet = load_wallet(dir.path()).await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(wallet.balance(), 100);
+    for p in wallet.proofs {
+        assert_eq!(
+            p.proof.c,
+            signed_point(bdhke::hash_to_curve(p.proof.secret.as_bytes()).unwrap())
+        );
+    }
+    assert!(mint.requests.lock().unwrap()[0]["inputs"]
+        .as_array()
+        .unwrap()
+        .iter()
+        .all(|p| p["id"] == V2));
+    assert!(verify_and_receive_payment(dir.path(), &token, 100)
+        .await
+        .is_err());
+    assert_eq!(load_wallet(dir.path()).await.unwrap().balance(), 100);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn paid_v3_full_v2_and_v1_ids_work() {
+    for id in [V2, ACTIVE] {
+        let mint = Mint::start(0, None).await;
+        let dir = mint.wallet().await;
+        let token = CashuToken::new(&mint.url, vec![proof(id, 128)])
+            .serialize()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            verify_and_receive_payment(dir.path(), &token, 100)
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            128
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn fees_cannot_consume_underpayment_and_allowed_fees_credit_actual_value() {
+    let mint = Mint::start(1000, None).await;
+    let dir = mint.wallet().await;
+    let token = CashuToken::new(&mint.url, vec![proof(V2, 128)])
+        .serialize_v4()
+        .unwrap();
+    assert!(verify_and_receive_payment(dir.path(), &token, 128)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err()
+        .to_string()
+        .contains("after mint fees"));
+    assert!(mint.requests.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+    assert_eq!(
+        verify_and_receive_payment(dir.path(), &token, 127)
+            .await
+            .unwrap(),
+        127
+    );
+    assert_eq!(load_wallet(dir.path()).await.unwrap().balance(), 127);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn rejected_mint_response_does_not_credit_wallet() {
+    for status in [200, 400, 422, 500, 503] {
+        let mint = Mint::start(0, Some(status)).await;
+        let dir = mint.wallet().await;
+        let token = CashuToken::new(&mint.url, vec![proof(V2, 128)])
+            .serialize_v4()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(verify_and_receive_payment(dir.path(), &token, 100)
+            .await
+            .is_err());
+        assert_eq!(load_wallet(dir.path()).await.unwrap().balance(), 0);
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn invalid_untrusted_multimint_and_underpaid_tokens_never_reach_swap() {
+    let mint = Mint::start(0, None).await;
+    let dir = mint.wallet().await;
+    let token = CashuToken::new(&mint.url, vec![proof(V2, 128)]);
+    let mut invalid = vec![
+        "cashuSend_500_abc_1700000000".into(),
+        "cashuBinvalid".into(),
+    ];
+    let mut wrong_unit = token.clone();
+    wrong_unit.unit = Some("usd".into());
+    invalid.push(wrong_unit.serialize().unwrap());
+    let mut multi = token.clone();
+    multi.token.push(token.token[0].clone());
+    invalid.push(multi.serialize().unwrap());
+    let mut untrusted = token.clone();
+    untrusted.token[0].mint = "http://127.0.0.1:1".into();
+    invalid.push(untrusted.serialize().unwrap());
+    for id in ["00ffffffffffffff", "01ffffffffffffff"] {
+        invalid.push(
+            CashuToken::new(&mint.url, vec![proof(id, 128)])
+                .serialize()
+                .unwrap(),
+        );
+    }
+    for value in invalid {
+        assert!(verify_and_receive_payment(dir.path(), &value, 100)
+            .await
+            .is_err());
+    }
+    assert!(
+        verify_and_receive_payment(dir.path(), &token.serialize().unwrap(), 129)
+            .await
+            .is_err()
+    );
+    assert!(mint.requests.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+    assert_eq!(load_wallet(dir.path()).await.unwrap().balance(), 0);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn buyer_token_rejected_by_seller_can_be_refunded_without_balance_loss() {
+    let mint = Mint::start(0, Some(422)).await;
+    let buyer = mint.wallet().await;
+    let seller = mint.wallet().await;
+    let mut wallet = load_wallet(buyer.path()).await.unwrap();
+    wallet.mint_url = mint.url.clone();
+    wallet.add_proofs(&mint.url, vec![proof(V2, 64), proof(V2, 32), proof(V2, 4)]);
+    save_wallet(buyer.path(), &wallet).await.unwrap();
+    let token = send_token(buyer.path(), 100).await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(load_wallet(buyer.path()).await.unwrap().balance(), 0);
+    assert!(verify_and_receive_payment(seller.path(), &token, 100)
+        .await
+        .is_err());
+    mint.failure.store(0, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
+    assert_eq!(receive_token(buyer.path(), &token).await.unwrap(), 100);
+    assert_eq!(load_wallet(buyer.path()).await.unwrap().balance(), 100);
+    assert_eq!(load_wallet(seller.path()).await.unwrap().balance(), 0);
+    assert!(receive_token(buyer.path(), &token).await.is_err());
+    assert_eq!(load_wallet(buyer.path()).await.unwrap().balance(), 100);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn unreachable_mint_does_not_credit_seller() {
+    let mint = Mint::start(0, None).await;
+    let dir = mint.wallet().await;
+    let token = CashuToken::new(&mint.url, vec![proof(V2, 128)])
+        .serialize_v4()
+        .unwrap();
+    mint.task.abort();
+    tokio::task::yield_now().await;
+    assert!(verify_and_receive_payment(dir.path(), &token, 100)
+        .await
+        .is_err());
+    assert_eq!(load_wallet(dir.path()).await.unwrap().balance(), 0);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn send_with_fees_preserves_payment_denominations_and_saves_change() {
+    // 128 inputs - 2 fee = 126. Splitting 126 as one sum omits 1,
+    // which is needed for a 65-sat payment, after consuming the inputs.
+    let mint = Mint::start(1000, None).await;
+    let buyer = mint.wallet().await;
+    let mut wallet = load_wallet(buyer.path()).await.unwrap();
+    wallet.mint_url = mint.url.clone();
+    let first = proof(V2, 64);
+    let mut second = first.clone();
+    second.secret.push_str("-second");
+    second.c = signed_point(bdhke::hash_to_curve(second.secret.as_bytes()).unwrap());
+    wallet.add_proofs(&mint.url, vec![first, second]);
+    save_wallet(buyer.path(), &wallet).await.unwrap();
+    let encoded = send_token(buyer.path(), 65).await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        CashuToken::deserialize(&encoded).unwrap().total_amount(),
+        65
+    );
+    assert_eq!(load_wallet(buyer.path()).await.unwrap().balance(), 61);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn paid_file_gate_delivers_bytes_only_after_payment_and_does_not_charge_missing_files() {
+    use crate::content_server::{
+        self, AccessControl, Availability, ContentCatalog, ContentItem, ServeResult,
+    };
+    for (exists, accepts_cashu, price) in [
+        (true, true, 100),
+        (true, false, 100),
+        (false, true, 100),
+        (true, true, 129),
+    ] {
+        let mint = Mint::start(0, None).await;
+        let seller = mint.wallet().await;
+        let item = ContentItem {
+            id: "paid-test".into(),
+            filename: "test.txt".into(),
+            mime_type: "text/plain".into(),
+            size_bytes: 5,
+            description: String::new(),
+            added_at: String::new(),
+            availability: Availability::AllPeers,
+            access: AccessControl::Paid {
+                price_sats: price,
+                accepted: vec![if accepts_cashu { "ecash" } else { "fedimint" }.into()],
+            },
+        };
+        content_server::save_catalog(seller.path(), &ContentCatalog { items: vec![item] })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        if exists {
+            tokio::fs::create_dir_all(seller.path().join("content/files"))
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            tokio::fs::write(seller.path().join("content/files/test.txt"), b"hello")
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+        }
+        let token = CashuToken::new(&mint.url, vec![proof(V2, 128)])
+            .serialize_v4()
+            .unwrap();
+        let result = content_server::serve_content(
+            seller.path(),
+            "paid-test",
+            Some(&token),
+            None,
+            None,
+            None,
+            false,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        if exists && accepts_cashu && price <= 128 {
+            match result {
+                ServeResult::Ok(bytes, mime) => {
+                    assert_eq!(bytes, b"hello");
+                    assert_eq!(mime, "text/plain");
+                }
+                _ => panic!("paid content was not delivered"),
+            }
+            assert_eq!(load_wallet(seller.path()).await.unwrap().balance(), 128);
+        } else {
+            assert!(matches!(
+                result,
+                ServeResult::NotFound | ServeResult::PaymentRequired(_)
+            ));
+            assert_eq!(load_wallet(seller.path()).await.unwrap().balance(), 0);
+            assert!(mint.requests.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -989,6 +989,24 @@ impl AppManifest {
        validate_security(&self.app.security)?;
        validate_ports(&self.app.ports)?;
        validate_interfaces(&self.app.interfaces)?;
+        if let Some(value) = self.app.extensions.get("install_prerequisites") {
+            let items = value.as_sequence().ok_or_else(|| {
+                ManifestError::Invalid("install_prerequisites must be a list of app ids".into())
+            })?;
+            for item in items {
+                let id = item.as_str().unwrap_or_default();
+                if id.is_empty()
+                    || id == self.app.id
+                    || !id
+                        .bytes()
+                        .all(|b| b.is_ascii_lowercase() || b.is_ascii_digit() || b == b'-')
+                {
+                    return Err(ManifestError::Invalid(
+                        "install_prerequisites must contain valid other app ids".into(),
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+        }
        validate_environment(&self.app.environment)?;
        validate_devices(&self.app.devices)?;

@@ -1074,6 +1092,14 @@ impl AppManifest {
        // `..` copy sources). See docs/manifest-hooks-design.md.
        self.app.hooks.validate()?;

+        if let Some(value) = self.app.extensions.get("backup_before_runtime_change") {
+            if value.as_bool().is_none() {
+                return Err(ManifestError::Invalid(
+                    "backup_before_runtime_change must be boolean".into(),
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+
        Ok(())
    }
 }
@@ -1111,6 +1137,7 @@ fn validate_security(policy: &SecurityPolicy) -> Result<(), ManifestError> {
        "SETGID",
        "SETUID",
        "SYS_ADMIN",
+        "SYS_CHROOT",
    ];
    let mut seen = HashSet::new();
    for cap in &policy.capabilities {
@@ -1746,40 +1773,48 @@ app:
            }
        }
        exempt.sort();
-        // 28 as of 2026-08-23: the 26 below plus cuprate's two exemptions —
-        // 18183 (Monero p2p gossip, same reasoning as bitcoin's 8333) and
-        // 18090 (host mapping for Monero's canonical 18089 restricted RPC,
-        // upstream's own safe-for-public
-        // subset that wallets connect to directly as a "remote node" over
-        // plain HTTP JSON-RPC — same reasoning as electrumx's 50001).
-        // cuprate's unrestricted RPC (full node control) stays loopback-only
-        // (auth: local), not in this set.
-        //
-        // 26 as of 2026-08-16: the 25 below plus phoenixd 9740, a
-        // loopback-only JSON API whose own generated http password
-        // authenticates every request (added with the phoenixd onboarding,
-        // which did not update this count — exactly the drift this test
-        // exists to catch).
-        //
-        // 25 as of the v1.7.123 port-policy round: bitcoin p2p (8333 ×2),
-        // core-lightning 9736/9835, electrumx 50001, fedimint 8173/8174,
-        // fedimint-gateway 8176/9737, gitea ssh 2222, lightning-stack
-        // 8091/9738/10010, lnd 9735/10009/18080, netbird 3478/8086/8087,
-        // pine TLS 10381 + the three voice ports (10200/10300/10400 — the
-        // disclosed known gap), router SSDP/mDNS 1900/5353. Every one is a
-        // deliberate, rationale-carrying exemption; the release-gate test
-        // stage timed out that cycle, so the count here lagged at 17.
+        // Reviewed 2026-09-30: lightning-stack's three retired endpoints
+        // disappeared; Cuprate restricted RPC moved from none to gate-open.
+        // Compare exact endpoints, not just a count that can hide substitutions.
+        let expected = [
+            ("bitcoin-core", 8333),
+            ("bitcoin-knots", 8333),
+            ("core-lightning", 9736),
+            ("core-lightning", 9835),
+            ("cuprate", 18183),
+            ("electrumx", 50001),
+            ("fedimint", 8173),
+            ("fedimint", 8174),
+            ("fedimint-gateway", 8176),
+            ("fedimint-gateway", 9737),
+            ("gitea", 2222),
+            ("lnd", 9735),
+            ("lnd", 10009),
+            ("lnd", 18080),
+            ("netbird", 8087),
+            ("netbird-server", 3478),
+            ("netbird-server", 8086),
+            ("phoenixd", 9740),
+            ("pine", 10381),
+            ("pine-openwakeword", 10400),
+            ("pine-piper", 10200),
+            ("pine-whisper", 10300),
+            ("router", 1900),
+            ("router", 5353),
+        ]
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|(id, port)| (id.to_owned(), port))
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
        assert_eq!(
-            exempt.len(),
-            28,
-            "unauthenticated port set changed — review before updating this count: {exempt:?}"
+            exempt, expected,
+            "unauthenticated endpoint set changed; review each exemption"
        );
    }

    /// `auth: open` ports are served by the gate WITHOUT its login challenge,
    /// so they are the second unauthenticated-by-the-gate surface and get the
-    /// same review guard as `auth: none`. Each one must be an app that
-    /// enforces a real login of its own.
+    /// same review guard as `auth: none`. Each must enforce its own login or
+    /// have an explicitly reviewed public protocol purpose.
    #[test]
    fn gate_open_ports_are_all_accounted_for() {
        let apps = std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("../../apps");
@@ -1801,6 +1836,8 @@ app:
            }
        }
        open.sort();
+        // Cuprate 18090 is its deliberately public restricted RPC subset;
+        // unrestricted node-control RPC remains container-loopback-only.
        // Gitea 3001 (git clients speak basic-auth, not browser cookies),
        // BTCPay 23000 (checkout/invoice/webhook endpoints must be reachable
        // by anonymous payers), and — since the v1.8.7 platform round — the
@@ -1808,18 +1845,35 @@ app:
        // nginx-proxy-manager 8081 (NPM admin accounts), tailscale 8240
        // (tailnet login on the web console). Both enforce their own login,
        // and an operator can re-gate either from Settings → Access control.
+        // Angor's indexer exposes public chain data/transaction broadcast;
+        // its optional standalone relay accepts signed public Nostr events.
+        // Neither mounts credentials or the node's internal relay database.
        assert_eq!(
            open,
            vec![
+                ("angor-indexer".to_string(), 8998u16),
+                ("angor-relay".to_string(), 8091u16),
                ("btcpay-server".to_string(), 23000u16),
+                ("cuprate".to_string(), 18090u16),
                ("gitea".to_string(), 3001u16),
                ("nginx-proxy-manager".to_string(), 8081u16),
                ("tailscale".to_string(), 8240u16),
            ],
-            "gate-open port set changed — every entry must be an app with its own login"
+            "gate-open port set changed — review login or intentional public protocol purpose"
        );
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn invalid_install_prerequisites_are_rejected() {
+        for value in ["not-a-list", "[demo]", "['../other']", "[false]", "['']"] {
+            let yaml = format!("app:\n  id: demo\n  name: Demo\n  version: 1.0.0\n  container:\n    image: docker.io/library/alpine:3.20\n  install_prerequisites: {value}\n");
+            assert!(AppManifest::parse(&yaml)
+                .unwrap_err()
+                .to_string()
+                .contains("install_prerequisites"));
+        }
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn an_undeclared_port_classifies_as_session_but_is_not_declared() {
        // Two different questions, and conflating them caused both gate
@@ -310,59 +310,7 @@ impl PodmanClient {
                );
                continue;
            }
-            // Honour the manifest's protocol (default tcp). netbird's STUN port
-            // is 3478/udp; forcing tcp here would publish the wrong protocol and
-            // silently break relay discovery.
-            let protocol = match port.protocol.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
-                "udp" => "udp",
-                "sctp" => "sctp",
-                _ => "tcp",
-            };
-            // Effective bind. A gated port with no declared bind would
-            // publish 0.0.0.0 — the app would own every host address, which
-            // is both the exposure itself and the reason the daemon's app
-            // gate cannot bind those addresses to authenticate them. Pin it
-            // to loopback so the gate can take the external addresses.
-            //
-            // Doing it HERE, at container creation, is the point: the pin and
-            // the gate's takeover then both come from the daemon and cannot
-            // disagree. The earlier attempt put this decision in manifest
-            // data instead, and a node whose manifests lagged the binary
-            // published Bitcoin's loopback-only RPC across the LAN
-            // (test node, 2026-08-03).
-            //
-            // A port that already declares a bind is never overridden — that
-            // is exactly what keeps `bind: 127.0.0.1` ports host-local and
-            // leaves `auth: none` protocol ports (LND gRPC/REST, electrum)
-            // published as they are, so remote wallets keep working.
-            // NOTE: the daemon deliberately does NOT rewrite this. Pinning a
-            // published port to loopback is how an app hands its external
-            // addresses to the gate, but it belongs in the manifest, not in
-            // daemon-side inference:
-            //
-            //   * `bind` is already honoured by every publish path (here and
-            //     in package::install), so a manifest edit needs no code.
-            //   * inference here would cover only THIS path — proven on
-            //     a test node, where a recreate went through another one and
-            //     the pin never applied.
-            //   * and inferring from an ABSENT field is what republished
-            //     Bitcoin's loopback RPC across the LAN, and came within one
-            //     container-recreate of pinning LND's gRPC/REST and breaking
-            //     every remote wallet.
-            //
-            // So the migration ships as `bind: 127.0.0.1` in the signed
-            // catalog. Verified 2026-08-03 that a disk-only manifest edit is
-            // overridden by the catalog, which is precisely why the catalog is
-            // the right and only place to carry it.
-            let mut mapping = serde_json::json!({
-                "container_port": port.container,
-                "host_port": port.host,
-                "protocol": protocol,
-            });
-            if !port.bind.is_empty() {
-                mapping["host_ip"] = serde_json::json!(port.bind);
-            }
-            port_mappings.push(mapping);
+            port_mappings.push(podman_publish_mapping(port));
        }

        let mut mounts = Vec::new();
@@ -751,6 +699,25 @@ pub fn image_uses_insecure_registry(image: &str) -> bool {
        .is_some_and(|host| INSECURE_REGISTRY_HOSTS.contains(&host))
 }

+// Keep the explicitly declared bind and transport identical to Quadlet. The
+// app gate owns external listeners; container publication must not bypass it.
+fn podman_publish_mapping(port: &crate::manifest::PortMapping) -> serde_json::Value {
+    let protocol = match port.protocol.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
+        "udp" => "udp",
+        "sctp" => "sctp",
+        _ => "tcp",
+    };
+    let mut mapping = serde_json::json!({
+        "container_port": port.container,
+        "host_port": port.host,
+        "protocol": protocol,
+    });
+    if !port.bind.is_empty() {
+        mapping["host_ip"] = serde_json::json!(port.bind);
+    }
+    mapping
+}
+
 fn podman_network_settings(
    network: Option<&str>,
    network_policy: &str,
@@ -1110,6 +1077,24 @@ mod tests {
        ));
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn portainer_manifest_keeps_private_network_and_loopback_api_publication() {
+        let m = AppManifest::parse(include_str!("../../../apps/portainer/manifest.yml")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            podman_network_settings(
+                m.app.container.network.as_deref(),
+                &m.app.security.network_policy
+            ),
+            ("slirp4netns", None)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            podman_publish_mapping(&m.app.ports[0]),
+            serde_json::json!({
+                "container_port": 9000, "host_port": 9000, "protocol": "tcp", "host_ip": "127.0.0.1"
+            })
+        );
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn podman_network_settings_uses_networks_map_for_custom_networks() {
        assert_eq!(
@@ -618,6 +618,46 @@ impl DockerRuntime {
    }
 }

+// Docker is a development fallback. Refuse Podman-only network modes instead
+// of silently installing a different topology; still honor binds for other apps.
+fn docker_network_and_ports(manifest: &AppManifest, offset: u16) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+    let network = manifest
+        .app
+        .container
+        .network
+        .as_deref()
+        .filter(|v| !v.is_empty())
+        .unwrap_or(&manifest.app.security.network_policy);
+    if matches!(network, "slirp4netns" | "pasta") {
+        anyhow::bail!("this app requires rootless Podman networking ({network})");
+    }
+    let mut args = Vec::new();
+    if !network.is_empty() && network != "isolated" {
+        args.extend(["--network".to_owned(), network.to_owned()]);
+    }
+    for port in &manifest.app.ports {
+        let host = port
+            .host
+            .checked_add(offset)
+            .context("published port offset overflow")?;
+        let bind = if port.bind.is_empty() {
+            String::new()
+        } else {
+            format!("{}:", port.bind)
+        };
+        let protocol = if port.protocol.is_empty() {
+            "tcp"
+        } else {
+            &port.protocol
+        };
+        args.extend([
+            "-p".to_owned(),
+            format!("{bind}{host}:{}/{protocol}", port.container),
+        ]);
+    }
+    Ok(args)
+}
+
 #[async_trait]
 impl ContainerRuntime for DockerRuntime {
    async fn pull_image(&self, image: &str, signature: Option<&str>) -> Result<()> {
@@ -657,25 +697,7 @@ impl ContainerRuntime for DockerRuntime {
            cmd.arg("--read-only");
        }

-        match manifest.app.security.network_policy.as_str() {
-            "host" => {
-                cmd.arg("--network").arg("host");
-            }
-            "isolated" => {
-                // Docker uses bridge network by default
-            }
-            _ => {
-                cmd.arg("--network")
-                    .arg(&manifest.app.security.network_policy);
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Port mappings with offset
-        for port in &manifest.app.ports {
-            let host_port = port.host + port_offset;
-            cmd.arg("-p")
-                .arg(format!("{}:{}", host_port, port.container));
-        }
+        cmd.args(docker_network_and_ports(manifest, port_offset)?);

        // Volumes
        for volume in &manifest.app.volumes {
@@ -1035,6 +1057,21 @@ mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use std::collections::HashMap;

+    #[test]
+    fn docker_fallback_rejects_rootless_only_topology_and_preserves_bind_protocol() {
+        let mut m =
+            AppManifest::parse(include_str!("../../../apps/portainer/manifest.yml")).unwrap();
+        assert!(docker_network_and_ports(&m, 0).is_err());
+        m.app.container.network = Some("bridge".into());
+        m.app.ports[0].protocol = "udp".into();
+        let args = docker_network_and_ports(&m, 1).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            args,
+            vec!["--network", "bridge", "-p", "127.0.0.1:9001:9000/udp"]
+        );
+        assert!(docker_network_and_ports(&m, u16::MAX).is_err());
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn missing_container_classifier_covers_podman5_phrasings() {
        // podman 5.x `inspect` phrasing for a missing container.
@@ -16,9 +16,11 @@ lookup relays from the defaults. It does not replace GitWorkshop's NIP-34,
 GRASP, repository browser, issue, pull-request, or review interfaces.

 The separate dependency patch refreshes the npm lockfile and moves `fflate` to
-0.8.3, `react-router-dom` to 7.18.3, and Vitest to 5.0.0. The resulting clean
-install reports zero npm advisories; its type-check, 152 unit tests, and
-Archipelago subpath production build pass. Keeping this mechanical security
+0.8.3, `react-router-dom` to 7.18.3, and Vitest to 5.0.0. On 2026-09-30 the lockfile was refreshed again for `brace-expansion`
+1.1.21/5.0.12, `fast-uri` 3.1.8 and `ip-address` 10.7.2 after fresh node
+installs failed the retained dependency audit. The resulting clean install
+reports zero npm advisories; its type-check, 152 unit tests, and Archipelago
+subpath production build pass. The complete image also builds on the X250. Keeping this mechanical security
 update separate makes both the upstream integration and future dependency
 refreshes auditable.

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json
-index 20631bb..0933917 100644
+index 20631bb..86b6f86 100644
 --- a/package-lock.json
 +++ b/package-lock.json
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
@@ -495,9 +495,9 @@ index 20631bb..0933917 100644
 -      "version": "5.0.7",
 -      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-5.0.7.tgz",
 -      "integrity": "sha512-7oFy703dxfY3/NLxC1fh2SUCQ0H9rmAY+5EpDVfXjUTTs+HEwR2nYaqLv+GWcTsumwxPfiz6CzCNkwXwBUwqCA==",
-+      "version": "5.0.9",
-+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-5.0.9.tgz",
-+      "integrity": "sha512-ScQ4IuvIEF1TMlP7Zt+vjJ//9zlPb2SDcxWxM3bk8s6t6GGdJ7KO1dCcTidOPJKePW30LE/2cT7wCyPho9/Wxg==",
+      "version": "5.0.12",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-5.0.12.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-YovQ3rzhaLMIrDjNDMkNS01tea93qhEhG5xy8f6+R0l+dw3Ki+5sCoIoI942iuLZTHWogWktgwVDhU09iNEimQ==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
@@ -678,9 +678,9 @@ index 20631bb..0933917 100644
 -      "version": "1.1.15",
 -      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-1.1.15.tgz",
 -      "integrity": "sha512-EwOCDEex4quD37XhqM3omwtMoJjr//isUZz1JopUNWms+4Z2ViyM/k1YIRePpoVNnQhENnxtFjLaxNHrT7xIUg==",
-+      "version": "1.1.18",
-+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-1.1.18.tgz",
-+      "integrity": "sha512-Edep/X9fGqVNmzKBVsDYIOtD+z1tuezV70LBjdCst9Tqu76lsnvRiZ6oTic1n+/BIwX6QDGAO94PN4N2SADvtw==",
+      "version": "1.1.21",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-1.1.21.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-9zeA+KLZNNzglF2TPKRQEDyx6Yby7daAkuy8MiPzpXPsYDWi/DRM8jmwUDxokQjYqBpv5DgPiwD4h4ZZSy1Ujw==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
@@ -833,9 +833,9 @@ index 20631bb..0933917 100644
 -      "version": "3.1.3",
 -      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fast-uri/-/fast-uri-3.1.3.tgz",
 -      "integrity": "sha512-i70LwGWUduXqzicKXWshooq+sWL1K3WUU5rKZNG/0i3a1OSoX3HqhH5WbWwTmqWfor4urUakGPiRQcleRZTwOg==",
-+      "version": "3.1.7",
-+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fast-uri/-/fast-uri-3.1.7.tgz",
-+      "integrity": "sha512-dOvZVzjdZdz7phd9v6jCbwxrBW3fK6n8Rc0CtdmM4bumzMnxywBYhuph6J819RRw/ku+rLbelwfMunktuzVVHg==",
+      "version": "3.1.8",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fast-uri/-/fast-uri-3.1.8.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-GZMtZUTNRpOVIECoXwLNZS5xUGE+mVNbTB8h/7Rwh2TFWcBQiPzTgyZi05BF9UMZKkLJv8XBRJTlU7zg8+ZfMg==",
       "funding": [
         {
           "type": "github",
@@ -859,9 +859,9 @@ index 20631bb..0933917 100644
 -      "version": "5.0.7",
 -      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-5.0.7.tgz",
 -      "integrity": "sha512-7oFy703dxfY3/NLxC1fh2SUCQ0H9rmAY+5EpDVfXjUTTs+HEwR2nYaqLv+GWcTsumwxPfiz6CzCNkwXwBUwqCA==",
-+      "version": "5.0.9",
-+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-5.0.9.tgz",
-+      "integrity": "sha512-ScQ4IuvIEF1TMlP7Zt+vjJ//9zlPb2SDcxWxM3bk8s6t6GGdJ7KO1dCcTidOPJKePW30LE/2cT7wCyPho9/Wxg==",
+      "version": "5.0.12",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-5.0.12.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-YovQ3rzhaLMIrDjNDMkNS01tea93qhEhG5xy8f6+R0l+dw3Ki+5sCoIoI942iuLZTHWogWktgwVDhU09iNEimQ==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
@@ -893,9 +893,9 @@ index 20631bb..0933917 100644
 -      "version": "10.2.0",
 -      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ip-address/-/ip-address-10.2.0.tgz",
 -      "integrity": "sha512-/+S6j4E9AHvW9SWMSEY9Xfy66O5PWvVEJ08O0y5JGyEKQpojb0K0GKpz/v5HJ/G0vi3D2sjGK78119oXZeE0qA==",
-+      "version": "10.7.0",
-+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ip-address/-/ip-address-10.7.0.tgz",
-+      "integrity": "sha512-BGFsyJd5mpXp3rK6jIdADLNgpJUK1jnjzvYF8lK+VyDab9JAmqN0YOKDdP17HlgKb2+ehPgDc8EtnRLbGCAMhA==",
+      "version": "10.7.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ip-address/-/ip-address-10.7.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-7H/2gFSIitxc0hG3nOI1glS8QLo/EHBFFLk8vEUjXY/xu0AdL8jZ9U1IzO2PUm0d2D/ofQcAifb0g6OBkt8U7w==",
       "license": "MIT",
       "engines": {
         "node": ">= 12"
@@ -1445,4 +1445,3 @@ index bd7190c..6aa5a6f 100644
 import { vi } from "vitest";
 
 // Mock window.matchMedia
-
@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@

        // ── State ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
        let unit = 'sats';
-        let state = { info: null, channels: [], pending: null, peers: [], payments: [], invoices: [], txns: [], fees: null, graph: null };
+        let state = { readiness: null, info: null, channels: [], pending: null, peers: [], payments: [], invoices: [], txns: [], fees: null, graph: null };
        let peerSort = { col: 'peer', dir: 1 };
        let activityFilter = 'all';
        let logsLoaded = false;
@@ -1142,9 +1142,19 @@
        }

        async function refreshAll() {
+            if (state.refreshing) return;
+            state.refreshing = true;
            const icon = document.getElementById('refreshIcon');
            if (icon) icon.classList.add('animate-spin-slow');
            try {
+                state.readiness = await lndSafe('/archy-status', null);
+                if (state.readiness && state.readiness.state.startsWith('waiting_')) {
+                    state.info = null;
+                    state.onchainStale = true;
+                    state.chanbalStale = true;
+                    renderAll();
+                    return;
+                }
                const [info, channels, pending, peers, fees, graph, payments, invoices, txns] = await Promise.all([
                    lndSafe('/v1/getinfo', null),
                    lndSafe('/v1/channels', { channels: [] }),
@@ -1166,10 +1176,17 @@
                state.invoices = (invoices && invoices.invoices) || [];
                state.txns = (txns && txns.transactions) || [];

-                // Balances are separate so one failing endpoint can't blank the rest.
-                state.onchain = await lndSafe('/v1/balance/blockchain', null);
-                state.chanbal = await lndSafe('/v1/balance/channels', null);
+                // Preserve known balances on outage; never decode an error as zero.
+                const [onchain, chanbal] = await Promise.all([
+                    lndSafe('/v1/balance/blockchain', null),
+                    lndSafe('/v1/balance/channels', null),
+                ]);
+                state.onchainStale = !validBalance(onchain && (onchain.confirmed_balance ?? onchain.total_balance));
+                state.chanbalStale = !validBalance(chanbal && (chanbal.local_balance?.sat ?? chanbal.balance));
+                if (!state.onchainStale) state.onchain = onchain;
+                if (!state.chanbalStale) state.chanbal = chanbal;
            } finally {
+                state.refreshing = false;
                if (icon) icon.classList.remove('animate-spin-slow');
            }
            renderAll();
@@ -1192,11 +1209,17 @@
            const pill = document.getElementById('headerStatusPill');
            const dot = document.getElementById('headerStatusDot');

-            if (!g) {
-                setText('headerStatusText', 'Unreachable');
-                pill.className = 'pill bad';
-                dot.className = 'status-dot-sm bg-red';
-                document.getElementById('syncCard').style.display = 'none';
+            const waiting = state.readiness && state.readiness.state.startsWith('waiting_');
+            if (!g || waiting) {
+                setText('headerStatusText', waiting ? state.readiness.message : 'Connecting to LND');
+                pill.className = 'pill warn';
+                dot.className = 'status-dot-sm bg-yellow';
+                document.getElementById('syncCard').style.display = '';
+                setText('syncSubtitle', waiting ? state.readiness.message + '. Lightning will become available automatically.' : 'Checking Lightning availability. Retrying automatically.');
+                setText('syncBlockLabel', '');
+                setText('syncPercent', '');
+                document.getElementById('syncProgressBar').style.width = '0%';
+                for (const id of ['syncChain', 'syncGraph', 'syncHeight', 'syncPeers']) setText(id, '—');
                return;
            }

@@ -1237,6 +1260,11 @@
        }

        // ── Balances ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+        function validBalance(value) {
+            return (typeof value === 'number' || (typeof value === 'string' && /^\d+$/.test(value)))
+                && Number.isSafeInteger(Number(value)) && Number(value) >= 0;
+        }
+
        function renderBalances() {
            const onchainConfirmed = num(state.onchain && (state.onchain.confirmed_balance ?? state.onchain.total_balance));
            const onchainUnconfirmed = num(state.onchain && state.onchain.unconfirmed_balance);
@@ -1253,22 +1281,23 @@
            const haveOnchain = !!state.onchain;
            const haveChan = !!cb;

-            setBalance('balTotal', haveOnchain || haveChan ? onchainConfirmed + lnLocal : null);
-            setText('balTotalSub', haveOnchain || haveChan ? 'on-chain + lightning' : 'waiting for LND');
+            setBalance('balTotal', haveOnchain && haveChan ? onchainConfirmed + lnLocal : null);
+            setText('balTotalSub', state.onchainStale || state.chanbalStale ? 'balance unavailable · last known values' : haveOnchain && haveChan ? 'on-chain + lightning' : 'waiting for LND');
            setBalance('balLightning', haveChan ? lnLocal : null);
-            setText('balLightningSub', !haveChan ? 'waiting for LND'
+            setText('balLightningSub', !haveChan ? 'waiting for LND' : state.chanbalStale ? 'last known balance'
                : lnPending > 0 ? fmtAmount(lnPending) + ' pending open' : 'spendable over channels');
            setBalance('balOnchain', haveOnchain ? onchainConfirmed : null);
-            setText('balOnchainSub', !haveOnchain ? 'waiting for LND'
+            setText('balOnchainSub', !haveOnchain ? 'waiting for LND' : state.onchainStale ? 'last known balance'
                : onchainUnconfirmed > 0 ? fmtAmount(onchainUnconfirmed) + ' unconfirmed' : 'confirmed');

-            setText('liqLocal', fmtAmount(lnLocal));
-            setText('liqRemote', fmtAmount(lnRemote));
+            const liquidityReady = haveChan && !state.chanbalStale && !!state.info;
+            setText('liqLocal', liquidityReady ? fmtAmount(lnLocal) : '—');
+            setText('liqRemote', liquidityReady ? fmtAmount(lnRemote) : '—');
            const total = lnLocal + lnRemote;
            const localPct = total > 0 ? (lnLocal / total) * 100 : 50;
-            document.getElementById('liqBarLocal').style.width = localPct + '%';
-            document.getElementById('liqBarRemote').style.width = (100 - localPct) + '%';
-            setText('liqHint', total > 0
+            document.getElementById('liqBarLocal').style.width = (liquidityReady ? localPct : 0) + '%';
+            document.getElementById('liqBarRemote').style.width = (liquidityReady ? 100 - localPct : 0) + '%';
+            setText('liqHint', !liquidityReady ? 'Channel capacity is unavailable while waiting for LND.' : total > 0
                ? Math.round(localPct) + '% of your channel capacity is outbound (sendable).'
                : 'Open a channel to start sending and receiving over Lightning.');
        }
@@ -1284,6 +1313,15 @@

        function renderSummary() {
            const g = state.info;
+            if (!g) {
+                for (const id of ['statPeers', 'statActiveChannels', 'statCapacity', 'statRoutingMonth', 'healthHeight', 'healthPending', 'chActive', 'chInactive', 'chPending', 'chCapacity']) setText(id, '—');
+                for (const id of ['statChannelsSub', 'channelsLinkSub']) setText(id, 'Waiting for LND');
+                for (const id of ['healthChain', 'healthGraph']) {
+                    const pill = document.getElementById(id);
+                    pill.textContent = '—'; pill.className = 'pill warn';
+                }
+                return;
+            }
            const chans = state.channels;
            const active = chans.filter(c => c.active).length;
            const inactive = chans.length - active;
@@ -1321,6 +1359,10 @@
        function renderChannels() {
            const el = document.getElementById('channelList');
            if (!el) return;
+            if (!state.info) {
+                el.innerHTML = '<div class="empty-state">Waiting for LND. Existing channels will appear when it is ready.</div>';
+                return;
+            }
            const q = (document.getElementById('channelFilter').value || '').toLowerCase();
            let list = state.channels.slice();
            if (q) list = list.filter(c => String(c.remote_pubkey || '').toLowerCase().includes(q) || String(c.chan_id || '').includes(q));
@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
 # Archipelago mempool frontend — adds a resilient nginx backend proxy.
 #
-# The only delta vs the upstream image is /patch/entrypoint.sh, which rewrites
-# the generated nginx-mempool.conf to use `resolver` + a variable proxy_pass so
-# the frontend re-resolves the backend (mempool-api) via DNS on every request.
-# Without this, nginx pins the backend IP at startup and serves 502 / "offline"
-# after any backend restart (podman reassigns the IP). See the script header.
-ARG BASE=source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.0.0
+# Keep the upstream startup logic; repair its rendered proxy configuration.
+# Publish this derived image under an Archipelago-specific tag, never the
+# upstream version tag that the registry mirror can overwrite.
+ARG BASE=source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend@sha256:d63498a109622475c913db4e3199d893f2440a451450e542923d2e55a38407a0
 FROM ${BASE}

 # --chmod keeps the exec bit (build runs as USER 1000, plain COPY lands root:0644
 # → "not executable"). Base USER/ENTRYPOINT/CMD (1000 / /patch/entrypoint.sh /
 # nginx -g "daemon off;") are inherited unchanged.
-COPY --chmod=0755 entrypoint.sh /patch/entrypoint.sh
+RUN cp /patch/entrypoint.sh /patch/upstream-entrypoint.sh
+COPY --chmod=0755 entrypoint.sh start-nginx.sh repair-nginx.sh /patch/
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Mempool frontend DNS recovery
+
+The stock v3.3.1 nginx configuration resolves `mempool-api` only when workers
+start. Recreating the backend can change its Podman address while the frontend
+continues to serve its static page, leaving all API/WebSocket requests offline.
+
+Build and test the derived image before publishing:
+
+```sh
+podman build --pull=never -t source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1 docker/mempool-frontend
+python3 scripts/test-mempool-dns-recovery.py
+```
+
+The base is pinned by digest. The wrapper preserves upstream runtime options,
+then repairs all four local API/WebSocket routes after placeholder rendering.
+DNS is cached for five seconds using the container network resolver. Explicit
+rewrites preserve API prefixes and query arguments; backend absence does not
+prevent nginx startup. An unexpected upstream configuration fails startup
+instead of silently omitting the fix.
+
+Use an Archipelago-specific image tag. Do not replace it with a stock upstream
+mirror when updating mempool. Every upstream update must rebuild this wrapper
+and pass the recovery test (backend absent, changed IP, HTTP and WebSocket
+mapping, repeated repair, and frontend restart).
+
+Publish the tested image before publishing the signed app catalog. Both the
+mempool umbrella image mapping and the archy-mempool-web embedded manifest must
+point at the patched image. Keep scripts/image-versions.sh in sync. The frontend
+health check must reach `/api/v1/backend-info` through nginx, not only `/`.
@@ -1,137 +1,5 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_HOST__=${BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_HOST:=127.0.0.1}
-__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_PORT__=${BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_PORT:=8999}
-__MEMPOOL_FRONTEND_HTTP_PORT__=${FRONTEND_HTTP_PORT:=8080}
-
-CONF=/etc/nginx/conf.d/nginx-mempool.conf
-
-# ─── archipelago patch ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# The stock frontend writes `proxy_pass http://<backend>:8999` with a literal
-# hostname and NO resolver, so nginx resolves the backend IP ONCE at worker
-# start and caches it for the process lifetime. Podman reassigns the backend
-# container's IP whenever it is restarted/recreated (gate, OTA, crash, reboot
-# re-IPAM), after which nginx keeps proxying to the dead IP → /api hangs, the
-# websocket 502s, and the mempool UI shows "offline" until nginx is reloaded.
-#
-# Fix: force per-request DNS re-resolution via `resolver` + a variable in
-# proxy_pass. Because a variable in proxy_pass disables nginx's automatic
-# location→URI rewriting, each block is rewritten to preserve its original
-# path mapping exactly:
-#   /api/v1/ws, /ws → "/"            (var + "/" replaces the whole URI)
-#   /api/v1         → identity       (no-URI proxy_pass passes $uri unchanged)
-#   /api/           → /api/v1/$1     (explicit rewrite, then no-URI proxy_pass)
-# Operates on the __PLACEHOLDER__ tokens so the host/port sed below fills in
-# the concrete values (incl. the `set $mp_backend` line). Idempotent.
-# Resolver address: podman's aardvark-dns answers on the network gateway
-# (e.g. 10.89.0.1), NOT Docker's 127.0.0.11. Read it from resolv.conf so this
-# works on any podman network/subnet (and still falls back for Docker).
-ARCHY_RESOLVER=$(awk '/^nameserver/ { print $2; exit }' /etc/resolv.conf 2>/dev/null)
-ARCHY_RESOLVER=${ARCHY_RESOLVER:-127.0.0.11}
-
-if ! grep -q 'set \$mp_backend' "$CONF"; then
-  awk -v res_addr="$ARCHY_RESOLVER" '
-    BEGIN { res = 0 }
-    /^[[:space:]]*location / && res == 0 {
-      print "\tresolver " res_addr " valid=10s ipv6=off;"
-      res = 1
-    }
-    /proxy_pass http:\/\/__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_HOST__:__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_PORT__\/;/ {
-      print "\t\tset $mp_backend __MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_HOST__;"
-      print "\t\tproxy_pass http://$mp_backend:__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_PORT__/;"
-      next
-    }
-    /proxy_pass http:\/\/__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_HOST__:__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_PORT__\/api\/v1\/;/ {
-      print "\t\tset $mp_backend __MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_HOST__;"
-      print "\t\trewrite ^/api/(.*)$ /api/v1/$1 break;"
-      print "\t\tproxy_pass http://$mp_backend:__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_PORT__;"
-      next
-    }
-    /proxy_pass http:\/\/__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_HOST__:__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_PORT__\/api\/v1;/ {
-      print "\t\tset $mp_backend __MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_HOST__;"
-      print "\t\tproxy_pass http://$mp_backend:__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_PORT__;"
-      next
-    }
-    { print }
-  ' "$CONF" > "$CONF.archy" && mv "$CONF.archy" "$CONF"
-fi
-# ─── end archipelago patch ────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-sed -i "s/__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_HOST__/${__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_HOST__}/g" /etc/nginx/conf.d/nginx-mempool.conf
-sed -i "s/__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_PORT__/${__MEMPOOL_BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_PORT__}/g" /etc/nginx/conf.d/nginx-mempool.conf
-
-cp /etc/nginx/nginx.conf /patch/nginx.conf
-sed -i "s/__MEMPOOL_FRONTEND_HTTP_PORT__/${__MEMPOOL_FRONTEND_HTTP_PORT__}/g" /patch/nginx.conf
-cat /patch/nginx.conf > /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
-
-if [ "${LIGHTNING_DETECTED_PORT}" != "" ];then
-  export LIGHTNING=true
-fi
-
-# Runtime overrides - read env vars defined in docker compose
-
-__MAINNET_ENABLED__=${MAINNET_ENABLED:=true}
-__TESTNET_ENABLED__=${TESTNET_ENABLED:=false}
-__TESTNET4_ENABLED__=${TESTNET_ENABLED:=false}
-__SIGNET_ENABLED__=${SIGNET_ENABLED:=false}
-__LIQUID_ENABLED__=${LIQUID_ENABLED:=false}
-__LIQUID_TESTNET_ENABLED__=${LIQUID_TESTNET_ENABLED:=false}
-__ITEMS_PER_PAGE__=${ITEMS_PER_PAGE:=10}
-__KEEP_BLOCKS_AMOUNT__=${KEEP_BLOCKS_AMOUNT:=8}
-__NGINX_PROTOCOL__=${NGINX_PROTOCOL:=http}
-__NGINX_HOSTNAME__=${NGINX_HOSTNAME:=localhost}
-__NGINX_PORT__=${NGINX_PORT:=8999}
-__BLOCK_WEIGHT_UNITS__=${BLOCK_WEIGHT_UNITS:=4000000}
-__MEMPOOL_BLOCKS_AMOUNT__=${MEMPOOL_BLOCKS_AMOUNT:=8}
-__BASE_MODULE__=${BASE_MODULE:=mempool}
-__ROOT_NETWORK__=${ROOT_NETWORK:=}
-__MEMPOOL_WEBSITE_URL__=${MEMPOOL_WEBSITE_URL:=https://mempool.space}
-__LIQUID_WEBSITE_URL__=${LIQUID_WEBSITE_URL:=https://liquid.network}
-__MINING_DASHBOARD__=${MINING_DASHBOARD:=true}
-__LIGHTNING__=${LIGHTNING:=false}
-__AUDIT__=${AUDIT:=false}
-__MAINNET_BLOCK_AUDIT_START_HEIGHT__=${MAINNET_BLOCK_AUDIT_START_HEIGHT:=0}
-__TESTNET_BLOCK_AUDIT_START_HEIGHT__=${TESTNET_BLOCK_AUDIT_START_HEIGHT:=0}
-__SIGNET_BLOCK_AUDIT_START_HEIGHT__=${SIGNET_BLOCK_AUDIT_START_HEIGHT:=0}
-__ACCELERATOR__=${ACCELERATOR:=false}
-__ACCELERATOR_BUTTON__=${ACCELERATOR_BUTTON:=true}
-__SERVICES_API__=${SERVICES_API:=https://mempool.space/api/v1/services}
-__PUBLIC_ACCELERATIONS__=${PUBLIC_ACCELERATIONS:=false}
-__HISTORICAL_PRICE__=${HISTORICAL_PRICE:=true}
-__ADDITIONAL_CURRENCIES__=${ADDITIONAL_CURRENCIES:=false}
-
-# Export as environment variables to be used by envsubst
-export __MAINNET_ENABLED__
-export __TESTNET_ENABLED__
-export __TESTNET4_ENABLED__
-export __SIGNET_ENABLED__
-export __LIQUID_ENABLED__
-export __LIQUID_TESTNET_ENABLED__
-export __ITEMS_PER_PAGE__
-export __KEEP_BLOCKS_AMOUNT__
-export __NGINX_PROTOCOL__
-export __NGINX_HOSTNAME__
-export __NGINX_PORT__
-export __BLOCK_WEIGHT_UNITS__
-export __MEMPOOL_BLOCKS_AMOUNT__
-export __BASE_MODULE__
-export __ROOT_NETWORK__
-export __MEMPOOL_WEBSITE_URL__
-export __LIQUID_WEBSITE_URL__
-export __MINING_DASHBOARD__
-export __LIGHTNING__
-export __AUDIT__
-export __MAINNET_BLOCK_AUDIT_START_HEIGHT__
-export __TESTNET_BLOCK_AUDIT_START_HEIGHT__
-export __SIGNET_BLOCK_AUDIT_START_HEIGHT__
-export __ACCELERATOR__
-export __ACCELERATOR_BUTTON__
-export __SERVICES_API__
-export __PUBLIC_ACCELERATIONS__
-export __HISTORICAL_PRICE__
-export __ADDITIONAL_CURRENCIES__
-
-folder=$(find /var/www/mempool -name "config.js" | xargs dirname)
-echo ${folder}
-envsubst < ${folder}/config.template.js > ${folder}/config.js
-
-exec "$@"
+set -eu
+# Preserve the pinned upstream entrypoint (including new runtime options).
+# Apply our DNS repair only after it has rendered the nginx configuration.
+exec /patch/upstream-entrypoint.sh /patch/start-nginx.sh "$@"
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Resolve the backend again after container IP changes. Run after upstream
+# placeholder substitution, so the repair also works on an existing container.
+set -eu
+conf=${1:-/etc/nginx/conf.d/nginx-mempool.conf}
+resolv=${2:-/etc/resolv.conf}
+backend=${BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_HOST:-127.0.0.1}
+port=${BACKEND_MAINNET_HTTP_PORT:-8999}
+resolver=$(awk '/^nameserver/ { print $2; exit }' "$resolv")
+[ -n "$resolver" ] || { echo 'No DNS resolver configured' >&2; exit 1; }
+case "$resolver" in *:*) resolver="[$resolver]" ;; esac
+case "$backend" in *[!a-zA-Z0-9._-]*|'') echo 'Invalid backend hostname' >&2; exit 1 ;; esac
+case "$port" in *[!0-9]*|'') echo 'Invalid backend port' >&2; exit 1 ;; esac
+
+tmp=$(mktemp "${conf}.archy.XXXXXX")
+trap 'rm -f "$tmp"' EXIT HUP INT TERM
+awk -v backend="$backend" -v port="$port" -v resolver="$resolver" '
+  BEGIN {
+    base = "http://" backend ":" port
+    print "# Archipelago: refresh backend DNS after container replacement."
+    print "resolver " resolver " valid=5s ipv6=off; # archy-dns"
+    print "resolver_timeout 3s; # archy-dns"
+  }
+  /# Archipelago: refresh backend DNS/ || /# archy-dns/ { next }
+  /^[[:space:]]*location[[:space:]]/ { location = $2 }
+  /^[[:space:]]*proxy_pass[[:space:]]/ && index($2, base) == 1 {
+    target = $2
+    sub(/;$/, "", target)
+    path = substr(target, length(base) + 1)
+    if (location != "/api/v1/ws" && location != "/ws" && location != "/api/v1" && location != "/api/") {
+      print "Unexpected backend location: " location > "/dev/stderr"
+      failed = 1; exit 1
+    }
+    if (path != "/" && path != "/api/v1" && path != "/api/v1/") {
+      print "Unexpected backend URI mapping" > "/dev/stderr"
+      failed = 1; exit 1
+    }
+    # Explicitly preserve prefix substitution and query arguments. A variable
+    # proxy_pass without a URI forwards the rewritten URI and original args.
+    print "\t\tset $mp_backend " backend ";"
+    if (path != location)
+      print "\t\trewrite ^" location "(.*)$ " path "$1 break;"
+    print "\t\tproxy_pass http://$mp_backend:" port ";"
+    count++
+    next
+  }
+  /proxy_pass http:\/\/\$mp_backend:/ { count++ }
+  { print }
+  END {
+    if (failed || count != 4) {
+      print "Expected four backend proxies; refusing an incomplete DNS repair" > "/dev/stderr"
+      exit 1
+    }
+  }
+' "$conf" > "$tmp"
+cat "$tmp" > "$conf"
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+/patch/repair-nginx.sh
+nginx -t
+exec "$@"
@@ -3,6 +3,94 @@
 Working backlog of forward-looking items not yet scoped into a dedicated plan
 doc. See [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) for the curated, public-facing direction.

+## Framework incident — closed with operator acceptance
+
+- **CLOSED WITH OPERATOR ACCEPTANCE (2026-09-30): Framework LND startup /
+  missing Receive address / false zero balance.** Startup, native balances,
+  Cashu address and source integration were verified; the operator accepted the
+  remaining display check and authorized release. See the incident record for evidence.
+  See [incident evidence and closure criteria](incident-framework-lnd-startup.md)
+  and the repository `AGENTS.md` session-start instructions.
+
+## Next release after 1.8.21 — reported 2026-09-30
+
+Release status and acceptance gates: [execution checklist](next-release-20260930.md).
+
+- [ ] **Release blocker: Gitea → Portainer repository integration.** Diagnose
+  smart-HTTP reachability from Portainer's actual request namespace, then provide
+  one declarative topology and idempotent migration for fresh installs and
+  existing nodes. Preserve gate/auth boundaries, operator configuration,
+  repository/key/database mounts and Portainer stacks. Cover install order,
+  lifecycle/reboot/update convergence, clone/push and source-branch/Compose-file
+  acceptance with a disposable integration setup. Ship in both OTA and ISO;
+  a healthy Gitea root page is insufficient. Operator supplied a private handover;
+  deployment addresses and credentials must not be committed.
+
+- [ ] **New X250: GitWorkshop failed at 70%; slow Nginx installation.** Missing
+  ISO build contexts restored on-node; package staging/smoke checks added.
+  GitWorkshop dependency audit refreshed and build/HTTP recovery verified;
+  Nginx was a slow successful image pull. Aggregate progress label corrected.
+  Include the validated repair in the next OTA/ISO. See lifecycle evidence.
+
+- [ ] **Angor indexer service in the app store**, requested after the other
+  current repair/review work (2026-09-30). Follow the repository's app-development
+  and packaging documentation; treat it as a headless service unless upstream
+  documentation establishes a UI. Verify Bitcoin/Mempool requirements, decide
+  whether an existing first-class relay meets Angor's requirements or a relay
+  must be packaged with the indexer, and use the Angor logo from angor.io for its
+  service icon. Official current deployment documentation located and reviewed: stock Mempool
+  plus an optional strfry relay. Both headless services and the dependency guard
+  are implemented; API outage/recovery and five relay lifecycle cycles passed.
+  Final candidate install/lifecycle checks and signed delivery remain pending.
+  Install on the development box; Bitcoin must finish syncing for indexed queries.
+
+- [ ] **App lifecycle: keep installed apps visible through restart and hard
+  refresh; gate embedded/browser launches on actual web and listener readiness.**
+  Source repair and scoped live acceptance passed; full release gate pending.
+  Includes durable inventory reconstruction,
+  concurrent inventory writes, stale scan/lifecycle updates, delayed HTTP startup,
+  and the app gate's post-install listener delay. See
+  [app lifecycle repair evidence](app-lifecycle-repair-20260930.md).
+
+- [x] Review and repair open paid-download PRs #161 and #162, refresh both
+  branches from main, run independent and combined isolated suites, and verify
+  rootless file permissions in disposable scratch storage. Combined result:
+  1,585 passed, zero failed, four existing tests ignored. See the
+  [review evidence and remaining acceptance work](pr-review-20260930.md).
+- [x] Integrate the reviewed PR branches into the next release and run funded
+  candidate acceptance, including Tor-only transport and payments with change.
+  Operator authorized completing the normal merge/closure workflow on
+  2026-09-30. Both PRs are now merged and closed through Gitea; integrate
+  local repair commits and sync git/ngit before release. The combined candidate
+  is deployed on both test endpoints. Funded Tor-only purchase with change,
+  confirmed refund, exact Files bytes and zero-cost repeat delivery passed.
+  The updated source still needs inclusion in signed OTA/ISO artifacts.
+- [ ] Design durable recovery for an accepted payment whose response is lost.
+  Preserve the truthful unconfirmed-refund warning and prevent automatic
+  duplicate payment while that recovery work is outstanding.
+- [x] **ThinkPad X250 kiosk: Bitcoin version choices readable above pruning.**
+  Replaced the native popup with inline radio choices. Actual Chromium 152 kiosk
+  assertions and screenshot verify white-on-dark choices, selection changes and
+  layout above pruning controls. Focused component tests pass. Included in the
+  next-release source; published 1.8.21 artifacts remain unchanged.
+
+## 1.8.21 repair and release tasks — completed 2026-09-30
+
+See the [execution record](repair-release-20260929.md) for evidence and limits.
+
+- [x] Fix Cashu paid-file redemption between dev and Shorty; test keyset IDs,
+  mint errors, fees, and refund reporting before live validation.
+- [x] Record Framework verification and the operator's acceptance of the
+  remaining display check before release.
+- [x] Replace the unavailable tx1138.com explorer default with mempool.space;
+  migrate the old default with fresh consent and preserve custom/local explorers.
+- [x] Offer pruning in the Bitcoin installation version modal, using the same
+  pruning settings as automatic pruning even on large disks.
+- [x] Explain Bitcoin warmup without raw RPC errors; gate LND unlock on Bitcoin
+  RPC readiness and show install/start/sync waiting states with automatic recovery.
+- [x] Test the completed changes on this development box, then publish a new
+  signed OTA and raw ISO release. Record any remaining verification gaps.
+
 ## Dev & build process (priority)

 - Formalize the contributor workflow: releases, CI, maintainers, automated
@@ -765,3 +765,13 @@ Every supported app must satisfy the lifecycle contract:
 For apps with special dependencies, launch must explain dependency wait states instead of showing a dead iframe. Examples include Bitcoin sync/IBD, Lightning wallet readiness, Nostr signer bridge injection, Tailscale login/auth, and app-specific setup screens.

 Runtime changes should be validated with focused tests first, then the release lifecycle harness on the validation host when host access is intentionally resumed.
+
+### Adapters for shared services
+
+A service that reuses an installed stack can declare `install_prerequisites`
+with the required component app ids and keep the runtime relationship in
+`dependencies`. This refuses an incomplete installation before creating the
+adapter instead of reporting a successful installation with no usable backend.
+For example, Angor Indexer requires `mempool-api` (shown to users as its owning
+Mempool app), shares that index and declares only an `api` interface. API-only
+interfaces belong in Services and do not generate browser launch buttons.
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+# App lifecycle repair — 2026-09-30
+
+Status: source repairs, optimized build, new-node recovery and scoped live
+lifecycle acceptance verified. Full release gate remains pending.
+These are next-release changes. Published 1.8.21 artifacts remain unchanged.
+
+## Report
+
+The operator reports that restarting an app can make it disappear, and a hard
+refresh offers installation again. Newly installed apps sometimes fail to
+connect in both embedded views and browser tabs. The new X250 additionally reproduced GitWorkshop disappearing during install
+and Nginx Proxy Manager spending approximately 14 minutes at 70%. A disposable
+app on the dev box exposed a separate restart failure.
+
+## Findings and repairs
+
+- Quadlet removes containers during stop/restart. The scanner protected existing
+  in-memory entries but did not reconstruct an absent app on a fresh daemon.
+  It now synthesizes stopped entries from the durable installed set, respecting
+  uninstall records, normalizing container prefixes, and preserving cached
+  metadata. Absence does not establish an image version or available update.
+- Concurrent read/modify/write operations could lose installed-app records;
+  in-place writes could expose truncated JSON to readers. Serialize writers,
+  publish by atomic rename, and sync the file and parent directory. Legacy
+  package install/uninstall success paths update the durable record too.
+- Scans and lifecycle/progress operations could replace a newer model from an
+  older snapshot. Use locked mutations for lifecycle/progress, and merge scan
+  results only into entries unchanged since the scan's merge snapshot.
+- Container running state and TCP accept alone did not establish HTTP readiness.
+  Add explicit `ui-ready` based on bounded HTTP probes of the loopback upstream;
+  reject connection failures and server errors, accept normal redirects and
+  authentication challenges, and do not follow redirects or send credentials.
+  Self-signed HTTPS apps are probed locally without certificate validation.
+- The app gate swept new listeners only every 60 seconds. Wake that sweep
+  immediately for a ready upstream whose declared gate port is not yet claimed,
+  and withhold readiness until external and Tor listener claims exist.
+- Fixed launch URLs could bypass suppressed runtime URLs. Enforce readiness in
+  app cards, details, centralized embedded/browser launchers, and session frames.
+  Starting/restarting clears readiness immediately. A waiting frame does not
+  load an iframe and resumes when the backend reports readiness.
+
+### New X250 findings
+
+- The published ISO copied only `bitcoin-ui`, `lnd-ui` and `electrs-ui` build
+  directories. GitWorkshop failed because `/opt/archipelago/docker/archipelago-source`
+  was missing. Copy the complete docker source tree for bundled and unbundled
+  ISOs, matching OTA packaging. Validate every manifest build context and
+  Dockerfile in OTA staging, ISO staging and the mounted ISO smoke test.
+- After restoring the omitted contexts, GitWorkshop's retained npm audit rejected
+  newly reported brace-expansion, fast-uri and ip-address vulnerabilities.
+  Refresh the existing pinned dependency patch, keeping the audit enabled.
+  Clean install/audit (zero advisories), type-check, 152 upstream tests and
+  subpath production build pass. The image builds on the X250 and `/healthz`
+  returns 200. No wallet or Bitcoin container restart was needed.
+- Nginx was receiving data, not frozen: over 1 GB read during the pull. It
+  completed at 12:40:46 UTC after starting at 12:26:27; its web endpoint returns
+  200. The orchestrated path previously labelled the entire download/build/start
+  operation "Creating container" at 70%. Give that aggregate operation its own
+  truthful label and earlier phase; no byte-level download estimate is claimed.
+- Restore install progress immediately from an already-loaded server snapshot,
+  so a new store created after hard refresh does not wait for another mutation.
+- Replace the install modal's native version popup with inline radio choices.
+  On this actual X250's Chromium 152 kiosk renderer, selection changes work,
+  options have white text on dark backgrounds, and remain above pruning controls.
+  Screenshot and browser assertions captured; no install confirmation was clicked.
+
+### Restart safety
+
+The disposable fixture restart at 12:38:05 UTC stopped its container, then
+`ss | kill` in runtime port cleanup sent SIGTERM to the management daemon at
+12:38:35. The daemon owned the gate listener on the same port at other addresses.
+Systemd restarted management; Bitcoin and LND container IDs/start times were
+unchanged. Remove port-owner kills and broad `pkill` patterns from restart,
+install recovery and Grafana preparation. Recovery now uses the existing
+container-ID-aware ghost reaper: absent container ownership must be established
+before a process is terminated. A real listening-socket regression checks that
+conflict cleanup preserves the host listener. App-gate manifest lookup now honors
+`ARCHIPELAGO_APPS_DIR`, matching the orchestrator's configured manifest root.
+
+## Validation
+
+- Full frontend suite: 139 files, 1,126 tests passed; final focused kiosk/store
+  checks: nine passed. Production frontend build passed.
+- Final isolated backend suite: 1,567 passed, zero failed, four existing ignored
+  tests. Optimized backend build passed and was deployed to the development node.
+- Tests cover empty runtime inventory, alias deduplication, uninstall exclusion,
+  concurrent durable writes, concurrent state changes, stale scan publication,
+  TCP-without-HTTP, HTTP statuses including 502/503, and gate listener claims.
+- Live disposable Node fixture delayed HTTP startup by 25 seconds. Desktop and
+  mobile retained the waiting screen through hard refresh without mounting an
+  iframe, then opened the exact fixture page automatically when ready.
+- Restart retained the app in both state APIs throughout and returned to ready;
+  the management PID did not change. Stopping removed the Quadlet container;
+  restarting management reconstructed its installed/stopped entry without a
+  false update offer. Starting it again succeeded. Desktop and mobile continued
+  to show the installed app after hard refresh.
+- LAN access required node authentication and returned exact fixture bytes after
+  authentication. The fixture was uninstalled through the package lifecycle API;
+  its temporary manifest root and service override were removed.
+- Bitcoin and LND container IDs and start times stayed unchanged through all
+  scoped checks and management restarts. No wallet data was used by the fixture.
+- X250 kiosk checks also opened the repaired GitWorkshop and Nginx Proxy Manager
+  pages successfully, with no failed local resource loads.
+
+## Limits
+
+This prevents the identified lifecycle/readiness failures; it cannot guarantee
+that an app or network never fails after a successful readiness check. Actual
+application failures must remain visible rather than being labelled successful.
+The full lifecycle/reboot release gate and funded acceptance of the reviewed
+paid-download PRs remain pending. The X250 kiosk fix has live rendering evidence.
@@ -290,3 +290,35 @@ app:
 Validate with `scripts/validate-app-manifest.sh` and regenerate the catalog
 with `scripts/generate-app-catalog.py` (drift-checked in CI by
 `scripts/check-app-catalog-drift.py`).
+
+### Persistent-state backup for runtime repairs
+
+`app.backup_before_runtime_change: true` opts an app into a stopped-state snapshot
+before reconciliation changes a service’s network, ports, security settings,
+command or health configuration. Image-upgrade backup policy remains separate. The orchestrator
+archives writable persistent bind mounts under the node data directory, collapses
+nested mounts, excludes the runtime Podman socket, and preserves the previous
+Quadlet definition for rollback. Named volumes, outside-data-root state and
+symlinked mount roots fail closed rather than silently producing an incomplete
+backup. A failed snapshot resumes the original service and leaves migration
+pending. Private archives are retained under `migration-backups/`; fresh installs
+and unchanged runtime configurations do not create migration snapshots.
+
+Catalog generation preserves the previously published base manifest for older
+daemons and puts opted-in network changes in a signed `manifest_variants` entry
+requiring `runtime-migration-backup-v1`. New runtimes select only variants whose
+complete requirement list they support. Supply `BASE_CATALOG` when generating
+against a different reviewed pre-migration catalog. This keeps catalog refresh
+from applying a migration before the matching OTA code is installed.
+
+### Existing shared-service prerequisites
+
+`app.install_prerequisites` is an optional list of existing app ids, for example
+`[mempool-api]` for a headless indexer adapter. The runtime checks their manifest
+container names before recording installation or changing any dependency. If one
+is missing, installation refuses with its owning app's title and removes the
+optimistic install tile. Runtime observation errors fail closed. This does not
+automatically install dependencies, alter Bitcoin pruning, or require a synced
+backend merely to recognize an already-installed service. Declare ongoing
+relationships separately in `dependencies`; use the app health check for actual
+API readiness. Self-dependencies and malformed ids are invalid.
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+# Same-node Gitea sources in Portainer
+
+Status: root cause reproduced and network repair verified in disposable and actual
+production Portainer instances; final migration integration and release acceptance remain in progress.
+This change belongs to the next signed catalog, OTA and ISO. It does not modify
+published 1.8.21 artifacts.
+
+## Confirmed cause
+
+On the affected X250, Gitea 1.27.3 and Portainer 2.45.0 run in rootless Podman
+5.4.2, managed by user Quadlet services. Gitea publishes HTTP on loopback and the
+Archipelago app gate serves its public port. Gitea's public ROOT_URL already
+matches that gate URL.
+
+Portainer had no explicit network selection and Podman selected pasta. Its
+network namespace contained the host's LAN address. A Git request to that same
+LAN address therefore reached Portainer's namespace rather than the host gate:
+connection refused before authentication. The exact smart-HTTP request from the
+host returned 200 with `application/x-git-upload-pack-advertisement`. From
+Portainer's actual namespace the LAN request was refused, while its host mapping
+returned a Git advertisement and the expected branch tip. Direct container-IP
+requests timed out. Container health and host-only HTTP checks missed the defect.
+
+A disposable Portainer using `slirp4netns` successfully created a Source through
+Portainer's own API, using the original LAN clone URL. Returning that fixture to
+pasta reproduced the refusal; recreating with slirp repaired it while preserving
+its account and saved Source. Restart also passed. The requested branch tip and
+Compose file were read from that actual Portainer network namespace. No user
+stack was deployed. Deployment addresses and repository details are kept outside
+this public record.
+
+## Source changes
+
+- Declare Portainer's rootless `slirp4netns` mode in its manifest. No shared static
+  container IP, host networking, all-interface backend publication or auth bypass.
+- Keep Gitea's loopback HTTP backend and gate port; machine Git uses Gitea's
+  authentication. Remove obsolete port-3000 nginx metadata/template and the old
+  best-effort installer commands which silently rewrote app.ini and falsely
+  claimed success. Gitea owns first-run setup and operator configuration.
+- Gitea SSH also failed before authentication: OpenSSH logged a denied
+  `chroot("/var/empty")` because the manifest dropped `SYS_CHROOT`. Add that
+  specific sandbox capability and reconcile security-directive changes. A
+  disposable fixture then passed SSH clone/push with host-key checking enabled.
+- Existing Quadlet reconciliation applies Network= drift. Record a durable
+  pending restart before updating the unit and clear it only after a successful
+  restart, so failed reloads/restarts and management interruptions retry.
+- Detect explicit rootless network-mode drift in the older Podman runtime too.
+  Unspecified networks do not trigger inferred changes to unrelated apps.
+- Portainer and Gitea opt into `backup_before_runtime_change`. Before recreation, gracefully
+  stop the app and archive its writable persistent bind mounts, including nested
+  Compose state, once each. Runtime sockets are excluded. Save the previous
+  Quadlet definition, where present. Archives live under the node data directory's
+  private `migration-backups/<id>/` directory; state is never deleted. Backup
+  failures resume the original service and fail the migration visibly.
+- Keep Podman API and Quadlet bind/network behavior covered by actual-manifest
+  tests. Docker remains a development fallback: it now preserves bind/protocol
+  declarations and rejects Podman-only networking instead of silently changing it.
+
+## Operator use and diagnostics
+
+Use Gitea's advertised HTTP(S) clone URL in Portainer Sources, with the Gitea
+username and token in the credential fields. On first-run Gitea setup, the public
+base URL must match the origin opened through Archipelago (including its port).
+Keep a deliberately configured HTTPS/domain origin when one exists. Do not use a
+container IP or put a token into the URL. A private repository requires repository
+read permission. A successful Source check fetches Git refs; it does not deploy
+a stack or establish that a Compose build uses a desired application revision.
+
+`scripts/check-portainer-git-source.py` calls Portainer's own read-only Source
+connection test. Supply a private mode-600 JSON credential file containing
+`api_key` or `jwt`, and optionally `git: {username, password}`. Pass
+`--portainer-url`, `--repository-url` and `--credentials-file`. It does not create
+Sources or stacks and prints no credentials or raw server errors. It distinguishes
+Portainer login/API failures from Git connection refusal, timeout, DNS/TLS
+failure, HTML/login interception and repository authentication failure. TLS
+verification stays enabled and API redirects are refused.
+
+## Upgrade and rollback
+
+The signed catalog embeds manifests and overrides installed disk copies.
+Capability-gated manifest variants keep the previous Portainer manifest as the
+base for older daemons; only daemons supporting `runtime-migration-backup-v1`
+select the network repair. This prevents catalog refresh from triggering an
+unbacked recreation before the OTA is installed. A disk
+edit alone cannot deliver this fix. Publish the matching catalog with the tested
+runtime, then verify the generated unit, actual network mode and Source API.
+Expect a Portainer interruption while the snapshot and recreation run; duration
+depends on its saved state size.
+The Portainer routing repair does not require a Gitea configuration change.
+The separate SSH capability repair does recreate Gitea, preserving and snapshotting
+both data/config mounts first. Supported systemd drop-in overrides remain intact.
+
+Keep the previous trusted catalog/runtime for rollback. Restore that catalog
+before restoring the saved `previous.container`, reloading user systemd and
+starting Portainer; otherwise reconciliation will correctly reapply the new
+manifest. The archive is a stopped-state emergency backup, not an instruction to
+roll back a live database automatically. Restore it only with Portainer stopped
+and after preserving any newer state. Do not replace Gitea data/config, keys,
+repositories or the production Portainer database with disposable test data.
+
+## Validation and remaining gates
+
+- Disposable X250 Portainer Source API: old mode refuses; repaired mode succeeds;
+  saved account/Source survive recreation; restart succeeds.
+- Invalid Git credentials produce a repository-authentication error, distinct
+  from TCP refusal. Requested branch and Compose file read from Portainer context.
+- Combined backend suite including the reviewed paid-download PRs and catalog
+  rollout guard: 1,605 passed, zero failed, four existing ignored
+  tests, including stopped-state archive round trips and failure preservation. Container runtime suite: 78 passed.
+  Five diagnostic regression tests passed; catalog regeneration is idempotent
+  and the generated catalog has zero manifest metadata drift.
+- Fresh managed Gitea and Portainer fixtures: authenticated private Source
+  creation, invalid-token rejection, workstation clone/push and exact branch
+  lookup from Portainer namespace passed. LFS batch/upload/download and OCI
+  registry authentication/blob/manifest round trips passed. Desktop and mobile
+  login/private-repository/assets/hard-refresh checks passed.
+- Still required before release: live automatic migration with the new runtime,
+  snapshot/rollback verification and reversed install-order acceptance,
+  lifecycle/reboot convergence, and signed-catalog delivery to the existing app.
+  Record LFS/registry/SSH/browser checks and actual hardware/runtime coverage.
+
+### Affected X250: production routing repair verified
+
+Applied the tested rootless network setting to the actual installed Portainer
+through a persistent Quadlet drop-in, after gracefully stopping it and creating a
+private archive of its database and Compose directory. Compared the archive
+against the stopped original before changing configuration; retained the original
+unit and a rollback path. A verification helper initially compared mount list
+order rather than mount identity and safely rolled back; the corrected check
+compares sorted source/destination/write-mode tuples and passed.
+
+The actual production Portainer namespace reproduced connection refusal before
+repair. After repair it received a Git smart-HTTP advertisement, fetched the
+requested branch at its current tip and read its Compose file. Repeating these
+checks after restarting the managed Portainer service passed. All original data
+and socket mounts and the loopback-only HTTP binding are retained. Gitea,
+Bitcoin and the wallet container IDs and start times were unchanged. No stack
+was deployed and no repository credential was changed.
+
+This establishes the routing repair on the affected hardware. A logged-in
+production Portainer Source UI/API acceptance has not yet been recorded; the
+corresponding API checks passed on disposable instances as documented above.
+The installed-node drop-in persists through service restart/reboot but is not the
+fleet delivery mechanism. Automatic migration and signed catalog/OTA/ISO release
+validation remain pending; the source manifest declares the same network mode.
+Private deployment addresses, branch details and state archives are not committed.
+
+### Managed automatic migration and archive restore
+
+The new runtime candidate migrated an existing managed fixture from pasta to
+slirp without a manual unit edit. It preserved the account, saved Source and
+mount set, saved a private stopped-state archive plus the previous unit, restored
+Source API access, and cleared the pending restart marker. A management-service
+restart preserved the new container identity/start time and did not create
+another archive. The archive extracted into an isolated scratch directory and
+compared cleanly, including the database and Compose directory. Rootless archive
+ownership required scratch cleanup inside `podman unshare`; no production data
+was overwritten. Native Bitcoin and LND IDs/start times remained unchanged.
+
+This optimized candidate predates the final bounded backup-retry guard; that
+latest source passed the isolated 1,605-test suite and must also be exercised in
+the final release build. A fixture-only systemd start failure was then injected during a security
+directive migration. The failure retained the durable restart marker. After
+removing the injected failure, the reconciler restarted the service without a
+manual container start, restored Source API access and cleared the marker.
+Reverse install order, final-build retry-budget coverage, full reboot and
+signed delivery remain open.
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# Incident — 2026-09-15: Minibits Cashu claim stuck retrying an already-redeemed token
+
+## Report
+
+User: "The cashu server is unable to get it's tokens from nostr on
+[affected node]" — clarified as the Cashu **client wallet**
+(Minibits `@minibits.cash` Lightning-address receive flow), not a mint
+server. UI showed: *"a payment arrived but couldn't be redeemed yet (1)"*.
+
+## Root cause
+
+`wallet::minibits::claim_and_redeem` (`core/archipelago/src/wallet/minibits.rs`)
+polls Nostr relays for NIP-04-encrypted Cashu tokens sent to the node's
+`@minibits.cash` address, decrypts them, and redeems them at the mint. A
+token that fails to redeem is kept in `MinibitsState.pending_claims` and
+retried on the next poll — by design, so a *transient* failure (mint briefly
+down, decrypt hiccup) never drops real money.
+
+But one queued claim had already been redeemed (mint error **11001 "Token
+Already Spent"** — most likely double-delivered by the relay, or redeemed
+by an earlier run before a crash lost track of it). That's a *terminal*
+condition, not a transient one: the code didn't distinguish the two, so it
+retried the same dead claim every ~6 seconds forever:
+
+```
+WARN archipelago::wallet::ecash: Failed to swap proofs from mint https://mint.minibits.cash/Bitcoin:
+     This ecash has already been redeemed — it can't be claimed twice.: {"code":11001,"detail":"Token Already Spent"}
+WARN archipelago::wallet::minibits: Minibits claim decrypted but failed to redeem (...); will retry next poll
+```
+
+Confirmed via `sudo journalctl -u archipelago.service` on the affected node,
+and via `/var/lib/archipelago/wallet/minibits.json`, which had exactly one
+`pending_claims` entry. Each poll also unconditionally queried all three
+`CLAIM_RELAY_URLS` (`relay.minibits.cash`, `relay.damus.io`, `nos.lol`)
+instead of the primary relay only, adding needless churn and leaking the
+wallet's Nostr pubkey to two relays it didn't need to touch — `relay.damus.io`
+was additionally failing NIP-42 auth / 503ing on every poll.
+
+**No funds were at risk** — an already-redeemed token has zero remaining
+value. The only symptom was a permanently stuck "couldn't be redeemed yet"
+banner and wasted relay connections.
+
+### Why this had already been "fixed" once and came back
+
+This exact bug (terminal-11001 handling + relay-query reduction) was fixed
+on 2026-09-09 on branch `feat/minibits-lnurl-receive` (commits `4e410d7`,
+`489995c`) and pushed to `origin`. **That branch was never merged into
+`main`.** `main` carries its own, independently-diverged rewrite of
+`minibits.rs` that never got those two hardening fixes. The affected node
+OTA'd to `1.8.16-alpha` (built from `main`) earlier on 2026-09-15, so the bug
+resurfaced on the first replayed/double-delivered claim after that update.
+
+## Fix
+
+Two parts:
+
+### 1. Immediate unstick (affected node, operational, no code change)
+
+- Backed up `/var/lib/archipelago/wallet/minibits.json`.
+- Stopped `archipelago.service`, emptied `pending_claims` (`[]`) in the
+  state file, restarted the service.
+- Verified via `journalctl` that polling resumed cleanly with no further
+  "already been redeemed" warnings.
+
+### 2. Code fix, ported into `main`
+
+- **`core/archipelago/src/wallet/mint_client.rs`**: exposed the existing
+  NUT error-code-11001 translation as a public constant,
+  `ALREADY_REDEEMED_MSG`, and a typed `AlreadyRedeemed` condition identified
+  only by the structured mint error code. Remote text cannot impersonate it.
+- **`core/archipelago/src/wallet/minibits.rs`**:
+  - Added `is_already_redeemed(&anyhow::Error) -> bool`, checking the error
+    chain for the typed `AlreadyRedeemed` condition. The ecash receive path
+    preserves it only when all failed mint entries report already-spent proofs;
+    mixed terminal/transient failures remain retryable.
+  - In the claim redeem loop, a redeem failure matching
+    `is_already_redeemed` is now dropped (logged at `info!`, not retried)
+    instead of being pushed back onto `pending_claims`. Every other failure
+    still retries next poll, unchanged.
+  - `fetch_relay_dms` now connects to `RELAY_URL` (the Minibits relay)
+    alone first via `try_connect_relay`, and only adds the two public
+    fallback relays (`relay.damus.io`, `nos.lol`) if that primary relay is
+    unreachable. Also paginates the DM fetch (200/page, capped at 5 pages)
+    backward with an inclusive `until` boundary. The cursor persists across
+    polls when capped or interrupted, independently of the forward watermark.
+    A full same-second boundary is fetched with a larger limit rather than
+    skipped, so multiple payments sharing a timestamp remain reachable.
+
+Deliberately **not** ported from the unmerged branch: its `STATE_LOCK`
+skip-if-busy guard and per-claim attempt-count backstop. `main`'s existing
+`MINIBITS_STATE_LOCK` already fully serializes claim polls (blocks rather
+than skips — a different but equally valid way to close the same race), and
+an attempt-count backstop would have required reshaping the `PendingClaim`
+enum for marginal extra protection beyond what the 11001 fix already covers.
+
+## Verification
+
+- `cargo build -p archipelago` — clean, no new warnings.
+- `cargo test -p archipelago --bin archipelago wallet::minibits` — existing
+  suite still green (see PR/commit for the run).
+- Live on the affected node: claim poll loop confirmed quiet post-unstick
+  (only `relay.minibits.cash` connects logged, no redeem-failure warnings).
+
+## Lesson (recorded in memory)
+
+A fix that lives only on an unmerged feature branch is not a fix that's
+actually deployed. Before trusting a memory or changelog claim that
+something "shipped," check which branch the running/released build was
+built from (`git log <branch>..main` / `main..<branch>`) rather than
+assuming a pushed branch was merged.
+
+## Pre-merge review regressions
+
+- A 450-event newest-first backlog is completely fetched.
+- 250 distinct payments sharing one timestamp are preserved.
+- A 1,300-event backlog resumes after the five-page cap and a state reload.
+- An interrupted relay fetch retains its unfinished cursor.
+- Only structured error 11001 is terminal, including when errors are wrapped;
+  remote free text and mixed mint failures cannot discard a retryable claim.
@@ -0,0 +1,405 @@
+# Framework: LND startup, missing Receive address, false zero balance
+
+**Status: CLOSED WITH OPERATOR ACCEPTANCE — startup, native balances, Cashu address and source integration verified; user accepted the remaining display check and authorized release on 2026-09-30.**
+
+Reported: 2026-09-15. Source inspected: main at `3b9b74da` (v1.8.17-alpha publication).
+The Framework's installed version and exact incident time have not been verified.
+
+## Mandatory priority across sessions
+
+The user explicitly requested that this be investigated and fixed on the node
+before resuming unrelated work in later sessions. `AGENTS.md` in the repository
+and `/home/archipelago/.codex/AGENTS.md` carry this session-start priority.
+Only live verification below, or an explicit user change of priority, clears it.
+
+## Reported observations
+
+- Framework stopped showing its Lightning address in Receive.
+- After a restart, LND did not initialize and the UI displayed a balance of zero.
+- Manually restarting LND restored operation.
+- Node access will be supplied later. No Framework connection, restart, wallet
+  operation, or deployment was performed during this offline investigation.
+- Still clarify whether the restart was a full reboot or management-service
+  restart, and which Receive item vanished: a Lightning invoice, an on-chain
+  address, or the Cashu tab's `@minibits.cash` address.
+
+A successful manual restart is a workaround, not a root cause or durable fix.
+The zero display does not establish that any funds were lost. Its relation to
+v1.8.17-alpha is unknown; do not infer a release regression from timing alone.
+
+## Confirmed source findings
+
+### 1. LND errors can be presented as successful zero balances
+
+`core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs`, `handle_lnd_getinfo`:
+
+- `/v1/getinfo` is decoded without checking HTTP success. Its response fields are
+  optional, so an error object such as `{"code":14,"message":"wallet not ready"}`
+  can deserialize with every expected field absent instead of rejecting the call.
+- Channel and blockchain balance requests suppress connection/JSON failures and
+  substitute responses with absent balances. HTTP status is not checked here either.
+- Missing or unparsable balances become `0` through `unwrap_or(0)`.
+- `neode-ui/src/views/Home.vue`, `loadWeb5Status`, treats this RPC response as
+  success, sets the wallet connected flag, overwrites prior balances, and can
+  persist the false zero in the wallet snapshot. Its existing failure handling
+  preserves prior balances only when the RPC actually rejects.
+
+This is a confirmed code defect and a plausible explanation for the reported
+display. It is not proof of the Framework's failure sequence.
+
+Required fix: reject unsuccessful/incomplete LND balance responses or model
+availability explicitly end to end. Never translate unavailable data into a
+verified zero. Preserve known balances with a clear unavailable/stale indication;
+show an unknown state when no valid balance is known. Genuine successful zeros
+must still render as zero. Cover outage, partial failure, cold load, and recovery.
+
+### 2. Startup readiness and wallet unlock need live evidence
+
+- `main.rs` runs crash/container boot recovery before starting the reconciler.
+- `crash_recovery.rs` can start existing containers directly.
+- `container/prod_orchestrator.rs` runs LND post-start hooks on explicit restart
+  and on normal reconciliation of already-running containers. Therefore it is
+  incorrect to conclude that running containers categorically skip unlock.
+- `container/lnd.rs::ensure_wallet_initialized` checks wallet existence and
+  `/v1/getinfo`, then attempts unlock. Its unlock wait budget is approximately ten
+  minutes; per-request timeouts can extend elapsed time. Historical comments
+  describe slow database startup and restart loops, but that is not Framework evidence.
+- `health_monitor.rs` models LND's Bitcoin dependency. Container-running state
+  alone is not proof of wallet readiness, Bitcoin connectivity, or invoice readiness.
+
+Investigate boot ordering, Bitcoin readiness, listener/port mapping, wallet unlock,
+mount availability, stopped markers, restart counters, and actual reconcile logs.
+
+### 3. Destructive automatic recovery exists; exclude it from diagnosis
+
+`container/lnd.rs::ensure_wallet_initialized` calls
+`recreate_wallet_destructively` when all candidate passwords are rejected. That
+function can delete the LND chain and graph data directories. Its comment assumes
+alpha wallets hold no real funds; that assumption must not guide this investigation.
+
+No evidence establishes that it ran on Framework. Preserve the original wallet
+and channels; rejected passwords must lead to a recoverable error, not automatic
+wallet deletion. Review and disable this destructive fallback before using a
+modified initialization path as a repair. The existing
+`unlock_existing_wallet_no_wipe` demonstrates the non-destructive error behavior.
+
+### 4. The missing address must be identified precisely
+
+`ReceiveBitcoinModal.vue` generates Lightning invoices using `lnd.createinvoice`
+after a readiness check, and Bitcoin addresses using `lnd.newaddress`. Its Cashu
+Lightning address uses `wallet.ecash-lnaddress` and the Minibits service separately.
+Do not assume the Minibits address disappears because LND is down. Trace the actual
+tab and response once the user clarifies and the node can be inspected.
+
+## Next session: live investigation order
+
+1. Request Framework access and verify node identity without publishing its hostname,
+   address, credentials, or wallet identifiers. Do not substitute the development box.
+2. Record installed backend/image versions, boot and incident timestamps, and exact
+   restart/action sequence. Capture current and previous-boot management/LND logs
+   before another restart can obscure evidence. Keep raw logs private and redact
+   secrets, invoices, wallet identifiers, and personally identifying data in summaries.
+3. Read container/service state, restart counters, mounts, stopped markers, listener
+   mappings, Bitcoin readiness, LND wallet state, and authenticated API results.
+   Never dump container environments, macaroons, passwords, seeds, or wallet databases.
+4. Compare HTTP status and data from LND getinfo/balance endpoints with the RPC and
+   visible Receive/balance state. Distinguish unavailable data, locked wallet,
+   syncing wallet, and genuine zero. Preserve last-known balance evidence privately.
+5. Establish whether the manual restart ran a missing/failed hook, waited out a
+   dependency, refreshed networking/credentials, or masked another failure.
+6. Implement the evidenced startup repair and unavailable-balance handling with
+   regressions. Preserve wallet/channel state and arrange recovery access before
+   deploying or deliberately rebooting the node.
+
+## Acceptance criteria — all required to close
+
+- [x] Root cause of Framework startup failure supported by node evidence.
+- [x] Fix implemented and focused regression tests pass.
+- [ ] Failed, locked, delayed, and partial LND responses never masquerade as a
+      fresh zero balance; genuine zero remains correct.
+- [x] Existing wallet identity and channel state preserved through the repair.
+- [x] Framework starts LND and reaches usable wallet readiness after a controlled
+      full reboot, without manually restarting LND.
+- [ ] The originally affected Receive flow works after boot and after recovery;
+      outages show an actionable state and recover without requiring a page reload.
+- [ ] Display confirmation pending; authenticated LND balances match pre-reboot values.
+- [x] LND logs show no restart loop, repeated unlock failure, or wallet-recreation path.
+- [ ] Evidence, tested versions, deployment, and limitations recorded here; user
+      informed of live results. Only then set status RESOLVED and clear the blockers.
+
+## Work completed so far
+
+2026-09-15: source investigation and persistent session-start instructions only.
+No code fix, release, node deployment, or live reproduction for this incident yet.
+
+## Live evidence captured 2026-09-15
+
+Access was provided during the same session. Read-only inspection confirmed:
+
+- Framework runs `1.8.17-alpha-dev`; the current full boot began at 18:40:09 UTC.
+- LND opened its databases in 6.7 seconds and requested its wallet password at
+  18:40:20. It then rejected GetInfo/ChannelBalance/WalletBalance as wallet locked.
+- The management service's first sequential reconcile pass was occupied by
+  unrelated image recovery, including a missing voice image from 18:40:24 and
+  later a missing Core Lightning image. Manifests are iterated from a HashMap;
+  wallet readiness has no initial priority. Boot recovery itself completed at
+  18:40:18; the first full app-reconcile report appeared at 18:44:34.
+- The user's manual LND restart was recorded at 18:42:33. The replacement LND
+  process started at 18:42:40, requested its password at 18:43:05, and unlocked
+  at 18:43:07 through the explicit restart hook. This supports delayed unlock
+  behind unrelated recovery, rather than a missing wallet or bad password.
+- At inspection, `/v1/state` reports SERVER_ACTIVE; getinfo reports chain and
+  graph sync and two active channels. Both authenticated balance endpoints
+  report nonzero balances. No wallet-recreation event was found in captured logs.
+- The Minibits RPC separately fails with “The ecash wallet has no seed yet”.
+  `wallet/cashu_seed.json` and `wallet/minibits.json` are absent. The existing
+  ecash wallet is present with proofs and an August modification timestamp.
+  Do not overwrite it or generate an unrelated recovery identity. Still identify
+  which Receive item the user meant before declaring this part repaired.
+
+Private raw evidence: `/home/archipelago/.local/state/archy-incidents/framework-lnd-20260915/`.
+Files have mode 0600 and the directory 0700. Do not commit or publish raw logs.
+
+Candidate changes on `investigate/framework-lnd-startup`:
+
+- Run Bitcoin and LND reconciliation before unrelated image pulls/builds.
+- Reject failed/incomplete LND balance responses instead of manufacturing zeros.
+- Preserve known Home balances on invalid responses, visibly label unavailable
+  balances, and clear the warning after a successful refresh.
+- Remove automatic destructive wallet recreation; failed unlock preserves data.
+- Add backend outage/zero/ordering regressions and UI failure/recovery coverage.
+
+These changes are not yet deployed or verified through a Framework reboot.
+
+### Candidate validation and staging
+
+Source fix commit: `4237fb5e` on `investigate/framework-lnd-startup`.
+
+- 44 focused backend tests passed (including LND errors, genuine zero, startup ordering).
+- 58 additional reconciliation/update tests passed.
+- 12 Home UI tests passed, including outage/partial response/cold-load/recovery cases.
+- Rust formatting, frontend type checking and production build passed.
+- Optimized backend build passed in 8m02s.
+- Both candidate artifacts were copied to Framework and SHA-256 matched locally.
+- Private on-node baseline and static channel backup are under
+  `/var/lib/archipelago/support/framework-lnd-20260915/`, along with the previous
+  backend, dashboard, and `rollback.sh`. This directory is root-only.
+- Candidate staged at `/tmp/archy-framework-candidate/`; not applied yet.
+- A timing confirmation for the maintenance restart/full reboot was requested
+  because it interrupts all node services. Do not reboot while that is pending.
+- SSH works through the temporary control socket
+  `/tmp/archy-framework-connection/control`. No SSH password was saved to disk.
+- The supplied SSH password did not authenticate to the dashboard. Do not guess
+  additional passwords or alter dashboard authentication. Native LND diagnostics
+  are authenticated using its existing local macaroon without printing it.
+
+Status remains OPEN until deployment and live boot/Receive/balance verification.
+
+### Authorized deployment and full reboot — 2026-09-15
+
+The user answered “yes please” to applying the staged fix and rebooting. Timing
+approval is no longer pending. Applied the staged backend and dashboard after
+rechecking both checksums and rollback copies. There were no pending channel
+HTLCs at reboot. No wallet data, secrets, or recovery identities were replaced.
+
+Live results:
+
+- A different boot ID confirms a full reboot occurred.
+- Running backend on disk matches candidate SHA-256
+  `5a354f76ebe619561eef0d318e4f41f177d04004682504d7434d632733f8e298`.
+- Management service started around 19:23:57 UTC; LND asked for its wallet
+  password at 19:24:10 and logged automatic unlock at 19:24:18. No manual LND
+  restart or interactive unlock was used after this reboot.
+- LND reports SERVER_ACTIVE and chain sync. Its identity and channel-point set
+  are identical to the private pre-reboot baseline; both channels are active.
+- On-chain and Lightning balances exactly equal the pre-reboot values.
+- LND container and systemd restart counts are zero after recovery.
+- Public HTTP checks on the node returned 200 for the dashboard index and new
+  Home bundle; their bytes match the installed candidate, including the new
+  unavailable-balance notice.
+- Captured post-reboot management and LND journals in the private local evidence
+  directory. Detailed before/after identity, channel, and balance records remain
+  in the root-only support directory on Framework.
+
+The user was asked to refresh the dashboard and confirm the originally missing
+Receive item and displayed balances. Keep OPEN until that reply is assessed;
+Minibits seed absence was a separate finding and must not be mistaken for an
+LND startup failure. Candidate is a direct node deployment, not a newly signed
+fleet release. The source branch must be integrated before a subsequent release
+can preserve this fix across the fleet.
+
+### Cashu Receive follow-up
+
+The user confirmed that the remaining error is specifically on the Ecash tab:
+“Lightning address unavailable — you can still paste a token below.”
+
+Read-only checks confirm Framework has an encrypted node master seed, existing
+Cashu proofs, and neither `wallet/cashu_seed.json` nor `wallet/minibits.json`.
+The existing Minibits handler requires an ecash seed, but setup was available
+only through the Settings backup screen; Receive hid the actionable cause.
+
+UI fix commit: `a3b64670`.
+
+- Receive checks the non-secret seed status when registration fails.
+- Unseeded wallets get the existing password/TOTP/backup-passphrase-verified setup
+  component directly in Receive, with import/restore controls excluded from this
+  focused setup screen. Setup derives from the saved node seed when present.
+- The recovery words stay in the existing local reveal UI, are cleared on Done,
+  and are never emitted to Receive. Receive retries registration after Done.
+- Seeded wallets with service outages get Retry, without offering a new identity.
+- Ten focused Receive/backup tests and the production UI build passed.
+- Deployed the dashboard change without restarting services; live HTTP index and
+  setup bundle returned 200 and byte-matched the candidate.
+- Backed up original Cashu proofs to the root-only support directory as
+  `ecash-before-address-setup.json`. No seed or proof mutation was performed by
+  the assistant. Prior LND-fixed dashboard is also backed up there.
+
+The user was asked to refresh Receive → Ecash → Set up address, authenticate in
+that node UI, and click Done. Dashboard password is required to decrypt the node
+seed; the SSH password did not authenticate to the dashboard. Do not request or
+print recovery words, bypass authentication, or create an unrelated random seed.
+After completion, verify saved seed/profile presence, registration success,
+address display, and unchanged original proofs before closing the incident.
+
+### Cashu setup completed and verified — 2026-09-15
+
+The user initially reported a forgotten passphrase, then said “did it now”. No
+independent-seed fallback was implemented or used. The user completed the existing
+password-verified setup themselves; the assistant did not receive recovery words.
+
+Read-only node verification confirmed:
+
+- `wallet/cashu_seed.json` exists, is nonempty, and records source `node-seed`.
+- `wallet/minibits.json` exists with a `@minibits.cash` address and no pending claims.
+- The original ecash wallet file is byte-for-byte unchanged from the protected
+  pre-setup copy; every original proof is preserved.
+- The registered address's public LNURL-pay metadata returns HTTP 200, tag
+  `payRequest`, an HTTPS callback, and a valid amount range. No invoice was paid
+  and no funded payment test was performed.
+
+LND automatic startup and native balances were already verified after the full
+reboot. Cashu setup and address registration are now also verified on Framework.
+Do not ask for the forgotten passphrase again or propose a replacement Cashu seed.
+
+Remaining: integrate the tested source branch before the next fleet release;
+record final human confirmation of the rendered dashboard balance (native balances
+match exactly, and UI failure/recovery regressions pass). Keep this follow-up
+visible across sessions; do not rebuild/reboot/reinitialize a working wallet just
+to repeat already completed checks.
+
+### Backup copy and layout — 2026-09-15
+
+At the user's request, shortened the ecash backup explanations and stacked each
+card section's text and full-width action vertically. Kept the distinction
+between node-derived and separate phrases, and the warning that a newly created
+phrase covers future coins rather than existing legacy coins.
+
+All 10 Receive/backup tests and the production UI build pass. Deployed the UI to
+Framework without a restart; served index and backup-component bundle match the
+build byte-for-byte. The prior UI is saved as `web-ui-before-backup-copy` in the
+protected incident directory. Source integration and final rendered dashboard
+balance confirmation remain pending as above.
+
+### LNURL comment-length report — 2026-09-15
+
+User reports a maximum-comment-length error in some sending wallets. Live
+Framework address metadata advertises integer `commentAllowed: 100`. The QR
+contains the address only; Archy's Receive UI does not add a comment. The
+Minibits-hosted callback returned invoices for omitted/empty comments, 100 ASCII
+characters, 101 ASCII characters, and 100 accented characters. These were unpaid
+invoice requests at the advertised minimum amount; no funds were sent.
+
+The callback did not reproduce the error, including beyond its advertised limit.
+Sending-wallet validation against the advertised 100-character limit is therefore
+a hypothesis, not a confirmed root cause. Asked which wallets fail and whether
+an empty comment also fails. Need that result before selecting a code fix.
+The service controls the advertised limit; changing local Receive text or QR
+cannot raise it for other wallets.
+
+### Primal Spark: automatic recipient note exceeds the address limit
+
+User clarified that no comment was entered and the sender is Primal Spark.
+Checked Framework's management journal over the preceding 20 minutes: no
+comment-length errors, service active, and zero pending Minibits claims. Recent
+claim polling connected to and disconnected from the relay normally. Historical
+seed-authentication failures preceded the successful setup already documented.
+
+The live address's Minibits `text/plain` description is **101 ASCII characters**,
+while `commentAllowed` is **100**. Description template (address redacted):
+`Pay to [ADDRESS] with Lightning. Receiver will receive ecash into Minibits Wallet.`
+
+Primal Android source at `36939db97213e7f8eeefaa4adaf125d839fc662e`:
+- `WalletTextParserImpl.handleLnUrlText` assigns the parsed description to
+  `DraftTx.noteRecipient`, including for Lightning-address input.
+- `TransactionEditor` initializes its editable recipient note from that value.
+- `SparkWalletServiceImpl` passes it untrimmed to `PrepareLnurlPayRequest.comment`.
+- Breez Spark source at `8bb38ec292a590907360c4e7f2a4134b8f09de9e`,
+  `common/src/lnurl/pay.rs::validate_user_input`, rejects a comment exceeding the
+  limit with the exact reported error before requesting the callback.
+
+This identifies a concrete compatibility failure: the address description can
+become an automatic over-limit comment without the sender typing anything.
+The user confirmed that explicitly clearing the prefilled recipient note made
+the payment work, and supplied the same description observed in live metadata.
+This confirms the automatic-comment compatibility failure. The installed Primal
+platform/version was not captured. Node logs alone cannot show sender-side
+validation or requests to the external Minibits callback.
+
+Durable upstream correction: Primal should keep receiver metadata separate from
+the sender's comment and enforce the limit on actual user comments. Minibits can
+also shorten its description or raise its advertised comment limit. Archy does
+not serve this external LNURL metadata; do not rename an existing wallet address,
+rotate its seed, or claim that a local dashboard edit fixes this sender behavior.
+
+### Primal workaround confirmed by user
+
+The user confirmed successful payment after removing the automatic description.
+The permanent sender-side correction is to leave the recipient comment empty by
+default and retain receiver metadata only as display text. In Primal Android,
+remove the assignment of the LNURL description to the draft recipient note in
+`WalletTextParserImpl.handleLnUrlText`; also validate explicitly entered comments
+against the endpoint's limit. No upstream change has been submitted or deployed.
+Existing Framework addresses and wallet identities remain unchanged.
+
+### Can Archy shorten the current address description?
+
+Inspected Minibits' public wallet client (`src/services/minibitsService.ts`,
+`updateWalletProfile`) and `WalletProfileRecord`. The supported profile update
+fields are name, lud16, and avatar; there is no exposed LNURL description or
+comment-limit setting. Its public web repository also contains no implementation
+of the LNURL metadata endpoint or description template.
+
+For the existing `@minibits.cash` address, no supported client-side mechanism
+to shorten this text was found. Do not send guessed profile-update fields or
+rename the address to disguise the problem. A Minibits server change could use
+`Pay to [ADDRESS]`, well below the current limit. Controlling this metadata in
+Archy would instead require an Archy-hosted LNURL service/address and correct
+invoice metadata binding; rewriting the QR label or only proxying edited metadata
+is insufficient. No wallet/profile mutations were made during this investigation.
+
+### Source integration confirmed — 2026-09-29
+
+`git merge-base --is-ancestor 4237fb5e HEAD` succeeds on main at
+`540639d2`. The previously tested startup ordering, safe unlock, and unavailable
+balance fixes are integrated and included in the intervening releases. The
+earlier “source integration pending” notes above are historical, not current.
+The user reports no further Framework incidents. Requested final confirmation
+of rendered balances and Receive; do not mark closed without that response.
+
+A separate startup failure was observed on the development box today when Core
+was installed against existing block data: Core made steady replay progress,
+while LND exited on its short “bitcoind start timeout”. Candidate work defers
+unlock until authenticated Bitcoin RPC answers, with dependency waiting states
+in the LND UI. This is not evidence of a new failure on Framework.
+
+### Operator acceptance and release authorization — 2026-09-30
+
+After being told that final rendered balance/Receive confirmation remained and
+SSH access was unavailable, the user replied: “that's fine I believe it'd fixed,
+please release”. This explicitly accepts proceeding past the remaining human
+display check. Close this incident with operator acceptance based on the earlier
+controlled reboot, preserved identity/channels/native balances, working Receive
+address/payment, source integration, and the user's report of no further issues.
+No new direct Framework inspection or on-screen verification is claimed today.
+Reopen investigation if the original startup, Receive, or false-zero symptom
+recurs; preserve the wallet and channels.
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+# Next OTA and raw ISO after 1.8.21
+
+**Status: implementation and acceptance in progress; NOT ready to release.**
+
+This is the consolidated execution checklist for the operator's chat requests.
+A targeted node repair is not completion of the release. Finish the remaining
+acceptance gates, preserve live wallets and app data, and publish both artifacts
+through git and ngit. No universal absence of future failures is claimed.
+
+## Changes already shipped in 1.8.21 or earlier
+
+Keep these fixes in the next build and include relevant regressions:
+
+- Mempool image/catalog version agreement and update-button behavior.
+- Minibits integration; Framework automatic LND startup and safe unavailable
+  balances. Framework incident closed with operator acceptance.
+- Shorter, single-column ecash backup messaging.
+- AIUI transparent background on desktop/mobile.
+- Cashu paid-file keyset/mint/error/refund corrections, with live purchases.
+- mempool.space explorer fallback, preserving local/custom explorer settings.
+- Bitcoin install pruning choice and matching automatic-pruning behavior.
+- Friendly Bitcoin warmup and LND install/start/sync waiting states.
+- Raw ISO publishing and upload support.
+
+The Primal automatic LNURL comment problem was traced to sender behavior and
+Minibits metadata. The user accepted clearing the sender's automatic comment;
+no unsupported local metadata rewrite or wallet-identity replacement is planned.
+See the Framework incident and 1.8.21 execution records for evidence/limits.
+
+## New release scope and gates
+
+| Task | Implemented/verified | Remaining before release |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| X250 Bitcoin picker | Inline choices; actual Chromium kiosk selection, readability and pruning layout passed | Include in final UI/build checks |
+| App disappearance/readiness | Durable inventory and safe lifecycle repair; delayed HTTP and desktop/mobile hard-refresh checks passed | Final lifecycle/reboot gate on candidate |
+| X250 GitWorkshop/Nginx | Missing build contexts restored, dependency/build checks and live UI passed; Nginx slow pull diagnosed; truthful progress label | Verify both artifact payloads contain all build contexts |
+| PRs 161/162 | Reviewed, repaired, merged/closed normally; combined regression suite passed | Funded Tor-only candidate purchase, retained change, refund, Files bytes and cached repeat passed; include in signed artifacts |
+| Gitea/Portainer | Root cause confirmed; source network/backup/retry/catalog changes; real X250 routing repair and restart verified; private Git, SSH, LFS, registry and browser fixture checks passed | Automatic migration, scratch restore, failed-start recovery and reverse installation order passed. Operator confirms production site works through Portainer; production host reboot also preserved network/Git/Compose access; final candidate delivery and release checks remain |
+| Angor headless store service | Implemented standard Mempool adapter and separate optional relay, official logo, headless store entries and declarative dependency guard. API security/outage/DNS tests and five relay lifecycle cycles passed | Final candidate prerequisite/install acceptance, management restart/reboot checks and signed catalog delivery; real indexing on dev waits for Bitcoin sync |
+
+Durable payment receipts after a lost seller response remain a separately
+recorded design follow-up. Preserve the truthful unconfirmed-refund warning and
+prevent duplicate automatic payment; do not describe an unconfirmed refund as
+completed. See PR review for the accepted scope and coverage limits.
+
+## Final release checklist
+
+- [ ] Finish all new-scope implementation and specific acceptance above.
+- [x] Remove disposable fixtures and temporary test overrides; verify native
+      Bitcoin/LND identity and start-state baselines remain protected.
+- [x] Commit and push completed source changes to git and ngit.
+- [ ] Run final backend/UI/regression/release gates on the final source; inspect
+      skipped tests and report actual hardware/runtime coverage.
+- [ ] Prepare compatible signed app catalog; old runtimes must not apply a
+      migration before they have backup/recovery support.
+- [ ] Version/changelog and OTA payload prepared, validated and signed by user.
+- [ ] Raw ISO built; payload hashes/content verified; installer boot tested.
+- [ ] User signs ISO checksums; publish OTA and ISO plus verification files on
+      git and ngit; independently read back hashes and update discovery.
+- [ ] Provide LAN scp command for the new raw ISO.
+
+Latest backend source verification: 1,609 passed, zero failed, four existing
+ignored tests. This is one layer of evidence, not a substitute for live gates.
+
+## Angor verification — 2026-09-30
+
+- Isolated backend suite: 1,606 passed, four existing ignored; container suite:
+  79 passed. Frontend: 140 files / 1,130 tests passed; production build passed.
+- Disposable rootless API gateway: versioned and legacy API paths, query/body
+  forwarding, transaction-only POST, method/body limits, CORS, removal of
+  dashboard credentials, read-only non-root operation, truthful backend outage
+  and DNS recovery after backend recreation passed. No real transaction broadcast.
+- Dedicated relay: NIP-11, signed event publish/read, invalid signature rejection
+  and event/config persistence across five managed stop/start/restart cycles
+  passed. Internal relay identity and start time stayed unchanged. Follow-up
+  acknowledgement samples were 2–9 ms through both backend and app gate.
+- Published adapter 1.0.1 and relay 1.1.2 to the authenticated maintainer namespace.
+  Anonymous registry readback succeeded. Adapter digest:
+  `sha256:997be611700b55c521ad801fa92daaca2ae6951ac71407434c85eb9603f77c38`;
+  relay mirror digest:
+  `sha256:80444ad1304a0e504948b48ea1550c091b18b9f10757f07ce9a68fc261b8f6c1`.
+- Delivery target is the development box, as clarified by the operator. Do not
+  install Angor on the separate Portainer node. Full indexer availability still
+  requires the dev box's Bitcoin sync and Mempool/Electrum indexing to finish.
+- Funded PR acceptance passed after the operator funded the dev Cashu wallet
+  with 16 sats. Exact net payment was 1 sat; underpayment refunded in full;
+  repeat delivery cost zero. Both endpoints ran the combined candidate.
+  No spent proofs were reactivated and no native Bitcoin/LND funds were moved.
+
+## Development candidate and cleanup
+
+The combined optimized backend and production UI are deployed on the development
+box with a private rollback copy. Native Bitcoin/LND containers were unchanged
+during deployment. The operator separately uninstalled/reinstalled Bitcoin Core
+to select an unpruned node; RPC confirmed `pruned=false`, and a separate baseline
+was recorded after that operator action. Do not compare subsequent checks with
+the pre-reinstall container start times.
+
+Completed Gitea setup/private-repository and Portainer integration fixtures were
+uninstalled through the supported lifecycle and removed from installed inventory.
+Their private evidence/data were retained outside the active manifests. The old
+Cuprate UI review container was also removed. Active Angor acceptance fixtures
+must be removed on completion; the requested Angor services remain installed.
+
+Funded acceptance used Tor-only peer-file transport, verified exact delivery
+bytes and compatibility response fields, and read the result back through
+FileBrowser. The original transport preference was restored, and temporary
+seller catalog entries/files and the exact buyer test document were removed.
+Financial receipt history was retained.
+
+The final managed-install fixture exposed a separate Quadlet quoting defect:
+whitespace-free command arguments containing apostrophes lost those characters
+in the generated service. The renderer now quotes these arguments and
+environment values; the updated isolated backend suite passed (1,607 passed, four opt-in tests
+ignored), and the final candidate rebuild is in progress. Do not tag a release before this live regression is verified.
+
+The production Portainer host subsequently rebooted after the routing repair.
+A post-boot probe from the actual Portainer namespace again verified the Git
+smart-HTTP response type, current branch ref and Compose contents. Its
+slirp4netns route and all production app containers survived. The temporary
+Portainer fixture was absent. This verifies the repaired production route
+across reboot; it does not substitute for final new-runtime delivery checks.
+
+## Follow-up acceptance: app cards and Angor icon
+
+- Mempool duplicate traced to `archy-mempool-web` durable inventory alias being
+  restored beside the real `mempool` frontend. Shared scanner canonicalization
+  fixes live and absent-container paths without deleting installed markers.
+  Frontend suppresses aliases only while a canonical tile exists.
+- Readiness text names the app and condition: “Web UI not ready: Gitea”. It shares the status row,
+  with full text available through its title; card actions use bottom alignment.
+- Angor uses the operator-supplied dark-mode icon with green outer corners.
+  Built-in imagegen prompt: fill transparent/white corners with the existing
+  flat green, preserve the black symbol, square opaque PNG, no added details.
+- Backend alias suite: 1608 passed, 4 ignored. Focused readiness/frame UI tests:
+  30 passed. Production UI build passed and is live on dev. Browser checks at
+  1440 and 1024 pixels verified named waiting text, bottom-aligned actions,
+  equal row heights, no overflow and one Mempool card after hard refresh.
+  The 390-pixel mobile icon layout also passed hard refresh. Final-source
+  isolated Mempool alias regression passed after the scanner simplification.
+- Managed Angor adapter acceptance: five stop/start/restart cycles, missing
+  prerequisite refusal, management restart and cleanup all passed. Both temporary
+  fixtures and their network were removed. Actual dev API verification remains
+  pending after removing an incomplete legacy-created adapter.
+
+## Startup manifest reload race
+
+Live Angor acceptance exposed a separate startup race: runtime asset bootstrap
+cleared and copied `/opt/archipelago/apps` in the background while the startup
+catalog refresh reloaded it. The daemon logged 62 loaded manifests followed by
+54 and then rejected the new disk-only app as unknown. A stable manifest snapshot
+confirmed the diagnosis: supported uninstall/reinstall produced the correct
+rootless Quadlet service with its declared port and network.
+
+Runtime promotion and the legacy installer-directory repair now finish before
+orchestrator construction. The background doctor no longer changes that tree.
+The final source backend suite passed 1,608 tests (four existing opt-in tests
+ignored). Optimized build and normal-path live startup/restart verification have now passed (see final follow-up below).
+
+Actual dev Angor acceptance passed managed service identity, no capabilities,
+UID 101:101, archy-net, public block height, CORS and both fee URL forms. During
+Bitcoin initial sync, the real Mempool fee API returns 503; the adapter faithfully
+returns the same status and body. Full-sync fee availability remains unverified;
+ready-backend API and failure/recovery behavior passed the isolated live fixture.
+The temporary `/run/archy-candidate-manifests` snapshot override and snapshot
+are now removed; normal startup/reload verification passed.
+
+The latest complete UI suite passed 140 files / 1,132 tests. Release preflight
+passed all static, manifest, catalog, type and UI gates. The requested named
+waiting message, compact card layout and green Angor icon are deployed to dev;
+desktop 1440/1024 and mobile 390 browser checks passed after hard refresh.
+The startup-order optimized build and normal-path startup checks are complete.
+The later dashboard-address candidate is now deployed with rollback; see the
+final live follow-up below. Do not rerun the earlier deployment helper: its
+temporary override has already been removed. No new release version/tag, OTA
+or ISO has been created.
+
+## Mempool and dashboard follow-up
+
+- Deployed the Mempool alias and runtime-promotion-order backend to dev. Real
+  server state contains one healthy `mempool`; the stale `mempool-web` record
+  is gone. Real-data browser checks at 1440/390 pixels found exactly one tile
+  before and after hard refresh. Bitcoin/LND identities/start times unchanged.
+- Removed the candidate manifest override. Normal management startup passed
+  two full cycles with 62 manifests retained through both initial catalog
+  refreshes. The next cycle hit a single readiness assertion; a subsequent
+  read-only check found Angor healthy and the manifest count intact. Remaining
+  repeat coverage should use bounded polling to distinguish transient request
+  failures from loss of app definitions; do not report five cycles passed yet.
+- Bitcoin Core's dashboard was serving HTTP 200 on 8334 while readiness checked
+  RPC 8332. Companion URL selection now takes priority over protocol sockets
+  for Core/Knots and Electrum aliases, with a regression preserving allocated
+  UI ports for other apps. Backend suite: 1,609 passed, four opt-in ignored.
+  Optimized build is `/tmp/archy-dashboard-address-build.log`; deployment and
+  live IBD verification helper: `/tmp/archy-dashboard-address-deploy.py`.
+- Phoenixd has no browser UI. Headless services now omit web-readiness messages;
+  actual browser apps name their web interface rather than waiting for
+  themselves. Focused 23 UI tests and production build passed; deployed to dev.
+
+## Final live follow-up: all three reported readiness/display defects fixed
+
+- Final optimized backend is deployed on dev. Bitcoin Core's launch address is
+  `http://localhost:8334` and `ui-ready` is true during initial block download.
+  Live verification recorded height 293,855 with `initialblockdownload=true`.
+  Chromium at 1440 and 390 pixels opened the embedded dashboard, read a numeric
+  current block height, and repeated that check after hard refresh.
+- One healthy Mempool remains in server state and in desktop/mobile My Apps
+  after hard refresh. Its durable install markers were preserved.
+- Phoenixd remains a running headless service without a web launcher or false
+  web-readiness message. Desktop/mobile browser checks passed. For actual web
+  apps, the compact copy is “Web UI not ready: [app]”; the reason comes first so
+  narrower cards do not truncate it into a misleading self-dependency.
+- Five normal management startup and managed Angor restart cycles passed
+  across the two acceptance logs. The retry harness uses bounded readiness
+  polling; it does not accept a running container alone as API readiness.
+  Disk + catalog manifest count remained 62 across startup refreshes, replacing
+  the previous 62-to-54 failure. Temporary override and snapshot are removed.
+- Final backend tests: 1,609 passed, zero failed, four existing opt-in ignored.
+  Final UI tests: 140 files / 1,133 passed. Production UI build passed and is live.
+  Bitcoin/LND container identities and start timestamps stayed unchanged.
+- Evidence: `/tmp/archy-dashboard-address-deploy.log`,
+  `/tmp/archy-bitcoin-ibd-browser.log`, `/tmp/archy-mempool-live-browser.log`,
+  `/tmp/archy-service-readiness-browser.log`,
+  `/tmp/archy-runtime-order-remaining-cycles.log`, and
+  `/tmp/archy-readiness-final-ui-tests.log`.
+- These are live development fixes. The new signed catalog, versioned OTA and
+  raw ISO still need preparation, artifact verification, signing and publication.
+
+### X250 Nginx Proxy Manager tunnel repair (2026-09-30)
+
+A further live report was a real startup failure, separate from the earlier slow
+image pull. An operator-specific Quadlet `web-tunnel.conf` published NPM's HTTP
+listener on tunnel port 18080. LND subsequently occupied 18080 on all addresses;
+pasta failed before NPM could start, with more than 1,400 systemd retries. The
+standard NPM manifest only publishes admin port 8081 and did not introduce this
+extra mapping. Changing the standard manifest would not repair this override.
+
+The node's override now uses free tunnel-local port 18081. Its persistent nftables
+configuration redirects only HTTP arriving from the configured WireGuard peer on
+the original tunnel destination to that port. The peer/public routing is unchanged;
+the input rule accepts the translated port and retains the existing interface,
+peer and forwarding restrictions. LND's REST port and native processes were not
+changed. This deployment-specific topology must not be copied into global app
+manifests or applied indiscriminately to other nodes.
+
+An abandoned certificate request also left an unreferenced database record and
+a temporary nginx challenge server for the same hostname. After backing up the
+entire NPM data directory and both configuration files, the unused failed record
+was soft-deleted and the stale challenge file archived. The referenced, valid
+certificate, proxy host, keys and user accounts were preserved.
+
+Live checks: NPM admin and API HTTP 200; nginx configuration validation with no
+duplicate-host warning; public HTTP redirects to HTTPS; valid public TLS reaches
+the site's existing authentication response, matching its direct upstream. NPM
+starts with zero automatic restarts and no missing-certificate renewal error.
+Bitcoin, LND and the production site container identities/start times were
+unchanged by the port repair. Rollback copies and the data archive are retained
+in the node's private support directory. No global OTA or ISO was published by
+this repair; the remaining release gates above still apply.
+
+#### Follow-up: fleet delivery and false health failures
+
+A longer observation exposed a second, generic defect after the port conflict
+was repaired: the health monitor probed all published ports at `127.0.0.1`,
+including NPM's tunnel-only listeners. Every monitor interval could therefore
+restart a healthy app. The short initial restart check did not catch this.
+
+The next backend now probes the actual `host_ip` from Podman; only wildcard
+addresses map to the corresponding loopback family. Regression tests cover
+explicit IPv4/IPv6 binds, wildcards, UDP/unpublished/invalid entries, and a real
+listener on a different loopback address. NPM's manifest now checks its internal
+admin HTTP API. The same check is deployed as a persistent Quadlet drop-in on
+the affected node so its older backend stops making false recovery attempts.
+
+The backend embeds `scripts/repair-npm-tunnel.py` and runs it before app
+reconciliation, after runtime asset promotion. This makes the targeted legacy
+port migration available to both OTA and ISO installations without relying on
+an independently installed script. Standard fresh installs are a no-op. Only
+the recognized legacy tunnel/firewall profile is migrated; unknown operator
+routing, occupied replacement ports and live-only firewall changes fail closed
+with a startup warning. Configuration backups, an interrupted-migration journal,
+atomic nft transactions and rollback protect the existing routing. Native wallet
+services and certificate databases are never modified by this fleet migration.
+
+The Python migration tests run in the release gate. The unsigned next catalog
+was regenerated successfully with the new NPM HTTP health check. These changes
+are prepared for the next release; existing published OTA/ISO artifacts remain
+unchanged and the new signed artifacts still require the release gates above.
+
+Verification for this follow-up: 18 migration tests passed; 43 health-monitor
+backend tests passed through the isolated runner. A disposable network-namespace
+regression exercised actual peer traffic through the nft redirect while a
+separate simulated LND listener retained port 18080. The generated rules also
+passed nft validation and atomic replacement. Run that regression with
+`sudo unshare --net python3 tests/regression/npm-tunnel-network.py`; it refuses
+to run in the host network namespace. The migration is a verified no-op on the
+already repaired node and on a standard development install without the override.
+
+After deploying the API health check, a 270-second live observation crossed
+multiple health-monitor intervals: NPM stayed healthy with the same container
+ID/start time, every API probe returned success, and Bitcoin/LND/production-site
+container IDs/start times were unchanged. This supersedes the initial short
+restart-only acceptance recorded above. The generic backend fix is committed
+for release, while the live node uses the equivalent internal NPM health check.
+
+### Final-gate Angor health-check correction
+
+Final release observation found the adapter healthy over IPv4 but marked
+unhealthy by its in-container BusyBox wget: `localhost` resolved to `::1`, where
+nginx does not listen. Its manifest now explicitly probes `127.0.0.1`. The live
+managed service was refreshed and its real Podman health check passed. The
+rootless gateway integration now runs the manifest's health check inside the
+actual image, in addition to endpoint/security/outage/DNS recovery assertions;
+all passed. A metadata regression covers the address-family requirement. Test
+containers and their network were removed by the fixture cleanup.
+
+## 1.8.22-alpha release preparation
+
+Final implementation gate passed: 1,612 isolated backend tests, zero failures,
+four existing opt-in tests ignored; 140 frontend files / 1,133 tests; frontend
+type check and production build; static/catalog/trust/build-context checks.
+The four exclusions require external AI backends, Reticulum subprocess/live
+transport, physical RNode hardware, or creation of a live Minibits profile.
+They are not claimed as executed by the isolated suite. Existing funded
+Cashu/Minibits and Framework acceptance remains recorded above.
+
+The real dev Angor stack now returns HTTP 200 fee estimates through both API
+forms; Bitcoin is still in initial sync, so full-chain completion remains an
+operational prerequisite rather than a completed test. The image-level health
+probe, outage/recovery and live native-state preservation checks passed after
+reloading the corrected manifest. Production Portainer again fetched the exact
+repository branch and Compose content from its own network namespace.
+
+Version preparation is 1.8.22-alpha. No new release tag or fleet-visible update
+manifest is published by the version commit. Optimized candidate deployment,
+artifact inspection, ISO smoke/boot checks and offline signatures follow.
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+# Paid-download PR review — 2026-09-30
+
+## Scope and result
+
+Reviewed both open PRs from the repository pull-request list: [#161](https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/pulls/161)
+and [#162](https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/pulls/162).
+Both branches were updated from main, repaired and tested independently and
+together. Their existing remote branches were advanced without rewriting the
+contributors' history. Both were subsequently merged and closed and are now
+integrated on main. Candidate live-wallet acceptance remains pending.
+The signed 1.8.21 artifacts are unchanged.
+
+| Candidate | Tested commit | Isolated backend result |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| PR #161 | `971d4777` | 1,576 passed, 0 failed, 4 existing tests ignored |
+| PR #162 | `0677924a` | 1,568 passed, 0 failed, 4 existing tests ignored |
+| Both together | `4bf4bf1a` | 1,585 passed, 0 failed, 4 existing tests ignored |
+
+Both individual branches also passed production `cargo check`, with the
+repository's existing 16 warnings. The combined merge required no conflict
+resolution. Backend tests ran through `scripts/test-backend-isolated.sh` so they
+could not access host wallets, native services or production container storage.
+
+## Findings and repairs
+
+### #161 — payment delivery and file readability
+
+- The branch conflicted with newer mint-fee, keyset-ID and truthful refund
+  reporting fixes. Preserve those implementations from main; do not reintroduce
+  its older unconditional “refunded” messages or duplicate keyset resolution.
+- Opening a file before charging, then reopening/reading it afterward, still
+  permits a read failure after payment. Prepare the complete requested bytes
+  before redemption, including ranged reads. Tests delete or alter the backing
+  file during payment verification and still receive the prepared original data.
+- Empty/out-of-bounds/reversed ranges could fail after redemption, and empty
+  files could underflow the range calculation. Validate ranges before charging
+  and return HTTP 416 when unsatisfiable.
+- `chmod a+r` unnecessarily changed the permissions of shared paid/private
+  files. Read restricted FileBrowser files through the rootless namespace while
+  retaining their mode. Scope the fallback to regular files canonically inside
+  FileBrowser storage, and reject unauthorized peers before reading.
+- A single-delivery flag must also prevent redirects and ambiguous transport
+  retries. Payment-bearing GET and POST requests now retain the first HTTP
+  response and do not retry after timeouts or disconnects that might follow
+  delivery. Refused connections and normal nonpayment browsing retain the
+  appropriate retry behavior.
+- Interrupted response bodies now report the outcome using the actual local
+  refund result. Seller explanations are bounded, stripped of control
+  characters and explicitly identified as peer text.
+- Original permission tests silently returned when run as root. Replacement
+  tests inject read/payment boundary failures, exercise them under the isolated
+  runner, and assert that read failures never invoke redemption.
+
+### #162 — saving purchases in Files
+
+- Its host-permission repair overlapped 1.8.21's authenticated Files API path.
+  Review of [FileBrowser v2.63.23's resource handler](https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/v2.63.23/http/resource.go)
+  showed that `override=false` checks for existence separately from opening
+  with truncation. It does not guarantee no overwrites under concurrent saves.
+- The proposed direct path exposed the final filename before the write
+  completed. Both direct and namespace paths now finish a private temporary
+  file and publish it through a no-clobber hard link, retrying numbered names.
+- Plain `ln` could place a temporary file inside an existing directory instead
+  of treating the destination as a collision. Use `ln -T`; existing directories
+  and dangling symlinks are conflicts, never replacement targets.
+- Add filename and destination checks, unique temporary names, bounded name
+  retries, synchronization before publication, and exact input-length checks.
+  Truncated pipe input cannot become a completed purchased file.
+- Files storage remains optional. An unavailable copy destination does not
+  undo the purchase or create a fake FileBrowser installation; the durable
+  purchased-content cache remains primary.
+
+## Additional verification on the development node
+
+Used disposable scratch directories only, then removed them:
+
+- Reproduced a FileBrowser-style rootless-owned 0640 upload. The host backend
+  UID could not read it. `podman unshare cat` returned identical bytes without
+  changing its 0640 mode.
+- Ran the exact namespace writer script with four concurrent writers against
+  a directory owned by the container UID range. Every file had unique naming,
+  exact bytes, the expected owner and mode, and no remaining temporary file.
+- Sent truncated input to the namespace writer and verified refusal, no final
+  file and temporary-file cleanup.
+
+The isolated tests additionally exercised 24 simultaneous direct writes,
+existing-file preservation, symlink/directory conflicts, collision exhaustion,
+root-independent permission failures, read-before-redemption ordering,
+authorization, redirects and peer disconnects.
+
+Logs on the development box:
+`/tmp/archy-pr161-tests.log`, `/tmp/archy-pr162-tests.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-pr-integration-tests.log`, `/tmp/archy-pr161-check.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-pr162-check.log`, `/tmp/archy-pr-userns-scratch-test.log`.
+
+## Next-release acceptance and limits
+
+- Both reviewed branches are integrated on main alongside the lifecycle fixes.
+  Repeat release gates against the final release commit after remaining changes.
+- Perform funded peer-to-peer acceptance on the candidate build, including a
+  Tor-only purchase and a purchase requiring change, before the next release.
+  The new review branches were not deployed to funded live wallets here.
+- These PRs do not implement durable payment receipts. If a seller redeems a
+  payment and the connection subsequently loses the response, the buyer may
+  receive an unconfirmed-refund warning. Do not represent that warning as proof
+  of a refund or automatically charge the buyer again. Receipt-based recovery
+  remains separate follow-up work.
+- Abrupt process termination can leave a hidden namespace temporary file;
+  ordinary write failures and truncated input are tested to clean up. The final
+  filename is published only after complete input, and existing files remain
+  protected.
+- The separately reported X250 kiosk selector is fixed and verified on the
+  actual kiosk; see the lifecycle evidence and consolidated release checklist.
+
+## Authorized merge — 2026-09-30
+
+The operator explicitly requested normal merged/closed PR status after review.
+Re-read both PRs and verified their heads still exactly matched the reviewed
+commits. Changes from the integration-test base to main were documentation only.
+Gitea normal merges completed and read-back confirmed `merged=true`, `state=closed`:
+
+- #161: `3daea6623be3e2c7222101b8e6ac411423c7e16c`.
+- #162: `b02ba4100d922dd1b75c6a78121ef446c2159a54`.
+
+Local next-release lifecycle work was integrated with main at `d69e8452`. Funded release acceptance and the documented delivery-receipt
+limitation remain as recorded above; merging does not claim a new release.
@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
+# Repair and release execution — 2026-09-29
+
+**Status: 1.8.21 PUBLISHED — see the completion record at the end.**
+
+The next release is tracked in [the current execution checklist](next-release-20260930.md).
+The dated entries below preserve the investigation history.
+
+User requires all tasks completed and tested on the development box before the
+next OTA and raw ISO. Passing unit tests alone does not establish live correctness.
+
+## Confirmed evidence
+
+- Dev-to-Shorty 100-sat Cashu file purchases failed twice. Both sellers' and
+  buyers' accepted mints match. Shorty's mint swap returned HTTP 422; both
+  attempted purchases were refunded 100 sats. The old message guessed a mint
+  mismatch without evidence.
+- Wallet import repaired truncated V2 keyset IDs, while paid-content redemption
+  bypassed that repair. Central swap repair and protocol-level regression tests now pass.
+- Core installation on dev reused existing chain data. At 17:42 UTC it was
+  advancing through block replay with no Core container restarts. At 17:49 UTC
+  it had connected to peers and started transaction-index synchronization.
+- LND exited repeatedly with `bitcoind start timeout` while Core loaded. After
+  Core became available LND stayed running and reported waiting for backend sync.
+- Framework source fix 4237fb5e is already an ancestor of main. Existing live
+  reboot/native balance evidence is in the incident document. Final display
+  confirmation remains pending.
+
+## Changes under validation
+
+- Cashu V4/V2 ID expansion at every swap; fee-aware underpayment rejection;
+  single-mint/sat-only/cryptographic paid tokens; no false mint-mismatch or
+  unconditional refund claims. Missing content checked before redemption.
+- mempool.space default; migrate old tx1138 default with fresh consent, retain
+  local explorer priority and custom preferences.
+- Core/Knots optional pruning on the version modal and app detail install path;
+  persist choice across runtime restarts; use identical 50,000 MiB automatic
+  pruning entrypoint behavior on large and small disks.
+- Plain Bitcoin block-index startup message; defer LND wallet initialization or
+  unlock until Bitcoin RPC is usable; authenticated dependency status and LND UI
+  waiting states; no partial total displayed as a complete balance.
+
+## Validation and release gates
+
+- [x] Final backend regression suite passes (including mock mint HTTP and real
+  curve signatures, v1/full-v2/truncated-v2, fees, errors, duplicate redemption).
+- [x] Initial explorer and pruning modal tests pass: 15 tests.
+- [x] Both actual manifest entrypoints tested with isolated fake bitcoind across
+  6 disk/choice combinations each. No existing chain pruned for this test.
+- [x] Initial LND UI install/start/sync/recovery and invalid-balance tests pass.
+- [x] Frontend production build and relevant existing wallet tests pass (34
+  focused tests, including 12 Home failure/recovery checks). Final UI suite: 1,120 passed; production build passed. Full release harness and final frontend follow-up passed.
+- [x] Fault tests and final source review complete.
+- [x] Candidate deployed with rollback to dev and Shorty; hashes verified.
+- [x] Live paid-file purchase succeeds; failed purchase/refund behavior verified.
+- [x] Live waiting/UI verified on dev; recovery covered by deterministic tests.
+- [x] Framework operator acceptance and authorization to release recorded.
+- [x] Release version/changelog, catalog/image implications, signing prepared.
+- [x] Signed OTA built, tested, published to git and ngit.
+- [x] Raw ISO built, boot-tested, signed and published; download command supplied.
+
+Tests must not wipe/recreate wallets, prune the operator's existing full chain,
+or claim that arbitrary failures can never happen. Record material gaps before
+release. Signing keys remain with the user; prepare concrete artifacts first.
+
+### Further startup findings
+
+Live dev `/v1/state` returned `RPC_ACTIVE` while `/v1/getinfo` timed out during
+Bitcoin initial sync. Candidate startup now recognizes the already-unlocked
+state instead of repeating unlock attempts for ten minutes. The health watchdog
+also now excludes Bitcoin initial sync, warmup, unavailable/stale status and
+LND height progress from its restart criteria. A later observed `podman restart`
+was externally initiated; its precise caller has not yet been established, so
+the watchdog defect is a source finding rather than a confirmed attribution.
+
+Framework SSH rejected the previously provided login on 2026-09-29. No password
+was saved and no wallet changes were attempted. The human display-confirmation
+question remains pending. Do not repeat a Framework reboot to reconfirm old work.
+
+LND UI waiting-state, stale-balance, partial-failure/recovery and prompt-render
+tests pass (4 Node tests). Waiting states avoid calls to LND endpoints that block
+until sync, and prevent overlapping refreshes.
+
+### Final source validation
+
+The final backend suite passed: 1,548 passed, zero failed, four existing ignored
+live/hardware tests. Includes saved pruning preference, rejecting an old catalog
+that cannot honor explicit pruning, and all nine paid-Cashu protocol tests.
+Unsigned candidate catalog passes strict drift and fleet registry trust checks.
+The release gate caught a missing What's New entry; generated it from the curated
+changelog and reran the frontend gate/build. No public release has been changed.
+
+At 18:23 UTC dev Bitcoin exited with status 137 and restarted; current container
+is not marked OOM-killed and no kernel/oomd record identified the cause. Bitcoin
+is replaying blocks again (height 482071 at 18:31 UTC). Installed old LND continues
+to time out while Bitcoin RPC warms up. Candidate is not deployed yet; verify its
+readiness deferral live before declaring this fixed. Do not attribute the Bitcoin
+exit to a specific actor without evidence.
+
+### Doctor restart cause established and repaired
+
+Full system journal identifies container-doctor at 18:23:21 UTC issuing raw
+`podman restart bitcoin-core` for an allegedly missing 8333 listener. The same
+script restarted LND at 17:57:48 and 18:23:35 UTC. The port was actually listening.
+Reproduced the original `ss | awk | grep -q` pipeline returning `0 141 0`: grep
+exits after its match, awk gets SIGPIPE, and pipefail falsely reports no listener.
+The raw restart also enforces a short stop timeout and races Quadlet cleanup.
+
+The repaired check consumes the entire socket snapshot, distinguishes inspection
+failure from a missing port, and leaves containers running when inspection fails.
+Necessary restarts use their managed systemd units and shutdown timeouts; unmanaged
+Bitcoin/LND fallback receives 600/330-second grace respectively. Regression uses
+20,000 socket rows plus mocked service/container commands and passes. Thirty
+read-only checks of the actual Bitcoin listener pass. Script deployed to dev and
+Shorty with root-only rollback copies. OTA runtime payload includes scripts/.
+This evidence supersedes the earlier unknown-caller/unknown-exit attribution.
+
+### Initial candidate live validation — 18:48 UTC
+
+Source 0f85f588, optimized backend SHA256
+84434c495c5f8472cf6bfcb6c65e762502c74718ad88271619373335c0054bb6,
+deployed to dev and Shorty with matching hashes and rollback copies. Both
+management services restarted; wallets/channels were not reset. Old embedded
+runtime assets restored the old doctor on backend startup; updated the live
+script AND embedded runtime copy on both nodes. Final OTA will contain the new
+script directly.
+
+Authenticated dev readiness transitioned from waiting_start to waiting_sync.
+Real Chromium at 1440px and 390px showed Waiting for Bitcoin to sync, an unknown
+balance, and no blocked native LND calls. Screenshot review also caught invented
+zero capacity/channel counts during waiting: corrected them and the empty-channel
+recommendation; five UI regression tests now pass.
+
+Real Minibits Cashu purchase from dev to Shorty succeeded for one sat and returned
+the expected 44 bytes. A rejected one-sat underpayment was refunded exactly, and
+two cached downloads charged zero. Temporary seller files/catalog entries removed.
+The first test runner expected data_base64 while the first-purchase API returns
+data; cached responses use data_base64. Existing purchase clients only consume
+data, so a follow-up normalizes both response variants to both fields.
+
+The optional Files copy failed because FileBrowser owns host paths as mapped UID
+100000. Follow-up uses its authenticated API with override=false and collision
+suffixes. A live API probe succeeded, refused overwrite with HTTP409, preserved
+original bytes, and cleaned up. New protocol tests cover folder creation, escaped
+names, collisions, authentication failure, disk-full, and unavailable service.
+Full backend suite for these follow-ups is running; do not package the earlier
+backend as final.
+
+### Follow-up validation and OTA delivery check
+
+Paid-response and Files API regressions passed in the full backend run: 1,552
+passed, zero failed, four existing ignored tests. Live browser waiting checks
+passed again after removing invented zero capacity and channel counts.
+
+OTA inspection found that companion image :local (created by old installers and
+used on dev) bypassed both source-staleness detection and rebuilding. The earlier
+assumption that build-context detection covered these nodes was incorrect.
+Follow-up applies the existing source-mtime/stamp checks to both :local and
+:latest, preserving the existing tag and rebuilding only stale source. Existing
+image-ID comparison then restarts the UI companion onto the new image. This does
+not restart LND itself. Regression covers every companion's two local tags; final
+backend suite is running. Verify the resulting live rebuilt image before release.
+
+### Test isolation finding — release remains blocked
+
+The next full run passed 1,552 tests but one existing boot-loop timing test failed.
+Its output and node logs exposed an independent test defect: MockRuntime tests
+still invoked real Quadlet service operations and Podman socket recovery. These
+caused further LND/companion restarts during unrestricted unit runs. They were not
+a recurrence of the repaired doctor port check. Stopped unrestricted testing;
+LND has remained running since 19:02:46 UTC during isolated test execution.
+
+New isolated runner hides live wallets, service buses, container storage and host
+process IDs, supplies a private network and temporary writable fixture paths,
+and keeps host filesystems read-only. An independent boundary probe passed.
+Test-only service helpers use a temporary Quadlet directory and simulated service
+results; mocked runtimes skip real Podman socket/network provisioning. Host file
+helpers require the isolated-runner marker and execute inside the namespace
+instead of escaping through sudo/systemd-run. Release harness and AGENTS now
+require this runner. Initial isolation trials correctly blocked host operations
+and exposed fixture permission assumptions; final runner compiles and executes
+the full suite with those fixture paths isolated. No final pass claimed yet.
+
+Main dashboard candidate and AIUI build at b634f41a are now deployed on dev; served
+index SHA matches the build. Live package.versions returns bitcoinPrune=false
+for Core and Knots, preserving current automatic mode. Existing full chain stays
+unpruned. Final backend (Files/cached response/legacy UI delivery follow-ups) is
+not yet deployed; earlier 0f85f588 backend remains live on both nodes.
+
+Final isolated backend run: **1,553 passed, zero failed, four existing ignored**
+in 13 seconds after compilation. Boundary probe confirms no host service buses,
+live wallet data, host process IDs, or external network. Bitcoin/LND start times
+remained unchanged during isolated execution. Production helpers are unchanged;
+the namespace-specific command behavior is compiled only into unit tests.
+Release and ISO gates now use the isolated runner.
+
+### Final backend deployment and App Store follow-up — 19:36 UTC
+
+Full release harness passed: static/catalog checks, frontend type-check and
+1,117 frontend tests, cargo-check, and isolated backend suite (1,553 passed,
+four existing ignored). Final optimized backend built successfully; SHA256
+16a173129672cbb40c250446ec52ba4a9bd1974cbb3a4988f90c6f3187b7a1f7.
+Deployed to dev. Legacy :local LND companion automatically rebuilt at 19:35 UTC
+and restarted onto image 702c0cd88fb5c8a561c76dabdb96c40648dd62d401c78f2e10d4318b06f02abe.
+Served UI bytes match candidate source. Native Bitcoin/LND start times unchanged.
+
+Actual desktop pruning screenshot exposed horizontal overflow; moved the
+explanation below the app header. The App Store uses Marketplace.vue, a separate
+install path from Discover.vue. Its first Install button bypassed the version
+modal. The browser check therefore sent an unintended Knots install request at
+19:28 UTC. Core remained running, no Knots container was created, and the full
+chain was not pruned. Removed only the newly created Knots installed-app record
+and newly created version config; preserved root-only rollback copies.
+
+Marketplace now uses the shared version/pruning modal. Added integration tests
+for both Core and Knots: no install request until confirmation, selected version
+and pruning forwarded, cancellation sends no install request. Four Marketplace
+tests pass (three new plus existing refresh check). Further browser checks block
+package.install requests at their network boundary. Final frontend rebuild and
+post-fix live checks remain pending. Final paid-file follow-up is still pending.
+
+### Unsigned release candidate ready — 19:46 UTC
+
+Final frontend source/build attribution: 3612458e. Production dashboard and AIUI
+builds passed. Final frontend suite: 1,120 tests across 139 files passed.
+Desktop 1280px and mobile 390px browser checks passed for the app detail pruning
+choice and App Store version modal; no horizontal overflow and no installation
+request. Screenshot review confirms readable controls and explanation. Browser
+installation requests are blocked during these selection-only checks.
+
+Final backend SHA above matches both dev and Shorty. A fresh one-sat purchase
+passed on those exact binaries: correct file bytes, both response field aliases,
+exact one-sat refund on underpayment, zero-charge cached repeat, and exact Files
+copy. Temporary seller entries/files and Files test copy removed; transaction
+audit and owned cache retained. Total net transfer during the two live purchase
+rounds: two sats from dev to Shorty. Desktop/mobile LND waiting checks passed
+again on the automatically rebuilt companion. Native Bitcoin and LND stayed up.
+
+Prepared, unsigned files:
+- releases/pending/v1.8.20-alpha/app-catalog.json
+- releases/pending/v1.8.20-alpha/manifest.json
+
+Staged OTA backend: 64,716,656 bytes, SHA256
+16a173129672cbb40c250446ec52ba4a9bd1974cbb3a4988f90c6f3187b7a1f7.
+Frontend archive: 97,152,297 bytes, SHA256
+658b78fce0dfa20a627c987dd153b24cbac15adbde905cc6518744c637e12802.
+Artifact sizes/hashes/release notes validate. Checked actual archive: flat
+layout, readable root permissions, exact doctor/LND UI source bytes, and fresh
+AIUI attribution. Catalog has zero metadata drift and passes fleet registry trust.
+
+Remaining: user-local release-root signatures, Framework's final display
+confirmation, signed publication to git/ngit, then raw ISO build/boot test/signing
+and publication. No v1.8.20 public release or tag exists yet. Four pre-existing
+hardware/live tests remain ignored. Bitcoin sync-to-ready recovery is covered
+by deterministic tests; the live node remains in initial sync. Do not describe
+these checks as proof against every possible network/payment failure.
+
+### Signing and release authorization — 2026-09-30
+
+Both catalog and OTA signatures verify against the pinned release root. Staged
+artifact hash/size checks and catalog drift/trust checks pass. User accepted the
+remaining Framework display check and explicitly authorized release. Publication
+and ISO build may proceed; do not regenerate the signed manifest or artifacts.
+
+### Published OTA; ISO withheld after live shutdown defect — 2026-09-30
+
+Signed 1.8.20 OTA/catalog published to git and ngit, with public asset hashes
+verified. Catalog rollout triggered a Bitcoin command update at 08:34 UTC.
+Although the orchestrator allowed a long stop, Quadlet's generated Podman removal
+still used its ten-second default and killed Bitcoin. Core replayed its block
+index; LND later lost its connection to the previous Bitcoin container IP.
+
+Stopped the ISO build and queued boot check; any partial 1.8.20 ISO is invalid
+and must not be published. Preparing 1.8.21 to supersede the immutable signed OTA.
+Installed explicit graceful-stop systemd overrides on dev and Shorty without
+restarting native services. Candidate Quadlet fix adds per-app container, systemd,
+and command-wait budgets, including existing containers and uninstall fallback.
+Focused 43 tests pass, including actual Quadlet generator stop-before-remove order.
+Full tests, disposable slow-stop verification, build and deployment remain pending.
+
+Disposable live regression passed: started an Alpine container with its legacy
+ten-second stop setting, rewrote and reloaded its Quadlet with explicit twenty-
+second graceful stop, verified the same container ID and old internal timeout
+remained running, then stopped it. Its twelve-second shutdown handler completed
+in 12.6 seconds, emitted the completion marker, and exited without SIGKILL/137.
+Fixture had no network or wallet mounts and was removed afterward.
+
+Core finished index loading and resumed unpruned initial sync. LND automatically
+unlocked at 08:47 UTC. The existing backend-address cascade then performed a
+graceful LND restart at 08:57 UTC after Bitcoin reconciliation completed; LND
+automatically unlocked again and reached chain-sync waiting. No manual wallet
+unlock or restart was used for this recovery.
+
+### False dependency restart exposed during monitoring — 09:08 UTC
+
+The initial 1.8.21 candidate passed all 1,557 isolated backend tests and 1,120
+frontend tests. Monitoring nevertheless found another managed LND restart at
+09:08:32 while Bitcoin's container/start timestamp remained unchanged. Management
+logs explicitly attribute it to the backend-address cascade. This also makes
+the earlier 08:57 cascade suspect; it must not be described as a proven necessary
+restart. These service restarts preceded the isolated test executable, whose
+namespace boundaries remain intact.
+
+The cascade trusted Started/Installed action reports. A failed runtime inspection
+followed by successful systemctl start of an already active unit can produce
+Started without changing Bitcoin. Dependency restarts now require observed
+container-ID, running-state, or start-time changes. Failed observations remain
+unknown, not absence; a known absent backend becoming running still qualifies.
+Actual exec-drift restarts are recognized even when their outer report is NoOp.
+Stopped/lifecycle-in-flight dependents remain excluded, and user stop markers
+are re-read after the potentially slow pass. Added runtime-observation and
+false-action/real-exec-drift regression cases; full isolated rerun pending.
+Stopped the first optimized build and preparing new artifacts from this correction.
+
+### Final 1.8.21 artifacts and live verification — 2026-09-30
+
+Source and frontend/AIUI attribution: c993d9dd. Full isolated backend suite:
+1,559 passed, zero failed, four existing hardware/live tests ignored. Frontend
+suite: 1,120 passed; final production type-check/build passed after the last
+release-note-only edit. Optimized backend built in 13m22s.
+
+Staged unsigned 1.8.21 OTA manifest and artifacts:
+- Backend: 64,748,176 bytes; SHA256
+  ff602e85f340aff7e43d9d94f7f84f11f713735c964c0d8ba150e23b065c30eb.
+- Frontend archive: 97,152,546 bytes; SHA256
+  6c0842ec83a440269a353808a4cf154174f5232c9989b4a5448bc6486e1d0620.
+
+Artifact validator passed. Actual archive has flat paths, readable root index,
+and exact fresh AIUI, doctor and LND UI payload bytes. Exact files deployed to
+dev at 09:32 UTC and Shorty at 09:35 UTC; rollback binaries and dashboards under
+root-only /var/lib/archipelago/support/release-1821 on each node. Only management
+services restarted. Existing Bitcoin/Core-or-Knots and native LND container IDs
+and start times were preserved. Correct generated graceful-stop commands are
+present before forced removal on both nodes; temporary grace overrides removed.
+Dev systemd deadlines are 615 seconds for Bitcoin and 345 seconds for LND.
+
+Desktop/mobile Lightning UI checks passed again: waiting for Bitcoin sync,
+unknown balance, no unavailable native RPC requests. Served dashboard and AIUI
+attribution bytes match the release. Native LND states: dev RPC_ACTIVE while
+Bitcoin syncs; Shorty SERVER_ACTIVE. Dev completed full reconciliation passes
+at 09:34:21 and 09:36:40 with Bitcoin/LND NoOp, and no dependency restart.
+Shorty's first full pass completed 09:36:55 with Knots/LND NoOp.
+
+Final paid-file check on these exact binaries passed: fresh one-sat dev-to-Shorty
+purchase, exact one-sat refund on underpayment, identical response aliases,
+correct Files copy, and zero-charge cached repeat. Removed temporary seller
+entries/files and Files copy; retained purchase audit and owned cache. Total net
+transfer across all three live payment rounds in this repair session: three sats.
+
+Remaining: finish Shorty observation and remove temporary diagnostic logging;
+user-local 1.8.21 OTA signature (existing catalog signature remains valid),
+publish git/ngit, build/boot-test/sign and publish the raw 1.8.21 ISO.
+No 1.8.21 release tag or public OTA yet. Do not publish the quarantined partial
+1.8.20 ISO. The existing 1.8.20 git/ngit release notes now explain the withheld ISO
+and pending hotfix; signed 1.8.20 assets remain immutable.
+
+Shorty's second clean full pass completed at 09:38:06 UTC. Removed temporary
+diagnostic logging on both nodes and restarted only management again; native
+Bitcoin and LND IDs/start times remained unchanged, with generated stop settings
+still verified. No temporary graceful-stop overrides remain. Catalog signature
+verifies against the pinned release root; final 1.8.21 artifact validator passes.
+The candidate is ready for the user's local OTA signing ceremony.
+
+### 1.8.21 publication completed — 2026-09-30
+
+The operator signed the OTA manifest and subsequently the ISO checksum JSON.
+Both signatures verified against the pinned release root. The signed OTA was
+published on git/ngit, and the operator confirmed that Framework could see the
+update. Source main and the annotated `v1.8.21-alpha` tag were published.
+
+Raw ISO:
+`archipelago-installer-1.8.21-alpha-unbundled-x86_64_RC1.iso`
+
+- Size: 2,682,419,200 bytes.
+- SHA256: `8667b5522c476a40e29abba19df4180086191527a194a88765aa70ed527f9406`.
+- Build and ISO smoke checks passed. The mounted backend matched the staged
+  OTA backend hash, and the full dashboard/AIUI tree matched the fresh build.
+- An isolated UEFI QEMU guest, with no network or host disks attached, booted to
+  the installer prompt. The VM was stopped and the ISO unmounted afterward.
+  This was an installer boot check, not a full installation onto hardware.
+- Uploaded the raw ISO, plain SHA256 sidecar and signed checksum JSON to the
+  [1.8.21 release](https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/releases/tag/v1.8.21-alpha).
+  The stored server file hashes matched, the public ISO headers and first/last
+  byte samples matched, and both public checksum files matched byte-for-byte.
+- The ngit downloader's full-ISO acquisition exceeded its fixed 30-minute
+  deadline on the available connection. Published Nostr asset records using
+  the already verified hashes, sizes and public URLs with the existing ngit
+  signer; both repository relays acknowledged them. Ngit then accepted those
+  records and final readback resolved all five release assets with the expected
+  hashes and sizes. No new release-root signing was performed by the assistant.
+
+Final publication evidence: `/tmp/archy-1821-finish-events.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-ngit-1821-complete-view.json`, and
+`/tmp/archy-1821-verified-asset-events.log` on the development box.
+
+Subsequent review of PRs #161/#162 found additional delivery and concurrent
+file-save edge cases. Their repaired, tested branches are recorded in
+[the next-release review](pr-review-20260930.md); those changes are not in the
+signed 1.8.21 artifacts. The X250 kiosk selector report is also tracked for the
+next release. No claim of exhaustive hardware or network-failure coverage is
+made for this release.
@@ -2607,21 +2607,14 @@ if [ -f "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../scripts/image-versions.sh" ]; then
    echo "   ✅ Bundled image-versions.sh"
 fi

-# Bundle docker UI source files for building custom UIs on first boot
-# Always bundle — these are tiny HTML/CSS files, not container images
-if true; then
-    DOCKER_UI_DIR="$SCRIPT_DIR/../../docker"
-    if [ -d "$DOCKER_UI_DIR" ]; then
-        echo "   Bundling docker UI source files..."
-        mkdir -p "$ARCH_DIR/docker"
-        for ui_dir in bitcoin-ui lnd-ui electrs-ui; do
-            if [ -d "$DOCKER_UI_DIR/$ui_dir" ]; then
-                cp -r "$DOCKER_UI_DIR/$ui_dir" "$ARCH_DIR/docker/"
-                echo "   ✅ Bundled $ui_dir source"
-            fi
-        done
-    fi
-fi
+# Build-source apps need their complete contexts even on unbundled ISOs.
+# Keep this identical to the OTA runtime payload; a per-app allowlist silently
+# omitted GitWorkshop, FIPS and Cuprate and made fresh installs fail at 70%.
+DOCKER_UI_DIR="$SCRIPT_DIR/../../docker"
+[ -d "$DOCKER_UI_DIR" ] || { echo "Missing docker build sources" >&2; exit 1; }
+mkdir -p "$ARCH_DIR/docker"
+cp -a "$DOCKER_UI_DIR/." "$ARCH_DIR/docker/"
+python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../scripts/check-app-build-contexts.py" "$ARCH_DIR"

 if [ "$UNBUNDLED" = "1" ]; then
    echo "   ✅ Unbundled build ready (Tor setup included, no container images)"
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Gitea iframe proxy — strips X-Frame-Options so Gitea works in Archipelago iframe.
-# Gitea container binds to port 3001, this proxy listens on port 3000 (the public port).
-# Deployed to /etc/nginx/conf.d/gitea-iframe.conf
-server {
-    listen 3000;
-    server_name _;
-    client_max_body_size 1G;
-
-    location / {
-        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3001;
-        proxy_set_header Host $http_host;
-        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
-        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
-        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
-        proxy_http_version 1.1;
-        proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
-        proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
-        proxy_hide_header X-Frame-Options;
-        proxy_hide_header Content-Security-Policy;
-    }
-}
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
  "name": "neode-ui",
-  "version": "1.8.13-alpha",
+  "version": "1.8.22-alpha",
  "lockfileVersion": 3,
  "requires": true,
  "packages": {
    "": {
      "name": "neode-ui",
-      "version": "1.8.13-alpha",
+      "version": "1.8.22-alpha",
      "dependencies": {
        "@scure/bip39": "^2.2.0",
        "@types/dompurify": "^3.0.5",
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
  "name": "neode-ui",
  "private": true,
-  "version": "1.8.13-alpha",
+  "version": "1.8.22-alpha",
  "type": "module",
  "scripts": {
    "start": "./start-dev.sh",
@@ -378,13 +378,13 @@
    {
      "id": "mempool",
      "title": "Mempool Explorer",
-      "version": "3.0.0",
+      "version": "3.3.1-archy1",
      "description": "Bitcoin mempool and blockchain explorer. Real-time transaction and block visualization.",
      "icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/mempool.webp",
      "author": "Mempool",
      "category": "money",
      "tier": "core",
-      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1",
+      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1-archy1",
      "repoUrl": "https://github.com/mempool/mempool",
      "requires": [
        "bitcoin-knots",
@@ -644,6 +644,35 @@
          "/var/lib/archipelago/vaultwarden:/data"
        ]
      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "angor-indexer",
+      "title": "Angor Indexer",
+      "version": "1.0.1",
+      "description": "Headless Bitcoin indexer endpoint for Angor. Reuses this node’s Mempool and Electrum index; requires a synced, unpruned Bitcoin node. Add this service’s address as the custom indexer in Angor settings. A relay is optional and installed separately.",
+      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-indexer:1.0.1",
+      "author": "Angor / Archipelago",
+      "requires": [
+        "Mempool API",
+        "Unpruned Bitcoin"
+      ],
+      "category": "money",
+      "tier": "optional",
+      "icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/angor-green.png",
+      "repoUrl": "https://github.com/block-core/angor"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "angor-relay",
+      "title": "Angor Relay",
+      "version": "1.1.2",
+      "description": "Optional dedicated Nostr relay for Angor project metadata. Separate storage and access settings keep the node’s internal relay private. Add this service’s address to Angor’s relay settings; use WSS for browser clients.",
+      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-relay:1.1.2",
+      "author": "Angor / Archipelago",
+      "requires": [],
+      "category": "nostr",
+      "tier": "optional",
+      "icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/angor-green.png",
+      "repoUrl": "https://github.com/hoytech/strfry"
    }
  ]
 }
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ export interface PackageVersionsResponse {
  pinnedVersion: string | null
  autoUpdate: boolean
  versions: CatalogVersionInfo[]
+  bitcoinPrune?: boolean | null
 }

 export interface AppGatePortStatus {
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+<template>
+    <div class="mt-5 space-y-2">
+      <label class="flex items-center gap-2 text-sm text-white/80">
+        <input v-model="model" type="checkbox" class="accent-orange-400" />
+        Prune Bitcoin to save disk space
+      </label>
+      <p class="text-xs text-white/50">
+        Keeps about 50 GB of recent blocks, using the same settings as automatic
+        pruning on smaller disks. All blocks are still downloaded and verified.
+        Mempool and other apps that need the full blockchain won’t be available.
+        Turning pruning off later requires downloading the blockchain again.
+      </p>
+      <p v-if="!model" class="text-xs text-white/50">
+        Automatic pruning still applies on disks smaller than 1 TB.
+      </p>
+    </div>
+
+</template>
+<script setup lang="ts">
+const model = defineModel<boolean>({ default: false })
+</script>
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
archipelago	02b840f2d1	chore: prepare 1.8.22-alpha release candidate Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 36s Details	2026-09-30 16:45:43 -04:00
archipelago	f992780957	fix: probe Angor IPv4 health endpoint inside the actual image	2026-09-30 16:40:16 -04:00
archipelago	c82c1eee98	fix: prevent NPM tunnel collisions and false app health restarts	2026-09-30 16:30:40 -04:00
archipelago	2992443d5d	docs: record verified NPM tunnel port conflict and node repair	2026-09-30 16:12:04 -04:00
archipelago	259c353147	Clear completed candidate deployment instructions	2026-09-30 13:46:50 -04:00
archipelago	1724ea05d1	Show readiness reason first and record live dashboard acceptance Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 45s Details	2026-09-30 13:46:16 -04:00
archipelago	c1e20a71ae	Check companion dashboards and omit headless UI waiting messages Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 37s Details	2026-09-30 13:28:37 -04:00
archipelago	bf56956790	Record UI acceptance and remaining normal-startup release gate	2026-09-30 12:57:35 -04:00
archipelago	2f1a3ade07	Promote runtime manifests before starting app reconciliation	2026-09-30 12:50:46 -04:00
archipelago	ef8254272c	Name waiting apps, align card actions, and update Angor icon Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 39s Details	2026-09-30 12:43:53 -04:00
archipelago	d50be13232	Normalize Mempool frontend aliases in restored app inventory	2026-09-30 12:41:15 -04:00
archipelago	439b55a236	Use manifest names for new services and document release acceptance Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 38s Details	2026-09-30 12:20:29 -04:00
archipelago	5ab65f7581	Preserve apostrophes in Quadlet commands and record funded acceptance	2026-09-30 12:08:35 -04:00
archipelago	169bf77de6	Add headless Angor services and shared-index install guard Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 43s Details	2026-09-30 11:52:19 -04:00
archipelago	7c4169867c	docs: consolidate release scope and record migration recovery checks	2026-09-30 10:52:41 -04:00
archipelago	acf544500f	fix(apps): preserve state across runtime repairs and restore Gitea SSH	2026-09-30 10:46:38 -04:00
archipelago	7d767c8cb0	fix(catalog): gate network migration manifests on backup support	2026-09-30 10:08:56 -04:00
archipelago	eb3ccfa00b	Merge branch 'fix/gitea-portainer-20260930'	2026-09-30 09:57:49 -04:00
archipelago	eda28c4cd6	fix(portainer): repair same-node Git routing with recoverable network migration	2026-09-30 09:57:25 -04:00
archipelago	d69e845216	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 1m10s Details	2026-09-30 09:32:20 -04:00
archipelago	dc962c53b0	docs: record live lifecycle acceptance and next release blockers	2026-09-30 09:31:18 -04:00
archipelago	6ac26f637c	fix(apps): preserve lifecycle state and wait for usable launch endpoints	2026-09-30 09:10:30 -04:00
archipelago	27d81e956d	fix(installer): ship all app build contexts and refresh GitWorkshop dependencies	2026-09-30 09:09:21 -04:00
archipelago	eb39391223	fix(ui): keep Bitcoin version choices readable in kiosk	2026-09-30 09:09:21 -04:00
chaum	b02ba4100d	Merge pull request 'fix(files): save purchased files atomically with rootless ownership' (#162 ) from fix/filebrowser-purchase-filing into main	2026-09-30 12:58:36 +00:00
chaum	3daea6623b	Merge pull request 'fix(ecash): prevent paid-download replay and read failures after charging' (#161 ) from fix/ecash-paid-download-v2-keyset into main	2026-09-30 12:58:33 +00:00
archipelago	d42f448e31	docs: close verified 1.8.21 OTA and ISO publication	2026-09-30 07:46:05 -04:00
archipelago	1566f1bb00	docs: record tested paid-download PRs for next release	2026-09-30 07:34:18 -04:00
archipelago	0677924a64	Merge current main and make purchase filing atomic under concurrent writes	2026-09-30 07:26:51 -04:00
archipelago	971d477795	Merge current main and harden paid-download delivery	2026-09-30 07:25:47 -04:00
archipelago	f12042f194	docs: track X250 kiosk Bitcoin version selector regression	2026-09-30 07:01:57 -04:00
archipelago	e7cf336665	chore: publish release v1.8.21-alpha Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 37s Details	2026-09-30 05:55:13 -04:00
archipelago	8ca20de82e	release: prepare signed 1.8.21-alpha OTA	2026-09-30 05:51:16 -04:00
archipelago	1fa654cb6a	docs: record 1.8.21 artifact and two-node release acceptance	2026-09-30 05:39:26 -04:00
archipelago	c993d9dd0d	fix(lnd): require observed Bitcoin lifecycle change before dependency restart	2026-09-30 05:16:17 -04:00
archipelago	33d2b3ce60	fix(containers): preserve graceful shutdown through Quadlet and prepare 1.8.21	2026-09-30 04:59:30 -04:00
archipelago	c7ce35bd43	chore: publish release v1.8.20-alpha Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 1m31s Details	2026-09-30 04:32:43 -04:00
archipelago	ad1d71a462	Prepare signed v1.8.20-alpha release and record operator acceptance	2026-09-30 04:27:02 -04:00
ssmithxandClaude Opus 5.5	33477f284b	fix(files): file purchased content into FileBrowser folders again Every paid download logged "filing into filebrowser/Music/... failed (non-fatal): Permission denied". The purchase played in-app but never appeared in Files. FileBrowser's folders belong to its rootless container range (host uid 100000, mode 755). This service is host uid 1000, outside that range, so it can read them but not create files in them. New container::filebrowser::save_new_file: - Writes directly when the folder allows it. - Otherwise writes through `podman unshare`, where that uid range is ours: to a temp file, then chowned to the folder's owner, set to 0644, and hard-linked into place. FileBrowser never sees a partial file and an existing file is never replaced. A missing folder is created and given its parent's owner. No sudo. - Keeps the "name (2).ext" de-duplication the RPC did inline. Checked the unshare script on amishparadise in a scratch folder owned like FileBrowser's: new folder + file OK, owner/mode right, no clobber, no temp file left, and the service can read the result. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-29 22:36:31 +00:00
ssmithxandClaude Opus 5.5	03e38d1ca3	test: regression tests for the paid-download fixes - mint_client: a stub mint shows swap() sends the full v2 keyset id when given a cashuB short id, and leaves complete v1/v2 ids unchanged. - fips::dial: the single-delivery decisions are now small functions (fips_answer_is_final, fips_retryable). Tests cover them and, against a silent local peer, check that a single-delivery request isn't resent after a timeout while an ordinary one still is. - content_server: an unreadable paid file returns Unavailable before the payment gate runs, and a readable one still returns 402. Also covers ensure_readable's grant/reopen behaviour. The podman grant is replaced by a refusal under cfg(test) so results don't depend on the host. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-29 20:12:16 +00:00
archipelago	bded929812	Record validated OTA candidate and remaining release gates	2026-09-29 15:47:22 -04:00
archipelago	3612458e86	Handle empty recorded calls in install regression assertion	2026-09-29 15:38:49 -04:00
archipelago	8d9fad1749	Require Bitcoin version and pruning selection from the App Store	2026-09-29 15:37:05 -04:00
archipelago	d25ed492c9	Keep Bitcoin pruning explanation below desktop install controls	2026-09-29 15:27:00 -04:00
archipelago	1f9abefc35	Isolate backend tests from live node wallets and services	2026-09-29 15:15:51 -04:00
archipelago	b634f41a1c	Complete paid-file caching and deliver LND waiting UI to existing nodes	2026-09-29 14:59:08 -04:00
archipelago	0f85f588fb	Fix Cashu file redemption and Bitcoin-dependent wallet readiness	2026-09-29 14:42:44 -04:00
ssmithxandClaude Opus 5.5	e5fc99d66c	fix(content): never charge for a file the seller can't serve or replay a spent token After the keyset-id fix, a Minibits paid download still failed and the buyer lost the sats. What happened, 2026-09-29, amishparadise: 1. The seller redeemed the token, then failed to read the file. It was a FileBrowser upload owned by the container subuid (100999) with mode 0640. The handler mapped that Err to 404. 2. The buyer's FIPS dial treats 404 as "fall back to Tor" and resent the request with the same, now spent, token. The seller answered 402, and the buyer showed "seller doesn't accept your Cashu mint". Fixes: - serve_content checks the file is readable before the paid gate. If it isn't, it grants read with `podman unshare chmod a+r`, which matches the other shared files. If that also fails it returns Unavailable (503) without taking payment. - The content handler returns 500 on internal errors and logs them, instead of a silent 404. - New PeerRequest::single_delivery(), used for the paid download: the FIPS answer is final, FIPS retries only when it never connected, and there's no Tor replay once the request may have been delivered. - The buyer shows the seller's error text for non-402 failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-29 18:42:20 +00:00
ssmithxandClaude Opus 5.5	8b74803290	fix(ecash): repair short v2 keyset ids on every swap, not just receive Paid cloud downloads paid with Minibits ecash were always rejected. The buyer sends a cashuB token, which carries NUT-02 v2 keyset ids in their 8-byte short form. Minibits rotated its active keyset to a v2 id, and the seller's verify_and_receive_payment called MintClient::swap directly, skipping the short->full id repair that only receive_token applied. The mint answered 422 ("ID length invalid"). The buyer then showed the misleading "seller doesn't accept your Cashu mint" hint. Move the repair into swap() so every caller is covered: payment verify, streaming gate, send change, and cross-mint swaps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-29 15:47:23 +00:00
archipelago	540639d2c1	chore: publish release v1.8.19-alpha	2026-09-28 13:21:51 -04:00
archipelago	562871b1ce	chore: prepare signed release v1.8.19-alpha	2026-09-28 13:18:34 -04:00
archipelago	cca3f8bfcd	docs: include AIUI packaging fix in v1.8.19 release notes Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 44s Details	2026-09-28 13:13:31 -04:00
archipelago	89c08be712	fix(aiui): match host color scheme for iframe transparency Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 56s Details	2026-09-28 12:37:40 -04:00
archipelago	b4ecf86c13	chore: stage v1.8.19-alpha version bump	2026-09-28 12:33:59 -04:00
archipelago	b14fe78306	fix(aiui): expose host wallpaper and package fresh production builds	2026-09-28 12:32:18 -04:00
archipelago	3f0c1038c3	docs: add v1.8.19 release notes to settings	2026-09-28 12:23:57 -04:00
archipelago	1fbefce6df	docs: add v1.8.19-alpha release notes	2026-09-28 12:23:05 -04:00
archipelago	63cb68451a	fix(aiui): keep embedded chat background transparent	2026-09-22 05:04:59 -04:00
archipelago	17cfebbe26	chore: publish release v1.8.18-alpha	2026-09-20 11:49:39 -04:00
archipelago	379fb930fc	chore: prepare release v1.8.18-alpha Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 43s Details	2026-09-20 11:45:35 -04:00
archipelago	1bebdeac0f	Prepare v1.8.18-alpha release notes	2026-09-18 06:36:43 -04:00
archipelago	f458591132	Document Minibits description customization limits Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 45s Details	2026-09-15 16:13:14 -04:00
archipelago	6155539254	Confirm Primal automatic-comment cause and successful workaround	2026-09-15 16:11:09 -04:00
archipelago	76e0f1f3b6	Trace Primal Spark auto-comment failure against Framework address	2026-09-15 16:09:16 -04:00
archipelago	ba6ce2cdb6	Record live LNURL comment limit investigation	2026-09-15 16:06:21 -04:00
archipelago	8212049f57	Shorten ecash backup copy and stack card actions	2026-09-15 16:03:52 -04:00
archipelago	5814f47659	docs: verify Framework Cashu address and preserved proofs	2026-09-15 15:58:16 -04:00
archipelago	94f5e892c3	docs: track authenticated Cashu address setup and remaining verification	2026-09-15 15:47:48 -04:00
archipelago	a3b6467047	fix(ecash): guide unseeded wallets through Lightning address setup	2026-09-15 15:45:32 -04:00
archipelago	66db6497ec	docs: record successful Framework reboot verification	2026-09-15 15:27:13 -04:00
archipelago	81be17f09f	docs: record Framework live evidence and staged fix validation	2026-09-15 15:15:34 -04:00
archipelago	4237fb5e79	fix(wallet): prioritize LND boot and reject unavailable balances	2026-09-15 15:09:08 -04:00
archipelago	4302138b4f	docs: make Framework LND incident a persistent investigation blocker	2026-09-15 14:56:01 -04:00
archipelago	3b9b74dae5	chore: publish release v1.8.17-alpha Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 36s Details	2026-09-15 12:56:18 -04:00
archipelago	4021c1f496	chore: prepare release v1.8.17-alpha	2026-09-15 12:53:06 -04:00
archipelago	5f8de584bc	docs: add v1.8.17-alpha release notes Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 42s Details	2026-09-15 12:33:24 -04:00
chaum	38de1b3310	Merge pull request 'fix(ecash): stop replayed Minibits claims retrying forever, reduce relay churn' (#160 ) from fix/minibits-already-redeemed into main	2026-09-15 16:32:53 +00:00
archipelago	abfbccc906	fix(ecash): preserve retryable claims and resume relay backlogs	2026-09-15 12:31:49 -04:00
ssmithxandClaude Sonnet 5	9d4e74e094	docs: redact node hostname from the Minibits incident writeup Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-15 16:19:23 +00:00
ssmithxandClaude Sonnet 5	db355b759c	fix(ecash): stop replayed Minibits claims retrying forever, reduce relay churn claim_and_redeem retried every redeem failure indefinitely, including a terminal one: mint error 11001 "Token Already Spent" (a claim replayed by a relay-watermark edge case, or already redeemed by an earlier run). On archy-x250-pa3 this pinned pending_claims at 1 forever and hammered mint.minibits.cash's swap endpoint every ~6s, with the UI permanently showing "a payment arrived but couldn't be redeemed yet". - mint_client: expose the NUT error-code-11001 message as ALREADY_REDEEMED_MSG so callers can recognize it without duplicating the string. - minibits: drop (not retry) a redeem failure that matches is_already_redeemed — the value was already swept, so retrying can never succeed. - fetch_relay_dms: query the primary relay.minibits.cash alone first, falling back to the public relay.damus.io/nos.lol only if it's unreachable, and page past a 200-DM backlog instead of silently stranding older DMs behind an un-advanced watermark. This fix already existed on feat/minibits-lnurl-receive (`4e410d7`, `489995c`, 2026-09-09) but that branch was never merged into main, which has its own independently-diverged minibits.rs — so the bug shipped again in 1.8.16-alpha. Ported directly onto main's current implementation this time. Immediate unblock on archy-x250-pa3: cleared the one poisoned pending_claims entry from wallet/minibits.json by hand (already-redeemed, zero value at risk) and restarted archipelago.service; confirmed via journalctl that polling is quiet again. See docs/incident-2026-09-15-minibits-already-redeemed.md for the full writeup. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-15 16:12:00 +00:00
archipelago	31d77f01ac	chore: publish release v1.8.16-alpha Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 34s Details	2026-09-15 04:02:57 -04:00
archipelago	1b0ed281b2	chore: prepare release v1.8.16-alpha	2026-09-15 03:59:43 -04:00
archipelago	9c6580f5c0	fix: prevent stale catalog updates and redundant container recreation Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 40s Details	2026-09-15 03:40:21 -04:00
archipelago	83abb0485d	fix: publish signed mempool DNS recovery catalog	2026-09-15 03:13:02 -04:00
archipelago	b35409ca74	fix: recover mempool frontend after backend address changes	2026-09-15 02:49:06 -04:00
archipelago	700d39c425	fix: keep release credentials out of public remote URLs	2026-09-14 10:47:58 -04:00
archipelago	4272c47ee5	chore: sign app catalog for v1.8.15-alpha	2026-09-13 13:21:24 -04:00
archipelago	c7cb043485	chore: publish release v1.8.15-alpha	2026-09-13 05:09:56 -04:00
archipelago	4dfe79290e	chore: sign release v1.8.15-alpha manifest	2026-09-13 04:42:17 -04:00
archipelago	d3e3df6d24	docs: add release validation note	2026-09-13 04:32:58 -04:00
archipelago	969570e38b	chore: prepare release v1.8.15-alpha Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m29s Details	2026-09-13 04:32:16 -04:00
archipelago	b73d646db5	docs: prepare 1.8.15 alpha notes Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m22s Details	2026-09-13 03:06:53 -04:00
archipelago	8c37ff412c	fix: present Cuprate as one launchable app Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m28s Details	2026-09-13 03:06:22 -04:00
archipelago	06bf359535	chore: publish release v1.8.14-alpha	2026-09-13 02:56:29 -04:00
archipelago	a4f3415f0f	chore: prepare release v1.8.14-alpha Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m25s Details	2026-09-13 02:53:11 -04:00
archipelago	c9c9ebe6d4	docs: sync whats new for 1.8.14 alpha Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m18s Details	2026-09-13 02:34:45 -04:00
archipelago	100993445b	docs: prepare 1.8.14 alpha release notes	2026-09-13 02:33:30 -04:00
archipelago	a4f80e7ec1	test: update GitWorkshop launcher deep-link expectation Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m14s Details	2026-09-13 01:48:36 -04:00
archipelago	4ad34d3a0a	test: validate full Archipelago ngit promotion path	2026-09-13 01:45:22 -04:00
archipelago	c9bae926a5	test: satisfy strict indexed access Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m14s Details	2026-09-13 01:41:11 -04:00