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Author SHA1 Message Date
ssmithxandClaude Sonnet 5 dc7b598558 fix(tor): un-alias bitcoin-core's hidden-service name; add regression tests
read_tor_address("bitcoin-core") was resolving through tor_service_name to
the shared "bitcoin" alias, but enrollment (install.rs auto-enroll and the
tor.create-service RPC) always names HiddenServiceDir/tor-hostnames entries
using the raw package_id verbatim — never canonicalized. On a real node
that's hidden_service_bitcoin-core, which the aliased lookup never found,
so the per-app UI Tor badge stayed empty even after the previous commit
made bitcoin-core auto-enrollable.

Give bitcoin-core its own identity-mapped arm instead of folding it into
the legacy bitcoin/bitcoin-knots/bitcoind alias, and pin all three lookup
tables (known_service_port, is_protocol_service, tor_service_name) with
regression tests so this alias-drift class of bug can't recur silently.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WxfWiFfnBkdSxwKUuV2tNy
2026-09-10 16:26:59 +00:00
ssmithxandClaude Sonnet 5 69f3a355c7 fix(tor): recognize bitcoin-core in Tor auto-enrollment tables
apps/bitcoin-core/manifest.yml uses id "bitcoin-core", but
known_service_port/is_protocol_service (tor/mod.rs) and
tor_service_name (docker_packages.rs) only matched "bitcoin" and
"bitcoin-knots", so the app silently never got auto-enrolled for a
P2P (8333) hidden service at install time, and the UI's Tor address
lookup for it always returned None.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WxfWiFfnBkdSxwKUuV2tNy
2026-09-10 15:28:17 +00:00
15 changed files with 55 additions and 1306 deletions
+2 -3
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@@ -90,9 +90,8 @@ rustls-pemfile = "1.0"
webpki = { package = "rustls-webpki", version = "0.101" }
reqwest = { version = "0.11", default-features = false, features = ["json", "socks", "rustls-tls", "stream"] }
# Nostr (node discovery + NIP-44 encrypted peer handshake).
# nip06: NIP-06 key derivation for the Minibits @minibits.cash profile flow.
nostr-sdk = { version = "0.44", features = ["nip04", "nip06", "nip44"] }
# Nostr (node discovery + NIP-44 encrypted peer handshake)
nostr-sdk = { version = "0.44", features = ["nip04", "nip44"] }
# Backup encryption (DID identity export) + TOTP 2FA encryption
argon2 = "0.5.3"
@@ -269,8 +269,6 @@ impl RpcHandler {
"wallet.ecash-network" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_network().await,
"wallet.ecash-set-network" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_set_network(params).await,
"wallet.ecash-seed-status" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_seed_status().await,
"wallet.ecash-lnaddress" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_lnaddress().await,
"wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_lnaddress_claim().await,
"wallet.ecash-seed-reveal" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_seed_reveal(params).await,
"wallet.ecash-restore" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_restore(params).await,
"wallet.ecash-seed-import" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_seed_import(params).await,
+19 -2
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@@ -377,6 +377,23 @@ async fn write_staged_torrc(content: &str, staging: &str) -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod known_service_tests {
use super::{is_protocol_service, known_service_port};
#[test]
fn bitcoin_core_is_a_protocol_service_on_the_p2p_port() {
// Regression: apps/bitcoin-core/manifest.yml uses id "bitcoin-core",
// distinct from the legacy "bitcoin"/"bitcoin-knots" ids. Missing
// here means auto-enrollment silently skips it (known_service_port
// returns 0) and, separately, regenerate_torrc falls back to the
// web-app HiddenServicePort-80 default instead of forwarding 8333
// straight through.
assert_eq!(known_service_port("bitcoin-core"), 8333);
assert!(is_protocol_service("bitcoin-core"));
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod torrc_tests {
use super::app_hidden_service_port_line;
@@ -594,7 +611,7 @@ fn is_valid_v3_onion(s: &str) -> bool {
pub(in crate::api::rpc) fn known_service_port(name: &str) -> u16 {
match name {
"archipelago" => 80,
"bitcoin" | "bitcoin-knots" => 8333,
"bitcoin" | "bitcoin-core" | "bitcoin-knots" => 8333,
"electrs" | "electrumx" => 50001,
"lnd" => 8080,
"btcpay" | "btcpay-server" | "btcpayserver" => 23000,
@@ -619,7 +636,7 @@ pub(in crate::api::rpc) fn known_service_port(name: &str) -> u16 {
pub(in crate::api::rpc) fn is_protocol_service(name: &str) -> bool {
matches!(
name,
"bitcoin" | "bitcoin-knots" | "electrs" | "electrumx" | "lnd"
"bitcoin" | "bitcoin-core" | "bitcoin-knots" | "electrs" | "electrumx" | "lnd"
)
}
-24
View File
@@ -421,30 +421,6 @@ impl RpcHandler {
}))
}
/// `wallet.ecash-lnaddress` — the node's Minibits Lightning address
/// (`<name>@minibits.cash`, LUD-16), derived from and authenticated by the
/// ecash wallet's own seed. Registers the profile on first use; safe to call
/// on every open of the Cashu receive screen (it is idempotent).
pub(super) async fn handle_wallet_ecash_lnaddress(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
crate::wallet::minibits::lnaddress(&self.config.data_dir).await
}
/// `wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim` — redeem any Lightning payments that
/// arrived on the node's Minibits address as ecash. Returns the sats swept in
/// (0 when nothing was waiting), so the UI can refresh its balance.
/// `failed_count` is non-zero when a payment was fetched (and so already
/// consumed server-side) but couldn't be redeemed yet — it stays queued
/// and is retried automatically, but the UI should tell the operator
/// rather than let it be a silent, unbounded wait.
pub(super) async fn handle_wallet_ecash_lnaddress_claim(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
let outcome = crate::wallet::minibits::claim_and_redeem(&self.config.data_dir).await?;
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"claimed_count": outcome.claimed_count,
"received_sats": outcome.received_sats,
"failed_count": outcome.failed_count,
}))
}
pub(super) async fn handle_wallet_networking_profits(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
let summary = profits::get_networking_profits(&self.config.data_dir).await?;
Ok(serde_json::json!({
@@ -657,9 +657,19 @@ fn apply_dynamic_metadata(app_id: &str, meta: &mut AppMetadata) {
/// Map app_id to Tor hidden service directory name.
/// "archipelago" is the main web UI (nginx port 80).
/// Supports container names from deploy (archy-*, btcpay-server, etc.).
///
/// This must match what enrollment actually names the hidden service dir
/// with — both the install-time auto-enroll (`install.rs`) and the manual
/// `tor.create-service` RPC write `HiddenServiceDir` using the raw
/// `package_id`/`name` verbatim, with no canonicalization. So `bitcoin-core`
/// gets its own identity arm rather than folding into the "bitcoin" alias:
/// aliasing it here without also canonicalizing the write side would point
/// this lookup at `hidden_service_bitcoin`, which never gets created — the
/// on-disk dir is always `hidden_service_bitcoin-core` for this app id.
fn tor_service_name(app_id: &str) -> Option<&'static str> {
match app_id {
"archipelago" => Some("archipelago"),
"bitcoin-core" => Some("bitcoin-core"),
"bitcoin" | "bitcoin-knots" | "bitcoind" => Some("bitcoin"),
"electrumx" | "electrs" | "electrum" => Some("electrumx"),
"lnd" | "lnd-ui" => Some("lnd"),
@@ -906,6 +916,28 @@ mod launch_url_port_tests {
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tor_service_name_tests {
use super::tor_service_name;
#[test]
fn bitcoin_core_resolves_to_its_own_hidden_service_dir() {
// Regression: enrollment (install.rs, tor.create-service) writes
// HiddenServiceDir/tor-hostnames entries using the raw package_id
// verbatim, never canonicalized. Aliasing "bitcoin-core" to the
// shared "bitcoin" name here would point reads at a directory
// enrollment never creates.
assert_eq!(tor_service_name("bitcoin-core"), Some("bitcoin-core"));
}
#[test]
fn legacy_bitcoin_ids_share_the_bitcoin_alias() {
assert_eq!(tor_service_name("bitcoin"), Some("bitcoin"));
assert_eq!(tor_service_name("bitcoin-knots"), Some("bitcoin"));
assert_eq!(tor_service_name("bitcoind"), Some("bitcoin"));
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod extract_lan_address_tests {
use super::extract_lan_address;
-47
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@@ -207,15 +207,7 @@ impl CashuToken {
}
/// Decode a cashuA (V3 JSON) or cashuB (V4 CBOR) token string.
///
/// Trims surrounding whitespace first: a token can arrive with stray
/// leading/trailing whitespace from a clipboard paste, or (confirmed
/// live, 2026-09-08) from Minibits' own NIP-04 claim-DM content, which
/// has a trailing space after the base64 — none of the base64 alphabets
/// in `decode_token_base64` tolerate that, so an otherwise-valid token
/// would hard-fail with "Invalid base64" instead of parsing.
pub fn deserialize(token_str: &str) -> Result<Self> {
let token_str = token_str.trim();
if let Some(payload) = token_str.strip_prefix(CASHU_B_PREFIX) {
return Self::deserialize_v4(payload);
}
@@ -516,45 +508,6 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(decoded.memo, Some("test token".to_string()));
}
/// Regression guard (2026-09-08): a real Minibits claim DM decrypted to
/// a cashuB token with a trailing space after the base64 payload, which
/// made every base64 alphabet in `decode_token_base64` reject it as
/// invalid — three real payments got stuck retrying forever with
/// "Invalid base64 in cashuB token" until `deserialize` started
/// trimming the whole string first. Whitespace can show up around a
/// token from more than one source (clipboard paste included), so this
/// covers cashuA too, and leading as well as trailing.
#[test]
fn deserialize_trims_stray_whitespace() {
let token = CashuToken {
token: vec![TokenEntry {
mint: "http://127.0.0.1:8175".to_string(),
proofs: vec![Proof {
amount: 8,
id: "009a1f293253e41e".to_string(),
secret: "abcdef1234567890".to_string(),
c: "02a9acc1e48c25eeeb9289b5031cc57da9fe72f3fe2861d94ec4da0e7f6c2b4e24"
.to_string(),
}],
}],
memo: None,
unit: Some("sat".to_string()),
};
let encoded = token.serialize().unwrap();
assert!(encoded.starts_with("cashuA"));
for wrapped in [
format!("{encoded} "),
format!(" {encoded}"),
format!(" {encoded}\n"),
format!("{encoded}\t"),
] {
let decoded = CashuToken::deserialize(&wrapped)
.unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("failed on {wrapped:?}: {e}"));
assert_eq!(decoded.total_amount(), 8);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_total_amount_multi_proof() {
let token = CashuToken {
-902
View File
@@ -1,902 +0,0 @@
//! The Minibits `@minibits.cash` Lightning address (LUD-16) for the node's
//! ecash wallet.
//!
//! ## Why this exists next to the mint client
//!
//! The ecash wallet already talks to `mint.minibits.cash` as a plain Cashu
//! mint (`wallet::mint_client`): mint/melt quotes, swap, receive. That gives the
//! node ecash *from* Minibits, but not a *name* at Minibits. A human-readable
//! Lightning address like `braveharbor42@minibits.cash` is a separate service —
//! the Minibits profile API at `api.minibits.cash/v3` — and it is what lets any
//! Lightning wallet pay this node by typing an address, with the payment landing
//! as ecash.
//!
//! ## Identity: the ecash wallet *is* the Minibits wallet
//!
//! Minibits ties an address to a wallet by `seedHash`, and authenticates the
//! wallet with a NIP-06 Nostr keypair. Both come from the *existing* NUT-13
//! ecash phrase (`wallet::nut13`), so there is no second secret to back up:
//!
//! - `seedHash = sha256(mnemonic.to_seed(""))` — the exact bytes the Minibits
//! app hashes, so restoring the same phrase in the Minibits app recovers the
//! same address (and vice-versa).
//! - Nostr keys via NIP-06 at `m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0`. `nostr_sdk::Keys::from_mnemonic`
//! uses that path with an empty BIP-39 passphrase — byte-for-byte the derivation
//! the Minibits app (nostr-tools `accountFromSeedWords`) does, verified against
//! the crate's own NIP-06 test vector.
//!
//! ## Flow (all verified against the live v3 API)
//!
//! 1. `POST /auth/challenge {pubkey}` → `{challenge, createdAt}`.
//! 2. Sign a NIP-42 kind-22242 event (`relay` + `challenge` tags, server's
//! `createdAt`) with the Nostr key.
//! 3. `POST /auth/verify {pubkey, challenge, signature}` → JWT access token.
//! 4. `POST /profile {walletId, seedHash}` → the assigned `lud16`/`nip05`.
//! Idempotent per pubkey: re-registering returns the existing address.
//! 5. `POST /claim {seedHash}` → NIP-04-encrypted Cashu tokens for Lightning
//! payments sent to the address; decrypt with the Nostr key + the server's
//! Nostr pubkey, then redeem through `ecash::receive_token`.
//!
//! Only runs on the mainnet ecash network — Minibits is a mainnet service, and a
//! testnet node must not register a profile or hit the production API.
//!
//! ## A claim can't be re-fetched — so nothing gets dropped
//!
//! `/claim` consumes a payment server-side the instant it's returned. A local
//! failure after that point (mint briefly unreachable, a stale cached server
//! key, a crash mid-loop) must not silently lose the coins, so every fetched
//! token is persisted to `MinibitsState::pending_claims` *before* decrypt/
//! redeem is attempted, and stays there — retried on every later poll — until
//! it succeeds. `ClaimOutcome::failed_count` reports how many are still
//! stuck so the caller can surface it instead of it being a log-only event.
//! Separately, `ensure_mint_accepted` keeps the Minibits mint on the node's
//! accepted-mints allow-list: the address is inherently backed by that one
//! mint, so an operator-edited allow-list must never be able to cause this
//! same kind of loss via `receive_token`'s mint check.
use super::ecash::{self, EcashNetwork};
use super::nut13;
use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
use base64::Engine;
use nostr_sdk::nips::{nip04, nip06::FromMnemonic};
use nostr_sdk::{Client, EventBuilder, Filter, Kind, RelayUrl, Tag, TagKind, Timestamp, ToBech32};
use rand::seq::SliceRandom;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::path::Path;
use tokio::fs;
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
/// Minibits profile/LNURL API. Confirmed live: `/v3/auth/challenge`,
/// `/v3/profile`, `/v3/claim` (the older `/v2` host no longer serves profiles).
const API_BASE: &str = "https://api.minibits.cash/v3";
/// The relay named in the NIP-42 auth event. Matches the value the Minibits app
/// sends and the relay the service publishes in its NIP-05 record.
const RELAY_URL: &str = "wss://relay.minibits.cash";
/// Relays to check for incoming claim DMs (see `fetch_relay_dms`). Confirmed
/// live 2026-09-08: real Lightning payments to a `@minibits.cash` address are
/// delivered as a NIP-04 DM (kind 4, `#p`-tagged to the wallet's pubkey)
/// published to relays — *not* surfaced by `POST /claim`, which was the only
/// source this module fetched from until that gap stranded three real
/// payments. `RELAY_URL` first (it's the service's own relay and the one
/// most likely to have them), plus two large public relays as a fallback in
/// case that relay is ever unreachable or Minibits adds others.
const CLAIM_RELAY_URLS: &[&str] = &[RELAY_URL, "wss://relay.damus.io", "wss://nos.lol"];
/// NIP-42 client authentication event kind.
const AUTH_KIND: u16 = 22242;
/// The Minibits service Nostr pubkey that NIP-04-encrypts claimed tokens. Used
/// only as a fallback: the authoritative value is read from the address's own
/// LUD-16 metadata (`nostrPubkey`) at claim time, so a Minibits key rotation
/// does not strand claims.
const FALLBACK_SERVER_NOSTR_PUBKEY: &str =
"beeb48407a6f087ea8f76dc384a5d88c67ced9bd9fb0cdba90930210df3d92e7";
/// Re-authenticate this long before the JWT actually expires, so a claim poll
/// never races the expiry boundary.
const TOKEN_EXPIRY_SKEP_SECS: i64 = 120;
const STATE_FILE: &str = "wallet/minibits.json";
/// Small word lists for the generated address name. Uniqueness comes from the
/// numeric suffix plus the retry-on-collision below — the Minibits server rejects
/// a name already taken by another wallet and we simply draw another, so these do
/// not need to be exhaustive (the Minibits app ships lists hundreds long).
const ADJECTIVES: &[&str] = &[
"calm", "brave", "quiet", "solar", "rapid", "noble", "lunar", "vivid", "amber", "crisp",
"eager", "fancy", "gentle", "happy", "jolly", "keen", "lucky", "mellow", "nimble", "proud",
"quick", "rusty", "sunny", "tidy", "urban", "vital", "warm", "zesty", "bold", "clever",
"daring", "epic", "fiery", "grand", "humble", "iron", "merry", "polar", "sleek", "wild",
];
const NOUNS: &[&str] = &[
"harbor", "meadow", "canyon", "summit", "river", "forest", "island", "comet", "nebula",
"orbit", "quartz", "maple", "willow", "falcon", "otter", "badger", "salmon", "crane",
"ridge", "creek", "glade", "grove", "prairie", "delta", "cobalt", "onyx", "topaz", "ember",
"anchor", "lantern", "beacon", "cabin", "drift", "signal", "thunder", "zephyr", "marble",
"pebble", "sequoia", "tundra",
];
/// Persistent state for the node's Minibits address.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct MinibitsState {
/// The chosen wallet name (the `name` in `name@minibits.cash`).
pub wallet_id: String,
/// The full LUD-16 Lightning address, e.g. `braveharbor42@minibits.cash`.
pub lud16: String,
/// NIP-05 address (Minibits sets this equal to `lud16`).
pub nip05: String,
/// This node's NIP-06 Nostr pubkey (hex) the profile is bound to.
pub nostr_pubkey: String,
/// `sha256(seed)` — the wallet identifier Minibits keys claims on.
pub seed_hash: String,
/// Cached JWT access token.
#[serde(default)]
pub access_token: String,
/// Access-token expiry (unix seconds); 0 when unknown/expired.
#[serde(default)]
pub access_expires: i64,
/// Server Nostr pubkey used to decrypt claims, discovered from LUD-16.
#[serde(default)]
pub server_nostr_pubkey: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub created_at: String,
/// Raw NIP-04-encrypted claim tokens fetched from `/claim` but not yet
/// successfully redeemed. A claim is consumed server-side the instant
/// `/claim` returns it, so it is stashed here *before* decrypt/redeem is
/// attempted — a local failure (mint briefly down, bad cached server key,
/// process crash mid-loop) then retries next poll instead of losing the
/// coins outright.
#[serde(default)]
pub pending_claims: Vec<String>,
/// Unix timestamp of the newest Nostr DM we've already pulled into
/// `pending_claims` (see `fetch_relay_dms`). Nostr events never expire
/// from relays, so without this watermark every poll would re-fetch and
/// re-attempt every claim ever sent — harmless (the mint rejects an
/// already-spent token) but wasteful and noisy.
#[serde(default)]
pub last_dm_seen_at: u64,
}
/// A fresh Nostr keypair + seedHash derived from the node's ecash phrase.
struct MinibitsIdentity {
keys: nostr_sdk::Keys,
seed_hash: String,
}
/// Derive the Minibits identity (NIP-06 Nostr keys + seedHash) from the node's
/// ecash mnemonic. Both are deterministic, so the address and claims are
/// recoverable from the same 24 words the ecash already lives on.
fn derive_identity(phrase: &str, seed: &[u8; 64]) -> Result<MinibitsIdentity> {
let keys = nostr_sdk::Keys::from_mnemonic(phrase, None::<&str>)
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("NIP-06 derivation failed: {e}"))?;
let seed_hash = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(seed));
Ok(MinibitsIdentity { keys, seed_hash })
}
/// A Minibits profile record — the fields we read off every profile response.
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct ProfileRecord {
#[serde(rename = "walletId")]
wallet_id: String,
#[serde(default)]
nip05: String,
#[serde(default)]
lud16: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pubkey: String,
}
/// Turn a non-2xx Minibits response into a readable error, surfacing the
/// server's `error.name`/`error.message` when present.
fn minibits_error(status: reqwest::StatusCode, body: &str) -> anyhow::Error {
if let Ok(v) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(body) {
if let Some(err) = v.get("error") {
let name = err.get("name").and_then(|n| n.as_str()).unwrap_or("ERROR");
let msg = err.get("message").and_then(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
return anyhow!("Minibits API error {status}: {name} {msg}");
}
}
anyhow!(
"Minibits API error {status}: {}",
&body[..body.len().min(180)]
)
}
fn state_path(data_dir: &Path) -> std::path::PathBuf {
data_dir.join(STATE_FILE)
}
async fn load_state(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<Option<MinibitsState>> {
let path = state_path(data_dir);
match fs::read_to_string(&path).await {
Ok(s) if s.trim().is_empty() => Ok(None),
Ok(s) => match serde_json::from_str::<MinibitsState>(&s) {
Ok(st) if st.wallet_id.is_empty() => Ok(None),
Ok(st) => Ok(Some(st)),
// Unlike the accepted-mints file, nothing here is a user-editable
// security setting — it's a pure mirror of state Minibits already
// holds server-side, and registration is idempotent per pubkey
// (§ module docs), so re-registering after a corrupt/truncated
// read always recovers the *same* address. A node whose disk
// filled up mid-write (observed on archy-x250-pa3, 2026-09-08:
// this file truncated to 0 bytes) must self-heal on the next open
// rather than permanently show "Lightning address unavailable".
Err(e) => {
warn!(
"Minibits: {} is corrupt/unreadable ({e}); treating as no profile yet and re-registering",
path.display()
);
Ok(None)
}
},
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(None),
Err(e) => Err(e).with_context(|| format!("Failed to read {}", path.display())),
}
}
/// Write the state file 0600 — it holds a bearer JWT. Same sensitivity class as
/// the ecash files it sits beside, so it gets the same owner-only mode.
async fn save_state(data_dir: &Path, state: &MinibitsState) -> Result<()> {
let path = state_path(data_dir);
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
fs::create_dir_all(parent)
.await
.context("Failed to create the wallet directory")?;
}
let content = serde_json::to_string_pretty(state)
.context("Failed to serialize the Minibits profile")?;
fs::write(&path, content)
.await
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to write {}", path.display()))?;
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))
.await
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to chmod 0600 {}", path.display()))?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Read the `exp` claim (unix seconds) from a JWT without verifying it — the
/// token comes straight from Minibits over TLS; we only use the expiry to decide
/// when to refresh.
fn jwt_expiry(token: &str) -> Option<i64> {
let payload = token.split('.').nth(1)?;
let bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.decode(payload)
.ok()?;
let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).ok()?;
v.get("exp")?.as_i64()
}
/// Run the NIP-42 challenge/verify dance and return the access token plus its
/// expiry. Idempotent and cheap enough to redo whenever the cached token lapses.
async fn authenticate(
client: &reqwest::Client,
keys: &nostr_sdk::Keys,
) -> Result<(String, i64)> {
let ch: serde_json::Value = client
.post(format!("{API_BASE}/auth/challenge"))
.json(&serde_json::json!({ "pubkey": keys.public_key().to_hex() }))
.send()
.await
.context("Minibits auth challenge request failed")?
.error_for_status()
.context("Minibits auth challenge rejected")?
.json()
.await
.context("Minibits auth challenge was not JSON")?;
let challenge = ch["challenge"]
.as_str()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Minibits challenge response missing 'challenge'"))?
.to_string();
let created_at = ch["createdAt"]
.as_u64()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Minibits challenge response missing 'createdAt'"))?;
// Sign a NIP-42 auth event, stamping the server's own createdAt so the
// signature lines up with the challenge it was issued for.
let unsigned = EventBuilder::new(Kind::from(AUTH_KIND), "")
.tag(Tag::relay(
RelayUrl::parse(RELAY_URL).context("Invalid Minibits relay URL")?,
))
.tag(Tag::custom(
TagKind::custom("challenge"),
vec![challenge.clone()],
))
.custom_created_at(Timestamp::from(created_at))
.build(keys.public_key());
let signed = unsigned
.sign_with_keys(keys)
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("Failed to sign the Minibits auth challenge: {e}"))?;
let tok: serde_json::Value = client
.post(format!("{API_BASE}/auth/verify"))
.json(&serde_json::json!({
"pubkey": keys.public_key().to_hex(),
"challenge": challenge,
"signature": hex::encode(signed.sig.serialize()),
}))
.send()
.await
.context("Minibits auth verify request failed")?
.error_for_status()
.context("Minibits auth verify rejected (bad challenge signature)")?
.json()
.await
.context("Minibits auth verify was not JSON")?;
let access = tok["accessToken"]
.as_str()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Minibits verify response missing 'accessToken'"))?
.to_string();
let expires = jwt_expiry(&access).unwrap_or_else(|| {
chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() + 3600 // conservative fallback
});
Ok((access, expires))
}
/// True when the cached access token is missing or about to lapse.
fn token_is_stale(state: &MinibitsState) -> bool {
let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
state.access_token.is_empty() || now + TOKEN_EXPIRY_SKEP_SECS >= state.access_expires
}
/// Ensure we hold a valid access token, re-authenticating as needed and folding
/// the fresh token back into `state` (which the caller persists).
async fn ensure_token(
client: &reqwest::Client,
state: &mut MinibitsState,
keys: &nostr_sdk::Keys,
) -> Result<()> {
if token_is_stale(state) {
let (access, expires) = authenticate(client, keys).await?;
state.access_token = access;
state.access_expires = expires;
debug!("Minibits: authenticated (token valid to {})", expires);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Draw a fresh readable wallet name, Minibits-style: adjective + noun + number.
fn generate_wallet_id() -> String {
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let adj = ADJECTIVES.choose(&mut rng).copied().unwrap_or("quiet");
let noun = NOUNS.choose(&mut rng).copied().unwrap_or("harbor");
let num = rand::Rng::gen_range(&mut rng, 1..=999);
format!("{adj}{noun}{num}")
}
/// Register the profile, returning the assigned address. Retries with a new name
/// a handful of times if the generated name is already taken by another wallet.
async fn register_profile(
client: &reqwest::Client,
access: &str,
seed_hash: &str,
) -> Result<ProfileRecord> {
let mut last_err = None;
for attempt in 0..6 {
let wallet_id = generate_wallet_id();
let resp = client
.post(format!("{API_BASE}/profile"))
.bearer_auth(access)
.json(&serde_json::json!({ "walletId": wallet_id, "seedHash": seed_hash }))
.send()
.await
.context("Minibits profile registration request failed")?;
let status = resp.status();
let body = resp
.text()
.await
.context("Minibits profile response body read failed")?;
if status.is_success() {
let rec: ProfileRecord = serde_json::from_str(&body)
.context("Minibits profile response was not the expected shape")?;
return Ok(rec);
}
// Name collision → draw another. Anything else is fatal.
let is_taken = body.contains("ALREADY_EXISTS") || body.contains("already");
if is_taken {
warn!("Minibits name '{wallet_id}' taken, retrying (attempt {attempt})");
last_err = Some(minibits_error(status, &body));
continue;
}
return Err(minibits_error(status, &body));
}
Err(last_err.unwrap_or_else(|| anyhow!("Could not register a free Minibits name")))
}
/// Fetch the LUD-16 metadata for our own address and read the service's
/// `nostrPubkey` — the key that NIP-04-encrypts claimed tokens.
async fn discover_server_nostr_pubkey(
client: &reqwest::Client,
lud16: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
let (name, domain) = lud16
.split_once('@')
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Malformed Minibits address '{lud16}'"))?;
let url = format!("https://{domain}/.well-known/lnurlp/{name}");
let md: serde_json::Value = client
.get(&url)
.send()
.await
.context("Minibits LUD-16 metadata request failed")?
.json()
.await
.context("Minibits LUD-16 metadata was not JSON")?;
md.get("nostrPubkey")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.map(|s| s.to_string())
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Minibits LUD-16 metadata missing 'nostrPubkey'"))
}
/// Load the ecash phrase, or establish it from the node master seed when this
/// node has not materialised one yet — but never fail an address request just
/// because a phrase is not on disk; report that clearly instead.
async fn ecash_phrase(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<(String, [u8; 64])> {
let seed = nut13::load_seed(data_dir)
.await?
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("The ecash wallet has no seed yet — restore or reveal it first"))?;
Ok((seed.phrase(), seed.seed_bytes()))
}
/// Get (registering on first use) the node's Minibits Lightning address.
///
/// On mainnet this registers a profile with the Minibits server the first time
/// and caches it in `wallet/minibits.json`; later calls return the cached address
/// and refresh the access token as needed. Registration is idempotent per pubkey,
/// so a node that restores the same ecash phrase recovers the same address.
pub async fn lnaddress(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
let network = ecash::load_network(data_dir).await;
if network == EcashNetwork::Testnet {
return Err(anyhow!(
"Minibits Lightning addresses are mainnet-only — switch the ecash network to mainnet to set one up"
));
}
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(20))
.build()
.context("Failed to build the Minibits HTTP client")?;
let (phrase, seed) = ecash_phrase(data_dir).await?;
let identity = derive_identity(&phrase, &seed)?;
let mut state = match load_state(data_dir).await? {
Some(st) => st,
None => {
info!("Minibits: no profile yet, registering a new @minibits.cash address");
let (access, expires) = authenticate(&client, &identity.keys).await?;
let rec = register_profile(&client, &access, &identity.seed_hash).await?;
MinibitsState {
wallet_id: rec.wallet_id.clone(),
lud16: rec
.lud16
.clone()
.unwrap_or_else(|| format!("{}@minibits.cash", rec.wallet_id)),
nip05: rec.nip05.clone(),
nostr_pubkey: rec.pubkey.clone(),
seed_hash: identity.seed_hash.clone(),
access_token: access,
access_expires: expires,
server_nostr_pubkey: String::new(),
created_at: chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
pending_claims: Vec::new(),
last_dm_seen_at: 0,
}
}
};
ensure_token(&client, &mut state, &identity.keys).await?;
save_state(data_dir, &state).await?;
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"address": state.lud16,
"nip05": state.nip05,
"wallet_id": state.wallet_id,
"nostr_pubkey": state.nostr_pubkey,
"npub": identity.keys.public_key().to_bech32().unwrap_or_default(),
}))
}
/// Outcome of a claim poll.
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
pub struct ClaimOutcome {
pub claimed_count: usize,
pub received_sats: u64,
/// Claims that were fetched (and so already consumed server-side) but
/// still haven't been redeemed after this poll — decrypt/redeem failed
/// and they are queued in `pending_claims` for the next poll rather than
/// dropped. Non-zero here means real, unswept value the operator should
/// know about.
pub failed_count: usize,
}
const NO_CLAIMS: ClaimOutcome = ClaimOutcome {
claimed_count: 0,
received_sats: 0,
failed_count: 0,
};
/// Make sure the Minibits mint is on the accepted-mints allow-list.
///
/// `ecash::receive_token` checks the raw accepted-mints file directly (not
/// the more lenient `ecash::is_mint_trusted`, which always trusts the default
/// mint) — so an operator who edited their accepted-mints list (e.g. via the
/// `streaming.configure-mints` RPC) and dropped the default mint would
/// otherwise cause every Minibits claim to fail *after* the claim was already
/// consumed server-side, permanently losing those coins with nothing but a
/// log line to show for it. The Minibits Lightning address is inherently
/// backed by this one mint — registering it already implies trusting the
/// mint — so self-heal the allow-list here rather than let that combination
/// silently strand funds.
/// Fetch NIP-04 DM (kind 4) events addressed to `our_pubkey` newer than
/// `since`, from `CLAIM_RELAY_URLS`. Returns each event's raw (still
/// encrypted) content plus its `created_at`, newest last. This — not
/// `POST /claim` — is how Minibits actually delivers a Lightning payment
/// made to a `@minibits.cash` address: confirmed live 2026-09-08 against
/// three real payments that `/claim` never surfaced. Best-effort: a relay
/// error here must not abort the poll, since `pending_claims` may still hold
/// earlier fetches worth retrying.
async fn fetch_relay_dms(
our_pubkey: nostr_sdk::PublicKey,
since: u64,
) -> Vec<(String, u64, String)> {
let client = Client::default();
for url in CLAIM_RELAY_URLS {
if let Err(e) = client.add_relay(*url).await {
warn!("Minibits: could not add relay {url}: {e}");
}
}
client.connect().await;
// Give relays a moment to finish the WebSocket handshake before the
// fetch's own timeout starts consuming that time.
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(800)).await;
// `since` is inclusive in NIP-01, and `since` here is the `created_at` of
// the newest event we've already queued — so filter strictly after it,
// or the same event gets re-fetched (and its already-spent token
// re-attempted) every poll forever.
let filter = Filter::new()
.pubkey(our_pubkey)
.kind(Kind::from(4u16))
.since(Timestamp::from(since.saturating_add(1)))
.limit(200);
let result = match client
.fetch_events(filter, std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
.await
{
Ok(events) => {
let mut out: Vec<(String, u64, String)> = events
.into_iter()
.map(|e| (e.content, e.created_at.as_u64(), e.pubkey.to_hex()))
.collect();
out.sort_by_key(|(_, created_at, _)| *created_at);
out
}
Err(e) => {
warn!("Minibits: relay fetch for claim DMs failed: {e}");
Vec::new()
}
};
client.shutdown().await;
result
}
async fn ensure_mint_accepted(data_dir: &Path, mint_url: &str) -> Result<()> {
let mut accepted = ecash::load_accepted_mints(data_dir).await?;
if !accepted.mints.iter().any(|m| m == mint_url) {
accepted.mints.push(mint_url.to_string());
ecash::save_accepted_mints(data_dir, &accepted).await?;
info!("Minibits: added {mint_url} to accepted mints (needed to redeem LN-address claims)");
}
Ok(())
}
/// Poll Minibits for Lightning payments sent to the node's address and redeem
/// each into the ecash wallet.
///
/// Each claim is a NUT-00 token NIP-04-encrypted by the Minibits service to
/// this wallet's Nostr key; decrypting it needs the service pubkey
/// (discovered from our LUD-16 metadata, falling back to the known
/// constant). A claim is consumed server-side the instant `/claim` returns
/// it, so newly-fetched tokens are persisted to `state.pending_claims`
/// *before* decrypt/redeem is attempted; a token that fails to decrypt or
/// redeem stays in `pending_claims` and is retried on the next poll instead
/// of being dropped, and `failed_count` tells the caller when that happened
/// so it isn't purely a log-line event.
pub async fn claim_and_redeem(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<ClaimOutcome> {
let network = ecash::load_network(data_dir).await;
if network == EcashNetwork::Testnet {
return Ok(NO_CLAIMS);
}
ensure_mint_accepted(data_dir, &network.default_mint()).await?;
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
.build()
.context("Failed to build the Minibits HTTP client")?;
let (phrase, seed) = ecash_phrase(data_dir).await?;
let identity = derive_identity(&phrase, &seed)?;
let mut state = match load_state(data_dir).await? {
Some(st) => st,
// Nothing is addressable until a profile exists; registering lazily here
// means a payment could not have arrived, so claiming is a no-op.
None => return Ok(NO_CLAIMS),
};
ensure_token(&client, &mut state, &identity.keys).await?;
// Discover (and cache) the service key that wraps claimed tokens.
if state.server_nostr_pubkey.is_empty() {
match discover_server_nostr_pubkey(&client, &state.lud16).await {
Ok(pk) => state.server_nostr_pubkey = pk,
Err(e) => {
warn!("Minibits: could not read service Nostr pubkey ({e}); using fallback");
state.server_nostr_pubkey = FALLBACK_SERVER_NOSTR_PUBKEY.to_string();
}
}
}
let server_pk = nostr_sdk::PublicKey::from_hex(&state.server_nostr_pubkey)
.context("Service Nostr pubkey was not valid hex")?;
// Fetch anything new. A failure here is *not* fatal to the poll — the
// operator may still have earlier claims sitting in `pending_claims` that
// are worth retrying — so log and fall through instead of bailing out.
let resp = client
.post(format!("{API_BASE}/claim"))
.bearer_auth(&state.access_token)
.json(&serde_json::json!({ "seedHash": state.seed_hash }))
.send()
.await;
match resp {
Ok(resp) => {
let status = resp.status();
let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
if status.is_success() {
match serde_json::from_str::<Vec<serde_json::Value>>(&body) {
Ok(claims) => {
for claim in &claims {
match claim.get("token").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) {
Some(t) => state.pending_claims.push(t.to_string()),
None => warn!("Minibits claim had no 'token' field; skipping"),
}
}
}
Err(e) => warn!("Minibits claim response was not the expected shape: {e}"),
}
} else {
warn!("{}", minibits_error(status, &body));
}
}
Err(e) => warn!("Minibits claim request failed ({e}); retrying only previously-pending claims"),
}
// The actual delivery channel: real Lightning payments arrive as a
// NIP-04 DM on relays, not via `/claim` above. `since` is our own
// watermark (Nostr events never expire off a relay, so without it we'd
// re-fetch and re-attempt every claim ever sent on every poll).
let dms = fetch_relay_dms(identity.keys.public_key(), state.last_dm_seen_at).await;
for (content, created_at, author) in dms {
if author != state.server_nostr_pubkey {
warn!("Minibits: ignoring claim DM from unexpected pubkey {author}");
continue;
}
state.pending_claims.push(content);
state.last_dm_seen_at = state.last_dm_seen_at.max(created_at);
}
// Persist immediately: everything in `pending_claims` right now has
// already been consumed server-side (or, for relay DMs, is public and
// can't be un-sent), whether it came from this fetch or survived from an
// earlier failed attempt.
save_state(data_dir, &state).await?;
if state.pending_claims.is_empty() {
return Ok(NO_CLAIMS);
}
let to_process = std::mem::take(&mut state.pending_claims);
let mut redeemed = 0usize;
let mut sats = 0u64;
let mut still_pending = Vec::new();
for enc in &to_process {
let decoded = match nip04::decrypt(identity.keys.secret_key(), &server_pk, enc) {
Ok(d) => d,
Err(e) => {
warn!("Minibits claim could not be decrypted ({e}); will retry next poll");
still_pending.push(enc.clone());
continue;
}
};
match ecash::receive_token(data_dir, &decoded).await {
Ok(got) => {
redeemed += 1;
sats += got;
info!("Minibits: redeemed a claimed payment ({got} sats)");
}
Err(e) => {
warn!("Minibits claim decrypted but failed to redeem ({e}); will retry next poll");
still_pending.push(enc.clone());
}
}
}
let failed_count = still_pending.len();
state.pending_claims = still_pending;
save_state(data_dir, &state).await?;
Ok(ClaimOutcome { claimed_count: redeemed, received_sats: sats, failed_count })
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn derived_nostr_key_matches_the_nip06_vector() {
// The Minibits app derives its Nostr key at m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0 with an
// empty BIP-39 passphrase (nostr-tools accountFromSeedWords). Lock to the
// crate's own NIP-06 secret-key vector so a nostr-sdk bump cannot silently
// move our derivation and orphan the registered address.
let phrase = "leader monkey parrot ring guide accident before fence cannon height naive bean";
let keys = nostr_sdk::Keys::from_mnemonic(phrase, None::<&str>).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(keys.secret_key().as_secret_bytes()),
"7f7ff03d123792d6ac594bfa67bf6d0c0ab55b6b1fdb6249303fe861f1ccba9a"
);
}
#[test]
fn seed_hash_is_sha256_of_the_bip39_seed() {
// Minibits hashes the *seed*, not the phrase — a regression here would
// make the node register a profile that the Minibits app cannot recover.
let phrase = "leader monkey parrot ring guide accident before fence cannon height naive bean";
let m: bip39::Mnemonic = phrase.parse().unwrap();
let seed = m.to_seed("");
let want = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(seed));
let id = derive_identity(phrase, &seed).unwrap();
assert_eq!(id.seed_hash, want);
}
#[test]
fn generated_names_are_readable_and_bounded() {
for _ in 0..200 {
let n = generate_wallet_id();
assert!(!n.is_empty());
assert!(n.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_lowercase() || c.is_ascii_digit()));
// ends in at least one digit (the 1..=999 suffix)
assert!(n.chars().last().map(|c| c.is_ascii_digit()).unwrap_or(false));
}
}
#[test]
fn stale_token_when_missing_or_near_expiry() {
let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
assert!(token_is_stale(&MinibitsState::default()));
assert!(token_is_stale(&MinibitsState {
access_token: "x".into(),
access_expires: now + 10, // inside the skew window
..Default::default()
}));
assert!(!token_is_stale(&MinibitsState {
access_token: "x".into(),
access_expires: now + 3600,
..Default::default()
}));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn ensure_mint_accepted_heals_a_dropped_default_mint() {
// Regression guard: `ecash::receive_token` checks the raw accepted-mints
// file, not the more lenient `is_mint_trusted` — so an operator-edited
// allow-list that dropped the default mint must not be able to make
// Minibits claims (already consumed server-side by the time redeem
// runs) fail permanently and silently.
let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let mint = "https://mint.minibits.cash/Bitcoin";
ecash::save_accepted_mints(
tmp.path(),
&ecash::AcceptedMints {
mints: vec!["https://mint.example.com".to_string()],
},
)
.await
.unwrap();
ensure_mint_accepted(tmp.path(), mint).await.unwrap();
let accepted = ecash::load_accepted_mints(tmp.path()).await.unwrap();
assert!(accepted.mints.iter().any(|m| m == mint));
assert!(accepted.mints.iter().any(|m| m == "https://mint.example.com"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn ensure_mint_accepted_does_not_duplicate() {
let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let mint = "https://mint.minibits.cash/Bitcoin";
ensure_mint_accepted(tmp.path(), mint).await.unwrap();
ensure_mint_accepted(tmp.path(), mint).await.unwrap();
let accepted = ecash::load_accepted_mints(tmp.path()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(accepted.mints.iter().filter(|m| *m == mint).count(), 1);
}
#[test]
fn dm_watermark_advances_but_never_rewinds() {
// `claim_and_redeem` does `state.last_dm_seen_at.max(created_at)` per
// event. Events from `fetch_relay_dms` are sorted ascending, but the
// watermark must still be safe against an out-of-order relay
// response (or a future refactor) — it must never move backward, or
// an already-queued DM gets re-fetched and its now-spent token
// re-attempted forever.
let mut watermark = 100u64;
for created_at in [105, 103, 110, 108] {
watermark = watermark.max(created_at);
}
assert_eq!(watermark, 110);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn load_state_treats_empty_file_as_no_profile() {
// Reproduces archy-x250-pa3, 2026-09-08: a disk-full write truncated
// wallet/minibits.json to 0 bytes, which then made every
// wallet.ecash-lnaddress call fail with "EOF while parsing a value"
// instead of just re-registering (idempotent per pubkey, so safe).
let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let path = tmp.path().join(STATE_FILE);
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(path.parent().unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
tokio::fs::write(&path, b"").await.unwrap();
let st = load_state(tmp.path()).await.unwrap();
assert!(st.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn load_state_treats_corrupt_json_as_no_profile() {
let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
let path = tmp.path().join(STATE_FILE);
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(path.parent().unwrap())
.await
.unwrap();
tokio::fs::write(&path, b"{ not valid json").await.unwrap();
let st = load_state(tmp.path()).await.unwrap();
assert!(st.is_none());
}
/// Live end-to-end against the production Minibits API: register a throwaway
/// profile with a random ecash phrase and claim (nothing pending → 0). Run
/// with `cargo test -- --ignored --nocapture`. It creates one disposable
/// profile on the public service and holds no funds.
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore]
async fn registers_and_claims_against_live_minibits() {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("mbtest-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
// A node has an ecash phrase before it has a Minibits profile; stand up
// a fresh random one so registration derives a real identity.
nut13::establish_independent(&dir).await.unwrap();
let info = lnaddress(&dir).await.expect("live registration failed");
let addr = info["address"].as_str().unwrap().to_string();
assert!(addr.ends_with("@minibits.cash"), "bad address {addr}");
println!("registered live address: {addr}");
// A second call must return the same cached address, not register again.
let again = lnaddress(&dir).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(again["address"].as_str().unwrap(), addr.as_str());
let out = claim_and_redeem(&dir).await.expect("live claim poll failed");
println!("claim poll: {out:?}");
assert_eq!(out.claimed_count, 0);
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}
}
-1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ pub mod bdhke;
pub mod cashu;
pub mod ecash;
pub mod fedimint_client;
pub mod minibits;
pub mod mint_client;
pub mod nut13;
pub mod profits;
-12
View File
@@ -137,18 +137,6 @@ impl EcashSeed {
self.mnemonic.words().map(|w| w.to_string()).collect()
}
/// The phrase as a single string — the input to NUT-13 *and* to the NIP-06
/// Nostr derivation the Minibits profile flow needs (`crate::wallet::minibits`).
pub fn phrase(&self) -> String {
self.mnemonic.to_string()
}
/// The 64-byte BIP-39 seed. Same bytes Minibits hashes with SHA-256 to get
/// its `seedHash`, so the two wallets agree on wallet identity.
pub fn seed_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 64] {
self.seed
}
pub fn source(&self) -> SeedSource {
self.source
}
@@ -106,30 +106,6 @@
<!-- Ecash -->
<div v-if="receiveMethod === 'ecash'">
<!-- Shareable @minibits.cash Lightning address (LUD-16): any Lightning
wallet can pay this node by address, and the sats land as ecash.
Fetched on tab open; claimed payments are polled in while open. -->
<div v-if="lnAddress" class="mb-4 p-3 bg-white/5 rounded-lg text-center">
<p class="text-white/60 text-sm mb-2">{{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressTitle') }}</p>
<canvas ref="lnAddressQrCanvas" class="mx-auto mb-3 rounded-lg" style="image-rendering: pixelated;"></canvas>
<p class="text-white/50 text-xs mb-1">{{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressLabel') }}</p>
<p class="text-base font-mono text-white/95 break-all mb-2">{{ lnAddress }}</p>
<CopyButton :value="lnAddress" :label="t('common.copy')" />
<p class="text-white/40 text-xs mt-3 leading-relaxed">{{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressHint') }}</p>
<p v-if="lnClaimedSats > 0" class="text-green-400 text-sm mt-2">
{{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressReceived', { amount: lnClaimedSats.toLocaleString() }) }}
</p>
<p v-if="lnPendingClaims > 0" class="text-orange-400 text-sm mt-2">
{{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressPendingRetry', { count: lnPendingClaims }) }}
</p>
</div>
<div v-else-if="lnAddressLoading" class="mb-4 text-center text-white/50 text-sm py-4">
{{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressLoading') }}
</div>
<div v-else-if="lnAddressError" class="mb-3 text-xs text-white/40">
{{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressUnavailable') }}
</div>
<div class="mb-3">
<label class="text-white/60 text-sm block mb-1">{{ t('receiveBitcoin.pasteEcashToken') }}</label>
<textarea v-model="ecashToken" rows="3" placeholder="cashuB… (Cashu) or Fedimint notes" class="w-full input-glass font-mono"></textarea>
@@ -199,12 +175,6 @@ watch(() => props.show, (open) => {
arkAddress.value = ''
ecashToken.value = ''
ecashResult.value = ''
stopLnClaimPoll()
lnAddress.value = ''
lnAddressLoading.value = false
lnAddressError.value = false
lnClaimedSats.value = 0
lnPendingClaims.value = 0
error.value = ''
processing.value = false
if (props.autoGenerate && receiveMethod.value === 'onchain') {
@@ -223,85 +193,9 @@ const ecashResult = ref('')
const onchainQrCanvas = ref<HTMLCanvasElement | null>(null)
const lightningQrCanvas = ref<HTMLCanvasElement | null>(null)
const arkQrCanvas = ref<HTMLCanvasElement | null>(null)
const lnAddressQrCanvas = ref<HTMLCanvasElement | null>(null)
const processing = ref(false)
const error = ref('')
// ── Minibits Lightning address (ecash receive) ──────────────────────────────
// The ecash tab doubles as "receive onto my @minibits.cash address": the node
// derives/registers it from its own ecash seed (wallet.ecash-lnaddress) and
// sweeps any Lightning payments that land there back into ecash while the tab is
// open (wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim). A registration failure is never fatal —
// the paste-token path below always works.
const lnAddress = ref('')
const lnAddressLoading = ref(false)
const lnAddressError = ref(false)
const lnClaimedSats = ref(0)
// A payment the backend fetched (and so already consumed at Minibits) but
// couldn't redeem yet — it's queued for automatic retry, not lost, but the
// operator should see it rather than have it be a silent, unbounded wait.
const lnPendingClaims = ref(0)
let lnClaimTimer: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null
async function loadLnAddress() {
if (lnAddress.value || lnAddressLoading.value) return
lnAddressLoading.value = true
lnAddressError.value = false
try {
const res = await rpcClient.call<{ address?: string }>({ method: 'wallet.ecash-lnaddress' })
lnAddress.value = res?.address || ''
if (lnAddress.value) {
await nextTick()
renderQr(lnAddress.value, lnAddressQrCanvas.value)
startLnClaimPoll()
} else {
lnAddressError.value = true
}
} catch {
lnAddressError.value = true
} finally {
lnAddressLoading.value = false
}
}
function stopLnClaimPoll() {
if (lnClaimTimer) {
clearInterval(lnClaimTimer)
lnClaimTimer = null
}
}
function startLnClaimPoll() {
stopLnClaimPoll()
lnClaimTimer = setInterval(() => void pollLnClaims(), 8000)
}
async function pollLnClaims() {
if (!props.show || !lnAddress.value) {
stopLnClaimPoll()
return
}
try {
const res = await rpcClient.call<{ received_sats?: number; failed_count?: number }>({
method: 'wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim',
})
if (res?.received_sats && res.received_sats > 0) {
lnClaimedSats.value += res.received_sats
emit('received')
}
lnPendingClaims.value = res?.failed_count || 0
} catch {
// Transient poll failure (offline, mint busy) — keep polling.
}
}
onUnmounted(stopLnClaimPoll)
// Fetch the address the first time the operator opens the ecash tab.
watch(receiveMethod, (m) => {
if (m === 'ecash' && props.show) void loadLnAddress()
})
// ── On-chain payment detection ────────────────────────────────────────────
// The generated address is FRESH (lnd.newaddress), so any incoming wallet
// transaction paying it is this receive — no baseline bookkeeping needed.
@@ -415,16 +309,12 @@ async function renderQr(data: string, canvas: HTMLCanvasElement | null, prefix =
function close() {
stopWatchingPayment()
stopLnClaimPoll()
paymentSeen.value = null
invoiceResult.value = ''
onchainAddress.value = ''
arkAddress.value = ''
ecashToken.value = ''
ecashResult.value = ''
lnAddress.value = ''
lnClaimedSats.value = 0
lnPendingClaims.value = 0
error.value = ''
emit('close')
}
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
// Real vue-i18n instance (unlike ReceiveBitcoinModal.test.ts, which mocks
// `t` to a no-op and so cannot catch a bad message string). Operator report
// (2026-09-08): clicking the Ecash tab closed the whole Receive modal, in
// both the browser and the Android companion's WebView. Root cause: vue-i18n
// treats a bare `@` as the start of "linked message" syntax — `en.json`'s
// `receiveBitcoin.lnAddressLabel` ("Your @minibits.cash address:") isn't
// valid linked-message syntax, so *compiling* that message throws a
// SyntaxError the instant it's first rendered (i.e. the moment the address
// loads), and the uncaught render-function error blanks the whole teleported
// modal. Fixed by escaping it as `{'@'}` (the same pattern already used for
// `settings.domainNamePlaceholder`). This test uses the real compiler so a
// future bad interpolation string in this component fails fast in `npm test`
// instead of only in a live browser.
import { flushPromises, mount } from '@vue/test-utils'
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import ReceiveBitcoinModal from '../ReceiveBitcoinModal.vue'
import { rpcClient } from '@/api/rpc-client'
import i18n from '@/i18n'
vi.mock('@/api/rpc-client', () => ({
rpcClient: { call: vi.fn() },
}))
vi.mock('@/composables/useLightningRequired', () => ({
useLightningRequired: () => ({
requireLightningReady: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
handleLightningFailure: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(false),
}),
}))
describe('ReceiveBitcoinModal — ecash tab with the real vue-i18n compiler', () => {
it('renders the Minibits address label without an uncaught render error', async () => {
vi.mocked(rpcClient.call).mockImplementation(async ({ method }: { method: string }) => {
if (method === 'wallet.ecash-lnaddress') {
return { address: 'someone@minibits.cash' } as never
}
return { claimed_count: 0, received_sats: 0, failed_count: 0 } as never
})
const wrapper = mount(ReceiveBitcoinModal, {
props: { show: true },
attachTo: document.body,
global: { plugins: [i18n] },
})
let captured: unknown = null
wrapper.vm.$.appContext.app.config.errorHandler = (err) => { captured = err }
await flushPromises()
const ecashTab = Array.from(document.body.querySelectorAll('button')).find((b) =>
b.textContent?.toLowerCase().includes('ecash'),
)
expect(ecashTab).toBeTruthy()
ecashTab!.dispatchEvent(new Event('click', { bubbles: true }))
await flushPromises()
await flushPromises()
expect(captured).toBeNull()
expect(wrapper.emitted('close')).toBeFalsy()
const dialog = document.body.querySelector('[role="dialog"]')
expect(dialog).toBeTruthy()
expect(dialog?.textContent).toContain('minibits.cash')
expect(dialog?.textContent).toContain('someone@minibits.cash')
wrapper.unmount()
})
})
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
import { flushPromises, mount } from '@vue/test-utils'
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import ReceiveBitcoinModal from '../ReceiveBitcoinModal.vue'
import { rpcClient } from '@/api/rpc-client'
vi.mock('vue-router', () => ({
useRoute: () => ({ fullPath: '/dashboard' }),
useRouter: () => ({ push: vi.fn() }),
}))
vi.mock('vue-i18n', () => ({
useI18n: () => ({ t: (key: string, params?: Record<string, unknown>) => (params ? `${key}:${JSON.stringify(params)}` : key) }),
}))
vi.mock('@/api/rpc-client', () => ({
rpcClient: { call: vi.fn() },
}))
vi.mock('@/composables/useLightningRequired', () => ({
useLightningRequired: () => ({
requireLightningReady: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
handleLightningFailure: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(false),
}),
}))
// Guards an operator report (2026-09-08): clicking the Ecash tab appeared to
// close the whole Receive modal. Not reproduced here — the tab switch alone
// (success or failure of wallet.ecash-lnaddress) never emits `close` or
// unmounts the dialog — but the RPC-eager tab switch is exactly the kind of
// path a future change could regress, so it's worth pinning down.
describe('ReceiveBitcoinModal — ecash tab click', () => {
it('does not close/emit when the ecash tab is clicked and the RPC succeeds', async () => {
vi.mocked(rpcClient.call).mockResolvedValue({ address: 'someone@minibits.cash' } as never)
const wrapper = mount(ReceiveBitcoinModal, {
props: { show: true },
attachTo: document.body,
})
await flushPromises()
const tabs = Array.from(document.body.querySelectorAll('button'))
const ecashTab = tabs.find((b) => b.textContent?.toLowerCase().includes('ecash'))
expect(ecashTab).toBeTruthy()
ecashTab!.dispatchEvent(new Event('click', { bubbles: true }))
await flushPromises()
expect(wrapper.emitted('close')).toBeFalsy()
expect(document.body.querySelector('[role="dialog"]')).toBeTruthy()
wrapper.unmount()
})
it('does not close/emit when the ecash tab is clicked and the RPC fails', async () => {
vi.mocked(rpcClient.call).mockRejectedValue(new Error('boom'))
const wrapper = mount(ReceiveBitcoinModal, {
props: { show: true },
attachTo: document.body,
})
await flushPromises()
const tabs = Array.from(document.body.querySelectorAll('button'))
const ecashTab = tabs.find((b) => b.textContent?.toLowerCase().includes('ecash'))
expect(ecashTab).toBeTruthy()
ecashTab!.dispatchEvent(new Event('click', { bubbles: true }))
await flushPromises()
expect(wrapper.emitted('close')).toBeFalsy()
expect(document.body.querySelector('[role="dialog"]')).toBeTruthy()
wrapper.unmount()
})
})
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
// Every message string must survive vue-i18n's message compiler. Found the
// hard way (2026-09-08): a bare `@` in a message is parsed as the start of
// "linked message" syntax (`@:key`), so a literal `@` (an email/handle-style
// placeholder, e.g. "user@example.com") throws a SyntaxError the first time
// it's *rendered*, not at build time — see [[vue-i18n-bare-at-sign-crash]]
// in project memory for the full incident (it blanked a whole modal in both
// the browser and the Android companion's WebView). A literal `@`, `{`, `}`
// or other message-syntax character must be escaped as e.g. `{'@'}`.
//
// This walks every string in every locale file and asks the real compiler
// to parse it — no rendering, no component needed, so it's fast and catches
// the whole class of bug regardless of which component ever ends up using
// the string.
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
import i18n from '@/i18n'
import en from '../en.json'
import es from '../es.json'
function collectStrings(obj: unknown, path: string, out: Array<[string, string]>) {
if (typeof obj === 'string') {
out.push([path, obj])
} else if (obj && typeof obj === 'object') {
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(obj as Record<string, unknown>)) {
collectStrings(v, path ? `${path}.${k}` : k, out)
}
}
}
describe('locale messages compile', () => {
it.each([
['en', en],
['es', es],
])('every %s message string compiles under the real vue-i18n compiler', (_locale, messages) => {
const strings: Array<[string, string]> = []
collectStrings(messages, '', strings)
expect(strings.length).toBeGreaterThan(100)
const failures: string[] = []
for (const [path, msg] of strings) {
try {
i18n.global.t(path)
} catch (e) {
failures.push(`${path}: ${(e as Error).message.split('\n')[0]} (source: ${JSON.stringify(msg)})`)
}
}
expect(failures).toEqual([])
})
})
+1 -8
View File
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@
"passwordNeedUppercase": "Password must contain at least one uppercase letter",
"passwordNeedLowercase": "Password must contain at least one lowercase letter",
"passwordNeedDigit": "Password must contain at least one digit",
"passwordNeedSpecial": "Password must contain at least one special character (!{'@'}#$%^&* etc.)",
"passwordNeedSpecial": "Password must contain at least one special character (!@#$%^&* etc.)",
"setupFailed": "Setup failed",
"verificationFailed": "Verification failed",
"disableFailed": "Failed to disable 2FA",
@@ -775,13 +775,6 @@
"paymentConfirmed": "Payment confirmed",
"transactionId": "Transaction ID",
"pasteEcashToken": "Paste ecash token",
"lnAddressTitle": "Or share your Minibits Lightning address",
"lnAddressHint": "Anyone can pay you sats with any Lightning wallet by sending to this address — the sats arrive as ecash. Keep this screen open to receive them.",
"lnAddressLabel": "Your {'@'}minibits.cash address:",
"lnAddressLoading": "Setting up your Lightning address…",
"lnAddressUnavailable": "Lightning address unavailable — you can still paste a token below.",
"lnAddressReceived": "Received {amount} sats to your Lightning address!",
"lnAddressPendingRetry": "A payment arrived but couldn't be redeemed yet ({count}) — retrying automatically, keep this screen open.",
"processing": "Processing...",
"generateAddress": "Generate Address",
"createInvoice": "Create Invoice",
+1 -8
View File
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@
"passwordNeedUppercase": "La contrase\u00f1a debe contener al menos una letra may\u00fascula",
"passwordNeedLowercase": "La contrase\u00f1a debe contener al menos una letra min\u00fascula",
"passwordNeedDigit": "La contrase\u00f1a debe contener al menos un d\u00edgito",
"passwordNeedSpecial": "La contrase\u00f1a debe contener al menos un car\u00e1cter especial (!{'@'}#$%^&* etc.)",
"passwordNeedSpecial": "La contrase\u00f1a debe contener al menos un car\u00e1cter especial (!@#$%^&* etc.)",
"setupFailed": "La configuraci\u00f3n fall\u00f3",
"verificationFailed": "La verificaci\u00f3n fall\u00f3",
"disableFailed": "Error al deshabilitar 2FA",
@@ -756,13 +756,6 @@
"paymentConfirmed": "Pago confirmado",
"transactionId": "ID de transacci\u00f3n",
"pasteEcashToken": "Pegar token Ecash",
"lnAddressTitle": "O comparte tu direcci\u00f3n Lightning de Minibits",
"lnAddressHint": "Cualquier persona puede pagarte sats con cualquier billetera Lightning enviando a esta direcci\u00f3n \u2014 los sats llegan como ecash. Mant\u00e9n esta pantalla abierta para recibirlos.",
"lnAddressLabel": "Su direcci\u00f3n {'@'}minibits.cash:",
"lnAddressLoading": "Configurando su direcci\u00f3n Lightning\u2026",
"lnAddressUnavailable": "Direcci\u00f3n Lightning no disponible \u2014 a\u00fan puede pegar un token abajo.",
"lnAddressReceived": "\u00a1Recibi\u00f3 {amount} sats en su direcci\u00f3n Lightning!",
"lnAddressPendingRetry": "Lleg\u00f3 un pago pero a\u00fan no se pudo canjear ({count}) \u2014 reintentando autom\u00e1ticamente, mantenga esta pantalla abierta.",
"processing": "Procesando...",
"generateAddress": "Generar direcci\u00f3n",
"createInvoice": "Crear factura",