Compare commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 Archipelago
|
7a1055a32a |
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ name: Demo images
|
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# code (see demo-deploy/ and docs/demo-deployment-design.md).
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#
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# Required repo configuration:
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# vars.DEMO_REGISTRY e.g. source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025
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# vars.DEMO_REGISTRY e.g. 146.59.87.168:3000/lfg2025
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# vars.DEMO_REGISTRY_HOST registry host for docker login (no org suffix)
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# secrets.DEMO_REGISTRY_USER
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# secrets.DEMO_REGISTRY_TOKEN
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@@ -4,11 +4,13 @@ on:
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workflow_dispatch:
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inputs:
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target:
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description: 'Target node IP or hostname'
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description: 'Target node IP (e.g. 192.168.1.198)'
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required: true
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default: '192.168.1.198'
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password:
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description: 'Node UI password (leave blank to use the NODE_UI_PASSWORD secret)'
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description: 'Node password (or "auto" for fresh install)'
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required: false
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default: 'auto'
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jobs:
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post-install-tests:
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@@ -20,46 +22,33 @@ jobs:
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with:
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fetch-depth: 1
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- name: Install SSH key
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env:
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SSH_KEY: ${{ secrets.NODE_SSH_KEY }}
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run: |
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if [ -z "$SSH_KEY" ]; then
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echo "ERROR: repository secret NODE_SSH_KEY is not configured."
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echo "Post-install tests authenticate by key; password auth is not supported."
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exit 1
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fi
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mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh
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printf '%s\n' "$SSH_KEY" > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
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chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
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- name: Run post-install tests on target
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env:
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TARGET: ${{ github.event.inputs.target }}
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NODE_PASSWORD: ${{ github.event.inputs.password }}
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NODE_UI_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.NODE_UI_PASSWORD }}
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SSH_USER: ${{ vars.NODE_SSH_USER }}
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run: |
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PASSWORD="${NODE_PASSWORD:-$NODE_UI_PASSWORD}"
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if [ -z "$PASSWORD" ]; then
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echo "ERROR: no node password supplied (input or NODE_UI_PASSWORD secret)."
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exit 1
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TARGET="${{ github.event.inputs.target }}"
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PASSWORD="${{ github.event.inputs.password }}"
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if [ "$PASSWORD" = "auto" ]; then
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PASSWORD="testpass123!"
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fi
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USER_NAME="${SSH_USER:-archipelago}"
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echo "══════════════════════════════════════════"
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echo "Running post-install tests on $TARGET"
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echo "══════════════════════════════════════════"
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scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new \
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# Copy test script to target and run
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sshpass -p 'archipelago' scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
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scripts/run-post-install-tests.sh \
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"${USER_NAME}@${TARGET}:/tmp/run-post-install-tests.sh"
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archipelago@${TARGET}:/tmp/run-post-install-tests.sh 2>/dev/null || \
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scp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
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scripts/run-post-install-tests.sh \
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archipelago@${TARGET}:/tmp/run-post-install-tests.sh
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# Password is passed over stdin, never as an argv the node's process
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# list (or this job's log) would expose.
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printf '%s' "$PASSWORD" | ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new \
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"${USER_NAME}@${TARGET}" \
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"sudo bash /tmp/run-post-install-tests.sh --password-stdin"
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# Run tests (with sudo for service checks)
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sshpass -p 'archipelago' ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
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archipelago@${TARGET} \
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"sudo bash /tmp/run-post-install-tests.sh '$PASSWORD'" 2>/dev/null || \
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ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
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archipelago@${TARGET} \
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"sudo bash /tmp/run-post-install-tests.sh '$PASSWORD'"
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frontend-tests:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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Executable
+51
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Keep the served companion APK in sync with main on every push.
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#
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# When a push to main includes Android changes, rebuild the APK, refresh
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# neode-ui/public/packages/archipelago-companion.apk, commit it, and ask
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# you to push again (so the refreshed APK rides along in the same push).
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#
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# Enable once per clone: git config core.hooksPath .githooks
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set -euo pipefail
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ROOT="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
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cd "$ROOT"
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# ship-companion.sh already (re)published the APK for this push — don't redo it.
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[ -n "${SHIP_COMPANION:-}" ] && exit 0
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PUSH_MAIN=0; RANGE_OLD=""; RANGE_NEW=""
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while read -r _local_ref local_sha remote_ref remote_sha; do
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if [ "${remote_ref##*/}" = "main" ]; then
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PUSH_MAIN=1; RANGE_OLD="$remote_sha"; RANGE_NEW="$local_sha"
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fi
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done
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[ "$PUSH_MAIN" = "1" ] || exit 0
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# Loop-break: if the tip is already the auto APK commit, let the push proceed.
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case "$(git log -1 --pretty=%s)" in
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*"companion APK"*) exit 0 ;;
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esac
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# Only rebuild when this push actually touches the Android app.
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ZEROS="0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
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if [ -z "$RANGE_OLD" ] || [ "$RANGE_OLD" = "$ZEROS" ]; then
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ANDROID_CHANGED=1
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elif git diff --quiet "$RANGE_OLD" "$RANGE_NEW" -- Android/ 2>/dev/null; then
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ANDROID_CHANGED=0
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else
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ANDROID_CHANGED=1
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fi
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[ "$ANDROID_CHANGED" = "1" ] || exit 0
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bash scripts/publish-companion-apk.sh || exit 0
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DEST="neode-ui/public/packages/archipelago-companion.apk"
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if git diff --cached --quiet -- "$DEST"; then
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exit 0 # APK unchanged — nothing to do
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fi
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git commit -q -m "chore(android): update companion APK download [skip ci]"
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echo "" >&2
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echo "▶ Companion APK rebuilt and committed. Run your push again to include it." >&2
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exit 1
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@@ -31,27 +31,9 @@ jobs:
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- name: Format
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run: cargo fmt --all -- --check
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# KEY-05 layer (b) is enforced HERE, with no step of its own: core/clippy.toml
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# bans the defaulted RNG entry points, and `-D warnings` already turns a
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# `disallowed_methods` hit into a build failure. `--all-targets` covers tests
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# too, deliberately. See docs/security/KEY-05-ENTROPY-ENFORCEMENT.md
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- name: Clippy
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run: cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings
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# KEY-05 layer (c) — see core/deny.toml for the policy and its rationale.
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#
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# The version is pinned deliberately. EmbarkStudios/cargo-deny-action exposes
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# no input to pin the cargo-deny version, and an unpinned supply-chain checker
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# is a contradiction in terms, so the tool is installed from crates.io — the
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# source actually vetted at the 10-06 Task 5 legitimacy checkpoint — rather
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# than by adding another unvetted action to this workflow.
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#
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# `check bans` ONLY: the advisories gate is not enabled (bans-only policy).
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- name: Supply chain (cargo-deny)
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run: |
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cargo install --locked cargo-deny --version 0.20.2
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cargo deny check bans
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- name: Test
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run: cargo test --all-features
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@@ -93,31 +75,8 @@ jobs:
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- name: Checkout
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uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- name: Install YAML parser
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run: python3 -m pip install --quiet pyyaml
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- name: Validate manifests
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run: |
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for manifest in apps/*/manifest.yml; do
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./scripts/validate-app-manifest.sh --repo-audit "$manifest"
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done
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# The signed catalog overrides on-disk manifests on every node, so a
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# catalog naming a registry host the deployed fleet does not trust breaks
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# every install fleet-wide. Blocking, and cheap.
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- name: Catalog registry trust floor
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run: python3 scripts/check-catalog-registry-trust.py
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# A stale image literal on the fallback install path deploys an old
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# image after the manifest has moved on — how a withdrawn, vulnerable
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# release gets installed post-fix. Blocking.
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- name: Installer image pins
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run: python3 scripts/check-installer-image-pins.py
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# Advisory: shows where the release catalog has fallen behind the
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# manifests in this repo. Not blocking, because the catalog can only be
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# updated through the signing ceremony, so drift is expected between a
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# manifest landing and the next signed release.
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- name: Catalog drift (advisory)
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continue-on-error: true
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run: python3 scripts/check-app-catalog-drift.py --catalog releases/app-catalog.json --release
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ name: Demo images
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# code (see demo-deploy/ and docs/demo-deployment-design.md).
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#
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# Required repo configuration:
|
||||
# vars.DEMO_REGISTRY e.g. source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025
|
||||
# vars.DEMO_REGISTRY e.g. 146.59.87.168:3000/lfg2025
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# vars.DEMO_REGISTRY_HOST registry host for docker login (no org suffix)
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# secrets.DEMO_REGISTRY_USER
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# secrets.DEMO_REGISTRY_TOKEN
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-73
@@ -19,9 +19,6 @@ dist-ssr/
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build/
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*.local
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# Vite build cache
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neode-ui/.vite/
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# IDE / editor
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.idea/
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.vscode/
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@@ -62,13 +59,6 @@ coverage/
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releases/**
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!releases/
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!releases/manifest.json
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# The signed app catalog and the registry trust floor are source, not build
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# output: nodes fetch the catalog from this path on main, and the floor is what
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# scripts/check-catalog-registry-trust.py checks it against. Both were being
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# swallowed by the rule above — app-catalog.json only stayed tracked because it
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# predates it.
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!releases/app-catalog.json
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!releases/registry-trust-floor.json
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# Image recipe output
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image-recipe/output/
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@@ -92,23 +82,6 @@ scripts/resilience/reports/
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.codex-tmp/
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.claude/
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.pnpm-store/
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||||
|
||||
# Key material and local databases — belt-and-braces so a stray key or a
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# copied node database can never be committed. Open-source readiness plan,
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# Phase 1 item 5: `.claude/settings.local.json` was previously only caught by
|
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# a machine-global ignore rule, which protects one machine and no contributor.
|
||||
*.key
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||||
*.pem
|
||||
id_rsa*
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*.sqlite
|
||||
*.sqlite3
|
||||
*.db
|
||||
|
||||
# ...except the throwaway TLS fixtures the appgate tests compile in via
|
||||
# include_bytes!. They are documented non-identity material (see that
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||||
# directory's README) and are already tracked; the negation stops the rule
|
||||
# above from silently dropping them if they are ever regenerated.
|
||||
!core/archipelago/src/appgate/testdata/*.key
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||||
**/__pycache__/
|
||||
*.bak
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -116,49 +89,3 @@ id_rsa*
|
||||
# app/docs asset path with a descriptive filename.
|
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Screenshot *.png
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||||
uploads/
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Local-only material ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Present on disk, never tracked: everything describing Archipelago's own
|
||||
# infrastructure or internal development process. The repo is source code and
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# guidelines only. Inventory: .local-only/manifest.txt — wipe: .local-only/wipe.sh
|
||||
/.local-only/
|
||||
/.planning/
|
||||
/loop/
|
||||
/docs/operations-runbook.md
|
||||
/docs/hotfix-process.md
|
||||
/docs/PRODUCTION-MASTER-PLAN.md
|
||||
/docs/UNIFIED-TASK-TRACKER.md
|
||||
/docs/FIPS-UPTIME-AND-UI-STATE-PLAN.md
|
||||
/docs/HANDOFF-2026-07-20-fips-peer-files.md
|
||||
/docs/HANDOFF-2026-07-23-companion-apk-deploy.md
|
||||
/docs/qr-scanner-snappiness-handover.md
|
||||
/docs/RETICULUM-TRANSPORT-PROGRESS.md
|
||||
/docs/combined-test-plan-2026-07-22.md
|
||||
/docs/pine-voice-release-test-plan.md
|
||||
/docs/OPEN-SOURCE-READINESS-PLAN.md
|
||||
/docs/archive/HANDOVER-2026-07-02-iso-feedback.md
|
||||
/docs/archive/SESSION-1.8.0-OTA-PROGRESS.md
|
||||
/docs/security/KEY-02-FLEET-ROTATION.md
|
||||
/docs/security/KEY-03-SIGNING-POSTURE.md
|
||||
/tests/production-quality/TRACKER.md
|
||||
/scripts/deploy-config-defaults.sh
|
||||
/scripts/deploy-tailscale.sh
|
||||
/scripts/deploy-to-target.sh
|
||||
/scripts/setup-target-dev.sh
|
||||
/scripts/setup-aiui-server.sh
|
||||
/scripts/setup-https-dev.sh
|
||||
/scripts/debug-frontend.sh
|
||||
/scripts/node-profile.sh
|
||||
/scripts/fleet-fips-pair.sh
|
||||
/scripts/fleet-fips-unpair.sh
|
||||
/image-recipe/sync-from-live.sh
|
||||
/docs/security/PHASE-10-VERIFICATION-GUIDE.md
|
||||
/docs/security/KEY-01-ON-NODE-VERIFICATION.md
|
||||
/docs/security/KEY-02-ROOTFS-EVIDENCE.md
|
||||
/docs/security/ENTROPY-SEED-AUDIT-2026-07-31.md
|
||||
/image-recipe/INTEGRATION-GUIDE.md
|
||||
/docs/multinode-testing-plan.md
|
||||
/docs/bitcoin-version-bulletproof-rollout.md
|
||||
|
||||
# Generated PWA dev output (vite-plugin-pwa) — never a source artifact
|
||||
neode-ui/dev-dist/
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
[submodule "indeedhub"]
|
||||
path = indeedhub
|
||||
url = http://146.59.87.168:3000/lfg2025/indeehub.git
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
||||
# Ingest Conflict Report
|
||||
|
||||
Mode: new (fresh bootstrap — no existing .planning/ context to check against)
|
||||
Precedence: ADR > SPEC > PRD > DOC (no per-doc overrides present)
|
||||
|
||||
## Conflict Detection Report
|
||||
|
||||
### BLOCKERS (0)
|
||||
|
||||
(none)
|
||||
|
||||
### WARNINGS (0)
|
||||
|
||||
(none)
|
||||
|
||||
### INFO (4)
|
||||
|
||||
[INFO] Overlapping locked ADRs on Nostr marketplace discovery — consistent, not contradictory
|
||||
Found: docs/adr/003-nostr-for-discovery.md and docs/adr/006-nostr-marketplace-discovery.md are both locked and both decide "Nostr relays (NIP-78, kind 30078) for app manifest discovery" over the same scope
|
||||
Note: The decisions agree; ADR-006 refines ADR-003 with concrete trust tiers (Verified/Community/Unverified), curated built-in app list, and pre-install signature verification. Both preserved as separate entries in intel/decisions.md; no resolution needed. Consider marking one as superseding/refining the other in the docs for hygiene.
|
||||
|
||||
[INFO] SPEC security validation list narrower than ADR-009 mandatory defaults
|
||||
Found: docs/adr/009-manifest-container-security.md (locked) mandates non-root UID (> 1000), pinned image tags (no `latest`), and a default seccomp profile as non-negotiable defaults; docs/app-manifest-spec.md's documented SecurityPolicy schema and AppManifest::validate() list do not mention these three (SecurityPolicy has apparmor_profile but no seccomp field)
|
||||
Note: This is SPEC silence, not contradiction — no auto-resolution applied. ADR-009 governs by precedence (ADR > SPEC) and lock status. The SPEC itself declares `core/container/src/manifest.rs` canonical over the doc, so the gap may be documentation drift rather than implementation drift. Flagged for downstream verification, recorded as absent in intel/constraints.md.
|
||||
|
||||
[INFO] ADR numbering gap — ADR-010 absent from ingest set
|
||||
Found: Classified ADRs run 001–009 and 011; no classification exists for an ADR-010
|
||||
Note: Either ADR-010 does not exist, was withdrawn, or was not included in the ingest. No action required for synthesis; noted for completeness of the decision record.
|
||||
|
||||
[INFO] Cross-reference graph is acyclic
|
||||
Found: cross_refs edges: ADR-007 → ADR-003; ADR-009 → docs/app-manifest-spec.md (+ code paths); SPEC → out-of-set docs and code only (app-developer-guide.md, manifest-hooks-design.md, marketplace-protocol.md, core/container/src/manifest.rs, api/rpc/package/stacks.rs)
|
||||
Note: DFS cycle detection found no cycles; all 11 docs were synthesized. Several SPEC cross-refs point to documents not in the ingest set — they were not followed.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
|
||||
# Archipelago
|
||||
|
||||
## What This Is
|
||||
|
||||
Archipelago is a self-hosted personal-server platform: a Rust daemon (workspace at `core/`)
|
||||
plus a Vue 3 frontend (`neode-ui/`, built to `web/dist/neode-ui/`) running on Debian nodes
|
||||
with rootless Podman, managing ~40 declarative, manifest-driven apps (Bitcoin, Lightning,
|
||||
mesh/LoRa, federation, media, and more). It ships as OTA-updated releases to a live fleet
|
||||
and is actively shipping v1.7.x alpha releases. This milestone drives it to the
|
||||
**developer-ready app platform** north star.
|
||||
|
||||
## Core Value
|
||||
|
||||
A third-party developer can publish an app via the signed/decentralized registry and a user
|
||||
can install it on their node — every app manifest-driven, manifests shipped via the signed
|
||||
registry (not OTA disk files), all rootless, secure, robust, and 100%-uptime-capable.
|
||||
|
||||
## Current State (brownfield baseline, 2026-07-29)
|
||||
|
||||
- Single-node production gate is **GREEN** (5/5 on .228, 2026-06-23) — that exit criterion is met.
|
||||
- ~40 apps are manifest-based and Quadlet-migrated; all multi-container stacks use the
|
||||
orchestrator stack pattern; the legacy per-app installer anti-pattern is deleted.
|
||||
- Workstream B (registry-distributed manifests) phases 1+2 are code-complete; the signing
|
||||
ceremony is done (release-root pinned in `anchor.rs`); the fleet flip is not yet authorized.
|
||||
- Workstream C (marketplace) is design-only (`docs/marketplace-protocol.md`); no tooling or
|
||||
trust UX built. Developer CLI suite (`archy app …`) does not exist yet.
|
||||
- Phase-3 Quadlet default-flip is validated opt-in on .228/.198 but not default.
|
||||
- Declared next exit criteria: the multinode pass (`docs/multinode-testing-plan.md`) and the
|
||||
remaining workstreams.
|
||||
|
||||
## Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
### Validated
|
||||
|
||||
- ✓ Single-node lifecycle gate green 5× on .228 (install/UI/stop/start/restart/reinstall/
|
||||
reboot-survive/daemon-restart-survive/uninstall) — 2026-06-23
|
||||
- ✓ Manifest-driven app packaging for all ~40 apps incl. multi-container stacks (workstream A)
|
||||
- ✓ Signed catalog + release-root signing ceremony (workstream B phases 1+2, code-complete)
|
||||
|
||||
### Active
|
||||
|
||||
See `.planning/REQUIREMENTS.md` — 20 v1 requirements across MNODE / LIFE / REG / SEC / DEV / MKT,
|
||||
all mapped to phases in `.planning/ROADMAP.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Out of Scope
|
||||
|
||||
- Rootful containers, Docker, privileged containers — invariant (ADR-001/ADR-009)
|
||||
- Per-app Rust installers / OS-level provisioning — the anti-pattern being deleted
|
||||
- Centralized gatekept app store — decentralized Nostr marketplace instead (ADR-006)
|
||||
- Web5 DWN spec compliance — deprioritized after TBD shutdown (ADR-011)
|
||||
- Custom live voice-call protocol — deprioritized per user 2026-07-01; revisit later
|
||||
- DHT/iroh distribution backbone (workstream D) — design-only, tracker-marked backlog; v2
|
||||
|
||||
## Context
|
||||
|
||||
- Repo: `core/` Rust workspace (no root Cargo.toml), `neode-ui/` Vue frontend, `apps/` manifests,
|
||||
`tests/lifecycle/` + `tests/multinode/` gates, `docs/` authoritative plans.
|
||||
- Authoritative narrative: `docs/PRODUCTION-MASTER-PLAN.md`; day-to-day open list:
|
||||
`docs/UNIFIED-TASK-TRACKER.md`. Codebase map: `.planning/codebase/ARCHITECTURE.md` +
|
||||
`.planning/codebase/CONCERNS.md`.
|
||||
- Known debt informing this milestone (from CONCERNS.md): federation tombstone-write errors
|
||||
swallowed; reconciler has no flap observability and no failed-unit self-healing; generated
|
||||
AppArmor profiles are never applied; multinode test harness curl calls lack timeouts;
|
||||
SPEC validation is narrower than ADR-009's mandates (non-root UID, pinned tags, seccomp).
|
||||
- Fleet is live and OTA-updated; all destructive verification happens on designated test
|
||||
nodes per the deploy roster — never uninvited on in-use nodes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Constraints
|
||||
|
||||
- **Security**: Rootless Podman only; manifest-declared secrets (0600, never logged);
|
||||
mandatory container security defaults enforced at manifest level (ADR-009)
|
||||
- **Data safety**: Migrations never destroy data — preserve `/var/lib/archipelago/<app>`,
|
||||
secrets, credentials, ports, adoption container names; always a rollback path
|
||||
- **Verification**: Real-node verification before any tag; lifecycle gate runs ON the node,
|
||||
not via RPC; mesh changes need real-RF E2E tests; re-run the gate after orchestrator changes
|
||||
- **Process**: Commit + push every unit of work (`git push gitea-ai main`); stage by explicit
|
||||
path; deploy to the dev pair before any OTA; never commit secrets
|
||||
- **Tech stack**: Rust (Tokio/Hyper, JSON-RPC 2.0) backend; Vue 3 + Pinia frontend;
|
||||
Quadlet/systemd-user container units; Ed25519-signed release artifacts
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Decisions
|
||||
|
||||
<decisions>
|
||||
|
||||
All ten ADRs below are **locked** (Status: Accepted; ingest source `docs/adr/*.md`). They are
|
||||
non-negotiable inputs to planning and cannot be overridden without a new ADR.
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Decision | Scope |
|
||||
|----|----------|-------|
|
||||
| ADR-001 | Podman over Docker — rootless, daemonless, systemd-native; `archy-net` for inter-container DNS | Container runtime |
|
||||
| ADR-002 | `did:key` (Ed25519) node identity — self-contained, offline-capable; gaps mitigated via federation trust lists | Identity |
|
||||
| ADR-003 | Nostr relays (NIP-78, kind 30078) for node + app discovery — multi-relay query, 15-min cache, trust scoring, Tor-compatible | Discovery |
|
||||
| ADR-004 | Tor hidden services for inter-node RPC/control plane — bulk data via registries, not Tor | Federation transport |
|
||||
| ADR-005 | ChaCha20-Poly1305 + Argon2id (64MB, 3 iter) for backup encryption | Backups |
|
||||
| ADR-006 | Nostr relays for marketplace discovery — DID-signed manifests, trust tiers (Verified/Community/Unverified), signature verification before install | Marketplace |
|
||||
| ADR-007 | Bilateral DID federation trust via single-use invite codes; Trusted/Observer/Untrusted levels | Federation trust |
|
||||
| ADR-008 | Dual keys from one master seed — Ed25519 canonical identity, secp256k1 for Nostr/Bitcoin/Lightning, linked via NIP-05 | Keys |
|
||||
| ADR-009 | Manifest-level container security enforcement — readonly_root, no_new_privileges, non-root UID, drop-ALL caps, pinned tags, seccomp; overrides explicit + audited | Container security |
|
||||
| ADR-011 | DWN deprioritized — keep custom `dwn_store.rs`, stop branding as Web5, invest in Nostr + Tor federation instead | Peer data sync |
|
||||
|
||||
(ADR-010 does not exist in the repo — numbering gap, noted in `.planning/INGEST-CONFLICTS.md`.)
|
||||
|
||||
</decisions>
|
||||
|
||||
Milestone-level decisions:
|
||||
|
||||
| Decision | Rationale | Outcome |
|
||||
|----------|-----------|---------|
|
||||
| Milestone version = 1.8.0-alpha | Decided 2026-07-08 per tracker | — Pending ship |
|
||||
| Workstream D (DHT) deferred to v2 | Design-only, tracker-marked backlog; not needed for north-star metric | — Pending |
|
||||
| App manifest canonical schema = `core/container/src/manifest.rs` | SPEC self-declares code wins over doc | ✓ Good |
|
||||
| Phase-3 Quadlet flip gated on multinode gate reporting clean | Prior uncommitted-flip confusion; flip fresh as a 2-line change when gate is clean | — Pending |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
*Last updated: 2026-07-29 after intel ingest (10 ADRs + 1 SPEC) + codebase mapping*
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
|
||||
# Requirements: Archipelago (v1.8.0 — Developer-Ready App Platform)
|
||||
|
||||
**Defined:** 2026-07-29
|
||||
**Core Value:** A third-party developer can publish an app via the signed/decentralized registry and a user can install it on their node — manifest-driven, rootless, secure, robust.
|
||||
|
||||
No PRDs existed in the ingest set; these requirements are derived from the master plan's
|
||||
declared exit criteria (multinode pass + workstreams B/C/F), `.planning/codebase/CONCERNS.md`,
|
||||
`docs/UNIFIED-TASK-TRACKER.md`, and the user-chosen success metric. Constraints from
|
||||
`docs/app-manifest-spec.md` and the locked ADRs (see PROJECT.md) bound how each is built.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1 Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
### Federation & Mesh Hardening (FED)
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] **FED-01**: Removing a federation node sticks — it disappears from every UI surface, tombstones propagate, it never reappears via later sync cycles, and a failed removal surfaces an error (never a silent no-op)
|
||||
- [ ] **FED-02**: Federation sync converges and is observable — after sync settles, fleet nodes agree on the node list with fresh status; stale entries, duplicates, and silent sync failures are eliminated and sync errors are operator-visible
|
||||
- [ ] **FED-03**: A structured code review of the federation/fleet area (`core/archipelago/src/federation`, node sync, FIPS/transport dial layer) and mesh area (`core/archipelago/src/mesh`, mesh RPC surface) is completed, with every finding fixed or explicitly deferred with a reason
|
||||
- [ ] **FED-04**: Mesh messaging parity — attachment send (and the rest of the mesh chat surface) behaves identically on the demo and on real nodes: the demo backend implements the same RPC surface the UI calls, transport decisions mirror the real size-based tier logic, and no demo-only modals exist
|
||||
- [ ] **FED-05**: Inter-node Lightning channel opening UX — the UI shows the node's shareable Lightning URI; lists trusted (federated) nodes by hostname for one-click channel opening; and lets the user browse/request channels with public nodes — using the existing design system and components, verified on the :8100 dev preview against archi-dev before deploy
|
||||
- [ ] **FED-06**: On-brand payment success animation — the invoice "paid" tick's circle uses the screensaver-style ring with outer EQ-segment lines (reuse `ScreensaverRing.vue`'s compact size) in place of the current success burst, applied consistently everywhere the paid tick shows
|
||||
|
||||
### UI Performance (PERF)
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] **PERF-01**: The slowest tab switches and secondary-screen opens are profiled with causes named (remount storms, serial RPC waterfalls, uncached fetches) — fixes are targeted, not guessed
|
||||
- [ ] **PERF-02**: Main-tab switches render immediately from cached state with background refresh — no blank screens or long spinners on tabs already visited this session
|
||||
- [ ] **PERF-03**: Secondary screens (screens reached from a tab's main page) open without a blocking full reload and are instant on repeat visits — verified on real node hardware, not just the dev box
|
||||
|
||||
### Multinode Verification (MNODE)
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] **MNODE-01**: The 5× destructive lifecycle gate passes on a second fleet node (archy-x250-beta) with 0 failures, run on-node per gate policy
|
||||
- [ ] **MNODE-02**: Cross-node federation/mesh/transport suites (`tests/multinode/smoke.sh`, `meshtastic.sh`) pass between fleet nodes, with all harness RPC calls time-bounded (no indefinite curl hangs)
|
||||
- [ ] **MNODE-03**: Removing a federation peer sticks — tombstone-write failures are surfaced (not swallowed) and a removed peer never silently reappears after subsequent sync cycles
|
||||
|
||||
### Lifecycle Perfection (LIFE)
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] **LIFE-01**: Quadlet backends are the default — restarting `archipelago.service` leaves every app container running (no SIGKILL-the-world, no multi-minute rebuild storm)
|
||||
- [ ] **LIFE-02**: The reconciler self-heals failed Quadlet units — a `.service` in `failed` state (and not user-stopped) is reset-failed + started automatically, with backoff against busy-looping
|
||||
- [ ] **LIFE-03**: Per-app restart/flap observability — restart counters, a threshold log line when an app restarts >N times in M minutes, and restart counts surfaced in health/status RPC output
|
||||
- [ ] **LIFE-04**: Cascade uninstall→reinstall is gate-verified for multi-container stacks and installed apps — no ghost entries, no orphan containers, data preserved per policy, reinstall returns healthy
|
||||
- [ ] **LIFE-05**: Install and uninstall report real, monotonic progress driven by backend progress events, always reaching a terminal success/failure state — asserted in the gate, never a fake or stuck bar
|
||||
|
||||
### Registry-Distributed Manifests (REG)
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] **REG-01**: The published signed catalog embeds full app manifests; nodes install/update from signature-verified catalog manifests (disk manifests remain the fallback for build-source apps); tampered catalogs are rejected with safe fallback
|
||||
- [ ] **REG-02**: The fleet is flipped to registry-distributed manifests — adding or bumping an image-only app requires only a re-signed catalog publish, no binary OTA or disk rsync
|
||||
|
||||
### Security Enforcement (SEC)
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] **SEC-01**: `AppManifest::validate()` enforces the full ADR-009 mandate set — non-root UID, pinned image tags (no `latest`), capability allow-list, seccomp — with explicit, documented, auditable overrides
|
||||
- [ ] **SEC-02**: Generated AppArmor/seccomp security profiles are actually applied at container creation (`--security-opt`) and verified effective on running apps
|
||||
|
||||
### Developer Tooling (DEV)
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] **DEV-01**: `archy app validate` checks a manifest locally and returns the same pass/fail verdict the node enforces (schema + security rules)
|
||||
- [ ] **DEV-02**: `archy app render` previews the exact Quadlet/podman configuration a manifest produces
|
||||
- [ ] **DEV-03**: A developer can local-install and lifecycle-test an app against a dev node from the CLI (`archy app local-install` / `lifecycle-test`)
|
||||
- [ ] **DEV-04**: The developer guide walks a new third-party developer from an empty directory to an installed, running app using only the CLI and docs
|
||||
|
||||
### Decentralized Marketplace (MKT)
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] **MKT-01**: A third-party developer can publish a DID-signed app manifest to public Nostr relays (NIP-78, kind 30078) via the tooling
|
||||
- [ ] **MKT-02**: A node discovers marketplace apps from multiple relays and displays each app's trust tier (Verified / Community / Unverified) per ADR-006 trust scoring
|
||||
- [ ] **MKT-03**: Manifest signatures are verified before installation; tampered or invalid marketplace manifests cannot be installed
|
||||
- [ ] **MKT-04**: End-to-end north star: a user installs a third-party marketplace-published app on their node and it runs healthy under the standard lifecycle guarantees
|
||||
|
||||
## v2 Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
Deferred to a future milestone. Tracked but not in the current roadmap.
|
||||
|
||||
### Distribution Backbone (DIST)
|
||||
|
||||
- **DIST-01**: BLAKE3 content-addressed catalog distribution via iroh swarm, origin-always-wins (workstream D — design-only today, tracker-marked backlog)
|
||||
|
||||
### Fleet & Hardening (FLEET)
|
||||
|
||||
- **FLEET-01**: Bitcoin multi-version fleet-wide OTA rollout (user-gated on timing per `docs/bitcoin-version-bulletproof-rollout.md`)
|
||||
- **FLEET-02**: App-specific health assertions for the ~34 apps with only baseline lifecycle coverage
|
||||
- **FLEET-03**: LUKS2 full-partition encryption for `/var/lib/archipelago/`
|
||||
- **FLEET-04**: Dynamic per-app resource rebalancing (cgroup-stats feedback loop)
|
||||
|
||||
## Out of Scope
|
||||
|
||||
| Feature | Reason |
|
||||
|---------|--------|
|
||||
| Rootful/privileged containers, Docker | Invariant — ADR-001/ADR-009 |
|
||||
| Per-app Rust installers / host provisioning | The anti-pattern workstream A deleted |
|
||||
| Centralized gatekept app store | ADR-006 chose decentralized Nostr marketplace |
|
||||
| Web5 DWN spec compliance | ADR-011 — deprioritized after TBD shutdown |
|
||||
| Custom live voice-call protocol | Deprioritized 2026-07-01 per user; no scope decided |
|
||||
|
||||
## Traceability
|
||||
|
||||
Which phases cover which requirements. Updated during roadmap creation.
|
||||
|
||||
| Requirement | Phase | Status |
|
||||
|-------------|-------|--------|
|
||||
| FED-01 | Phase 1 | Pending |
|
||||
| FED-02 | Phase 1 | Pending |
|
||||
| FED-03 | Phase 1 | Pending |
|
||||
| FED-04 | Phase 1 | Pending |
|
||||
| FED-05 | Phase 1 | Pending |
|
||||
| FED-06 | Phase 1 | Pending |
|
||||
| PERF-01 | Phase 2 | Pending |
|
||||
| PERF-02 | Phase 2 | Pending |
|
||||
| PERF-03 | Phase 2 | Pending |
|
||||
| MNODE-01 | Phase 3 | Pending |
|
||||
| MNODE-02 | Phase 3 | Pending |
|
||||
| MNODE-03 | Phase 3 | Pending |
|
||||
| LIFE-01 | Phase 4 | Pending |
|
||||
| LIFE-02 | Phase 4 | Pending |
|
||||
| LIFE-03 | Phase 4 | Pending |
|
||||
| LIFE-04 | Phase 4 | Pending |
|
||||
| LIFE-05 | Phase 4 | Pending |
|
||||
| REG-01 | Phase 5 | Pending |
|
||||
| REG-02 | Phase 5 | Pending |
|
||||
| SEC-01 | Phase 6 | Pending |
|
||||
| SEC-02 | Phase 6 | Pending |
|
||||
| DEV-01 | Phase 7 | Pending |
|
||||
| DEV-02 | Phase 7 | Pending |
|
||||
| DEV-03 | Phase 7 | Pending |
|
||||
| DEV-04 | Phase 7 | Pending |
|
||||
| MKT-01 | Phase 8 | Pending |
|
||||
| MKT-02 | Phase 8 | Pending |
|
||||
| MKT-03 | Phase 8 | Pending |
|
||||
| MKT-04 | Phase 8 | Pending |
|
||||
|
||||
**Coverage:**
|
||||
- v1 requirements: 29 total
|
||||
- Mapped to phases: 29
|
||||
- Unmapped: 0
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
*Requirements defined: 2026-07-29*
|
||||
*Last updated: 2026-07-29 — added FED (federation/mesh hardening) and PERF (UI performance) requirement groups; phases renumbered after inserting them as Phases 1–2*
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
|
||||
# Roadmap: Archipelago — v1.8.0 Developer-Ready App Platform
|
||||
|
||||
## Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Brownfield milestone starting from a green single-node production gate (5/5 on .228,
|
||||
2026-06-23). The journey: make federation and mesh rock-solid (node removal, sync,
|
||||
messaging parity), fix the UI slowness users feel on every tab switch, prove the platform
|
||||
across the fleet (multinode pass), make the container lifecycle bulletproof (Quadlet
|
||||
default, self-healing, honest progress, no ghosts), flip manifest distribution from OTA
|
||||
disk files to the signed registry, harden manifest security enforcement to the full
|
||||
ADR-009 bar, ship the `archy app` developer CLI, and land the decentralized Nostr
|
||||
marketplace — ending at the north star: a third-party developer publishes an app via the
|
||||
signed/decentralized registry and a user installs it on their node.
|
||||
|
||||
## Phases
|
||||
|
||||
**Phase Numbering:**
|
||||
- Integer phases (1, 2, 3): Planned milestone work
|
||||
- Decimal phases (2.1, 2.2): Urgent insertions (marked with INSERTED)
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] **Phase 1: Federation & Mesh Hardening** - Deep review of federation/fleet + mesh code; node removal sticks, sync converges, mesh messaging behaves identically on demo and real nodes
|
||||
- [ ] **Phase 2: UI Performance** - Tab switches and secondary screens render fast; worst transitions measured and fixed
|
||||
- [ ] **Phase 3: Multinode Verification Pass** - Lifecycle gate green on a second node; cross-node federation/mesh/transport suites pass; federation removal sticks
|
||||
- [ ] **Phase 4: Lifecycle Perfection & Quadlet Default** - Quadlet backends default, failed-unit self-healing, flap observability, cascade gate, truthful progress
|
||||
- [ ] **Phase 5: Registry-Distributed Manifests** - Signed catalog carries full manifests; fleet flipped off OTA disk-file distribution
|
||||
- [ ] **Phase 6: Manifest Security Enforcement** - Validation matches ADR-009 mandates; generated security profiles actually applied
|
||||
- [ ] **Phase 7: Developer Tooling CLI** - `archy app validate/render/local-install/lifecycle-test` + developer guide
|
||||
- [ ] **Phase 8: Decentralized Marketplace** - DID-signed publish to Nostr relays, trust-tier discovery, verified third-party install end-to-end
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase Details
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 1: Federation & Mesh Hardening
|
||||
**Goal**: Federation and mesh are tight — a structured review of the fleet/federation and mesh code feeds fixes so node removal sticks, sync converges, and mesh messaging (including attachments) behaves identically everywhere it runs
|
||||
**Depends on**: Nothing (first phase)
|
||||
**Requirements**: FED-01, FED-02, FED-03, FED-04, FED-05, FED-06
|
||||
**Success Criteria** (what must be TRUE):
|
||||
1. A structured code review of the federation/fleet area (`core/archipelago/src/federation`, node sync, FIPS/transport dial layer) and the mesh area (`core/archipelago/src/mesh`, mesh RPC surface) produces a findings list, and every finding is fixed or explicitly deferred with a reason
|
||||
2. Removing a federation node removes it everywhere — it disappears from all UI surfaces, tombstones propagate, and it never reappears after later sync cycles; a failed removal surfaces an error instead of silently no-opping
|
||||
3. Federation sync converges: after sync settles, fleet nodes agree on the node list and node status is fresh — stale entries, duplicates, and silent sync failures are gone, and sync errors are visible to the operator
|
||||
4. Mesh attachment send works identically on the demo and on real nodes — same modals, same transport decisions, same success — with the demo backend implementing the same RPC surface the UI calls (no "Method not found", no demo-only chooser modal)
|
||||
5. Channel-opening between nodes is first-class UI: a user can copy/share their node's Lightning URI; sees a list of trusted (federated) nodes by hostname to open a channel with in one flow; and can browse/request channels with public nodes — built with the existing design system (Teleport-to-body modals, house style), tested live on the :8100 dev preview against archi-dev, and fixed there before any deploy
|
||||
6. The invoice/payment "paid" success animation is on-brand: the tick's circle is the screensaver-style ring with the outer EQ-segment lines (reuse `neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue`, which already ships a `compact` overlay size), replacing the current burst in the payment success pane (`neode-ui/src/components/SendBitcoinModal.vue`) and matching wherever else the paid tick appears
|
||||
**Plans**: 10 plans
|
||||
|
||||
Plans:
|
||||
- [ ] 01-01-PLAN.md — Serialize the federation node store and make removal stick (FED-01)
|
||||
- [ ] 01-02-PLAN.md — Demo mesh/federation RPC parity + automated parity harness (FED-04)
|
||||
- [ ] 01-03-PLAN.md — On-brand paid tick: ScreensaverRing badge variant on both success surfaces (FED-06)
|
||||
- [ ] 01-04-PLAN.md — Lightning identity: own-node URI + meshed Lightning peer discovery (FED-05)
|
||||
- [ ] 01-05-PLAN.md — Federation sync convergence and operator-visible sync errors (FED-02)
|
||||
- [ ] 01-06-PLAN.md — Lightning URI on the federation sync payload, sharing default decided (FED-05)
|
||||
- [ ] 01-07-PLAN.md — Channel-open request messaging over the mesh (FED-05)
|
||||
- [ ] 01-08-PLAN.md — Channel-open UX: own URI, trusted-node picker, meshed-peer requests (FED-05)
|
||||
- [ ] 01-09-PLAN.md — Structured federation/mesh review + dev-pair deploy (FED-03)
|
||||
- [ ] 01-10-PLAN.md — Consolidated phase verification on the dev pair (FED-01/02/05/06)
|
||||
**UI hint**: yes
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 2: UI Performance
|
||||
**Goal**: The UI feels fast — switching tabs and opening secondary screens (screens reached from a tab's main page) renders promptly instead of stalling on refetches and remounts
|
||||
**Depends on**: Nothing (frontend-focused; parallelizable with Phase 1)
|
||||
**Requirements**: PERF-01, PERF-02, PERF-03
|
||||
**Success Criteria** (what must be TRUE):
|
||||
1. The slowest tab switches and secondary-screen opens are profiled and the causes named (remount storms, serial RPC waterfalls, uncached fetches) before fixes land
|
||||
2. Switching between main tabs renders the target view immediately from cached state, refreshing data in the background — no blank screens or long spinners on tabs already visited this session
|
||||
3. Secondary screens open without a blocking full reload; repeat visits are instant
|
||||
4. The fixes are verified on real node hardware (not just the dev box) — the sluggishness the user reported is gone on-device
|
||||
**Plans**: TBD
|
||||
**UI hint**: yes
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 3: Multinode Verification Pass
|
||||
**Goal**: The platform's lifecycle and federation guarantees are proven across the fleet, not just on .228 — the declared next exit criterion
|
||||
**Depends on**: Phase 1 (proves the federation/mesh fixes hold fleet-wide)
|
||||
**Requirements**: MNODE-01, MNODE-02, MNODE-03
|
||||
**Success Criteria** (what must be TRUE):
|
||||
1. The 5× destructive lifecycle gate reports 0 failures on a second fleet node (archy-x250-beta), run on-node
|
||||
2. The cross-node smoke suite (federation pairing both directions, FIPS anchors, peer content browse) passes between two fleet nodes with every harness RPC time-bounded — a slow node produces a test failure, never an indefinite hang
|
||||
3. An operator who removes a federation peer never sees it reappear in the peer list after later sync cycles; a tombstone-write failure is surfaced as an error instead of silently swallowed
|
||||
4. The on-air mesh suite passes between two radio-equipped nodes over real RF
|
||||
**Plans**: TBD
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 4: Lifecycle Perfection & Quadlet Default
|
||||
**Goal**: An insanely-reliable container environment — every app installs, runs, restarts, uninstalls, and reinstalls cleanly with honest progress, no ghosts, and automatic recovery
|
||||
**Depends on**: Phase 3 (Quadlet default-flip is gated on the second-node gate reporting clean)
|
||||
**Requirements**: LIFE-01, LIFE-02, LIFE-03, LIFE-04, LIFE-05
|
||||
**Success Criteria** (what must be TRUE):
|
||||
1. Restarting `archipelago.service` on a fleet node leaves every app container running — no SIGKILL-the-world, no multi-minute reconciler rebuild
|
||||
2. An app whose Quadlet unit enters `failed` state (and was not user-stopped) comes back automatically within a bounded window, with backoff on persistent failure — no operator intervention
|
||||
3. An operator can see per-app restart counts in status output, and a flapping app (>N restarts in M minutes) is flagged in logs instead of being invisible
|
||||
4. Uninstalling then reinstalling any gated app — including multi-container stacks like immich/btcpay — leaves no ghost My-Apps entries or orphan containers, preserves data per policy, and returns the app healthy, verified by the cascade gate tier
|
||||
5. Install and uninstall progress bars move monotonically from real backend progress events and always land on a terminal success/failure state — asserted in the gate, and the single-node gate stays green after all orchestrator changes
|
||||
**Plans**: TBD
|
||||
**UI hint**: yes
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 5: Registry-Distributed Manifests
|
||||
**Goal**: Manifests ship via the signed registry, not OTA disk files — bumping or adding an app becomes a signed catalog change
|
||||
**Depends on**: Phase 4 (fleet lifecycle stable under Quadlet default before changing the distribution channel)
|
||||
**Requirements**: REG-01, REG-02
|
||||
**Success Criteria** (what must be TRUE):
|
||||
1. A fleet node installs and updates an image-only app from the full manifest embedded in the signed catalog, verified against the pinned release-root key, with no corresponding OTA disk file present (disk remains the fallback for build-source apps)
|
||||
2. A tampered or unsigned catalog manifest is rejected and the node falls back safely — it never installs from an unverified manifest
|
||||
3. Bumping an app version fleet-wide requires only regenerating, re-signing, and publishing the catalog — no binary OTA, no disk rsync — proven live on the fleet
|
||||
**Plans**: TBD
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 6: Manifest Security Enforcement
|
||||
**Goal**: A third-party manifest cannot weaken node security — declared security policy is fully validated and actually enforced at runtime
|
||||
**Depends on**: Phase 5 (enforcement guards the registry channel third-party manifests will arrive through)
|
||||
**Requirements**: SEC-01, SEC-02
|
||||
**Success Criteria** (what must be TRUE):
|
||||
1. A manifest violating ADR-009 mandates (root user, unpinned `latest` tag, capability outside the allow-list, disabled seccomp) is rejected at validation with a clear error naming the violation
|
||||
2. Security overrides (`readonly_root: false`, extra capabilities) work only when explicitly listed in the manifest and leave an audit trail
|
||||
3. Generated AppArmor/seccomp profiles are applied to containers at creation and verifiably effective on a running app — not just generated and ignored
|
||||
4. The single-node lifecycle gate stays green with enforcement on — existing catalog apps all pass the strengthened validation (or carry documented overrides)
|
||||
**Plans**: TBD
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 7: Developer Tooling CLI
|
||||
**Goal**: A third-party developer can build, validate, and test an Archipelago app locally without reading platform internals
|
||||
**Depends on**: Phase 6 (CLI validation must mirror the final enforced rule set)
|
||||
**Requirements**: DEV-01, DEV-02, DEV-03, DEV-04
|
||||
**Success Criteria** (what must be TRUE):
|
||||
1. A developer runs `archy app validate` on a manifest directory and gets the same pass/fail verdict — including security rules — that a node would enforce at install
|
||||
2. A developer runs `archy app render` and sees the exact Quadlet/podman configuration their manifest produces before ever touching a node
|
||||
3. A developer can install their app onto a dev node and run its lifecycle test (install/UI/stop/start/restart/uninstall) from the CLI
|
||||
4. A new developer following only the developer guide goes from an empty directory to a running app on a node — no tribal knowledge required
|
||||
**Plans**: TBD
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 8: Decentralized Marketplace
|
||||
**Goal**: The north star — third-party developers publish apps via the decentralized registry and users install them on their nodes
|
||||
**Depends on**: Phase 7 (publish rides the CLI; installs ride registry distribution from Phase 5 and enforcement from Phase 6)
|
||||
**Requirements**: MKT-01, MKT-02, MKT-03, MKT-04
|
||||
**Success Criteria** (what must be TRUE):
|
||||
1. A third-party developer publishes a DID-signed app manifest to public Nostr relays (NIP-78, kind 30078) using the tooling
|
||||
2. A node discovers the published app from multiple relays and the app store UI shows its trust tier (Verified / Community / Unverified) per ADR-006 scoring
|
||||
3. The node verifies the manifest signature before installation; a tampered or invalid marketplace manifest cannot be installed
|
||||
4. A user installs the third-party marketplace-published app on their node and it runs healthy under the standard lifecycle guarantees — the user-chosen success metric, demonstrated end-to-end
|
||||
**Plans**: TBD
|
||||
**UI hint**: yes
|
||||
|
||||
## Progress
|
||||
|
||||
**Execution Order:**
|
||||
Phases execute in numeric order: 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 → 5 → 6 → 7 → 8
|
||||
(Phases 1 and 2 are independent and may be worked in parallel.)
|
||||
|
||||
| Phase | Plans Complete | Status | Completed |
|
||||
|-------|----------------|--------|-----------|
|
||||
| 1. Federation & Mesh Hardening | 0/10 | Planned | - |
|
||||
| 2. UI Performance | 0/TBD | Not started | - |
|
||||
| 3. Multinode Verification Pass | 0/TBD | Not started | - |
|
||||
| 4. Lifecycle Perfection & Quadlet Default | 0/TBD | Not started | - |
|
||||
| 5. Registry-Distributed Manifests | 0/TBD | Not started | - |
|
||||
| 6. Manifest Security Enforcement | 0/TBD | Not started | - |
|
||||
| 7. Developer Tooling CLI | 0/TBD | Not started | - |
|
||||
| 8. Decentralized Marketplace | 0/TBD | Not started | - |
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
gsd_state_version: 1.0
|
||||
milestone: v1.8.0
|
||||
milestone_name: milestone
|
||||
current_phase: 1
|
||||
current_phase_name: Federation & Mesh Hardening
|
||||
status: planning
|
||||
stopped_at: Phase 1 planned (10 plans, checker-approved)
|
||||
last_updated: "2026-07-29T16:20:37.730Z"
|
||||
last_activity: 2026-07-29
|
||||
last_activity_desc: "Completed quick task 260729-fw7: mesh hop graphic redesign (branded HopVizModal, vertical mobile layout)"
|
||||
progress:
|
||||
total_phases: 8
|
||||
completed_phases: 0
|
||||
total_plans: 10
|
||||
completed_plans: 0
|
||||
percent: 0
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Project State
|
||||
|
||||
## Project Reference
|
||||
|
||||
See: .planning/PROJECT.md (updated 2026-07-29)
|
||||
|
||||
**Core value:** A third-party developer can publish an app via the signed/decentralized registry and a user can install it on their node — manifest-driven, rootless, secure, robust.
|
||||
**Current focus:** Phase 1 — Federation & Mesh Hardening
|
||||
|
||||
## Current Position
|
||||
|
||||
Phase: 1 of 8 (Federation & Mesh Hardening)
|
||||
Plan: 0 of TBD in current phase
|
||||
Status: Ready to plan
|
||||
Last activity: 2026-07-29 — Completed quick task 260729-fw7: mesh hop graphic redesign (branded HopVizModal, vertical mobile layout)
|
||||
|
||||
Progress: [░░░░░░░░░░] 0%
|
||||
|
||||
## Performance Metrics
|
||||
|
||||
**Velocity:**
|
||||
|
||||
- Total plans completed: 0
|
||||
- Average duration: —
|
||||
- Total execution time: —
|
||||
|
||||
**By Phase:**
|
||||
|
||||
| Phase | Plans | Total | Avg/Plan |
|
||||
|-------|-------|-------|----------|
|
||||
| - | - | - | - |
|
||||
|
||||
## Accumulated Context
|
||||
|
||||
### Roadmap Evolution
|
||||
|
||||
- Phase 1 added (2026-07-29): Federation & Mesh Hardening — user-directed top priority (node removal/sync issues, mesh attachment parity incl. demo); prior phases shifted down
|
||||
- Phase 2 added (2026-07-29): UI Performance — slow tab switches and secondary screens; prior phases shifted down
|
||||
- FED-05 added to Phase 1 (2026-07-29): inter-node Lightning channel-opening UX (share node URI, pick trusted/federated nodes by hostname, request channels with public nodes); UI tested on :8100 dev preview against archi-dev before deploy
|
||||
- FED-06 added to Phase 1 (2026-07-29): on-brand paid-tick animation — screensaver ring + EQ segments (reuse ScreensaverRing.vue compact) replacing the success burst in SendBitcoinModal.vue
|
||||
|
||||
### Decisions
|
||||
|
||||
Decisions are logged in PROJECT.md (10 locked ADRs in the `<decisions>` block + milestone decisions table). Recent decisions affecting current work:
|
||||
|
||||
- Milestone version = 1.8.0-alpha (decided 2026-07-08)
|
||||
- Phase-3 Quadlet default-flip is gated on the second-node gate reporting clean (do fresh, never stage uncommitted)
|
||||
- Workstream D (DHT distribution) deferred to v2 — design-only backlog
|
||||
- Canonical manifest schema = `core/container/src/manifest.rs` (code wins over spec doc)
|
||||
|
||||
### Pending Todos
|
||||
|
||||
None yet.
|
||||
|
||||
### Blockers/Concerns
|
||||
|
||||
- [Phase 1] Federation tombstone fix touches trust code — fix carefully, re-verify with `tests/multinode/smoke.sh`, don't patch blind
|
||||
- [Phase 3] Multinode gate on archy-x250-beta was launched 2026-07-01 (log on-node); verify outcome before re-running
|
||||
- [Phase 5] Fleet registry flip awaits explicit user authorization + timing call
|
||||
- [Phase 6] Strengthened ADR-009 validation may reject existing catalog apps — audit manifests before enforcement lands
|
||||
- [Global] Live OTA fleet: deploy to the dev pair before any OTA; gate re-runs required after orchestrator changes; some verification is user/hardware-gated (radios, on-device tests)
|
||||
|
||||
### Quick Tasks Completed
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Description | Date | Commit | Directory |
|
||||
|---|-------------|------|--------|-----------|
|
||||
| 260729-fw7 | improve mesh message hop graphic/animation: balanced desktop sizing, vertical mobile layout, archipelago branding | 2026-07-29 | ac09fc5d | [260729-fw7-improve-mesh-message-hop-graphic-animati](./quick/260729-fw7-improve-mesh-message-hop-graphic-animati/) |
|
||||
| 260729-gjd | demo: indee.tx1138.com in app iframe (:2101 whole-origin proxy), auto nostr signer sign-in, IndeeHub pre-installed on fresh session | 2026-07-29 | d00ca624 | [260729-gjd-demo-make-indee-tx1138-com-work-in-the-a](./quick/260729-gjd-demo-make-indee-tx1138-com-work-in-the-a/) |
|
||||
| 260729-hj1 | peer-files media batch: Wavlake paid tracks + purchases + dedupe + real photos (demo); lightbox/player open routing + free-image lightbox fix (both builds) | 2026-07-29 | f52c5407 | [260729-hj1-peer-files-media-batch-wavlake-paid-trac](./quick/260729-hj1-peer-files-media-batch-wavlake-paid-trac/) |
|
||||
| 260729-je5 | connected-nodes list fills card height (constant footer gap); companion app skips demo intro | 2026-07-29 | d54517cf | [260729-je5-ui-fixes-connected-nodes-scrollable-list](./quick/260729-je5-ui-fixes-connected-nodes-scrollable-list/) |
|
||||
|
||||
## Deferred Items
|
||||
|
||||
| Category | Item | Status | Deferred At |
|
||||
|----------|------|--------|-------------|
|
||||
| Distribution | DIST-01 DHT/iroh backbone (workstream D) | v2 | 2026-07-29 |
|
||||
| Fleet | FLEET-01 Bitcoin multi-version fleet OTA (user-gated) | v2 | 2026-07-29 |
|
||||
| Fleet | FLEET-02 per-app deep health assertions (~34 apps) | v2 | 2026-07-29 |
|
||||
| Fleet | FLEET-03 LUKS2 data-partition encryption | v2 | 2026-07-29 |
|
||||
|
||||
## Session Continuity
|
||||
|
||||
Last session: 2026-07-29T16:20:37.711Z
|
||||
Stopped at: Phase 1 planned (10 plans, checker-approved)
|
||||
Resume file: .planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-01-PLAN.md
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
|
||||
<!-- refreshed: 2026-07-29 -->
|
||||
# Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
**Analysis Date:** 2026-07-29
|
||||
|
||||
## System Overview
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ Frontend Layer (Vue 3) │
|
||||
│ `neode-ui/src` (TypeScript + SPA) │
|
||||
│ Routes → Views → Components → Composables → RPC Client │
|
||||
└────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
|
||||
│ WebSocket + HTTP(S)
|
||||
│ JSON-RPC 2.0 protocol
|
||||
▼
|
||||
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ HTTP Server Layer (Hyper) │
|
||||
│ `core/archipelago/src/server.rs` │
|
||||
│ TCP Listener → Hyper → Router → ApiHandler/RpcHandler │
|
||||
└────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
|
||||
│
|
||||
┌──────────┴──────────┬──────────────────┐
|
||||
│ │ │
|
||||
▼ ▼ ▼
|
||||
┌─────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌────────────┐
|
||||
│ WebSocket │ RPC │ │ Content │
|
||||
│ Handler │ Handler │ │ Proxy │
|
||||
│ (state sync) │ (methods)│ │ (app URIs) │
|
||||
└─────────┘ └──────────┘ └────────────┘
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
└──────────┬───────┘
|
||||
│
|
||||
▼
|
||||
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ Service Layer (Async Tasks) │
|
||||
│ `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/*` │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ • auth, identity, secrets │
|
||||
│ • container orchestration │
|
||||
│ • bitcoin, lightning, wallet │
|
||||
│ • mesh, federation, FIPS │
|
||||
│ • content, backup, settings │
|
||||
└─────────────┬───────────────────────┘
|
||||
│
|
||||
┌───────────┼───────────┬──────────────┐
|
||||
│ │ │ │
|
||||
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
|
||||
┌─────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌────────┐ ┌──────────┐
|
||||
│Container│ │ State │ │BlobStore
|
||||
│Orch. │ │Manager │ │ │ │Identity │
|
||||
│(Podman) │ │(Broadcast
|
||||
│ │ │ channels)│ │ ContentClient Manager │
|
||||
└─────────┘ └──────────┘ └────────┘ └──────────┘
|
||||
│ │ │ │
|
||||
└───────────┼───────────┼─────────┘
|
||||
│
|
||||
▼
|
||||
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ Persistent Storage Layer │
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ • Data directory files (YAML/JSON) │
|
||||
│ • SQLite (session store) │
|
||||
│ • Blob store (content-addressed) │
|
||||
│ • Podman container state │
|
||||
│ • Secret vaults (encrypted) │
|
||||
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Component Responsibilities
|
||||
|
||||
| Component | Responsibility | File |
|
||||
|-----------|----------------|------|
|
||||
| **Server** | HTTP listener, connection multiplexing, TLS/encryption | `core/archipelago/src/server.rs` |
|
||||
| **ApiHandler** | HTTP request routing, authentication, response formatting | `core/archipelago/src/api/handler/mod.rs` |
|
||||
| **RpcHandler** | JSON-RPC 2.0 dispatch, method registration, rate limiting | `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mod.rs` |
|
||||
| **ContainerOrchestrator** | Podman lifecycle, manifest reconciliation, adoption | `core/archipelago/src/container/prod_orchestrator.rs` |
|
||||
| **StateManager** | Central state broadcast channel, revision tracking | `core/archipelago/src/state.rs` |
|
||||
| **AuthManager** | User credentials, session validation, password hashing | `core/archipelago/src/auth.rs` |
|
||||
| **Identity Manager** | Node Ed25519 keys, seed derivation, Tor address | `core/archipelago/src/identity_manager.rs` |
|
||||
| **BootReconciler** | Periodic manifest sync loop, adoption, remediation | `core/archipelago/src/container/boot_reconciler.rs` |
|
||||
| **Frontend Router** | Vue Router, page navigation, deep linking | `neode-ui/src/router/index.ts` |
|
||||
| **Frontend Stores** | Pinia state (apps, settings, user, mesh) | `neode-ui/src/stores/` |
|
||||
| **Frontend Components** | UI elements, modals, cards, layout primitives | `neode-ui/src/components/` |
|
||||
|
||||
## Pattern Overview
|
||||
|
||||
**Overall:** Multi-tier async architecture with centralized request dispatch and broadcast state synchronization.
|
||||
|
||||
**Key Characteristics:**
|
||||
- **Async-first (Tokio)** - All I/O operations are non-blocking; task spawning for background work
|
||||
- **RPC-driven API** - Frontend communicates via JSON-RPC 2.0 (not REST); single `/api/v0` WebSocket + HTTP endpoint
|
||||
- **State as broadcast** - Global state changes flow through Tokio broadcast channels to all connected WebSocket clients
|
||||
- **Manifest-driven containers** - App lifecycle controlled by declarative YAML manifests (Archipelago-specific extensions)
|
||||
- **Plugin architecture** - Apps are isolated Podman containers with declarative interfaces (web UI, ports, secrets)
|
||||
|
||||
## Layers
|
||||
|
||||
**HTTP/Transport Layer:**
|
||||
- Purpose: Accept inbound connections, handle TLS termination, demultiplex HTTP/WebSocket
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/server.rs`
|
||||
- Contains: Hyper listener, TCP accept loop, connection state tracking
|
||||
- Depends on: Tokio, Hyper, TLS/mTLS libraries (rustls/openssl)
|
||||
- Used by: All external clients (web UI, companion app, API consumers)
|
||||
|
||||
**Request Routing & Auth Layer:**
|
||||
- Purpose: Dispatch HTTP requests to handlers, validate sessions, enforce CSRF, rate-limit login
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/api/` (handler + rpc submodules)
|
||||
- Contains: Route matching, middleware chain, cookie extraction, error formatting
|
||||
- Depends on: Server, StateManager, SessionStore
|
||||
- Used by: All request paths; gates API access
|
||||
|
||||
**RPC Dispatch Layer:**
|
||||
- Purpose: Deserialize JSON-RPC 2.0 requests, call appropriate service method, serialize responses
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mod.rs` + subdirectories (auth.rs, container.rs, bitcoin.rs, etc.)
|
||||
- Contains: Method table, parameter validation, response formatting, rate limit checks
|
||||
- Depends on: All service modules
|
||||
- Used by: Frontend (WebSocket + HTTP POST to /api/v0), internal tools
|
||||
|
||||
**Service Layer:**
|
||||
- Purpose: Implement business logic — container lifecycle, identity, auth, content sync, mesh discovery
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/*` (one RPC module per domain), plus `core/archipelago/src/` (background tasks)
|
||||
- Contains: ~40 RPC method modules + 50+ core service modules (bootstrap.rs, health_monitor.rs, crash_recovery.rs, etc.)
|
||||
- Depends on: StateManager, ContainerOrchestrator, config/secrets, external services (Bitcoin, Lightning, FIPS)
|
||||
- Used by: RPC layer; other services for cross-cutting concerns (mesh, federation, webhooks)
|
||||
|
||||
**State Management Layer:**
|
||||
- Purpose: Hold canonical application state, broadcast changes to all connected clients, persist snapshots
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/state.rs` (StateManager + data_model.rs)
|
||||
- Contains: RwLock<DataModel>, broadcast channel, revision counter
|
||||
- Depends on: DataModel (serde-serializable struct tree)
|
||||
- Used by: All services that mutate state (container ops, auth, settings)
|
||||
|
||||
**Container Orchestration Layer:**
|
||||
- Purpose: Podman lifecycle management, image verification, secret injection, crash recovery, adoption
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/container/prod_orchestrator.rs` (1M+ lines; split across boot_reconciler.rs, quadlet.rs, docker_packages.rs, etc.)
|
||||
- Contains: Manifest parsing, image pull/verify, container create/start/stop, volume mounts, networking
|
||||
- Depends on: Podman CLI + socket, config parser, image registries, local filesystem
|
||||
- Used by: RPC container.* methods, BootReconciler loop, crash recovery
|
||||
|
||||
**Frontend Layer (Vue 3):**
|
||||
- Purpose: Render UI, dispatch RPC calls, maintain local UI state, handle user input
|
||||
- Location: `neode-ui/src/`
|
||||
- Contains: Views (pages), Components (reusable UI), Composables (logic hooks), Stores (Pinia), Router
|
||||
- Depends on: Vue 3, Vue Router, Pinia, RPC client library (custom), D3/Leaflet (charts/maps)
|
||||
- Used by: Browser clients (desktop, mobile, companion app via WebView)
|
||||
|
||||
## Data Flow
|
||||
|
||||
### Primary Request Path (User Action → Backend → State Sync)
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Frontend user interaction** (click button, type input) → Vue component event handler
|
||||
- Location: `neode-ui/src/views/*.vue` or `neode-ui/src/components/*.vue`
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Composable dispatches RPC** (e.g., `useContainerInstall()` calls `rpc.container.install()`)
|
||||
- Location: `neode-ui/src/composables/` (custom or imported from `api/rpc-client.ts`)
|
||||
|
||||
3. **RPC client serializes → HTTP/WebSocket POST to /api/v0**
|
||||
- Location: `neode-ui/src/api/rpc-client.ts`
|
||||
- Payload: `{ jsonrpc: "2.0", method: "container.install", params: {...}, id: ... }`
|
||||
|
||||
4. **HTTP Server receives, routes to ApiHandler**
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/server.rs` (listener) → `core/archipelago/src/api/handler/mod.rs` (dispatch)
|
||||
|
||||
5. **ApiHandler checks auth**, extracts body, calls RpcHandler
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/api/handler/mod.rs:handle_request()`
|
||||
|
||||
6. **RpcHandler dispatches by method name** to specific RPC module
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mod.rs:call()` → routing to `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/container.rs:install()`
|
||||
|
||||
7. **Service method executes** (e.g., `container.rs:install()` calls orchestrator, updates state)
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/container.rs` (calls methods on ContainerOrchestrator)
|
||||
|
||||
8. **StateManager.update_data()** broadcasts the new state to all WebSocket subscribers
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/state.rs:update_data()` → broadcast channel
|
||||
- All connected WebSocket clients receive `{ rev: N, data: {...} }` update
|
||||
|
||||
9. **Frontend receives state update**, updates Pinia stores, re-renders UI
|
||||
- Location: `neode-ui/src/stores/` (Pinia stores mutate) → Vue reactivity chain → DOM update
|
||||
|
||||
**State Management:**
|
||||
- All reads from `StateManager` go through `get_snapshot()` which acquires read-lock
|
||||
- All writes go through `update_data()` which acquires write-lock + increments revision
|
||||
- Broadcast channel has ~100-message buffer; slow subscribers may lose old updates (by design — UI only needs latest)
|
||||
- WebSocket clients re-sync on reconnect via `get_snapshot()` call (full state transfer)
|
||||
|
||||
### Secondary Flow: Scheduled Reconciliation (Convergence Loop)
|
||||
|
||||
1. **BootReconciler spawned at startup** in `main.rs`
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/main.rs` (line ~338-348)
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Reconciler runs every `RECONCILER_DEFAULT_INTERVAL`** (~30s typical)
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/container/boot_reconciler.rs:run_forever()`
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Compares desired manifests (disk + registry catalog) vs actual Podman state**
|
||||
- Looks for: containers missing, containers orphaned, image updates, secret changes
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Applies remediation** (create, delete, restart containers)
|
||||
- Calls: orchestrator.reconcile_*() methods
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Logs changes, broadcasts state update if anything changed**
|
||||
- Frontend receives update, shows user the reconciled app state
|
||||
|
||||
This ensures apps survive crashes, OTA updates, or manual Podman edits — the desired state always converges.
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Abstractions
|
||||
|
||||
**ContainerOrchestrator trait:**
|
||||
- Purpose: Abstract container lifecycle behind a trait so Prod (Podman-based) and Dev (in-memory) modes can coexist
|
||||
- Examples: `core/archipelago/src/container/prod_orchestrator.rs`, `core/archipelago/src/container/dev_orchestrator.rs`
|
||||
- Pattern: Trait-based strategy; RpcHandler holds `Arc<dyn ContainerOrchestrator>`, switches at runtime
|
||||
- Methods: create, start, stop, delete, adopt, list, reconcile, install, upgrade
|
||||
|
||||
**Manifest (YAML-based declarative app):**
|
||||
- Purpose: Fully describe an app's container, dependencies, secrets, ports, UI in one file
|
||||
- Examples: `/opt/archipelago/apps/*/manifest.yml` (on-disk) or registry-delivered catalogs
|
||||
- Pattern: Custom extensions over OCI/Docker Compose (e.g., `interfaces.main.ui`, `generated_secrets`)
|
||||
- Parsed into: `container::manifest::Manifest` struct, consumed by orchestrator
|
||||
|
||||
**RPC Method Modules:**
|
||||
- Purpose: Group related JSON-RPC methods by domain (auth, container, bitcoin, mesh, etc.)
|
||||
- Examples: `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/auth.rs`, `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/bitcoin.rs`
|
||||
- Pattern: Each module exports `pub async fn method_name(handler, params) -> Result<Response>`
|
||||
- Registration: Hardcoded dispatch in `RpcHandler::call()` (no reflection; methods are explicit)
|
||||
|
||||
**BlobStore (Content-Addressed):**
|
||||
- Purpose: Store attachments/files by SHA-256 hash; issue time-limited capability tokens for access
|
||||
- Examples: Used by mesh.send-content, federation attachments, backup archives
|
||||
- Pattern: Capability-based access control (CBAC); tokens scoped to issuer pubkey + hash
|
||||
- Located: `core/archipelago/src/blobs.rs` + `core/archipelago/src/content_server.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
**StateManager + DataModel:**
|
||||
- Purpose: Single source of truth for UI state; broadcast updates to all clients
|
||||
- Pattern: Read-write lock over a serde-serializable struct tree; broadcast channel for efficiency
|
||||
- Persistence: Most state is ephemeral (app listings, UI settings); durable state persists to disk separately
|
||||
- Clients: Frontend (WebSocket subscriber), internal services (read via get_snapshot), monitoring/debug
|
||||
|
||||
**Session Store:**
|
||||
- Purpose: Track authenticated HTTP sessions (cookie → user identity mapping)
|
||||
- Examples: SQLite-backed or in-memory store
|
||||
- Pattern: Session token issued at login, validated on each request, expires after TTL
|
||||
- Used by: ApiHandler auth check, rate limiter (per IP + per user)
|
||||
|
||||
## Entry Points
|
||||
|
||||
**Backend Daemon (Binary):**
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/main.rs`
|
||||
- Triggers: `systemd start archipelago.service` or manual `./archipelago` on development node
|
||||
- Responsibilities: Parse config, init tracing, load/reconcile containers, start HTTP server, spawn background tasks
|
||||
- Key setup: Load identity → setup auth → spawn orchestrator → load manifests → start reconciler → start server
|
||||
|
||||
**Frontend SPA:**
|
||||
- Location: `neode-ui/src/main.ts`
|
||||
- Triggers: Browser loads `/index.html` (served by HTTP server from `/opt/archipelago/web-ui/`)
|
||||
- Responsibilities: Boot Vue app, setup Router, setup Pinia stores, establish WebSocket to backend
|
||||
- Key setup: Mount app → router ready → fetch initial state → subscribe to updates
|
||||
|
||||
**RPC Endpoints (HTTP + WebSocket):**
|
||||
- Location: `core/archipelago/src/api/` (handler routes requests here)
|
||||
- Endpoint: `/api/v0` (JSON-RPC 2.0 POST or WebSocket upgrade)
|
||||
- Methods: ~200+ RPCs across domains (auth, container, bitcoin, mesh, federation, etc.)
|
||||
- Example: `POST /api/v0` with body `{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "auth.login", "params": {...}, "id": 1}`
|
||||
|
||||
**Background Tasks (Spawned at startup):**
|
||||
- BootReconciler: Periodic manifest reconciliation loop
|
||||
- Health Monitor: Periodic app health checks + restart
|
||||
- Update Scheduler: Periodic app update checks
|
||||
- Mesh Service: P2P mesh listener + sender (federation, LoRa)
|
||||
- Webhook Relay: Listens for inbound webhooks, broadcasts to subscribers
|
||||
- WebSocket Listener: Upgraded HTTP connections → broadcast state subscriber
|
||||
- See: `core/archipelago/src/main.rs` (lines ~400-450 show the spawned tasks)
|
||||
|
||||
## Architectural Constraints
|
||||
|
||||
- **Single event loop** — All I/O-bound work runs on a single Tokio multi-threaded runtime; no worker threads by default (some container ops are blocking, run in tokio::task::spawn_blocking)
|
||||
- **Global state via broadcast** — StateManager broadcasts to all WebSocket clients; no request-response for state changes (async by design)
|
||||
- **Container state mutability** — Podman state can drift from manifest (manual edits, crashes); reconciler runs periodically to converge
|
||||
- **No in-process data consistency** — Multiple services can mutate StateManager concurrently; last write wins (fine for UI; critical ops use locks)
|
||||
- **Shared blob store** — All services that need to share content use the same BlobStore instance (single cap_key, single root directory)
|
||||
- **Rate limiting per IP + method** — Prevents brute-force login, but shared IPs see shared limits (edge case: family users, proxies)
|
||||
- **Session cookie same-site** — WebSocket + HTTP POST must be same-origin; CORS headers controlled by ApiHandler
|
||||
|
||||
## Anti-Patterns
|
||||
|
||||
### Circular RPC Dispatches
|
||||
|
||||
**What happens:** An RPC method calls back into another RPC method, forming a cycle (e.g., auth.login → container.list → auth.check_permission → auth.login)
|
||||
**Why it's wrong:** Deadlocks on RwLocks, infinite loops on state broadcasts, unclear error messages, hard to debug
|
||||
**Do this instead:** Pass check result as a side-effect from the outer method; compute permissions once at the start. Use composable patterns in frontend instead (e.g., `useCanInstall()` checks perms once per component mount).
|
||||
|
||||
### Synchronous blocking in RPC handlers
|
||||
|
||||
**What happens:** RPC method calls `.unwrap()` on Podman command result, blocking the entire event loop
|
||||
**Why it's wrong:** One slow container op (e.g., large image pull) blocks all concurrent users
|
||||
**Do this instead:** Use `tokio::task::spawn_blocking()` for I/O that may take >100ms. See `core/archipelago/src/container/docker_packages.rs` for examples.
|
||||
|
||||
### Hardcoding paths in app RPC modules
|
||||
|
||||
**What happens:** `bitcoin.rs` hardcodes `/opt/archipelago/data/bitcoin.conf` instead of using `config.data_dir`
|
||||
**Why it's wrong:** Dev mode, tests, and alternate installs all fail with "not found"
|
||||
**Do this instead:** Read from `Config` struct, which is passed to every RPC method. See `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/bitcoin.rs:status()` for correct pattern.
|
||||
|
||||
### Frontend state outside Pinia stores
|
||||
|
||||
**What happens:** Components use component-local ref<> for app list, duplicate the StateManager's data
|
||||
**Why it's wrong:** Stale data after OTA updates, inconsistent with other users on the same node, race conditions on install/uninstall
|
||||
**Do this instead:** Always derive from Pinia stores (e.g., `useAppStore().apps`). Stores subscribe to WebSocket updates. See `neode-ui/src/stores/appStore.ts`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Not handling WebSocket reconnection
|
||||
|
||||
**What happens:** Frontend goes offline for 10s (network glitch), WebSocket closes, frontend doesn't re-sync state
|
||||
**Why it's wrong:** UI shows stale data (app still "installing" when actually done), user clicks again, double-action happens
|
||||
**Do this instead:** WebSocket reconnect handler should re-fetch full state (`node.status`, etc.), re-subscribe. See `neode-ui/src/api/rpc-client.ts` for the reconnect loop.
|
||||
|
||||
## Error Handling
|
||||
|
||||
**Strategy:** Defensive layering — errors are caught at each tier, logged, and converted to user-facing messages.
|
||||
|
||||
**Patterns:**
|
||||
- HTTP layer: 4xx/5xx with JSON error (no 500s for logic errors; only for crashes)
|
||||
- RPC layer: Serialize error as `{ error: { code: N, message: "...", data: {...} } }` per JSON-RPC spec
|
||||
- Service layer: Use `anyhow::Result<T>` + `?` operator for early exit; convert to `RpcError` at handler boundary
|
||||
- Frontend: Catch RPC errors, show toast/modal, log to console (never crash the app)
|
||||
|
||||
**Critical paths:**
|
||||
- Auth failure: 401 Unauthorized + "Invalid password" (no "user not found" to leak usernames)
|
||||
- Container ops: If reconciler sees drift, logs it but continues (never crashes the daemon)
|
||||
- Image pull failure: Fallback to last-cached version if network timeout (user is never blocked on external registries)
|
||||
- Podman socket unavailable: Return 503 Service Unavailable (user sees "Archipelago is starting")
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*Architecture analysis: 2026-07-29*
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
|
||||
# Codebase Concerns
|
||||
|
||||
**Analysis Date:** 2026-07-29
|
||||
|
||||
## Tech Debt
|
||||
|
||||
**Federation node removal tombstone gap:**
|
||||
- Issue: `federation::remove_node()` (`core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs:180-197`) calls `tombstone_did()` at line 193 but explicitly drops the error with `let _ = …`. If tombstone write fails (disk I/O, permission, transient), the peer is removed from `nodes.json` but never actually recorded as removed, so the next background sync/notify-join silently re-adds it.
|
||||
- Files: `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs:180-197`, `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs:272-300`
|
||||
- Impact: Federation peers marked for removal can reappear after the next sync cycle, confusing the operator and potentially re-establishing unwanted connections.
|
||||
- Fix approach: Surface the tombstone-write failure instead of swallowing it; consider retry logic with backoff; add integration test via `tests/multinode/smoke.sh` to verify removal sticks across sync cycles.
|
||||
|
||||
**Container reconciler observability gap:**
|
||||
- Issue: No metrics distinguish "settling after restart" from "flapping" — container thrashing is invisible until anecdotal reports. No per-app restart counter or log line when an app restarts >N times in M minutes.
|
||||
- Files: `core/archipelago/src/container/prod_orchestrator.rs` (reconciler loop), `core/archipelago/src/health_monitor.rs`
|
||||
- Impact: Silent restart storms go unnoticed; users see frequent service interruptions without diagnostics; operator can't distinguish normal convergence from a crash loop.
|
||||
- Fix approach: Add per-app restart counter + log line when threshold exceeded; emit metric on each restart; wire restart count into health/status RPC output.
|
||||
|
||||
**Failed systemd unit self-healing gap:**
|
||||
- Issue: When a Quadlet-backed app's `.service` unit enters `failed` state (e.g., exit 255), the reconciler does not automatically `reset-failed` + `start` it. The unit sits failed until the operator manually intervenes or the service restarts.
|
||||
- Files: `core/archipelago/src/container/prod_orchestrator.rs` (reconcile loop)
|
||||
- Impact: Apps with transient failures go down and stay down; no automatic recovery; operator must manually reset or restart the orchestrator.
|
||||
- Fix approach: Add reconcile step: quadlet-backed app whose `.service` is `failed` and not user-stopped → call `systemctl --user reset-failed <unit>` + `start`; add backoff to avoid busy-loop on persistent failures.
|
||||
|
||||
**Bitcoin RPC credentials not retrieved from config/secrets:**
|
||||
- Issue: `core/container/src/bitcoin_simulator.rs:158` has a TODO marking hardcoded (or missing) RPC credentials in the Bitcoin simulator real-mode path. Credentials should be fetched from the secret store.
|
||||
- Files: `core/container/src/bitcoin_simulator.rs:155-165`
|
||||
- Impact: Bitcoin simulator in real mode (Testnet/Mainnet) cannot authenticate to the node; RPC calls fail.
|
||||
- Fix approach: Inject `SecretsProvider` into `BitcoinSimulator::new()` or pass credentials as constructor args; fetch via `config/secrets` at runtime; handle credential rotation.
|
||||
|
||||
**Container security policies not wired in:**
|
||||
- Issue: `core/security/src/container_policies.rs` generates AppArmor/SELinux profiles but the `apply_profile()` function has a TODO at line 71: "Configure Podman to use the profile" — the profiles are generated but never applied to running containers.
|
||||
- Files: `core/security/src/container_policies.rs:63-75`
|
||||
- Impact: Security profiles exist but provide zero protection; containers run without the intended isolation constraints.
|
||||
- Fix approach: Pass `--security-opt apparmor=<profile>` (or SELinux equivalent) to Podman at container creation; verify profile loads via `apparmor_status`; add CI check that profiles compile cleanly.
|
||||
|
||||
**Dynamic resource adjustment not implemented:**
|
||||
- Issue: `core/performance/src/resource_manager.rs:86` has a TODO for dynamic resource adjustment based on usage. The allocator is static; no adaptive rebalancing when load patterns shift.
|
||||
- Files: `core/performance/src/resource_manager.rs:86-88`
|
||||
- Impact: Resource allocation is rigid; a node with skewed usage (e.g., one app consuming all memory) has no mechanism to rebalance dynamically.
|
||||
- Fix approach: Monitor per-app resource usage via cgroup stats; implement feedback loop to adjust limits; gate on production deployment (likely Phase 3+).
|
||||
|
||||
## Known Bugs
|
||||
|
||||
**Multinode RPC robustness gap:**
|
||||
- Symptoms: The `node_rpc()` function in `tests/multinode/lib/multinode.bash` lacks `--max-time` on curl calls — a slow server-side RPC can hang the test suite indefinitely with zero feedback.
|
||||
- Files: `tests/multinode/lib/multinode.bash` (exact line TBD; see grep for `node_rpc`)
|
||||
- Trigger: Run multinode federation/mesh test against a slow or overloaded node; curl will block forever.
|
||||
- Workaround: Manually kill the test process and diagnose the hanging RPC manually; no automatic timeout recovery.
|
||||
- Fix approach: Add `--max-time 30` to all curl calls in `node_rpc()`; re-run `tests/multinode/smoke.sh` to verify.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Considerations
|
||||
|
||||
**Secrets environment variable exposure risk:**
|
||||
- Risk: Bitcoin and other service credentials are materialized as env vars in `ARCHIPELAGO_*` (e.g., `BITCOIN_RPC_PASSWORD`). Env vars are visible via `/proc/<pid>/environ` and potentially logged.
|
||||
- Files: `core/archipelago/src/container/prod_orchestrator.rs`, `core/container/src/manifest.rs`, `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/package/config.rs`
|
||||
- Current mitigation: Secrets are declared as `generated_secrets` in manifests and materialized 0600/rootless; the orchestrator avoids logging values.
|
||||
- Recommendations: Audit all env-var passing to containers; consider switching high-sensitivity secrets (bitcoin RPC, LND macaroons) to file-based secrets mounted read-only; add audit logging for secret access.
|
||||
|
||||
**Federation DID validation incomplete:**
|
||||
- Risk: Federation peer DIDs are added via the RPC without cryptographic verification of ownership. A compromised peer could advertise arbitrary DIDs.
|
||||
- Files: `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` (add-node path), `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs`
|
||||
- Current mitigation: DIDs are stored locally; transitive federation discovery uses the tombstone list to block removed peers.
|
||||
- Recommendations: Add DID-ownership proof (e.g., signed proof-of-identity) before accepting a peer's advertised DID; document the trust model; consider user warnings when adding peers.
|
||||
|
||||
**AppArmor profiles overly permissive:**
|
||||
- Risk: Generated AppArmor profiles use blanket `network,` instead of per-port/protocol rules. Readonly flag is checkbox only, not enforced per actual app needs.
|
||||
- Files: `core/security/src/container_policies.rs:46-54`
|
||||
- Current mitigation: None (profiles not applied).
|
||||
- Recommendations: Refine per-app capabilities based on manifest's declared needs; add integration test verifying readonly mounts are enforced; apply profiles in development before prod.
|
||||
|
||||
## Performance Bottlenecks
|
||||
|
||||
**Container thrashing during reconcile:**
|
||||
- Problem: Restarting `archipelago.service` SIGKILLs every container, forcing a full rebuild over several minutes. Uninstall + reinstall loops can cascade-trigger restarts.
|
||||
- Files: `core/archipelago/src/container/prod_orchestrator.rs` (the reconciler's desired-state machine)
|
||||
- Cause: Pre-Phase-3 architecture: containers run in systemd cgroup, not as independent Quadlet units.
|
||||
- Improvement path: Phase-3 Quadlet default-flip (`config.rs:256`) — each app becomes an independent `.container` unit; restart only the affected app, not the entire cgroup.
|
||||
|
||||
**Reconciler churn on boot:**
|
||||
- Problem: Boot reconciler makes multiple passes reconciling drift; during each pass, containers may be recreated. Post-OTA health checks deliberately skip per-app container assertions because of restart-storm unpredictability.
|
||||
- Files: `core/archipelago/src/container/prod_orchestrator.rs`, `core/archipelago/src/bootstrap.rs`
|
||||
- Cause: Multi-pass reconciliation + no incremental diff detection.
|
||||
- Improvement path: Consolidate reconciler into single pass for boot; cache manifest/config diffs to avoid redundant comparisons; add boot-only fast-path.
|
||||
|
||||
**Bitcoin IBD on .198 stalled (disk I/O):**
|
||||
- Problem: .198 bitcoin is mid-IBD with only 21% progress; disk is 448GB (below 1TB archival threshold); load is high (~3–5).
|
||||
- Files: `tests/multinode-testing-plan.md` (documented issue)
|
||||
- Cause: Undersized/slow disk; concurrent workload.
|
||||
- Improvement path: User decision required: swap in a different node (already done for gate run, using .5 instead) or add storage + wait for sync. Not a code issue.
|
||||
|
||||
## Fragile Areas
|
||||
|
||||
**Uninstall + reinstall lifecycle:**
|
||||
- Files: `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/package/install.rs`, `core/archipelago/src/container/quadlet.rs:disable_remove()`, `neode-ui/src/components/AppCard.vue`
|
||||
- Why fragile: Pre-2026-07-26, `quadlet::disable_remove()` called systemd + podman with no timeouts, causing hangs. Fixed by commit `71cc9ac4` (added `QUADLET_STOP_TIMEOUT`, SIGKILL escalation, reset-failed). AppCard was hardcoding uninstall bar to "stuck full-red" (fixed `9f17ba68`). Tests for reinstall/cascade are still opt-in.
|
||||
- Safe modification: Any changes to the uninstall path must be tested via `cascade-uninstall.bats` (7/7 on .228); extend coverage to multi-container stacks (immich, btcpay). Verify on .228 before fleet roll.
|
||||
- Test coverage: `tests/lifecycle/bats/cascade-uninstall.bats` exists but not in canonical gate; must opt-in with `ARCHY_GATE_CASCADE=1`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Production orchestrator state machine:**
|
||||
- Files: `core/archipelago/src/container/prod_orchestrator.rs` (6291 lines)
|
||||
- Why fragile: Largest file in the codebase; owns install/start/stop/restart/remove/upgrade for every app; per-app mutex + RwLock concurrency model; complex dependency resolution, adoption scan, Quadlet rendering, and host-port-wait logic interleaved.
|
||||
- Safe modification: Understand the per-app mutex protocol before touching state mutation; test all changes via the lifecycle gate on .228; use the adoption scan + manifest merge logic for any new manifest evolution.
|
||||
- Test coverage: 667 unit tests green (2026-07-01); lifecycle gate covers ~8 core apps; ~30 apps untested in gate.
|
||||
|
||||
**Mesh radio configuration + boot race:**
|
||||
- Files: `core/archipelago/src/mesh/meshtastic.rs`, `core/archipelago/src/mesh/mod.rs`, tests at `tests/lifecycle/bats/meshtastic.bats`
|
||||
- Why fragile: Radio boot-race fixed (2026-07-28, `a8c4694c`/`3f76b496`); on-air config apply must finish before device is used. Earlier versions had probe-boot-race + live config propagation issues. Must verify on real hardware.
|
||||
- Safe modification: Any mesh changes require E2E test on real LoRa radios (dev-box ↔ x250-dev, or fleet broadcast); unit tests alone won't catch RF timing issues.
|
||||
- Test coverage: 8-stage on-air smoke test in `tests/multinode/meshtastic.sh` (run manually; not in canonical gate).
|
||||
|
||||
**Lightning payment state machine:**
|
||||
- Files: `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/wallet.rs:payinvoice()`
|
||||
- Why fragile: Slow multi-hop payments (>15s) previously surfaced as "failed" while settling in background; client-side 15s timeout was aborting the wait. Fixed by commit `614a0f5a` (120s wait, pending status, lnd.paymentstatus poll). Must verify on Framework PT with real multi-hop.
|
||||
- Safe modification: Any lnd state changes must test full payment lifecycle: invoice creation, encoding, send, multi-hop wait, settlement confirmation. Verify on Framework PT before release.
|
||||
- Test coverage: Local LND payinvoice smoke test; no multinode lightning routing test in gate.
|
||||
|
||||
## Scaling Limits
|
||||
|
||||
**Uninstall progress bar truthfulness:**
|
||||
- Current capacity: Uninstall now has timeouts (fixed 2026-07-26) but progress-bar still reports fake stages (full-red full-opacity).
|
||||
- Limit: Long uninstalls (>30s) show no real progress; bar claims "uninstalling" for the full duration.
|
||||
- Scaling path: Backend must emit real progress events (% complete, stage name); UI must poll + display truthfully; integrate into all 5 gate iterations (not just 1 throw-away app).
|
||||
|
||||
**Federation node list deduplication on disk bloat:**
|
||||
- Current capacity: `federation/storage.rs:dedup_nodes_by_onion()` reads entire nodes.json into memory each time a node is added/synced. At N federated peers, O(N) memory + O(N²) comparisons per operation.
|
||||
- Limit: No hard limit measured; scales fine up to hundreds of peers. Beyond 1000+ peers, memory/time may become visible.
|
||||
- Scaling path: Switch to a disk-backed database (e.g., rocksdb) for federation state if peer count grows; or implement incremental dedup on disk writes (preserve dedup state, only recompute on load).
|
||||
|
||||
**Lifecycle gate iteration count:**
|
||||
- Current capacity: `ARCHY_ITERATIONS=5` runs 5 full cycles (stop/start/restart/survive per app). Entire run takes ~8–12 hours on .228.
|
||||
- Limit: Cannot easily scale to 10+ iterations without timeout risks; per-app timeout tuning is manual.
|
||||
- Scaling path: Add per-app timeout tuning (manifest field); parallelize per-app tests where safe (currently serial to avoid contention).
|
||||
|
||||
## Dependencies at Risk
|
||||
|
||||
**Reticulum transport daemon process group:**
|
||||
- Risk: Pre-fix (before `be50c886`), process group wasn't cleaned up on drop. Fork-bombs or dangling processes possible under error conditions.
|
||||
- Impact: Stale reticulum processes accumulating over time; resource leaks on node.
|
||||
- Migration plan: Code fix already deployed (commit `7a7fec21`); no active risk. Monitor fleet for stale python processes post-deployment.
|
||||
|
||||
**Podman socket mount security model:**
|
||||
- Risk: Apps mounting `/run/podman/podman.sock` get full container-management access. Not restricted by the security policy (AppArmor profiles not applied).
|
||||
- Files: `core/archipelago/src/container/prod_orchestrator.rs:135-137` (detection), manifests for apps with podman mounts (e.g., portainer)
|
||||
- Impact: A compromised app with podman socket access can start/stop/delete any container on the node.
|
||||
- Recommendation: Restrict podman socket mounts to admin-only apps (portainer, docker-api tools); document risk; consider socket filtering layer (selinux context, etc.) once AppArmor is wired.
|
||||
|
||||
**Bitcoin version multi-version branch not fleet-wide:**
|
||||
- Risk: Branch `bitcoin-version-bulletproof` (base `095a76cd`) carries multi-version support but hasn't been deployed fleet-wide yet. .228 carries it; others still run single version.
|
||||
- Impact: Users on single-version nodes can't switch versions; version mismatch across fleet breaks federation.
|
||||
- Migration plan: Coordinated OTA + catalog publish + `:latest` repoint sequencing per `docs/bitcoin-version-bulletproof-rollout.md`. Awaiting user decision on timing.
|
||||
|
||||
## Missing Critical Features
|
||||
|
||||
**Developer tooling CLI suite:**
|
||||
- Problem: Third-party developers need `archy app validate/render/local-install/lifecycle-test` tooling before external registry launches.
|
||||
- Blocks: External marketplace (workstream C); external developer onboarding.
|
||||
- Status: Not yet built; documented in APP-PACKAGING-MIGRATION-PLAN.md step 5.
|
||||
|
||||
**Manifest-distributed registry flip:**
|
||||
- Problem: Manifests still travel via OTA disk rsync. The signed catalog currently distributes only image overrides, not full manifests. Workstream B phases 1+2 done; not yet fleet-deployed.
|
||||
- Blocks: Cannot confidently add/bump apps without re-signing the catalog.
|
||||
- Status: Code ready; flip awaits authorization + timing call from user.
|
||||
|
||||
**Phase-3 Quadlet default-flip:**
|
||||
- Problem: Orchestrator still uses legacy cgroup-based container management; Phase-3 `use_quadlet_backends` switch exists but is opt-in only.
|
||||
- Blocks: Resolves container thrashing; unlocks independent app restarts; unblocks lifecycle perfection (workstream F).
|
||||
- Status: Code validated on .228/.198 (commit pending); ready to flip when multinode gate passes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Test Coverage Gaps
|
||||
|
||||
**~30 apps with zero app-specific assertions:**
|
||||
- What's not tested: Apps like grafana, jellyfin, vaultwarden, penpot, nextcloud, photoprism, uptime-kuma, homeassistant, etc. have no app-specific health checks beyond "container running."
|
||||
- Files: `tests/lifecycle/bats/all-apps-matrix.bats`, `tests/lifecycle/bats/all-apps-lifecycle.bats` (generic baseline coverage)
|
||||
- Risk: App-specific bugs (API down, data corruption, dependency failure) go unnoticed until user encounters them.
|
||||
- Priority: Medium — baseline coverage is a real safety net; app-specific assertions are a "nice to harden" backlog item, not a gate blocker.
|
||||
- Approach: Add per-app health RPC endpoints or HTTP probes; wire into the gate as opt-in per-app test suites.
|
||||
|
||||
**Progress UI assertions incomplete:**
|
||||
- What's not tested: Install + uninstall must report monotonic, truthful progress. No stage/percentage assertions in the gate.
|
||||
- Files: `neode-ui/src/components/AppCard.vue`, `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/package/install.rs` (backend progress events)
|
||||
- Risk: Silent hangs or fake progress bars are invisible to the gate.
|
||||
- Priority: High — immich/grafana uninstall was stuck full-red (fixed); progress truthfulness is part of definition of done for workstream F.
|
||||
- Approach: Backend must emit real progress events; UI must display & test them; integrate into canonical gate (currently opt-in).
|
||||
|
||||
**All-apps matrix in cascade gate:**
|
||||
- What's not tested: `ARCHY_GATE_CASCADE=1` runs ONE throwaway app's uninstall/reinstall. Must extend to multi-container stacks (immich, btcpay, mempool) and all ~40 installed apps.
|
||||
- Files: `tests/lifecycle/bats/cascade-uninstall.bats` (single-app variant)
|
||||
- Risk: Multi-container app uninstall bugs (e.g., orphan postgres container) go undetected.
|
||||
- Priority: High — part of workstream F definition of done.
|
||||
- Approach: Parametrize cascade test over all manifest IDs; run 5 cascades total (not 5 per app to save time); gate-pass requires zero ghost containers post-uninstall.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*Analysis based on codebase state 2026-07-29. Issues tracked in `docs/UNIFIED-TASK-TRACKER.md` (day-to-day) and `docs/PRODUCTION-MASTER-PLAN.md` (historical narrative).*
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
|
||||
# Coding Conventions
|
||||
|
||||
**Analysis Date:** 2026-07-29
|
||||
|
||||
## Naming Patterns
|
||||
|
||||
**Files:**
|
||||
- TypeScript/Vue: PascalCase for components (e.g., `ToggleSwitch.vue`, `SendBitcoinModal.vue`), camelCase for composables and stores (e.g., `useFileType.ts`, `controller.ts`)
|
||||
- Rust: snake_case for modules and files (e.g., `bitcoin_rpc.rs`, `storage_crypto.rs`)
|
||||
- Test files: co-located with source in `__tests__/` subdirectories with `.test.ts` or `.spec.ts` suffix for Vitest, `.bats` for shell tests
|
||||
- Constants in TypeScript use UPPER_SNAKE_CASE within modules (e.g., `IMAGE_EXTS`, `CATEGORY_COLORS` in `useFileType.ts`)
|
||||
|
||||
**Functions:**
|
||||
- TypeScript/Vue: camelCase for all functions (e.g., `getFileCategory`, `formatSize`, `useFileType`)
|
||||
- Composables: `use` prefix for Vue composables (e.g., `useFileType`, `useToast`, `useMessageToast`) — exported as named exports or default exports
|
||||
- Store functions (Pinia): defined with snake_case action names, exported from `defineStore` factory
|
||||
- Rust: snake_case for all functions and methods (e.g., `doesnt_reallocate`, following Rust conventions)
|
||||
|
||||
**Variables:**
|
||||
- TypeScript: camelCase for local variables and reactive refs (e.g., `modelValue`, `isActive`, `gamepadCount`)
|
||||
- Refs (Vue 3): prefix not required, but convention is lowercase start (e.g., `const ext = ref('jpg')`)
|
||||
- Computed properties: camelCase, explicit `.value` suffix in templates when needed
|
||||
- Parameters: camelCase, typed explicitly in TypeScript (e.g., `password: string`, `isDir: Ref<boolean>`)
|
||||
|
||||
**Types:**
|
||||
- TypeScript: PascalCase for type aliases and interfaces (e.g., `RPCOptions`, `FileCategory`, `CatalogVersionInfo`)
|
||||
- Union types: PascalCase (e.g., `PendingState = 'pending' | 'sent' | 'approved'`)
|
||||
- Component props: typed with `defineProps<{ ... }>()` syntax in `<script setup>`
|
||||
- Rust: PascalCase for structs and enums, snake_case for fields within them
|
||||
|
||||
## Code Style
|
||||
|
||||
**Formatting:**
|
||||
- No global Prettier config; code style follows project patterns incrementally
|
||||
- Vue components: single-file components (`.vue`) with `<template>`, `<script setup>`, optional `<style scoped>`
|
||||
- TypeScript: indentation is 2 spaces (visible in `vitest.config.ts`, Vue components, test files)
|
||||
- Line width: no strict enforcement observed; pragmatic wrapping around 80–100 characters
|
||||
- Arrow functions preferred for short callbacks: `(x) => x * 2`
|
||||
- Template strings for multi-line formatting
|
||||
|
||||
**Linting:**
|
||||
- No `.eslintrc` detected at repo root or `neode-ui/` level
|
||||
- Rust: Clippy allowances declared at crate level in `main.rs` (`#![allow(...)]`) to suppress stylistic lints and focus CI on correctness issues
|
||||
- Examples of suppressed Clippy lints: `too_many_arguments`, `type_complexity`, `enum_variant_names`, `unused_io_amount`
|
||||
|
||||
## Import Organization
|
||||
|
||||
**Order:**
|
||||
1. Vue framework imports (`import { computed, ref, type Ref } from 'vue'`)
|
||||
2. Library imports (`import { defineStore } from 'pinia'`, `import { format } from 'date-fns'`)
|
||||
3. Local module imports (`import { useFileType } from '../useFileType'`, `import { rpcClient } from '../api/rpc-client'`)
|
||||
4. Types/interfaces (inline in import statements via `type` keyword when needed)
|
||||
5. No blank lines required between groups in practice
|
||||
|
||||
**Path Aliases:**
|
||||
- TypeScript: `@` alias maps to `src/` (configured in `vitest.config.ts` and `tsconfig.json`)
|
||||
- Usage: `import { displayVersion } from '@/utils/version'`
|
||||
- Rust: crate-relative paths (`use crate::module::submodule`) and external crate paths
|
||||
|
||||
## Error Handling
|
||||
|
||||
**Patterns:**
|
||||
- TypeScript: explicit try-catch with error type narrowing (e.g., `if (error instanceof Error) { ... }`)
|
||||
- RPC client (`rpc-client.ts`): catches fetch errors, AbortError, and HTTP errors; distinguishes retryable (502, 503) from permanent (401, 403)
|
||||
- Rust: `anyhow::Result<T>` for fallible operations; `?` operator for error propagation; `.context("message")` for adding context
|
||||
- Backend error responses: JSON-RPC format with `error: { code, message, data? }` structure; UI catches and displays via toast system
|
||||
- Network errors: automatic retry with exponential backoff (600ms × (attempt + 1) with jitter); configurable `maxRetries` per call
|
||||
|
||||
## Logging
|
||||
|
||||
**Framework:** console object for frontend, `tracing` crate for Rust backend
|
||||
|
||||
**Patterns:**
|
||||
- Frontend: `console.warn`, `console.error` used selectively (e.g., `[RPC]` prefixed logs in `rpc-client.ts` for session/CSRF events)
|
||||
- Rust: `tracing::info!`, `tracing::warn!` for structured logging; `println!` avoided in production code
|
||||
- No log levels enforced or documented; pragmatic use based on severity
|
||||
|
||||
## Comments
|
||||
|
||||
**When to Comment:**
|
||||
- Explain non-obvious retry logic, timeout decisions, CSRF handling (see `rpc-client.ts` lines 138–178 for example)
|
||||
- Clarify why a workaround exists (e.g., "Already on the login page: redirecting = a full reload")
|
||||
- Document integration points with backend RPC methods and their expected response shapes
|
||||
- Avoid redundant comments restating what the code obviously does
|
||||
|
||||
**JSDoc/TSDoc:**
|
||||
- Function parameter types documented inline via TypeScript type annotations (e.g., `ext: Ref<string>`)
|
||||
- Minimal use of explicit JSDoc blocks; type signature is the primary documentation
|
||||
- Comments above exports explain purpose in one sentence (e.g., "// RPC Client for connecting to Archipelago backend")
|
||||
- Optional fields in interfaces documented via property-level comments (e.g., `/** Abort the call from the outside … */`)
|
||||
|
||||
## Function Design
|
||||
|
||||
**Size:** Functions are typically 5–50 lines; error-handling paths in `callInner<T>` (`rpc-client.ts`) stretch to 120 lines but remain single-responsibility (retry logic + error classification)
|
||||
|
||||
**Parameters:**
|
||||
- Prefer object parameters for 3+ arguments (e.g., `RPCOptions` object over separate `method, params, timeout`)
|
||||
- Vue composables accept `Ref<T>` types to maintain reactivity (e.g., `useFileType(ext: Ref<string>, isDir: Ref<boolean>)`)
|
||||
- Store action functions accept only necessary parameters; broader state via closure
|
||||
|
||||
**Return Values:**
|
||||
- Composables return object with properties (computed values + reactive refs): `{ category, isImage, isAudio, ... }`
|
||||
- Store actions return `void` or the modified state
|
||||
- Utilities return simple values or objects (e.g., `formatSize` returns string, `formatDate` returns string)
|
||||
- Async functions return `Promise<T>` with explicit type parameters (e.g., `async call<T>(options): Promise<T>`)
|
||||
|
||||
## Module Design
|
||||
|
||||
**Exports:**
|
||||
- Composables export a single named function and helper functions: `export function useFileType(...)`, `export function getFileCategory(...)`
|
||||
- Stores export the Pinia store factory: `export const useControllerStore = defineStore(...)`
|
||||
- RPC client exports as singleton instance: `export const rpcClient = new RPCClient()`
|
||||
- Utilities export multiple helpers from the same file (e.g., `formatSize`, `formatDate` from same module)
|
||||
|
||||
**Barrel Files:**
|
||||
- Not observed as a primary pattern; each file self-documents its exports
|
||||
- Imports use direct paths (e.g., `from '../composables/useFileType'`) rather than barrel `index.ts`
|
||||
- Test files import specific utilities directly to minimize test setup complexity
|
||||
|
||||
## Type Safety
|
||||
|
||||
**Vue 3 with TypeScript:**
|
||||
- Components use `<script setup lang="ts">` with `defineProps<{ ... }>()` and `defineEmits<{ ... }>()`
|
||||
- Props explicitly typed as interfaces/objects with required/optional fields marked
|
||||
- Events typed as call signatures (e.g., `'update:modelValue': [value: boolean]`)
|
||||
- Reactive variables typed at declaration: `const isActive = ref<boolean>(false)`, or via inference when obvious
|
||||
|
||||
**Rust:**
|
||||
- Explicit type annotations on public APIs; inference acceptable inside functions
|
||||
- Generic parameters used to encode interface contracts (e.g., `struct DataUrl<'a>`)
|
||||
- Pattern matching to handle enums and `Option<T>` / `Result<T, E>` types safely
|
||||
|
||||
## Component Architecture (Vue)
|
||||
|
||||
**File structure:**
|
||||
- Single-file components with template → script → (optional) style
|
||||
- Props come first, emits second, internal state/computed/methods follow
|
||||
- One component per file (naming matches the file name)
|
||||
- Slots used minimally; prefer explicit prop configuration over slot forwarding
|
||||
|
||||
**Reactivity:**
|
||||
- `ref()` for primitive/object state; `computed()` for derived values
|
||||
- `watch()` used for side effects on ref changes (not extensively shown in samples but implied)
|
||||
- Pinia stores used for global state (authentication, app list, mesh status, etc.)
|
||||
|
||||
## Constants and Enums
|
||||
|
||||
**Pattern:** Constants are module-level `const` with UPPER_SNAKE_CASE names and immutable type annotations:
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
const IMAGE_EXTS = new Set(['jpg', 'jpeg', ...])
|
||||
const CATEGORY_COLORS: Record<FileCategory, string> = { ... }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Enums:** Type aliases preferred over TypeScript `enum` keyword (e.g., `type FileCategory = 'folder' | 'image' | ...`)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*Convention analysis: 2026-07-29*
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
|
||||
# External Integrations
|
||||
|
||||
**Analysis Date:** 2026-07-29
|
||||
|
||||
## APIs & External Services
|
||||
|
||||
**Bitcoin Protocol:**
|
||||
- Bitcoin Core RPC endpoint - Primary blockchain interaction
|
||||
- SDK/Client: `bitcoin` crate (v0.32.5), `reqwest` HTTP client
|
||||
- Endpoint: `http://127.0.0.1:8332/` (configurable)
|
||||
- Used for: Transaction broadcasting, UTXO validation, network sync status
|
||||
- Auth: Basic HTTP auth (hardcoded RPC credentials in containers)
|
||||
|
||||
**Lightning Network:**
|
||||
- Lightning Network Daemon (LND) - Layer 2 payments
|
||||
- SDK/Client: Native REST API (`reqwest` + `serde_json`)
|
||||
- REST Endpoint: `http://localhost:8080/` (container network)
|
||||
- gRPC Endpoint: `http://localhost:10009/` (not currently used by backend)
|
||||
- P2P Port: 9735
|
||||
- Used for: Channel management, payment invoicing, routing
|
||||
- Auth: Macaroon-based authentication (stored in `lnd-data:/root/.lnd`)
|
||||
- Proxied: `/proxy/lnd/` → backend RPC auth + CORS handling
|
||||
|
||||
**Nostr Protocol:**
|
||||
- Nostr Relays - Node discovery and encrypted messaging
|
||||
- SDK/Client: `nostr-sdk` crate (v0.44, with NIP-04 and NIP-44 support)
|
||||
- Usage: Optional, opt-in via `NOSTR_DISCOVERY_ENABLED` config
|
||||
- Relays: Configurable via comma-separated `NOSTR_RELAYS` env var
|
||||
- Transport: SOCKS5 Tor proxy optional via `NOSTR_TOR_PROXY` config
|
||||
- Features: Ed25519 node identity publishing, encrypted peer handshake
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/nostr_relays.rs`, `nostr_discovery.rs`, `nostr_handshake.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
**Mesh Networking:**
|
||||
- Reticulum Protocol (RNS v1.3.5) - Local mesh radio coordination
|
||||
- Daemon: `reticulum-daemon/` (Python daemon, RNS 1.3.5 + LXMF 1.0.1)
|
||||
- Interface: Supervised as managed container
|
||||
- LoRa Radio: Serial2 communication over USB (Meshtastic-compatible radios)
|
||||
- P2P Discovery: mDNS (multicast DNS via `mdns-sd` crate)
|
||||
- Mesh Ports: IPv6 dual-stack listeners (port mirroring to containers)
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/mesh/`, `core/archipelago/src/mesh_ports.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
**Tor (Optional):**
|
||||
- Tor SOCKS5 Proxy - Anonymous network routing
|
||||
- Endpoint: `socks5h://127.0.0.1:9050` (default, configurable)
|
||||
- Used for: Nostr relay connections (when routed through Tor)
|
||||
- Client: `reqwest` with SOCKS feature enabled
|
||||
- Config key: `nostr_tor_proxy`
|
||||
|
||||
**Fedimint:**
|
||||
- Federated Custody Chaumian Mint - Alternative payment layer
|
||||
- SDK/Client: JSON-RPC API (`reqwest` + `serde_json`)
|
||||
- Endpoint: `http://localhost:8174/` (container network)
|
||||
- P2P Port: 8173
|
||||
- UI Port: 8175 (guardian management)
|
||||
- Used for: Custody alternatives, blind signatures
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/fedimint.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
**Decentralized Web Node (DWN):**
|
||||
- DWN Health Check - Decentralized identity messaging
|
||||
- Endpoint: `http://127.0.0.1:3100/health`
|
||||
- Purpose: Node provisioning verification
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/constants.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
## Data Storage
|
||||
|
||||
**Databases:**
|
||||
- **Application Databases (optional, app-managed):**
|
||||
- PostgreSQL: Immich, IndeedHub, Penpot, Endurain, Nextcloud
|
||||
- MySQL/MariaDB: Mempool, Nextcloud
|
||||
- Redis/Valkey: Immich, IndeedHub, Penpot (caching/sessions)
|
||||
- SQLite: Optional local state (Cargo.toml comments out `sqlx`)
|
||||
|
||||
Connection: Via container network (not directly accessible from backend)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Key-Value Stores:**
|
||||
- In-memory cache: Tokio sync primitives (Arc<DashMap>, Mutex)
|
||||
- Persistent app state: User credentials, device tokens, manifest cache stored in `$DATA_DIR`
|
||||
|
||||
**File Storage:**
|
||||
- Local filesystem only
|
||||
- User data directory: `$ARCHIPELAGO_DATA_DIR` (default `/var/lib/archipelago/`)
|
||||
- Subdirectories: `apps/`, `secrets/`, `backups/`, `content/`, `catalog/`
|
||||
- App-specific: `/var/lib/archipelago/<app>/` (mounted into containers)
|
||||
- Content sharing: Peer-to-peer via HTTP Range requests (see `content_server.rs`)
|
||||
|
||||
**Caching:**
|
||||
- No external cache service
|
||||
- In-app caching: Tokio-spawned tasks, Arc<DashMap> for concurrent access
|
||||
- Browser caching: Workbox service worker (5-min API cache, 30-day asset cache, 1-year font cache)
|
||||
|
||||
## Authentication & Identity
|
||||
|
||||
**Auth Provider:**
|
||||
- Custom JWT-based (node-local)
|
||||
- Implementation: Ed25519 signing (key in `credentials/` directory)
|
||||
- Session tokens: Stored browser-side via cookies (CSRF token middleware)
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/auth.rs`, `core/archipelago/src/identity_manager.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
**BIP-39 Mnemonic Seed:**
|
||||
- Seed generation: `bip39` crate (v2.1.0)
|
||||
- HD key derivation: `bitcoin` crate (v0.32.5) with BIP-32
|
||||
- Signing: Ed25519 for identity, ECDSA for Bitcoin transactions
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/seed.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
**Identity (Decentralized):**
|
||||
- Nostr npub (from Ed25519 keys)
|
||||
- DID (Decentralized Identifier) via did:dht (BitTorrent DHT)
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/identity.rs`, `core/archipelago/src/nostr_discovery.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
**2FA:**
|
||||
- TOTP (Time-based One-Time Password)
|
||||
- Library: `totp-rs` (v5.7, with otpauth and gen_secret)
|
||||
- QR generation: `qrcode` crate (v0.14)
|
||||
- Encrypted storage: Argon2-derived key + ChaCha20-Poly1305
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/totp.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
## Monitoring & Observability
|
||||
|
||||
**Error Tracking:**
|
||||
- Not integrated (logging only)
|
||||
|
||||
**Logs:**
|
||||
- Approach: Structured logging via `tracing` crate
|
||||
- Output: stdout (configurable level via `RUST_LOG` or config file)
|
||||
- Subscriber: `tracing-subscriber` with `env-filter`
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/monitoring.rs`, `core/archipelago/src/health_monitor.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
**Health Monitoring:**
|
||||
- Health checks: Container liveness probes (Docker/Podman healthcheck)
|
||||
- System metrics: Disk space, memory, container startup tiers
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/health_monitor.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
## CI/CD & Deployment
|
||||
|
||||
**Hosting:**
|
||||
- Bare metal (Debian Linux) with Podman rootless containers
|
||||
- Fleet nodes: .198, .228, .116, x250-dev, Framework PT (various test/dev targets)
|
||||
|
||||
**CI Pipeline:**
|
||||
- Git-based CI: Gitea (self-hosted at `.160:3000` and `.168:3000`)
|
||||
- Push accounts: `gitea-ai` (for protected main branch)
|
||||
- Build pipeline: Local `cargo build`/`npm run build` (not centralized CI/CD service)
|
||||
- Release: Manual versioning + signed OTA manifests
|
||||
- Docker builds: Local `docker-compose` or Dockerfile.web/backend
|
||||
|
||||
**Deployment:**
|
||||
- Container orchestration: Podman with Quadlet systemd units (Phase 3+)
|
||||
- Legacy fallback: Direct `podman create + systemctl start`
|
||||
- OTA (Over-The-Air): Signed manifest-driven updates (v1.7+)
|
||||
- Sideload: Binary + tarball to `/usr/local/bin/archipelago` and `/opt/archipelago/`
|
||||
|
||||
## Environment Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
**Required env vars:**
|
||||
- `ARCHIPELAGO_DATA_DIR` - Local state directory (default: platform-specific)
|
||||
- `ARCHIPELAGO_LOG_LEVEL` - Logging verbosity (default: `info`)
|
||||
- `CONTAINER_RUNTIME` - `podman` or `docker` (auto-detect by default)
|
||||
- `NOSTR_DISCOVERY_ENABLED` - Enable node publishing to Nostr relays (false by default)
|
||||
- `NOSTR_RELAYS` - Comma-separated relay URLs (if discovery enabled)
|
||||
- `NOSTR_TOR_PROXY` - SOCKS5 proxy address (optional, routes Nostr through Tor)
|
||||
- `VITE_AIUI_URL` - AIUI chat interface URL (frontend, optional)
|
||||
- `BACKEND_URL` - Backend target for dev server (frontend, default: `http://localhost:5959`)
|
||||
|
||||
**Secrets location:**
|
||||
- At-rest: `$DATA_DIR/credentials/` (user.json with encrypted TOTP, session keys)
|
||||
- In-container: Mounted as read-only volumes, never logged
|
||||
- No `.env` file in production (config-driven)
|
||||
|
||||
## Webhooks & Callbacks
|
||||
|
||||
**Incoming:**
|
||||
- Marketplace callbacks - App catalog updates from registry
|
||||
- Peer discovery webhooks (via Nostr relays)
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/webhooks.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
**Outgoing:**
|
||||
- Device token push notifications (not yet implemented)
|
||||
- App install/uninstall event notifications (framework-pt integration)
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/device_tokens.rs`
|
||||
|
||||
## Container-Based Services (Orchestrated by Archipelago)
|
||||
|
||||
**Bitcoin Stack:**
|
||||
- Bitcoin Core (lncm/bitcoind:v27.0 or knots variant)
|
||||
- ElectrumX (via separate image)
|
||||
- Electrs (alternative to ElectrumX)
|
||||
|
||||
**Lightning/Payments:**
|
||||
- LND (lightninglabs/lnd:v0.17.4-beta+)
|
||||
- BTCPay Server (btcpayserver:1.13.5+)
|
||||
- Fedimint (fedimint/fedimintd:v0.10.0+)
|
||||
|
||||
**Media & Content:**
|
||||
- Immich (self-hosted photo/media library)
|
||||
- Nextcloud (cloud storage)
|
||||
- OnlyOffice (document server)
|
||||
- Penpot (design tool)
|
||||
- SearXNG (search engine)
|
||||
- FileBrowser (file management UI)
|
||||
|
||||
**Infrastructure:**
|
||||
- nginx (reverse proxy, CORS, rate limiting)
|
||||
- Home Assistant (home automation hub)
|
||||
- Grafana (metrics dashboard)
|
||||
- ThunderHub (Lightning node UI)
|
||||
- Mempool Explorer (blockchain monitor)
|
||||
- Endurain (fitness tracking)
|
||||
- Morphos (file converter)
|
||||
- IndeedHub (job board)
|
||||
- Pine (voice assistant)
|
||||
|
||||
## Integration Points (API Contracts)
|
||||
|
||||
**Backend ↔ Frontend (gRPC-style RPC):**
|
||||
- Endpoint: `/rpc/v1/*` (HTTP/REST)
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/` (all RPC handlers)
|
||||
- Major modules: `auth.rs`, `bitcoin.rs`, `lnd/`, `container.rs`, `marketplace.rs`, `mesh/`
|
||||
|
||||
**Frontend ↔ App Iframes:**
|
||||
- Endpoint: `/app/<app-name>/*` (proxied to container)
|
||||
- Sandbox: Cross-origin iframe isolation
|
||||
|
||||
**Mesh Node ↔ Reticulum:**
|
||||
- Serial: USB LoRa radio (Meshtastic-compatible)
|
||||
- Protocol: Binary Meshcore format
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/mesh/`
|
||||
|
||||
**Catalog ↔ App Registry:**
|
||||
- Endpoint: `/api/app-catalog` (cached from registry)
|
||||
- Format: Signed YAML manifest + SHA256 verification
|
||||
- Related files: `core/archipelago/src/marketplace.rs`, `app_catalog/`
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*Integration audit: 2026-07-29*
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
|
||||
# Technology Stack
|
||||
|
||||
**Analysis Date:** 2026-07-29
|
||||
|
||||
## Languages
|
||||
|
||||
**Primary:**
|
||||
- Rust 2021 edition - Backend server (Archipelago daemon, container orchestrator)
|
||||
- TypeScript 5.9 - Frontend (Vue components, application code)
|
||||
- Vue 3 (TypeScript) - UI framework and reactive components
|
||||
- Python 3.13 - Reticulum mesh daemon (RNS/LXMF protocols)
|
||||
|
||||
**Secondary:**
|
||||
- JavaScript - Build scripts, mock backend (`neode-ui/mock-backend.js`), test utilities
|
||||
- YAML - Configuration (docker-compose, app manifests)
|
||||
- Shell - Build scripts, deployment helpers
|
||||
|
||||
## Runtime
|
||||
|
||||
**Environment:**
|
||||
- Rust (1.70+) - Native compiled binaries
|
||||
- Node.js 22 (Alpine-based containers) - Frontend dev/build, mock backend
|
||||
- Python 3.13 - Reticulum daemon runtime
|
||||
- Tokio async runtime (v1, full features) - Async server runtime
|
||||
|
||||
**Package Manager:**
|
||||
- npm (v10+) - JavaScript dependencies
|
||||
- Cargo (v1.70+) - Rust dependencies
|
||||
- pip - Python dependencies (Reticulum stack)
|
||||
- Lockfiles: `neode-ui/package-lock.json`, `core/Cargo.lock`
|
||||
|
||||
## Frameworks
|
||||
|
||||
**Core:**
|
||||
- Tokio (v1) - Async Rust runtime, full features (networking, signals, sync primitives)
|
||||
- Vue 3 (v3.5) - Progressive web framework with TypeScript support
|
||||
- Hyper (v0.14) - HTTP/1 server framework with WebSocket support
|
||||
- Reticulum (v1.3.5) - Mesh networking protocol stack
|
||||
- LXMF (v1.0.1) - Lightweight message format protocol
|
||||
|
||||
**HTTP & WebSocket:**
|
||||
- Hyper v0.14 (HTTP/1, full features) - Core HTTP server
|
||||
- Hyper-util v0.1 - HTTP utilities
|
||||
- Tower v0.5 - Middleware and service composing
|
||||
- Tower-http v0.6 - CORS, tracing middleware
|
||||
- Hyper-ws-listener v0.3 - WebSocket upgrade handler
|
||||
- Tokio-tungstenite v0.20 - WebSocket client/server implementation
|
||||
- Reqwest v0.11 - HTTP client (with rustls-tls, SOCKS proxy support, JSON)
|
||||
|
||||
**Frontend Build:**
|
||||
- Vite v7.2 - Build tool and dev server
|
||||
- Vue-tsc v3.1 - TypeScript compilation for Vue
|
||||
- Tailwind CSS v3.4 - Utility-first CSS framework
|
||||
- Autoprefixer v10.4 - CSS vendor prefixes
|
||||
- PostCSS v8.5 - CSS processing
|
||||
|
||||
**Testing:**
|
||||
- Vitest v3.1 - Unit test runner (Vite-native)
|
||||
- Playwright v1.58 - E2E testing (browser automation)
|
||||
- @vue/test-utils v2.4 - Vue component testing
|
||||
- JSDOM v25 - DOM implementation for tests
|
||||
- Tokio-test v0.4 - Async Rust test utilities
|
||||
|
||||
**PWA:**
|
||||
- Vite-plugin-pwa v1.2 - Progressive Web App support
|
||||
- Workbox integration - Service worker caching strategies
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Dependencies
|
||||
|
||||
**Critical:**
|
||||
- bitcoin v0.32.5 - Bitcoin library (with rand-std feature for BIP-39/BIP-32)
|
||||
- bip39 v2.1.0 - Mnemonic seed generation
|
||||
- nostr-sdk v0.44 - Nostr protocol (NIP-04, NIP-44 encrypted messaging)
|
||||
- mainline v2 - BitTorrent DHT (did:dht decentralized identity)
|
||||
- reticulum v1.3.5 - Mesh networking protocol
|
||||
- lxmf v1.0.1 - Lightweight message format
|
||||
|
||||
**Cryptography:**
|
||||
- ed25519-dalek v2.2 - Ed25519 digital signatures (with rand_core)
|
||||
- curve25519-dalek v4.1 - X25519 elliptic curve (key agreement)
|
||||
- blake3 v1 - BLAKE3 hash function
|
||||
- bcrypt v0.15 - Password hashing
|
||||
- sha2 v0.10 - SHA-256 hashing
|
||||
- hmac v0.12 - HMAC authentication
|
||||
- argon2 v0.5 - Argon2 password hashing
|
||||
- chacha20poly1305 v0.10 - AEAD encryption
|
||||
- zeroize v1.8 - Secure memory wiping
|
||||
|
||||
**Authentication & Identity:**
|
||||
- uuid v1.0 - UUID generation (v4)
|
||||
- totp-rs v5.7 - TOTP 2FA (with otpauth, gen_secret)
|
||||
- qrcode v0.14 - QR code generation (server-side)
|
||||
|
||||
**Data Serialization:**
|
||||
- serde v1.0 - Serialization framework (with derive)
|
||||
- serde_json v1.0 - JSON codec
|
||||
- serde_yaml v0.9 - YAML codec
|
||||
- ciborium v0.2 - CBOR encoding/decoding
|
||||
- serde_bytes v0.11 - Efficient byte serialization
|
||||
- toml v0.8 - TOML config parsing
|
||||
|
||||
**Networking & Mesh:**
|
||||
- mdns-sd v0.18 - mDNS service discovery
|
||||
- serial2-tokio v0.1 - Serial port communication (LoRa radios over USB)
|
||||
- socket2 v0.5 - Low-level socket options (IPv6_V6ONLY for dual-stack)
|
||||
- libc v0.2 - Process group signaling
|
||||
|
||||
**Compression & Archives:**
|
||||
- tar v0.4 - TAR archive creation
|
||||
- flate2 v1.0 - gzip compression
|
||||
- zip v2.0 - ZIP archive handling (LoRa firmware flashing)
|
||||
- reed-solomon-erasure v6.0 - Erasure coding (Phase 2 mesh transport)
|
||||
- hkdf v0.12 - HKDF key derivation (Phase 3 encrypted mesh)
|
||||
|
||||
**Utilities:**
|
||||
- anyhow v1.0 - Error handling
|
||||
- thiserror v1.0 - Error types with derive macros
|
||||
- tracing v0.1 - Structured logging
|
||||
- tracing-subscriber v0.3 - Log filtering and formatting
|
||||
- regex v1.10 - Pattern matching
|
||||
- chrono v0.4 - Date/time handling
|
||||
- hex v0.4 - Hex encoding/decoding
|
||||
- bs58 v0.5 - Base58 encoding (Bitcoin addresses)
|
||||
- base64 v0.21 - Base64 encoding
|
||||
- zbase32 v0.1 - Z-base-32 encoding (DHT)
|
||||
- data-encoding v2.6 - Multiple encoding schemes
|
||||
- bytes v1 - Efficient byte buffer
|
||||
- futures-util v0.3 - Async utilities
|
||||
- http-body-util v0.1 - HTTP body utilities
|
||||
- http-body v1.0 - HTTP body abstractions
|
||||
- indexmap v2.0 - Ordered maps
|
||||
- async-trait v0.1 - Async trait methods
|
||||
- sd-notify v0.4 - Systemd watchdog notification
|
||||
|
||||
**Infrastructure (Optional):**
|
||||
- iroh v1 (optional, feature-gated) - QUIC-based peer swarm engine (Phase 2)
|
||||
- iroh-blobs v0.103 (optional, feature-gated) - Content addressable storage provider
|
||||
|
||||
## Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
**Environment:**
|
||||
- Config file: `config/archipelago.toml` or `$DATA_DIR/config.yml`
|
||||
- Runtime options: Docker/Podman selection, dev/prod modes, FIPS anchor selection, Nostr discovery
|
||||
- Key env vars: `ARCHIPELAGO_DATA_DIR`, `ARCHIPELAGO_LOG_LEVEL`, `CONTAINER_RUNTIME`, `NOSTR_DISCOVERY_ENABLED`, `NOSTR_RELAYS`, `NOSTR_TOR_PROXY`
|
||||
|
||||
**Build:**
|
||||
- Cargo workspace at `core/` (5 members: archipelago, container, openwrt, performance, security)
|
||||
- Release profile: opt-level 3
|
||||
- Dev profile: opt-level 0
|
||||
- Test profile: opt-level 3
|
||||
- Cross-compilation: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu via `.cargo/config.toml`
|
||||
|
||||
**Frontend Build:**
|
||||
- Vite config: `neode-ui/vite.config.ts` (development port 8100, production build to `../web/dist/neode-ui`)
|
||||
- TypeScript config: `neode-ui/tsconfig.json`
|
||||
- Module path alias: `@` → `src/`
|
||||
|
||||
## Platform Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
**Development:**
|
||||
- Rust 1.70+ with Cargo
|
||||
- Node.js 22+ with npm
|
||||
- Python 3.13+ (for Reticulum daemon)
|
||||
- Docker or Podman (for local app testing)
|
||||
- rustup target: `aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu` (for ARM64 cross-compilation)
|
||||
- gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu (for cross-compilation toolchain on Linux hosts)
|
||||
|
||||
**Production:**
|
||||
- Deployment target: Debian/Alpine Linux (rootless Podman)
|
||||
- Binary output: `/usr/local/bin/archipelago` (sideloaded or via Quadlet systemd units)
|
||||
- Frontend served: nginx with Vite-built SPA (PWA manifest, service worker, CORS proxies)
|
||||
- Database support: Optional (SQLx with SQLite driver available but commented out)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*Stack analysis: 2026-07-29*
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
|
||||
# Codebase Structure
|
||||
|
||||
**Analysis Date:** 2026-07-29
|
||||
|
||||
## Directory Layout
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
archipelago-repo/
|
||||
├── core/ # Rust workspace root (Cargo.toml at workspace level)
|
||||
│ ├── archipelago/ # Main daemon binary (backend)
|
||||
│ │ ├── src/
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── main.rs # Entry point, startup, background tasks
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── server.rs # HTTP server (Hyper), listener, connection multiplexing
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── state.rs # StateManager + data_model.rs (central state)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── auth.rs # User auth, password hashing, session management
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── identity.rs # Node identity, Ed25519 keys, Tor address
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── config.rs # Config loading, data directory setup
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── api/ # HTTP API layer
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── handler/ # HTTP request dispatch, WebSocket, content proxy
|
||||
│ │ │ │ └── rpc/ # JSON-RPC 2.0 methods (~40 domain modules)
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── auth.rs # auth.login, auth.setup, etc.
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── container.rs # container.install, .list, .start, etc.
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── bitcoin.rs # bitcoin.status, bitcoin.send, etc.
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── mesh.rs # mesh.* (peer discovery, LoRa, federation)
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── wallet.rs # wallet.* (lightning, Bitcoin)
|
||||
│ │ │ │ └── [20+ other domains]
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── container/ # Container orchestration (Podman)
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── prod_orchestrator.rs # Main Podman lifecycle (>250KB)
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── boot_reconciler.rs # Periodic manifest sync loop
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── docker_packages.rs # Image registry, image verification
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── quadlet.rs # Systemd Quadlet generation
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── secrets.rs # Secret injection (0600 files)
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── lnd.rs # Lightning Network Daemon container setup
|
||||
│ │ │ │ ├── app_catalog.rs # Signed app catalog, manifest overlay
|
||||
│ │ │ │ └── [data managers, registry, image policy]
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── bootstrap.rs # Post-startup tasks (systemd units, audio stack, gamepad)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── crash_recovery.rs # Container recovery after crash, PID marker
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── health_monitor.rs # Periodic app health checks, restart
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── mesh.rs # Mesh P2P listener, sender, LoRa radio control
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── federation.rs # Federation (DNS-SD, HTTP API)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── fips/ # FIPS anchor (Tor bridge to peer)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── bitcoin_rpc.rs # Bitcoin Core RPC client calls
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── bitcoin_status.rs # Bitcoin sync status polling
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── content_server.rs # Content-addressed blob server (CAP tokens)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── blobs.rs # BlobStore (hash→file mapping, encryption)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── wallet.rs # Lightning + Bitcoin wallet logic
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── identity_manager.rs # Seed derivation, key rotation
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── marketplace.rs # Marketplace transaction logic
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── transport.rs # Transport selection (Mesh/FIPS/Tor routing)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── update.rs # OTA update apply, verification, rollback
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── session.rs # Session store (SQLite or in-memory)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── rate_limit.rs # Rate limiter (per-IP, per-endpoint, per-user)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── monitoring.rs # Metrics collection (app count, memory, etc.)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── data_model.rs # State struct tree (serde Serialize/Deserialize)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── constants.rs # Global constants (version, defaults)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── peer*.rs, webhook*.rs, nostr*.rs, vpn.rs, etc.
|
||||
│ │ │ └── seed.rs # Seed storage, backup QR generation
|
||||
│ │ ├── Cargo.toml # Dependencies
|
||||
│ │ └── tests/ # Unit/integration tests
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ ├── container/ # Container management library (OCI types, Podman)
|
||||
│ │ ├── src/
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── manifest.rs # Manifest struct (YAML parsing)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── runtime.rs # Podman CLI calls (create, start, stop, logs)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── podman_client.rs # Podman socket API client
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── image_verify.rs # Image signature verification (Cosign)
|
||||
│ │ │ └── port_manager.rs # Port allocation, conflict detection
|
||||
│ │ └── Cargo.toml
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ ├── security/ # Secrets management library
|
||||
│ │ ├── src/
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── secrets_manager.rs # Secret encryption/decryption (ChaCha20)
|
||||
│ │ │ └── vault.rs # Vault storage, rotation
|
||||
│ │ └── Cargo.toml
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ ├── performance/ # Performance monitoring library
|
||||
│ ├── openwrt/ # OpenWrt device integration
|
||||
│ ├── Cargo.toml # Workspace manifest (members: archipelago, container, security, etc.)
|
||||
│ └── Cargo.lock # Locked dependency versions
|
||||
│
|
||||
├── neode-ui/ # Frontend (Vue 3, TypeScript)
|
||||
│ ├── src/
|
||||
│ │ ├── main.ts # Vue app entry point, Router setup, WebSocket init
|
||||
│ │ ├── App.vue # Root component (layout, nav)
|
||||
│ │ ├── router/
|
||||
│ │ │ └── index.ts # Vue Router config (routes, guards)
|
||||
│ │ ├── views/ # Page-level components (one per route)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── Home.vue # Dashboard
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── Apps.vue # App browser + installer
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── AppDetails.vue # Single app detail + logs
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── AppSession.vue # Iframe container for app content
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── Cloud.vue # File browser (WebDAV/DWN)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── Mesh.vue # Mesh map, contacts, messages
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── Wallet.vue # Lightning + Bitcoin addresses/sends
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── Marketplace.vue # Paid apps, content marketplace
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── Server.vue # Node status, settings, restart
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── Federation.vue # Federation peers, federation apps
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── Onboarding*/ # Multi-step setup flow
|
||||
│ │ │ └── [15+ other pages]
|
||||
│ │ ├── components/ # Reusable UI components
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── AppCard.vue # App listing card
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── AppInstaller.vue # Install modal
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── Modal.vue # Generic modal (teleported)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── Toast.vue # Notification toast
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── MeshGraph.vue # Mesh topology graph (D3)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── MapView.vue # Mesh map (Leaflet)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── QrScanner.vue # QR code input
|
||||
│ │ │ └── [30+ other components]
|
||||
│ │ ├── composables/ # Logic hooks (Vue composition API)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── useAuth.ts # Login/logout logic
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── useAppStore.ts # Access app Pinia store
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── useRpc.ts # Make RPC calls
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── useWebSocket.ts # WebSocket connection management
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── useOnboarding.ts # Onboarding flow state
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── useControllerNav.ts # Gamepad controller navigation
|
||||
│ │ │ └── [20+ other composables]
|
||||
│ │ ├── stores/ # Pinia state management (reactive stores)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── appStore.ts # Apps list, install state
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── walletStore.ts # Lightning/Bitcoin addresses, balance
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── meshStore.ts # Mesh peers, messages
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── settingsStore.ts # User settings, theme, language
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── userStore.ts # Current user identity
|
||||
│ │ │ └── [other stores]
|
||||
│ │ ├── api/
|
||||
│ │ │ └── rpc-client.ts # RPC client library (request, WebSocket, reconnect)
|
||||
│ │ ├── services/ # Business logic (not Vue-dependent)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── qrScanner.ts # QR scanner initialization
|
||||
│ │ │ └── [other services]
|
||||
│ │ ├── utils/ # Utility functions
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── format.ts # Date, number, currency formatting
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── validate.ts # Input validation (emails, addresses)
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── crypto.ts # Client-side crypto (BIP39, etc.)
|
||||
│ │ │ └── [helpers]
|
||||
│ │ ├── types/ # TypeScript type definitions
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── index.ts # Export all types
|
||||
│ │ │ └── [domain-specific types]
|
||||
│ │ ├── i18n.ts # Internationalization config
|
||||
│ │ ├── locales/ # Translation files
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── en.json # English
|
||||
│ │ │ ├── es.json # Spanish
|
||||
│ │ │ └── [other languages]
|
||||
│ │ ├── assets/ # Static assets
|
||||
│ │ │ └── icon/ # App icons, favicons
|
||||
│ │ ├── style.css # Global CSS (Tailwind + custom)
|
||||
│ │ ├── data/ # Static data (country lists, etc.)
|
||||
│ │ └── e2e/ # Playwright E2E tests
|
||||
│ │ ├── intro-experience.spec.ts
|
||||
│ │ └── app-launch.spec.ts
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ ├── public/ # Static web root
|
||||
│ │ ├── index.html # HTML entry point
|
||||
│ │ ├── favicon.ico # Browser tab icon
|
||||
│ │ ├── manifest.json # PWA manifest
|
||||
│ │ └── catalog.json # App catalog (copied from app-catalog/catalog.json)
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ ├── package.json # Frontend dependencies + build scripts
|
||||
│ ├── tsconfig.json # TypeScript config
|
||||
│ ├── vite.config.ts # Vite build config
|
||||
│ ├── vitest.config.ts # Vitest test runner config
|
||||
│ ├── tailwind.config.js # Tailwind CSS config
|
||||
│ ├── mock-backend.js # Dev mock server (for `npm run dev:mock`)
|
||||
│ └── [other build configs]
|
||||
│
|
||||
├── apps/ # Containerized applications (app manifests + build scripts)
|
||||
│ ├── bitcoin-core/ # Bitcoin Core container
|
||||
│ │ ├── manifest.yml # Archipelago manifest (interface, ports, secrets, health)
|
||||
│ │ ├── Dockerfile # OCI image definition
|
||||
│ │ ├── bitcoin.conf.template # Config template (secrets injected at runtime)
|
||||
│ │ └── start.sh # Container entrypoint
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
│ ├── lightning-stack/ # Lightning Network stack (LND)
|
||||
│ ├── lnd/ # LND daemon
|
||||
│ ├── immich/ # Photo backup app
|
||||
│ ├── nextcloud/ # Cloud storage
|
||||
│ ├── electrumx/ # Bitcoin block explorer index
|
||||
│ ├── router/ # Mesh router app
|
||||
│ ├── pine/ # Voice assistant (whisper + piper + nginx)
|
||||
│ ├── vaultwarden/ # Password manager
|
||||
│ ├── [40+ other apps]
|
||||
│ ├── QUICKSTART.md # App development guide
|
||||
│ ├── PORTS.md # Port allocation reference
|
||||
│ └── build.sh # App build script (all apps)
|
||||
│
|
||||
├── web/ # Built frontend output
|
||||
│ └── dist/
|
||||
│ └── neode-ui/ # `npm run build` output (served by nginx)
|
||||
│ ├── index.html
|
||||
│ ├── [JS bundles]
|
||||
│ └── [static assets]
|
||||
│
|
||||
├── tests/ # Test suite
|
||||
│ ├── lifecycle/
|
||||
│ │ ├── run-gate.sh # Single-node production gate (5 iterations)
|
||||
│ │ └── TESTING.md # Test plan documentation
|
||||
│ ├── e2e/ # End-to-end tests (Playwright)
|
||||
│ └── [other test directories]
|
||||
│
|
||||
├── docs/ # Documentation (user & developer guides)
|
||||
│ ├── PRODUCTION-MASTER-PLAN.md # North star: manifest-driven, registry-based, decentralized
|
||||
│ ├── UNIFIED-TASK-TRACKER.md # Open tasks (fastest-first)
|
||||
│ ├── APP-PACKAGING-MIGRATION-PLAN.md
|
||||
│ ├── registry-manifest-design.md
|
||||
│ ├── multinode-testing-plan.md
|
||||
│ ├── release-workflow.md # OTA + ISO release process
|
||||
│ ├── app-development.md # Guide for app developers
|
||||
│ ├── api-rpc-reference.md # JSON-RPC 2.0 method documentation
|
||||
│ └── [20+ other docs]
|
||||
│
|
||||
├── image-recipe/ # ISO/image build scripts
|
||||
│ ├── build-debian-iso.sh # Builds bootable Debian ISO
|
||||
│ ├── include/ # Root filesystem overlays
|
||||
│ │ └── opt/archipelago/ # Pre-baked config, scripts, systemd units
|
||||
│ └── [other image components]
|
||||
│
|
||||
├── scripts/ # Utility scripts
|
||||
│ ├── deploy-to-target.sh # Sideload binary to test node (Tailscale SSH + rsync)
|
||||
│ ├── resilience/ # Resilience test scripts
|
||||
│ └── [other scripts]
|
||||
│
|
||||
├── demo/ # Demo deployment (pre-configured node)
|
||||
│ ├── demo-deploy.yml # Docker Compose for vps2 demo
|
||||
│ └── [demo-specific scripts]
|
||||
│
|
||||
├── docker/ # Docker/Podman config
|
||||
│ └── [docker-compose fragments, Dockerfiles]
|
||||
│
|
||||
├── .planning/ # Codebase analysis documents (this is you)
|
||||
│ └── codebase/
|
||||
│ ├── ARCHITECTURE.md
|
||||
│ ├── STRUCTURE.md
|
||||
│ ├── CONVENTIONS.md
|
||||
│ ├── TESTING.md
|
||||
│ ├── STACK.md
|
||||
│ ├── INTEGRATIONS.md
|
||||
│ └── CONCERNS.md
|
||||
│
|
||||
├── .claude/ # Claude Code configuration
|
||||
│ └── skills/ # GSD skills (if any project-specific)
|
||||
│
|
||||
├── .github/ # GitHub Actions CI/CD
|
||||
├── .gitea/ # Gitea CI/CD (local Gitea runner)
|
||||
├── .git/ # Git repository
|
||||
├── .gitignore # Git ignore patterns
|
||||
├── CLAUDE.md # Project instructions (commit rules, invariants, testing)
|
||||
├── Cargo.lock # Locked Rust dependency versions
|
||||
├── CHANGELOG.md # Release notes
|
||||
├── CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
|
||||
├── CONTRIBUTING.md
|
||||
└── README.md # Project overview
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Directory Purposes
|
||||
|
||||
**core/**
|
||||
- Purpose: Rust backend source and dependencies
|
||||
- Contains: Main daemon binary, container orchestration, RPC handlers, business logic
|
||||
- Key files: `archipelago/src/main.rs` (entry point), `archipelago/Cargo.toml` (deps)
|
||||
|
||||
**neode-ui/**
|
||||
- Purpose: Vue 3 frontend SPA source
|
||||
- Contains: Views, components, stores, translations, tests, build config
|
||||
- Key files: `src/main.ts` (entry point), `vite.config.ts` (build), `package.json` (deps)
|
||||
|
||||
**apps/**
|
||||
- Purpose: Containerized application definitions
|
||||
- Contains: Manifests (YAML), Dockerfiles, configs for ~50 apps (Bitcoin, LND, Immich, etc.)
|
||||
- Key files: `*/manifest.yml` (app definition), `*/Dockerfile` (image build)
|
||||
|
||||
**web/dist/neode-ui/**
|
||||
- Purpose: Production frontend output (built by `npm run build`)
|
||||
- Contains: Bundled JS, HTML, static assets
|
||||
- Key files: `index.html` (entry), JS chunks (hashed filenames)
|
||||
- Note: Served by nginx at `/` on node
|
||||
|
||||
**tests/**
|
||||
- Purpose: Test suite (unit, integration, E2E)
|
||||
- Contains: Lifecycle gate (production exit criterion), E2E specs, test utilities
|
||||
- Key files: `lifecycle/run-gate.sh` (the production gate), `e2e/*.spec.ts` (user flows)
|
||||
|
||||
**docs/**
|
||||
- Purpose: User and developer documentation
|
||||
- Contains: Architecture, design decisions, release process, task tracking
|
||||
- Key files: `PRODUCTION-MASTER-PLAN.md` (north star), `UNIFIED-TASK-TRACKER.md` (open tasks)
|
||||
|
||||
**image-recipe/**
|
||||
- Purpose: ISO/image build scripts
|
||||
- Contains: Debian ISO recipe, root filesystem overlays, bootloader config
|
||||
- Key files: `build-debian-iso.sh` (main build), `include/opt/archipelago/` (pre-baked system config)
|
||||
|
||||
**scripts/**
|
||||
- Purpose: Utility and deployment scripts
|
||||
- Contains: Sideload/deploy to test nodes, resilience testing, CI glue
|
||||
- Key files: `deploy-to-target.sh` (ship binary to remote node)
|
||||
|
||||
## Key File Locations
|
||||
|
||||
**Entry Points:**
|
||||
- Backend daemon: `core/archipelago/src/main.rs` (spawns HTTP server, tasks, orchestrator)
|
||||
- Frontend app: `neode-ui/src/main.ts` (Vue app, router, WebSocket init)
|
||||
- App manifest: `apps/*/manifest.yml` (Archipelago-specific; controls container, secrets, UI)
|
||||
- Production gate: `tests/lifecycle/run-gate.sh` (exit criterion for releases)
|
||||
|
||||
**Configuration:**
|
||||
- Backend config: `core/archipelago/src/config.rs` (data dir, bind port, dev mode flag)
|
||||
- Frontend config: `neode-ui/vite.config.ts` (build settings, env vars)
|
||||
- App registries: `/var/lib/archipelago/registries.json` (user-configured Gitea mirrors)
|
||||
- Secrets location: `/var/lib/archipelago/secrets/` (encrypted ChaCha20 files)
|
||||
|
||||
**Core Logic:**
|
||||
- Container orchestration: `core/archipelago/src/container/prod_orchestrator.rs` (300KB+ main logic)
|
||||
- RPC dispatch: `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mod.rs` (method routing, ~200 RPCs)
|
||||
- State management: `core/archipelago/src/state.rs` (StateManager) + `core/archipelago/src/data_model.rs` (struct def)
|
||||
- Frontend stores: `neode-ui/src/stores/` (Pinia stores, reactive state)
|
||||
|
||||
**Testing:**
|
||||
- Rust unit tests: Inline in `core/` modules (use `#[test]` and `#[tokio::test]`)
|
||||
- Vitest unit tests: `neode-ui/src/**/__tests__/*.test.ts`
|
||||
- E2E tests: `neode-ui/e2e/*.spec.ts` (Playwright)
|
||||
- Integration tests: `tests/` (shell scripts, node command testing)
|
||||
|
||||
## Naming Conventions
|
||||
|
||||
**Files:**
|
||||
- Rust modules: `snake_case.rs` (e.g., `health_monitor.rs`, `crash_recovery.rs`)
|
||||
- Vue components: `PascalCase.vue` (e.g., `AppCard.vue`, `MeshGraph.vue`)
|
||||
- Composables: `use[Name].ts` (e.g., `useAuth.ts`, `useRpc.ts`)
|
||||
- Stores: `[domain]Store.ts` (e.g., `appStore.ts`, `walletStore.ts`)
|
||||
- Tests: `[name].test.ts` or `[name].spec.ts` (e.g., `rpc-client.test.ts`, `app-launch.spec.ts`)
|
||||
- Scripts: lowercase with hyphens (e.g., `deploy-to-target.sh`, `run-gate.sh`)
|
||||
|
||||
**Directories:**
|
||||
- Rust workspace members: lowercase (e.g., `archipelago`, `container`, `security`)
|
||||
- Feature directories: PascalCase or lowercase depending on context
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/views/` — page components (mostly PascalCase)
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/composables/` — logic hooks (lowercase files with `use` prefix)
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/` — RPC modules by domain (lowercase: `bitcoin.rs`, `mesh.rs`)
|
||||
|
||||
**Functions/Methods:**
|
||||
- Async functions: `async fn method_name() -> Result<T>` (no special suffix)
|
||||
- Event handlers: `on[Event]` in Vue (e.g., `@click="onInstall"` calls `onInstall()`)
|
||||
- Computed properties: `computed(() => ...)` (no special name)
|
||||
- Public RPC methods: `pub async fn [domain]_[action](...)` (e.g., `container_install`, `bitcoin_send`)
|
||||
|
||||
**Variables & Constants:**
|
||||
- Constants: `UPPER_SNAKE_CASE` (e.g., `RECONCILER_DEFAULT_INTERVAL`, `MAX_FILE_SIZE`)
|
||||
- State variables: `camelCase` (e.g., `appList`, `isLoading`)
|
||||
- Type aliases: `PascalCase` (e.g., `AppId`, `MeshPeer`)
|
||||
|
||||
**Exports & Modules:**
|
||||
- Re-exports barrel files: `mod.rs` exporting `pub use child::*;`
|
||||
- Private internals: `mod private;` (not `pub mod`)
|
||||
- Path aliases (neode-ui): `@/` = `src/`, `@components/` = `src/components/`
|
||||
|
||||
## Where to Add New Code
|
||||
|
||||
**New RPC Method (Backend):**
|
||||
1. Determine domain (auth, container, bitcoin, mesh, wallet, etc.)
|
||||
2. Add async fn to `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/[domain].rs`
|
||||
3. Function signature: `pub async fn [action](handler: &RpcHandler, params: [ParamType]) -> Result<[ResponseType]>`
|
||||
4. Register in `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mod.rs` dispatcher (line ~350+, search for `match method_name`)
|
||||
5. Test: Unit test in same file with `#[tokio::test]`, or E2E in `tests/`
|
||||
|
||||
**New Frontend View (Page):**
|
||||
1. Create `neode-ui/src/views/[ViewName].vue` (PascalCase)
|
||||
2. Import Router in `neode-ui/src/router/index.ts`, add route
|
||||
3. Add navigation link in `neode-ui/src/components/Nav.vue` (if public-facing)
|
||||
4. State: Use or create Pinia store in `neode-ui/src/stores/`
|
||||
5. Test: Add E2E test in `neode-ui/e2e/` if user-facing flow
|
||||
|
||||
**New Container App:**
|
||||
1. Create directory `apps/[app-name]/`
|
||||
2. Write `manifest.yml` (copy structure from existing app; define interfaces.main.ui, health check, secrets)
|
||||
3. Write `Dockerfile` (base image, deps, entrypoint)
|
||||
4. Add to `app-catalog/catalog.json` with entry (id, version, url to manifest)
|
||||
5. Test: `archipelago container.install { manifest_url: "..." }` on dev node
|
||||
|
||||
**New Component (Frontend):**
|
||||
1. Create `neode-ui/src/components/[ComponentName].vue`
|
||||
2. If reusable logic, extract to `neode-ui/src/composables/use[Logic].ts`
|
||||
3. If shared state, use Pinia store (don't create component-local state)
|
||||
4. Example: `components/AppCard.vue` displays one app (reused in Apps.vue listing)
|
||||
|
||||
**New Utility Function:**
|
||||
- Backend service logic: Add to `core/archipelago/src/[domain].rs` or new file if it's cross-cutting
|
||||
- Frontend helper: Add to `neode-ui/src/utils/` (e.g., `format.ts`, `validate.ts`)
|
||||
- Example: Lightning address validation → `neode-ui/src/utils/validate.ts:validateLightningAddress()`
|
||||
|
||||
**New Test:**
|
||||
- Rust unit test: Inline in source file (`#[test]` or `#[tokio::test]`)
|
||||
- Frontend unit test: `neode-ui/src/composables/__tests__/use[Logic].test.ts`
|
||||
- E2E test: `neode-ui/e2e/[feature].spec.ts` (Playwright)
|
||||
- Integration test: `tests/[feature].sh` (shell script running node commands)
|
||||
|
||||
## Special Directories
|
||||
|
||||
**core/target/**
|
||||
- Purpose: Rust build artifacts (generated)
|
||||
- Generated: Yes (by `cargo build`)
|
||||
- Committed: No (in .gitignore)
|
||||
|
||||
**neode-ui/node_modules/**
|
||||
- Purpose: npm dependencies
|
||||
- Generated: Yes (by `npm install` or `pnpm install`)
|
||||
- Committed: No (in .gitignore)
|
||||
|
||||
**web/dist/**
|
||||
- Purpose: Built frontend output (generated)
|
||||
- Generated: Yes (by `npm run build`)
|
||||
- Committed: No (in .gitignore) — distributed via OTA/ISO
|
||||
|
||||
**/var/lib/archipelago/** (at runtime on node)
|
||||
- Purpose: Data directory (user data, settings, secrets, backups)
|
||||
- Generated: Yes (created by daemon on first boot)
|
||||
- Committed: No (runtime data; contains user secrets)
|
||||
- Subdirs:
|
||||
- `identity/` — Node Ed25519 keys
|
||||
- `secrets/` — Encrypted secret vaults (ChaCha20)
|
||||
- `apps/` — App manifests (disk copies or registry overlays)
|
||||
- `backups/` — Encrypted backup archives
|
||||
- `registries.json` — User-configured Gitea mirrors
|
||||
- etc.
|
||||
|
||||
**/opt/archipelago/** (at runtime on node)
|
||||
- Purpose: System-level Archipelago files (read-only on ISO, writable post-install)
|
||||
- Contains:
|
||||
- `web-ui/` — Built frontend (nginx root)
|
||||
- `bin/archipelago` — Daemon binary
|
||||
- `docker/` — Docker Compose or Quadlet files (orchestration)
|
||||
- `scripts/` — System maintenance scripts
|
||||
- Note: OTA updates overwrite `web-ui/` + `bin/` atomically
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*Structure analysis: 2026-07-29*
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,449 @@
|
||||
# Testing Patterns
|
||||
|
||||
**Analysis Date:** 2026-07-29
|
||||
|
||||
## Test Framework
|
||||
|
||||
**Frontend:**
|
||||
- Runner: Vitest 3.1.1
|
||||
- Config: `neode-ui/vitest.config.ts`
|
||||
- Environment: jsdom (DOM testing in Node.js)
|
||||
- Globals: enabled (`globals: true`) — `describe`, `it`, `expect` available without imports
|
||||
- Assertion library: built-in Vitest assertions (compatible with Jest)
|
||||
|
||||
**Backend (Rust):**
|
||||
- Framework: built-in `#[test]` attribute and `cargo test`
|
||||
- Command: `cd core && cargo test --workspace --bins`
|
||||
|
||||
**E2E (Browser):**
|
||||
- Framework: Playwright 1.58.2
|
||||
- Config: implicit (tests in `neode-ui/e2e/` directory)
|
||||
|
||||
**Shell Integration Tests:**
|
||||
- Framework: Bats (Bash Automated Testing System)
|
||||
- Location: `tests/lifecycle/bats/`
|
||||
- Config files: `tests/lifecycle/lib/rpc.bash` (RPC wrapper helpers)
|
||||
|
||||
**Run Commands:**
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Unit tests (Vitest)
|
||||
npm run test # Run all tests once
|
||||
npm run test:watch # Watch mode, re-run on file changes
|
||||
|
||||
# Rust tests
|
||||
cd core && cargo test --workspace --bins
|
||||
|
||||
# Specific Vitest suite
|
||||
npm run test -- src/composables/__tests__/useFileType.test.ts
|
||||
|
||||
# Shell lifecycle tests (from repo root)
|
||||
ARCHY_PASSWORD=password123 tests/lifecycle/run.sh # Read-only tests
|
||||
ARCHY_PASSWORD=password123 ARCHY_ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE=1 tests/lifecycle/run.sh # Include destructive
|
||||
|
||||
# Release gate (5× iterations, must run ON the target node)
|
||||
ARCHY_PASSWORD=password123 ARCHY_ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE=1 ARCHY_ITERATIONS=5 \
|
||||
tests/lifecycle/run-gate.sh
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Test File Organization
|
||||
|
||||
**Location:**
|
||||
- Frontend: co-located with source in `__tests__/` subdirectories
|
||||
- Example: `src/composables/useFileType.ts` → `src/composables/__tests__/useFileType.test.ts`
|
||||
- Example: `src/api/rpc-client.ts` → `src/api/__tests__/rpc-client.test.ts`
|
||||
- E2E: separate `e2e/` directory at root of frontend
|
||||
- Shell: `tests/lifecycle/bats/` directory
|
||||
|
||||
**Naming:**
|
||||
- Vitest: `*.test.ts` or `*.spec.ts` suffix (`.test.ts` preferred)
|
||||
- Playwright: `*.spec.ts` suffix
|
||||
- Bats: `*.bats` suffix
|
||||
- Rust unit: same file with `#[test]` functions at the bottom or in submodules
|
||||
|
||||
**Structure:**
|
||||
```
|
||||
neode-ui/
|
||||
├── src/
|
||||
│ ├── composables/
|
||||
│ │ ├── useFileType.ts
|
||||
│ │ └── __tests__/
|
||||
│ │ ├── useFileType.test.ts
|
||||
│ │ ├── useNavSounds.test.ts
|
||||
│ │ └── ... (other composable tests)
|
||||
│ ├── api/
|
||||
│ │ ├── rpc-client.ts
|
||||
│ │ └── __tests__/
|
||||
│ │ └── rpc-client.test.ts
|
||||
│ └── stores/
|
||||
│ ├── controller.ts
|
||||
│ └── (no tests found for stores in exploration)
|
||||
├── e2e/
|
||||
│ ├── app-launch.spec.ts
|
||||
│ ├── intro-experience.spec.ts
|
||||
│ └── visual-regression.spec.ts
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Test Structure
|
||||
|
||||
**Vitest Suite Organization:**
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest'
|
||||
import { ref } from 'vue'
|
||||
import { getFileCategory, useFileType, formatSize, formatDate } from '../useFileType'
|
||||
|
||||
describe('getFileCategory', () => {
|
||||
it('returns folder for directories', () => {
|
||||
expect(getFileCategory('', true)).toBe('folder')
|
||||
expect(getFileCategory('jpg', true)).toBe('folder')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('identifies image extensions', () => {
|
||||
expect(getFileCategory('jpg', false)).toBe('image')
|
||||
expect(getFileCategory('png', false)).toBe('image')
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('useFileType', () => {
|
||||
it('returns correct category and computed values for an image', () => {
|
||||
const ext = ref('jpg')
|
||||
const isDir = ref(false)
|
||||
const result = useFileType(ext, isDir)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(result.category.value).toBe('image')
|
||||
expect(result.isImage.value).toBe(true)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('reacts to ref changes', () => {
|
||||
const ext = ref('jpg')
|
||||
const isDir = ref(false)
|
||||
const result = useFileType(ext, isDir)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(result.category.value).toBe('image')
|
||||
ext.value = 'mp3'
|
||||
expect(result.category.value).toBe('audio')
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Patterns:**
|
||||
- `describe()` blocks group related tests by function or component
|
||||
- `it()` blocks test a single behavior (flat structure, no nesting of describe blocks observed)
|
||||
- `beforeEach()` / `afterEach()` hooks for setup/teardown per test
|
||||
- `beforeAll()` / `afterAll()` hooks for suite-level setup (e.g., login in bats tests)
|
||||
- Assertions use `expect(actual).toBe(expected)` or `expect(actual).toEqual(object)`
|
||||
|
||||
**Playwright E2E Structure:**
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
import { expect, test, type Page } from '@playwright/test'
|
||||
|
||||
async function login(page: Page) {
|
||||
await page.goto('/login', { waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded' })
|
||||
await page.evaluate(() => {
|
||||
localStorage.setItem('neode_intro_seen', '1')
|
||||
})
|
||||
// ... fill form, submit
|
||||
await page.waitForURL('**/dashboard**', { timeout: 20_000 })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test('installed app launch opens reachable app URL', async ({ page, context, baseURL }) => {
|
||||
test.skip(!EXPECTED_URL, 'Set ARCHY_EXPECTED_LAUNCH_URL for launch qualification')
|
||||
|
||||
await login(page)
|
||||
await page.goto('/dashboard/apps', { waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded' })
|
||||
|
||||
const appCard = page.locator('[data-controller-container]', {
|
||||
has: page.getByRole('heading', { name: APP_CARD_TITLE, exact: true }),
|
||||
}).first()
|
||||
|
||||
await appCard.waitFor({ timeout: 30_000 })
|
||||
await expect(appCard.locator('button')).toBeVisible()
|
||||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Bats Shell Test Structure:**
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bats
|
||||
# tests/lifecycle/bats/bitcoin-knots.bats
|
||||
|
||||
load '../lib/rpc.bash'
|
||||
|
||||
setup_file() {
|
||||
: "${ARCHY_PASSWORD:?Set ARCHY_PASSWORD env var to the UI password}"
|
||||
export ARCHY_FORCE_LOGIN=1
|
||||
rpc_login
|
||||
unset ARCHY_FORCE_LOGIN
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
teardown_file() {
|
||||
rpc_logout_local
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@test "container-list includes bitcoin-knots" {
|
||||
run rpc_result container-list
|
||||
[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
|
||||
echo "$output" | jq -e '.[] | select(.name == "bitcoin-knots")' >/dev/null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@test "container-status returns a valid status object" {
|
||||
run rpc_call container-status '{"app_id":"bitcoin-knots"}'
|
||||
[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Mocking
|
||||
|
||||
**Framework (Vitest):** `vi` from Vitest; global stub support
|
||||
|
||||
**Patterns:**
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
const mockFetch = vi.fn()
|
||||
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', mockFetch)
|
||||
|
||||
// Import after stubbing
|
||||
const { rpcClient } = await import('../rpc-client')
|
||||
|
||||
// In tests:
|
||||
mockFetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(jsonResponse({ result: { did: 'did:key:z123' } }))
|
||||
mockFetch.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('fetch failed'))
|
||||
|
||||
// Assertions on mock calls:
|
||||
expect(mockFetch).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
|
||||
const [url, init] = mockFetch.mock.calls[0]!
|
||||
expect(url).toBe('/rpc/v1')
|
||||
expect(init.method).toBe('POST')
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Vue Test Utils:**
|
||||
- Component mounting: `mount(Component, { global: { mocks: { $ver: displayVersion } } })`
|
||||
- Props tested by passing to mount options
|
||||
- Events tested by listening to emitted events
|
||||
|
||||
**What to Mock:**
|
||||
- External HTTP requests (fetch, axios)
|
||||
- Timers (for timeout logic; `vi.useFakeTimers()`)
|
||||
- Global objects (localStorage, console, window.location)
|
||||
|
||||
**What NOT to Mock:**
|
||||
- Vue reactivity (ref, computed) — these are core to component behavior
|
||||
- RPC client methods in component tests — prefer integration-style testing
|
||||
- Built-in assertions (expect) — always available
|
||||
- Pinia stores in unit tests of composables that use them — store directly if needed
|
||||
|
||||
## Fixtures and Factories
|
||||
|
||||
**Test Data:**
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
function jsonResponse(body: unknown, status = 200, statusText = 'OK'): Response {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
ok: status >= 200 && status < 300,
|
||||
status,
|
||||
statusText,
|
||||
json: () => Promise.resolve(body),
|
||||
// ... other Response properties
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Usage:
|
||||
mockFetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(jsonResponse({ result: { did: 'did:key:z123' } }))
|
||||
mockFetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(jsonResponse(null, 502, 'Bad Gateway'))
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Location:**
|
||||
- Fixtures (test data, helper functions) defined inline in test files or in small helper modules
|
||||
- No central fixture factory observed; each test file is self-contained
|
||||
- Shell test helpers in `tests/lifecycle/lib/rpc.bash` (RPC wrapper for bats)
|
||||
|
||||
## Coverage
|
||||
|
||||
**Requirements:**
|
||||
- Frontend: 80% branch coverage (set in `vitest.config.ts` thresholds)
|
||||
- Rust: no explicit threshold; pragmatic testing of public APIs
|
||||
- Shell: coverage tracked per app in `tests/lifecycle/TESTING.md` (lifecycle matrix)
|
||||
|
||||
**View Coverage:**
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Generate coverage report
|
||||
npm run test -- --coverage
|
||||
|
||||
# Output formats: text, text-summary, html
|
||||
# Config in vitest.config.ts: reporter: ['text', 'text-summary']
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Coverage Scope (Frontend):**
|
||||
- Included: `src/api/*.ts`, `src/stores/*.ts`, `src/composables/*.ts`, `src/utils/*.ts`, `src/services/*.ts`, `src/router/*.ts`
|
||||
- Excluded: test files (`src/**/__tests__/**`), type definitions (`*.d.ts`), entry point (`src/main.ts`)
|
||||
|
||||
## Test Types
|
||||
|
||||
**Unit Tests (Vitest):**
|
||||
- Scope: individual functions, composables, utility modules
|
||||
- Approach: fast, isolated, mock external dependencies
|
||||
- Example: `useFileType.test.ts` tests `getFileCategory`, `useFileType`, `formatSize`, `formatDate` independently
|
||||
- Latency: ~5s for full suite; individual tests <1s
|
||||
|
||||
**Integration Tests (Vitest + RPCClient):**
|
||||
- Scope: RPC client with mocked fetch, authentication flows, retry logic
|
||||
- Approach: more complex setup, test interactions between layers
|
||||
- Example: `rpc-client.test.ts` tests 70+ scenarios (login, TOTP, federation, package operations)
|
||||
- Latency: ~30s for full suite
|
||||
|
||||
**E2E Tests (Playwright):**
|
||||
- Scope: real browser, real app instance, user journeys (login → navigate → interact)
|
||||
- Approach: full app stack running; no mocks of UI layer
|
||||
- Example: `app-launch.spec.ts` tests app card discovery and launch via button click
|
||||
- Latency: 30–120s per test depending on app startup time
|
||||
|
||||
**Lifecycle Tests (Bats):**
|
||||
- Scope: container operations (install, start, stop, restart, uninstall) on a live node
|
||||
- Approach: RPC calls to backend, shell commands for verification, destructive operations tier-gated
|
||||
- Tiers:
|
||||
- L0 unit: Rust unit tests (cargo test)
|
||||
- L1 RPC: JSON-RPC API responses (bats + rpc.bash)
|
||||
- L2 UI: HTTP probe of app URLs (bats + ui-probes.bash)
|
||||
- L3 lifecycle survival: container restart/reboot survival (bats, gated)
|
||||
- Latency: 30–120s per suite depending on tier and container startup
|
||||
|
||||
## Common Patterns
|
||||
|
||||
**Async Testing (Vitest):**
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
it('makes a successful RPC call and returns the result', async () => {
|
||||
mockFetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(jsonResponse({ result: { did: 'did:key:z123' } }))
|
||||
|
||||
const result = await rpcClient.call<{ did: string }>({
|
||||
method: 'node.did',
|
||||
params: {},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
expect(result).toEqual({ did: 'did:key:z123' })
|
||||
expect(mockFetch).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
|
||||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- `async` keyword on test function
|
||||
- `await` for async operations
|
||||
- No explicit promise handling; expect called after `await` completes
|
||||
- Timeouts set via test config or `{ timeout: N }` in individual tests
|
||||
|
||||
**Error Testing (Vitest):**
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
it('throws after max retries on persistent 502', async () => {
|
||||
mockFetch.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse(null, 502, 'Bad Gateway'))
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(rpcClient.call({ method: 'test' })).rejects.toThrow('HTTP 502: Bad Gateway')
|
||||
expect(mockFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('throws immediately on non-retryable HTTP errors', async () => {
|
||||
mockFetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(jsonResponse(null, 401, 'Unauthorized'))
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(rpcClient.call({ method: 'test' })).rejects.toThrow('Session expired')
|
||||
expect(mockFetch).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
|
||||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- `expect(...).rejects.toThrow(message)` for expected rejections
|
||||
- Mock returns set per-call (`mockResolvedValueOnce`, `mockResolvedValue`)
|
||||
- Retry logic verified via call count assertions (`toHaveBeenCalledTimes`)
|
||||
|
||||
**Timer Mocking (Vitest):**
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
vi.useFakeTimers({ shouldAdvanceTime: true })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
vi.useRealTimers()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('retries on 502 Bad Gateway and eventually succeeds', async () => {
|
||||
mockFetch
|
||||
.mockResolvedValueOnce(jsonResponse(null, 502, 'Bad Gateway'))
|
||||
.mockResolvedValueOnce(jsonResponse({ result: 'ok' }))
|
||||
|
||||
const result = await rpcClient.call({ method: 'test' })
|
||||
|
||||
expect(result).toBe('ok')
|
||||
expect(mockFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)
|
||||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Fake timers enable testing of timeout/retry delays without blocking real time
|
||||
- `shouldAdvanceTime: true` auto-advances clock for non-blocking tests
|
||||
- Clean up with `vi.useRealTimers()` after each test
|
||||
|
||||
**Vue Component Testing (Vue Test Utils):**
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
it('returns correct values for audio', () => {
|
||||
const ext = ref('mp3')
|
||||
const isDir = ref(false)
|
||||
const result = useFileType(ext, isDir)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(result.category.value).toBe('audio')
|
||||
expect(result.isAudio.value).toBe(true)
|
||||
expect(result.isImage.value).toBe(false)
|
||||
expect(result.iconColor.value).toBe('text-orange-400')
|
||||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Refs created with `ref()` passed as test inputs
|
||||
- Computed values accessed via `.value`
|
||||
- No mount overhead for pure composable logic
|
||||
|
||||
**Playwright Browser Testing:**
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
test('installed app launch opens reachable app URL', async ({ page, context, baseURL }) => {
|
||||
await login(page)
|
||||
await page.goto('/dashboard/apps', { waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded' })
|
||||
|
||||
const appCard = page.locator('[data-controller-container]', {
|
||||
has: page.getByRole('heading', { name: APP_CARD_TITLE, exact: true }),
|
||||
}).first()
|
||||
|
||||
await appCard.waitFor({ timeout: 30_000 })
|
||||
await expect(appCard.locator('button')).toBeVisible()
|
||||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- Locators used to find elements (CSS selector, role, text)
|
||||
- Wait timeouts on slow networks (30s for app startup)
|
||||
- `waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded'` or `'networkidle'` for page load
|
||||
- Screenshots and video recording available via config
|
||||
|
||||
## Test Configuration Details
|
||||
|
||||
**Vitest Config (`vitest.config.ts`):**
|
||||
- Environment: jsdom
|
||||
- Globals: enabled (no imports needed)
|
||||
- Setup file: `vitest.setup.ts` (mocks global Vue config like `$ver`)
|
||||
- Coverage provider: v8
|
||||
- Coverage threshold: 80% branches
|
||||
- Excluded from coverage: tests, types, main.ts
|
||||
|
||||
**Playwright Config (implicit, environment variables used):**
|
||||
- Base URL: derived from `VITE_*` env vars in dev
|
||||
- Timeouts: per-test overrides via `{ timeout: N }`
|
||||
- Retry: 0 (no automatic retries; explicit in tests via polling)
|
||||
- Config environment variables: `ARCHY_PASSWORD`, `ARCHY_APP_ID`, `ARCHY_EXPECTED_LAUNCH_URL`
|
||||
|
||||
**Shell Test Config (environment variables):**
|
||||
- `ARCHY_PASSWORD`: login password (required)
|
||||
- `ARCHY_ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE`: enable stop/start/restart/uninstall tests
|
||||
- `ARCHY_ALLOW_CASCADE_DESTRUCTIVE`: enable uninstall/reinstall on throwaway app
|
||||
- `ARCHY_ITERATIONS`: loop count for release gate (5× for production readiness)
|
||||
- `ARCHY_FORCE_LOGIN`: fresh RPC token per test file
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*Testing analysis: 2026-07-29*
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
|
||||
# Synthesis Summary
|
||||
|
||||
Ingest mode: new (fresh bootstrap; no existing PROJECT.md/REQUIREMENTS.md/ROADMAP.md)
|
||||
Synthesized: 2026-07-29
|
||||
Precedence applied: ADR > SPEC > PRD > DOC (no per-doc overrides)
|
||||
|
||||
## Doc counts by type
|
||||
|
||||
- ADR: 10 (all locked, Status: Accepted, confidence: high)
|
||||
- SPEC: 1 (confidence: high)
|
||||
- PRD: 0
|
||||
- DOC: 0
|
||||
- UNKNOWN: 0
|
||||
- Total: 11
|
||||
|
||||
## Decisions locked (10)
|
||||
|
||||
All in `intel/decisions.md`:
|
||||
- ADR-001 Podman over Docker — docs/adr/001-podman-over-docker.md
|
||||
- ADR-002 did:key (Ed25519) node identity — docs/adr/002-did-key-method.md
|
||||
- ADR-003 Nostr relays for node + app discovery — docs/adr/003-nostr-for-discovery.md
|
||||
- ADR-004 Tor hidden services for inter-node RPC/control plane — docs/adr/004-tor-for-peer-communication.md
|
||||
- ADR-005 ChaCha20-Poly1305 + Argon2id backup encryption — docs/adr/005-chacha20-backup-encryption.md
|
||||
- ADR-006 Nostr relays for marketplace discovery (trust tiers) — docs/adr/006-nostr-marketplace-discovery.md
|
||||
- ADR-007 Bilateral DID federation trust via single-use invite codes — docs/adr/007-did-federation-trust.md
|
||||
- ADR-008 Dual keys (Ed25519 + secp256k1) from one master seed — docs/adr/008-dual-key-strategy.md
|
||||
- ADR-009 Manifest-level container security enforcement — docs/adr/009-manifest-container-security.md
|
||||
- ADR-011 DWN deprioritization (Nostr + Tor federation instead) — docs/adr/011-dwn-deprioritization.md
|
||||
|
||||
## Requirements extracted (0)
|
||||
|
||||
No PRDs in ingest set. `intel/requirements.md` records the absence.
|
||||
|
||||
## Constraints (7 entries)
|
||||
|
||||
From docs/app-manifest-spec.md, in `intel/constraints.md`:
|
||||
- schema: 4 (top-level `app:` block, ContainerConfig, SecurityPolicy + validation, Volumes)
|
||||
- api-contract: 1 (lifecycle hooks)
|
||||
- protocol: 2 (Quadlet installation/reconciler semantics, distribution channels: signed catalog + Nostr marketplace)
|
||||
- nfr: 0
|
||||
|
||||
## Context topics (0)
|
||||
|
||||
No DOC-type documents. `intel/context.md` records the absence.
|
||||
|
||||
## Conflicts
|
||||
|
||||
- Blockers: 0
|
||||
- Competing variants: 0
|
||||
- Auto-resolved: 0
|
||||
- Informational notes: 4 (ADR-003/006 consistent overlap; SPEC validation narrower than ADR-009 mandates — silence, not contradiction; ADR-010 numbering gap; acyclic cross-ref graph)
|
||||
|
||||
Detail: `.planning/INGEST-CONFLICTS.md`
|
||||
|
||||
## Cycle detection
|
||||
|
||||
Cross-ref graph acyclic (max depth well under cap). All 11 docs synthesized; no docs excluded.
|
||||
|
||||
## Files
|
||||
|
||||
- Decisions: `.planning/intel/decisions.md`
|
||||
- Requirements: `.planning/intel/requirements.md`
|
||||
- Constraints: `.planning/intel/constraints.md`
|
||||
- Context: `.planning/intel/context.md`
|
||||
- Conflict report: `.planning/INGEST-CONFLICTS.md`
|
||||
- Raw classifications: `.planning/intel/classifications/*.json`
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"source_path": "/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/docs/adr/001-podman-over-docker.md",
|
||||
"type": "ADR",
|
||||
"confidence": "high",
|
||||
"manifest_override": false,
|
||||
"title": "ADR-001: Podman Over Docker",
|
||||
"summary": "Chose Podman over Docker as the container runtime for rootless, daemonless operation with native systemd integration.",
|
||||
"scope": ["Podman", "Docker", "container runtime", "rootless containers", "systemd integration", "archy-net network"],
|
||||
"cross_refs": [],
|
||||
"locked": true,
|
||||
"precedence": null,
|
||||
"notes": ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"source_path": "/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/docs/adr/002-did-key-method.md",
|
||||
"type": "ADR",
|
||||
"confidence": "high",
|
||||
"manifest_override": false,
|
||||
"title": "ADR-002: DID Key Method for Node Identity",
|
||||
"summary": "Chose did:key (Ed25519) as the primary DID method for node identity; self-contained and offline-capable, with federation trust lists mitigating rotation/revocation gaps.",
|
||||
"scope": ["did:key", "node identity", "DID methods", "Ed25519 keys", "peer authentication", "federation trust lists", "verifiable credentials"],
|
||||
"cross_refs": [],
|
||||
"locked": true,
|
||||
"precedence": null,
|
||||
"notes": ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"source_path": "/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/docs/adr/003-nostr-for-discovery.md",
|
||||
"type": "ADR",
|
||||
"confidence": "high",
|
||||
"manifest_override": false,
|
||||
"title": "ADR-003: Nostr Relays for Node and App Discovery",
|
||||
"summary": "Chose Nostr relays (NIP-78, kind 30078) for decentralized node discovery and marketplace app manifest distribution.",
|
||||
"scope": [
|
||||
"Nostr relays",
|
||||
"node discovery",
|
||||
"app discovery",
|
||||
"marketplace app manifests",
|
||||
"NIP-78",
|
||||
"NIP-33 replaceable events",
|
||||
"trust scoring",
|
||||
"relay caching"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"cross_refs": [],
|
||||
"locked": true,
|
||||
"precedence": null,
|
||||
"notes": ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"source_path": "/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/docs/adr/004-tor-for-peer-communication.md",
|
||||
"type": "ADR",
|
||||
"confidence": "high",
|
||||
"manifest_override": false,
|
||||
"title": "ADR-004: Tor Hidden Services for Peer Communication",
|
||||
"summary": "Chose Tor hidden services (.onion) for all inter-node RPC/control-plane communication; bulk data pulled from registries instead.",
|
||||
"scope": ["Tor hidden services", "inter-node communication", "federation sync", "archy-tor container", "RPC/control plane", "NAT traversal"],
|
||||
"cross_refs": [],
|
||||
"locked": true,
|
||||
"precedence": null,
|
||||
"notes": ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"source_path": "/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/docs/adr/005-chacha20-backup-encryption.md",
|
||||
"type": "ADR",
|
||||
"confidence": "high",
|
||||
"manifest_override": false,
|
||||
"title": "ADR-005: ChaCha20-Poly1305 for Backup Encryption",
|
||||
"summary": "Chose ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD with Argon2id key derivation for encrypting backups at rest, over AES-256-GCM and XChaCha20-Poly1305.",
|
||||
"scope": ["backup encryption", "ChaCha20-Poly1305", "Argon2id key derivation", "AEAD", "nonce handling"],
|
||||
"cross_refs": [],
|
||||
"locked": true,
|
||||
"precedence": null,
|
||||
"notes": ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"source_path": "/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/docs/adr/006-nostr-marketplace-discovery.md",
|
||||
"type": "ADR",
|
||||
"confidence": "high",
|
||||
"manifest_override": false,
|
||||
"title": "ADR-006: Nostr Relays for Marketplace Discovery",
|
||||
"summary": "Chose Nostr relays (NIP-78, kind 30078 events) for decentralized app manifest discovery instead of a centralized marketplace server.",
|
||||
"scope": ["Nostr relays", "app manifest discovery", "marketplace", "trust scoring", "trust tiers", "manifest signature verification"],
|
||||
"cross_refs": [],
|
||||
"locked": true,
|
||||
"precedence": null,
|
||||
"notes": ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"source_path": "/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/docs/adr/007-did-federation-trust.md",
|
||||
"type": "ADR",
|
||||
"confidence": "high",
|
||||
"manifest_override": false,
|
||||
"title": "ADR-007: DID-Based Federation Trust",
|
||||
"summary": "Chose bilateral DID-based verification with single-use invite codes over Tor for establishing federation trust between nodes, with Trusted/Observer/Untrusted levels.",
|
||||
"scope": ["federation", "DID verification", "invite codes", "trust levels", "Tor hidden services", "Ed25519 keys"],
|
||||
"cross_refs": ["ADR-003"],
|
||||
"locked": true,
|
||||
"precedence": null,
|
||||
"notes": ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"source_path": "/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/docs/adr/008-dual-key-strategy.md",
|
||||
"type": "ADR",
|
||||
"confidence": "high",
|
||||
"manifest_override": false,
|
||||
"title": "ADR-008: Dual Key Strategy (Ed25519 + Secp256k1)",
|
||||
"summary": "Maintain two key pairs per node identity: Ed25519 for DID/Web5 operations, secp256k1 for Nostr/Bitcoin/Lightning, both derived from one master seed.",
|
||||
"scope": ["node identity", "Ed25519", "secp256k1", "DID documents", "verifiable credentials", "federation authentication", "backup encryption", "Nostr event publishing", "node discovery", "Lightning Network", "key derivation", "master seed"],
|
||||
"cross_refs": [],
|
||||
"locked": true,
|
||||
"precedence": null,
|
||||
"notes": ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"source_path": "/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/docs/adr/009-manifest-container-security.md",
|
||||
"type": "ADR",
|
||||
"confidence": "high",
|
||||
"manifest_override": false,
|
||||
"title": "ADR-009: Manifest-Level Container Security Enforcement",
|
||||
"summary": "Enforce mandatory container security defaults (readonly root, no-new-privileges, non-root UID, dropped capabilities, pinned tags) at the manifest level during container creation.",
|
||||
"scope": ["container security", "app manifests", "manifest validation", "podman container creation", "security defaults", "capability restrictions", "seccomp", "core/container module"],
|
||||
"cross_refs": ["docs/app-manifest-spec.md", "core/container/src/", "core/security/src/"],
|
||||
"locked": true,
|
||||
"precedence": null,
|
||||
"notes": ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"source_path": "/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/docs/adr/011-dwn-deprioritization.md",
|
||||
"type": "ADR",
|
||||
"confidence": "high",
|
||||
"manifest_override": false,
|
||||
"title": "ADR-011: DWN Deprioritization",
|
||||
"summary": "Deprioritizes Web5 DWN spec compliance after TBD's shutdown; keeps existing custom DWN store code and prioritizes Nostr plus Tor federation for peer sync.",
|
||||
"scope": ["DWN (Decentralized Web Node)", "Web5", "dwn_store.rs", "Nostr", "federation", "peer discovery", "peer data sync"],
|
||||
"cross_refs": [],
|
||||
"locked": true,
|
||||
"precedence": null,
|
||||
"notes": ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"source_path": "/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/docs/app-manifest-spec.md",
|
||||
"type": "SPEC",
|
||||
"confidence": "high",
|
||||
"manifest_override": false,
|
||||
"title": "App Manifest Specification",
|
||||
"summary": "Defines the declarative manifest.yml schema for apps: top-level fields, container config, security policy, volumes, hooks, installation semantics, and signed-catalog/marketplace distribution.",
|
||||
"scope": [
|
||||
"app manifest.yml schema",
|
||||
"ContainerConfig (image/build, networks, derived_env, secret_env, generated_secrets, generated_certs)",
|
||||
"SecurityPolicy (capabilities allow-list, network_policy, readonly_root)",
|
||||
"volumes and bind-mount confinement",
|
||||
"lifecycle hooks (post_install, pre_start)",
|
||||
"health checks and interfaces",
|
||||
"Quadlet installation and reconciler semantics",
|
||||
"signed app catalog distribution",
|
||||
"decentralized marketplace distribution"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"cross_refs": [
|
||||
"app-developer-guide.md",
|
||||
"manifest-hooks-design.md",
|
||||
"marketplace-protocol.md",
|
||||
"core/container/src/manifest.rs",
|
||||
"api/rpc/package/stacks.rs"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"locked": false,
|
||||
"precedence": null,
|
||||
"notes": ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
|
||||
# Constraints (from SPECs)
|
||||
|
||||
Extracted from 1 classified SPEC: `docs/app-manifest-spec.md` (accurate as of 2026-07-08). The SPEC self-declares that the canonical schema is the Rust parser in `core/container/src/manifest.rs` — if doc and code disagree, the code wins.
|
||||
|
||||
## App manifest top-level schema (`app:` block)
|
||||
- source: docs/app-manifest-spec.md
|
||||
- type: schema
|
||||
- content: Every app is a directory `apps/<id>/` with a `manifest.yml` containing a single top-level `app:` block. Apps are purely declarative — the orchestrator owns the entire lifecycle; no per-app installer code. Required fields: `id` (lowercase alphanumeric + `-`/`_`, must match directory name), `name`, `version`. Optional fields: `description`, `container` (ContainerConfig), `dependencies` (storage/app_id+version/bare string), `resources` (cpu_limit, memory_limit, disk_limit), `security` (SecurityPolicy), `ports` (host/container/protocol), `volumes`, `files` (GeneratedFile: path/content/overwrite; path must sit under a declared bind mount), `environment` (static KEY=value), `health_check` (type/endpoint/path/interval/timeout/retries; `http` is what the monitor exercises), `devices` (must start with `/dev/`), `interfaces` (launch surfaces keyed by name), `hooks` (LifecycleHooks). Unknown keys are absorbed into an `extensions` map (serde flatten) as transitional metadata — not typed schema, not validated.
|
||||
|
||||
## ContainerConfig schema
|
||||
- source: docs/app-manifest-spec.md
|
||||
- type: schema
|
||||
- content: Exactly one of `image` or `build` must be present (image XOR build). Fields: `image` (registry reference), `image_signature` (optional), `pull_policy` (default `if-not-present`), `build` ({context, dockerfile default "Dockerfile", tag, build_args}), `network` (literal podman `--network` value; omitted = rootless default isolated network), `network_aliases` (extra DNS names on the network), `entrypoint`, `custom_args`, `derived_env` ({key, template} rendered against host facts at apply time; allowed placeholders only: {{HOST_IP}}, {{HOST_MDNS}}, {{DISK_GB}} plus dependency-resolved facts — never hard-code host specifics), `secret_env` ({key, secret_file} read from /var/lib/archipelago/secrets/<secret_file>, injected as a podman secret so it never appears in `podman inspect` or unit files; secret_file must be a bare filename, no `/` or `..`), `generated_secrets` ({name, kind} materialised by the orchestrator on first use, 0600, rootless service user, idempotent + self-healing; kind ∈ hex16|hex32|base64|bcrypt; bcrypt writes <name>=hash and <name>.pw=plaintext), `generated_certs` ({crt, key, common_name?, sans?} self-signed TLS materialised before create), `data_uid` ("UID:GID" applied to the app's bind-mounted data dir before create).
|
||||
|
||||
## SecurityPolicy schema and validation rules
|
||||
- source: docs/app-manifest-spec.md
|
||||
- type: schema
|
||||
- content: Security block defaults: `readonly_root: true`, `no_new_privileges: true`, `capabilities: []` (cap-drop ALL, add back only listed), `network_policy: isolated` (isolated | bridge | host), `apparmor_profile: null` (optional). Validation enforced at `AppManifest::validate()`: capabilities must come from the reviewed allow-list (CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER, NET_ADMIN, NET_BIND_SERVICE, NET_RAW, SETGID, SETUID, SYS_ADMIN); `network_policy` must be exactly isolated/bridge/host; no `container:`/`ns:` network modes; devices must be `/dev/*`; bind-mount sources confined to `/var/lib/archipelago` (reviewed exceptions: rootless podman socket and dbus); `derived_env` templates limited to the placeholder allow-list; `secret_env`/`generated_secrets` names must be bare filenames; hook steps validated against the hook allow-list. (Note: the SPEC's documented validation list does not mention ADR-009's non-root UID, pinned-image-tag, or seccomp mandates — see INGEST-CONFLICTS.md INFO entry.)
|
||||
|
||||
## Volumes schema
|
||||
- source: docs/app-manifest-spec.md
|
||||
- type: schema
|
||||
- content: Volume entries: `type` ∈ bind | volume | tmpfs; bind entries take `source` (confined to /var/lib/archipelago per validation), `target`, `options` from an allow-list (rw, ro, z, Z, shared, …); tmpfs entries take `target` and `tmpfs_options` (e.g. "rw,noexec,nosuid,size=256m").
|
||||
|
||||
## Lifecycle hooks contract
|
||||
- source: docs/app-manifest-spec.md
|
||||
- type: api-contract
|
||||
- content: Hooks are declarative, allow-listed operations that run against the app's own container — never the host (design: manifest-hooks-design.md). `post_install` runs once after install with the container running; supported steps: `copy_from_host` (src relative to an allow-listed root — data dir / web-ui; no absolute paths, no '..') and `exec` (podman exec inside the container). `pre_start` is reserved in the schema; its executor is not yet wired.
|
||||
|
||||
## Installation semantics (Quadlet + reconciler)
|
||||
- source: docs/app-manifest-spec.md
|
||||
- type: protocol
|
||||
- content: The orchestrator compiles the manifest into a rootless Podman Quadlet unit under `user.slice` — the container survives backend restarts and reboots. A level-triggered reconciler converges drift every 30 seconds. Multi-container apps are sets of per-member manifests installed together via the stack orchestrator (`api/rpc/package/stacks.rs`) on an app-local network.
|
||||
|
||||
## Manifest distribution channels
|
||||
- source: docs/app-manifest-spec.md
|
||||
- type: protocol
|
||||
- content: Manifests ship two ways. (1) Signed catalog (primary): `releases/app-catalog.json` embeds the full manifest per app with an Ed25519 detached signature verified against the pinned release-root anchor; nodes overlay catalog manifests over disk files — catalog wins for image-only apps; `apps/<id>/manifest.yml` on disk remains the fallback and is still required for build-source apps. (2) Decentralized marketplace: Nostr NIP-78 discovery with DID-signed manifests (marketplace-protocol.md); the marketplace uses its own flatter manifest schema, not this one. Tooling: validate with `scripts/validate-app-manifest.sh`, regenerate catalog with `scripts/generate-app-catalog.py`, drift-checked in CI by `scripts/check-app-catalog-drift.py`.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
# Context (from DOCs)
|
||||
|
||||
No DOC-type documents were present in the ingest set (10 ADRs + 1 SPEC). No context notes extracted.
|
||||
|
||||
This file intentionally records absence rather than repurposing ADR/SPEC content as context.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
|
||||
# Decisions (from ADRs)
|
||||
|
||||
Extracted from 10 classified ADRs. All are `locked: true` (Status: Accepted) and cannot be auto-overridden by any lower-precedence source.
|
||||
|
||||
## ADR-001: Podman Over Docker
|
||||
- source: docs/adr/001-podman-over-docker.md
|
||||
- status: locked (Accepted)
|
||||
- decision: Use Podman as the container runtime instead of Docker. Rootless by default, daemonless, Docker-compatible, native systemd integration, OCI-compliant. Use `archy-net` custom network for inter-container DNS.
|
||||
- scope: container runtime, rootless containers, systemd integration, archy-net network
|
||||
|
||||
## ADR-002: DID Key Method for Node Identity
|
||||
- source: docs/adr/002-did-key-method.md
|
||||
- status: locked (Accepted)
|
||||
- decision: Use `did:key` (Ed25519) as the primary DID method for node identity. Self-contained, offline-capable, local resolution. Known gaps (no rotation, no service endpoints, no revocation) mitigated via federation trust lists and separately-stored service endpoints; future migration to did:peer/did:web possible if rotation is needed.
|
||||
- scope: node identity, DID methods, Ed25519 keys, peer authentication, federation trust lists, verifiable credentials
|
||||
|
||||
## ADR-003: Nostr Relays for Node and App Discovery
|
||||
- source: docs/adr/003-nostr-for-discovery.md
|
||||
- status: locked (Accepted)
|
||||
- decision: Use Nostr relays (NIP-78, kind 30078) for both node discovery and marketplace app manifests. Query multiple relays in parallel with dedupe; local cache with 15-minute TTL; trust scoring (DID verification, relay consensus, federation trust); hashtag filtering (`archipelago-marketplace`); NIP-33 replaceable events for updates; Tor-compatible via SOCKS proxy.
|
||||
- scope: node discovery, app discovery, marketplace app manifests, NIP-78, NIP-33 replaceable events, trust scoring, relay caching
|
||||
|
||||
## ADR-004: Tor Hidden Services for Peer Communication
|
||||
- source: docs/adr/004-tor-for-peer-communication.md
|
||||
- status: locked (Accepted)
|
||||
- decision: Use Tor hidden services (.onion addresses) for all inter-node communication. Scoped to RPC/control plane only — bulk data (container images) pulled from registries. Retry with backoff; `archy-tor` container runs automatically with host networking; federation sync interval (5 min) tolerates occasional failures.
|
||||
- scope: inter-node communication, federation sync, archy-tor container, RPC/control plane, NAT traversal
|
||||
|
||||
## ADR-005: ChaCha20-Poly1305 for Backup Encryption
|
||||
- source: docs/adr/005-chacha20-backup-encryption.md
|
||||
- status: locked (Accepted)
|
||||
- decision: Use ChaCha20-Poly1305 (AEAD) with Argon2id key derivation for backup encryption at rest, chosen over AES-256-GCM and XChaCha20-Poly1305. Random nonce per backup stored alongside ciphertext; Argon2id with 64MB memory cost and 3 iterations for password-to-key derivation.
|
||||
- scope: backup encryption, AEAD, Argon2id key derivation, nonce handling
|
||||
|
||||
## ADR-006: Nostr Relays for Marketplace Discovery
|
||||
- source: docs/adr/006-nostr-marketplace-discovery.md
|
||||
- status: locked (Accepted)
|
||||
- decision: Use Nostr relays (NIP-78, kind 30078 events) for decentralized app manifest discovery instead of a centralized marketplace server. Developers publish signed manifests to public relays; nodes query multiple relays; trust scoring via cross-relay verification count, DID-linked developer reputation, optional community endorsements. Trust tiers: Verified (known developer, 3+ relays, DID-verified), Community (2+ relays, valid manifest, unsigned/new developer), Unverified (single relay, new developer). Local relay-response caching; built-in curated list for essential apps; manifest signature verification before installation.
|
||||
- scope: marketplace, app manifest discovery, trust scoring, trust tiers, manifest signature verification
|
||||
|
||||
## ADR-007: DID-Based Federation Trust
|
||||
- source: docs/adr/007-did-federation-trust.md
|
||||
- status: locked (Accepted)
|
||||
- decision: Use bilateral DID-based verification with single-use invite codes for federation trust establishment. Invite code carries DID, .onion address, and shared secret; exchanged out-of-band; both nodes verify DIDs via signed challenges over Tor; ongoing communication is DID-authenticated over Tor hidden services. Trust levels: Trusted (full access), Observer (read-only), Untrusted (blocked). Discovery (ADR-003) finds nodes; federation trusts them.
|
||||
- scope: federation, DID verification, invite codes, trust levels, Tor hidden services, Ed25519 keys
|
||||
- cross-refs: ADR-003
|
||||
|
||||
## ADR-008: Dual Key Strategy (Ed25519 + Secp256k1)
|
||||
- source: docs/adr/008-dual-key-strategy.md
|
||||
- status: locked (Accepted)
|
||||
- decision: Maintain two key pairs per node identity, both derived from one master seed: Ed25519 as canonical identity (DID documents, verifiable credentials, federation auth, backup encryption via X25519 DH) and secp256k1 for Nostr/Bitcoin/Lightning (event publishing, node discovery, Lightning channel auth). Secp256k1 key linked to the DID via Nostr profile (NIP-05). Backup captures the master seed; DID document includes both verification methods.
|
||||
- scope: node identity, key derivation, master seed, Ed25519, secp256k1, DID documents, federation authentication, backup encryption, Nostr event publishing, node discovery, Lightning Network
|
||||
|
||||
## ADR-009: Manifest-Level Container Security Enforcement
|
||||
- source: docs/adr/009-manifest-container-security.md
|
||||
- status: locked (Accepted)
|
||||
- decision: Enforce mandatory container security defaults at the manifest level, applied automatically during container creation. Non-negotiable defaults: `readonly_root: true`, `no_new_privileges: true`, non-root user (UID > 1000), drop ALL capabilities (add back only required), pinned image tags (no `latest`), default seccomp profile. `core/container/` validates manifests (parse → validate → reject violations → apply security context at `podman create`). Optional overrides (`readonly_root: false`, extra capabilities like NET_ADMIN) require explicit listing and documented justification, with audit trail.
|
||||
- scope: container security, app manifests, manifest validation, podman container creation, security defaults, capability restrictions, seccomp
|
||||
- cross-refs: docs/app-manifest-spec.md, core/container/src/, core/security/src/
|
||||
|
||||
## ADR-011: DWN Deprioritization
|
||||
- source: docs/adr/011-dwn-deprioritization.md
|
||||
- status: locked (Accepted)
|
||||
- decision: Deprioritize Web5 DWN spec compliance following TBD's November 2024 shutdown. Keep existing custom DWN store code (`core/archipelago/src/network/dwn_store.rs`) for peer file catalogs and federation state; stop calling it "Web5 DWN" in user-facing text; do not invest in DWN spec compliance; prioritize Nostr + Tor federation for peer discovery and data exchange; re-evaluate only if DIF produces a viable Rust SDK or the spec regains maintainers.
|
||||
- scope: DWN, Web5, dwn_store.rs, Nostr, federation, peer discovery, peer data sync
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
# Requirements (from PRDs)
|
||||
|
||||
No PRD documents were present in the ingest set (10 ADRs + 1 SPEC). No requirements extracted.
|
||||
|
||||
Downstream note: requirements for the roadmap must be derived elsewhere (e.g. from user input or a future PRD ingest); this file intentionally records absence rather than inferring requirements from ADR/SPEC content.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
|
||||
# Onboarding Summary
|
||||
|
||||
## Project State
|
||||
- PROJECT.md: present
|
||||
- REQUIREMENTS.md: present
|
||||
- ROADMAP.md: present
|
||||
- STATE.md: present
|
||||
|
||||
## Codebase Context
|
||||
- Brownfield repo: yes
|
||||
- Map readiness: complete
|
||||
- Codebase map: .planning/codebase/ (complete codebase map)
|
||||
- Fast map available: yes
|
||||
|
||||
## Docs Context
|
||||
- Existing ADR/PRD/SPEC/RFC candidates: 11
|
||||
|
||||
## Recommended Next Step
|
||||
- /gsd-manager
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: 01-federation-mesh-hardening
|
||||
plan: 01
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 1
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs
|
||||
autonomous: true
|
||||
requirements: [FED-01]
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "A federation removal issued while an auto-sync pass is in flight leaves the peer removed — a sync's pre-removal node-list snapshot can no longer re-save the removed peer (FED-01 adjacency edge)"
|
||||
- "Two concurrent federation node writes both persist — neither silently loses the other's update (the lost-update class behind the reported 'removed nodes reappear' symptom)"
|
||||
- "Removing the last remaining federated node succeeds, leaves an empty node list, and returns Ok with an empty Vec (FED-01 empty edge)"
|
||||
- "A removal whose tombstone write fails returns Err to the caller instead of reporting success (FED-01 failure-surfacing)"
|
||||
- "The tombstone is durably written before the filtered node list is saved, so an interruption between the two never resurrects the removed peer (FED-01 ordering edge)"
|
||||
- "A partially-written federation node list can never be observed by a concurrent reader — the list is written to a sibling temp file and renamed into place"
|
||||
prohibitions:
|
||||
- statement: "Removing a federation node MUST NOT delete or destroy that peer's local data — no app data directory under /var/lib/archipelago, no mesh message history, no credential store is erased by unfederating; removal revokes trust, it never destroys operator data"
|
||||
category: safety
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- path: core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs
|
||||
provides: "Serialized, crash-safe federation node store"
|
||||
contains: "FEDERATION_STORE_LOCK"
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- from: core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs
|
||||
to: core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs
|
||||
via: "update_node_state acquires FEDERATION_STORE_LOCK for its whole load-mutate-save cycle, so a sync pass cannot interleave with remove_node"
|
||||
pattern: "FEDERATION_STORE_LOCK"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Close the concurrency race that lets a removed federation node come back: serialize every
|
||||
read-modify-write against `federation/nodes.json` behind one async lock, and make the node-list
|
||||
write atomic.
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: FED-01 — "removing a federation node sticks" is the reason this phase exists. RESEARCH.md
|
||||
identifies an unlocked read-modify-write on `federation/nodes.json` as the primary suspect: the 90s
|
||||
auto-sync loop, the 1800s auto-sync loop, `federation.sync-state`, and `federation.remove-node` all
|
||||
load → mutate → save the same file with zero coordination, so a sync task holding a pre-removal
|
||||
snapshot silently re-saves the peer the operator just removed — with no error logged anywhere.
|
||||
Output: `federation/storage.rs` with a module-level `FEDERATION_STORE_LOCK`, inner/outer function
|
||||
split to avoid re-entrancy deadlock, an atomic temp-file+rename node-list write, and three new
|
||||
regression tests that fail without the lock.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<execution_context>
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/templates/summary.md
|
||||
</execution_context>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
@.planning/PROJECT.md
|
||||
@.planning/ROADMAP.md
|
||||
@.planning/STATE.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-RESEARCH.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-PATTERNS.md
|
||||
@core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs
|
||||
@core/archipelago/src/update.rs
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
## Artifacts this phase produces
|
||||
|
||||
Created or changed by **this plan**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Symbol | Kind | File |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `FEDERATION_STORE_LOCK` | `static tokio::sync::Mutex<()>` | `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` |
|
||||
| `save_nodes_inner` | private async fn (no lock; atomic temp+rename write) | same |
|
||||
| `load_nodes_inner` | private async fn (no lock) | same |
|
||||
| `tombstone_did_inner` / `untombstone_did_inner` | private async fns (no lock) | same |
|
||||
| `test_concurrent_writes_do_not_lose_updates` | `#[tokio::test]` | same (`mod tests`) |
|
||||
| `test_remove_survives_concurrent_state_sync` | `#[tokio::test]` | same (`mod tests`) |
|
||||
| `test_remove_last_node_leaves_empty_list` | `#[tokio::test]` | same (`mod tests`) |
|
||||
| `test_remove_errors_when_tombstone_write_fails` | `#[tokio::test]` | same (`mod tests`) |
|
||||
|
||||
Public function signatures of `load_nodes`, `save_nodes`, `add_node`, `remove_node`,
|
||||
`set_trust_level`, `update_node`, `update_node_state`, `record_peer_transport`, `tombstone_did`,
|
||||
`untombstone_did`, `load_removed_dids` are **unchanged** — callers in `sync.rs`, `handlers.rs`,
|
||||
`server.rs`, and `mesh/mod.rs` compile untouched.
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="tracer" tdd="true">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: End-to-end — a removal survives an in-flight sync (lock + atomic write)</name>
|
||||
<reversibility rating="reversible">A module-private lock and a temp+rename write are internal
|
||||
to storage.rs behind unchanged public signatures; reverting is a single-file change with no
|
||||
on-disk format change.</reversibility>
|
||||
<files>core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` — the whole file (532 lines). Note in particular:
|
||||
`load_nodes` (L51), `record_peer_transport` (L120), `save_nodes` (L149), `add_node` (L161,
|
||||
calls `untombstone_did`), `remove_node` (L180, calls `tombstone_did`), `tombstone_did` (L214),
|
||||
`untombstone_did` (L237), `set_trust_level` (L256), `update_node` (L272), `update_node_state`
|
||||
(L292), and the existing `#[cfg(test)] mod tests` (L341) with its `make_node(did, onion)`
|
||||
helper and `tempfile::tempdir()` convention.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/update.rs` lines 25-40 — `UPDATE_OP_LOCK`, the in-repo precedent for
|
||||
"two async call sites race on one on-disk resource". Copy its doc-comment style (name the
|
||||
concrete historical incident, then state the acquisition policy).
|
||||
- `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-PATTERNS.md` — section "Async static lock
|
||||
for a racy on-disk resource" and "core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs (locking fix)".
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<behavior>
|
||||
- `test_concurrent_writes_do_not_lose_updates`: under `#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 4)]`,
|
||||
seed one node, then `tokio::join!` an `add_node(B)` with a `set_trust_level(A, Observer)`;
|
||||
afterwards `load_nodes` returns 2 nodes AND node A's trust level is Observer. Without the
|
||||
lock one of the two writes is lost.
|
||||
- `test_remove_survives_concurrent_state_sync`: under the multi-thread flavor, loop 50 times:
|
||||
fresh tempdir, seed nodes A and B, `tokio::join!(remove_node(A), update_node_state(A, snapshot))`,
|
||||
then assert `load_nodes` contains no entry whose `did` is A and `load_removed_dids` contains A.
|
||||
Without the lock this reliably fails within 50 iterations.
|
||||
- `test_remove_last_node_leaves_empty_list`: seed exactly one node, remove it, assert the
|
||||
returned Vec is empty, `load_nodes` returns an empty Vec (not an error), and the DID is
|
||||
tombstoned.
|
||||
</behavior>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Write the three tests FIRST in the existing `mod tests` block and confirm they fail (run the
|
||||
verify command and capture the failure) before writing the fix.
|
||||
|
||||
Then add at module scope, immediately after the existing `use` block:
|
||||
`static FEDERATION_STORE_LOCK: tokio::sync::Mutex<()> = tokio::sync::Mutex::const_new(());`
|
||||
with a doc comment that names the failure it prevents — a `federation.remove-node` RPC racing
|
||||
the 90s auto-sync pass, whose pre-removal `load_nodes` snapshot re-saves the removed peer with
|
||||
no error logged — and states the acquisition policy: acquire with `.lock().await`, never
|
||||
`try_lock`. Reject-on-contention is wrong here: a rejected federation write reproduces the very
|
||||
lost-write symptom the lock exists to stop, unlike `update.rs` where rejecting a second
|
||||
concurrent download is the desired UX.
|
||||
|
||||
Restructure so no public function can deadlock on itself. For each function that both takes the
|
||||
lock and calls another locking function, extract the body into a private `*_inner` fn that does
|
||||
NOT acquire, and make the public fn a thin wrapper: acquire the guard, call the inner(s), drop.
|
||||
Required inner fns for this task: `load_nodes_inner`, `save_nodes_inner`, `tombstone_did_inner`,
|
||||
`untombstone_did_inner`. `remove_node` (which calls `tombstone_did`) and `add_node` (which calls
|
||||
`untombstone_did`) must call the `*_inner` variants under a single held guard so tombstone +
|
||||
node-list save are one critical section.
|
||||
|
||||
Convert the node-list write in `save_nodes_inner` to atomic replace: serialize to a sibling path
|
||||
formed by appending a `.tmp` suffix to the resolved nodes file path in the same directory, write
|
||||
it with `tokio::fs::write`, then `tokio::fs::rename` it onto the real path. Keep the existing
|
||||
`.context(...)` error strings so callers' messages are unchanged. Same-directory rename is
|
||||
required — a cross-filesystem rename is not atomic.
|
||||
|
||||
In THIS task route `load_nodes`, `save_nodes`, `remove_node`, `tombstone_did`,
|
||||
`untombstone_did`, and `update_node_state` through the lock. The remaining mutators are Task 2.
|
||||
|
||||
Preserve `remove_node`'s existing ordering exactly: the retain/`bail!`-on-not-found check, then
|
||||
the tombstone write with its failure propagated via `.context("persist removal tombstone")?`,
|
||||
then the node-list save. Do not weaken that ordering or its error propagation.
|
||||
|
||||
Build gotcha from CLAUDE.md: if the build hits `rust-lld: undefined hidden symbol`, that is
|
||||
incremental-cache corruption — re-run with `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0`.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation::storage</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation::storage` exits 0.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'FEDERATION_STORE_LOCK' core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` is at least 7.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'tokio::sync::Mutex::const_new' core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` equals 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'fs::rename' core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `grep -Eq 'async fn test_remove_survives_concurrent_state_sync' core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` succeeds.
|
||||
- `grep -Eq 'async fn test_concurrent_writes_do_not_lose_updates' core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` succeeds.
|
||||
- `grep -Eq 'async fn test_remove_last_node_leaves_empty_list' core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` succeeds.
|
||||
- `grep -Eq 'flavor = "multi_thread"' core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` succeeds (the
|
||||
race tests are useless on the single-threaded default runtime).
|
||||
- The SUMMARY records the captured pre-fix failure output for at least one of the three tests.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>The removal-vs-sync race is closed at the storage layer and proven by a test that fails without the lock; the node list is written atomically.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: Bring every remaining federation mutator under the lock + surface tombstone-write failure</name>
|
||||
<files>core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` as left by Task 1 — specifically the four
|
||||
mutators not yet routed through the lock: `record_peer_transport` (L120 pre-change),
|
||||
`add_node`, `set_trust_level`, `update_node`.
|
||||
- The existing test `test_remove_nonexistent_node_errors` (L445 pre-change) — mirror its
|
||||
assertion style for the new failure test.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Route `add_node`, `set_trust_level`, `update_node`, and `record_peer_transport` through
|
||||
`FEDERATION_STORE_LOCK` using the same wrapper + `*_inner` split established in Task 1. Every
|
||||
public function in this module that performs a load → mutate → save cycle must hold the guard
|
||||
for the whole cycle; none may call another lock-acquiring public function while holding it.
|
||||
|
||||
Add `test_remove_errors_when_tombstone_write_fails`: seed a node, then make the tombstone write
|
||||
fail by pre-creating the removed-nodes path as a directory (a directory cannot be replaced by a
|
||||
file write), call `remove_node`, and assert the result is `Err` AND that `load_nodes` still
|
||||
contains the node — a removal whose tombstone never landed must not have half-applied. This is
|
||||
the FED-01 "a failed removal surfaces an error instead of silently no-opping" criterion at the
|
||||
storage layer.
|
||||
|
||||
Do not change any public signature and do not touch `load_invites`/`save_invites` (a separate
|
||||
file with no cross-writer).
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation` exits 0.
|
||||
- `grep -Eq 'async fn test_remove_errors_when_tombstone_write_fails' core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` succeeds.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'FEDERATION_STORE_LOCK.lock().await' core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` is at least 9.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo build -p archipelago` exits 0 with no new warnings in `federation::storage`
|
||||
(dead-code warnings on unused `*_inner` fns mean a mutator was missed).
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` exits 0 — no caller in `sync.rs`, `handlers.rs`,
|
||||
`server.rs`, or `mesh/mod.rs` was broken by the refactor.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>Every federation node-store mutator is serialized; a tombstone-write failure is proven to surface as an error with no half-applied removal.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<threat_model>
|
||||
## Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| federated peer → `federation::sync` → node store | A remote peer's state snapshot crosses into local persisted trust state |
|
||||
| operator RPC (`federation.remove-node`) → node store | An authenticated local operator action mutates trust membership |
|
||||
| process → `federation/nodes.json` on disk | Multiple concurrent async tasks write one file; a crash can leave it partial |
|
||||
|
||||
## STRIDE Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| T-01-01 | Tampering | `federation::storage` concurrent read-modify-write | high | mitigate | `FEDERATION_STORE_LOCK` held across the whole load-mutate-save cycle in every mutator (Tasks 1-2); regression test proves a removal survives a concurrent sync |
|
||||
| T-01-02 | Elevation of Privilege | a removed (untrusted) peer regaining federation membership via the race | high | mitigate | Same lock; plus the pre-existing tombstone check in `merge_transitive_peers` and `handle_federation_peer_joined` is left intact and re-verified by `cargo test -p archipelago federation` |
|
||||
| T-01-03 | Denial of Service | a partial `nodes.json` write on crash making the node list unreadable | medium | mitigate | Atomic temp-file + same-directory `fs::rename` in `save_nodes_inner` (Task 1) |
|
||||
| T-01-04 | Denial of Service | lock contention stalling the federation RPC surface | low | accept | Federation writes are infrequent (90s loop + operator actions); `.lock().await` queues rather than rejects, and every critical section is a bounded file read+write |
|
||||
</threat_model>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation` — green.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` — green (no caller regressions).
|
||||
- The pre-fix failure of `test_remove_survives_concurrent_state_sync` is recorded in the SUMMARY as
|
||||
evidence the test is fail-first and not vacuous.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- Every read-modify-write in `federation/storage.rs` is serialized behind one module-level async mutex with no re-entrancy path.
|
||||
- The node list is written atomically (temp file + same-directory rename).
|
||||
- Four new tests exist and pass; at least one is demonstrated to fail without the lock.
|
||||
- Public signatures unchanged; the full `archipelago` test suite is green.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
Create `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-01-SUMMARY.md` when done.
|
||||
Commit with `git add` by explicit path (another agent shares this tree — never `git add -A`), then
|
||||
push per CLAUDE.md: `git push gitea-ai main`.
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: 01-federation-mesh-hardening
|
||||
plan: 02
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 1
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- neode-ui/mock-backend.js
|
||||
- neode-ui/scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs
|
||||
- neode-ui/package.json
|
||||
autonomous: true
|
||||
requirements: [FED-04]
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "Every mesh.* and federation.* RPC method the neode-ui frontend calls has a matching handler in mock-backend.js — the demo never answers a UI call with 'Method not found'"
|
||||
- "Renaming a mesh peer on the demo persists: mesh.contacts-save then mesh.contacts-list returns the saved alias, mirroring the daemon's handle_mesh_contacts_save/list behavior"
|
||||
- "A reaction, reply, edit, delete, or forward performed on the demo mutates the demo message store and is visible on the next mesh.messages read — it is not a bare ok acknowledgement"
|
||||
- "The demo's transport decision for an attachment matches the daemon's size tiers (auto under 1024 bytes, chooser in the 1024..2300 band, tor-only above 2300) — no demo-only chooser modal"
|
||||
- "An automated parity check fails when a UI-called mesh.*/federation.* method has no mock-backend handler, so the gap class is caught before manual demo testing"
|
||||
prohibitions:
|
||||
- statement: "The demo/mock backend MUST NOT gain behavior that diverges from the real daemon — it must never invent a demo-only modal, a demo-only response shape, or a success path a real node does not produce; every mirrored handler cites the daemon source file and line range it mirrors"
|
||||
category: transparency
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- path: neode-ui/scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs
|
||||
provides: "Static UI-call vs mock-handler cross-reference plus a live RPC smoke sequence"
|
||||
min_lines: 60
|
||||
- path: neode-ui/mock-backend.js
|
||||
provides: "mesh.contacts-list/save, stateful message-mutation handlers, and the 10 previously-missing UI-called methods"
|
||||
contains: "mesh.contacts-list"
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- from: neode-ui/scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs
|
||||
to: neode-ui/mock-backend.js
|
||||
via: "spawns mock-backend.js on MOCK_BACKEND_PORT and posts a scripted JSON-RPC sequence"
|
||||
pattern: "MOCK_BACKEND_PORT"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Finish demo/real mesh parity: the demo backend answers every mesh and federation RPC the UI calls,
|
||||
and the message-mutation calls actually mutate demo state instead of returning a bare acknowledgement.
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: FED-04. Attachment-send parity already landed on main (`c2ce71c6`) — `mesh.send-content-inline`
|
||||
/ `mesh.send-content` / `mesh.fetch-content` / `mesh.transport-advice` now mirror the daemon's tier
|
||||
logic. RESEARCH.md and a fresh cross-reference of `neode-ui/src/**` against `mock-backend.js` show
|
||||
what remains: **12 methods the UI calls that have no case at all** (they fall through to a
|
||||
`Method not found` error the frontend swallows in `try/catch`), and **six ack-only stubs** that
|
||||
never touch the demo message store, so reactions/edits/deletes silently do not render on the demo.
|
||||
Output: those gaps closed, plus a repeatable parity harness so this class of drift is caught by a
|
||||
command instead of by squinting at the browser console.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<execution_context>
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/templates/summary.md
|
||||
</execution_context>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
@.planning/PROJECT.md
|
||||
@.planning/ROADMAP.md
|
||||
@.planning/STATE.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-RESEARCH.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-PATTERNS.md
|
||||
@neode-ui/mock-backend.js
|
||||
@core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
## Artifacts this phase produces
|
||||
|
||||
Created or changed by **this plan**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Symbol | Kind | File |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `neode-ui/scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` | new node script (static cross-reference + live smoke) | new file |
|
||||
| `test:mock-parity` | npm script | `neode-ui/package.json` |
|
||||
| `MOCK_BACKEND_PORT` | env var override for the mock's listen port | `neode-ui/mock-backend.js` |
|
||||
| `mesh.contacts-list`, `mesh.contacts-save` | new mock RPC cases | `neode-ui/mock-backend.js` |
|
||||
| `mesh.clear-all`, `mesh.schedule-message`, `mesh.list-scheduled`, `mesh.cancel-scheduled`, `mesh.assistant-status`, `mesh.assistant-configure` | new mock RPC cases | same |
|
||||
| `federation.nodes`, `federation.dwn-status`, `federation.notify-did-change`, `federation.cancel-request` | new mock RPC cases | same |
|
||||
| `store.mesh.contacts`, `store.mesh.scheduled` | new per-session mock store buckets | same |
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="tracer">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: End-to-end — alias a mesh peer on the demo and it sticks, proven by a parity harness</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/mock-backend.js, neode-ui/scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs, neode-ui/package.json</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `neode-ui/mock-backend.js` lines 4300-4500 — the `mesh.transport-advice` case and the comment
|
||||
block above it (the house convention: mirror the daemon and cite the source file), the
|
||||
`mesh.send-content-inline` case for how a handler mutates `currentStore().mesh.dynamic`, and
|
||||
the ack-only stub block at the end of the mesh cases.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/mock-backend.js` lines 5495-5530 — the per-session store shape (`mesh: { dynamic: [], blobs: {} }`)
|
||||
and `currentStore()`.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/mock-backend.js` lines 80-90 and 5710-5730 — the `PORT` constant and the `server.listen` call.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs` — `handle_mesh_contacts_list` (from L1218)
|
||||
and `handle_mesh_contacts_save` (from L1253): the real merge of `state.contacts` (a
|
||||
`ContactEntry` map with `alias`, `notes`, `pinned`, `blocked`) over `state.peers`, and the
|
||||
exact response shape the UI consumes.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/api/rpc-client.ts` lines 795-820 — the `mesh.contacts-list` / `mesh.contacts-save`
|
||||
wrappers and their params shape.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/views/Mesh.vue` — the two call sites (on mount, and on peer rename) to confirm
|
||||
which response fields are read.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Add a `contacts` bucket (a plain object keyed by peer contact id) to the per-session mock store
|
||||
alongside the existing `dynamic` and `blobs` keys.
|
||||
|
||||
Implement `mesh.contacts-save`: accept the same params the daemon's handler takes, upsert
|
||||
`{ alias, notes, pinned, blocked }` for the given peer key into the session `contacts` bucket,
|
||||
and return the same result shape the real handler returns. Implement `mesh.contacts-list`:
|
||||
merge the session `contacts` bucket over the demo's `mesh.peers` list exactly as the daemon
|
||||
merges `state.contacts` over `state.peers`, and return the same field names. Follow the house
|
||||
convention already used above `mesh.transport-advice`: a comment naming
|
||||
`typed_messages.rs handle_mesh_contacts_list` / `handle_mesh_contacts_save` as the source of
|
||||
truth, so a future reader knows where to re-check parity.
|
||||
|
||||
Change the hardcoded listen port to read an env override first, defaulting to the existing
|
||||
value, so a harness can bind an ephemeral port without colliding with a running dev preview.
|
||||
Use the env var name `MOCK_BACKEND_PORT`.
|
||||
|
||||
Create `neode-ui/scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` with two stages and a non-zero exit on any failure:
|
||||
(1) STATIC — scan `neode-ui/src/**` for every `'mesh.<verb>'` / `'federation.<verb>'` string
|
||||
literal, scan `mock-backend.js` for every `case '<method>':`, and report methods called by the UI
|
||||
with no mock case. Print the offending method names. (2) LIVE — spawn `node mock-backend.js`
|
||||
with `MOCK_BACKEND_PORT` set to a free port, poll `/rpc/v1` until ready (bounded ~10s), then POST
|
||||
a scripted JSON-RPC sequence and assert on the responses: `mesh.contacts-save` with an alias,
|
||||
then `mesh.contacts-list` returns that alias for that peer. Kill the child in a `finally` block.
|
||||
Do not use `|| echo`-style fallbacks anywhere in the script or its npm wiring — a failed spawn,
|
||||
a failed fetch, or a missing field must propagate as a non-zero exit, never a passing run that
|
||||
measured nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
Register it as the `test:mock-parity` npm script in `neode-ui/package.json`.
|
||||
|
||||
In this task the STATIC stage is expected to still report the other missing methods; make it
|
||||
print them and exit non-zero only when the LIVE stage fails or when a method from an explicit
|
||||
`KNOWN_GAPS` array is missing. Task 2 empties `KNOWN_GAPS` to zero entries.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && node --check mock-backend.js && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && node --check mock-backend.js` exits 0.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` exits 0 and its output contains the alias
|
||||
round-trip assertion result.
|
||||
- `grep -c "case 'mesh.contacts-list'" neode-ui/mock-backend.js` equals 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c "case 'mesh.contacts-save'" neode-ui/mock-backend.js` equals 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'MOCK_BACKEND_PORT' neode-ui/mock-backend.js` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'typed_messages.rs' neode-ui/mock-backend.js` is at least 2 (the pre-existing
|
||||
transport-advice citation plus the new contacts citation).
|
||||
- `node -e "process.exit(require('./neode-ui/package.json').scripts['test:mock-parity'] ? 0 : 1)"` exits 0.
|
||||
- Killing the harness leaves no stray listener: `cd neode-ui && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` exits 0 twice in a row.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>Peer aliasing works end-to-end on the demo and a single command proves it, with the remaining method gaps enumerated by name.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: Close the remaining ten UI-called methods with no mock handler</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/mock-backend.js, neode-ui/scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- The STATIC-stage output from Task 1 — the authoritative live list. As of planning it is:
|
||||
`mesh.clear-all`, `mesh.schedule-message`, `mesh.list-scheduled`, `mesh.cancel-scheduled`,
|
||||
`mesh.assistant-status`, `mesh.assistant-configure`, `federation.nodes`,
|
||||
`federation.dwn-status`, `federation.notify-did-change`, `federation.cancel-request`.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs` lines 390-440 — the real handler names each of
|
||||
these methods dispatches to, so the mock mirrors the right handler.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/mock-backend.js` — the existing `federation.list-nodes`, `federation.list-pending-requests`,
|
||||
`federation.approve-request`, and `federation.reject-request` cases, for the response shapes
|
||||
the sibling federation methods must match.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Add a case for each remaining method, mirroring the real handler's response shape (read the
|
||||
Rust handler named by the dispatcher before writing each one) and citing it in a comment the way
|
||||
the contacts handlers do.
|
||||
|
||||
Behavioral requirements, not bare acknowledgements: `mesh.clear-all` empties the session
|
||||
`dynamic` message array; `mesh.schedule-message` pushes into a new session `scheduled` bucket
|
||||
and returns the created entry's id; `mesh.list-scheduled` returns that bucket;
|
||||
`mesh.cancel-scheduled` removes by id and reports whether an entry was actually removed;
|
||||
`federation.nodes` returns the same node array `federation.list-nodes` returns (the UI treats
|
||||
them as aliases); `federation.cancel-request` removes the request from the pending-requests
|
||||
bucket the existing approve/reject cases operate on.
|
||||
|
||||
Then set the harness's `KNOWN_GAPS` array to empty so the STATIC stage exits non-zero on ANY
|
||||
UI-called method without a mock case, and extend the LIVE stage with one assertion per newly
|
||||
stateful method that has observable state: schedule a message then list it and assert it is
|
||||
present; cancel it and assert it is gone; clear-all then read `mesh.messages` and assert the
|
||||
dynamic messages are gone.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && node --check mock-backend.js && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` exits 0 with zero reported missing methods.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && grep -c 'KNOWN_GAPS' scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` is at least 1 and the array
|
||||
literal it is assigned is empty.
|
||||
- Each of the ten method names appears exactly once as a `case '<method>':` in `mock-backend.js`.
|
||||
- Deliberately deleting one `case` line makes `node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` exit non-zero
|
||||
(fail-first proof); restore the line afterward and record the check in the SUMMARY.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>The demo answers every mesh and federation RPC the UI calls, and the parity harness is proven to fail when it does not.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 3: Make the message-mutation stubs mutate demo state</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/mock-backend.js, neode-ui/scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `neode-ui/mock-backend.js` — the ack-only stub block covering `mesh.send-reaction`,
|
||||
`mesh.send-reply`, `mesh.send-read-receipt`, `mesh.edit-message`, `mesh.delete-message`,
|
||||
`mesh.forward-message`, `mesh.send-channel` (currently a shared bare-acknowledgement case),
|
||||
and the `mesh.send-content-inline` case above it for the message-object shape pushed into
|
||||
`currentStore().mesh.dynamic`.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs` lines 637-976 — reply / reaction /
|
||||
read-receipt / forward handlers, and lines 1065-1180 — edit / delete. Note the stable
|
||||
`sender_pubkey` + `sender_seq` message key these operate on, not the local `id`.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs` lines 139-180 — the `MeshMessage` field set the demo
|
||||
objects must match (`id`, `direction`, `peer_contact_id`, `peer_name`, `plaintext`,
|
||||
`timestamp`, `delivered`, `encrypted`, `transport`, `message_type`, `typed_payload`,
|
||||
`sender_pubkey`, `sender_seq`).
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/views/Mesh.vue` and `neode-ui/src/stores/mesh.ts` — how the UI reads reactions,
|
||||
edited text, and deleted markers, so the mutated shape is the one that renders.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Split the shared acknowledgement case into individual cases that mutate `currentStore().mesh.dynamic`:
|
||||
|
||||
`mesh.send-reaction` — locate the target message by the same key the daemon uses and append or
|
||||
toggle the emoji in its reactions collection. `mesh.send-reply` — push a new message whose
|
||||
payload carries the replied-to message key, so the UI renders the quote block.
|
||||
`mesh.send-read-receipt` — mark the target message read. `mesh.edit-message` — replace the
|
||||
target's text and set the edited marker the UI reads. `mesh.delete-message` — apply the same
|
||||
deletion representation the daemon applies (tombstone marker vs removal — read the handler and
|
||||
mirror it, do not choose independently). `mesh.forward-message` — push a copy addressed to the
|
||||
destination peer. `mesh.send-channel` — push a channel-addressed message.
|
||||
|
||||
Leave `mesh.refresh` and `mesh.reboot-radio` as acknowledgements — the daemon's handlers have no
|
||||
message-store effect either, so mirroring means leaving them alone. Add a comment on that pair
|
||||
stating why they remain acknowledgements, so a later reader does not "fix" them into divergence.
|
||||
|
||||
Extend the harness's LIVE stage: send a message, react to it, and assert `mesh.messages` shows
|
||||
the reaction; edit it and assert the text changed and the edited marker is set; delete it and
|
||||
assert the daemon-matching representation; forward it and assert a copy exists for the
|
||||
destination peer.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && node --check mock-backend.js && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` exits 0 with the reaction, edit, delete, and
|
||||
forward assertions all reported as passing.
|
||||
- `grep -c "case 'mesh.send-reaction':" neode-ui/mock-backend.js` equals 1 and that case is no
|
||||
longer part of a shared fall-through group with `mesh.refresh`.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'typed_messages.rs' neode-ui/mock-backend.js` is at least 4 (each mirrored family
|
||||
cites its daemon source).
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npm run build` exits 0 (the mock is dev-only, but the build must not regress).
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>Reactions, replies, edits, deletes, and forwards render on the demo exactly as on a real node, proven by the live harness.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
## Planner Assumptions (flagged, unresolved)
|
||||
|
||||
- **FED-04 / spec-less probe, category `unclassified`:** the probe could not classify an edge for
|
||||
FED-04, and no acceptance criterion was invented for it. The parity harness covers the *known*
|
||||
drift class (missing handler, non-mutating handler); it does NOT cover response-shape drift where
|
||||
a mock case exists and returns a differently-shaped success object than the daemon. That residual
|
||||
class is surfaced here rather than silently dropped, and is a candidate finding for the FED-03
|
||||
review in plan 01-07.
|
||||
|
||||
<threat_model>
|
||||
## Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| browser → mock backend `/rpc/v1` | Developer-local demo surface; accepts unauthenticated JSON-RPC on a loopback-bound dev port |
|
||||
| harness child process → mock backend | The parity script spawns and drives the mock on an ephemeral port |
|
||||
|
||||
## STRIDE Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| T-01-05 | Spoofing | mock backend impersonating real daemon behavior in a way that hides a real-node bug | medium | mitigate | Every mirrored handler cites the daemon file and line range it mirrors; the parity harness asserts observable state transitions, not acknowledgements |
|
||||
| T-01-06 | Information Disclosure | mock backend binding a non-loopback interface on a developer machine | low | accept | Pre-existing `0.0.0.0` bind is unchanged by this plan; the mock serves only synthetic demo data and ships in no release artifact |
|
||||
| T-01-07 | Tampering | the parity harness leaving an orphaned server process holding a port | low | mitigate | The child is killed in a `finally` block and the acceptance criteria require two consecutive clean runs |
|
||||
| T-01-SC | Tampering | npm/pip/cargo installs | high | mitigate | No packages are added by this plan — the harness uses only Node built-ins (`node:child_process`, `fetch`, `node:fs`). If any dependency becomes necessary, stop and run the Package Legitimacy Gate before installing |
|
||||
</threat_model>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` — green, zero missing methods.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npm run build` — green.
|
||||
- Fail-first proof recorded: deleting a `case` line makes the harness exit non-zero.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- Zero mesh.*/federation.* methods called by the UI lack a mock handler.
|
||||
- Peer aliasing, reactions, replies, edits, deletes, and forwards all change demo state and render.
|
||||
- A single command reproduces the parity verdict and is proven fail-first.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
Create `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-02-SUMMARY.md` when done.
|
||||
Commit staged by explicit path only (a second agent shares this tree), then `git push gitea-ai main`.
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: 01-federation-mesh-hardening
|
||||
plan: 03
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 1
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/components/SendBitcoinModal.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/components/WalletScanModal.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/ScreensaverRing.test.ts
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/PaidTick.test.ts
|
||||
autonomous: true
|
||||
requirements: [FED-06]
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "The payment-success tick in SendBitcoinModal renders the screensaver EQ-segment ring, not a CSS ripple burst"
|
||||
- "The payment-success tick in WalletScanModal renders the same EQ-segment ring, so the paid tick is identical on every surface it appears"
|
||||
- "ScreensaverRing exposes a third badge size variant sized 160px on mobile and 192px from 768px up, with --viz-radius 80px/96px, alongside the untouched default and compact variants"
|
||||
- "The badge ring fits inside the modal card without clipping — the success pane's ring container is no larger than the badge diameter at either breakpoint"
|
||||
- "The success amount numerals and SENT / Done copy are unchanged — only the ring geometry behind the checkmark changes"
|
||||
- "SystemDangerZone and Screensaver continue to render the compact and default variants unchanged"
|
||||
- statement: "ScreensaverRing's segment animation is disabled under prefers-reduced-motion for every size variant including the new badge, matching the site-wide reduced-motion convention"
|
||||
verification: backstop
|
||||
prohibitions:
|
||||
- statement: "The paid-tick change MUST NOT alter what the success pane asserts about the payment — the ring is decoration; it must never render a success state for a payment that has not actually settled, and no success-gating condition may be relaxed to make the animation easier to trigger"
|
||||
category: safety
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- path: neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue
|
||||
provides: "badge size variant + reduced-motion guard"
|
||||
contains: "viz-ring-badge"
|
||||
- path: neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/PaidTick.test.ts
|
||||
provides: "Assertions that both paid-tick surfaces render the badge ring"
|
||||
min_lines: 25
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- from: neode-ui/src/components/SendBitcoinModal.vue
|
||||
to: neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue
|
||||
via: "success pane renders <ScreensaverRing size=\"badge\" /> layered under the checkmark core"
|
||||
pattern: "ScreensaverRing"
|
||||
- from: neode-ui/src/components/WalletScanModal.vue
|
||||
to: neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue
|
||||
via: "success pane renders <ScreensaverRing size=\"badge\" /> in place of the plain circle"
|
||||
pattern: "ScreensaverRing"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Make the invoice/payment "paid" tick on-brand: the circle around the checkmark becomes the
|
||||
screensaver ring with its outer EQ-segment lines, everywhere the paid tick appears.
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: FED-06, locked by the user in CONTEXT.md — the paid-tick circle is the ScreensaverRing
|
||||
style, applied consistently to every paid/success tick surface. RESEARCH.md flagged that a naive
|
||||
drop-in overflows the modal card (the existing compact variant is 240-320px against a 96-112px
|
||||
badge); 01-UI-SPEC.md resolved that by deciding on a new `badge` size variant rather than a
|
||||
transform hack, and also recorded that `ScreensaverRing` has no `prefers-reduced-motion` guard at
|
||||
all today — a real gap this phase must close.
|
||||
Output: a third size variant plus a reduced-motion guard in the shared component, both paid-tick
|
||||
call sites swapped, and component tests pinning the result.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<execution_context>
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/templates/summary.md
|
||||
</execution_context>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
@.planning/PROJECT.md
|
||||
@.planning/STATE.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-UI-SPEC.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-PATTERNS.md
|
||||
@neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue
|
||||
@neode-ui/src/components/Screensaver.vue
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
## Artifacts this phase produces
|
||||
|
||||
Created or changed by **this plan**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Symbol | Kind | File |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `size: 'default' \| 'compact' \| 'badge'` | widened prop union | `neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue` |
|
||||
| `.viz-ring-badge` | CSS class (160px / 192px, `--viz-radius` 80px / 96px) | same |
|
||||
| reduced-motion media guard on `.viz-segment` | CSS | same |
|
||||
| `neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/ScreensaverRing.test.ts` | new vitest suite | new file |
|
||||
| `neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/PaidTick.test.ts` | new vitest suite | new file |
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- planner-discipline-allow: burst-ring -->
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="tracer" tdd="true">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: End-to-end — the badge ring variant renders as the payment-success tick</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue, neode-ui/src/components/SendBitcoinModal.vue, neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/ScreensaverRing.test.ts, neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/PaidTick.test.ts</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue` — the whole file (about 115 lines): the
|
||||
`withDefaults(defineProps<{ size?: ... }>())` union, the `sizeClass` computed, the two
|
||||
existing size CSS classes with their `min-width: 768px` breakpoints and `--viz-radius`
|
||||
custom properties, and the `segment-pulse` keyframes.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/components/SendBitcoinModal.vue` lines 1-30 (the success pane markup: the
|
||||
success-burst container, its three ripple span elements, and the core circle plus checkmark)
|
||||
and lines 680-740 (the corresponding CSS block, including the existing
|
||||
`@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce)` rule — copy that exact media-query syntax into
|
||||
ScreensaverRing).
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/components/Screensaver.vue` — the existing `ScreensaverRing` + `ScreensaverLogo`
|
||||
centred-absolute layering pattern (`position: relative` wrapper, `position: absolute; inset: 0`
|
||||
inner content) to reuse for the checkmark core.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/BaseModal.test.ts` — the house vitest + `@vue/test-utils`
|
||||
conventions for mounting a component in this repo.
|
||||
- `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-UI-SPEC.md` — the "FED-06 Sizing Decision"
|
||||
table (exact diameters and radii) and the "UI Considerations" rows for the paid-tick ring.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<behavior>
|
||||
- `ScreensaverRing.test.ts`: mounting with `size="badge"` puts `viz-ring-badge` on the root
|
||||
element; mounting with `size="compact"` still yields `viz-ring-compact`; the default mount
|
||||
still yields `viz-ring-default`; the rendered segment count matches the `segmentCount` prop.
|
||||
- `PaidTick.test.ts`: SendBitcoinModal driven into its payment-success state renders exactly one
|
||||
`ScreensaverRing` with `size="badge"`, renders the checkmark core, and renders zero ripple
|
||||
elements; the success amount text is unchanged.
|
||||
</behavior>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Write both test files first and confirm they fail before implementing.
|
||||
|
||||
In `ScreensaverRing.vue`: widen the `size` prop union with a third member `'badge'`, extend
|
||||
`sizeClass` to map it to `viz-ring-badge`, and add a `.viz-ring-badge` CSS rule following the
|
||||
exact shape of the existing two — `width`/`height` 160px and `--viz-radius: 80px` at mobile,
|
||||
then a `@media (min-width: 768px)` block with 192px and `--viz-radius: 96px`. Do not touch
|
||||
`.viz-ring-default` or `.viz-ring-compact`; `Screensaver.vue` and `SystemDangerZone.vue` must
|
||||
keep their current rendering.
|
||||
|
||||
Also inside `ScreensaverRing.vue`, add the missing motion guard so it applies to every variant:
|
||||
a `@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce)` block that sets `animation: none` and a static
|
||||
reduced opacity on `.viz-segment`. Use the same media-query syntax as the guard already present
|
||||
in `SendBitcoinModal.vue` so the two read identically.
|
||||
|
||||
In `SendBitcoinModal.vue`'s payment-success pane: import `ScreensaverRing`, replace the three
|
||||
ripple span elements with `<ScreensaverRing size="badge" />`, keep the existing core circle and
|
||||
checkmark markup untouched, and wrap the pair in the Screensaver-style layering (a
|
||||
`position: relative` container sized to the badge diameter, with the core absolutely centred over
|
||||
the ring). Remove the ripple elements' now-dead CSS rules and their keyframes; keep the core and
|
||||
checkmark rules, and keep the existing reduced-motion rule but drop the clause that referenced
|
||||
the removed elements. Do not change the success amount numerals, the SENT copy, the Done button,
|
||||
or any condition that decides when the success pane is shown.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && test -f src/components/__tests__/ScreensaverRing.test.ts && test -f src/components/__tests__/PaidTick.test.ts && npx vitest run src/components/__tests__/ScreensaverRing.test.ts src/components/__tests__/PaidTick.test.ts</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- Both test files exist and `npx vitest run src/components/__tests__/ScreensaverRing.test.ts src/components/__tests__/PaidTick.test.ts` exits 0 (the explicit `test -f` guards are required — `vitest.config.ts` sets `passWithNoTests: true`, so a missing file would otherwise pass vacuously).
|
||||
- `grep -c 'viz-ring-badge' neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue` is at least 2 (computed mapping + CSS rule).
|
||||
- `grep -c 'prefers-reduced-motion' neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue` equals 1.
|
||||
- `grep -Eq '160px' neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue` and `grep -Eq '192px' neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue` both succeed.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'viz-ring-compact' neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue` is unchanged from before the edit (the compact variant is untouched).
|
||||
- `grep -c 'ScreensaverRing' neode-ui/src/components/SendBitcoinModal.vue` is at least 2 (import + usage).
|
||||
- `grep -c 'burst-ring' neode-ui/src/components/SendBitcoinModal.vue` equals 0.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run` exits 0 — no existing suite regressed.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npm run build` exits 0 and `grep -rq 'viz-ring-badge' ../web/dist/neode-ui/assets/` succeeds (per CLAUDE.md: the build can silently no-op, so grep the built bundle for the new string).
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>The badge variant exists, the send-payment success tick renders it, and both are pinned by tests that failed before the change.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: Bring the scan-modal paid tick to the same ring</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/src/components/WalletScanModal.vue, neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/PaidTick.test.ts</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/components/WalletScanModal.vue` around line 232 (the success circle markup — a
|
||||
fixed 24-unit inline-flex circle with the success-ring class) and around line 861 (its CSS
|
||||
rule). Note it has no ripple animation at all today, unlike the send modal.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/components/SendBitcoinModal.vue` as left by Task 1 — the layering wrapper to
|
||||
copy verbatim.
|
||||
- `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-UI-SPEC.md` — the FED-06 sizing table row
|
||||
confirming this call site also uses the badge variant.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Replace WalletScanModal's fixed success circle with the same composition Task 1 established:
|
||||
a `position: relative` container sized to the badge diameter holding `<ScreensaverRing size="badge" />`
|
||||
with the existing checkmark content absolutely centred over it. Import `ScreensaverRing`. Drop
|
||||
the now-unused fixed-size utility classes and the plain-circle CSS rule; keep the checkmark
|
||||
glyph, its colour, and the surrounding copy exactly as they are.
|
||||
|
||||
Extend `PaidTick.test.ts` with a WalletScanModal case asserting its success state renders one
|
||||
`ScreensaverRing` with `size="badge"` and still renders the checkmark.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify on the dev preview before considering this done, per the user requirement recorded in
|
||||
CONTEXT.md: run the dev preview and confirm neither ring is clipped by the modal card's
|
||||
scrolling container at a narrow viewport and at desktop width. Record the observation in the
|
||||
SUMMARY. The blocking human sign-off for this is consolidated into plan 01-07.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && npx vitest run src/components/__tests__/PaidTick.test.ts && npm run build</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run src/components/__tests__/PaidTick.test.ts` exits 0 and the suite contains both a SendBitcoinModal case and a WalletScanModal case.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'ScreensaverRing' neode-ui/src/components/WalletScanModal.vue` is at least 2.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'success-ring' neode-ui/src/components/WalletScanModal.vue` equals 0.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run` exits 0.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npm run build` exits 0.
|
||||
- The SUMMARY records the dev-preview observation for both surfaces at a narrow and a desktop viewport.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>Both paid-tick surfaces render the identical branded ring, with no clipping at either breakpoint.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
## Planner Assumptions (flagged, unresolved)
|
||||
|
||||
- **FED-06 / spec-less probe, category `unclassified`:** the probe surfaced an unclassified edge for
|
||||
FED-06 that no defensible acceptance criterion covers. Surfaced rather than dropped: the phase
|
||||
requirement says the ring applies "everywhere the paid tick appears", and a repo-wide grep found
|
||||
exactly two paid-tick surfaces (`SendBitcoinModal.vue`, `WalletScanModal.vue`). If a third
|
||||
success-tick surface is added between planning and execution — or exists under markup this grep
|
||||
did not match — it will not be covered by this plan. The FED-03 review in plan 01-07 re-runs the
|
||||
grep as a check.
|
||||
|
||||
<threat_model>
|
||||
## Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| payment result → success pane render | The only security-relevant edge: what the UI asserts about a payment's settlement |
|
||||
|
||||
## STRIDE Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| T-01-08 | Spoofing | success pane rendered for a payment that has not settled | high | mitigate | This plan changes decoration only; the acceptance criteria forbid touching any condition that gates the success pane, and `npx vitest run` on the existing suites must stay green |
|
||||
| T-01-09 | Denial of Service | 48 animated segments rendered inside a modal degrading low-power devices | low | mitigate | The badge variant is the smallest of the three; the new `prefers-reduced-motion` guard disables the animation entirely for users who ask for it |
|
||||
| T-01-10 | Repudiation | the success amount or recipient text changing as a side effect of the swap | medium | mitigate | Tests assert the success amount text is unchanged; the action forbids touching the numerals and copy |
|
||||
</threat_model>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run` — green.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npm run build` — green, and the built bundle contains the new class name.
|
||||
- Dev-preview observation recorded for both modals at narrow and desktop widths.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- A third `badge` size variant exists on the shared ring component; existing variants and their consumers are untouched.
|
||||
- Both paid-tick surfaces render the branded ring with the checkmark layered centred.
|
||||
- A reduced-motion guard covers every variant.
|
||||
- Component tests pin all of the above and were proven to fail before the change.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
Create `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-03-SUMMARY.md` when done.
|
||||
Stage by explicit path, commit, and `git push gitea-ai main`.
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: 01-federation-mesh-hardening
|
||||
plan: 04
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 1
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs
|
||||
autonomous: true
|
||||
requirements: [FED-05]
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "lnd.getinfo returns this node's Lightning identity_pubkey and its advertised connection URIs, so the UI has something real to copy and share"
|
||||
- "A node with no reachable LND, or an LND that advertises no URI, yields an absent identity rather than a fabricated one — the caller can tell 'not available' from 'available'"
|
||||
- "A meshed peer that advertises Lightning is recorded with its URI on the mesh peer record and is listed by mesh.lightning-peers"
|
||||
- "mesh.lightning-peers returns an empty list, not an error, when no meshed peer has advertised Lightning (FED-05 empty edge, mesh half)"
|
||||
- "A peer that advertises Lightning twice appears once in mesh.lightning-peers, with the most recent URI (FED-05 adjacency edge, mesh half)"
|
||||
- "mesh.lightning-peers returns peers in a deterministic order so the picker list does not reshuffle between reads (FED-05 ordering edge, mesh half)"
|
||||
- "An inbound Lightning advertisement whose URI is not well-formed is rejected and does not overwrite a previously known good URI for that peer"
|
||||
prohibitions:
|
||||
- statement: "A node's Lightning URI MUST NOT be advertised to parties the operator has not chosen to reach — the advertisement is sent on an explicit send, never auto-broadcast to every radio contact in range, and a received URI is never re-broadcast onward to third parties"
|
||||
category: privacy
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- path: core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs
|
||||
provides: "identity_pubkey + uris on the lnd.getinfo response"
|
||||
contains: "identity_pubkey"
|
||||
- path: core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs
|
||||
provides: "LightningInfo typed message + payload"
|
||||
contains: "LightningInfo"
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- from: core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs
|
||||
to: core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs
|
||||
via: "inbound LightningInfo envelope writes MeshPeer.lightning_uri"
|
||||
pattern: "lightning_uri"
|
||||
- from: core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs
|
||||
to: core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs
|
||||
via: "mesh.lightning-peers and mesh.send-lightning-info match arms"
|
||||
pattern: "mesh.lightning-peers"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Give the platform the two Lightning facts the channel-open UI needs from the mesh side: **this node's
|
||||
own shareable URI**, and **which meshed peers have Lightning installed and what their URI is**.
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: FED-05, whose scope is LOCKED in CONTEXT.md — the "public/other" list in the channel-open
|
||||
picker is *meshed peer nodes that have Lightning installed*, not `lnd listpeers`, not a curated
|
||||
directory, not a live LN-graph query. That requires peers to advertise a Lightning capability plus
|
||||
their URI over the mesh. RESEARCH.md Pitfall 5 confirms neither datum exists today: `handle_lnd_getinfo`
|
||||
fetches LND's `/v1/getinfo` but its response struct does not deserialize `identity_pubkey` or `uris`,
|
||||
and PATTERNS.md records that mesh peer capability advertisement has **no analog** in the codebase —
|
||||
it is genuinely new surface, to be built on the existing typed-envelope pattern.
|
||||
Output: an extended `lnd.getinfo`, a new `LightningInfo` typed mesh message, a `lightning_uri` field
|
||||
on `MeshPeer`, and two new RPCs (`mesh.lightning-peers`, `mesh.send-lightning-info`).
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<execution_context>
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/templates/summary.md
|
||||
</execution_context>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
@.planning/PROJECT.md
|
||||
@.planning/STATE.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-CONTEXT.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-RESEARCH.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-PATTERNS.md
|
||||
@core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
## Artifacts this phase produces
|
||||
|
||||
Created or changed by **this plan**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Symbol | Kind | File |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `LndInfo.identity_pubkey: Option<String>` | new response field on `lnd.getinfo` | `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs` |
|
||||
| `LndInfo.uris: Vec<String>` | new response field on `lnd.getinfo` | same |
|
||||
| `LndGetInfoResponse.identity_pubkey` / `.uris` | new deserialized LND REST fields | same |
|
||||
| `MeshMessageType::LightningInfo = 26` (label `lightning_info`) | new wire message type | `core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs` |
|
||||
| `LightningInfoPayload { uri, alias }` | new CBOR payload struct | same |
|
||||
| `MeshPeer.lightning_uri: Option<String>` | new optional peer field | `core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs` |
|
||||
| `handle_mesh_lightning_peers` | new RPC handler (`mesh.lightning-peers`) | `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs` |
|
||||
| `handle_mesh_send_lightning_info` | new RPC handler (`mesh.send-lightning-info`) | same |
|
||||
| `mesh.lightning-peers`, `mesh.send-lightning-info` | dispatcher match arms | `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs` |
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="tracer" tdd="true">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: End-to-end — this node's own Lightning URI reaches the RPC boundary</name>
|
||||
<reversibility rating="reversible">Two additive optional fields on an internal RPC response; no
|
||||
consumer breaks if they are removed again.</reversibility>
|
||||
<files>core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs` lines 1-110 — the `LndInfo` serialize struct, the
|
||||
`LndGetInfoResponse` deserialize struct (which currently declares only `alias`,
|
||||
`num_active_channels`, `num_peers`, `synced_to_chain`, `block_height`), and how
|
||||
`handle_lnd_getinfo` maps one into the other with `unwrap_or_default()`.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/channels.rs` around `handle_lnd_openchannel` (from L238) —
|
||||
the sibling handler's pubkey validation (66 hex chars) and error-shaping style to mirror.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<behavior>
|
||||
- Deserializing an LND `/v1/getinfo` body that contains `identity_pubkey` and a non-empty `uris`
|
||||
array yields both on the mapped response.
|
||||
- Deserializing a body with neither field present succeeds and yields `identity_pubkey: None`
|
||||
and an empty `uris` vector — never a fabricated or placeholder identity.
|
||||
- A body whose `identity_pubkey` is not 66 hex characters yields `identity_pubkey: None` rather
|
||||
than propagating a malformed key that `lnd.openchannel` would later reject.
|
||||
</behavior>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Write the tests first, in a `#[cfg(test)] mod tests` block in `info.rs`, driving a
|
||||
`serde_json::from_str::<LndGetInfoResponse>(...)` over three fixture bodies (full, empty,
|
||||
malformed pubkey) plus the mapping function. Extract the `LndGetInfoResponse` → `LndInfo`
|
||||
identity mapping into a small pure function so it is testable without an HTTP call; keep the
|
||||
existing HTTP flow otherwise untouched.
|
||||
|
||||
Add `identity_pubkey: Option<String>` and `uris: Vec<String>` to `LndGetInfoResponse` with
|
||||
`#[serde(default)]`, and the corresponding `identity_pubkey: Option<String>` and
|
||||
`uris: Vec<String>` to the serialized `LndInfo`. Validate the pubkey shape the same way
|
||||
`handle_lnd_openchannel` does (66 hexadecimal characters) before forwarding it; on failure
|
||||
forward `None`, and log at `warn!` naming the field.
|
||||
|
||||
Do not change any existing `LndInfo` field name or type — `HomeWalletCard.vue`, `Server.vue`,
|
||||
and `Web5Wallet.vue` all read this response.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo test -p archipelago lnd::info</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago lnd::info` exits 0 with at least 3 test cases.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'identity_pubkey' core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs` is at least 4.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'uris' core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs` is at least 3.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo build -p archipelago` exits 0.
|
||||
- The SUMMARY records the pre-implementation failing output of the fixture tests.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>`lnd.getinfo` carries the node's real Lightning identity and URIs, or an honest absence, proven by fixture tests.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: A meshed peer can advertise "I have Lightning" and its URI is stored</name>
|
||||
<reversibility rating="costly">`MeshMessageType` is a radio wire format shared with every fleet
|
||||
node; the new discriminant and its CBOR payload shape become readable by deployed peers after the
|
||||
next OTA, so changing the payload later needs a coordinated fleet upgrade. Kept additive (unused
|
||||
discriminant, optional payload fields) so old nodes simply ignore it.</reversibility>
|
||||
<files>core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs, core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs, core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs` lines 28-200 — the `#[repr(u8)] MeshMessageType`
|
||||
enum (highest current discriminant is `AssistResponse = 25`), and the three places every new
|
||||
variant must be added: the enum, `from_u8`, `from_label`, and `label`. Also read
|
||||
`ReactionPayload` (from L533) and `PresencePayload` (from L727) for payload struct conventions,
|
||||
and the `TypedEnvelope` doc comment about `compact_bytes` (a plain derived `Vec<u8>` bloats
|
||||
every message on the wire — this matters on LoRa).
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs` lines 60-118 — the `MeshPeer` struct and its
|
||||
`#[serde(default)]` optional-field convention (see `lat`/`lon`, `pkc_capable`).
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs` around lines 430-490 — the
|
||||
`Some(MeshMessageType::Reaction)` and `Some(MeshMessageType::Presence)` inbound arms: how a
|
||||
decoded envelope is matched, its payload deserialized, and peer/message state mutated.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Add `LightningInfo = 26` to `MeshMessageType` with a doc comment stating what it advertises and
|
||||
that it is only ever sent on an explicit operator action. Register it in `from_u8` (26),
|
||||
`from_label` ("lightning_info"), and `label`.
|
||||
|
||||
Add `LightningInfoPayload` next to the other payload structs: a required `uri: String` (the
|
||||
`pubkey@host:port` form) and an optional `alias: Option<String>` with `#[serde(default)]`.
|
||||
Follow the surrounding payload structs' serde conventions.
|
||||
|
||||
Add `#[serde(default)] pub lightning_uri: Option<String>` to `MeshPeer`, with a doc comment
|
||||
saying it is set only from a received `LightningInfo` advertisement (or federation seeding in a
|
||||
later plan) and is what the channel-open picker offers as a request target.
|
||||
|
||||
Add an inbound arm in `dispatch.rs` for the new type, mirroring the shape of the `Reaction` and
|
||||
`Presence` arms: deserialize the payload, validate the URI before storing (a `pubkey@host` form
|
||||
whose pubkey part is 66 hex characters; the `:port` suffix is optional), and on success write it
|
||||
onto the resolved `MeshPeer`. On a malformed URI, log at `warn!` and return without touching a
|
||||
previously stored value. Store the newest advertisement when a peer advertises more than once —
|
||||
overwrite, do not accumulate.
|
||||
|
||||
Add unit tests in `message_types.rs` covering the round-trip of the new discriminant through
|
||||
`from_u8`/`from_label`/`label`, and a `dispatch.rs`-level test (or a pure helper test if
|
||||
`dispatch.rs` has no test harness) asserting that a malformed URI leaves a previously stored good
|
||||
URI intact.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo test -p archipelago mesh::message_types mesh::listener</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago mesh::message_types mesh::listener` exits 0.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'LightningInfo' core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs` is at least 5 (enum, from_u8, from_label, label, payload doc).
|
||||
- `grep -Eq 'lightning_info' core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs` succeeds.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'lightning_uri' core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'LightningInfo' core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` exits 0.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>The mesh understands a Lightning-capability advertisement, validates it, and records the peer's URI.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 3: Expose the meshed Lightning peers and the send path over RPC</name>
|
||||
<files>core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs, core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs` around `handle_mesh_contacts_list`
|
||||
(from L1218) — the canonical read-handler shape: `self.mesh_service.read().await`, the
|
||||
"Mesh service not running" error, `shared_state()`, then `.read().await` on the relevant map.
|
||||
- The same file around `handle_mesh_send_reaction` (in the L637-976 family) — the canonical
|
||||
send-handler shape: build a payload, wrap in `TypedEnvelope::new(...).with_seq(seq)`, send.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs` lines 390-440 — the one-line `"mesh.<verb>" =>
|
||||
self.handle_...(params).await,` registration convention.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/server.rs` around `is_peer_allowed_path` (from L1270) — confirm whether
|
||||
the new RPCs need peer reachability. They are operator-local calls over `/rpc/v1`, which is
|
||||
already in the allow-list; do NOT widen that list.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Add `handle_mesh_lightning_peers`: read the mesh peer map, keep only peers whose `lightning_uri`
|
||||
is set, collapse duplicates by the peer's authenticating key (the `MeshPeer` accessor that
|
||||
prefers the verified archipelago identity key over the firmware routing key) keeping the most
|
||||
recently heard entry, and return a stable-sorted array — sort by display name, then by contact
|
||||
id as the tiebreak, so the picker list does not reshuffle between reads. Each entry carries at
|
||||
minimum: contact id, display name, `lightning_uri`, `last_heard`, `reachable`, and `hops`.
|
||||
Returning zero matching peers is an empty array with a success result, never an error.
|
||||
|
||||
Add `handle_mesh_send_lightning_info`: take a target peer identifier in params, read this node's
|
||||
own URI from the `lnd.getinfo` path built in Task 1, refuse with a clear error when no URI is
|
||||
available (LND down, or no advertised URI) rather than sending an empty advertisement, then send
|
||||
a `LightningInfo` envelope to that peer only. It must not broadcast to all contacts: the target
|
||||
is required, and the handler returns an error when it is absent.
|
||||
|
||||
Register both in the dispatcher as `"mesh.lightning-peers"` and `"mesh.send-lightning-info"`,
|
||||
following the existing one-line convention.
|
||||
|
||||
Add tests covering: empty peer map yields an empty array; two advertisements from the same peer
|
||||
yield one entry with the newer URI; ordering is stable across two consecutive calls over the
|
||||
same peer set; `handle_mesh_send_lightning_info` with no target errors.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo test -p archipelago mesh</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago mesh` exits 0.
|
||||
- `grep -c '"mesh.lightning-peers"' core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs` equals 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c '"mesh.send-lightning-info"' core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs` equals 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'handle_mesh_lightning_peers' core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'is_peer_allowed_path' core/archipelago/src/server.rs` is unchanged from before this plan (the peer allow-list is not widened).
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` exits 0.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo clippy -p archipelago --all-targets` produces no new warnings in `api::rpc::mesh` or `mesh::message_types`.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>The picker's meshed-Lightning-peer list has a real, deterministic, deduplicated data source, and a node can advertise its own URI to a chosen peer.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<threat_model>
|
||||
## Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| radio peer → typed-envelope decode → `MeshPeer` | Untrusted, unauthenticated-by-default RF input mutates local peer state |
|
||||
| LND REST (`/v1/getinfo`) → daemon | Local service response parsed into an RPC payload the UI displays and copies |
|
||||
| operator RPC → outbound mesh send | An operator action that discloses this node's payment endpoint to a chosen peer |
|
||||
|
||||
## STRIDE Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| T-01-11 | Spoofing | a radio peer advertising someone else's Lightning URI to redirect a channel open | high | mitigate | The advertisement is stored against the peer's authenticating key (the verified archipelago identity key, never the firmware routing key — see `MeshPeer`'s auth-key accessor doc); the UI in plan 01-06 labels these peers as *request* targets, not trusted opens |
|
||||
| T-01-12 | Tampering | a malformed or oversized URI corrupting stored peer state | high | mitigate | URI shape validated before store (66-hex pubkey part); invalid input leaves any previously stored value untouched; test asserts this |
|
||||
| T-01-13 | Information Disclosure | this node's payment endpoint leaking to every radio contact in range | high | mitigate | `mesh.send-lightning-info` requires an explicit target and errors without one; there is no broadcast path, and a received URI is never re-advertised onward |
|
||||
| T-01-14 | Denial of Service | advertisement flooding growing the peer map unboundedly | medium | accept | The advertisement writes a field on an existing peer record rather than creating records; peer-map growth is governed by the pre-existing contact-discovery limits, unchanged here |
|
||||
| T-01-15 | Elevation of Privilege | a new RPC becoming peer-reachable and letting a remote peer enumerate Lightning peers | high | mitigate | Both RPCs ride the existing `/rpc/v1` operator surface; the acceptance criteria assert `is_peer_allowed_path` is not widened |
|
||||
| T-01-SC | Tampering | npm/pip/cargo installs | high | mitigate | No new crates are introduced. If one becomes necessary, stop and run the Package Legitimacy Gate before installing |
|
||||
</threat_model>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` — green.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo clippy -p archipelago --all-targets` — no new warnings in the touched modules.
|
||||
- Fixture-test failure output captured before the Task 1 implementation.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- `lnd.getinfo` exposes a real identity pubkey and URI list, or an honest absence.
|
||||
- A `LightningInfo` mesh message exists, is validated on receipt, and populates `MeshPeer.lightning_uri`.
|
||||
- `mesh.lightning-peers` returns a deduplicated, deterministically ordered list and an empty array when there are none.
|
||||
- `mesh.send-lightning-info` requires an explicit target and refuses to send an empty advertisement.
|
||||
- The peer HTTP allow-list is unchanged.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
Create `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-04-SUMMARY.md` when done.
|
||||
Stage by explicit path, commit, and `git push gitea-ai main`.
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: 01-federation-mesh-hardening
|
||||
plan: 05
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 2
|
||||
depends_on: ["01-01"]
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/server.rs
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/federation/types.ts
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/federation/NodeList.vue
|
||||
autonomous: true
|
||||
requirements: [FED-02]
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "A federation sync failure is recorded on the peer's node record and surfaced through federation.list-nodes, so the operator sees it in the UI instead of it existing only as a debug log line"
|
||||
- "A successful sync clears a previously recorded sync error for that peer — the badge does not persist after the peer recovers (FED-02 adjacency edge)"
|
||||
- "A periodic sync pass over zero federated nodes is a clean no-op: no error is recorded, nothing is written, and no error surfaces in the UI (FED-02 empty edge)"
|
||||
- "A state snapshot older than the one already stored for a peer does not overwrite the newer one — out-of-order sync responses cannot move a peer's status backwards (FED-02 ordering edge)"
|
||||
- "Exactly one periodic federation sync loop runs in the daemon; the redundant second loop is gone and every behavior unique to it is preserved in the surviving loop"
|
||||
- "Duplicate node entries do not accumulate across sync cycles — after sync settles the node list has one entry per federated node"
|
||||
prohibitions:
|
||||
- statement: "Making sync errors visible MUST NOT expose a peer's onion address, DID, or any transport secret in an error string rendered to a surface wider than the operator's own dashboard — a sync error message names what failed, never credential material"
|
||||
category: privacy
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- path: core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs
|
||||
provides: "last_sync_error / last_sync_error_at on FederatedNode"
|
||||
contains: "last_sync_error"
|
||||
- path: neode-ui/src/views/federation/NodeList.vue
|
||||
provides: "Operator-visible sync-error badge on a node row"
|
||||
contains: "last_sync_error"
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- from: core/archipelago/src/server.rs
|
||||
to: core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs
|
||||
via: "the periodic sync loop calls record_sync_result after each peer attempt instead of only debug-logging"
|
||||
pattern: "record_sync_result"
|
||||
- from: core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs
|
||||
to: neode-ui/src/views/federation/NodeList.vue
|
||||
via: "federation.list-nodes emits last_sync_error, the node row renders it as a badge"
|
||||
pattern: "last_sync_error"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Make federation sync converge and stop failing silently: one sync loop instead of two, a per-peer
|
||||
sync error persisted and shown to the operator, and out-of-order snapshots unable to move a peer's
|
||||
state backwards.
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: FED-02. RESEARCH.md's anti-pattern list is explicit — both periodic sync loops in
|
||||
`server.rs` log failures at `debug!` only, so a peer that has not synced in days looks identical to
|
||||
one that synced a minute ago. The same section notes the two loops (90s at ~L497, 1800s at ~L840)
|
||||
are redundant apart from one tail call, and that the redundancy doubles the write-race exposure that
|
||||
plan 01-01 just locked down. Open Question 1 asks the reviewer to `git log -p` both loop-insertion
|
||||
commits before deleting either — that check is a required step here, not an optional one.
|
||||
Output: `last_sync_error` plumbed store → loop → RPC → UI badge, one surviving loop, and a
|
||||
monotonicity guard on `update_node_state`.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<execution_context>
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/templates/summary.md
|
||||
</execution_context>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
@.planning/PROJECT.md
|
||||
@.planning/STATE.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-RESEARCH.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-PATTERNS.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-01-SUMMARY.md
|
||||
@core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
## Artifacts this phase produces
|
||||
|
||||
Created or changed by **this plan**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Symbol | Kind | File |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `FederatedNode.last_sync_error: Option<String>` | new optional field | `core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs` |
|
||||
| `FederatedNode.last_sync_error_at: Option<String>` | new optional field | same |
|
||||
| `record_sync_result` | new pub async fn (records or clears a peer's sync error under the store lock) | `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` |
|
||||
| `last_sync_error`, `last_sync_error_at` on `federation.list-nodes` | new response fields | `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` |
|
||||
| `FederatedNode.last_sync_error?` / `.last_sync_error_at?` | new TS interface fields | `neode-ui/src/views/federation/types.ts` |
|
||||
| sync-error badge on a node row | Vue markup + class | `neode-ui/src/views/federation/NodeList.vue` |
|
||||
| the 1800s periodic federation sync loop | **deleted** (its unique tail call moved into the 90s loop) | `core/archipelago/src/server.rs` |
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="tracer" tdd="true">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: End-to-end — a failed federation sync becomes visible to the operator</name>
|
||||
<files>core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs, core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs, core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs, core/archipelago/src/server.rs, neode-ui/src/views/federation/types.ts, neode-ui/src/views/federation/NodeList.vue</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs` lines 50-146 — `FederatedNode`'s existing optional
|
||||
fields and the doc-comment convention on `last_transport` / `last_transport_at` (a result
|
||||
field written back after each attempt). The new pair mirrors that shape for the failure side.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` as left by plan 01-01 — `record_peer_transport`
|
||||
(the existing "write a result field back after an attempt" function) and the
|
||||
`FEDERATION_STORE_LOCK` wrapper + `*_inner` split convention the new function must follow.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` `handle_federation_list_nodes`
|
||||
(from L220) — the `serde_json::json!` node object and the `if let Some(...)` conditional-field
|
||||
pattern the new fields must follow.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/server.rs` lines 497-600 — the 90s periodic federation sync loop, its
|
||||
per-peer `sync_with_peer` call and the `debug!(peer = %node.did, error = %e, ...)` arm that
|
||||
currently swallows failures.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/views/federation/types.ts` lines 19-33 — the `FederatedNode` TS interface.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/views/federation/NodeList.vue` lines 40-140 — the trusted-node and peer rows,
|
||||
`transportBadge()` (L166) and `trustBadgeClass()` for the badge idiom to mirror, and the
|
||||
existing loading row.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/views/federation/__tests__/NodeList.test.ts` — the existing suite's mount
|
||||
conventions.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<behavior>
|
||||
- `record_sync_result(data_dir, did, Err("..."))` sets `last_sync_error` to the message and
|
||||
`last_sync_error_at` to an RFC 3339 timestamp on that node only.
|
||||
- `record_sync_result(data_dir, did, Ok(()))` clears both fields on that node.
|
||||
- `record_sync_result` for a DID that is not in the node list is a no-op returning Ok — a peer
|
||||
removed mid-pass must not be resurrected by an error write.
|
||||
- `federation.list-nodes` emits both fields when set and omits them when unset.
|
||||
- NodeList renders a sync-error badge on a node whose `last_sync_error` is set, and renders no
|
||||
such badge when it is unset.
|
||||
</behavior>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Write the Rust tests and the NodeList component test first and confirm they fail.
|
||||
|
||||
Add `#[serde(default)] pub last_sync_error: Option<String>` and
|
||||
`#[serde(default)] pub last_sync_error_at: Option<String>` to `FederatedNode`, with a doc comment
|
||||
modelled on `last_transport`: these record the outcome of the most recent sync attempt so the
|
||||
operator can tell a stale peer from a healthy one, replacing a debug-only log line. Update the
|
||||
`make_node` test helper in `storage.rs`'s test module so the struct literal still compiles.
|
||||
|
||||
Add `record_sync_result(data_dir: &Path, did: &str, outcome: Result<(), String>) -> Result<()>`
|
||||
to `storage.rs`, acquiring `FEDERATION_STORE_LOCK` and using the `*_inner` load/save functions
|
||||
established in 01-01. Missing DID is a silent Ok. Never create a node entry.
|
||||
|
||||
In `server.rs`'s 90s loop, replace the debug-only failure arm with a call to `record_sync_result`
|
||||
carrying the error's display string, and call it with a success outcome on the success arm.
|
||||
Truncate the recorded message to a bounded length (256 characters) so a pathological error
|
||||
cannot bloat the node file. Keep the existing `debug!` line as well — persisting is additive,
|
||||
not a replacement for logs.
|
||||
|
||||
In `handle_federation_list_nodes`, emit the two fields onto the node object using the same
|
||||
`if let Some(...)` conditional-insert pattern the existing optional fields use. Add the matching
|
||||
optional fields to the TS `FederatedNode` interface.
|
||||
|
||||
In `NodeList.vue`, add a badge on the node row shown only when `last_sync_error` is set: red
|
||||
family (`alert-error`-adjacent classes already in the house style), short label, and the full
|
||||
message plus the timestamp in the element's `title` attribute — the row must stay single-line, so
|
||||
apply the same `truncate` + `:title` treatment the node-name span already uses. Place it beside
|
||||
the existing transport badge, not in place of it. Do not add a new nav entry, card, or view —
|
||||
only this badge inside the existing row.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation && cd ../neode-ui && test -f src/views/federation/__tests__/NodeList.test.ts && npx vitest run src/views/federation/__tests__/NodeList.test.ts</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation` exits 0 and includes a test named for the clear-on-success behavior and one for the missing-DID no-op.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'last_sync_error' core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs` is at least 2.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'record_sync_result' core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'record_sync_result' core/archipelago/src/server.rs` is at least 2 (the failure arm and the success arm).
|
||||
- `grep -c 'last_sync_error' core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'last_sync_error' neode-ui/src/views/federation/types.ts` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'last_sync_error' neode-ui/src/views/federation/NodeList.vue` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run src/views/federation/__tests__/NodeList.test.ts` exits 0 with a case asserting the badge is absent when the field is unset (the guard against a badge that always renders).
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npm run build` exits 0.
|
||||
- The SUMMARY records the pre-implementation failing output for both the Rust and the component test.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>A sync failure is persisted per peer, travels through the RPC, and renders as a badge the operator can see — and clears when the peer recovers.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: Collapse the two periodic sync loops into one</name>
|
||||
<reversibility rating="costly">Deleting a background loop changes daemon runtime behavior across
|
||||
the whole fleet on the next OTA; restoring it means re-deriving code that is gone from the tree
|
||||
rather than flipping a flag. Mitigated by moving — not discarding — the loop's unique tail call
|
||||
and by the required git-history check below.</reversibility>
|
||||
<files>core/archipelago/src/server.rs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/server.rs` lines 497-600 (the 90s loop, including its asymmetry
|
||||
self-heal `notify_join` re-assertion) and lines 840-910 (the 1800s loop, whose unique tail
|
||||
call is `rpc.refresh_federation_mesh_peers()`).
|
||||
- The output of `git log -p -L 840,910:core/archipelago/src/server.rs` and
|
||||
`git log -p -L 497,600:core/archipelago/src/server.rs` — RESEARCH.md Assumption A2 flags that
|
||||
the 1800s loop may exist for an undocumented reason. Run this BEFORE deleting anything and
|
||||
record the finding in the SUMMARY.
|
||||
- `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-RESEARCH.md` — "Open Questions" item 1.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
First run the two `git log -p -L` commands above and write the answer to Open Question 1 into the
|
||||
SUMMARY: does the 1800s loop do anything the 90s loop does not, beyond
|
||||
`refresh_federation_mesh_peers()`? If the history shows a documented reason to keep it, STOP,
|
||||
do not delete it, and record that as a finding for the FED-03 review instead — the phase then
|
||||
keeps two loops and this task's remaining work is limited to routing both through
|
||||
`record_sync_result`.
|
||||
|
||||
Otherwise: move the `refresh_federation_mesh_peers()` call to the tail of the 90s loop's
|
||||
completed pass (after the per-peer iteration, alongside the existing pass-complete log), thread
|
||||
whatever handle it needs into that task's captured state, and delete the entire 1800s
|
||||
`tokio::spawn` block. Keep the 90s loop's startup settle delay and its asymmetry self-heal
|
||||
unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
Make the surviving loop's zero-node case an explicit clean no-op: when `load_nodes` returns an
|
||||
empty list the pass continues to the next tick without writing anything and without recording a
|
||||
sync error against anyone.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo build -p archipelago && cargo test -p archipelago federation</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo build -p archipelago` exits 0.
|
||||
- `grep -v '^ *//' core/archipelago/src/server.rs | grep -c 'federation::sync_with_peer'` equals 1 (comment lines stripped so a doc comment cannot satisfy the gate).
|
||||
- `grep -v '^ *//' core/archipelago/src/server.rs | grep -c 'refresh_federation_mesh_peers'` equals 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'from_secs(1800)' core/archipelago/src/server.rs` equals 0 <!-- planner-discipline-allow: from_secs(1800) -->
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` exits 0.
|
||||
- The SUMMARY contains the `git log -p -L` finding answering RESEARCH.md Open Question 1, and states explicitly whether the loop was deleted or kept.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>One periodic federation sync loop remains, its predecessor's unique behavior preserved, with the history check recorded.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 3: Stop out-of-order snapshots and duplicates from breaking convergence</name>
|
||||
<files>core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs, core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` `update_node_state` (from L292 pre-01-01) — it
|
||||
currently overwrites `last_seen`, `name`, `fips_npub`, and `last_state` unconditionally from
|
||||
whatever snapshot arrives, with no comparison against what is already stored.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs` — `NodeStateSnapshot.timestamp` is an RFC 3339
|
||||
string; note that a lexicographic compare is only safe for same-offset RFC 3339, so parse it.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` — `dedup_nodes_by_onion` and its two existing
|
||||
tests, for the convergence behavior already present.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs` — `merge_transitive_peers` (from L120) and its
|
||||
tombstone check, to confirm the guard added here does not conflict with it.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Add a monotonicity guard to `update_node_state`: parse the incoming snapshot's timestamp and the
|
||||
stored `last_state`'s timestamp with `chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339`; if the incoming one
|
||||
is strictly older, return Ok without mutating the node — a slow sync response that lands after a
|
||||
newer one must not move the peer's status backwards. When either timestamp fails to parse, fall
|
||||
back to the current accept-newest behavior so a peer with a malformed clock is not frozen out,
|
||||
and log at `debug!`. Learning a peer's `fips_npub` is exempt: a stale snapshot may still carry
|
||||
the only copy of a FIPS key this node has, so apply that one field even on a rejected snapshot,
|
||||
and say so in a comment.
|
||||
|
||||
Add tests: a strictly-older snapshot leaves `last_state` and `last_seen` unchanged; an equal
|
||||
timestamp is accepted (idempotent re-sync); a newer snapshot is accepted; a stale snapshot
|
||||
carrying a `fips_npub` this node lacks still populates it; an unparseable timestamp is accepted.
|
||||
|
||||
Add a convergence test asserting that repeatedly applying the same peer's snapshot plus a
|
||||
transitive-peer merge does not grow the node list — one entry per federated node after N cycles.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation` exits 0 with the five snapshot-ordering cases and the convergence case present by name.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'parse_from_rfc3339' core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` exits 0.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo clippy -p archipelago --all-targets` produces no new warnings in `federation`.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>Out-of-order sync responses cannot regress a peer's state, and repeated sync cycles converge to one entry per node.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<threat_model>
|
||||
## Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| federated peer → `sync_with_peer` → node record | A remote peer's snapshot and its timestamp drive local persisted state |
|
||||
| daemon → operator dashboard | A sync error string crosses from the daemon into rendered UI |
|
||||
| background loop → federation node store | The surviving periodic loop is now a writer of error state, not only a reader |
|
||||
|
||||
## STRIDE Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| T-01-16 | Tampering | a peer replaying an old snapshot to roll a node's status backwards | high | mitigate | The `update_node_state` monotonicity guard rejects strictly-older snapshots (Task 3), with tests |
|
||||
| T-01-17 | Information Disclosure | a sync error string carrying a peer onion address or transport credential into the UI | medium | mitigate | The recorded message is the error's display string truncated to 256 characters and rendered only on the operator's own dashboard; the prohibition above states the constraint and it is re-checked in the FED-03 review |
|
||||
| T-01-18 | Denial of Service | an unbounded error message bloating `nodes.json` on every failed pass | medium | mitigate | 256-character truncation before persistence (Task 1) |
|
||||
| T-01-19 | Repudiation | a silently-failing sync leaving no record of when a peer was last reachable | high | mitigate | `last_sync_error_at` is written on every attempt outcome; the badge makes staleness visible |
|
||||
| T-01-20 | Denial of Service | deleting the 1800s loop dropping a behavior the fleet depends on | high | mitigate | Mandatory `git log -p -L` history check before deletion, the unique tail call moved rather than dropped, and an explicit STOP path if the history shows a documented reason |
|
||||
</threat_model>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` — green.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run && npm run build` — green.
|
||||
- The SUMMARY answers RESEARCH.md Open Question 1 with git evidence.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- A sync failure is persisted, exposed over RPC, and rendered as an operator-visible badge that clears on recovery.
|
||||
- Exactly one periodic federation sync loop remains, with the deleted loop's unique behavior preserved.
|
||||
- Out-of-order snapshots cannot regress a peer's state; repeated cycles converge to one entry per node.
|
||||
- A zero-node sync pass writes nothing and records no error.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
Create `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-05-SUMMARY.md` when done.
|
||||
Stage by explicit path, commit, and `git push gitea-ai main`.
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: 01-federation-mesh-hardening
|
||||
plan: 06
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 3
|
||||
depends_on: ["01-04", "01-05"]
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs
|
||||
autonomous: false
|
||||
requirements: [FED-05]
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "A trusted federated peer's Lightning URI is known locally after sync and is emitted by federation.list-nodes, so the picker can offer a one-click channel open by hostname"
|
||||
- "The Lightning field on the federation sync payload is optional with a serde default, so a node running an older build syncs with a newer one in both directions without error"
|
||||
- "A federated peer that advertises no Lightning URI is emitted without the field rather than with an empty string — the picker can tell 'no Lightning' from 'Lightning at an unknown address'"
|
||||
- "An inbound Lightning URI that is not well-formed is rejected at sync time and never persisted or rendered"
|
||||
- "A stale sync snapshot cannot clear a peer's previously known Lightning URI, consistent with the snapshot-ordering guard from plan 01-05"
|
||||
prohibitions:
|
||||
- statement: "A node's Lightning URI MUST NOT reach a party the operator has not federated with — it must never be re-exported in this node's own outbound peer hints on behalf of a third-party peer, so a peer-of-a-peer cannot harvest payment endpoints by federating one hop away"
|
||||
category: privacy
|
||||
- statement: "Lightning URI sharing MUST NOT be silently enabled in a way the operator cannot see or reverse — whatever default ships, the current sharing state is discoverable from the node's own settings surface and changing it takes effect on the next sync without a data migration"
|
||||
category: transparency
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- path: core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs
|
||||
provides: "Lightning identity field(s) on NodeStateSnapshot (and FederationPeerHint only if the decision selects it)"
|
||||
contains: "lightning"
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- from: core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs
|
||||
to: core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs
|
||||
via: "build_local_state populates the Lightning field from this node's lnd.getinfo identity"
|
||||
pattern: "lightning"
|
||||
- from: core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs
|
||||
to: core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs
|
||||
via: "update_node_state persists the peer's Lightning URI; federation.list-nodes emits it"
|
||||
pattern: "lightning"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Carry a federated peer's Lightning URI over the federation sync payload, so the channel-open picker
|
||||
can list **trusted nodes by hostname** and open a channel with one click.
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: FED-05's primary list. RESEARCH.md Pitfall 5 is blunt: building the picker before the
|
||||
backend can supply a federated peer's Lightning pubkey/host produces a UI that lists names and has
|
||||
nothing to pass to `lnd.openchannel`. `NodeStateSnapshot` — the payload `federation.get-state` and
|
||||
sync exchange — carries no Lightning fields at all today.
|
||||
Output: the sync payload extended, the peer's URI persisted and emitted by `federation.list-nodes`,
|
||||
and the sharing default explicitly chosen by the operator rather than assumed.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<execution_context>
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/templates/summary.md
|
||||
</execution_context>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
@.planning/PROJECT.md
|
||||
@.planning/STATE.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-CONTEXT.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-RESEARCH.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-PATTERNS.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-04-SUMMARY.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-05-SUMMARY.md
|
||||
@core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
## Artifacts this phase produces
|
||||
|
||||
Created or changed by **this plan**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Symbol | Kind | File |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Lightning identity field(s) on `NodeStateSnapshot` | new optional serde-default field(s); exact names fixed by the Task 1 decision | `core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs` |
|
||||
| Lightning identity field(s) on `FederationPeerHint` | added **only if** the decision selects transitive sharing | same |
|
||||
| `FederatedNode.lightning_uri: Option<String>` | new persisted field on the local node record | same |
|
||||
| `build_local_state` Lightning parameter | changed fn signature in the federation sync builder | `core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs` |
|
||||
| `share_lightning_uri` | server setting + its accessor, **only if** the decision selects opt-in gating | `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` (+ server info) |
|
||||
| `lightning_uri` on `federation.list-nodes` | new response field | `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` |
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="checkpoint:decision" gate="blocking">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: Decide the Lightning field shape and sharing default on the federation sync payload</name>
|
||||
<decision>What shape does the Lightning identity take on the federation sync payload, and is sharing on by default or opt-in?</decision>
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
This writes a new field into `NodeStateSnapshot`, the payload every federated node exchanges on
|
||||
every sync. Once a release carrying it reaches the fleet, deployed peers parse that shape — a
|
||||
later change to the field name, the split, or the sharing scope needs a coordinated fleet
|
||||
upgrade plus a cleanup of URIs already cached in every peer's `nodes.json`. That is a one-way
|
||||
door, and the sources disagree about which way to walk through it:
|
||||
|
||||
- `01-CONTEXT.md` records "a federated peer's Lightning URI rides the federation sync payload
|
||||
**by default** — federation trust is already bilateral and explicit", and marks this
|
||||
**Claude's discretion, revisable** — not locked.
|
||||
- `01-RESEARCH.md` Open Question 3 recommends the opposite: follow the `shared_location`
|
||||
precedent (opt-in, default off) "since exposing a payment channel target more broadly than
|
||||
intended has real-money implications."
|
||||
|
||||
A second, related question rides along: `NodeStateSnapshot.federated_peers` carries a
|
||||
`FederationPeerHint` for each of this node's trusted peers, used for transitive discovery. If the
|
||||
Lightning field goes on the hint too, then Alice syncing with Bob learns Bob's *peers'* Lightning
|
||||
URIs — a payment endpoint reaching a party that node never federated with. Options B and C below
|
||||
keep the field off the hint; only choose otherwise deliberately.
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
<options>
|
||||
<option id="option-a">
|
||||
<name>Single `lightning_uri` on the snapshot AND on the peer hint, shared by default</name>
|
||||
<pros>Widest picker coverage — a peer-of-a-peer's URI is available without an extra sync hop; simplest single field; matches CONTEXT.md's default-on stance</pros>
|
||||
<cons>Sends a payment endpoint to nodes the operator never federated with, which the plan's own privacy prohibition forbids; hardest to walk back once cached across the fleet</cons>
|
||||
</option>
|
||||
<option id="option-b">
|
||||
<name>Single `lightning_uri` on the snapshot only, shared by default with direct federated peers (CONTEXT.md's stated default, narrowed)</name>
|
||||
<pros>Implements CONTEXT.md's recorded discretion default; bilateral federation trust is already explicit, so no new consent surface is needed; one field, one hop, no transitive leak; ships the picker with real data on day one</pros>
|
||||
<cons>Every existing federated pair starts sharing a payment endpoint on the OTA that carries it, with no per-operator prompt; reversing later means shipping an opt-out and waiting for peers to re-sync</cons>
|
||||
</option>
|
||||
<option id="option-c">
|
||||
<name>Single `lightning_uri` on the snapshot only, gated behind an explicit opt-in setting defaulting off (RESEARCH.md Open Question 3)</name>
|
||||
<pros>Mirrors the proven `shared_location` pattern exactly; no operator starts sharing a payment endpoint without acting; safest given real-money implications; the field itself stays additive so flipping the default later is a one-line change</pros>
|
||||
<cons>The trusted-node picker is empty until both sides opt in, so the FED-05 flow needs a discoverable "turn on Lightning sharing" path or it looks broken; more surface to build in this plan</cons>
|
||||
</option>
|
||||
</options>
|
||||
<resume-signal>Select: option-a, option-b, or option-c. If you pick option-c, also say where the toggle lives (a new row in the existing federation settings surface is the default assumption).</resume-signal>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="tracer" tdd="true">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: End-to-end — a trusted peer's Lightning URI reaches federation.list-nodes</name>
|
||||
<reversibility rating="one-way">This adds a field to `NodeStateSnapshot`, the wire payload every
|
||||
fleet node parses on every sync; after the OTA carrying it, changing the field's name, split, or
|
||||
sharing scope requires a coordinated fleet upgrade and a cleanup of URIs already cached in peers'
|
||||
node files.</reversibility>
|
||||
<precondition>`lnd.getinfo` returns `identity_pubkey` and `uris` (delivered by plan 01-04, Task 1) — confirm by reading `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs` for both field names before starting.</precondition>
|
||||
<files>core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs, core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs, core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs, core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs` lines 104-146 — the `shared_location` (`lat`/`lon`)
|
||||
opt-in field pair with its doc comment explaining absent-vs-null, and the `FederationPeerHint`
|
||||
struct with its `pubkey`/`onion` split. These are the exact patterns to mirror.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` around lines 470-485 — the
|
||||
`shared_location` gating block (`if data.server_info.share_location { ... } else { None }`)
|
||||
and how it is threaded into `federation::build_local_state`.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs` around lines 225-265 — `build_local_state`'s
|
||||
signature and where `shared_location` is mapped into the snapshot at construction time.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` `update_node_state` as left by plan 01-05,
|
||||
including the monotonicity guard and the `fips_npub` exemption comment — the new field follows
|
||||
the same "learn from the peer's snapshot" treatment.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs` as left by plan 01-04 — the `identity_pubkey` /
|
||||
`uris` field names and the 66-hex validation helper to reuse.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/channels.rs` `handle_lnd_openchannel` (from L238) — the
|
||||
exact URI/pubkey/address parsing the picker will feed, so the persisted format matches what
|
||||
that handler accepts.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<behavior>
|
||||
- `build_local_state` called with a Lightning URI puts it on the produced snapshot; called
|
||||
without one produces a snapshot with the field absent (not an empty string).
|
||||
- A snapshot deserialized from a payload that has no Lightning field succeeds with the field
|
||||
`None` — an older peer syncs fine.
|
||||
- `update_node_state` with a snapshot carrying a well-formed URI persists it onto the
|
||||
`FederatedNode`; with a malformed URI it leaves any previously stored value untouched.
|
||||
- A snapshot rejected by the plan-01-05 monotonicity guard does not clear an already-known URI.
|
||||
- `federation.list-nodes` emits `lightning_uri` for a node that has one and omits it otherwise.
|
||||
</behavior>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Implement exactly the option selected in Task 1 — do not substitute a different shape, and do not
|
||||
add the field to `FederationPeerHint` unless option-a was chosen. Record the chosen option id in
|
||||
the SUMMARY.
|
||||
|
||||
Write the tests first and confirm they fail.
|
||||
|
||||
Add the Lightning field(s) to `NodeStateSnapshot` with `#[serde(default)]` and a doc comment that
|
||||
states the sharing rule chosen in Task 1 and explicitly notes where it differs from the
|
||||
`shared_location` analog directly above it. Add `#[serde(default)] pub lightning_uri: Option<String>`
|
||||
to `FederatedNode` for the locally-persisted peer value, and update the `make_node` test helper
|
||||
so the struct literal still compiles.
|
||||
|
||||
Thread the value into `build_local_state` the same way `shared_location` is threaded: an added
|
||||
parameter, mapped into the snapshot at construction. At the `handlers.rs` call site, source it
|
||||
from this node's own `lnd.getinfo` identity (prefer the first entry of `uris`; fall back to
|
||||
composing `identity_pubkey` with the node's reachable host when `uris` is empty), gated per the
|
||||
Task 1 decision. An LND that is down or has no URI yields `None`, never an empty string and never
|
||||
a fabricated address.
|
||||
|
||||
In `update_node_state`, learn the peer's URI from the snapshot: validate the shape before storing
|
||||
(the pubkey part is 66 hexadecimal characters; the `@host[:port]` remainder is optional, matching
|
||||
what `handle_lnd_openchannel` accepts), and on a malformed value log at `debug!` and leave the
|
||||
prior value alone.
|
||||
|
||||
In `handle_federation_list_nodes`, emit `lightning_uri` with the same `if let Some(...)`
|
||||
conditional-insert pattern the other optional fields use.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation` exits 0 with the five behaviors above present as named cases.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'lightning' core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs` is at least 3.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'serde(default)' core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs` increased by at least 2 relative to the pre-change file.
|
||||
- A round-trip test proves back-compat in both directions: a snapshot JSON with no Lightning key deserializes to `None`, and a snapshot serialized with the field deserializes cleanly after being stripped of unknown keys.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'lightning_uri' core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` is at least 1.
|
||||
- If and only if option-a was selected: `grep -c 'lightning' core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs` includes an occurrence inside the `FederationPeerHint` struct. Otherwise `FederationPeerHint` has none — assert this either way and state which in the SUMMARY.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` exits 0.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>A trusted federated peer's Lightning URI is synced, validated, persisted, and emitted — the picker's primary list now has real targets.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 3: Make the sharing state visible and reversible</name>
|
||||
<files>core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs, core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- The Task 1 decision as recorded in the Task 2 SUMMARY notes.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` — the `share_location` server-info flag
|
||||
and the `server.set-location` RPC that toggles it, for the accessor + persistence pattern.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs` — `build_local_state`'s tests (from L335) for the
|
||||
assertion style.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Under option-c: add the `share_lightning_uri` server setting with a default of off, an RPC to
|
||||
read and set it following the `server.set-location` shape, and make `build_local_state`'s
|
||||
Lightning parameter `None` whenever the flag is off. Add tests: flag off produces a snapshot with
|
||||
no Lightning field even when LND has one; flag on produces it; toggling the flag off then
|
||||
re-syncing produces a snapshot without it.
|
||||
|
||||
Under option-a or option-b: add a read-only surface reporting the current sharing state and the
|
||||
URI actually being shared, so the operator can see what is going out; and make the outbound value
|
||||
`None` whenever this node's own Lightning is not installed or not reachable. Add tests: no LND
|
||||
produces no Lightning field; a present LND produces the URI; the reported state matches what
|
||||
`build_local_state` actually emits.
|
||||
|
||||
In both cases, add a test asserting a third-party peer's Lightning URI is never re-exported in
|
||||
this node's own outbound peer hints — build a local state while holding a peer whose URI is
|
||||
known, serialize it, and assert that URI string does not appear in the outbound payload's peer
|
||||
hint section. This test is the mechanical form of this plan's privacy prohibition and must exist
|
||||
regardless of which option was chosen.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation::sync</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation::sync` exits 0.
|
||||
- A test named for the third-party-URI-not-re-exported behavior exists and passes; temporarily injecting the peer URI into the outbound hint makes it fail (fail-first proof recorded in the SUMMARY).
|
||||
- Under option-c only: `grep -c 'share_lightning_uri' core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` is at least 2.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` exits 0.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo clippy -p archipelago --all-targets` produces no new warnings in `federation`.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>The operator can see, and change, what Lightning identity this node shares — and a peer's URI provably never travels one hop further.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<threat_model>
|
||||
## Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| this node → federated peer (outbound snapshot) | This node's payment endpoint crosses to a remote party |
|
||||
| federated peer → this node (inbound snapshot) | A remote party's claimed payment endpoint is persisted and later fed to `lnd.openchannel` |
|
||||
| transitive peer hint | A third party's identity data can ride this node's outbound payload to a party it never federated with |
|
||||
|
||||
## STRIDE Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| T-01-21 | Information Disclosure | this node's Lightning payment endpoint reaching a non-federated party | high | mitigate | The Task 1 decision fixes the sharing scope explicitly; Task 3 adds the test proving a third-party URI is never re-exported in outbound peer hints, plus a fail-first proof |
|
||||
| T-01-22 | Spoofing | a peer advertising a Lightning URI it does not control, redirecting a channel open and its funds | high | mitigate | The snapshot arrives over the existing ed25519-signature-verified federation path (unchanged); the URI is bound to that verified peer record and validated for shape before persistence. Not re-implemented here — the existing `identity::NodeIdentity::verify` path is reused, per RESEARCH.md V6 |
|
||||
| T-01-23 | Tampering | a malformed or oversized URI corrupting the persisted node record | high | mitigate | 66-hex pubkey validation before persist; malformed input leaves the prior value untouched, with a test |
|
||||
| T-01-24 | Tampering | a replayed older snapshot clearing a known Lightning URI | medium | mitigate | The plan-01-05 monotonicity guard rejects strictly-older snapshots; a test asserts a rejected snapshot does not clear the URI |
|
||||
| T-01-25 | Repudiation | the operator unable to tell what identity their node is sharing | medium | mitigate | Task 3 adds the visible sharing state (a setting under option-c, a read-only report otherwise) |
|
||||
</threat_model>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` — green.
|
||||
- Back-compat round-trip proven in both directions against a payload lacking the new field.
|
||||
- The chosen option id is recorded in the SUMMARY, together with the fail-first proof for the no-re-export test.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- The Lightning identity field exists on the federation sync payload in exactly the shape the operator chose, additively and back-compatibly.
|
||||
- A trusted peer's URI is validated, persisted, and emitted by `federation.list-nodes`.
|
||||
- A third party's URI provably never leaves this node in its own peer hints.
|
||||
- The current sharing state is visible to the operator.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
Create `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-06-SUMMARY.md` when done.
|
||||
Stage by explicit path, commit, and `git push gitea-ai main`.
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: 01-federation-mesh-hardening
|
||||
plan: 07
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 2
|
||||
depends_on: ["01-04"]
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs
|
||||
autonomous: true
|
||||
requirements: [FED-05]
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "A user can send a channel-open request to a meshed Lightning peer, carrying this node's own Lightning URI, an optional amount, and an optional message"
|
||||
- "A received channel-open request appears in the recipient's mesh conversation as a typed message showing the requester's URI and note, using the existing typed-message rendering path"
|
||||
- "Sending a channel-open request requires an explicit target peer — there is no broadcast form"
|
||||
- "A channel-open request whose payload URI is malformed is rejected on receipt and never stored as a message"
|
||||
- "Two channel-open requests sent to the same peer in quick succession produce two distinct messages with distinct sender sequence numbers, and neither is silently dropped (FED-05 concurrency edge, mesh half)"
|
||||
- "A request is never rendered or reported as an opened or funded channel — it carries no channel state"
|
||||
prohibitions:
|
||||
- statement: "A channel-open request MUST NOT be presented anywhere as an accepted, open, or funded channel — a request that has not been acted on by the recipient must never appear in a channel list, a balance, or a connected-peer count"
|
||||
category: transparency
|
||||
- statement: "Receiving a channel-open request MUST NOT cause the node to open a channel, connect to the requester, or move funds on its own — acting on a request is always a separate, explicit human decision"
|
||||
category: safety
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- path: core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs
|
||||
provides: "ChannelOpenRequest typed message + payload"
|
||||
contains: "ChannelOpenRequest"
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- from: core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs
|
||||
to: core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs
|
||||
via: "mesh.request-channel match arm"
|
||||
pattern: "mesh.request-channel"
|
||||
- from: core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs
|
||||
to: core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs
|
||||
via: "inbound ChannelOpenRequest is stored as a MeshMessage with its typed payload"
|
||||
pattern: "ChannelOpenRequest"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Give a meshed Lightning peer a way to be *asked* for a channel: a typed mesh message carrying the
|
||||
requester's Lightning URI and an optional note, sent to one chosen peer and rendered in the
|
||||
recipient's conversation.
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: FED-05's second list. CONTEXT.md locks the semantics — meshed peers with Lightning
|
||||
installed are nodes you "request to open a channel with", not nodes you open against directly,
|
||||
because mesh peers are not bilaterally trusted the way federated nodes are. 01-UI-SPEC.md fixes the
|
||||
UI verb ("Request Channel", reusing `PeerRequestModal.vue`'s message field and busy states).
|
||||
PATTERNS.md records that the send/receive shape for this is `typed_messages.rs`'s existing
|
||||
reaction/reply family — a struct-per-message-type serialized into the standard envelope — and that
|
||||
no capability/request mechanism exists yet to extend.
|
||||
Output: `MeshMessageType::ChannelOpenRequest`, its payload, an inbound arm that stores it as a
|
||||
conversation message, and a `mesh.request-channel` RPC.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<execution_context>
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/templates/summary.md
|
||||
</execution_context>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
@.planning/PROJECT.md
|
||||
@.planning/STATE.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-CONTEXT.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-UI-SPEC.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-PATTERNS.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-04-SUMMARY.md
|
||||
@core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
## Artifacts this phase produces
|
||||
|
||||
Created or changed by **this plan**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Symbol | Kind | File |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `MeshMessageType::ChannelOpenRequest = 27` (label `channel_open_request`) | new wire message type | `core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs` |
|
||||
| `ChannelOpenRequestPayload { uri, amount_sats, message }` | new CBOR payload struct | same |
|
||||
| inbound `ChannelOpenRequest` arm | listener dispatch arm storing the request as a `MeshMessage` | `core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs` |
|
||||
| `handle_mesh_request_channel` | new RPC handler (`mesh.request-channel`) | `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs` |
|
||||
| `mesh.request-channel` | dispatcher match arm | `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs` |
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="tracer" tdd="true">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: End-to-end — a channel-open request is sent to one peer and lands in their conversation</name>
|
||||
<reversibility rating="costly">`MeshMessageType` is a radio wire format read by every fleet node
|
||||
after the next OTA; the discriminant and payload shape become externally visible, so a later change
|
||||
needs a coordinated fleet upgrade. Kept additive on an unused discriminant with serde-default
|
||||
optional payload fields, so older nodes ignore it rather than erroring.</reversibility>
|
||||
<precondition>`MeshMessageType::LightningInfo = 26` exists (plan 01-04, Task 2) — confirm the highest current discriminant by reading `core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs` before choosing this type's number.</precondition>
|
||||
<files>core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs, core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs, core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs, core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs` — the enum and the four places every variant is
|
||||
registered (`enum`, `from_u8`, `from_label`, `label`), `InvoicePayload` (from L413) as the
|
||||
closest payload analog (it also carries a payment-ish string plus an optional amount), and the
|
||||
`TypedEnvelope` doc comment on `compact_bytes` and LoRa frame size.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs` lines 637-760 — `handle_mesh_send_reply`
|
||||
and `handle_mesh_send_reaction`: param extraction, target-peer resolution, sequence-number
|
||||
allocation, `TypedEnvelope::new(...).with_seq(seq)`, and the send call.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs` lines 430-500 — the `Reaction` and `Presence`
|
||||
inbound arms, and how an inbound typed message is turned into a stored `MeshMessage` with
|
||||
`message_type` and `typed_payload` set.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs` lines 139-180 — the `MeshMessage` fields the stored
|
||||
request must populate (`plaintext` is the human-readable fallback shown in list views).
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs` lines 390-440 — the one-line registration convention.
|
||||
- `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-UI-SPEC.md` — the Copywriting Contract row
|
||||
for "Primary CTA — meshed Lightning peer", which fixes what the UI in plan 01-08 will send.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<behavior>
|
||||
- `MeshMessageType` round-trips the new variant through `from_u8`, `from_label`, and `label`.
|
||||
- `handle_mesh_request_channel` with no target peer in params returns an error; with an unknown
|
||||
target peer it returns an error naming the peer.
|
||||
- `handle_mesh_request_channel` with a target sends exactly one envelope of the new type, whose
|
||||
payload carries this node's own Lightning URI and the caller's optional amount and message.
|
||||
- Two consecutive calls to the same target allocate two different sequence numbers.
|
||||
- An inbound envelope of the new type with a well-formed URI is stored as a `MeshMessage` whose
|
||||
`message_type` is the new label and whose `typed_payload` carries the request fields.
|
||||
- An inbound envelope whose payload URI is malformed stores nothing and logs a warning.
|
||||
</behavior>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Write the tests first and confirm they fail.
|
||||
|
||||
Add `ChannelOpenRequest = 27` to `MeshMessageType` (confirm 27 is unused first) with a doc comment
|
||||
stating that this is a *request*, that it carries no channel state, and that receiving one never
|
||||
causes the node to act. Register it in `from_u8`, `from_label` ("channel_open_request"), and
|
||||
`label`.
|
||||
|
||||
Add `ChannelOpenRequestPayload` beside the other payload structs: a required `uri: String` (the
|
||||
requester's own `pubkey@host:port`), plus `#[serde(default)] amount_sats: Option<u64>` and
|
||||
`#[serde(default)] message: Option<String>`. Bound the optional message length before send so a
|
||||
long note cannot blow past the LoRa framing budget the `TypedEnvelope` doc comment warns about;
|
||||
truncate at the send side rather than rejecting, and say so in a comment.
|
||||
|
||||
Add `handle_mesh_request_channel` following the `handle_mesh_send_reply` shape: require a target
|
||||
peer identifier in params and error without one (there is no broadcast form); read this node's
|
||||
own Lightning URI via the identity path plan 01-04 added to `lnd.getinfo`, and error with a clear
|
||||
message when it is unavailable rather than sending an empty request; build the payload, wrap it in
|
||||
a `TypedEnvelope` with a freshly allocated sequence number, and send it to that peer only.
|
||||
Register it in the dispatcher as `"mesh.request-channel"`.
|
||||
|
||||
Add the inbound arm in `dispatch.rs` mirroring the `Reaction` arm: deserialize the payload,
|
||||
validate the URI shape (66-hex pubkey part, optional `@host[:port]`), and on success store a
|
||||
`MeshMessage` with the new label as `message_type`, the payload as `typed_payload`, and a
|
||||
human-readable `plaintext` summary naming the requester and the requested amount when present.
|
||||
On a malformed URI, log at `warn!` and store nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
Do not add any code path that connects to, opens a channel with, or funds the requester on
|
||||
receipt. The inbound arm's only effect is storing a message.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo test -p archipelago mesh::message_types mesh::listener api::rpc::mesh</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago mesh::message_types mesh::listener api::rpc::mesh` exits 0 with the six behaviors above present as named cases.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'ChannelOpenRequest' core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs` is at least 5.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'channel_open_request' core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs` is at least 2.
|
||||
- `grep -c '"mesh.request-channel"' core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs` equals 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'ChannelOpenRequest' core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs` is at least 1.
|
||||
- The inbound arm contains no call to any `openchannel`, `connectpeer`, or send-funds path — verified by reading the arm and recorded in the SUMMARY.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` exits 0.
|
||||
- The SUMMARY records the pre-implementation failing test output.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>A channel-open request travels from an RPC call to a chosen peer's conversation, with no side effect beyond a stored message.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: Harden the request path against duplicates, oversize, and misuse</name>
|
||||
<files>core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs, core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs` as left by Task 1, plus the
|
||||
`handle_mesh_send_content_inline` size-tier logic for how this codebase bounds payload size
|
||||
before a send.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/mesh/outbox.rs` — whether an outbound send is queued and retried, so the
|
||||
duplicate-suppression window is placed where it will actually see both attempts.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs` — `MeshPeer`'s authenticating-key accessor doc comment
|
||||
(never use the firmware routing key for authentication).
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Add a short duplicate-suppression window to `handle_mesh_request_channel`: a second request to the
|
||||
same target peer within a bounded interval returns a distinct, non-error result reporting that a
|
||||
request was already sent, rather than emitting a second envelope. The UI in plan 01-08 also
|
||||
disables its button while a send is in flight, but a backend guard is what actually stops a
|
||||
double-click or a retried RPC from spamming a peer over a slow radio link. Two requests separated
|
||||
by more than the window must both go out — the window suppresses accidental duplicates, not
|
||||
legitimate repeat requests. Add tests for both sides of the window.
|
||||
|
||||
Bound the inbound side too: reject an inbound payload whose message field exceeds the same
|
||||
length bound the send side truncates at, and reject an `amount_sats` outside the range
|
||||
`handle_lnd_openchannel` accepts (its existing 20,000..=16,777,215 sat bounds) so a request can
|
||||
never carry an amount the recipient could not act on. Read `channels.rs` for those exact bounds
|
||||
rather than restating them from memory.
|
||||
|
||||
Attribute the stored inbound message to the peer's authenticating identity key, not the firmware
|
||||
routing key, following the `MeshPeer` accessor's documented rule — a request that claims to be
|
||||
from a trusted peer must be attributable.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo test -p archipelago mesh api::rpc::mesh</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago mesh api::rpc::mesh` exits 0, including a within-window suppression case and an outside-window pass-through case.
|
||||
- A test asserts an inbound request with an out-of-range `amount_sats` is rejected, using the bounds read from `channels.rs` rather than hardcoded duplicates of them.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` exits 0.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo clippy -p archipelago --all-targets` produces no new warnings in `mesh` or `api::rpc::mesh`.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>Accidental duplicate requests are suppressed, oversize and out-of-range requests are refused, and every stored request is attributable to a verified identity.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<threat_model>
|
||||
## Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| radio peer → typed-envelope decode → stored message | Untrusted RF input becomes a conversation entry naming a payment endpoint |
|
||||
| operator RPC → outbound request | An operator action discloses this node's payment endpoint to a chosen mesh peer |
|
||||
|
||||
## STRIDE Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| T-01-26 | Spoofing | a peer sending a request that appears to come from a trusted node, luring a channel open to an attacker's URI | high | mitigate | The stored message is attributed to the peer's verified archipelago identity key, never the firmware routing key (Task 2); the recipient's action on a request is always explicit and human |
|
||||
| T-01-27 | Elevation of Privilege | a received request causing an automatic channel open or fund movement | high | mitigate | The inbound arm's only effect is storing a message; the acceptance criteria require reading the arm and recording that it contains no open/connect/send-funds call |
|
||||
| T-01-28 | Denial of Service | request flooding filling a peer's conversation or saturating a LoRa link | high | mitigate | Send-side duplicate-suppression window plus inbound length and amount bounds (Task 2) |
|
||||
| T-01-29 | Information Disclosure | broadcasting this node's payment endpoint to every contact in range | high | mitigate | A target peer is required; the handler errors without one and there is no broadcast form |
|
||||
| T-01-30 | Tampering | an oversize payload fragmenting into unreassemblable LoRa chunks | medium | mitigate | The message field is truncated at the send side against the framing budget the `TypedEnvelope` doc comment describes; inbound oversize is rejected |
|
||||
| T-01-SC | Tampering | npm/pip/cargo installs | high | mitigate | No new crates. If one becomes necessary, stop and run the Package Legitimacy Gate before installing |
|
||||
</threat_model>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` — green.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo clippy -p archipelago --all-targets` — no new warnings in the touched modules.
|
||||
- The SUMMARY states, from a direct read, that the inbound arm performs no Lightning action.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- A new typed mesh message carries a channel-open request to one named peer.
|
||||
- Receiving one stores a conversation message and does nothing else.
|
||||
- Duplicates within a short window are suppressed; legitimate repeats are not.
|
||||
- Malformed URIs, oversize notes, and out-of-range amounts are refused.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
Create `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-07-SUMMARY.md` when done.
|
||||
Stage by explicit path, commit, and `git push gitea-ai main`.
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: 01-federation-mesh-hardening
|
||||
plan: 08
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 4
|
||||
depends_on: ["01-02", "01-06", "01-07"]
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelsPanel.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/api/rpc-client.ts
|
||||
- neode-ui/mock-backend.js
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts
|
||||
autonomous: true
|
||||
requirements: [FED-05]
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "A user can copy their own node's Lightning URI from the channel-open surface; the copy button label flips to Copied! for about two seconds"
|
||||
- "The displayed own-node URI truncates to its container with the full value in a title tooltip, and the full untruncated value is what reaches the clipboard"
|
||||
- "Trusted federated nodes that advertise Lightning are listed by hostname with a one-click Open Channel action"
|
||||
- "Meshed peers that have Lightning installed are listed separately with a Request Channel action, never a direct open — they are not bilaterally trusted"
|
||||
- "A peer that is both a trusted federated node and a meshed Lightning peer appears exactly once, in the trusted list (FED-05 adjacency edge)"
|
||||
- "Both picker lists render in a deterministic order that does not reshuffle between refreshes (FED-05 ordering edge)"
|
||||
- "When both lists are empty a single shared empty state renders once — not one per column"
|
||||
- "Both lists show the house loading treatment while fetching and the house error row on failure, matching the existing federation node list and Lightning channels panel conventions"
|
||||
- "Each list row shows the node name with truncation and a title tooltip, its trust badge, and its transport badge, mirroring the existing federation node row"
|
||||
- "Clicking Open Channel twice, or opening two channels to the same peer at once, results in one open attempt — the action is disabled while a request is in flight (FED-05 concurrency edge)"
|
||||
- "A manually pasted pubkey with no host still works, falling back to the address-less open path the Lightning channels panel already relies on"
|
||||
- "The manual-paste field is reached through a de-emphasised Paste URI Manually entry point below both lists, not as a third equal-weight column"
|
||||
- "The modal renders through the house modal shell so its backdrop covers the full screen and a click outside closes it"
|
||||
- "The request flow reuses the existing peer-request modal pattern — optional message field, Send Request submit, Sending… busy label"
|
||||
- statement: "When both lists are empty the shared empty state renders exactly once rather than once per list"
|
||||
verification: backstop
|
||||
- statement: "A manually pasted URI that is not in pubkey@host:port form is rejected client-side with a format message before any open call is made"
|
||||
verification: backstop
|
||||
prohibitions:
|
||||
- statement: "A channel-open request sent to a meshed peer MUST NOT be displayed as an open, pending-funding, or connected channel anywhere in the UI — until the recipient acts, it is a sent request and nothing more"
|
||||
category: transparency
|
||||
- statement: "The picker MUST NOT present a meshed peer's advertised URI with the same visual authority as a bilaterally-trusted federated node — the two lists stay visually distinct and the meshed action stays a request, so a user cannot mistake an unverified advertisement for a trusted target"
|
||||
category: safety
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- path: neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue
|
||||
provides: "Own-URI share, trusted-node picker, meshed-peer request picker, manual-paste fallback"
|
||||
min_lines: 150
|
||||
- path: neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts
|
||||
provides: "State coverage for empty, loading, error, populated, dedup, ordering, and double-click"
|
||||
min_lines: 60
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- from: neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelsPanel.vue
|
||||
to: neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue
|
||||
via: "the panel's existing Open Channel button opens the new picker modal"
|
||||
pattern: "LightningChannelModal"
|
||||
- from: neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue
|
||||
to: neode-ui/src/api/rpc-client.ts
|
||||
via: "federation.list-nodes, mesh.lightning-peers, lnd.getinfo, lnd.openchannel, mesh.request-channel"
|
||||
pattern: "lightning-peers"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Make channel opening between nodes first-class UI: share your node's Lightning URI, open a channel
|
||||
with a trusted federated node in one click, and request a channel from a meshed peer that has
|
||||
Lightning installed.
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: FED-05's user-facing half, with scope locked in CONTEXT.md (the second list is *meshed peer
|
||||
nodes that have Lightning installed* — not `lnd listpeers`, not a curated directory, not a live
|
||||
LN-graph query) and its visuals fixed by 01-UI-SPEC.md (copy, colours, spacing, the shared empty
|
||||
state, the de-emphasised manual-paste fallback, and the hard modal rule).
|
||||
Output: a new picker modal built from the house design system, reached from the Lightning panel's
|
||||
existing Open Channel button, working against the demo and against archi-dev.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<execution_context>
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/templates/summary.md
|
||||
</execution_context>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
@.planning/PROJECT.md
|
||||
@.planning/STATE.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-CONTEXT.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-UI-SPEC.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-PATTERNS.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-06-SUMMARY.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-07-SUMMARY.md
|
||||
@neode-ui/src/components/BaseModal.vue
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
## Artifacts this phase produces
|
||||
|
||||
Created or changed by **this plan**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Symbol | Kind | File |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `LightningChannelModal.vue` | new Vue component (picker modal) | `neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue` |
|
||||
| `meshLightningPeers()`, `requestChannel()`, `sendLightningInfo()` | new rpc-client wrappers | `neode-ui/src/api/rpc-client.ts` |
|
||||
| `mesh.lightning-peers`, `mesh.send-lightning-info`, `mesh.request-channel` | new mock RPC cases | `neode-ui/mock-backend.js` |
|
||||
| `identity_pubkey` / `uris` on the mock `lnd.getinfo` result | extended mock response | same |
|
||||
| `lightning_uri` on the mock `federation.list-nodes` nodes | extended mock response | same |
|
||||
| `LightningChannelModal.test.ts` | new vitest suite | `neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts` |
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="tracer" tdd="true">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: End-to-end — open a channel with a trusted federated node in one click</name>
|
||||
<precondition>`federation.list-nodes` emits `lightning_uri` (plan 01-06) and `mesh.lightning-peers` is registered in the dispatcher (plan 01-04) — confirm both by grepping `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` and `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs` before starting.</precondition>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue, neode-ui/src/api/rpc-client.ts, neode-ui/mock-backend.js, neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts, neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelsPanel.vue</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/components/BaseModal.vue` — the whole file. It already wraps `Teleport to="body"`,
|
||||
the full-screen `bg-black/60 backdrop-blur-md` backdrop, `@click.self` close, the pinned
|
||||
`text-xl font-semibold` title, and the scrolling body. The new modal MUST use it; never nest a
|
||||
modal inside a transform-affected ancestor.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelsPanel.vue` lines 246-360 (its current bespoke
|
||||
open-channel modal, its `openError` ref, `isStartupNotice()` amber-vs-red distinction, and the
|
||||
fee-preset block) and lines 505-630 (`showOpenModal`, `defaultOpenForm()`, `openForm`,
|
||||
`openingChannel`, and the validate-before-RPC sequence including the 20,000-sat minimum and the
|
||||
`pubkey@host:port` split with an optional address).
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/views/federation/NodeList.vue` lines 40-140 and 155-190 — the row layout to
|
||||
mirror (truncated name with `:title`, transport badge, trust badge, action button), the
|
||||
`trustedNodes` / `peerNodes` computed filters, and the "Loading nodes..." row.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/api/rpc-client.ts` lines 795-850 — the one-line
|
||||
`this.call({ method: '<ns>.<verb>', params })` wrapper convention and the existing
|
||||
`federation.list-nodes` wrapper.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/mock-backend.js` — the `lnd.getinfo`, `lnd.openchannel`, and `federation.list-nodes`
|
||||
cases, and the parity harness added by plan 01-02.
|
||||
- `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-UI-SPEC.md` — Design System, Spacing,
|
||||
Typography, Color, and the full Copywriting Contract. Every string in this modal comes from
|
||||
that table verbatim.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<behavior>
|
||||
- Mounted with a node list containing one trusted node that has a Lightning URI and one that does
|
||||
not, the trusted list renders exactly one row.
|
||||
- The row shows the node name (truncated, with a `title`), its trust badge, its transport badge,
|
||||
and an Open Channel button.
|
||||
- Clicking Open Channel calls the open RPC once with that node's URI; clicking it twice in
|
||||
immediate succession still results in exactly one call, and the button is disabled while in
|
||||
flight.
|
||||
- While the node list is loading, the loading treatment renders and no empty state renders.
|
||||
- When the node fetch rejects, the error row renders with the contract's error copy.
|
||||
- The modal root renders through the house modal shell, so the backdrop is a full-screen sibling
|
||||
of the card rather than a child of a transformed ancestor.
|
||||
</behavior>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Write the test file first and confirm it fails.
|
||||
|
||||
Add rpc-client wrappers for `mesh.lightning-peers`, `mesh.send-lightning-info`, and
|
||||
`mesh.request-channel` following the existing one-line convention. Extend the mock backend so the
|
||||
demo answers all three, so `lnd.getinfo` returns an `identity_pubkey` and a `uris` array, and so
|
||||
`federation.list-nodes` nodes carry `lightning_uri` — mirroring the real handlers per the mock's
|
||||
established "cite the daemon source" comment convention. The plan-01-02 parity harness must stay
|
||||
green.
|
||||
|
||||
Create `LightningChannelModal.vue` using `BaseModal` as its shell, title "Open Lightning Channel".
|
||||
In this task implement the trusted-node section only: fetch the federated node list, keep nodes
|
||||
whose trust level is trusted AND which have a Lightning URI, sort by display name with a stable
|
||||
tiebreak so the order does not shuffle between refreshes, and render each as a row mirroring the
|
||||
federation node row — truncated name with a `title` tooltip, the transport badge reusing
|
||||
NodeList's existing FIPS/Tor logic, the trust badge, and an Open Channel button on the right.
|
||||
|
||||
Wire Open Channel to the existing open-channel RPC, reusing the panel's proven sequence: validate
|
||||
before calling, keep the 20,000-sat minimum, split the URI into pubkey and optional address, and
|
||||
reuse the `openError` ref plus the `isStartupNotice()` amber-vs-red distinction rather than
|
||||
inventing a new error idiom. Guard against double submission with an in-flight flag keyed to the
|
||||
target so the button is disabled and a second click is a no-op.
|
||||
|
||||
Point the Lightning panel's **existing** Open Channel button at this modal instead of its bespoke
|
||||
one. Do not add a new nav entry, route, card, or dashboard tile — the user places new entry
|
||||
points, this plan only upgrades the one that already exists. Leave the panel's channel list,
|
||||
close-channel flow, and fee presets untouched.
|
||||
|
||||
Follow the UI-SPEC tables exactly: spacing on the 4px grid, the two-weight typography scale,
|
||||
accent orange reserved for the primary action buttons, the bolt icon path already used elsewhere
|
||||
in the app, and the copy strings verbatim.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && test -f src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts && npx vitest run src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- The test file exists and `npx vitest run src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts` exits 0 with all six behaviors present as named cases (the `test -f` guard is required — `vitest.config.ts` sets `passWithNoTests: true`).
|
||||
- A test asserts two immediate clicks produce exactly one open call.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'BaseModal' neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue` is at least 2 (import + usage).
|
||||
- `grep -c 'Open Channel' neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue` is at least 1 and the copy matches the UI-SPEC Copywriting Contract verbatim.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'LightningChannelModal' neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelsPanel.vue` is at least 2.
|
||||
- `grep -c "'mesh.lightning-peers'" neode-ui/src/api/rpc-client.ts` equals 1.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` exits 0 with zero missing methods.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run` exits 0 and `npm run build` exits 0.
|
||||
- No new route, nav item, or dashboard card was added — confirmed by `git diff --stat` showing no change to the router or any layout/nav component, recorded in the SUMMARY.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>A trusted federated node can be picked by hostname and a channel opened with one click, through the house modal shell, on the demo and against a real node.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: The meshed Lightning peers list and the Request Channel flow</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue, neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts, neode-ui/mock-backend.js</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/components/federation/PeerRequestModal.vue` — the whole file (66 lines): the
|
||||
optional message field, the `sending` → "Sending…" busy label, and the
|
||||
`$emit('send', message)` / `$emit('cancel')` contract. Reuse this component rather than
|
||||
building a second request modal.
|
||||
- `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-UI-SPEC.md` — the "FED-05 Visual Anchor"
|
||||
section (trusted list is primary, meshed list second) and the empty-state copy rows.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/views/federation/NodeList.vue` — the empty-state block treatment to mirror.
|
||||
- The plan-01-07 SUMMARY — the exact params `mesh.request-channel` expects.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Add the meshed-Lightning-peers section below the trusted list: fetch via `mesh.lightning-peers`,
|
||||
render rows in the same layout with a Request Channel button in place of Open Channel, and sort
|
||||
with the same stable ordering rule.
|
||||
|
||||
Deduplicate across the two lists: a peer that is both a trusted federated node and a meshed
|
||||
Lightning peer appears only in the trusted list. Match on the identity available in both payloads
|
||||
(the node's Lightning URI is the reliable common key; fall back to the peer's archipelago identity
|
||||
key when present). Never match on display name.
|
||||
|
||||
Wire Request Channel to `PeerRequestModal` — mount it with the optional message field, and on its
|
||||
send event call `mesh.request-channel` with the target peer and the message. While a request is
|
||||
in flight the row's button is disabled and shows the busy label; a second click is a no-op. On
|
||||
success show a sent-request confirmation on the row. That confirmation must not claim a channel
|
||||
exists, is pending funding, or is connected; it says a request was sent and nothing more.
|
||||
|
||||
Add the shared empty state: when the trusted list and the meshed list are BOTH empty, render the
|
||||
UI-SPEC's empty heading and body exactly once for the pair — not once per list. When only one is
|
||||
empty, that section renders nothing rather than its own empty state. Render the house loading
|
||||
treatment per section while its fetch is in flight, and the contract's error row on a failed
|
||||
fetch, using the same `openError` / startup-notice idiom as Task 1.
|
||||
|
||||
Extend the mock backend so `mesh.lightning-peers` returns a small demo peer set and
|
||||
`mesh.request-channel` records the request in the session store so the demo shows the same sent
|
||||
state a real node does.
|
||||
|
||||
Extend the test suite: both-empty renders one empty state; one-empty renders none for that
|
||||
section; a peer present in both lists renders once and in the trusted list; ordering is identical
|
||||
across two consecutive renders of a shuffled input; a double click on Request Channel produces one
|
||||
call; the sent confirmation contains no open or connected wording.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && npx vitest run src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts` exits 0 with the six cases above present by name.
|
||||
- The both-empty case asserts an element count of exactly 1 for the empty-state element, not merely that it is present.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'PeerRequestModal' neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue` is at least 2.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'Request Channel' neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` exits 0.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run && npm run build` exits 0.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>Meshed Lightning peers are listed and requestable, deduplicated against the trusted list, with a single shared empty state and no misleading channel wording.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 3: Share your own URI, and the manual-paste fallback</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue, neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/components/SendBitcoinModal.vue` — its `copyDetail` / "Copied!" clipboard
|
||||
feedback pattern (the label flips for about two seconds). Reuse it; do not invent a new
|
||||
copy-feedback idiom.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelsPanel.vue` lines 250-270 and 595-625 — the
|
||||
`pubkey@host:port` placeholder, the `Format: pubkey@host:port` helper text, and the
|
||||
validate-before-RPC sequence including the address-optional split.
|
||||
- `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-UI-SPEC.md` — the Copywriting Contract rows
|
||||
for "Primary CTA — own URI" and "Manual fallback entry point", and the UI Considerations rows
|
||||
marked backstop for the manual-paste form.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Add the own-node URI block at the top of the modal: read this node's Lightning identity from
|
||||
`lnd.getinfo`, display the URI truncated to its container with the full value in a `title`
|
||||
tooltip, and add a copy button whose label flips to the confirmation string for about two seconds.
|
||||
The clipboard receives the full untruncated value regardless of visual truncation. When the node
|
||||
has no Lightning URI available, the block explains that instead of showing an empty field or a
|
||||
fabricated address.
|
||||
|
||||
Add the manual-paste fallback below both lists as a de-emphasised disclosure, not a third
|
||||
equal-weight column: the entry point reveals a peer URI input with the placeholder and helper text
|
||||
reused verbatim from the Lightning panel. Validate client-side before calling the open RPC — a
|
||||
value that is not in `pubkey@host:port` form is rejected with the format message and no RPC is
|
||||
issued; a bare pubkey with no host is accepted and passes an undefined address through, which is
|
||||
the behavior the open RPC already supports. Reuse the same error ref and startup-notice treatment.
|
||||
|
||||
Extend the test suite: the copy button places the full untruncated URI on the clipboard and its
|
||||
label flips then reverts; the URI element carries a `title` with the full value; an invalid
|
||||
pasted value shows the format message and issues no RPC call; a bare pubkey issues the open call
|
||||
with an undefined address; the no-URI-available state renders its explanation rather than an
|
||||
empty field.
|
||||
|
||||
Then verify on the dev preview against archi-dev before this plan is considered complete, per the
|
||||
user requirement in CONTEXT.md: the preview at the dev port, the copy button, the trusted list,
|
||||
the meshed list, the request flow, and the manual paste. Record what was exercised in the SUMMARY.
|
||||
The blocking human sign-off is consolidated into plan 01-09.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && npx vitest run src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts && npm run build</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run src/components/__tests__/LightningChannelModal.test.ts` exits 0 with the five cases above present by name.
|
||||
- A test asserts the clipboard receives the full untruncated URI even when the rendered element is truncated.
|
||||
- A test asserts an invalid pasted value results in zero RPC calls (assert on the call count, not merely on the message being visible).
|
||||
- `grep -c 'Copy Lightning URI' neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'Paste URI Manually' neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue` is at least 1.
|
||||
- `grep -c 'pubkey@host:port' neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue` is at least 2 (placeholder + helper text).
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run && npm run build` exits 0.
|
||||
- The SUMMARY lists the dev-preview steps exercised against archi-dev and what was observed.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>A user can share their own node's Lightning URI and fall back to a pasted URI with real client-side validation, verified on the dev preview against a real node.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<threat_model>
|
||||
## Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| daemon RPC → browser | Peer-advertised Lightning URIs, some of them from unauthenticated radio peers, are rendered and offered as payment targets |
|
||||
| browser → clipboard | This node's payment endpoint is copied for the user to share out of band |
|
||||
| user click → `lnd.openchannel` | A UI action commits real funds to a channel |
|
||||
|
||||
## STRIDE Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| T-01-31 | Spoofing | a meshed peer's advertised URI presented with the same authority as a bilaterally-trusted federated node, luring funds to an attacker | high | mitigate | The two lists stay visually and semantically distinct; the meshed action is Request Channel, never a direct open; the prohibition above states this and a test asserts the meshed row's action wording |
|
||||
| T-01-32 | Tampering | a peer-supplied node name or URI containing markup that renders as UI | high | mitigate | Vue's default text interpolation escapes; the plan uses no `v-html` anywhere. A test asserting a name containing angle brackets renders as text is required before this row can be dispositioned |
|
||||
| T-01-33 | Repudiation | a sent request being read as an open channel, so a user believes they have inbound liquidity they do not | high | mitigate | The sent confirmation is worded as a request only; a test asserts the confirmation contains no open or connected wording |
|
||||
| T-01-34 | Denial of Service | a double click or a fast repeat committing two channel opens to the same peer | high | mitigate | An in-flight flag keyed to the target disables the action and makes a second click a no-op, backed by the plan-01-07 backend suppression window; a test asserts exactly one call for two immediate clicks |
|
||||
| T-01-35 | Information Disclosure | this node's Lightning URI being displayed to a shoulder-surfer or copied in a shared session | low | accept | A Lightning URI is a public payment endpoint by design; it is deliberately shareable and carries no spend authority |
|
||||
| T-01-36 | Elevation of Privilege | the modal bypassing the open RPC's server-side validation by calling with unvalidated input | medium | mitigate | Client-side validation is additive only; the existing server-side pubkey-format and amount-bounds validation in the open handler is reused unchanged and is the authority |
|
||||
</threat_model>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run` — green.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` — green, zero missing methods.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npm run build` — green.
|
||||
- Dev-preview walkthrough against archi-dev recorded in the SUMMARY (own URI copy, trusted open, meshed request, manual paste), per CONTEXT.md's "verified on the dev preview before any deploy" requirement.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- Own-node URI is displayed, truncated with a tooltip, and copied in full.
|
||||
- Trusted federated nodes with Lightning are listed by hostname with a one-click open.
|
||||
- Meshed Lightning peers are listed separately and requestable, deduplicated against the trusted list.
|
||||
- Shared empty state renders once; loading and error states follow the house conventions.
|
||||
- Manual paste validates client-side and supports a bare pubkey.
|
||||
- Double-submission is impossible; a request is never shown as a channel.
|
||||
- No new route, nav entry, or dashboard card was added.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
Create `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-08-SUMMARY.md` when done.
|
||||
Stage by explicit path, commit, and `git push gitea-ai main`.
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: 01-federation-mesh-hardening
|
||||
plan: 09
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 5
|
||||
depends_on: ["01-01", "01-02", "01-03", "01-04", "01-05", "01-06", "01-07", "01-08"]
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- .planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/fips/dial.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/mesh/mod.rs
|
||||
- core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs
|
||||
autonomous: true
|
||||
requirements: [FED-03, FED-01]
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "A findings document exists listing every issue the structured review of the federation/fleet area and the mesh area produced, with file and line citations"
|
||||
- "Every finding carries exactly one disposition — fixed, or deferred with a written reason — and no finding is left without one (FED-03 ordering edge)"
|
||||
- "Every reviewed area appears in the document, including areas where the review produced no findings, recorded as reviewed with none rather than omitted (FED-03 empty edge)"
|
||||
- "Every federation and mesh claim in the codebase concerns document is re-verified against current code and git history before being filed as a finding or dismissed, with the evidence cited (FED-03 adjacency edge)"
|
||||
- "Every finding marked fixed cites the commit and the test or command that demonstrates the fix"
|
||||
- "The known-fixed claims are recorded as already-fixed with their commit, not re-fixed"
|
||||
prohibitions:
|
||||
- statement: "A finding MUST NOT be closed as fixed without evidence a reader can re-run — a disposition of fixed always cites a commit and a verifying command or test name, never an assertion alone"
|
||||
category: transparency
|
||||
- statement: "A finding MUST NOT be dropped silently — an item judged out of scope is recorded as deferred with the reason and the phase or requirement that owns it, never deleted from the list"
|
||||
category: transparency
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- path: .planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md
|
||||
provides: "The FED-03 structured review output with per-finding dispositions"
|
||||
min_lines: 60
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- from: .planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md
|
||||
to: .planning/codebase/CONCERNS.md
|
||||
via: "each federation/mesh concern is re-verified and cross-referenced by its finding id"
|
||||
pattern: "CONCERNS"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Run the structured code review FED-03 requires over the federation/fleet area and the mesh area, and
|
||||
close it out: every finding fixed or explicitly deferred with a reason.
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: FED-03. RESEARCH.md Pitfall 2 is the governing constraint — `.planning/codebase/CONCERNS.md`
|
||||
is NOT current truth for this phase. At least two of its federation claims were already fixed on main
|
||||
before this phase started (the tombstone-write-swallowed claim was fixed in `01cbec27`; the
|
||||
peer-joined DID path does verify an ed25519 signature). Re-fixing an already-fixed bug wastes the
|
||||
review and risks reverting working code, so every claim gets a fresh code read plus a git-history
|
||||
check before it is filed or dismissed.
|
||||
Output: `01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md` with a disposition on every finding, the small findings fixed inline,
|
||||
and the phase's code deployed to the dev pair so plan 01-10's verification has something to test.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<execution_context>
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/templates/summary.md
|
||||
</execution_context>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
@.planning/PROJECT.md
|
||||
@.planning/STATE.md
|
||||
@.planning/codebase/CONCERNS.md
|
||||
@.planning/codebase/ARCHITECTURE.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-RESEARCH.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-01-SUMMARY.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-05-SUMMARY.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-07-SUMMARY.md
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
## Artifacts this phase produces
|
||||
|
||||
Created or changed by **this plan**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Symbol | Kind | File |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md` | new findings document with per-finding dispositions | `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md` |
|
||||
| finding-dependent fixes | code changes in the reviewed areas | files listed in `files_modified` |
|
||||
| dev-pair deployment | the phase build running on archi-dev-box and x250-dev, sha256-verified | (no repo file) |
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="tracer">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: End-to-end — one finding from discovery to closed disposition</name>
|
||||
<files>.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `.planning/codebase/CONCERNS.md` — the federation and mesh entries: the node-removal tombstone
|
||||
gap (cited at `federation/storage.rs:180-197`), the incomplete federation DID validation, the
|
||||
unbounded harness curl (cited as a multinode test-harness issue), the node-list dedup scaling
|
||||
note, and the mesh radio configuration boot race.
|
||||
- `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-RESEARCH.md` — the "Common Pitfalls" section
|
||||
(especially Pitfall 2's instruction to `git log -p` each cited range before acting) and the
|
||||
"Assumptions Log" rows A1, A2, and A5. A5 in particular is explicitly NOT independently
|
||||
re-verified and must be re-checked here.
|
||||
- The SUMMARYs from plans 01-01, 01-05, and 01-07 — what has already been fixed in this phase,
|
||||
so those items are recorded as fixed-by-this-phase rather than re-opened.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Create `01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md` with a table whose columns are: finding id (`F-01`, `F-02`, …),
|
||||
area (federation store / federation sync / federation RPC / FIPS-transport dial / mesh core /
|
||||
mesh RPC surface), severity, the file and line citation, the evidence (what was read and what
|
||||
`git log -p` or `git blame` showed), the disposition (`fixed` / `already-fixed` / `deferred`), and
|
||||
for `fixed` the commit plus the verifying command or test name, or for `deferred` the reason and
|
||||
the owning phase or requirement.
|
||||
|
||||
Then take exactly one finding all the way through in this task, to prove the pipeline: re-verify
|
||||
the codebase-concerns claim about incomplete federation DID validation — specifically the part
|
||||
RESEARCH.md flags as un-re-verified, whether anything checks proof of ownership of a DID on first
|
||||
contact, as opposed to the peer-joined path which does verify a signature. Read the add-node and
|
||||
peer-joined paths in the federation RPC handlers and run `git log -p` on them. File the finding
|
||||
with its evidence, then either fix it (if the fix is contained and does not touch federation trust
|
||||
or join cryptography beyond what correctness requires — CONTEXT.md's scope fence) or defer it with
|
||||
a written reason naming what a fix would touch and why that belongs elsewhere.
|
||||
|
||||
Record the two claims RESEARCH.md already verified as fixed with their commits, as `already-fixed`
|
||||
rows, so a future reader does not re-open them.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>test -f .planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md && grep -Eq '^\| *F-01' .planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md && cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md` exists with a header row and at least one `F-NN` row.
|
||||
- The first finding's row has a non-empty evidence cell naming the command that produced it and a non-empty disposition cell.
|
||||
- Rows exist recording both already-fixed claims with their commit hashes.
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation` exits 0 (if the first finding was fixed here, its test is included).
|
||||
- The SUMMARY quotes the `git log -p` output excerpt that decided the first finding.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>The findings document exists and one finding has travelled the full path from claim to evidence to disposition.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: Complete the review across both areas and disposition every finding</name>
|
||||
<files>.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md, core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs, core/archipelago/src/federation/sync.rs, core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs, core/archipelago/src/fips/dial.rs, core/archipelago/src/mesh/mod.rs, core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/` — `storage.rs`, `sync.rs`, `types.rs`, `invites.rs`, `mod.rs`
|
||||
as left by plans 01-01, 01-05, and 01-06.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` — the full RPC surface, including the
|
||||
peer-joined, peer-did-changed, and peer-address-changed signature-verification paths.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/fips/dial.rs` and the transport dial/fallback path — the FIPS-to-Tor
|
||||
fast-fail behaviour FED-03 names as in scope.
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/mesh/mod.rs` — `purge_federation_peer`, `upsert_federation_peer`,
|
||||
`seed_federation_peers_into_mesh`; and `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs`
|
||||
as left by plans 01-04 and 01-07.
|
||||
- `.planning/codebase/CONCERNS.md` — every remaining federation and mesh entry.
|
||||
- `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-02-SUMMARY.md` — the mock-parity residual
|
||||
class that plan flagged as a candidate finding for this review.
|
||||
- `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-CONTEXT.md` — the scope fence: do not touch
|
||||
federation trust or join cryptography beyond what removal and sync correctness require, and no
|
||||
data-destroying migrations.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Review each area in turn and add its findings to the document. For each codebase-concerns claim,
|
||||
do the fresh read plus `git log -p` on the cited range BEFORE filing or dismissing it, and put
|
||||
that evidence in the row — a finding that merely restates a concerns bullet without fresh
|
||||
evidence is not admissible.
|
||||
|
||||
Areas to cover, each of which must appear in the document even when it produced no findings —
|
||||
record those as reviewed with none rather than omitting them: federation store, federation sync,
|
||||
federation RPC surface, FIPS and transport dial, mesh core, mesh RPC surface.
|
||||
|
||||
Required specific checks, each of which becomes a row:
|
||||
- The mock-parity residual class flagged in the plan 01-02 SUMMARY (a mock case that exists but
|
||||
returns a differently-shaped success object than the daemon).
|
||||
- Whether the paid-tick grep from plan 01-03 still finds exactly the two surfaces it found at
|
||||
planning time, or whether a third has appeared.
|
||||
- The unbounded-curl concern: confirm it belongs to the multinode test harness and defer it to
|
||||
the phase that owns that requirement, with that phase named in the reason.
|
||||
- The node-list dedup scaling note: disposition it with the peer counts this fleet actually runs.
|
||||
- The mesh radio configuration boot race: confirm against current code and defer if it needs real
|
||||
LoRa hardware, naming that as the reason.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix findings that are contained — a bounded change inside the reviewed area with a test — and
|
||||
commit each as its own focused commit per CLAUDE.md. Defer anything that would breach the
|
||||
CONTEXT.md scope fence, require hardware this session lacks, or belong to another phase, and write
|
||||
the reason and the owner in the row. Every row ends with exactly one disposition.
|
||||
|
||||
Finish with a short summary section stating the counts: findings filed, fixed, already-fixed, and
|
||||
deferred; and a line stating that the counts sum to the number of rows.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd core && cargo test -p archipelago && cd ../neode-ui && npx vitest run && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` exits 0.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run` exits 0 and `node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs` exits 0.
|
||||
- Every row in `01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md` has a non-empty disposition cell — verify by counting rows and counting non-empty disposition cells and asserting the two numbers match; record both numbers in the SUMMARY.
|
||||
- All six named areas appear in the document.
|
||||
- The summary section's counts sum to the row count.
|
||||
- Every `fixed` row cites a commit hash and a verifying command or test name.
|
||||
- Every `deferred` row has a non-empty reason and names an owning phase or requirement.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>Both areas are reviewed, every finding has exactly one evidenced disposition, and the contained fixes are committed.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 3: Build and deploy the phase to the dev pair, sha256-verified</name>
|
||||
<precondition>archi-dev-box and x250-dev are reachable over the fleet network — confirm with a bounded connectivity probe to each before starting; if either is unreachable, halt rather than deploying to a partial pair.</precondition>
|
||||
<files>.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md</files>
|
||||
<read_first>
|
||||
- `scripts/deploy-to-target.sh` — the established deploy path and the environment variable it
|
||||
takes for the target. Read it fully before running it; do not hand-roll a deploy.
|
||||
- `CLAUDE.md` — the build instructions (cargo from `core/`; frontend build outputs to
|
||||
`web/dist/neode-ui/`; grep the built bundle for new strings because the build can silently
|
||||
no-op) and the deploy discipline (dev pair before any OTA).
|
||||
- The project memory note on deploying via service restart while containers are running — confirm
|
||||
what the deploy script does about restarts before running it, and record the answer.
|
||||
</read_first>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Build the backend from `core/` and the frontend from `neode-ui/`, then grep the built frontend
|
||||
bundle for a string introduced by this phase to prove the build is not stale.
|
||||
|
||||
Deploy to archi-dev-box and then to x250-dev using the established deploy script, one at a time.
|
||||
After each, verify the deployed binary's sha256 matches the locally built artifact, and record
|
||||
both hashes. After each deploy, check that the node's app containers are still running and record
|
||||
the result — a deploy that takes containers down is a finding, not a success.
|
||||
|
||||
Add a short deployment section to `01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md` recording: the built artifact hashes,
|
||||
the two target hostnames, the per-target sha256 match, the container-survival result, and the
|
||||
frontend bundle grep result.
|
||||
|
||||
Do not deploy to any other fleet node, do not cut a release, and do not publish an OTA — this
|
||||
phase ends at the dev pair plus the verification in plan 01-10.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>grep -Eq 'sha256' .planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo build --release -p archipelago` exits 0 and `cd neode-ui && npm run build` exits 0.
|
||||
- The built frontend bundle contains a string introduced by this phase — assert with a grep over `web/dist/neode-ui/assets/` for the badge ring class name added in plan 01-03.
|
||||
- The deployment section records two target hostnames, two sha256 pairs that match, and a container-survival result per target.
|
||||
- No release tag was created and no OTA manifest was published — confirmed by `git tag --points-at HEAD` producing no output, recorded in the SUMMARY.
|
||||
</acceptance_criteria>
|
||||
<done>The phase's code is running on both dev-pair nodes, provably the artifact that was built, with containers intact.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<threat_model>
|
||||
## Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| developer workstation → fleet node (deploy) | A built binary crosses onto a live node over SSH |
|
||||
| review process → codebase | A fix applied during review changes federation trust-adjacent code |
|
||||
|
||||
## STRIDE Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| T-01-37 | Tampering | a deployed binary differing from the one built and tested | high | mitigate | Per-target sha256 comparison against the local artifact, both hashes recorded (Task 3) |
|
||||
| T-01-38 | Denial of Service | a deploy restarting the service and killing running app containers | high | mitigate | The established deploy script is read before use and container survival is checked and recorded per target; a container loss is filed as a finding |
|
||||
| T-01-39 | Elevation of Privilege | a review fix loosening federation trust or join verification | high | mitigate | CONTEXT.md's scope fence is a required read; findings needing trust-code changes are deferred with the reason rather than patched here; the full test suite gates each fix |
|
||||
| T-01-40 | Repudiation | a finding quietly dropped so a known issue leaves no trace | medium | mitigate | The row-count-equals-disposition-count check and the summing counts section make an omission detectable; the prohibitions above state the rule |
|
||||
| T-01-41 | Information Disclosure | deploy credentials or node passwords committed while recording deployment evidence | high | mitigate | The deployment section records hostnames and hashes only; per CLAUDE.md, never commit secrets. Stage by explicit path and review the diff before committing |
|
||||
</threat_model>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
- `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago` — green.
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run && node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs && npm run build` — green.
|
||||
- `01-REVIEW-FINDINGS.md` row count equals its disposition count, and the summary counts sum to it.
|
||||
- Both dev-pair nodes report a matching sha256 and surviving containers.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- A findings document covers six named areas, including those with no findings.
|
||||
- Every finding has exactly one evidenced disposition; fixed rows cite commit and test, deferred rows cite reason and owner.
|
||||
- Every codebase-concerns federation/mesh claim was re-verified against current code and git history before being filed or dismissed.
|
||||
- The phase is deployed to the dev pair, sha256-verified, with containers intact and no release cut.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
Create `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-09-SUMMARY.md` when done.
|
||||
Stage by explicit path, commit each fix separately, and `git push gitea-ai main`.
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: 01-federation-mesh-hardening
|
||||
plan: 10
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 6
|
||||
depends_on: ["01-09"]
|
||||
files_modified: []
|
||||
autonomous: false
|
||||
requirements: [FED-01, FED-02, FED-05, FED-06]
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "An operator who removes a federated peer on a live node does not see it reappear after at least two subsequent sync cycles"
|
||||
- "A peer whose sync is failing shows the operator-visible sync-error badge on the live node, and the badge clears once that peer syncs successfully"
|
||||
- "The channel-open flow works against a real node on the dev preview: the own-node URI copies, a trusted federated node opens in one click, a meshed Lightning peer can be sent a request, and a manually pasted URI is accepted"
|
||||
- "The paid tick renders the branded ring on both payment-success surfaces on the dev preview, at a narrow and a desktop viewport, without clipping"
|
||||
- "The demo and a real node behave the same through the mesh chat surface — aliasing a peer, reacting, editing, deleting, and sending an attachment produce the same modals and the same outcome on both"
|
||||
prohibitions:
|
||||
- statement: "The phase MUST NOT be signed off on demo evidence alone — every criterion in this checkpoint that names a real node is exercised against a real node, because a demo-only pass is exactly the divergence class this phase exists to remove"
|
||||
category: transparency
|
||||
artifacts: []
|
||||
key_links: []
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Consolidate every human-gated verification this phase owes into one sign-off, run against the dev
|
||||
pair rather than the demo.
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: `01-VALIDATION.md` lists three manual-only verifications (removal sticking across real sync
|
||||
cycles, the channel-open flow end to end, and the paid-tick visual), and CONTEXT.md adds the user's
|
||||
own requirement that FED-05 and FED-06 are verified on the dev preview against archi-dev **before any
|
||||
deploy**. Rather than interrupting each implementation plan with its own checkpoint, they are gathered
|
||||
here so the operator is asked once, after the code is on the dev pair.
|
||||
Output: a recorded sign-off, or a list of issues that becomes the input to a gap-closure pass.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<execution_context>
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/templates/summary.md
|
||||
</execution_context>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
@.planning/PROJECT.md
|
||||
@.planning/STATE.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-VALIDATION.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-CONTEXT.md
|
||||
@.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-09-SUMMARY.md
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
## Artifacts this phase produces
|
||||
|
||||
This plan produces no new symbols. It verifies the artifacts produced by plans 01-01 through 01-09:
|
||||
the serialized federation store, the sync-error badge, the mesh Lightning identity and request
|
||||
messages, the federation Lightning URI field, the channel-open picker modal, the branded paid tick,
|
||||
and the demo RPC parity harness.
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="checkpoint:human-verify" gate="blocking">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: Phase 1 consolidated verification on the dev pair</name>
|
||||
<what-built>
|
||||
Phase 1 in full, deployed to archi-dev-box and x250-dev and sha256-verified by plan 01-09:
|
||||
- Federation node-store writes are serialized behind one lock with an atomic node-list write, so
|
||||
a removal issued during a sync pass can no longer be undone by that sync.
|
||||
- One periodic federation sync loop instead of two; per-peer sync failures are persisted and
|
||||
shown as a badge on the node row, clearing when the peer recovers; out-of-order snapshots can
|
||||
no longer move a peer's state backwards.
|
||||
- A new channel-open picker modal reached from the Lightning panel's existing Open Channel
|
||||
button: your own node's Lightning URI with a copy button, trusted federated nodes listed by
|
||||
hostname with a one-click open, meshed peers running Lightning listed separately with a
|
||||
request flow, and a manual URI paste fallback.
|
||||
- The payment-success tick now uses the screensaver ring with its EQ segments on both the send
|
||||
modal and the scan modal.
|
||||
- The demo backend answers every mesh and federation RPC the UI calls, and reactions, edits,
|
||||
deletes, and peer aliasing change demo state instead of returning a bare acknowledgement.
|
||||
</what-built>
|
||||
<how-to-verify>
|
||||
Run these against the dev pair, not the demo, except where a step says demo.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Removal sticks (FED-01).** On archi-dev-box, open the Federation view and remove a federated
|
||||
peer. Wait through at least two auto-sync cycles — the loop runs every 90 seconds, so give it
|
||||
four minutes — then reload. Expected: the peer is gone and stays gone. Then try removing a peer
|
||||
that no longer exists (repeat the removal): expected an error message, not a silent success.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Sync errors are visible (FED-02).** Make one federated peer unreachable — take its node off
|
||||
the network, or block it — and wait one sync cycle. Expected: that node's row shows a sync-error
|
||||
badge, and hovering it shows the error text and when it happened. Bring the peer back and wait
|
||||
one more cycle. Expected: the badge clears on its own.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Channel opening (FED-05).** Open the dev preview pointed at archi-dev and go to the Lightning
|
||||
channels panel, then click Open Channel. Expected: a full-screen modal (the backdrop covers the
|
||||
whole window and clicking outside closes it), showing your node's Lightning URI at the top.
|
||||
Click Copy Lightning URI: expected the label flips to Copied! for about two seconds, and pasting
|
||||
elsewhere gives the complete URI even though the on-screen text is shortened. Check the trusted
|
||||
list shows your federated nodes by hostname with their FIPS or Tor badge. Check the meshed
|
||||
Lightning peers list below it. Click Request Channel on a meshed peer, add a short message, and
|
||||
send: expected a "request sent" style confirmation that does NOT claim a channel is open or
|
||||
connected. Click Paste URI Manually, enter something malformed such as text with no at-sign:
|
||||
expected a format message and no attempt to open. Then paste a valid peer URI: expected the
|
||||
normal open flow. Finally, double-click Open Channel on a trusted node: expected one open
|
||||
attempt, with the button disabled while it runs.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Paid tick (FED-06).** On the dev preview, trigger a payment success in the send modal and in
|
||||
the scan modal. Expected: the checkmark now sits inside the screensaver-style ring with the
|
||||
radiating segment lines, at both a narrow phone width and a desktop width, with nothing cut off
|
||||
by the edge of the card. The amount and the SENT wording are unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Demo and real node match (FED-04).** On the demo, rename a mesh peer, react to a message,
|
||||
edit one, delete one, and send a small file attachment. Then do the same on archi-dev.
|
||||
Expected: the same modals appear in the same situations, the changes are visible in both, and
|
||||
the browser console shows no "Method not found" errors on either.
|
||||
|
||||
6. **Single-node gate stays green (CLAUDE.md mandate).** Phase 1 modified daemon internals
|
||||
(`federation/storage.rs`, `server.rs` — a periodic loop was removed), which falls under the
|
||||
"re-run the gate after orchestrator/lifecycle changes" rule. Run `tests/lifecycle/run-gate.sh`
|
||||
ON a dev-pair node (gate runs on-node, never via RPC). Expected: green, 0 not-ok. A full 5×
|
||||
run on .228 is NOT required here (that is Phase 3's multinode criterion) — one clean pass on
|
||||
the dev pair is the insurance this checkpoint needs.
|
||||
|
||||
If anything fails, describe what you saw and which numbered step it was — that becomes the gap
|
||||
list for a closure pass rather than a re-run of the whole phase.
|
||||
</how-to-verify>
|
||||
<resume-signal>Type "approved" to sign off Phase 1, or describe the issues by step number.</resume-signal>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<threat_model>
|
||||
## Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| operator judgement → phase sign-off | A human verdict gates whether this phase is considered complete |
|
||||
| live fleet node → operator observation | Verification runs against real nodes carrying real federation trust and real Lightning funds |
|
||||
|
||||
## STRIDE Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| T-01-42 | Repudiation | signing off on demo evidence while a real node still fails | high | mitigate | Each step names where it runs; the prohibition above forbids demo-only sign-off; step 5 explicitly compares the two |
|
||||
| T-01-43 | Elevation of Privilege | a removed peer regaining federation membership unnoticed because the check was too short | high | mitigate | Step 1 requires waiting at least two sync cycles at the 90-second interval, stated as a wall-clock duration rather than "a while" |
|
||||
| T-01-44 | Denial of Service | the verification itself taking a live node off the network and leaving it that way | medium | mitigate | Step 2 restores the peer as part of the step and requires observing the badge clear, so the node cannot be left isolated as a side effect |
|
||||
| T-01-45 | Spoofing | a channel opened against a peer-advertised URI during verification sending funds to the wrong node | high | mitigate | Step 3's request path targets a meshed peer with a request, not an open; the one-click open is exercised only against a bilaterally-trusted federated node the operator already federated with |
|
||||
</threat_model>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
The operator's response is the verification. An "approved" response completes the phase; any
|
||||
described issue is captured verbatim in the SUMMARY as a gap for `/gsd-plan-phase 1 --gaps`.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- All five numbered checks were exercised, each in the place it names.
|
||||
- The operator either approved or produced a numbered issue list.
|
||||
- The outcome is recorded in the SUMMARY, including which node each check ran against.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
Create `.planning/phases/01-federation-mesh-hardening/01-10-SUMMARY.md` when done, recording the
|
||||
verdict, the node each check ran against, and any issue text verbatim.
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
||||
# Phase 1 Context — Federation & Mesh Hardening
|
||||
|
||||
**Source:** User decisions captured in conversation 2026-07-29 (no full discuss-phase run)
|
||||
|
||||
<domain>
|
||||
Federation/fleet + mesh hardening on a live OTA fleet, plus two lightning-adjacent UI features
|
||||
(channel-open UX, on-brand paid-tick animation). Backend: Rust workspace at core/. Frontend:
|
||||
neode-ui (Vue), dev preview :8100 against archi-dev.
|
||||
</domain>
|
||||
|
||||
<decisions>
|
||||
- **FED-05 "public nodes" scope (LOCKED, user 2026-07-29, corrected same day):** the
|
||||
public/other list in the channel-open picker = MESHED PEER NODES THAT HAVE LIGHTNING
|
||||
INSTALLED — nodes known over the mesh (mesh peers/contacts beyond bilateral federation
|
||||
trust) that advertise lightning capability. NOT lnd listpeers, NOT a curated list, NOT
|
||||
a live LN-graph query. Implies peers need to advertise a "lightning installed/available"
|
||||
capability (plus their URI/pubkey) over mesh/federation state so the picker can list
|
||||
them. Manual URI paste can remain as a fallback entry path. Primary lists: (1) trusted
|
||||
federated nodes by hostname, (2) meshed peers with lightning installed — "request to
|
||||
open a channel with" these.
|
||||
- **FED-05 URI sharing default (Claude's discretion, revisable):** a federated peer's
|
||||
Lightning URI/pubkey rides the federation sync payload by default — federation trust is
|
||||
already bilateral and explicit. Follow the existing shared-field pattern in
|
||||
NodeStateSnapshot; if an opt-in toggle already exists for similar fields (e.g.
|
||||
shared_location), mirror that pattern with default ON for lightning URI.
|
||||
- **FED-06 (LOCKED, user):** paid-tick circle = ScreensaverRing.vue style (EQ segments),
|
||||
applied consistently to every paid/success tick surface (SendBitcoinModal success pane,
|
||||
WalletScanModal success-ring).
|
||||
- **FED-04:** demo attachment parity core already shipped on main (c2ce71c6) — remaining
|
||||
scope is the leftover mock gaps found in research (contacts-list/save, reaction/reply/
|
||||
edit/delete/forward stubs that never mutate demo state).
|
||||
- **Priority framing (user):** federation removal/sync correctness is the reason this phase
|
||||
exists — "we should just be working on making that as tight as possible".
|
||||
</decisions>
|
||||
|
||||
<specifics>
|
||||
- UI work verified on the :8100 dev preview against archi-dev BEFORE any deploy (user
|
||||
requirement, applies to FED-05/FED-06).
|
||||
- Deploy discipline per CLAUDE.md: dev pair before OTA; commit+push every unit of work.
|
||||
- Modals must Teleport to body (repeated user complaint — see project feedback memory).
|
||||
</specifics>
|
||||
|
||||
<deferred>
|
||||
- Live Lightning-graph search of arbitrary public nodes (not connected peers) — out of
|
||||
scope for FED-05 v1.
|
||||
- Curated/shipped public-node directory — not wanted.
|
||||
</deferred>
|
||||
|
||||
<scope_fence>
|
||||
Do not touch federation trust/join cryptography beyond what removal/sync correctness
|
||||
requires (STATE.md blocker: tombstone fix touches trust code — re-verify with
|
||||
tests/multinode/smoke.sh, don't patch blind). No data-destroying migrations.
|
||||
</scope_fence>
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,371 @@
|
||||
# Phase 1: Federation & Mesh Hardening - Research
|
||||
|
||||
**Researched:** 2026-07-29
|
||||
**Domain:** Federation node sync/removal (Rust/Tokio async daemon), mesh RPC parity (Rust + Node.js mock backend), Lightning channel-open UX (Vue 3), on-brand success animation (Vue 3/CSS)
|
||||
**Confidence:** HIGH (backend federation/mesh code — read directly, git-blamed); MEDIUM (FED-05 Lightning-URI UX — net-new surface, no prior art in repo); HIGH (FED-06 — both source components read directly)
|
||||
|
||||
<user_constraints>
|
||||
## User Constraints (from CONTEXT.md)
|
||||
|
||||
No CONTEXT.md exists for this phase (not yet run through `/gsd-discuss-phase`). No locked decisions or discretion areas to honor beyond `REQUIREMENTS.md` and the phase description supplied by the orchestrator. Treat all implementation choices below as recommendations for the planner, not locked decisions — the planner should flag any of these that warrant a user check-in (see `## Assumptions Log`).
|
||||
</user_constraints>
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
|
||||
The federation and mesh code is more mature than `CONCERNS.md` suggests — several concerns it lists (tombstone-write-swallowed, DID-join without signature verification) were already fixed in commit `01cbec27` (2026-07-02) and the `handle_federation_peer_joined` signature-verification path respectively. **Do not treat `CONCERNS.md` as current truth for this phase; the structured review (FED-03) must re-verify each claim against the code read in this research before acting on it.**
|
||||
|
||||
The real, currently-live bug class behind the user's "nodes reappear / sync issues" reports is almost certainly a **concurrency race on `federation/nodes.json`**: `federation/storage.rs` has zero locking (no `Mutex`, no atomic temp-file+rename) around `load_nodes()` → mutate → `save_nodes()`, yet the daemon runs **two independent, overlapping periodic federation-sync loops** (`server.rs` ~line 497, every 90s; `server.rs` ~line 840, every 1800s) plus the manual `federation.sync-state` RPC and `federation.remove-node` RPC — all of which do their own read-modify-write cycle against the same file with no coordination. A `remove_node()` call racing against an in-flight `sync_with_peer()`'s `update_node_state()` (which read the node list *before* the removal landed) will have the sync's stale read clobber the just-written removal when it saves — the removed node reappears with no error, exactly matching the reported symptom, and it is invisible to logs because both loops only `debug!()` on failure. This is the primary hypothesis to design a fix and a regression test around for FED-01/FED-02.
|
||||
|
||||
Mesh attachment-send parity (FED-04) was fixed just before this phase started (commit `c2ce71c6`, uncommitted → committed by another concurrent agent during this research session): `mock-backend.js` now implements `mesh.send-content-inline` / `mesh.send-content` / `mesh.fetch-content` / `mesh.transport-advice` mirroring the daemon's real tier logic. What remains for full "rest of the mesh chat surface" parity: `mesh.contacts-list` / `mesh.contacts-save` (peer aliasing, called live from `Mesh.vue` on mount and on rename) are **not implemented in mock-backend.js at all** and will 404 with "Method not found" on the demo; and `mesh.send-reaction` / `send-reply` / `edit-message` / `delete-message` / `forward-message` are stubbed as bare `{ok:true}` acks that never mutate `meshStore.dynamic`, so reactions/edits/deletes silently don't render on the demo even though the RPC call "succeeds."
|
||||
|
||||
FED-05 (Lightning channel-open UX) is greenfield: no RPC anywhere in the codebase currently returns this node's own Lightning `identity_pubkey`/`uris` (LND's own `/v1/getinfo` provides both, but `handle_lnd_getinfo` in `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs` doesn't parse or forward them), and `NodeStateSnapshot` (the federation sync payload) carries no Lightning fields for a peer's pubkey/host, so there is no way today to look up a *federated* peer's channel-open target. `handle_lnd_openchannel` (channels.rs) already accepts `pubkey` + optional `address` + `amount`/fee params and does the connect-then-open sequence correctly — reuse it as-is. "Public nodes" browse/request has no existing data source in this codebase (no LN graph query, no curated list) and needs a scope decision from the user before planning task breakdown.
|
||||
|
||||
FED-06 is a straightforward swap: `ScreensaverRing.vue` (`compact` size = 240px/320px) renders only the radiating EQ segments (no circle of its own — the "circle" is the separately-layered content in the center, exactly as `Screensaver.vue` does with `ScreensaverLogo`). `SendBitcoinModal.vue`'s `.send-success-burst` is 112px (7rem) with 3 CSS-ripple `.burst-ring` elements plus a `.burst-core` circle+checkmark — swap the `.burst-ring` elements for `<ScreensaverRing size="compact" />`, keep `.burst-core`+checkmark centered on top, and reconcile the size mismatch (ring is 2-3x larger than the current burst container; either scale it down via CSS `transform: scale()` or accept the larger footprint since the modal is `max-w-2xl`). `WalletScanModal.vue` has a second, simpler "paid tick" (`.success-ring`, no ripple animation at all) that the phase's "wherever else the paid tick appears" clause covers — plan to update both.
|
||||
|
||||
**Primary recommendation:** Start FED-03's structured review by (1) auditing every `federation::storage` read-modify-write call site for the missing-lock race described above and design a fix (a `tokio::sync::Mutex` per data_dir, or collapsing the two periodic sync loops into one), (2) re-verifying every `CONCERNS.md` federation/mesh claim against current code before acting on it, (3) filling the two demo-parity gaps in `mock-backend.js` (contacts-list/save + stateful reaction/edit/delete), (4) treating FED-05 as new RPC surface (own-node Lightning URI, peer Lightning info propagation, and a scoped "public nodes" answer) before any UI work, and (5) the FED-06 CSS/component swap.
|
||||
|
||||
## Architectural Responsibility Map
|
||||
|
||||
| Capability | Primary Tier | Secondary Tier | Rationale |
|
||||
|------------|-------------|----------------|-----------|
|
||||
| Federation node list, tombstones, sync loops | API / Backend (`core/archipelago/src/federation/`) | — | Disk-persisted state; must be race-free at the storage layer, not patched in the RPC or UI layer |
|
||||
| Federation removal propagation to mesh chat | API / Backend (`core/archipelago/src/mesh/mod.rs::purge_federation_peer`) | Frontend (Pinia `stores/mesh.ts`) | Backend already purges peer/messages/contacts server-side; frontend must not cache a stale contact after the WebSocket state bump |
|
||||
| Mesh RPC surface (attachments, reactions, contacts) | API / Backend (`core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/`) | Dev tooling (`neode-ui/mock-backend.js`) | The demo backend is a parity shim over the same RPC surface — it must mirror backend behavior, never invent its own contract |
|
||||
| FIPS/Tor transport dial + fallback | API / Backend (`core/archipelago/src/fips/dial.rs`, `transport/`) | — | Transport selection is a backend concern; UI only displays the resulting badge (`last_transport`) |
|
||||
| Lightning node URI (own + peer) | API / Backend (new: `lnd.getinfo` extension, federation sync payload extension) | Frontend (new modal) | LND is the source of truth for `identity_pubkey`/`uris`; federation sync is the transport for sharing a peer's LN info |
|
||||
| Channel-open UX (initiate) | Frontend (new modal, `Teleport`-to-body, house style) | API / Backend (`lnd.openchannel` — already exists) | Backend channel-open RPC is complete; only the UI (URI share, trusted-peer picker, public-node browse) is missing |
|
||||
| Paid-tick success animation | Frontend (`SendBitcoinModal.vue`, `WalletScanModal.vue`, `ScreensaverRing.vue`) | — | Pure presentation; no backend involvement |
|
||||
|
||||
## Standard Stack
|
||||
|
||||
This phase does not introduce new external dependencies. It is a hardening + UI-surface pass over an existing Rust (Tokio/Hyper/reqwest/serde) backend and Vue 3 (Pinia, Vue Router, Teleport) frontend, plus a Node.js/Express demo backend (`neode-ui/mock-backend.js`). No new libraries are needed for any of FED-01 through FED-06 — `ScreensaverRing.vue` and `handle_lnd_openchannel` already exist and should be reused, not reimplemented.
|
||||
|
||||
### Core (existing, reused)
|
||||
| Library | Version | Purpose | Why Standard |
|
||||
|---------|---------|---------|--------------|
|
||||
| tokio | (workspace pin) | Async runtime, `interval()`/`spawn()` for the periodic sync loops | Already the project's async foundation |
|
||||
| reqwest | (workspace pin) | HTTP client for FIPS/Tor peer dial and LND REST calls | Already used throughout `fips/dial.rs` and `api/rpc/lnd/` |
|
||||
| serde/serde_json | (workspace pin) | Wire format for `NodeStateSnapshot`, RPC params | Project-wide convention |
|
||||
| Vue 3 + Pinia | (package.json pin) | Frontend reactivity/state | Existing frontend stack |
|
||||
|
||||
**Version verification:** No new packages are being added; skip registry verification per protocol (nothing to verify). If the planner introduces any new crate/npm package during execution, verify it then.
|
||||
|
||||
## Package Legitimacy Audit
|
||||
|
||||
No external packages are being introduced by this phase — this section is not applicable. If a later plan step decides to add a dependency (e.g., a curated public-LSP list requires a small crate), run the Package Legitimacy Gate at that time.
|
||||
|
||||
## Architecture Patterns
|
||||
|
||||
### System Architecture Diagram
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ Federation node list (disk) │
|
||||
│ federation/{nodes,removed-nodes}.json │
|
||||
│ NO LOCK — read-modify-write per call │
|
||||
└───────────────┬─────────────────────────┘
|
||||
│ load_nodes() / save_nodes()
|
||||
┌───────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ │ │ │
|
||||
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
|
||||
┌───────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ 90s auto-sync │ │ 1800s auto-sync │ │ RPC: sync-state, │ │ RPC: remove-node, │
|
||||
│ loop (server.rs│ │ loop (server.rs │ │ (manual "Sync") │ │ set-trust, join, │
|
||||
│ ~L497) │ │ ~L840) │ │ │ │ peer-joined │
|
||||
└───────┬───────┘ └────────┬──────────┘ └────────┬──────────┘ └───────────┬─────────┘
|
||||
│ sync_with_peer() │ sync_with_peer() │ │
|
||||
│ → update_node_state() │ → update_node_state() │ │
|
||||
└──────────────┬─────────────┴──────────────┬─────────────────┘ │
|
||||
▼ ▼ ▼
|
||||
(race: stale in-memory list from an in-flight sync's earlier load_nodes()
|
||||
overwrites a concurrent remove_node()'s just-saved tombstoned list)
|
||||
│
|
||||
▼
|
||||
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ mesh/mod.rs: purge_federation_peer │
|
||||
│ (peers, messages, contacts, presence)│
|
||||
└───────────────┬───────────────────────┘
|
||||
▼
|
||||
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ StateManager broadcast → WebSocket │
|
||||
│ → Pinia stores → Federation.vue / │
|
||||
│ Mesh.vue re-render │
|
||||
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
|
||||
|
||||
Mesh attachment/parity path (FED-04):
|
||||
Frontend attach flow → mesh.transport-advice → {auto-mesh|choose|tor-only}
|
||||
→ mesh.send-content-inline (small) | mesh.send-content (large, via /api/blob)
|
||||
real daemon: api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs demo: mock-backend.js (mirrors tier logic — DONE)
|
||||
Frontend contacts/reactions/edit/delete
|
||||
real daemon: api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs (contacts-list/save, send-reaction, edit-message, ...)
|
||||
demo: mock-backend.js — contacts-list/save MISSING (404); reaction/edit/delete are no-op acks (GAP)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Recommended Project Structure
|
||||
|
||||
No new directories needed. Touch points:
|
||||
```
|
||||
core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs # add locking around load/save
|
||||
core/archipelago/src/server.rs # collapse or coordinate the two sync loops
|
||||
core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs # extend handle_lnd_getinfo with identity_pubkey/uris
|
||||
core/archipelago/src/federation/types.rs # (maybe) add lightning fields to NodeStateSnapshot
|
||||
core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs # (maybe) new RPC to fetch a peer's LN info
|
||||
neode-ui/mock-backend.js # add mesh.contacts-list/save, stateful reaction/edit/delete
|
||||
neode-ui/src/components/LightningChannelModal.vue # NEW — FED-05 (name TBD by planner)
|
||||
neode-ui/src/components/SendBitcoinModal.vue # FED-06 swap
|
||||
neode-ui/src/components/WalletScanModal.vue # FED-06 swap (secondary paid-tick site)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Pattern 1: Federation removal is already "belt and suspenders" — reuse, don't rewrite
|
||||
**What:** `handle_federation_remove_node` (handlers.rs:273) captures the peer's pubkey *before* calling `federation::remove_node`, then after removal calls `mesh::purge_federation_peer` to drop the synthetic mesh contact, its messages, presence, and persisted mesh-contacts entry. `federation::remove_node` (storage.rs:180) already tombstones the DID **before** saving the filtered node list and propagates a tombstone-write failure as an error (fixed in `01cbec27`).
|
||||
**When to use:** This is the correct pattern for FED-01 already. Don't redesign it — the actual gap is the concurrency race in the storage layer underneath it (see Pitfall 1), not the removal logic itself.
|
||||
**Example:**
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
// Source: core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs:180-198 (already fixed, 01cbec27)
|
||||
pub async fn remove_node(data_dir: &Path, did: &str) -> Result<Vec<FederatedNode>> {
|
||||
let mut nodes = load_nodes(data_dir).await?;
|
||||
let before = nodes.len();
|
||||
nodes.retain(|n| n.did != did);
|
||||
if nodes.len() == before {
|
||||
anyhow::bail!("No federated node with DID {}", did);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Tombstone FIRST and propagate failure — a remove whose tombstone
|
||||
// never landed isn't a remove.
|
||||
tombstone_did(data_dir, did).await.context("persist removal tombstone")?;
|
||||
save_nodes(data_dir, &nodes).await?;
|
||||
Ok(nodes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Pattern 2: Transitive sync already respects tombstones — verify, don't re-add protection
|
||||
**What:** `merge_transitive_peers` (sync.rs:120) loads `load_removed_dids()` and skips any hint whose DID is tombstoned, and `handle_federation_peer_joined` (handlers.rs:641) independently rejects a `peer-joined` callback for a tombstoned DID. Both paths that could resurrect a removed node already check the tombstone list.
|
||||
**When to use:** The FED-03 review should write a test that concurrently exercises remove + an in-flight sync (see Pitfall 1) rather than re-deriving the (already-correct) tombstone-check logic.
|
||||
|
||||
### Pattern 3: Demo backend must be a byte-for-byte RPC mirror, not a "close enough" mock
|
||||
**What:** `mock-backend.js`'s `mesh.transport-advice` case (line 4318) explicitly duplicates the daemon's size thresholds (`MESH_AUTO_MAX = 1024`, `MESH_HARD_MAX = 2300`) with a comment pointing at `typed_messages.rs handle_mesh_transport_advice` as the source of truth.
|
||||
**When to use:** Apply the same pattern to `mesh.contacts-list`/`mesh.contacts-save` and to the reaction/edit/delete stubs — read the real handler in `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs` (lines 1180-1371 for contacts/presence, 637-976 for reply/reaction/receipt/forward, 1065-1180 for edit/delete) and mirror its actual state transitions in `meshStore.dynamic`, not just an `{ok:true}` ack.
|
||||
|
||||
### Anti-Patterns to Avoid
|
||||
- **Unlocked read-modify-write on shared JSON files:** `federation/storage.rs` has none of `load_nodes()`/`save_nodes()` behind a mutex, and writes are a direct `fs::write()` (not atomic temp+rename). Any new federation code must NOT add a third code path that does its own read-modify-write without going through a shared lock — that widens the race window instead of closing it.
|
||||
- **Silent `debug!()` on periodic-loop errors:** Both sync loops in `server.rs` log sync failures at `debug!` level only (not surfaced to the state broadcast, not visible in the UI). FED-02 explicitly requires operator-visible sync errors — don't add a third silent loop; extend the existing ones to persist a `last_sync_error` alongside `last_seen`.
|
||||
- **Reinventing `handle_lnd_openchannel`'s connect-then-open sequence:** It already does `perm=false` synchronous peer connect before opening (with a documented reason: `perm=true` races and fails with "peer is not online"). Reuse it; do not write a second Lightning-channel RPC.
|
||||
- **Assuming `ScreensaverRing` is pre-sized for a 112px success badge:** its `compact` class is 240px (mobile) / 320px (≥768px) — 2-3x the current `.send-success-burst`. Naive drop-in will overflow the modal card; must be explicitly scaled or the surrounding layout redesigned.
|
||||
|
||||
## Don't Hand-Roll
|
||||
|
||||
| Problem | Don't Build | Use Instead | Why |
|
||||
|---------|-------------|-------------|-----|
|
||||
| Connecting to + opening a channel with an LN peer | A new RPC | `lnd.openchannel` (`api/rpc/lnd/channels.rs:238`) | Already validates pubkey format, amount bounds, fee params, and does the connect-before-open sequence correctly with the documented `perm=false` fix |
|
||||
| Paid/success radial visual | A new ring/particle component | `ScreensaverRing.vue` (`compact` size) | Explicitly required by FED-06; also already ships a reduced-motion-friendly animation pattern to copy for consistency |
|
||||
| Peer transport badge (FIPS/Tor) | New transport-tracking logic | `FederatedNode.last_transport`/`last_transport_at` (already written by `record_peer_transport`) | Already ground-truth (records what was actually used, not predicted) — FED-05's peer picker can reuse this field to show reachability |
|
||||
| Federated-peer list for the "trusted nodes" picker | A new RPC | `federation.list-nodes` (already returns `did`, `name`, `onion`, `trust_level`, `last_seen`) | FED-05 only needs to ADD Lightning fields to this payload/peer lookup, not build a parallel peer list |
|
||||
|
||||
**Key insight:** Almost every piece of infrastructure FED-01/02/04/05 need already exists in some form — the gaps are narrow (a missing lock, a missing mock method, a missing struct field) rather than missing subsystems. Resist the urge to redesign the federation sync architecture; patch the specific race and the specific parity/field gaps identified here.
|
||||
|
||||
## Common Pitfalls
|
||||
|
||||
### Pitfall 1: Unlocked concurrent read-modify-write on `federation/nodes.json` (PRIMARY SUSPECT for FED-01/FED-02)
|
||||
**What goes wrong:** A federated node the operator removes reappears after "some sync cycles," with no error anywhere — exactly the symptom reported. `federation::remove_node()` and `federation::sync::update_node_state()` (called from `sync_with_peer()`) both do `load_nodes()` → mutate in memory → `save_nodes()` with zero mutex and a non-atomic `fs::write()`. Two async tasks (e.g., the 90s auto-sync loop mid-flight for peer X, and a `federation.remove-node` RPC for the same peer X arriving concurrently) can interleave: the sync task's `load_nodes()` snapshot (taken before the removal) still contains X; the removal completes and saves a list without X; the sync task then finishes and calls `save_nodes()` with its stale in-memory list, silently restoring X.
|
||||
**Why it happens:** No `Mutex`/`RwLock` guards the federation JSON files, and there are TWO independent periodic sync loops (`server.rs` ~line 497, every 90s; ~line 840, every 1800s — the second loop's comment even says "every 30 min" while the interval literal is `Duration::from_secs(1800)`, i.e. that arithmetic is correct but the redundancy with the 90s loop is not otherwise explained or justified anywhere in the code) plus manual "Sync All" and remove/join/set-trust RPCs, all writing the same file.
|
||||
**How to avoid:** Add a per-data-dir `tokio::sync::Mutex<()>` (or an `Arc<Mutex<Vec<FederatedNode>>>` cache) that every `federation::storage` read-modify-write function acquires for the duration of its load+mutate+save; consider switching `save_nodes` to atomic temp-file+rename to avoid partial-write corruption on crash. Separately, evaluate collapsing the two periodic sync loops into one (the 90s loop already does everything the 1800s loop does, plus asymmetry self-heal) — the 1800s loop appears vestigial/redundant and doubles the race exposure for no described benefit.
|
||||
**Warning signs:** `tests/multinode/smoke.sh`'s "removed-node tombstone" section (already covers the transitive-reappear case) intermittently fails only under load/timing variance, or a removed node's `last_seen` timestamp updates *after* a `federation.remove-node` call succeeded — that's the race manifesting as reappearance without any logged error.
|
||||
|
||||
### Pitfall 2: Trusting `CONCERNS.md` as current state for this phase
|
||||
**What goes wrong:** Re-fixing an already-fixed bug (tombstone-write-swallowed was fixed in `01cbec27`, 2026-07-02) wastes the FED-03 review's time and risks reintroducing a regression if the "fix" reverts working code.
|
||||
**Why it happens:** `CONCERNS.md` was generated 2026-07-29 from a static codebase snapshot/analysis pass that in at least two documented cases (tombstone swallow, DID-join-without-verification) predates fixes already on `main`.
|
||||
**How to avoid:** For every `CONCERNS.md` federation/mesh item, `git log -p` the referenced file/line range before deciding it's still open. Two items already verified fixed in this research: "Federation node removal tombstone gap" (fixed `01cbec27`) and part of "Federation DID validation incomplete" (the `peer-joined` RPC does require and verify an ed25519 signature — `handlers.rs:588-607`). The remaining un-verified part of that concern — no proof-of-ownership check on the *original* DID mint, i.e. can anyone claim any DID string on first contact — may still be valid; verify it during the review rather than assuming either way.
|
||||
**Warning signs:** A "finding" in the FED-03 review that exactly matches a `CONCERNS.md` bullet without a fresh code read is a signal to re-verify before filing it.
|
||||
|
||||
### Pitfall 3: Demo mock silently no-ops instead of erroring on unmirrored RPCs
|
||||
**What goes wrong:** `mesh.contacts-list`/`mesh.contacts-save` are called live from `Mesh.vue` (lines 113, 896) but have no case in `mock-backend.js`'s switch — they fall through to the `default` case which returns a proper JSON-RPC error (`Method not found`), but the frontend call sites wrap them in `try {} catch { /* non-fatal */ }`, so the failure is invisible during manual demo testing unless you watch the browser console or server log (`console.log('[RPC] Unknown method: ...')`).
|
||||
**Why it happens:** New frontend RPC call sites get added over time; `mock-backend.js` parity is manual and easy to miss for methods that aren't on the "main" flow (aliasing a peer is a secondary action, not part of onboarding/attach-file).
|
||||
**How to avoid:** Grep `neode-ui/src/api/rpc-client.ts` for every `mesh.*`/`federation.*` method string and cross-reference against `mock-backend.js`'s switch cases as an explicit FED-03/FED-04 checklist item, not just the attachment-send path already fixed.
|
||||
**Warning signs:** Browser console shows `[RPC] Unknown method: mesh.contacts-list` while testing the demo at `:8100`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Pitfall 4: `ScreensaverRing`'s size classes don't have a "success-badge" variant
|
||||
**What goes wrong:** Dropping `<ScreensaverRing size="compact" />` directly into `.send-success-burst` (currently 112px) either overflows the card or looks disproportionate at 240-320px without adjusting the surrounding layout.
|
||||
**Why it happens:** `ScreensaverRing.vue`'s two size classes (`viz-ring-default`, `viz-ring-compact`) were designed for full-screen screensaver and settings-panel contexts (`SystemDangerZone.vue`), not for an inline modal success pane.
|
||||
**How to avoid:** Either (a) wrap the component in a container with `transform: scale(0.5)` (112/240 ≈ 0.47) and compensate for the transform not affecting layout box size (use negative margins or a fixed wrapping box), or (b) add a third `compact-sm`/`badge` size variant to `ScreensaverRing.vue` sized for this use case (cleaner, and reusable for `WalletScanModal.vue`'s `.success-ring` too). Confirm the choice with a UI-spec/sketch before implementation given this affects two components.
|
||||
**Warning signs:** Visual QA on `:8100` shows the ring clipped by the modal's `max-h-[90vh] overflow-y-auto` container or the checkmark badge floating disconnected from the ring's visual center.
|
||||
|
||||
### Pitfall 5: FED-05 has no backend field for a peer's Lightning identity
|
||||
**What goes wrong:** Building the "trusted nodes by hostname, one-click channel open" UI before the backend can supply a federated peer's LN `pubkey`/`host:port` results in a UI that can list *names* but has nothing to pass to `lnd.openchannel`.
|
||||
**Why it happens:** `NodeStateSnapshot` (the payload `federation.get-state`/sync exchanges) has no Lightning fields at all — it was designed for app/CPU/mem/tor status, not payment-channel metadata.
|
||||
**How to avoid:** Plan FED-05 backend-first: (1) extend `handle_lnd_getinfo` to parse and return `identity_pubkey` + `uris` from LND's real `/v1/getinfo` response (both fields already exist in LND's REST API — the daemon's `LndGetInfoResponse` struct just doesn't deserialize them yet), (2) add optional `lightning_pubkey`/`lightning_uri` fields to `NodeStateSnapshot` so a synced peer's info includes it (defaulted via `#[serde(default)]` for backward compat, matching every other optional field in that struct), (3) decide and scope the "public nodes" browse/request feature — no existing data source; recommend a small curated static list (documented, versioned) rather than a live LN graph query (`DescribeGraph` is heavy and not currently proxied anywhere in this codebase) unless the user specifically wants live graph browsing.
|
||||
**Warning signs:** A plan step that starts building `LightningChannelModal.vue` before a corresponding backend RPC/field change is scoped — check the plan's task ordering.
|
||||
|
||||
## Code Examples
|
||||
|
||||
### Reuse: opening a channel (backend already correct)
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
// Source: core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/channels.rs:238-336 (excerpted)
|
||||
// Params: { pubkey: <66-hex>, amount: <sats>, address?: <host:port>, private?, target_conf?, sat_per_vbyte? }
|
||||
// Validates pubkey format + amount bounds (20,000..=16,777,215 sats) before touching LND.
|
||||
// Connects to the peer synchronously (perm=false) before opening so "peer not online" is
|
||||
// surfaced deterministically instead of racing the open.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Reuse: transport badge already ground-truth per peer
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
// Source: core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs:120-147
|
||||
// record_peer_transport() writes last_transport/last_transport_at after every
|
||||
// successful PeerRequest — the FED-05 peer picker can show "reachable via FIPS"
|
||||
// / "reachable via Tor" per trusted node without any new plumbing.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Gap: demo mesh chat action stubs don't mutate state
|
||||
```javascript
|
||||
// Source: neode-ui/mock-backend.js:4479-4490 (current — needs to become stateful)
|
||||
case 'mesh.send-reaction':
|
||||
case 'mesh.send-reply':
|
||||
case 'mesh.send-read-receipt':
|
||||
case 'mesh.edit-message':
|
||||
case 'mesh.delete-message':
|
||||
case 'mesh.forward-message':
|
||||
case 'mesh.send-channel':
|
||||
case 'mesh.refresh':
|
||||
case 'mesh.reboot-radio': {
|
||||
return res.json({ result: { ok: true, sent: true } }) // no meshStore.dynamic mutation
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## State of the Art
|
||||
|
||||
| Old Approach | Current Approach | When Changed | Impact |
|
||||
|--------------|------------------|---------------|--------|
|
||||
| Tombstone write silently dropped (`let _ = tombstone_did(...)`) | Tombstone write propagated as a hard error, written before the node-list save | 2026-07-02, `01cbec27` | A failed tombstone write now fails the whole remove — matches FED-01's "a failed removal surfaces an error" requirement already, at the single-call level (the remaining gap is the cross-call race in Pitfall 1) |
|
||||
| Mesh attachment send: demo threw "Method not found" and force-opened a demo-only chooser modal | `mock-backend.js` implements the same RPC surface + mirrors the real size-tier logic | 2026-07-29, `c2ce71c6` | FED-04's core attachment-parity requirement is met; remaining gaps are contacts and reaction/edit/delete (see Pitfall 3) |
|
||||
|
||||
**Deprecated/outdated:** None specific to this phase's tech; no framework/library version churn involved.
|
||||
|
||||
## Assumptions Log
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Claim | Section | Risk if Wrong |
|
||||
|---|-------|---------|---------------|
|
||||
| A1 | The unlocked read-modify-write race on `federation/nodes.json` (Pitfall 1) is the primary cause of the user-reported "nodes reappear / sync issues" — this is a code-derived hypothesis, not confirmed via a reproduced failure in this research session | Summary, Pitfall 1 | If wrong, the planner should still fix the race (it's a real bug regardless) but should budget review time for other causes too — start FED-03 with a broader look, not a narrow patch-and-close on this one hypothesis |
|
||||
| A2 | The 1800s periodic federation sync loop (`server.rs` ~line 840) is redundant given the 90s loop and safe to remove/collapse | Pitfall 1, Anti-Patterns | If a maintainer added it for a specific reason not documented in the surrounding comments (e.g. covering a case the 90s loop misses), removing it could regress that unstated behavior — confirm via `git log -p` / git blame on that block before deleting |
|
||||
| A3 | "Public nodes" for channel-open browse/request (FED-05) should be a small curated static list rather than a live LN network graph query | Pitfall 5 | If the user actually wants live graph discovery, the curated-list approach under-delivers; this needs explicit user confirmation before FED-05 backend work starts |
|
||||
| A4 | `ScreensaverRing`'s size mismatch with `.send-success-burst` should be solved with a CSS scale-down rather than a new component size variant | Pitfall 4 | Either approach works technically; scale-down is faster but may look slightly different under `prefers-reduced-motion`; a new size variant is cleaner but touches the shared component. Low risk either way — a UI sketch/spec pass can decide before implementation |
|
||||
| A5 | The remaining "Federation DID validation incomplete" concern (no proof-of-ownership check on first DID mint) is still an open gap, not yet fixed like its sibling claims | Pitfall 2 | Not independently re-verified in this session (only the peer-joined signature check was confirmed); FED-03 should explicitly re-check this specific sub-claim before filing or dismissing it |
|
||||
|
||||
**If this table is empty:** N/A — see rows above.
|
||||
|
||||
## Open Questions
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Is the two-loop federation sync redundancy intentional?**
|
||||
- What we know: Both loops call `sync_with_peer` over all `Trusted`/`Observer` nodes; only the 90s loop does the "asymmetry self-heal" `notify_join` re-assertion; the 1800s loop additionally calls `refresh_federation_mesh_peers()` after its full pass (the 90s loop does not).
|
||||
- What's unclear: Whether the 1800s loop's `refresh_federation_mesh_peers()` call covers a gap the 90s loop leaves (e.g. name/roster propagation to mesh chat), which would mean simply deleting it regresses something.
|
||||
- Recommendation: `git log -p` / blame both loop-insertion commits during FED-03; if the mesh-peer-refresh behavior is the only unique value of the 1800s loop, move that single call into the 90s loop's completion and delete the 1800s loop entirely, closing half the race window.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **What UI/UX should "browse/request channels with public nodes" (FED-05) actually look like?**
|
||||
- What we know: No existing data source; `lnd.openchannel` supports a manual pubkey+address entry today (a user could theoretically paste a public node's URI already, just with no picker/browse UI).
|
||||
- What's unclear: Whether "public nodes" means (a) a curated list Archipelago ships/updates, (b) a live query against some LSP directory API, or (c) simply a well-labeled manual-paste field with format help (lowest-effort, matches what the backend already supports).
|
||||
- Recommendation: Flag for `/gsd-discuss-phase` or a direct user check-in before FED-05 planning — this is a scope decision, not a technical one.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Does `federation.get-state`'s `federated_peers` hint list need a Lightning field, or should peer LN info be a separate on-demand RPC?**
|
||||
- What we know: `NodeStateSnapshot.federated_peers` already carries a lightweight `FederationPeerHint` (did/pubkey/onion/name/fips_npub) shared during sync; adding `lightning_uri` there means every synced peer's LN info is cached locally without an extra round-trip.
|
||||
- What's unclear: Whether peers want to opt out of advertising their LN URI transitively (privacy consideration, similar to the existing `shared_location` opt-in pattern for lat/lon).
|
||||
- Recommendation: Follow the `shared_location` precedent (`Option<(f64,f64)>` only sent when the node opts in via `server.set-location`) — add an explicit opt-in setting for Lightning URI sharing rather than defaulting it on, since exposing a payment channel target more broadly than intended has real-money implications.
|
||||
|
||||
## Environment Availability
|
||||
|
||||
| Dependency | Required By | Available | Version | Fallback |
|
||||
|------------|------------|-----------|---------|----------|
|
||||
| Rust toolchain / cargo (from `core/`) | FED-01/02/03/04 backend work | Not probed this session (assume present per CLAUDE.md build instructions) | — | — |
|
||||
| Node.js / npm (`neode-ui/`) | FED-04/05/06 frontend + mock-backend.js work | Not probed this session (assume present per CLAUDE.md build instructions) | — | — |
|
||||
| `:8100` dev preview proxying to archi-dev | FED-05/06 required verification step per phase description | Not probed this session — verify at execution time per `docs/../reference_neode_ui_dev_testing.md` (mock=5959, pw password123) | — | — |
|
||||
| LND REST API (`LND_REST_BASE_URL`, local macaroon) | FED-05 `lnd.getinfo` extension + `lnd.openchannel` reuse | Assumed present on real nodes per existing `channels.rs`/`info.rs` code; demo backend has no real LND — FED-05 UI must be exercised against archi-dev (real LND) per phase description, not the pure-mock demo | — | Demo-only mock stub for `lnd.getinfo` identity fields if archi-dev is unavailable during a work session |
|
||||
| `tests/multinode/smoke.sh` | Regression coverage for FED-01/02 fix | Present, already covers removed-node tombstone + transitive-reappear scenarios; does NOT currently exercise the concurrent-race scenario (Pitfall 1) | — | Extend smoke.sh with a concurrent remove+sync test, or add a Rust-level `#[tokio::test]` in `federation/storage.rs` that spawns concurrent remove/save calls |
|
||||
|
||||
**Missing dependencies with no fallback:** None identified — this phase is code-only, no new external services.
|
||||
|
||||
**Missing dependencies with fallback:** LND-backed FED-05 verification (see row above) — use archi-dev per phase instructions; demo-only stubbing is a fallback if archi-dev is temporarily unavailable, but the phase's own success criteria require verification against archi-dev before deploy, so this fallback should not be treated as sufficient sign-off.
|
||||
|
||||
## Validation Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
### Test Framework
|
||||
| Property | Value |
|
||||
|----------|-------|
|
||||
| Framework (backend) | `cargo test` (Rust, workspace root `core/`) — federation/storage.rs and federation/sync.rs already have `#[tokio::test]` unit coverage |
|
||||
| Framework (frontend) | Vitest (`neode-ui/vitest.config.ts`, `vitest run`) |
|
||||
| Config file | `core/Cargo.toml` (workspace); `neode-ui/vitest.config.ts` |
|
||||
| Quick run command | `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation:: --lib` (backend); `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run src/components/__tests__/` (frontend, scope to touched files) |
|
||||
| Full suite command | `cd core && CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 cargo test` (backend, full); `cd neode-ui && npm run test` (frontend, full); `tests/multinode/smoke.sh` (cross-node, requires 2+ live nodes, run on-node per CLAUDE.md gate policy) |
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase Requirements → Test Map
|
||||
| Req ID | Behavior | Test Type | Automated Command | File Exists? |
|
||||
|--------|----------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|
|
||||
| FED-01 | Removed node never reappears, incl. under concurrent sync | unit + integration | `cargo test -p archipelago federation::storage::tests` (existing) + NEW concurrent-race test | ✅ existing tests / ❌ Wave 0 for the new race test |
|
||||
| FED-01 | Failed removal surfaces an error, not a silent no-op | unit | `cargo test -p archipelago federation::storage::tests::test_remove_nonexistent_node_errors` (existing, covers the "not found" case; add one for a simulated tombstone-write I/O failure) | ✅ existing / ❌ Wave 0 for I/O-failure case |
|
||||
| FED-02 | Sync converges; fleet nodes agree on node list | integration (multinode) | `tests/multinode/smoke.sh` section "federation pairing" + "removed-node tombstone" (existing) | ✅ |
|
||||
| FED-02 | Sync errors are operator-visible | manual / UI | No automated test yet — requires a UI element (e.g. per-node "last sync error" badge) that doesn't exist yet | ❌ Wave 0 (needs the field to exist first) |
|
||||
| FED-03 | Structured review findings fixed or deferred with reason | N/A (process requirement) | N/A — tracked via the plan's findings list, not a single automated test | — |
|
||||
| FED-04 | Attachment send parity demo vs real | manual (visual) + existing `mock-backend.js` logic mirrors daemon tier thresholds | Manual walk-through on `:8100` per phase description; consider a Vitest test asserting `mesh.transport-advice` tier boundaries match `MESH_AUTO_MAX`/`MESH_HARD_MAX` constants | ❌ Wave 0 (no existing frontend test pins these thresholds) |
|
||||
| FED-04 | Contacts list/save + reaction/edit/delete parity | manual + NEW mock-backend.js stateful behavior | Manual on `:8100`; no existing automated coverage of `mock-backend.js` behavior (it's a dev tool, not covered by `npm run test`) | ❌ Wave 0 if automated coverage is wanted; otherwise manual-only is acceptable for a demo shim |
|
||||
| FED-05 | Own node Lightning URI is shareable | unit (backend) + manual (UI) | NEW `cargo test` for `handle_lnd_getinfo`'s identity_pubkey/uris parsing (mock LND response fixture); manual UI check on archi-dev | ❌ Wave 0 |
|
||||
| FED-05 | Trusted-node picker + channel open flow | manual (UI, requires archi-dev + a live peer) | Manual per phase description ("tested live on the :8100 dev preview against archi-dev") | ❌ Wave 0 — inherently a live/manual check per the phase's own success criteria |
|
||||
| FED-06 | Paid-tick animation matches screensaver ring everywhere it appears | manual (visual) | Manual visual check of `SendBitcoinModal.vue` + `WalletScanModal.vue` on `:8100` | ❌ Wave 0 — visual-only requirement, no meaningful automated assertion beyond "component renders" |
|
||||
|
||||
### Sampling Rate
|
||||
- **Per task commit:** Backend: `cargo test -p archipelago federation:: mesh::` (scoped). Frontend: `npx vitest run` scoped to touched component test files, or a full quick run if none exist yet for touched files.
|
||||
- **Per wave merge:** Full `cargo test` (backend) + `npm run test` (frontend).
|
||||
- **Phase gate:** Full backend + frontend suites green, plus `tests/multinode/smoke.sh` federation sections green on a real 2-node pair, plus a manual FED-05/FED-06 walkthrough on `:8100` against archi-dev before any deploy (per phase description, "fixed there before any deploy").
|
||||
|
||||
### Wave 0 Gaps
|
||||
- [ ] New `#[tokio::test]` in `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` (or a new integration test) that spawns concurrent `remove_node()` + `update_node_state()`/`sync_with_peer`-equivalent calls against the same `data_dir` and asserts the removed node stays removed — this is the regression test for Pitfall 1 and does not exist today.
|
||||
- [ ] Test/fixture for `handle_lnd_getinfo` parsing `identity_pubkey`/`uris` from a mocked LND `/v1/getinfo` JSON response (FED-05) — no existing test touches this handler's response shape.
|
||||
- [ ] Decide whether `mock-backend.js` behavior warrants automated (Vitest/Playwright-against-mock) coverage, or manual-only is acceptable given it's a dev-preview tool, not shipped code — recommend manual-only unless the team already has a pattern for testing the mock backend elsewhere (none found in this research).
|
||||
- [ ] Framework install: none — all frameworks (`cargo test`, Vitest) are already configured and running.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Domain
|
||||
|
||||
### Applicable ASVS Categories
|
||||
|
||||
| ASVS Category | Applies | Standard Control |
|
||||
|---------------|---------|-----------------|
|
||||
| V2 Authentication | Partial | Federation peer identity is DID/ed25519-key-based, not password auth; `peer-joined`/`peer-did-changed`/`peer-address-changed` all require and verify an ed25519 signature over a canonical message before mutating state — already correct, verify no new RPC bypasses this |
|
||||
| V3 Session Management | No | Not applicable — federation/mesh RPCs are peer-signed, not session-cookie based |
|
||||
| V4 Access Control | Yes | `is_peer_allowed_path()` (`server.rs:1270`, tested at `server.rs:2075+`) restricts which HTTP paths a peer-only listener will serve — any new FED-05 RPC (e.g. "fetch peer's Lightning URI") that's meant to be peer-reachable must be added to this allow-list explicitly, not left to fall through |
|
||||
| V5 Input Validation | Yes | `lnd.openchannel` already validates pubkey format (66-hex) and amount bounds server-side (`channels.rs:252-268`) — reuse, and apply the same rigor to any new Lightning-URI-sharing field (validate the URI format before persisting/displaying it) |
|
||||
| V6 Cryptography | Yes | ed25519 signature verification via `identity::NodeIdentity::verify` — never hand-roll signature checks; reuse this existing verification path if FED-05 needs to authenticate a peer's advertised Lightning info |
|
||||
|
||||
### Known Threat Patterns for this stack
|
||||
|
||||
| Pattern | STRIDE | Standard Mitigation |
|
||||
|---------|--------|---------------------|
|
||||
| Federation peer spoofing a DID they don't control | Spoofing | ed25519 signature verification (already implemented for join/address-change/did-rotation — confirm any new FED-05 peer-info exchange follows the same pattern) |
|
||||
| Concurrent-write race corrupting/reverting federation state (Pitfall 1) | Tampering (unintentional, but security-relevant since it undermines the "removal sticks" guarantee — a removed/untrusted peer regaining federation membership is a real access-control regression) | Add locking around the storage layer (see Pitfall 1's fix) |
|
||||
| Unbounded transitive federation exposure (a Trusted peer's peer list auto-added as Observer) | Elevation of Privilege (bounded) | Already mitigated — `merge_transitive_peers` only runs for `Trusted`-level sources and only adds new peers as `Observer` (never auto-escalates to `Trusted`); this is intentional and correct, don't loosen it |
|
||||
| Advertising this node's Lightning payment-channel target more broadly than intended (FED-05 new surface) | Information Disclosure | Follow the existing `shared_location` opt-in pattern — do not default Lightning URI sharing to "on" for all federated peers (see Open Question 3) |
|
||||
|
||||
## Sources
|
||||
|
||||
### Primary (HIGH confidence)
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs`, `sync.rs`, `types.rs`, `invites.rs` — read directly, current `main`
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs` — read directly, current `main`
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/server.rs` (periodic sync loop sections, `is_peer_allowed_path`) — read directly
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/mesh/mod.rs` (`purge_federation_peer`, `upsert_federation_peer`, `seed_federation_peers_into_mesh`) — read directly
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/channels.rs`, `info.rs` — read directly
|
||||
- `core/archipelago/src/fips/dial.rs` — read directly
|
||||
- `neode-ui/mock-backend.js` (mesh RPC switch cases) — read directly, current `main` (post commit `c2ce71c6`)
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/views/Federation.vue`, `neode-ui/src/api/rpc-client.ts`, `neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue`, `neode-ui/src/components/Screensaver.vue`, `neode-ui/src/components/SendBitcoinModal.vue`, `neode-ui/src/components/WalletScanModal.vue`, `neode-ui/src/views/Mesh.vue` — read directly
|
||||
- `git log -p` on `core/archipelago/src/federation/storage.rs` (commit `01cbec27`) and `git show c2ce71c6` — verified fix history directly, not from documentation
|
||||
- `tests/multinode/smoke.sh` — read directly for existing federation test coverage
|
||||
- `.planning/REQUIREMENTS.md`, `.planning/STATE.md`, `.planning/codebase/ARCHITECTURE.md`, `.planning/codebase/CONCERNS.md` — project-provided context (CONCERNS.md's federation claims were then verified/refuted against live code per Pitfall 2)
|
||||
|
||||
### Secondary (MEDIUM confidence)
|
||||
- None — this research relied entirely on direct codebase reads and git history, not external web sources, since the phase is about hardening this specific project's existing code rather than adopting new external technology.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tertiary (LOW confidence)
|
||||
- None.
|
||||
|
||||
## Metadata
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence breakdown:**
|
||||
- Standard stack: HIGH — no new dependencies; existing stack confirmed by direct file reads
|
||||
- Architecture (FED-01/02/03/04): HIGH — read the actual implementation, confirmed fix history via git log, identified a concrete unverified race condition with file:line citations
|
||||
- Architecture (FED-05): MEDIUM — greenfield UI/RPC surface; confirmed what's missing (no existing Lightning-URI field/RPC) but the design (opt-in sharing, public-nodes scope) needs a user decision, not just engineering judgment
|
||||
- Pitfalls: HIGH for Pitfalls 1-3 (backend/demo, code-verified); MEDIUM for Pitfalls 4-5 (frontend sizing and FED-05 scope, judgment calls flagged in Assumptions Log)
|
||||
|
||||
**Research date:** 2026-07-29
|
||||
**Valid until:** 2026-08-12 (14 days — this is a fast-moving area of an actively-developed codebase; other agents were committing federation/mesh-adjacent changes during this very research session, per the mock-backend.js commit observed mid-session)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: 1
|
||||
slug: federation-mesh-hardening
|
||||
status: draft
|
||||
shadcn_initialized: false
|
||||
preset: none
|
||||
created: 2026-07-29
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Phase 1 — UI Design Contract
|
||||
|
||||
> Visual and interaction contract for the two UI-facing requirements in this phase:
|
||||
> **FED-05** (inter-node Lightning channel-opening UX) and **FED-06** (on-brand paid-tick
|
||||
> animation). The rest of Phase 1 (FED-01–04) is backend/parity work with no new UI surface.
|
||||
> Generated by gsd-ui-researcher, verified by gsd-ui-checker.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Design System
|
||||
|
||||
| Property | Value |
|
||||
|----------|-------|
|
||||
| Tool | none — no `components.json` found; project is **Vue 3**, and shadcn/ui does not support Vue (React-only), so the shadcn init gate does not apply here. Registry safety gate: not applicable. |
|
||||
| Preset | not applicable |
|
||||
| Component library | none — hand-authored Tailwind utilities + a custom "glass" CSS system (`glass-card`, `glass-button`, `glass-button-warning/danger/success`, `input-glass`, `alert-error/warning/info`, `BaseModal.vue`) defined in `neode-ui/src/style.css` and reused project-wide |
|
||||
| Icon library | none — inline hand-authored SVG, 24×24 viewBox, `stroke-width="2"` outline style (heroicons-esque but not the package). The bolt path `M13 10V3L4 14h7v7l9-11h-7z` is already the house Lightning icon (used in `Server.vue`, `HomeWalletCard.vue`, `Web5Wallet.vue`) — reuse it verbatim for any new Lightning iconography in FED-05, do not source a new icon. |
|
||||
| Font | Avenir Next (`font-sans`, body/UI text), Montserrat 700/800 (`font-archipelago`, headers only — not used in modals) |
|
||||
|
||||
**Modal contract (hard rule, repeated user complaint):** Every new modal in this phase MUST use `BaseModal.vue` (already wraps `Teleport to="body"` + full-screen `bg-black/60 backdrop-blur-md` backdrop + column layout with pinned header/footer and scrolling body) or, if a bespoke modal is unavoidable, MUST replicate that exact `<Teleport to="body">` + `fixed inset-0` + `@click.self="close"` pattern. Never nest a modal inside a `transform`-affected ancestor (glass-panel `translateZ` layers trap `position:fixed`).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Spacing Scale
|
||||
|
||||
Declared values (must be multiples of 4) — matches `tailwind.config.js`'s existing 4px-grid `spacing` tokens (`1`=4px … `8`=32px) plus standard Tailwind rem multiples used throughout the codebase for larger gaps:
|
||||
|
||||
| Token | Value | Usage |
|
||||
|-------|-------|-------|
|
||||
| xs | 4px | Icon-to-label gaps, badge padding |
|
||||
| sm | 8px | Compact row spacing, `gap-2` |
|
||||
| md | 16px | Default element spacing, `p-4` card padding |
|
||||
| lg | 24px | Section padding, `mb-6` between panel sections |
|
||||
| xl | 32px | Layout gaps between major picker columns |
|
||||
| 2xl | 48px | `py-12` empty-state vertical padding |
|
||||
| 3xl | 64px | Not used by this phase's new elements |
|
||||
|
||||
Exceptions: 44px minimum touch target on all new interactive buttons (global rule already enforced in `style.css` for mobile — the "Copy URI" / "Open Channel" / "Request Channel" buttons inherit `min-height: 44px` from `.glass-button` automatically, no override needed).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Typography
|
||||
|
||||
Scoped to this phase's new elements only (existing typography elsewhere is unchanged). Exactly two weights govern this phase's new elements — 400 and 600; Label and Body are differentiated from each other by size and color (not weight), matching how `NodeList.vue` already distinguishes node-name text from badge/hint text:
|
||||
|
||||
| Role | Size | Weight | Line Height |
|
||||
|------|------|--------|-------------|
|
||||
| Label | 12px (`text-xs`) | 400 (regular), `text-white/60` | 1.4 |
|
||||
| Body | 14px (`text-sm`) | 400 (regular), `text-white` | 1.5 |
|
||||
| Heading | 20px (`text-xl`) | 600 (semibold) | 1.3 |
|
||||
|
||||
Heading is pinned to `text-xl` (20px), not a range — this matches `BaseModal.vue`'s own `<h3 class="text-xl font-semibold">` title (the component every new modal in this phase must use per the Modal contract above) and `WalletScanModal.vue`'s pane title, i.e. the size the existing house modals actually use most for their titles. Modal titles ("Open Lightning Channel", "Request Channel") use Heading; node names use Body (`text-white`); URI strings, badges, and helper/meta text use Label (`text-white/60`) per the existing `LightningChannelsPanel.vue`/`NodeList.vue` convention.
|
||||
|
||||
**Inherited — not governed by this contract:** The `SendBitcoinModal.vue`/`WalletScanModal.vue` success-amount numerals (e.g. `12,345 sats`, `text-5xl font-black` — 48px / weight 800) are pre-existing, unchanged display text. FED-06 only replaces the ring graphic behind/around that text, never the text itself, so this weight/size falls outside the phase's new-elements typography contract above and is not counted toward its weight budget.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Color
|
||||
|
||||
| Role | Value | Usage |
|
||||
|------|-------|-------|
|
||||
| Dominant (60%) | `#000000` + `rgba(0,0,0,.35–.65)` | Page background, `.glass`/`.glass-card` surfaces |
|
||||
| Secondary (30%) | `rgba(0,0,0,.65)` blur(18px) card, `rgba(255,255,255,.05–.08)` nested rows | Modal cards, picker list rows (`bg-black/20` per-node rows, `bg-white/5` nested detail blocks) |
|
||||
| Accent (10%) | Archipelago orange `#fb923c` / `rgba(251,146,60,*)` | **Reserved for:** the "Open Channel" / "Request Channel" / "Copy Lightning URI" primary CTA buttons (`.glass-button-warning`), the Lightning bolt icon fill, focus-visible glow rings, the active picker-tab underline (mirrors existing `.mode-switcher-btn-active` treatment) |
|
||||
| Destructive | `#ef4444` family (`.glass-button-danger`) | Not used by FED-05 v1 (no destructive action ships this phase — channel *close* is existing, out-of-scope UI in `LightningChannelsPanel.vue`); declared for consistency if a future "revoke URI sharing" action is added |
|
||||
|
||||
**Inherited semantic colors (pre-existing house convention, unchanged by this phase, NOT part of the 10% accent budget):**
|
||||
- Success/paid emerald `#4ade80` text / `rgba(16,185,129,*)` fills — the paid-tick's center badge and "SENT"/amount numerals (FED-06 keeps this palette; only the surrounding ring geometry changes).
|
||||
- Info blue `#60a5fa` — FIPS/Tor transport badges already shown next to trusted-node rows (`NodeList.vue`'s `transportBadge`); reused as-is in the FED-05 trusted-node picker rows, not introduced by this phase.
|
||||
|
||||
Accent reserved for: **primary Lightning-channel action buttons, the Lightning bolt icon, focus rings, and the active picker-tab indicator only** — never for body text, card backgrounds, or informational badges.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Copywriting Contract
|
||||
|
||||
| Element | Copy |
|
||||
|---------|------|
|
||||
| Primary CTA — own URI | **"Copy Lightning URI"** (copy-to-clipboard button; on success the label flips to **"Copied!"** for ~2s, mirroring `SendBitcoinModal.vue`'s existing `copyDetail`/`Copied!` pattern — do not invent a new copy-feedback idiom) |
|
||||
| Primary CTA — trusted federated node | **"Open Channel"** (one-click; matches the verb already used in `LightningChannelsPanel.vue`'s existing Open Channel button/modal) |
|
||||
| Primary CTA — meshed Lightning peer | **"Request Channel"** (opens the request flow reusing `PeerRequestModal.vue`'s pattern — optional message field, "Send Request" submit button, `sending` → **"Sending…"** busy label — do not build a new request-modal component from scratch) |
|
||||
| Manual fallback entry point | **"Paste URI Manually"** (reveals a `Peer URI` input, placeholder `pubkey@host:port`, helper text `Format: pubkey@host:port` — verbatim reuse of `LightningChannelsPanel.vue`'s existing field copy) |
|
||||
| Empty state heading | **"No Lightning peers yet"** |
|
||||
| Empty state body | **"Add a federated node or connect with a meshed peer running Lightning to open a channel directly — or paste a peer's URI manually below."** |
|
||||
| Error state | **"Couldn't reach that peer — check they're online and try again."** (tone/placement mirrors the existing `openError`/`alert-error` treatment in `LightningChannelsPanel.vue`; LND "still starting up" transient errors reuse that same component's amber `isStartupNotice` treatment rather than the red error style) |
|
||||
| Destructive confirmation | Not applicable — FED-05 v1 ships open/request flows only, no destructive action |
|
||||
| FED-06 copy | Not applicable — pure visual swap. Existing "SENT" / success-amount / "Done" button copy in `SendBitcoinModal.vue` and `WalletScanModal.vue` is unchanged; only the ring graphic behind the checkmark changes. |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## UI Considerations
|
||||
|
||||
Applicable state considerations resolved: 13 covered, 3 backstop, 0 unresolved.
|
||||
|
||||
| Category | Element(s) | Status | Resolution / Reason |
|
||||
|----------|------------|--------|---------------------|
|
||||
| long-text | own-node URI display | ✅ covered | The displayed `pubkey@host:port` string truncates (CSS `truncate` + `title` tooltip, the existing house pattern) to fit its container; the full untruncated value is what gets copied to clipboard regardless of visual truncation |
|
||||
| empty | trusted-nodes picker list | ✅ covered | Empty state copy row above renders once when both the trusted and meshed-peer lists are empty (shared empty state, not duplicated per column) |
|
||||
| empty | meshed-LN-peers picker list | 🧪 backstop | Same shared empty-state copy as above; no wired test yet asserting the "shared, not duplicated" rendering rule — flag for planner/executor to add a component test |
|
||||
| loading | trusted-nodes picker list | ✅ covered | Mirrors `NodeList.vue`'s existing "Loading nodes..." spinner row treatment |
|
||||
| loading | meshed-LN-peers picker list | ✅ covered | Same spinner treatment as trusted-nodes list |
|
||||
| error | trusted-nodes / meshed-peer picker lists | ✅ covered | Ties to the Copywriting Contract error row; styled with `.alert-error`/`openError` convention already in `LightningChannelsPanel.vue` |
|
||||
| populated | trusted-nodes picker list | ✅ covered | Row layout mirrors `NodeList.vue`'s trusted-node row: name, trust badge, transport badge (FIPS/Tor), one-click "Open Channel" button |
|
||||
| populated | meshed-LN-peers picker list | ✅ covered | Same row layout, "Request Channel" button in place of "Open Channel" (peers are not bilaterally trusted, so the action is a request, never a direct open) |
|
||||
| zero-one-many | trusted-nodes / meshed-peer lists | ✅ covered (dismissed) | No item-count copy is planned for either list (unlike e.g. the channel-status tabs' count badges) — singular/plural phrasing is not applicable |
|
||||
| overflow | picker list rows (long node names) | ✅ covered | `truncate` class + `:title` tooltip on the node-name span, identical to the existing `NodeList.vue` convention |
|
||||
| partial | manual-URI-paste form | ✅ covered | A pasted pubkey without a host falls back to `lnd.openchannel`'s existing address-less-pubkey handling (`address = parts[1] \|\| undefined`), already proven in `LightningChannelsPanel.vue` |
|
||||
| error | manual-URI-paste form | 🧪 backstop | Invalid-format message ("Peer URI must be `pubkey@host:port`") is specified but no explicit format-validation test is scoped yet — planner should add one, do not silently skip client-side validation before calling `lnd.openchannel` |
|
||||
| long-text | manual-URI-paste form | ✅ covered | Same truncation/tooltip treatment as the own-node URI display |
|
||||
| unclassified | request-to-open-channel flow | ✅ covered (dismissed) | Reuses `PeerRequestModal.vue` verbatim (message field, Send Request/Sending states) — its own state coverage predates this phase and is not re-specified here |
|
||||
| long-text | paid-tick ring (`SendBitcoinModal.vue` + `WalletScanModal.vue`) | ✅ covered (dismissed) | The ring itself renders no text content (pure SVG/CSS segments); the 48px sats amount inside it is inherited text explicitly out of this contract (see Typography inherited note) |
|
||||
| overflow | paid-tick ring (`SendBitcoinModal.vue` + `WalletScanModal.vue`) | ✅ covered | New `badge` `ScreensaverRing` size variant (see below) is explicitly sized to fit inside the modal's `max-h-[90vh] overflow-y-auto` card without clipping — do not drop in the existing `compact` (240–320px) variant unscaled |
|
||||
| static-content (motion) | paid-tick ring, all `ScreensaverRing` size variants | 🧪 backstop | `ScreensaverRing.vue`'s `segment-pulse` animation currently has **no** `prefers-reduced-motion` guard anywhere (a real gap — confirmed by reading the component; contrast with `SendBitcoinModal.vue`'s existing `.burst-ring`, which already has one). This phase must add `@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce) { .viz-segment { animation: none; opacity: 0.6; } }` inside `ScreensaverRing.vue` itself so the guard applies to every size variant (including the new `badge` one), matching the site-wide reduced-motion convention. No existing automated test covers this — flag for planner as a Wave 0 test gap. |
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- Status vocabulary (locked by probe-core projectTruths):
|
||||
✅ covered → a plain truth string lifted into must_haves.truths
|
||||
🧪 backstop → a flat scalar { statement, verification: backstop }; at verify time, no explicit
|
||||
evidence → insufficient_spec → human_needed (never a silent pass, #1154)
|
||||
⚠ unresolved → an explicit planner assumption (surfaced, never silently dropped)
|
||||
Rows are REPLACED (not appended) on a probe re-run — idempotent. -->
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## FED-05 Visual Anchor
|
||||
|
||||
Primary visual anchor: the trusted-nodes list (federation trust is the primary path); meshed-lightning-peers list second; manual-paste fallback visually de-emphasized below both (collapsed behind the "Paste URI Manually" entry point per the Copywriting Contract above, not rendered as a third equal-weight column).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## FED-06 Sizing Decision (resolves RESEARCH.md Pitfall 4 / Assumption A4)
|
||||
|
||||
RESEARCH.md flagged the `ScreensaverRing` size mismatch (`compact` = 240–320px vs. the current 96–112px paid-tick badges) as needing a UI-spec decision before implementation. **Decision: add a new `badge` size variant to `ScreensaverRing.vue`**, not a CSS `transform: scale()` wrapper — cleaner, reusable across both call sites, and avoids reduced-motion/layout-box mismatches that a transform hack would introduce.
|
||||
|
||||
| Variant | Diameter (mobile) | Diameter (≥768px) | `--viz-radius` | Used by |
|
||||
|---------|-------------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------|
|
||||
| `badge` (NEW) | 160px | 192px | 80px / 96px | `SendBitcoinModal.vue` `.send-success-burst` (replaces the 112px burst), `WalletScanModal.vue` `.success-ring` (replaces the 96px/`w-24` ring) |
|
||||
| `compact` (existing, unchanged) | 240px | 320px | 120px / 160px | `SystemDangerZone.vue` and other existing overlay contexts — do not touch |
|
||||
| `default` (existing, unchanged) | 280–400px (responsive) | — | 140–200px | Full-screen `Screensaver.vue` |
|
||||
|
||||
Composition at both call sites: `<ScreensaverRing size="badge" />` renders the radiating EQ segments; the existing `.burst-core` (green circle + checkmark, `SendBitcoinModal.vue`) or `.success-ring` inner content (`WalletScanModal.vue`) is layered centered on top via `position: absolute; inset: 0` within a shared `position: relative` wrapper sized to the `badge` diameter — same layering pattern `Screensaver.vue` already uses for `ScreensaverLogo` inside `ScreensaverRing`. Do not resize or restyle the checkmark/core itself; only its container changes from a bespoke 96–112px circle to the `badge`-sized wrapper.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Registry Safety
|
||||
|
||||
| Registry | Blocks Used | Safety Gate |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|--------------|
|
||||
| shadcn official | none | not applicable — shadcn/ui is React-only; this is a Vue 3 project with an established hand-rolled design system (see Design System table) |
|
||||
| third-party | none | not applicable |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Checker Sign-Off
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Dimension 1 Copywriting: PASS
|
||||
- [ ] Dimension 2 Visuals: PASS
|
||||
- [ ] Dimension 3 Color: PASS
|
||||
- [ ] Dimension 4 Typography: PASS
|
||||
- [ ] Dimension 5 Spacing: PASS
|
||||
- [ ] Dimension 6 Registry Safety: PASS
|
||||
|
||||
**Approval:** pending
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: 1
|
||||
slug: federation-mesh-hardening
|
||||
# status lifecycle: draft (seeded by plan-phase) → validated (set by validate-phase §6)
|
||||
# audit-milestone §5.5 distinguishes NOT-VALIDATED (draft) from PARTIAL (validated + nyquist_compliant: false) (#2117)
|
||||
status: draft
|
||||
nyquist_compliant: false
|
||||
wave_0_complete: false
|
||||
created: 2026-07-29
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Phase 1 — Validation Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
> Per-phase validation contract for feedback sampling during execution.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Test Infrastructure
|
||||
|
||||
| Property | Value |
|
||||
|----------|-------|
|
||||
| **Framework** | cargo test (Rust, workspace at core/) + bash harnesses (tests/multinode/, tests/lifecycle/) + node --check / manual curl for mock-backend |
|
||||
| **Config file** | core/Cargo.toml (workspace); tests/multinode/smoke.sh |
|
||||
| **Quick run command** | `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation` |
|
||||
| **Full suite command** | `cd core && cargo test` (plus on-node `tests/multinode/smoke.sh` for cross-node behavior) |
|
||||
| **Estimated runtime** | ~120 seconds (cargo test); multinode smoke is node-gated |
|
||||
|
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Sampling Rate
|
||||
|
||||
- **After every task commit:** Run `cd core && cargo test -p archipelago federation` (or the targeted module's tests)
|
||||
- **After every plan wave:** Run `cd core && cargo test`; frontend waves: `cd neode-ui && npm run build` + grep dist for new strings
|
||||
- **Before `/gsd-verify-work`:** Full suite green + multinode smoke considerations noted (cross-node checks are hardware/node-gated)
|
||||
- **Max feedback latency:** 180 seconds
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Per-Task Verification Map
|
||||
|
||||
| Task ID | Plan | Wave | Requirement | Threat Ref | Secure Behavior | Test Type | Automated Command | File Exists | Status |
|
||||
|---------|------|------|-------------|------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|--------|
|
||||
| (filled by planner) | — | — | FED-01..06 | — | — | — | — | — | ⬜ pending |
|
||||
|
||||
*Status: ⬜ pending · ✅ green · ❌ red · ⚠️ flaky*
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave 0 Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Storage-race unit tests for `federation/storage.rs` (concurrent load/save + remove-during-sync) — stubs for FED-01/FED-02
|
||||
- [ ] Mock-backend RPC parity checks (mesh contacts + message-mutation methods) — FED-04 remainder
|
||||
|
||||
*Existing infrastructure covers cargo test; multinode smoke.sh covers cross-node sync but runs on-node only.*
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Manual-Only Verifications
|
||||
|
||||
| Behavior | Requirement | Why Manual | Test Instructions |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|------------|-------------------|
|
||||
| Removed peer never reappears across real fleet sync cycles | FED-01 | Needs two live nodes + wall-clock sync cycles | Remove a peer on archi-dev, watch peer list through ≥2 sync cycles (90s loop), confirm absent + error surfaced on induced failure |
|
||||
| Channel-open UX end-to-end | FED-05 | Visual/UX judgment + live LND | Drive :8100 preview against archi-dev; share URI, open channel to trusted node, request public-node channel |
|
||||
| Paid-tick animation on-brand | FED-06 | Visual judgment | Trigger payment success in preview; compare ring/EQ segments to screensaver |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Validation Sign-Off
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] All tasks have `<automated>` verify or Wave 0 dependencies
|
||||
- [ ] Sampling continuity: no 3 consecutive tasks without automated verify
|
||||
- [ ] Wave 0 covers all MISSING references
|
||||
- [ ] No watch-mode flags
|
||||
- [ ] Feedback latency < 180s
|
||||
- [ ] `nyquist_compliant: true` set in frontmatter
|
||||
|
||||
**Approval:** pending
|
||||
+151
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: quick-260729-fw7
|
||||
plan: 01
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 1
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/mesh/HopVizModal.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/Mesh.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/mesh/mesh-styles.css
|
||||
autonomous: true
|
||||
requirements: [QUICK-FW7]
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "Clicking a mesh message's transport pill (or the ⋯ button) opens a hop-route modal that is visually balanced on desktop — the hop chain fills the modal width, endpoint nodes are prominent, and the modal is no longer a cramped 420px card with tiny emoji + dot row"
|
||||
- "On narrow viewports (phone width) the hop chain renders VERTICALLY — sender at top, relays stacked, recipient at bottom — with the packet animation traveling top-to-bottom, nothing overflowing or wrapping awkwardly"
|
||||
- "The visualization uses Archipelago's design language: glass panel, dark-only palette, per-transport accent colors (meshcore orange #fb923c, meshtastic mint #3eb489, reticulum blue #60a5fa, lora amber #f59e0b, fips violet #a78bfa, tor indigo #818cf8), EQ-segment-style bars echoing ScreensaverRing, node glow, staggered reveal, animated packet traveling the path"
|
||||
- "prefers-reduced-motion disables all looping animations (existing behavior preserved)"
|
||||
- "Tor / FIPS / unknown-transport cases still render their distinct shapes (3 anonymous relays / direct P2P / not recorded), and SNR/RSSI + E2E/delivery metadata still display"
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- "neode-ui/src/views/mesh/HopVizModal.vue — new self-contained modal component (Teleport to body) with scoped styles"
|
||||
- "neode-ui/src/views/Mesh.vue — inline hop-viz modal markup replaced by <HopVizModal>"
|
||||
- "web/dist/neode-ui/ — rebuilt bundle containing the new component's class strings"
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- "Mesh.vue transport pill / ⋯ button click → hopVizMsg → <HopVizModal :msg :peer @close> renders"
|
||||
- "HopVizModal derives accent color from msg.transport, matching the pill colors in mesh-styles.css lines 168-173"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Redesign the mesh-message hop visualization modal in neode-ui: properly sized and balanced on desktop, vertical stacked layout on mobile, and fully on-brand (glass, per-transport accents, EQ-segment motif from ScreensaverRing, animated packet travel, node glow, staggered reveal).
|
||||
|
||||
User feedback (verbatim): "please make the hop graphic and animation on mesh messages much better balanced, the desktop one is very small and it doesn't work on mobile where it should be vertical, and make it much more archipelago style and branded, make it beautiful."
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: The current hop viz (inline in Mesh.vue lines ~2627-2678, styles in mesh-styles.css lines ~597-637) is a cramped horizontal flex row inside a 420px modal — tiny emoji endpoints, a dashed border with blinking `•` dots, no mobile handling. It reads as an afterthought, not an Archipelago feature.
|
||||
|
||||
Output: New `HopVizModal.vue` component wired into Mesh.vue, old inline markup and `.mesh-hopviz-*` CSS removed, rebuilt bundle in web/dist/neode-ui/ verified to contain the new strings.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
|
||||
**Current implementation (read all of these first):**
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/views/Mesh.vue` lines ~1291-1310 (hopVizMsg / hopVizPeer / hopVizHops state), lines ~2340-2350 (transport pill + ⋯ button that set `hopVizMsg`), lines ~2627-2678 (the inline Teleported modal to replace). Also `transportLabel()` and `signalQualityLabel()` helpers used by the modal — grep for them in Mesh.vue.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/views/mesh/mesh-styles.css` lines ~160-175 (transport pill accent colors + `.mesh-chat-e2e`), ~572-584 (`.mesh-transport-modal-backdrop`, `.mesh-transport-modal`, title/sub/cancel — SHARED with the send-transport and image-quality modals, do not break them), ~597-637 (`.mesh-hopviz-*` rules to delete/migrate).
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/components/ScreensaverRing.vue` — the brand EQ-segment motif: thin 4px rounded bars, white gradient fill, staggered `scaleY` pulse keyframes. Echo this visual language for relay-node markers.
|
||||
- `neode-ui/tailwind.config.js` — glass tokens (glass-dark/glass-border/shadow-glass), fonts: `Montserrat` = `font-archipelago` header font; app is dark-only.
|
||||
- Global focus glow + accent used app-wide: orange `rgba(251,146,60,…)` (#fb923c).
|
||||
|
||||
**Transport accent map (must match pill colors):** meshtastic `#3eb489`, meshcore `#fb923c`, reticulum `#60a5fa`, lora `#f59e0b`, fips `#a78bfa`, tor `#818cf8`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Data realities:** For LoRa transports only a hop COUNT is known (`peer.hops`, 0 or 0xff/null = direct), not per-relay identities — render count relays as anonymous branded markers. Tor = fixed "3 anonymous relays" shape. FIPS = direct P2P. `null` transport = not recorded. SNR/RSSI are current link readings (keep the existing disclaimer note).
|
||||
|
||||
**Project rules that apply:**
|
||||
- Modals MUST `<Teleport to="body">` with full-screen backdrop (already true — preserve it).
|
||||
- Frontend build can silently no-op: after `npm run build`, grep the built bundle in `web/dist/neode-ui/` for new strings before claiming done.
|
||||
- Commit the code changes when they work; push via `git push gitea-ai main`. Stage explicitly by path (`git add <paths>`), never `git add -A` — other agents may share the tree.
|
||||
- Do not deploy to any node; this rides the normal dev-pair → OTA pipeline later.
|
||||
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: Build HopVizModal.vue — branded, balanced desktop hop visualization</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/src/views/mesh/HopVizModal.vue, neode-ui/src/views/Mesh.vue, neode-ui/src/views/mesh/mesh-styles.css</files>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Create `neode-ui/src/views/mesh/HopVizModal.vue` (script setup, TypeScript) and move the hop-viz modal out of Mesh.vue into it.
|
||||
|
||||
Component contract:
|
||||
- Props: `msg: MeshMessage` (import type from `../../types/api` or wherever Mesh.vue imports it), `peer: MeshPeer | null`, plus the two label strings Mesh.vue already computes (`transportLabel` result and `signalQualityLabel` result) OR import/reuse those helpers if they are importable; if they are local functions in Mesh.vue, pass computed strings as props — do NOT duplicate logic.
|
||||
- Emits: `close`.
|
||||
- Template: `<Teleport to="body">` wrapping a full-screen backdrop (reuse `.mesh-transport-modal-backdrop` class so backdrop behavior stays consistent) with `@click.self="emit('close')"`, containing a `glass-card` panel.
|
||||
|
||||
Visual redesign (all styles SCOPED in the component; delete the old `.mesh-hopviz-*` rules from mesh-styles.css lines ~597-637 — but leave `.mesh-transport-modal-backdrop`, `.mesh-transport-modal`, `.mesh-transport-title/sub/cancel` untouched since the send-transport and image-quality modals still use them; the new panel should use its own width class, wider than 420px — target `min(560px, 94vw)` on desktop):
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Header:** transport-colored title using the Montserrat brand font (`font-family: 'Montserrat', sans-serif` or the `font-archipelago` utility), e.g. "MeshCore route", with the existing You → peer subtitle. Derive an `--hop-accent` CSS custom property on the panel root from `msg.transport` using the exact pill color map (meshtastic #3eb489, meshcore #fb923c, reticulum #60a5fa, lora #f59e0b, fips #a78bfa, tor #818cf8, fallback rgba(251,146,60) orange). All accents below use `var(--hop-accent)`.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Endpoint nodes (You / peer):** substantial circular medallions (~64-72px) instead of bare emoji — island glyph 🏝️ centered inside a ring of 12-16 EQ-style segments (thin rounded bars radiating like a compact ScreensaverRing — reuse its technique: absolutely-positioned bars, `transform: rotate(deg) translateY(-radius)`, staggered `scaleY` pulse animation, white-to-transparent gradient tinted with the accent). Soft accent glow behind each medallion (`box-shadow: 0 0 24px color-mix(...)` or an rgba shadow). Node name below in white 600-weight, ellipsized.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Path between endpoints:** replace the dashed-border + blinking `•` row with a proper track: a horizontal line/gradient in the accent color connecting the medallions, with:
|
||||
- Relay markers for each hop (LoRa transports: `Math.min(hops, 6)` markers; Tor: exactly 3 with a 🧅/anonymous treatment; FIPS: no relays, a single direct link) rendered as small EQ-segment clusters or glowing accent dots (~10-14px) sitting ON the track, each with its own subtle pulse, staggered.
|
||||
- An animated packet: a small bright dot/comet (accent color, blurred glow trail) traveling from sender to recipient along the track on an infinite ~2s loop. Use a CSS keyframe translating along the track container (like the existing `mesh-hopviz-travel` sweep but as a discrete glowing packet, not a background sheen).
|
||||
- Label under/over the track: "direct radio link" / "N hops" / "3 anonymous relays" / "direct peer-to-peer" / "transport wasn't recorded" — preserve the existing per-transport template branches and copy.
|
||||
- Staggered entrance: sender medallion, then track+relays, then recipient fade/slide in (keep the existing appear pattern, ~0.05/0.35/0.65s delays).
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Metadata footer:** keep the SNR/RSSI signal row (LoRa only, with the existing "current link readings" disclaimer note) and the E2E / delivered ✓✓ / timestamp row, restyled as small glass chips consistent with `.mesh-transport-meta` sizing. Keep the Close button (`.mesh-transport-cancel` class is fine).
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Reduced motion:** wrap ALL looping animations (packet, segment pulses, relay pulses) and entrance animations in the component's own `@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce)` block that disables them — the old CSS did this; the new component must too.
|
||||
|
||||
Wire-up in Mesh.vue: import HopVizModal, replace the inline `<Teleport>` block at lines ~2627-2678 with `<HopVizModal v-if="hopVizMsg" :msg="hopVizMsg" :peer="hopVizPeer" ... @close="hopVizMsg = null" />`. Keep `hopVizMsg`/`hopVizPeer`/`hopVizHops` state in Mesh.vue (or move `hopVizHops` into the component — it only needs `peer.hops`; prefer moving it in to shrink Mesh.vue). Do not touch the transport pill / ⋯ button triggers.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd /home/archipelago/Projects/archy/neode-ui && npx vue-tsc --noEmit 2>/dev/null || npm run build</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<done>HopVizModal.vue exists with the medallion + track + packet design, Mesh.vue renders it in place of the inline modal, old `.mesh-hopviz-*` rules removed from mesh-styles.css, other transport modals' shared classes untouched, type-check/build passes.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: Mobile vertical layout</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/src/views/mesh/HopVizModal.vue</files>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Add responsive behavior inside HopVizModal.vue's scoped styles. At narrow widths (`@media (max-width: 560px)` — pick the breakpoint so a typical phone portrait always gets it):
|
||||
- The chain flips to a COLUMN: sender medallion at top, vertical track with relay markers stacked below it, recipient medallion at bottom. Implement so the same DOM works in both orientations (flex-direction column + a track that switches from horizontal line to vertical line), rather than duplicating markup.
|
||||
- The packet animation travels TOP-TO-BOTTOM along the vertical track (a second keyframe or a transform-based animation that follows the flex axis).
|
||||
- Medallions may shrink slightly (~56px) but stay prominent; names and hop label must not truncate mid-word or overflow the panel; panel uses near-full width (`width: 94vw`) with comfortable vertical padding, and the whole modal scrolls (`max-height: 90vh; overflow-y: auto`) if metadata pushes it tall.
|
||||
- Entrance stagger and reduced-motion handling apply identically in vertical mode.
|
||||
Sanity-check both orientations in the browser via the dev preview (`npm run dev`, viewport toggling in devtools) if a display is available; otherwise rely on the CSS being purely breakpoint-driven and symmetric.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd /home/archipelago/Projects/archy/neode-ui && grep -q "max-width: 560px" src/views/mesh/HopVizModal.vue && grep -qi "column" src/views/mesh/HopVizModal.vue</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<done>Below the breakpoint the hop chain renders vertically (sender top → recipient bottom) with the packet traveling downward; no overflow; desktop layout unchanged above the breakpoint.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 3: Build, verify bundle, commit</name>
|
||||
<files>web/dist/neode-ui/ (build output), neode-ui/src/views/mesh/HopVizModal.vue</files>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
1. `cd neode-ui && npm run build` (outputs to `web/dist/neode-ui/`).
|
||||
2. Per CLAUDE.md, prove the build actually picked up the change: grep the built JS/CSS bundle for a new unique string from the component (e.g. a distinctive class name like `hopviz-medallion` or `hopviz-packet` — whatever class names Task 1 used; pick one that did not exist before): `grep -rl "hopviz-packet" web/dist/neode-ui/assets/` (adjust the token to the actual class name). It MUST match; if it doesn't, the build silently no-opped — investigate before proceeding.
|
||||
3. Also confirm the OLD inline markup is gone from the bundle source of truth: `grep -c "mesh-hopviz-chain" neode-ui/src/views/Mesh.vue` returns 0.
|
||||
4. Commit the code changes only (docs/planning files are committed by the orchestrator): `git add neode-ui/src/views/mesh/HopVizModal.vue neode-ui/src/views/Mesh.vue neode-ui/src/views/mesh/mesh-styles.css web/dist/neode-ui` — stage exactly these paths, never `git add -A`. Check `git status` first for other agents' unrelated changes and leave them alone. Commit message: `feat(mesh): redesign hop-route visualization — branded, animated, vertical on mobile` ending with the `Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>` trailer. Push: `git push gitea-ai main`.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>grep -rl "hopviz" /home/archipelago/Projects/archy/web/dist/neode-ui/assets/ | head -1 && cd /home/archipelago/Projects/archy && git log --oneline -1 | grep -qi "hop"</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<done>Fresh build in web/dist/neode-ui/ contains the new component's class strings, Mesh.vue no longer contains the old inline hopviz markup, and the change is committed and pushed via gitea-ai.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
- `npm run build` succeeds in neode-ui/; bundle in web/dist/neode-ui/ contains a new hopviz class string (silent-no-op guard).
|
||||
- Old `.mesh-hopviz-*` rules removed; `.mesh-transport-modal-backdrop` / `.mesh-transport-option` / image-quality modal styles untouched (grep mesh-styles.css and open the send-transport modal path in code to confirm shared classes intact).
|
||||
- Modal still Teleports to body with full-screen backdrop.
|
||||
- All five transport branches render: meshcore/meshtastic/reticulum (hop count), tor (3 relays), fips (direct), null (not recorded).
|
||||
- prefers-reduced-motion block present in the new component.
|
||||
<human-check>On the dev preview (:8100 or `npm run dev`), open Mesh chat, click a message's transport pill: desktop shows the wide balanced medallion+packet layout; shrinking the window below the breakpoint flips it vertical. Confirm it "feels Archipelago" — glass, accent glow, EQ-segment motif.</human-check>
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- Desktop hop modal is visually balanced: ~560px panel, prominent glowing endpoint medallions with EQ-segment rings, accent-colored track with animated traveling packet and staggered relay markers.
|
||||
- Mobile (< 560px) renders the chain vertically top-to-bottom with the packet traveling downward; nothing overflows.
|
||||
- Per-transport accent colors match the existing transport pill colors exactly.
|
||||
- Reduced-motion users get a static layout.
|
||||
- Built bundle verified to contain the new strings; code committed and pushed via gitea-ai.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
Executor commits code only. On completion, note results for the orchestrator; no SUMMARY.md required for quick mode unless the orchestrator asks.
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
+85
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: quick-260729-fw7
|
||||
plan: 01
|
||||
subsystem: neode-ui/mesh
|
||||
tags: [frontend, mesh, hop-viz, branding, animation, responsive]
|
||||
requires: []
|
||||
provides:
|
||||
- HopVizModal.vue branded hop-route visualization component
|
||||
affects:
|
||||
- neode-ui mesh chat (transport pill / ⋯ route modal)
|
||||
tech-stack:
|
||||
added: []
|
||||
patterns:
|
||||
- Self-contained Teleport-to-body modal component with scoped styles
|
||||
- EQ-segment ring motif (ScreensaverRing technique) reused for endpoint medallions
|
||||
- CSS custom property accent theming (--hop-accent) derived per transport in JS
|
||||
key-files:
|
||||
created:
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/mesh/HopVizModal.vue
|
||||
modified:
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/Mesh.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/mesh/mesh-styles.css
|
||||
decisions:
|
||||
- "Label strings (transportLabel/signalQualityLabel/timeAgo) passed as props from Mesh.vue — no logic duplication"
|
||||
- "hopVizHops moved into the component (derived from peer.hops); hopVizMsg/hopVizPeer state stays in Mesh.vue"
|
||||
- "web/dist/neode-ui NOT committed — web/ is gitignored (.gitignore:74); build output is intentionally untracked in this repo"
|
||||
metrics:
|
||||
duration: ~15m
|
||||
completed: 2026-07-29
|
||||
status: complete
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Quick Task 260729-fw7: Mesh Hop-Route Visualization Redesign Summary
|
||||
|
||||
**One-liner:** Replaced the cramped 420px inline hop-viz modal with a self-contained branded HopVizModal.vue — 560px balanced desktop layout with EQ-segment-ringed glowing medallions, per-transport accent track with animated traveling packet and staggered relay markers, flipping to a vertical sender-top→recipient-bottom chain below 560px.
|
||||
|
||||
## What Was Built
|
||||
|
||||
- **`neode-ui/src/views/mesh/HopVizModal.vue`** (new, ~430 lines): Teleport-to-body modal, `min(560px, 94vw)` glass panel, `max-height: 90vh` scrollable.
|
||||
- Montserrat transport-colored title; `--hop-accent` / `--hop-accent-soft` / `--hop-accent-faint` CSS vars derived from `msg.transport` matching the chat pill colors exactly (meshtastic #3eb489, meshcore #fb923c, reticulum #60a5fa, lora #f59e0b, fips #a78bfa, tor #818cf8, fallback orange).
|
||||
- Endpoint medallions: 72px (56px mobile), island glyph on an accent-tinted disc with glow, ringed by 14 EQ segments using the ScreensaverRing rotate+translateY+scaleY-pulse technique.
|
||||
- Track: accent gradient line, relay markers positioned fractionally along it — mini 3-bar EQ clusters for radio hops (`min(hops, 6)`), 🧅 ×3 for Tor, none for FIPS/unknown (unknown dims the line). Animated white/accent glowing packet travels sender→recipient on a 2.2s loop.
|
||||
- Per-transport labels preserved verbatim: "direct radio link" / "N hops" / "3 anonymous relays" / "FIPS overlay · direct peer-to-peer" / "transport wasn't recorded".
|
||||
- Staggered entrance (0.05/0.35/0.65s), metadata as glass chips (signal + SNR/RSSI + disclaimer note; E2E badge + delivered ✓✓ + time).
|
||||
- `@media (max-width: 560px)`: chain flips to column, track becomes a vertical line, packet animates top→bottom (`hopviz-packet-y`), same DOM.
|
||||
- `@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce)`: all loops and entrance animations disabled, packet hidden.
|
||||
- **`Mesh.vue`**: inline 50-line Teleport block replaced by `<HopVizModal>`; label helpers passed as computed props; `hopVizHops()` removed (moved into component).
|
||||
- **`mesh-styles.css`**: all `.mesh-hopviz-*` rules and their keyframes/reduced-motion block deleted; `.mesh-chat-transport-clickable`, `.mesh-transport-modal-*` (shared with send-transport + image-quality modals), and `.mesh-chat-more-btn` untouched (12 shared-class occurrences verified intact).
|
||||
|
||||
## Commits
|
||||
|
||||
| Task | Commit | Description |
|
||||
| ---- | ------ | ----------- |
|
||||
| 1–3 | `ac09fc5d` | feat(mesh): redesign hop-route visualization — branded, animated, vertical on mobile |
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
- `npx vue-tsc --noEmit` → exit 0.
|
||||
- `npm run build` → success; bundle guard (CLAUDE.md silent-no-op rule): `hopviz-packet` and `hopviz-medallion` found in `web/dist/neode-ui/assets/Mesh-D2ImmPoh.js` + `Mesh-Dy7zKwro.css`; old `mesh-hopviz-chain` string absent from both source and bundle.
|
||||
- Task 2 grep checks: `max-width: 560px` + `column` present in HopVizModal.vue.
|
||||
- Submodule guard run before commit (no indeedhub paths staged); no file deletions in the commit.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deviations from Plan
|
||||
|
||||
**1. [Rule 3 - Blocking] `web/dist/neode-ui` not staged/committed**
|
||||
- **Found during:** Task 3
|
||||
- **Issue:** Plan said to stage `web/dist/neode-ui`, but `web/` is gitignored (`.gitignore:74`) and untracked — build output is intentionally excluded from the repo (release tarballs are built from it at ship time).
|
||||
- **Fix:** Committed the three source files only; fresh build exists on disk in `web/dist/neode-ui/` and was grep-verified.
|
||||
|
||||
**2. Push deferred to orchestrator** — plan Task 3 said `git push gitea-ai main`, but the executor constraints state the orchestrator handles pushing; not pushed here.
|
||||
|
||||
## Known Stubs
|
||||
|
||||
None — no placeholder text, hardcoded-empty data paths, or unwired components introduced.
|
||||
|
||||
## Human Verification Pending
|
||||
|
||||
On the dev preview (`npm run dev` or :8100), open a mesh chat and click a message's transport pill: desktop shows the wide medallion+packet layout; shrinking below 560px flips it vertical. Confirm brand feel (glass, accent glow, EQ motif).
|
||||
|
||||
## Self-Check: PASSED
|
||||
|
||||
- FOUND: neode-ui/src/views/mesh/HopVizModal.vue
|
||||
- FOUND: commit ac09fc5d on main
|
||||
- FOUND: hopviz strings in web/dist/neode-ui/assets/ (fresh build)
|
||||
- CONFIRMED: 0 occurrences of `mesh-hopviz` in Mesh.vue and mesh-styles.css
|
||||
+348
@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: quick-260729-gjd
|
||||
plan: 01
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 1
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- neode-ui/docker/nginx-demo.conf
|
||||
- neode-ui/docker/indee-demo-signin.js
|
||||
- neode-ui/Dockerfile.web
|
||||
- docker-compose.demo.yml
|
||||
- demo-deploy/docker-compose.yml
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/composables/useDemoIntro.ts
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/appSession/useAppIdentity.ts
|
||||
- neode-ui/mock-backend.js
|
||||
autonomous: true
|
||||
requirements: [QUICK-260729-GJD]
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "A fresh demo session (clean browser, no localStorage) shows IndeeHub as an installed, running app in My Apps"
|
||||
- "Launching IndeeHub in the demo renders the real indee.tx1138.com site inside the in-app iframe session (no new tab, no external interstitial)"
|
||||
- "The embedded IndeeHub boots signed-in (active demo account visible, no login wall) and no identity-picker modal blocks the demo visitor"
|
||||
- "The non-demo (real node) build is byte-for-byte unaffected in behavior: indeedhub launch, identity picker, and NIP-07 bridge all work as before"
|
||||
- "The served demo content contains no occurrence of the private release-server IP (existing Docker build guards still pass)"
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- "neode-ui/docker/nginx-demo.conf — new whole-origin reverse-proxy server block (port 2101) for indee.tx1138.com with framing headers stripped and sign-in script injected"
|
||||
- "neode-ui/docker/indee-demo-signin.js — demo-only localStorage seeding script with a labelled throwaway demo nsec"
|
||||
- "docker-compose.demo.yml and demo-deploy/docker-compose.yml — publish the new 2101 port"
|
||||
- "neode-ui/src/composables/useDemoIntro.ts — indeedhub moved from external-tab to iframe launch via the :2101 proxy origin"
|
||||
- "neode-ui/mock-backend.js — indeedhub present in staticDevApps as installed/running"
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- "demoAppUrl('indeedhub') → http://<demo-host>:2101/ → nginx :2101 server block → https://indee.tx1138.com upstream"
|
||||
- "nginx sub_filter → /__demo/indee-demo-signin.js → seeds indeedhub-accounts + indeedhub-active-account localStorage keys → IndeeHub boot-restore logs the visitor in"
|
||||
- "staticDevApps['indeedhub'] → structuredClone into per-session package-data → My Apps grid on fresh session"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Make IndeeHub a first-class app in the PUBLIC DEMO only: (1) the real site
|
||||
https://indee.tx1138.com/ renders inside the in-app iframe session (today it is
|
||||
frame-busted by `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` and opens externally), (2) a demo
|
||||
visitor sees IndeeHub already signed in with a throwaway demo Nostr identity
|
||||
(no login wall, no identity-picker modal), and (3) IndeeHub appears as an
|
||||
already-installed, running app on a completely fresh demo session.
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: the demo currently punts IndeeHub to a new tab with a login wall —
|
||||
the flagship media app looks broken/hostile to demo visitors.
|
||||
Output: demo-scoped changes across nginx-demo.conf, a new sign-in seed script,
|
||||
the two demo compose files, useDemoIntro.ts, useAppIdentity.ts, mock-backend.js.
|
||||
|
||||
All behavior changes are gated behind IS_DEMO / demo-image build paths. The
|
||||
real-node build must be completely unaffected.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<execution_context>
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md
|
||||
@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/templates/summary.md
|
||||
</execution_context>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
@CLAUDE.md
|
||||
@neode-ui/src/composables/useDemoIntro.ts
|
||||
@neode-ui/docker/nginx-demo.conf
|
||||
@neode-ui/Dockerfile.web
|
||||
@neode-ui/Dockerfile.backend
|
||||
@docker-compose.demo.yml
|
||||
@demo-deploy/docker-compose.yml
|
||||
@neode-ui/src/views/appSession/appSessionConfig.ts
|
||||
@neode-ui/src/views/appSession/useAppIdentity.ts
|
||||
@neode-ui/src/views/appSession/useNostrBridge.ts
|
||||
@neode-ui/src/stores/appLauncher.ts
|
||||
@neode-ui/mock-backend.js
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
<verified_findings>
|
||||
Facts confirmed by inspection on 2026-07-29 (do not re-derive, but re-verify
|
||||
the live-bundle details marked "verify at exec time"):
|
||||
|
||||
- `curl -sI https://indee.tx1138.com/` → `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`, no
|
||||
Content-Security-Policy header today (strip both defensively).
|
||||
- The live index.html loads a hashed module bundle from absolute-root paths
|
||||
(`/assets/index-*.js`, `/icons/...`, `/manifest.json`). This is why the old
|
||||
`/app/indeedhub/` path-prefix + sub_filter proxy broke (asset/router paths
|
||||
escape the prefix). A WHOLE-ORIGIN proxy on a dedicated port has no such
|
||||
problem — the SPA sees itself at `/` and every relative call just works.
|
||||
- The live bundle (assets/index-BMWtjRCn.js) uses applesauce-accounts:
|
||||
- localStorage key `"indeedhub-accounts"` = JSON array of serialized
|
||||
accounts (`Fe.toJSON`/`Fe.fromJSON`), restored on boot before UI renders.
|
||||
- localStorage key `"indeedhub-active-account"` = active account id.
|
||||
- A private-key account class exists whose `fromJSON` does
|
||||
`const t=Vn(e.signer.key); new mr(e.pubkey, new ai(t))` — i.e. shape is
|
||||
`{ id, type: "<verify at exec time>", pubkey, signer: { key: "<hex sk>" } }`
|
||||
plus common fields from `loadCommonFields` (verify exact `type` string and
|
||||
common fields by grepping the live bundle for `static type` / the class's
|
||||
`toJSON`). An `"extension"` account type also exists (fallback path).
|
||||
- The bundle expects NIP-07 as a real `window.nostr` object ("Signer
|
||||
extension missing" guard) — it does NOT contain the archipelago
|
||||
`nostr-request` postMessage client.
|
||||
- Parent-side NIP-07 plumbing already exists: `AppSession.vue` line ~423
|
||||
routes `nostr-request` messages to `useNostrBridge`, which calls
|
||||
`node.nostr-pubkey` (mocked in mock-backend.js) and `node.nostr-sign`
|
||||
(NOT implemented in mock-backend.js). Only needed for the fallback approach.
|
||||
- `useAppIdentity.ts`: `isIdentityAwareApp('indeedhub')` is true → on iframe
|
||||
load with no stored identity it opens the identity-picker modal. In the demo
|
||||
this is a blocking modal the visitor shouldn't see.
|
||||
- `appLauncher.ts openSession`: `IS_DEMO && isDemoExternal(appId)` is the only
|
||||
thing forcing indeedhub external; `NEW_TAB_APP_IDS` is already bypassed when
|
||||
`IS_DEMO && isDemoApp(appId)`. `AppSession.vue mustOpenNewTab` has the same
|
||||
two-clause shape. Removing indeedhub from `DEMO_EXTERNAL_URLS` while keeping
|
||||
`isDemoApp('indeedhub')` true flips it to the iframe path everywhere.
|
||||
- `mock-backend.js`: per-visitor session state is initialized via
|
||||
`md['package-data'] = structuredClone(staticDevApps)` (~line 5493), so
|
||||
adding an entry to `staticDevApps` (~line 828) makes it installed on every
|
||||
fresh session. `APP_PORTS`-style map at ~line 323 already has
|
||||
`'indeedhub': 8190`; an icon exists at `/assets/img/app-icons/indeedhub.png`.
|
||||
- `Dockerfile.web` copies `nginx-demo.conf` to `/etc/nginx/nginx.conf.template`
|
||||
and runs `docker-entrypoint-custom.sh` (env substitution) — read the
|
||||
entrypoint before editing so the new server block's nginx `$vars` survive
|
||||
templating the same way the existing blocks' do.
|
||||
- Both Docker builds already scrub + fail on any occurrence of the private
|
||||
release-server IP; nothing in this change may hardcode host IPs — build the
|
||||
iframe URL from `window.location.hostname`.
|
||||
- `indeedhub/` at repo root is a git submodule (not checked out) — NEVER stage
|
||||
any path under it. `indeedhub-demo/` is a prior standalone-build attempt
|
||||
(clones the GitHub fork, builds with VITE env); this plan supersedes it by
|
||||
proxying the LIVE site instead — leave that directory untouched.
|
||||
</verified_findings>
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: nginx whole-origin proxy on :2101 + sign-in seed script + compose ports</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/docker/nginx-demo.conf, neode-ui/docker/indee-demo-signin.js, neode-ui/Dockerfile.web, docker-compose.demo.yml, demo-deploy/docker-compose.yml, neode-ui/docker/docker-entrypoint.sh</files>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Add a second `server` block to nginx-demo.conf: `listen 2101;` that is a
|
||||
pure whole-origin reverse proxy of `https://indee.tx1138.com` — no path
|
||||
prefix, no URL rewriting (this is the fix for the documented sub_filter
|
||||
breakage: the SPA keeps its own absolute-root paths). In that block:
|
||||
`location / { proxy_pass https://indee.tx1138.com; }` with
|
||||
`proxy_ssl_server_name on;`, `proxy_ssl_name indee.tx1138.com;`,
|
||||
`proxy_set_header Host indee.tx1138.com;`,
|
||||
`proxy_http_version 1.1;` + WebSocket upgrade headers (reuse the existing
|
||||
`$connection_upgrade` map), `proxy_hide_header X-Frame-Options;` and
|
||||
`proxy_hide_header Content-Security-Policy;`. For HTML injection:
|
||||
`proxy_set_header Accept-Encoding "";` (upstream must not gzip or
|
||||
sub_filter no-ops), `sub_filter_types text/html;`, `sub_filter_once on;`,
|
||||
`sub_filter '</head>' '<script src="/__demo/indee-demo-signin.js"></script></head>';`
|
||||
— a classic (non-module) script injected at end of head still executes
|
||||
BEFORE the SPA's deferred module bundle, which is what the seeding needs.
|
||||
Add `location = /__demo/indee-demo-signin.js { root /usr/share/nginx/html; }`
|
||||
(or alias) inside the 2101 server so the seed script is served same-origin
|
||||
to the iframe. Update the comment block that currently explains why
|
||||
IndeeHub is not proxied (lines ~106-109) to describe the new :2101 design.
|
||||
|
||||
Create neode-ui/docker/indee-demo-signin.js: a small plain-JS classic
|
||||
script, clearly headed with a comment stating it is PUBLIC-DEMO-ONLY and
|
||||
that the embedded key is a freshly generated THROWAWAY demo identity, not
|
||||
a real secret. Generate ONE fresh secp256k1 keypair at implementation time
|
||||
(e.g. `node -e` with a tiny script using any available schnorr/secp lib, or
|
||||
a one-off `npx` of nostr-tools in the scratchpad — the generator itself is
|
||||
not committed) and embed hex sk + hex pk as constants. The script: if
|
||||
`localStorage.getItem('indeedhub-accounts')` is empty/absent, write the
|
||||
two keys IndeeHub's boot-restore reads — `indeedhub-accounts` (JSON array
|
||||
with ONE serialized private-key account: verify the exact `type` string
|
||||
and common-field shape against the live bundle per verified_findings, shape
|
||||
`{ id, type, pubkey, signer: { key } }` + whatever `loadCommonFields`
|
||||
round-trips, give it a friendly name/metadata like "Archy Demo" if the
|
||||
shape supports it) and `indeedhub-active-account` (that account's id).
|
||||
Because the script runs on the :2101 origin inside the iframe, this
|
||||
touches only the proxied app's isolated storage. IndeeHub then restores
|
||||
the account on boot and self-signs with its own bundled signer — no
|
||||
window.nostr and no parent bridge required. Do NOT define a partial
|
||||
`window.nostr` in this approach (a pubkey-only shim with a broken
|
||||
signEvent causes worse failures than no shim).
|
||||
|
||||
FALLBACK (only if live testing in Task-3 verification shows the seeded
|
||||
account shape is not accepted): seed an `"extension"`-type account
|
||||
instead, define a `window.nostr` postMessage client in this same script
|
||||
(request/response protocol matching useNostrBridge: post
|
||||
`{type:'nostr-request', id, method, params}` to `window.parent`, resolve on
|
||||
`{type:'nostr-response', id, ...}`), and implement `node.nostr-sign` /
|
||||
`identity.nostr-sign` in mock-backend.js with real schnorr signatures over
|
||||
the same throwaway key (add `nostr-tools` to neode-ui dependencies — it is
|
||||
pure JS and Dockerfile.backend runs `npm install` over package.json).
|
||||
Prefer the primary approach; only fall back with evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
Wire the plumbing: `EXPOSE 2101` in Dockerfile.web (the seed script is
|
||||
already inside `neode-ui/` so the existing `COPY neode-ui/ ./` +
|
||||
dist copy do NOT ship it — add an explicit
|
||||
`COPY neode-ui/docker/indee-demo-signin.js /usr/share/nginx/html/__demo/indee-demo-signin.js`
|
||||
in the nginx stage of Dockerfile.web; it lands only in the demo web image,
|
||||
never in real-node artifacts). Publish the port in docker-compose.demo.yml
|
||||
(`"2101:2101"` on neode-web) and demo-deploy/docker-compose.yml (use an
|
||||
env-overridable mapping consistent with its existing `DEMO_WEB_PORT`
|
||||
style, e.g. `"${DEMO_INDEE_PORT:-2101}:2101"`, and document it in that
|
||||
file's header comment). Read docker-entrypoint.sh first and make sure the
|
||||
new server block survives its template substitution exactly like the
|
||||
existing blocks (same escaping convention for nginx `$` variables); touch
|
||||
the entrypoint only if its substitution list needs it.
|
||||
|
||||
Do not put any host IP in any of these files; upstream hostname
|
||||
indee.tx1138.com is fine.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>docker run --rm -v "$PWD/neode-ui/docker/nginx-demo.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro" nginx:alpine nginx -t (or, if docker unavailable locally, `nginx -t -c` via a podman run — config must parse). Plus: grep -c "2101" neode-ui/docker/nginx-demo.conf docker-compose.demo.yml demo-deploy/docker-compose.yml neode-ui/Dockerfile.web — each ≥1; grep -q "indee-demo-signin" neode-ui/docker/nginx-demo.conf && grep -qi "throwaway" neode-ui/docker/indee-demo-signin.js</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<done>nginx config parses with the new :2101 whole-origin proxy block (framing headers stripped, sub_filter injection, WS upgrade); seed script exists with labelled throwaway demo key and idempotent localStorage seeding; both compose files publish 2101; demo web image copies the script and exposes the port; no host IPs added anywhere.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: demo frontend — iframe launch via :2101 and no identity-picker wall</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/src/composables/useDemoIntro.ts, neode-ui/src/views/appSession/useAppIdentity.ts</files>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
In useDemoIntro.ts: remove `indeedhub` from `DEMO_EXTERNAL_URLS` (delete
|
||||
the map entirely if it becomes empty, simplifying `isDemoExternal` to
|
||||
return false — keep the exported function so call sites in appLauncher.ts
|
||||
and AppSession.vue compile unchanged). Make `demoAppUrl('indeedhub')`
|
||||
return the proxied origin built at runtime:
|
||||
`${window.location.protocol}//${window.location.hostname}:2101/`
|
||||
(hostname, never a hardcoded host/IP — works on any deploy host). Keep
|
||||
`isDemoApp('indeedhub')` true (it must stay in the demoable set so the
|
||||
NEW_TAB bypass in appLauncher.openSession and AppSession.mustOpenNewTab
|
||||
keeps routing it into the in-app iframe session, and so the install
|
||||
button stays enabled). Update the file-header comment block that
|
||||
currently documents the external-tab workaround to describe the :2101
|
||||
whole-origin proxy design instead. SSR-safety is not a concern (Vite SPA)
|
||||
but guard `typeof window !== 'undefined'` if other tests import the module
|
||||
in node context — check the existing unit tests under
|
||||
src/views/appSession/__tests__/ and src/stores/__tests__/ for assertions
|
||||
about indeedhub being demo-external and update them to the new behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
In useAppIdentity.ts: gate the picker for the demo. Import IS_DEMO from
|
||||
useDemoIntro and in `onIframeLoadIdentity` / `handleIdentityRequest`,
|
||||
when IS_DEMO is true, never set `showIdentityPicker` — the demo visitor
|
||||
must not be interrupted by an identity modal (the embedded IndeeHub is
|
||||
already signed in via the seeded account from Task 1, and `sendIdentity`'s
|
||||
`identity.sign` RPC is not what logs it in). Real-node behavior
|
||||
(picker on first launch) is untouched because IS_DEMO is compile-time
|
||||
false there.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && npx vitest run src/views/appSession src/stores --silent 2>&1 | tail -5 (all green) && VITE_DEMO=1 npm run build && grep -rq "2101" dist/assets && npm run build && grep -rq "indee.tx1138.com" dist/assets && echo BUNDLE-OK</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<done>Demo build (VITE_DEMO=1) bundle contains the :2101 launch logic (grep hit proves the build didn't silently no-op — per CLAUDE.md); plain build still compiles and demo-gated branches do not alter non-demo behavior; unit tests updated and green; launching indeedhub in demo resolves to the same-host :2101 origin in the iframe session; identity picker suppressed only under IS_DEMO.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 3: mock backend — IndeeHub pre-installed on fresh demo sessions</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/mock-backend.js</files>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Add an `indeedhub` entry to `staticDevApps` in mock-backend.js using the
|
||||
existing `staticApp({...})` helper: id `indeedhub`, title `Indeehub`
|
||||
(match the existing title map at ~line 537 and APP_TITLES), a short/long
|
||||
description consistent with the marketplace copy ("Bitcoin documentary
|
||||
streaming platform" per the existing entry), `state: 'running'`,
|
||||
`lanPort: 8190` (matches the existing port map), icon
|
||||
`/assets/img/app-icons/indeedhub.png`. Because per-session demo state is
|
||||
`structuredClone(staticDevApps)`, this alone makes it installed+running on
|
||||
every fresh session. Then reconcile the rest of the mock so nothing
|
||||
contradicts installed status: check the marketplace/available-apps mock
|
||||
responses and any install/uninstall handlers (~lines 540-740, 1900-1960,
|
||||
4900+) for `indeedhub` entries that would render it as not-installed or
|
||||
double-listed, and check `DEMO_APP_PAGES` does NOT grow an indeedhub
|
||||
placeholder (the demo launch URL bypasses /app/indeedhub/ entirely — the
|
||||
iframe goes to the :2101 origin). Keep the existing `node.nostr-pubkey`
|
||||
mock as-is unless Task 1's fallback path was taken (in which case align
|
||||
its pubkey with the throwaway demo key and add the sign handlers described
|
||||
there).
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && node -e "const s=require('fs').readFileSync('mock-backend.js','utf8'); if(!/staticDevApps[\s\S]*?indeedhub:\s*staticApp/.test(s)) process.exit(1)" && (DEMO=1 timeout 20 node mock-backend.js & sleep 4; curl -s -X POST localhost:5959/rpc/v1 -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"method":"server.data","id":1}' -H 'cookie: demo=fresh' | grep -o '"indeedhub"' | head -1; kill %1 2>/dev/null) — expect an indeedhub hit in fresh-session package-data (adapt the RPC method/auth to what the mock actually serves; a login with the demo password first is fine)</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<done>A fresh demo session's package-data includes indeedhub as installed and running with launchable UI; My Apps shows it without an install step; no duplicate/contradictory indeedhub listing in marketplace mocks; mock backend boots cleanly with DEMO=1.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<threat_model>
|
||||
## Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| demo nginx :2101 → indee.tx1138.com | demo host proxies an external site; upstream content is served under the demo host |
|
||||
| iframe (:2101 origin) ↔ parent (:2100 origin) | cross-origin; parent NIP-07 bridge only used in fallback path |
|
||||
| public visitors → demo host | anyone can drive the proxy |
|
||||
|
||||
## STRIDE Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| T-gjd-01 | Spoofing | throwaway demo nostr key | low | accept | key is a labelled public demo identity by design; generated fresh, never a real user key; anyone extracting it can only impersonate "the demo visitor" |
|
||||
| T-gjd-02 | Info disclosure | private release-server IP in served content | high | mitigate | no host IPs added in any changed file; iframe URL derived from window.location.hostname; existing Docker-build scrub+fail guards remain the backstop |
|
||||
| T-gjd-03 | Tampering | open reverse proxy on :2101 | medium | mitigate | proxy is pinned to a single upstream host (proxy_pass fixed hostname + proxy_ssl_name), no dynamic upstreams, no request-driven destinations — it cannot be used as an open proxy |
|
||||
| T-gjd-04 | Elevation | header stripping (X-Frame-Options/CSP) | low | accept | stripping applies only to the :2101 demo proxy of one known site, demo image only; real-node builds never carry this config |
|
||||
| T-gjd-SC | Tampering | npm installs | low | accept | primary path adds no dependencies; fallback path adds only nostr-tools (well-known, verify on npmjs.com before install) |
|
||||
</threat_model>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
Local (executor, before commit):
|
||||
1. nginx config parses (Task 1 verify).
|
||||
2. Unit tests green; VITE_DEMO=1 build contains ":2101" logic; plain build
|
||||
unaffected (Task 2 verify). Note: demo-gated strings are tree-shaken out of
|
||||
the plain build — that is EXPECTED; the bundle-grep for demo strings must be
|
||||
done on the VITE_DEMO=1 build, which is exactly what the demo Docker image
|
||||
builds (Dockerfile.web defaults ARG VITE_DEMO=1).
|
||||
3. Fresh-session mock package-data includes indeedhub (Task 3 verify).
|
||||
4. Optional full-stack smoke: `docker compose -f docker-compose.demo.yml up
|
||||
--build` locally, browse http://localhost:2100 in a private window →
|
||||
login `entertoexit` → IndeeHub installed → launch → iframe renders the
|
||||
proxied site from http://localhost:2101 with a signed-in account.
|
||||
5. `git status` — confirm nothing under indeedhub/ is staged, ever.
|
||||
|
||||
Post-deploy on vps2 (orchestrator deploys; verify on http://146.59.87.168:2100):
|
||||
1. `curl -sI http://146.59.87.168:2101/` returns 200 with NO X-Frame-Options
|
||||
header and the injected `indee-demo-signin.js` tag in the HTML body
|
||||
(`curl -s http://146.59.87.168:2101/ | grep indee-demo-signin`). If the
|
||||
port is unreachable, the vps2 firewall needs 2101 opened — flag to
|
||||
orchestrator.
|
||||
2. Fresh private browser window → :2100 → login → IndeeHub shows installed/
|
||||
running on the dashboard/My Apps without any install action.
|
||||
3. Launch IndeeHub → renders inside the in-app iframe (panel/overlay), not a
|
||||
new tab; content browsable; no identity-picker modal.
|
||||
4. Signed-in check: IndeeHub header shows an active account (avatar/profile
|
||||
instead of a sign-in button). If the seeded account shape was rejected
|
||||
(login wall still visible), execute the documented fallback (extension
|
||||
account + window.nostr shim + mock signer) and redeploy.
|
||||
5. View-source/network spot-check: no occurrence of the private
|
||||
release-server IP in any served response.
|
||||
6. Repeat-visit check: reload the iframe once — a service worker registered by
|
||||
IndeeHub may serve cached HTML without the injected tag on later loads;
|
||||
that is acceptable because localStorage is already seeded on first load,
|
||||
but confirm sign-in persists.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- Demo visitor on a fresh browser sees IndeeHub installed, launches it into
|
||||
the in-app iframe, and browses indee.tx1138.com content signed in — zero
|
||||
clicks spent on install/login/identity modals.
|
||||
- Real-node build behavior unchanged (all changes IS_DEMO- or demo-image-gated).
|
||||
- No secrets committed beyond the labelled throwaway demo key; nothing staged
|
||||
under indeedhub/; demo serves no private release-server IP.
|
||||
- Work committed in focused commits (infra / frontend / mock) with the
|
||||
Co-Authored-By trailer and pushed via gitea-ai per CLAUDE.md; docs left to
|
||||
the orchestrator.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
Create `.planning/quick/260729-gjd-demo-make-indee-tx1138-com-work-in-the-a/260729-gjd-SUMMARY.md` when done.
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
+107
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: quick-260729-gjd
|
||||
plan: 01
|
||||
subsystem: public-demo
|
||||
tags: [demo, indeedhub, nginx, reverse-proxy, nostr, mock-backend]
|
||||
requires: []
|
||||
provides:
|
||||
- "IndeeHub whole-origin demo proxy on :2101 (framing headers stripped, sign-in seeded)"
|
||||
- "Demo iframe launch of indeedhub via demoAppUrl → <host>:2101/"
|
||||
- "IndeeHub pre-installed/running on every fresh demo session"
|
||||
affects: [demo-deploy, neode-ui demo image]
|
||||
tech-stack:
|
||||
added: []
|
||||
patterns:
|
||||
- "Whole-origin per-port reverse proxy for frame-busting external SPAs (vs broken path-prefix sub_filter)"
|
||||
- "localStorage seeding via injected classic script on the proxied origin (applesauce-accounts nsec account)"
|
||||
key-files:
|
||||
created:
|
||||
- neode-ui/docker/indee-demo-signin.js
|
||||
modified:
|
||||
- neode-ui/docker/nginx-demo.conf
|
||||
- neode-ui/Dockerfile.web
|
||||
- docker-compose.demo.yml
|
||||
- demo-deploy/docker-compose.yml
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/composables/useDemoIntro.ts
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/appSession/useAppIdentity.ts
|
||||
- neode-ui/mock-backend.js
|
||||
decisions:
|
||||
- "Primary sign-in path used (seeded nsec account, self-signing) — NIP-07 bridge fallback NOT needed; verified against the live bundle"
|
||||
- "Dropped `sub_filter_types text/html` (text/html is nginx's default sub_filter type; explicit listing produced a duplicate-MIME warning)"
|
||||
metrics:
|
||||
duration: "~50 min"
|
||||
completed: 2026-07-29
|
||||
status: complete
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Quick Task 260729-gjd: IndeeHub in the Demo Summary
|
||||
|
||||
**One-liner:** Whole-origin nginx proxy of indee.tx1138.com on :2101 with an injected throwaway-nsec sign-in seeder, demo iframe launch via same-host :2101, and IndeeHub pre-installed in every fresh mock-backend session.
|
||||
|
||||
## Commits
|
||||
|
||||
| Task | Commit | Scope |
|
||||
|------|--------|-------|
|
||||
| 1 | 69bc3d3f | nginx :2101 whole-origin proxy + indee-demo-signin.js seeder + Dockerfile.web COPY/EXPOSE + both compose files publish 2101 |
|
||||
| 2 | 66d540f8 | useDemoIntro: DEMO_EXTERNAL_URLS → DEMO_PROXY_PORTS, demoAppUrl builds `<protocol>//<hostname>:2101/`; useAppIdentity: picker suppressed under IS_DEMO |
|
||||
| 3 | d00ca624 | mock-backend.js staticDevApps gains indeedhub (running, lanPort 8190) → installed on every fresh session |
|
||||
|
||||
## What was verified at exec time (live-bundle facts)
|
||||
|
||||
- Live site still serves `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`, no CSP; bundle `assets/index-BMWtjRCn.js`.
|
||||
- Account serialization confirmed by de-minifying the live bundle: private-key account class has `static type="nsec"`, `toJSON` → `{ signer: { key: <hex sk> }, id, pubkey, metadata, type }`; the manager registers the nsec type (`MM(Fe)` registers `mr`) and restores from `indeedhub-accounts` + activates by id from `indeedhub-active-account`. `Vn`/`je` confirmed hex decode/encode.
|
||||
- Pubkey math independently validated against BIP340 test vectors (sk=1 → Gx, sk=3 → F9308A01…) before embedding the generated pair. Mismatch would trigger the bundle's "Account signer mismatch" guard, so this was load-bearing.
|
||||
|
||||
## Throwaway demo identity
|
||||
|
||||
Freshly generated 2026-07-29 for this task (generator ran in scratchpad, not committed):
|
||||
- pk `7261540160244ec65ce0bf86ba03997e9b1b3b35c277e416bf1c7ba4271fee31`
|
||||
- sk embedded in `neode-ui/docker/indee-demo-signin.js`, clearly labelled PUBLIC-DEMO-ONLY / not a secret (threat T-gjd-01: accepted by design). Never a real user key.
|
||||
|
||||
## Local verification results
|
||||
|
||||
1. **nginx parse:** `nginx -t` clean in `nginx:alpine` (podman, with `--add-host neode-backend:127.0.0.1` to satisfy the pre-existing upstream reference).
|
||||
2. **Live proxy smoke (podman, config + seeder mounted):** `curl` through :2101 → 200, **no X-Frame-Options / CSP**, injected `<script src="/__demo/indee-demo-signin.js">` present in HTML, seed script served same-origin, hashed asset `/assets/index-BMWtjRCn.js` proxied 200.
|
||||
3. **Unit tests:** 195/195 green (`src/views/appSession` + `src/stores`), running with IS_DEMO=false — non-demo path exercised.
|
||||
4. **Demo build:** `VITE_DEMO=1 npm run build` succeeded; bundle (`web/dist/neode-ui/assets/index-ChDwfLt5.js`) contains the 2101 launch logic. This is exactly what Dockerfile.web builds (ARG VITE_DEMO=1 default).
|
||||
5. **Mock backend:** boots with DEMO=1; `/ws/db` initial dump of a fresh session contains `indeedhub` with `state=running`, ui=true, lan `http://localhost:8190`.
|
||||
6. **No IP leaks:** none of the changed files contain the private release-server IP; pre-existing occurrences in dist (catalog.json/marketplace data) are scrubbed+gated by the existing Dockerfile.web guard.
|
||||
7. **Submodule guard:** ran before all three commits; nothing under `indeedhub/` ever staged. No file deletions in any commit.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deviations from Plan
|
||||
|
||||
**1. [Minor] Dropped `sub_filter_types text/html` from the :2101 block**
|
||||
- **Found during:** Task 1 nginx parse check
|
||||
- **Issue:** nginx warns `duplicate MIME type "text/html"` — text/html is sub_filter's built-in default type
|
||||
- **Fix:** removed the redundant directive (identical behavior), noted in a comment
|
||||
- **Commit:** 69bc3d3f
|
||||
|
||||
**2. [Environment] Plain (non-demo) build + vue-tsc typecheck could not be run — permission denied**
|
||||
- Three attempts (`npm run build`, `vite build --outDir <scratch>`, `vue-tsc --noEmit`) were denied by the permission system mid-execution.
|
||||
- **Proxy coverage:** 195 unit tests ran and passed under IS_DEMO=false (compiles + non-demo runtime behavior), and the demo build compiled the same source. All changed TS is IS_DEMO-gated with types unchanged at call sites.
|
||||
- **Residual risk:** low; a plain `npm run build` before the next real-node frontend ship will confirm (it runs vue-tsc).
|
||||
|
||||
**3. [Flag] `web/dist/neode-ui/` currently holds a VITE_DEMO=1 bundle**
|
||||
- The demo verification build overwrote the (gitignored) `web/dist/neode-ui` output. **Rebuild with a plain `npm run build` before any real-node frontend deploy/ISO/OTA that rsyncs `web/dist`** — do not ship the demo bundle to real nodes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Fallback status
|
||||
|
||||
The plan's fallback (extension-type account + window.nostr postMessage shim + mock signer) was **not needed** — the primary seeded-nsec path matches the live bundle's restore contract exactly. If post-deploy testing shows a login wall anyway, the fallback is fully documented in the PLAN (Task 1 action block).
|
||||
|
||||
## Post-deploy checklist for orchestrator (vps2, after demo image rebuild + redeploy)
|
||||
|
||||
1. `curl -sI http://146.59.87.168:2101/` → 200, NO `X-Frame-Options`; `curl -s http://146.59.87.168:2101/ | grep indee-demo-signin` → hit. **If unreachable: open port 2101 in the vps2 firewall** (new requirement of this change).
|
||||
2. Fresh private window → `http://146.59.87.168:2100` → login `entertoexit` → IndeeHub shows installed/running in My Apps with no install step.
|
||||
3. Launch IndeeHub → renders inside the in-app iframe session (not a new tab), content browsable, **no identity-picker modal**.
|
||||
4. Signed-in check: IndeeHub header shows an active account (avatar/profile, not a sign-in button). Note: the throwaway key has no published kind-0 profile, so expect a default avatar/truncated npub rather than a named profile — that still counts as signed in. If a login wall appears, execute the documented fallback and redeploy.
|
||||
5. Spot-check served responses for the private release-server IP (should be none; build guard enforces).
|
||||
6. Reload the iframe once — sign-in must persist (localStorage already seeded even if a service worker serves cached HTML without the injected tag).
|
||||
7. Reminder: the `demo-deploy` thin stack now publishes `${DEMO_INDEE_PORT:-2101}:2101` — the public archy-demo repo copy of that compose file needs syncing when the images ship.
|
||||
|
||||
## Self-Check: PASSED
|
||||
|
||||
- neode-ui/docker/indee-demo-signin.js — FOUND
|
||||
- neode-ui/docker/nginx-demo.conf :2101 block — FOUND
|
||||
- Commits 69bc3d3f, 66d540f8, d00ca624 — FOUND in git log
|
||||
- No paths under indeedhub/ in any commit — VERIFIED
|
||||
- SUMMARY frontmatter status: complete — SET
|
||||
+376
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: quick-260729-hj1
|
||||
plan: 01
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 1
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- neode-ui/mock-backend.js
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/PeerFiles.vue
|
||||
- demo/content/music/ (2 new Wavlake mp3s)
|
||||
- demo/peer-media/ (Wavlake artwork + replaced photo-*.jpg files)
|
||||
autonomous: true
|
||||
requirements: [A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8]
|
||||
user_setup: []
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "Searching the Cloud files search for the Wavlake track titles returns them as peer-file results from at least one demo peer (A1, A2)"
|
||||
- "The first Wavlake track is PAID; buying it via the demo ecash flow immediately autoplays it in the bottom GlobalAudioPlayer bar (A3)"
|
||||
- "Cloud -> Paid Files tab shows pre-seeded purchase-history entries (sats paid + date); clicking an audio purchase plays it in the bottom bar (A4)"
|
||||
- "The aggregated Peer Files tab shows each library item on ~1 peer, with only 2-3 items deliberately duplicated across peers (A5)"
|
||||
- "Photo peer files show real photographs as card previews and in the full-screen viewer, not picsum placeholders (A6)"
|
||||
- "In the PeerFiles gallery, clicking a FREE image opens the full-screen image viewer (A8); free audio -> bottom player; free video -> video modal; paid unowned items stay gated behind the pay modal (A7)"
|
||||
- "Real-node build unaffected: all existing unit tests stay green, npm run build succeeds, and the frontend changes degrade gracefully when the real backend omits demo-only fields"
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- "demo/content/music/: two downloaded Wavlake mp3s (real bytes, committed)"
|
||||
- "demo/peer-media/: Wavlake artwork jpg(s) + photo-*.jpg replaced with real photographs"
|
||||
- "neode-ui/mock-backend.js: Wavlake PEER_LIBRARY entries, deduped peerCatalogFor, seeded+persistent owned-content state, real-bytes paid/owned downloads, /api/peer-content streaming route"
|
||||
- "neode-ui/src/views/PeerFiles.vue: click-to-open viewer routing incl. free-image lightbox fix, unified post-payment in-app open/autoplay"
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- "content.download-peer-paid must return real bytes + correct mime_type -> confirmEcashPay's audio branch -> audioPlayer.play (this is the A3 autoplay chain; today the mock returns text/plain which breaks it)"
|
||||
- "new /api/peer-content/:onion/:id mock route -> free-audio streaming AND the free-image viewer src (frontend already builds this URL at PeerFiles.vue:1011/1470; it 404s in the demo today)"
|
||||
- "seeded content.owned-list entries must reference onions of the SAME session's demoFederationNodes() output and items actually present in that peer's peerCatalogFor slice, or Owned badges will not line up"
|
||||
- "mock content.owned-list must include session purchases, otherwise loadOwned() (called after every purchase at PeerFiles.vue:1314) wipes the just-bought Owned state"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Peer-files media batch for the public demo plus two shared-behavior fixes.
|
||||
|
||||
Demo/mock only (A1-A6): add two real Wavlake tracks (metadata + bytes fetched at
|
||||
execution time), make the first one PAID with a working pay -> autoplay-in-bottom-bar
|
||||
flow, seed visible purchase history, dedupe the peer catalog to ~2-3 intentional
|
||||
duplicates, and replace picsum placeholder photos with real photographs.
|
||||
|
||||
Both builds (A7, A8): clicking a peer file opens the appropriate viewer (photos ->
|
||||
full-screen image viewer, audio -> bottom music player, video -> video modal), and
|
||||
fix the confirmed bug that FREE images are a click no-op in the PeerFiles gallery
|
||||
(PeerFiles.vue line 91 ternary falls through to `undefined` for non-playable free items).
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: the peer-files demo is a flagship "buy content over the mesh" showcase; today
|
||||
paid purchases unlock a text placeholder, free images don't open, free streaming 404s,
|
||||
and the catalog is visibly duplicate-heavy.
|
||||
Output: updated mock-backend.js + committed demo media assets + PeerFiles.vue behavior
|
||||
fixes, tests green, built bundle verified.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
|
||||
## Verified recon (do not re-derive; spot-check only)
|
||||
|
||||
**Wavlake API (probed 2026-07-29, works from this network):**
|
||||
- Track 1 (user link `wavlake.com/track/3504d80b-...`):
|
||||
`https://catalog.wavlake.com/v1/tracks/3504d80b-b4bf-4196-923b-7ed8b60caec9`
|
||||
returns `data.title = "WEBFIVEFOURTHREETWOONE"`, `data.artist = "Zazawowow"`,
|
||||
`data.albumTitle = "WEBFIVE"`, `data.duration = 249`,
|
||||
`data.artworkUrl = https://d12wklypp119aj.cloudfront.net/image/ed6c75e5-e469-4f52-b073-a18b237dadae.jpg`,
|
||||
and a stream URL whose direct CDN form is
|
||||
`https://d12wklypp119aj.cloudfront.net/track/3504d80b-b4bf-4196-923b-7ed8b60caec9.mp3`
|
||||
(HTTP 200, `content-type: audio/mpeg`, `content-length: 6041903`, accept-ranges,
|
||||
NO signature/expiry params — stable).
|
||||
- Album (user link `wavlake.com/album/9be3cdce-...`):
|
||||
`https://catalog.wavlake.com/v1/albums/9be3cdce-015e-4e7e-8ffe-c017945465c4`
|
||||
returns title "Michael Michael Saylor" (single) by Zazawowow with one track id
|
||||
`ba80e385-62a5-4309-ac1e-bb0493b8539f`. Fetch that id from the tracks endpoint for
|
||||
its metadata; its mp3 follows the same CDN pattern
|
||||
(`https://d12wklypp119aj.cloudfront.net/track/ba80e385-62a5-4309-ac1e-bb0493b8539f.mp3`).
|
||||
- Hotlink-vs-download criterion (decided): DOWNLOAD the mp3s + artwork into the repo.
|
||||
The CDN URLs are stable, but the mock serves content as base64 bytes / disk files
|
||||
(`content.download-peer`, `content.preview-peer` read `entry.disk` with
|
||||
`fsSync.readFileSync`), so committed local files are the architecturally consistent
|
||||
choice and remove any CORS/expiry/offline risk. This matches the existing pattern —
|
||||
`demo/content/music/*.mp3` and `demo/peer-media/*.jpg` are already committed real files.
|
||||
External wavlake/CDN URLs would be allowed under the demo IP-leak rule (only
|
||||
146.59.87.168 must never appear), but are simply not needed.
|
||||
|
||||
**Mock backend (`neode-ui/mock-backend.js`, port 5959, RPC at `/rpc/v1`):**
|
||||
- `PEER_LIBRARY` at line ~1256: films/series/books paid (no disk bytes), music/photos/
|
||||
docs free with `disk:` pointing at committed files under `demo/content/` and
|
||||
`demo/peer-media/` (helpers `PEER_MEDIA`/`PEER_CONTENT` at lines 1254-1255).
|
||||
- `peerCatalogFor(onion)` line ~1321: hash-based slice; the
|
||||
`((seed ^ (i * 2654435761)) >>> 0) % 12 < 3` clause puts each item on ~25% of the
|
||||
12 peers (`demoFederationNodes()` line ~1339, onions are RANDOM per session) —
|
||||
this is the heavy-duplication source (A5).
|
||||
- `content.preview-peer` (line ~2358): serves `entry.preview` or the image's `disk`.
|
||||
- `content.download-peer` (line ~2372): serves `entry.disk` bytes, else text placeholder.
|
||||
- `content.owned-list` (line ~2402): returns `{ items: [] }` — no purchase history, and
|
||||
it CLOBBERS just-bought state (see key_links).
|
||||
- `content.owned-get` / `content.download-peer-paid` / `-invoice` / `-onchain`
|
||||
(lines ~2405-2425): all return a TEXT PLACEHOLDER (`mime_type: text/plain`) — this is
|
||||
why paid autoplay (A3) cannot work today. Ecash rail deduction logic here must be kept.
|
||||
- There is NO `/api/peer-content/:onion/:id` route — the frontend's free-item stream
|
||||
URL (PeerFiles.vue lines 1011 and 1470) 404s in the demo.
|
||||
|
||||
**Frontend (`neode-ui/src/views/PeerFiles.vue`, 1616 lines):**
|
||||
- Card click (line 91): `isOwned ? viewOwned : (isPlayable ? playMedia : undefined)` —
|
||||
free images fall to `undefined` = the A8 bug. `isPlayable` (line 963) is video/audio only.
|
||||
- `viewOwned` (line 702): audio -> `audioPlayer.play` (bottom bar), image/video -> the
|
||||
Teleport-to-body "Owned-content viewer" modal (template line 310, footer hardcodes
|
||||
"Owned · unlocked" at line 354).
|
||||
- `confirmEcashPay` (line 1277): on success marks owned, audio -> `audioPlayer.play`
|
||||
(A3 autoplay ALREADY implemented here — only the mock's text/plain response breaks it),
|
||||
then `void loadOwned()` (line 1314).
|
||||
- `payWithLightning` (line 1364), `pollInvoice` (line 1417), `pollOnchain` (line 1197):
|
||||
on success these call `triggerDownload` (browser download) instead of the in-app
|
||||
open/autoplay path — inconsistent with confirmEcashPay.
|
||||
- `playMedia` (line 1460): free audio -> `audioPlayer.play(streamUrl)`, free video ->
|
||||
video modal via the same `/api/peer-content/` stream URL; paid uses
|
||||
`content.preview-peer` bytes ("10% preview"). NOTE: for a PAID AUDIO item the
|
||||
pre-purchase Preview button plays whatever `content.preview-peer` returns — so for the
|
||||
paid Wavlake track the mock MUST return audio bytes there, not artwork.
|
||||
- Preview thumbnails (watcher line 872): fetched ONLY for image/video mimes; audio cards
|
||||
show a waveform icon. The real backend's `content.preview-peer`
|
||||
(core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/content.rs:1113) proxies the seller's
|
||||
`/content/{id}/preview` — for audio that is audio bytes, so do NOT extend the
|
||||
thumbnail watcher to audio (it would fetch audio blobs as "thumbnails" on real nodes).
|
||||
- `Cloud.vue`: Paid Files tab (line ~155) lists `content.owned-list` items
|
||||
(`PaidItem { onion, content_id, filename, mime_type, size_bytes, paid_sats,
|
||||
purchased_at }`) and `viewPaidItem` (line ~470) plays audio in the bottom bar — this
|
||||
is the A4 purchase-history surface, already built; it only needs seeded data.
|
||||
Cloud search (`runSearch` line ~880) filters the aggregated `peerFiles` by filename —
|
||||
Wavlake items are searchable as soon as they appear in any peer's catalog slice.
|
||||
- `GlobalAudioPlayer` is mounted in `App.vue` (line 48); `useAudioPlayer` is a global
|
||||
singleton — nothing to change there.
|
||||
- Tests: `src/views/__tests__/PeerFilesRefresh.test.ts` mounts PeerFiles.vue — keep green.
|
||||
|
||||
**Project rules that bind this work:**
|
||||
- Modals/lightboxes must Teleport to body with full-screen backdrop (the existing
|
||||
owned-content viewer already complies — reuse it).
|
||||
- Do not add new UI entry points (no new tabs/cards/nav); only change behavior of
|
||||
existing elements.
|
||||
- NEVER stage/commit anything under `indeedhub/` (git submodule). Stage explicitly by
|
||||
path (`git add <paths>`), never `git add -A`.
|
||||
- Never expose 146.59.87.168 in demo-served content.
|
||||
- Commit each task when it works, message trailer `Co-Authored-By: Claude ...`.
|
||||
Executor commits code only; docs/summary are committed by the orchestrator.
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: Demo dataset — Wavlake tracks, real photos, dedupe, purchases, real paid bytes, streaming route</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/mock-backend.js, demo/content/music/ (2 new mp3s), demo/peer-media/ (artwork + replaced photo-*.jpg)</files>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
All changes in this task are demo/mock-only (mock-backend.js is not part of the
|
||||
real-node build).
|
||||
|
||||
1. Fetch Wavlake assets at execution time (A1, A2). Use curl against the verified
|
||||
endpoints in context: resolve track 3504d80b-b4bf-4196-923b-7ed8b60caec9 and the
|
||||
album 9be3cdce-015e-4e7e-8ffe-c017945465c4's single track
|
||||
ba80e385-62a5-4309-ac1e-bb0493b8539f via catalog.wavlake.com/v1/tracks/{id}.
|
||||
Parse real title/artist/albumTitle/duration/artworkUrl from the JSON (jq or node -e)
|
||||
— do NOT hardcode metadata from this plan except the ids; the API is the source of
|
||||
truth. Download each track's CDN mp3 into demo/content/music/ (filename derived from
|
||||
real title, e.g. "Zazawowow - WEBFIVEFOURTHREETWOONE.mp3") and each artworkUrl jpg
|
||||
into demo/peer-media/. Sanity-check downloads with file(1): mp3s must be MPEG audio
|
||||
(~6MB expected for track 1), artwork must be JPEG. Abort and report if the API shape
|
||||
changed.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Add both tracks to PEER_LIBRARY (A1-A3). mime_type audio/mpeg, real size_bytes
|
||||
(actual file size), disk: PEER_CONTENT('music', <filename>), description carrying
|
||||
real artist/album/duration metadata (this makes artist searchable too). First track
|
||||
(WEBFIVEFOURTHREETWOONE): access paid with a price the demo ecash balance easily
|
||||
covers (e.g. 21 sats). Second track: access 'free'. For the PAID track, give it a
|
||||
preview behavior consistent with playMedia: content.preview-peer for audio entries
|
||||
must return AUDIO bytes (read entry.disk; serving the full mp3 is acceptable for the
|
||||
demo, or the first ~10% byte-slice to match the "10% preview" badge — mp3 frames
|
||||
tolerate truncation), NOT the artwork jpg — see the recon note on playMedia's paid
|
||||
path. Keep image entries' preview behavior unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Dedupe peerCatalogFor (A5). Replace the probabilistic
|
||||
`((seed ^ (i * 2654435761)) >>> 0) % 12 < 3` inclusion with a deterministic
|
||||
assignment: each PEER_LIBRARY item lives on exactly one peer (e.g. index-based
|
||||
slot), plus a small explicit POPULAR list of 2-3 item ids that additionally appear
|
||||
on 1-2 more peers (a little duplication is realistic). Keep the function signature
|
||||
and per-session determinism (same onion -> same slice within a session). Ensure both
|
||||
Wavlake tracks land on at least one trusted peer's slice so Cloud search finds them.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Real photos (A6). Replace all ten demo/peer-media/photo-*.jpg picsum placeholders
|
||||
with real photographs downloaded at execution time from a stable free-license source
|
||||
(Wikimedia Commons Special:FilePath URLs with a width parameter, e.g. ?width=1200,
|
||||
are reliable and hotlink-free once committed). Pick images that match each entry's
|
||||
existing description (aurora over fjord, mountain lake, neon city rain, desert
|
||||
dunes, forest mist, ocean cliff, northern road, autumn valley, harbor dawn, alpine
|
||||
ridge) or update the descriptions (including the "sourced via picsum.photos"
|
||||
credit text and the stale PEER_LIBRARY header comment) to match reality. Keep the
|
||||
photo-*.jpg filenames so PEER_MEDIA references don't change; update each entry's
|
||||
size_bytes to the new actual file size. Verify each file with file(1) is a real
|
||||
JPEG of reasonable resolution (>= ~1000px wide).
|
||||
|
||||
5. Owned/purchase state (A3, A4). Introduce a mock owned-content store (e.g.
|
||||
mockState.ownedContent array of { onion, content_id, filename, mime_type,
|
||||
size_bytes, paid_sats, purchased_at }). Lazily seed it on first access with 2-4
|
||||
plausible past purchases dated days-to-weeks ago, referencing onions from the
|
||||
CURRENT session's demoFederationNodes() output and content ids actually present in
|
||||
that peer's peerCatalogFor slice (onions are random per session — compute, don't
|
||||
hardcode). At least one seeded purchase must be an audio item backed by real disk
|
||||
bytes so the Paid Files tab click plays music. content.owned-list returns this
|
||||
store (all fields of Cloud.vue's PaidItem interface). Every successful purchase
|
||||
path (content.download-peer-paid, and the -invoice/-onchain and onchain/invoice
|
||||
status flows' download calls) appends an entry with the real price and
|
||||
purchased_at=now, so the Owned badge survives the post-purchase loadOwned()
|
||||
refresh and purchases show up in the Paid Files tab.
|
||||
|
||||
6. Real bytes for paid/owned downloads (A3). Rework the shared
|
||||
content.owned-get / content.download-peer-paid / -invoice / -onchain case: look up
|
||||
the PEER_LIBRARY entry by content_id; when entry.disk exists return the real file
|
||||
bytes with mime_type entry.mime_type; keep the text placeholder only as fallback
|
||||
for entries without disk bytes (the fictional 2GB films). Preserve the existing
|
||||
ecash rail-deduction logic exactly. This makes buying the Wavlake track deliver a
|
||||
real mp3 with mime_type audio/mpeg, which is what confirmEcashPay's existing audio
|
||||
branch needs to autoplay in the bottom bar.
|
||||
|
||||
7. Streaming route. Add an Express GET route /api/peer-content/:onion/:content_id
|
||||
to mock-backend.js that resolves the PEER_LIBRARY entry and serves entry.disk via
|
||||
res.sendFile (Express handles Range/206 automatically — the frontend probes with
|
||||
Range: bytes=0-0), 404 JSON { error } otherwise. This unbreaks the demo's existing
|
||||
free-audio/video streaming and is required by Task 2's free-image viewer. Verify
|
||||
the demo/dev proxy actually forwards /api/* to the mock (check vite.config.ts /
|
||||
vite.preview.config.mts proxy config and the demo docker nginx config if present);
|
||||
if /api is not proxied in dev, register the route on whatever path prefix reaches
|
||||
the mock and keep the frontend URL unchanged (the frontend path is fixed — it must
|
||||
work on real nodes too, where nginx proxies /api to the daemon).
|
||||
|
||||
Commit this task on its own (stage mock-backend.js + the demo/ media files
|
||||
explicitly by path; git add demo/content/music demo/peer-media is fine, never
|
||||
git add -A; nothing under indeedhub/).
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && node --check mock-backend.js && node mock-backend.js & sleep 2; then RPC-probe localhost:5959: (a) content.browse-peer for each federation onion — every PEER_LIBRARY id appears on >=1 peer, total duplicate ids across all peers <= 3, both Wavlake ids present; (b) content.owned-list returns >=2 seeded items with paid_sats and purchased_at; (c) content.download-peer-paid for the paid Wavlake id returns mime_type audio/mpeg with data length > 1MB base64; (d) curl -H "Range: bytes=0-0" /api/peer-content/{onion}/{free-wavlake-id} returns 206; (e) file demo/peer-media/photo-*.jpg all report JPEG; then kill the mock. (If /rpc/v1 requires a session, log in first with the mock demo password password123.)</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<done>Both Wavlake tracks in the catalog with real committed bytes + real API metadata; first is paid and delivers real audio/mpeg bytes on purchase; owned-list seeded and purchase-persistent; catalog duplication reduced to <=3 intentional items; photos are real JPEGs; /api/peer-content serves Range requests. Committed.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: Shared viewer routing — free-image lightbox fix, click-to-open, unified post-payment open</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/src/views/PeerFiles.vue</files>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
These changes ship in BOTH the real-node build and the demo — no IS_DEMO gating,
|
||||
and every path must degrade gracefully against the real backend.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Fix the A8 bug + A7 click routing at the card click handler (line 91). Replace
|
||||
the ternary with a single openItem(item) dispatcher: owned -> viewOwned (existing);
|
||||
paid-unowned playable -> playMedia (existing 10% preview, keep); paid-unowned
|
||||
NON-playable (images, blurred) -> openPayModal(item) so the click gets the
|
||||
appropriate "viewer" for locked content while preserving the paid gating (the
|
||||
full image is never fetched or revealed pre-purchase — only the blurred thumbnail);
|
||||
FREE image -> open the existing Teleport-to-body owned-content viewer modal
|
||||
(template line 310) as a lightbox: set viewerItem/viewerMime and point viewerUrl
|
||||
at the free stream URL /api/peer-content/{onion}/{id} directly (an img src streams
|
||||
it; no base64 round-trip; works on real nodes via the Range proxy and in the demo
|
||||
via Task 1's new route). Free audio/video already route through playMedia — keep.
|
||||
Guard closeViewer's URL.revokeObjectURL so it only revokes blob: URLs.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Generalize the viewer footer (line 354): the hardcoded "Owned · unlocked" green
|
||||
caption must only show for owned items; for free items show a neutral caption
|
||||
(exact string "Free · shared by peer" — also used as the bundle-grep sentinel), and
|
||||
make the footer Save button use the free download path for free items (streamDownload)
|
||||
instead of content.owned-get.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Unify post-payment success handling (A3-adjacent, both builds). payWithLightning
|
||||
(line 1364), pollInvoice (line 1417) and pollOnchain (line 1197) currently
|
||||
triggerDownload on success; align them with confirmEcashPay (line 1277): mark the
|
||||
item owned in ownedKeys, refresh loadOwned, and open in-app — audio ->
|
||||
audioPlayer.play (bottom-bar autoplay), image/video -> the viewer modal — using the
|
||||
mime_type from the download response with item.mime_type as fallback. Extract the
|
||||
shared logic (e.g. an openPurchased(item, data, mime) helper) rather than
|
||||
duplicating it four times. Keep triggerDownload available via the viewer's Save
|
||||
button. Do not touch the payment/polling logic itself.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Do NOT extend the preview-thumbnail watcher (line 872) to audio — on real nodes
|
||||
content.preview-peer returns audio bytes for audio items (see recon), which must
|
||||
not be used as an img src. Audio cards keep the waveform icon.
|
||||
|
||||
5. Sanity-check the other previews-grid views for the same A8 class of bug:
|
||||
CloudFolder.vue / Cloud.vue My Files use FileCard @preview -> handlePreview ->
|
||||
MediaLightbox and should already open free images; verify by reading the handler
|
||||
chain (no change expected — do not modify them if they work).
|
||||
|
||||
6. Keep src/views/__tests__/PeerFilesRefresh.test.ts green; if the click-dispatch
|
||||
refactor is cheaply testable, extend that test file with a case asserting a free
|
||||
image click sets viewerUrl (do not build new test infrastructure).
|
||||
|
||||
Commit this task separately (stage neode-ui/src paths explicitly).
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && npx vitest run src/views/__tests__/PeerFilesRefresh.test.ts src/composables/__tests__/useAudioPlayer.test.ts</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<done>Clicking a free image in PeerFiles opens the full-screen viewer (Teleport-to-body, backdrop preserved); free audio -> bottom bar; free video -> video modal; paid unowned image click opens the pay modal and never reveals the image; all four payment-success paths open purchased content in-app with audio autoplaying in the bottom bar. Targeted tests green. Committed.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 3: Full test suite, production build, bundle verification, demo smoke</name>
|
||||
<files>(no new files — verification only; fixes belong to the task that broke them)</files>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
1. Run the full unit suite: cd neode-ui && npx vitest run — all tests (currently
|
||||
195) must pass. Fix any regression in the file that caused it, amending or adding
|
||||
a fixup commit to the responsible task's change.
|
||||
2. Production build per CLAUDE.md: cd neode-ui && npm run build (vue-tsc must pass;
|
||||
output lands in web/dist/neode-ui). Grep the built bundle for the Task 2 sentinel
|
||||
string to prove the build did not silently no-op:
|
||||
grep -rl "Free · shared by peer" ../web/dist/neode-ui/assets/ must match at least
|
||||
one js file.
|
||||
3. End-to-end demo smoke against the mock: start node mock-backend.js plus the dev
|
||||
frontend (or vite preview against the built dist) and exercise via curl/RPC: search
|
||||
corpus contains the Wavlake titles (browse-peer aggregation), paid purchase of the
|
||||
Wavlake track deducts ecash and returns audio/mpeg, owned-list grows by the
|
||||
purchase, /api/peer-content serves the free track with 206. Confirm no occurrence
|
||||
of 146.59.87.168 in mock-backend.js additions or demo-served data:
|
||||
grep -rn "146.59.87.168" neode-ui/mock-backend.js demo/ must be empty.
|
||||
4. Confirm git hygiene: git status shows nothing staged under indeedhub/; all work
|
||||
is committed across the task commits (code only — the summary doc is the
|
||||
orchestrator's commit). Leave deploy/push to the orchestrator.
|
||||
5. Write into the task summary a post-deploy live checklist for
|
||||
http://146.59.87.168:2100 (orchestrator deploys): search finds the Wavlake tracks;
|
||||
buy the paid track with ecash -> bottom bar autoplays; Paid Files tab shows seeded
|
||||
purchases; peer catalog shows <=3 duplicated files; photos are real and open in the
|
||||
lightbox on click; free song click plays in bottom bar.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd neode-ui && npx vitest run && npm run build && grep -rl "Free · shared by peer" ../web/dist/neode-ui/assets/ | head -1 && ! grep -rn "146.59.87.168" mock-backend.js ../demo/</automated>
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<done>Full suite green, production build succeeds, bundle grep proves the new UI string shipped, demo smoke passes, no IP leak, clean git state with per-task commits.</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<threat_model>
|
||||
## Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| executor -> catalog.wavlake.com / CloudFront / Wikimedia | External bytes fetched at execution time get committed into the repo and served by the demo |
|
||||
| demo visitor -> mock backend | Untrusted public visitors hit the new /api/peer-content route |
|
||||
|
||||
## STRIDE Threat Register
|
||||
|
||||
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| T-hj1-01 | Tampering | Downloaded mp3/jpg assets | medium | mitigate | Verify every download with file(1) magic-type + plausible size before committing; fetch only from the verified catalog.wavlake.com/CloudFront/Wikimedia URLs over https |
|
||||
| T-hj1-02 | Information Disclosure | Demo-served data | high | mitigate | Task 3 gate: grep for 146.59.87.168 across mock-backend.js and demo/ must be empty |
|
||||
| T-hj1-03 | Tampering (path traversal) | /api/peer-content route | medium | mitigate | Route resolves content_id strictly against PEER_LIBRARY entries (whitelist lookup, never a filesystem path built from request input) |
|
||||
| T-hj1-04 | Elevation | Paid-content gating in PeerFiles.vue | medium | mitigate | Paid-unowned image click opens the pay modal only; the free-image viewer path is reachable solely when access !== paid; no pre-purchase full-content fetch is added |
|
||||
</threat_model>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run` — full suite green (195 tests baseline).
|
||||
- `cd neode-ui && npm run build` — vue-tsc + vite build succeed; bundle grep for "Free · shared by peer" hits.
|
||||
- Mock RPC smoke: Wavlake items searchable via browse-peer aggregation; paid purchase returns audio/mpeg real bytes and appends to owned-list; duplicate ids across all 12 peers <= 3; /api/peer-content answers 206 to a Range probe; owned-list seeded with dated purchases.
|
||||
- `git log --oneline` shows one focused commit per task; nothing staged under indeedhub/.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- A1/A2: both Wavlake tracks (real API metadata, real committed bytes) searchable in the peer-files search.
|
||||
- A3: first Wavlake track is paid; demo ecash purchase autoplays it in the bottom GlobalAudioPlayer bar.
|
||||
- A4: Cloud -> Paid Files shows seeded purchase history; audio purchases play on click; new purchases persist in the list.
|
||||
- A5: at most 2-3 deliberately duplicated files across the aggregated peer catalog.
|
||||
- A6: all photo peer files are real photographs matching their descriptions.
|
||||
- A7/A8 (both builds): free image click opens the full-screen viewer, free audio -> bottom player, free video -> video modal, paid gating preserved; all payment paths open purchased media in-app.
|
||||
- Non-demo build safe: tests green, build clean, frontend degrades gracefully without demo-only mock data.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
On completion the executor reports per-task commit hashes and the post-deploy live
|
||||
verification checklist for http://146.59.87.168:2100 (deployment is the orchestrator's
|
||||
job; docs/summary committed by the orchestrator).
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
+89
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: quick-260729-hj1
|
||||
plan: 01
|
||||
subsystem: demo / peer-files
|
||||
status: complete
|
||||
requirements: [A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8]
|
||||
key-files:
|
||||
created:
|
||||
- "demo/content/music/Zazawowow - WEBFIVEFOURTHREETWOONE.mp3 (6,041,903 B, MPEG audio)"
|
||||
- "demo/content/music/Zazawowow - Michael Michael Saylor.mp3 (4,517,590 B, MPEG audio)"
|
||||
- demo/peer-media/artwork-webfive.jpg (1400x1400 JPEG)
|
||||
- demo/peer-media/artwork-michael-saylor.jpg (1400x1400 JPEG)
|
||||
modified:
|
||||
- neode-ui/mock-backend.js
|
||||
- neode-ui/vite.config.ts
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/PeerFiles.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/__tests__/PeerFilesRefresh.test.ts
|
||||
- demo/peer-media/photo-*.jpg (all 10 replaced with real Wikimedia Commons photos)
|
||||
commits:
|
||||
- "14d1a453 feat(demo): Wavlake tracks, real photos, deduped peer catalog, working paid flow"
|
||||
- "f52c5407 fix(peer-files): free-image lightbox, click-to-open routing, in-app open after every payment rail"
|
||||
metrics:
|
||||
duration: 64m
|
||||
tasks: 3
|
||||
completed: 2026-07-29
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Quick Task 260729-hj1: Peer-Files Media Batch (Wavlake, Paid Track, Real Photos) Summary
|
||||
|
||||
Two real Wavlake tracks (paid buy->autoplay flow now delivers real mp3 bytes), seeded purchase history, deduped peer catalog, ten real Commons photographs, and a shared-frontend fix so every peer file click opens the right viewer (free images finally open in the lightbox).
|
||||
|
||||
## What Was Done
|
||||
|
||||
### Task 1 — Demo dataset (commit 14d1a453, demo/mock only)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Wavlake tracks (A1-A3):** metadata fetched live from `catalog.wavlake.com/v1/tracks/{id}` (title/artist/album/duration confirmed against plan recon), mp3 bytes + 1400x1400 artwork downloaded from the CloudFront CDN and committed. `song-webfive` ("WEBFIVEFOURTHREETWOONE" by Zazawowow, 21 sats, PAID) and `song-michael-saylor` (free). Both verified as real MPEG audio with `file(1)`.
|
||||
- **Real paid bytes (A3):** the shared `content.owned-get` / `download-peer-paid` / `-invoice` / `-onchain` handler now returns real disk bytes with the correct `mime_type` when the entry has them (text placeholder only for the fictional no-disk films/books). Ecash rail-deduction logic preserved verbatim.
|
||||
- **Purchase history (A4):** per-session `sessionOwnedContent()` store lazily seeds 3 dated purchases (song-builders 100 sats — audio with real bytes; film-the-signal 2100; book-cypherpunk-essays 210), computed against the session's own federation onions/catalog slices. Every purchase path appends, so Owned badges survive the post-purchase `loadOwned()` refresh. `song-builders` was converted from free to paid (100 sats) so the seeded history contains a playable paid audio item without pre-owning the showcase Wavlake track.
|
||||
- **Dedupe (A5):** `peerCatalogFor` is now a deterministic one-peer-per-item assignment (index % 12 against the session's node order) plus a 3-item POPULAR list (`song-webfive`, `film-block-height`, `photo-aurora-fjord`) that appears on exactly one extra peer each. Verified: 29/29 ids present, exactly 3 duplicated ids, both Wavlake tracks on trusted peers.
|
||||
- **Session-stable onions:** `demoFederationNodes()` was regenerated (fresh random onions) on every RPC call; it is now memoised per session (`sessionFederationNodes()`) so catalogs, owned records and the Federation view agree.
|
||||
- **Real photos (A6):** all ten `photo-*.jpg` picsum placeholders replaced with real Wikimedia Commons photographs (aurora over Lofoten fjord, Lago di Limides/Dolomites, Dotonbori Osaka neon, Erg Chebbi dunes, Black Forest mist, Cliffs of Moher, Iceland winter road, Stowe VT autumn, St Ives harbour, Grindelwald ridge hiker). Each is >=1920px wide, visually inspected, license-credited in its description; `size_bytes` updated to real sizes; filenames kept so `PEER_MEDIA` refs are unchanged.
|
||||
- **Streaming route:** new `GET /api/peer-content/:onion/:content_id` serving `entry.disk` via `res.sendFile` (Range/206 works — probed). Whitelist lookup only (T-hj1-03), paid entries return 403 so full paid bytes are unreachable without purchase. Demo nginx already proxies `/api/` -> :5959; added the missing `/api` proxy to the vite dev config so dev works too.
|
||||
- **Paid audio preview:** `content.preview-peer` serves a ~10% leading slice of the real mp3 for audio entries (the Preview button plays it), images unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
### Task 2 — Shared viewer routing (commit f52c5407, both builds)
|
||||
|
||||
- **A8 fix + A7 routing:** card click goes through `openItem()`: owned -> cached viewer/bottom bar; paid playable -> 10% preview; paid non-playable -> pay modal (image never fetched pre-purchase, T-hj1-04); free image -> existing Teleport-to-body viewer as a lightbox with `viewerUrl` pointed at the stream URL (no base64 round-trip); free audio/video -> `playMedia` (bottom bar / video modal).
|
||||
- **Viewer footer:** "Owned · unlocked" (green) only for owned items; "Free · shared by peer" (neutral) otherwise — also the bundle-grep sentinel. Save button streams free files (`streamDownload`) instead of calling `content.owned-get`.
|
||||
- **Unified post-payment:** `payWithLightning`, `pollInvoice` and `pollOnchain` now share `openPurchased()` with the ecash flow — mark owned, refresh owned list, audio autoplays in the bottom bar, image/video open in the viewer. `triggerDownload` remains for the explicit Save path.
|
||||
- **Blob-URL hygiene:** `releaseViewerUrl()` only revokes `blob:` URLs (free items use plain URLs).
|
||||
- Preview-thumbnail watcher deliberately NOT extended to audio (real nodes return audio bytes there). Cloud.vue/CloudFolder.vue verified to already open free images via MediaLightbox — untouched.
|
||||
- Regression test added: free image click opens the lightbox.
|
||||
|
||||
### Task 3 — Verification
|
||||
|
||||
- Full unit suite: **697/697 passed** (baseline in plan said 195; suite has since grown — all green).
|
||||
- `npm run build` (vue-tsc + vite): success; `grep -rl "Free · shared by peer" web/dist/neode-ui/assets/` hits `PeerFiles-DsotBwvS.js` (build did not no-op).
|
||||
- Mock RPC smoke (20 checks, all pass): browse-peer aggregation contains both Wavlake titles; paid purchase deducts 21 sats ecash and returns `audio/mpeg` >1MB; purchase appended to owned-list; `/api/peer-content` answers 206 to a Range probe, 403 for paid items, 404 for unknown/traversal ids; paid audio preview is audio bytes; image previews still jpeg.
|
||||
- `grep -rn "146.59.87.168" neode-ui/mock-backend.js demo/` — empty (T-hj1-02).
|
||||
- Git: two focused code commits, nothing staged under `indeedhub/`, only other agents' pre-existing untracked files remain.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deviations from Plan
|
||||
|
||||
**1. [Rule 3 - Blocking] Session-memoised federation nodes.** The plan assumed onions were "random per session"; they were actually random per RPC call, which would have made seeded owned-content onions never match what the frontend sees. Added `sessionFederationNodes()` memoisation (per-visitor via the existing session store). Commit 14d1a453.
|
||||
|
||||
**2. [Rule 2 - Missing critical] `/api` dev proxy in vite.config.ts.** The demo nginx proxies `/api/` to the mock, but the vite dev server did not — the new route (and the existing `/api/blob`, `/api/app-catalog`) would 404 on :8100 dev. Added a `/api` proxy entry (dev-server-only config; real nodes use nginx). Commit 14d1a453.
|
||||
|
||||
**3. [Minor scope choice] `song-builders` converted free -> paid (100 sats).** The plan required a seeded audio purchase backed by real disk bytes, but the only paid audio item is the showcase Wavlake track, which must NOT be pre-owned (it would kill the A3 buy demo). Making one existing song paid provides a legitimately purchasable audio item for the seeded history and an Owned-badge example in the gallery.
|
||||
|
||||
## Post-Deploy Live Checklist — http://146.59.87.168:2100 (orchestrator deploys)
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Search (A1/A2):** Cloud -> search "Zazawowow" (or "WEBFIVE" / "Michael") — both tracks appear as peer-file results.
|
||||
2. **Paid buy -> autoplay (A3):** open the peer holding "Zazawowow - WEBFIVEFOURTHREETWOONE.mp3" (21 sats), Buy -> ecash -> Pay: the bottom GlobalAudioPlayer bar appears and the track audibly plays; card flips to green "Owned".
|
||||
3. **Preview before buying (A3):** the paid track's Preview button plays ~25s of real audio, not silence/artwork.
|
||||
4. **Paid Files tab (A4):** Cloud -> Paid Files shows 3+ seeded purchases with sats + dates; clicking "Builders, not talkers (Remastered).mp3" plays it in the bottom bar; the fresh Wavlake purchase from step 2 is now listed too.
|
||||
5. **Dedupe (A5):** browsing several peers, each file appears on ~1 peer; only 3 files (WEBFIVE track, Block Height film, aurora photo) appear on two.
|
||||
6. **Real photos (A6):** photo cards show real photographs (aurora, Dolomites lake, Osaka neon, dunes, mist, cliffs, Iceland road, Vermont autumn, St Ives, Grindelwald) — no picsum grey placeholders.
|
||||
7. **Free image lightbox (A8):** clicking any photo card opens the full-screen viewer with backdrop; footer reads "Free · shared by peer"; Save downloads it.
|
||||
8. **Free audio/video (A7):** clicking "Zazawowow - Michael Michael Saylor.mp3" (free) plays in the bottom bar; a free video (if on the browsed peer) opens the video modal.
|
||||
9. **Paid gating (A7):** a blurred paid image click opens the pay modal, never the image; paying via the Lightning QR path also opens the content in-app (no orphan browser download).
|
||||
|
||||
## Self-Check: PASSED
|
||||
|
||||
- demo/content/music/Zazawowow - WEBFIVEFOURTHREETWOONE.mp3 — FOUND (MPEG audio)
|
||||
- demo/content/music/Zazawowow - Michael Michael Saylor.mp3 — FOUND (MPEG audio)
|
||||
- demo/peer-media/artwork-webfive.jpg, artwork-michael-saylor.jpg — FOUND (JPEG)
|
||||
- All 10 demo/peer-media/photo-*.jpg — FOUND (JPEG, >=1920px wide)
|
||||
- Commit 14d1a453 — FOUND in git log
|
||||
- Commit f52c5407 — FOUND in git log
|
||||
+242
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: quick-260729-je5
|
||||
plan: 01
|
||||
type: execute
|
||||
wave: 1
|
||||
depends_on: []
|
||||
files_modified:
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/web5/Web5ConnectedNodes.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/App.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/RootRedirect.vue
|
||||
autonomous: true
|
||||
requirements: [QUICK-JE5-01, QUICK-JE5-02]
|
||||
|
||||
must_haves:
|
||||
truths:
|
||||
- "Connected-nodes card (dashboard Web5 view): the visible nodes list grows/shrinks to fill the card so the gap above the Find Nodes / Refresh buttons is a constant pt-4, regardless of how tall the sibling Node Visibility card makes the xl 2-col grid row (QUICK-JE5-01)"
|
||||
- "Below xl (single-column/mobile) the list keeps its current max-h-72 cap — no visual/sizing change (QUICK-JE5-01)"
|
||||
- "Demo build opened inside the Android companion WebView shows NO typing splash and NO /onboarding/intro — it lands on /login as if the intro was already seen (QUICK-JE5-02)"
|
||||
- "Browser/PWA demo intro behavior is byte-identical to today (replays on every fresh root boot); the skip path writes NOTHING to localStorage (QUICK-JE5-02)"
|
||||
- "Non-demo builds are a complete no-op for both changes' runtime behavior (QUICK-JE5-02)"
|
||||
- "All existing unit tests stay green (697) and npm run build succeeds with the new strings present in the built bundle"
|
||||
artifacts:
|
||||
- "neode-ui/src/views/web5/Web5ConnectedNodes.vue (flex/scroll fix, no design change)"
|
||||
- "neode-ui/src/App.vue (companion+demo intro gate at both IS_DEMO branch sites)"
|
||||
- "neode-ui/src/views/RootRedirect.vue (companion+demo intro gate at both IS_DEMO branch sites)"
|
||||
key_links:
|
||||
- "isCompanionApp() from neode-ui/src/utils/openExternal.ts is the single companion-detection source at all four IS_DEMO intro branch sites (same convention as stores/appLauncher.ts lines 224/329)"
|
||||
- "Web5ConnectedNodes.vue card root is already `flex flex-col`; the fix works entirely inside that column flex (list = flexible middle, footer = non-shrinking bottom)"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<objective>
|
||||
Two small, isolated UI fixes in neode-ui (shared by real + demo builds):
|
||||
|
||||
1. **QUICK-JE5-01 — Connected-nodes list flex fix (both builds):** the scrollable nodes
|
||||
list in the dashboard "Connected Nodes" card must always end at a consistent margin
|
||||
above the bottom Find Nodes / Refresh buttons, even when the sibling card
|
||||
(Web5NodeVisibility) stretches the shared grid row. Today the list is hard-capped at
|
||||
`max-h-72` and the footer uses `mt-auto`, so a tall sibling opens a growing dead gap
|
||||
between list and buttons.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **QUICK-JE5-02 — Companion app skips demo intro (demo build only):** when the demo
|
||||
runs inside the Android companion WebView (`window.ArchipelagoNative` bridge
|
||||
injected), skip the typing splash + `/onboarding/intro` entirely and land on /login,
|
||||
without touching any state the browser demo relies on. Desktop/PWA browser demo
|
||||
intro must be completely unaffected — the user resets and relies on it before demos.
|
||||
|
||||
Purpose: fix a visible layout bug on every node dashboard, and stop the companion app
|
||||
from replaying the demo cinematic every time the demo is opened in-app.
|
||||
Output: 2 focused commits on main (frontend only), tests green, verified build.
|
||||
</objective>
|
||||
|
||||
<context>
|
||||
@/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/CLAUDE.md
|
||||
@/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/neode-ui/src/views/web5/Web5ConnectedNodes.vue
|
||||
@/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/neode-ui/src/utils/openExternal.ts
|
||||
@/home/archipelago/Projects/archy/neode-ui/src/composables/useDemoIntro.ts
|
||||
|
||||
Key facts already established (do not re-derive):
|
||||
- The "connected nodes" container is `neode-ui/src/views/web5/Web5ConnectedNodes.vue`.
|
||||
Its card root (line 3) is already `glass-card p-6 ... flex flex-col`. The three tab
|
||||
panes (Trusted ~line 57, Observers ~line 90, Requests ~line 120) each use
|
||||
`class="space-y-2 max-h-72 overflow-y-auto"` with `v-show`, and the button footer
|
||||
(~line 161) is `<div class="mt-auto pt-4 space-y-3">`. The row is
|
||||
`neode-ui/src/views/web5/Web5.vue` line 59: `grid grid-cols-1 xl:grid-cols-2 gap-6`
|
||||
with sibling `Web5NodeVisibility` (grid items stretch to row height by default).
|
||||
- Companion detection already exists: `isCompanionApp()` in
|
||||
`neode-ui/src/utils/openExternal.ts` (true iff the native shell injected
|
||||
`window.ArchipelagoNative` with an `openInApp` function; a plain browser/PWA never
|
||||
has it, and the bridge exists before page scripts run — appLauncher.ts already
|
||||
relies on it synchronously).
|
||||
- The demo intro fires from exactly four IS_DEMO branch sites:
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/App.vue` ~line 433: `if (IS_DEMO && bootPath === '/') replayRequested = true` (typing splash on every root boot)
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/App.vue` ~line 588: post-splash `if (IS_DEMO) { router.push('/onboarding/intro'); reveal(); return }`
|
||||
- `neode-ui/src/views/RootRedirect.vue` ~lines 82 and 149: `if (IS_DEMO) { demoRoute() }` → pushes `/onboarding/intro`
|
||||
- `views/web5/__tests__/Web5ConnectedNodes.test.ts` exists but does NOT assert on
|
||||
`max-h-72` / `mt-auto` classes (verified by grep) — class changes should not break it.
|
||||
</context>
|
||||
|
||||
<tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 1: Connected-nodes list fills the card — constant gap above footer buttons (QUICK-JE5-01)</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/src/views/web5/Web5ConnectedNodes.vue</files>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Implement the column-flex fix per QUICK-JE5-01, exactly as scoped: flexible
|
||||
scrollable list + non-shrinking footer, replacing the fixed cap as the xl-row
|
||||
sizing mechanism. Concretely:
|
||||
|
||||
1. On EACH of the three v-show tab panes (Trusted, Observers, Requests — the divs
|
||||
currently classed `space-y-2 max-h-72 overflow-y-auto`), change the classes to:
|
||||
`space-y-2 flex-auto min-h-0 overflow-y-auto max-h-72 xl:max-h-none`
|
||||
- `flex-auto` (flex: 1 1 auto) + `min-h-0` is the standard fix: the visible pane
|
||||
becomes the flexible middle of the column-flex card, growing to absorb any
|
||||
extra height the grid row imposes and shrinking (with internal scroll) when
|
||||
constrained — so the space between list end and footer is always exactly the
|
||||
footer's own pt-4.
|
||||
- Keep `max-h-72` ONLY below xl (`xl:max-h-none` lifts it): below xl the grid is
|
||||
single-column (`grid-cols-1`), no sibling stretches the card, and the current
|
||||
mobile sizing must not change (constraint: no visual design change).
|
||||
- Hidden panes are `v-show` (display:none) so applying flex classes to all three
|
||||
is safe — only the visible one participates in layout.
|
||||
2. On the footer div (`mt-auto pt-4 space-y-3`), add `shrink-0` so the buttons can
|
||||
never be compressed by a long list. Keep `mt-auto` (harmless once the list is
|
||||
flex-auto — it only matters in the sub-xl capped case, where it preserves today's
|
||||
behavior exactly).
|
||||
3. Touch NOTHING else in the component: no color, spacing, typography, or markup
|
||||
changes. The card root already has `flex flex-col` — do not restructure it.
|
||||
4. Sanity-check the sibling row in `neode-ui/src/views/web5/Web5.vue` line 59 (read
|
||||
only): default grid item stretch is what feeds the card its height — no change
|
||||
needed there.
|
||||
|
||||
This component is shared by real and demo builds, so one fix covers both builds.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd /home/archipelago/Projects/archy/neode-ui && npx vitest run src/views/web5/__tests__/Web5ConnectedNodes.test.ts</automated>
|
||||
Also: grep the component to confirm no pane retains a bare `max-h-72` without `xl:max-h-none`, and that all three panes have `flex-auto min-h-0`.
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<done>
|
||||
All three tab panes are `flex-auto min-h-0 overflow-y-auto max-h-72 xl:max-h-none`;
|
||||
footer has `shrink-0`; component test file passes; no other visual changes.
|
||||
</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 2: Companion WebView + demo build skips the intro entirely (QUICK-JE5-02)</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/src/App.vue, neode-ui/src/views/RootRedirect.vue</files>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Gate all four IS_DEMO intro branch sites on NOT-companion, per QUICK-JE5-02. Use the
|
||||
existing `isCompanionApp()` from `@/utils/openExternal` (do NOT invent new
|
||||
detection — this is the same convention appLauncher.ts uses at lines 224/329, and
|
||||
the `window.ArchipelagoNative` bridge is injected by the native shell before page
|
||||
scripts run, so it is safe to call synchronously at boot).
|
||||
|
||||
1. `neode-ui/src/App.vue` (~line 433): change
|
||||
`if (IS_DEMO && bootPath === '/') replayRequested = true`
|
||||
to also require `!isCompanionApp()` — companion never requests the demo
|
||||
splash replay.
|
||||
2. `neode-ui/src/App.vue` (~line 588): gate the post-splash
|
||||
`if (IS_DEMO) { router.push('/onboarding/intro') ... }` block with
|
||||
`!isCompanionApp()`. When companion+demo, prefer routing DIRECTLY to '/login'
|
||||
and `reveal()` (mirroring the "seenOnboarding === true" branch just below)
|
||||
rather than falling through to `checkOnboardingStatus()` — the mock backend
|
||||
reports onboarded and would land on /login anyway, but the direct route avoids
|
||||
the status-check retry ladder and any splash-adjacent behavior. Add a one-line
|
||||
comment: companion in-app demo skips the intro; browser demo unaffected.
|
||||
3. `neode-ui/src/views/RootRedirect.vue` (~lines 82 and 149): gate both
|
||||
`if (IS_DEMO) { demoRoute() }` calls the same way. When IS_DEMO and
|
||||
isCompanionApp(), route to '/login' (behaving exactly as an intro-already-seen
|
||||
demo session) instead of demoRoute(). Import `isCompanionApp` from
|
||||
'@/utils/openExternal' (static import is fine — the module is tiny and already
|
||||
in the main bundle).
|
||||
4. HARD invariants (from the task constraints):
|
||||
- Write NOTHING to localStorage/sessionStorage from any skip path (no
|
||||
`neode_intro_seen`, no `demo_intro_date`, nothing) — the browser demo's
|
||||
manually-reset intro state must be untouched.
|
||||
- Non-demo builds: `IS_DEMO` is false, so every gated branch short-circuits
|
||||
before `isCompanionApp()` matters — verify by inspection that no new code
|
||||
runs outside `IS_DEMO === true` paths (keep `isCompanionApp()` on the RIGHT
|
||||
side of the `&&` / inside the IS_DEMO block).
|
||||
- Browser/PWA demo: `isCompanionApp()` is false (no bridge) — all four sites
|
||||
behave byte-identically to today.
|
||||
5. If an existing unit test covers RootRedirect demo routing, update/extend it; if
|
||||
cheap, add a small test asserting `isCompanianApp`-style bridge detection drives
|
||||
the skip (stub `window.ArchipelagoNative = { openInApp: () => {} }`). Do not
|
||||
build heavy test scaffolding — the 697 existing tests staying green is the gate.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd /home/archipelago/Projects/archy/neode-ui && npx vitest run</automated>
|
||||
Full suite green (697+ tests). Then grep both edited files to confirm every
|
||||
intro-triggering IS_DEMO branch also checks `isCompanionApp()`.
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<done>
|
||||
All four IS_DEMO intro branch sites (App.vue x2, RootRedirect.vue x2) skip the
|
||||
splash/intro and route to /login when `isCompanionApp()` is true; zero storage
|
||||
writes on the skip path; zero behavior change for browser demo and non-demo builds;
|
||||
full unit suite green.
|
||||
</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
<task type="auto">
|
||||
<name>Task 3: Build verification + bundle grep + commits</name>
|
||||
<files>neode-ui/ (build only — no new source edits expected)</files>
|
||||
<action>
|
||||
Per CLAUDE.md "Build / verify" and "Commit & push every unit of work":
|
||||
|
||||
1. `cd /home/archipelago/Projects/archy/neode-ui && npm run build` (vue-tsc + vite;
|
||||
outputs to web/dist/neode-ui). Build must succeed with zero type errors.
|
||||
2. Bundle grep (build can silently no-op — always grep the built output):
|
||||
- Fix 1: `grep -rl "xl:max-h-none" /home/archipelago/Projects/archy/web/dist/neode-ui/assets/` must match at least one asset (the new Tailwind class proves the fresh component shipped).
|
||||
- Fix 2: the gate is inside IS_DEMO code, which a non-demo build may fold away, so
|
||||
verify against a scratch demo build:
|
||||
`VITE_DEMO=1 npx vite build --outDir /tmp/claude-1000/-home-archipelago-Projects-archy/3ca40190-d6bb-4f98-9d89-8d2479484065/scratchpad/demo-dist --emptyOutDir`
|
||||
then confirm a JS chunk contains BOTH the `demoRoute` log string and
|
||||
`ArchipelagoNative` (heuristic that the companion gate survived into the demo
|
||||
bundle):
|
||||
`grep -rl "demoRoute" <scratch>/demo-dist/assets/*.js | xargs grep -l "ArchipelagoNative"`
|
||||
Do NOT commit or deploy the scratch demo build — it is verification only.
|
||||
3. Commits (code only — the orchestrator commits .planning docs):
|
||||
- Commit 1: Web5ConnectedNodes.vue flex fix.
|
||||
- Commit 2: App.vue + RootRedirect.vue companion demo-intro skip (plus any test
|
||||
file touched in Task 2).
|
||||
- Stage EXPLICITLY by path (`git add neode-ui/src/...`), never `git add -A`.
|
||||
- NEVER stage anything under `indeedhub/` (git submodule) — check
|
||||
`git status --porcelain` before each commit and confirm no `indeedhub` entries
|
||||
are staged.
|
||||
- Do not commit `web/dist/` build output unless the repo already tracks it AND
|
||||
it changed as a direct product of these fixes (check `git status` — if dist is
|
||||
untracked/ignored, leave it alone).
|
||||
- Messages end with the `Co-Authored-By: Claude ...` trailer per CLAUDE.md.
|
||||
</action>
|
||||
<verify>
|
||||
<automated>cd /home/archipelago/Projects/archy/neode-ui && npm run build && grep -rl "xl:max-h-none" ../web/dist/neode-ui/assets/ | head -1</automated>
|
||||
Plus the demo-build co-occurrence grep from step 2, and `git log --oneline -2`
|
||||
showing the two focused commits with no indeedhub/ paths in either
|
||||
(`git show --stat` per commit).
|
||||
</verify>
|
||||
<done>
|
||||
`npm run build` green; both bundle greps confirm the new code is in the built
|
||||
output; two focused commits exist, each staged by explicit path, no indeedhub/
|
||||
content, Co-Authored-By trailer present.
|
||||
</done>
|
||||
</task>
|
||||
|
||||
</tasks>
|
||||
|
||||
<verification>
|
||||
- Full unit suite: `cd neode-ui && npx vitest run` — all tests green (697 baseline; new tests may raise the count, zero failures).
|
||||
- `npm run build` succeeds; `web/dist/neode-ui` contains `xl:max-h-none`.
|
||||
- Scratch `VITE_DEMO=1` build contains the companion gate (demoRoute + ArchipelagoNative co-occurrence).
|
||||
- Manual spot-check (optional, dev preview :8100 or `npm run dev:mock`): on a wide (xl) window, pad the Node Visibility card content tall and confirm the connected-nodes list expands so the buttons keep an unchanged pt-4 gap; on a narrow window the card looks exactly as before.
|
||||
- Grep confirms no localStorage writes were added in App.vue/RootRedirect.vue skip paths.
|
||||
</verification>
|
||||
|
||||
<success_criteria>
|
||||
- QUICK-JE5-01: nodes list ends at a constant pt-4 above the bottom buttons at any xl row height; sub-xl sizing unchanged; no visual design changes.
|
||||
- QUICK-JE5-02: companion WebView + demo lands on /login with no splash and no /onboarding/intro; browser/PWA demo and non-demo builds byte-identical in behavior; no intro-state storage writes from the skip path.
|
||||
- Tests green, build verified via bundle grep, two clean path-staged commits, nothing from indeedhub/ touched.
|
||||
</success_criteria>
|
||||
|
||||
<output>
|
||||
On completion create `.planning/quick/260729-je5-ui-fixes-connected-nodes-scrollable-list/260729-je5-SUMMARY.md` (committed by the orchestrator, not the executor).
|
||||
</output>
|
||||
+103
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
phase: quick-260729-je5
|
||||
plan: 01
|
||||
subsystem: neode-ui
|
||||
tags: [web5, layout, demo, companion, onboarding-intro]
|
||||
requirements: [QUICK-JE5-01, QUICK-JE5-02]
|
||||
dependency-graph:
|
||||
requires: []
|
||||
provides:
|
||||
- "Connected-nodes card list flexes to fill xl grid-row height (constant pt-4 gap above footer buttons)"
|
||||
- "Companion WebView + demo build skips typing splash + /onboarding/intro, lands on /login"
|
||||
affects: [neode-ui demo build, companion app demo UX, Web5 dashboard]
|
||||
tech-stack:
|
||||
added: []
|
||||
patterns:
|
||||
- "Column-flex scroll pane: flex-auto min-h-0 overflow-y-auto with breakpoint-lifted max-h cap (max-h-72 xl:max-h-none)"
|
||||
- "isCompanionApp() as the single companion-detection source at IS_DEMO branch sites (same convention as appLauncher.ts)"
|
||||
key-files:
|
||||
created:
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/utils/__tests__/openExternal.test.ts
|
||||
modified:
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/web5/Web5ConnectedNodes.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/App.vue
|
||||
- neode-ui/src/views/RootRedirect.vue
|
||||
decisions:
|
||||
- "RootRedirect skip paths deliberately do NOT call log() — log() writes sessionStorage (archipelago_boot_log) and the skip path must write nothing to storage"
|
||||
- "Cheap test option chosen: unit test for isCompanionApp() bridge detection (the skip's driving mechanism) instead of heavy RootRedirect mount scaffolding"
|
||||
metrics:
|
||||
duration: ~15m
|
||||
completed: 2026-07-29
|
||||
tasks: 3
|
||||
tests: "700 passed (697 baseline + 3 new)"
|
||||
status: complete
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Quick Task 260729-je5: Connected-Nodes Scrollable List + Companion Demo Intro Skip Summary
|
||||
|
||||
Connected-nodes list now flexes to fill the xl grid-row (constant pt-4 gap above Find Nodes/Refresh) and the Android companion demo skips the intro straight to /login via isCompanionApp() gates at all four IS_DEMO branch sites, with zero storage writes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Task Commits
|
||||
|
||||
| Task | Name | Commit | Files |
|
||||
| ---- | ---- | ------ | ----- |
|
||||
| 1 | Connected-nodes list fills card (QUICK-JE5-01) | `b80e7c34` | Web5ConnectedNodes.vue |
|
||||
| 2 | Companion+demo intro skip (QUICK-JE5-02) | `d54517cf` | App.vue, RootRedirect.vue, openExternal.test.ts |
|
||||
| 3 | Build verification + bundle greps | — (verification only, no source edits) | — |
|
||||
|
||||
## What Was Done
|
||||
|
||||
### QUICK-JE5-01 — Connected-nodes list flex fix (`b80e7c34`)
|
||||
|
||||
- All three v-show tab panes (Trusted line 57, Observers line 90, Requests line 120) changed from `space-y-2 max-h-72 overflow-y-auto` to `space-y-2 flex-auto min-h-0 overflow-y-auto max-h-72 xl:max-h-none` — the visible pane is now the flexible middle of the card's existing column flex, growing to absorb row height from a tall sibling Web5NodeVisibility card and scrolling internally when constrained.
|
||||
- Below xl (single-column grid) the `max-h-72` cap remains — sub-xl sizing byte-identical.
|
||||
- Footer div gets `shrink-0` (kept `mt-auto`) so the buttons can never be compressed.
|
||||
- No other markup/design changes; Web5.vue grid row (line 59) untouched as planned.
|
||||
|
||||
### QUICK-JE5-02 — Companion demo intro skip (`d54517cf`)
|
||||
|
||||
All four IS_DEMO intro branch sites gated on the existing `isCompanionApp()` from `@/utils/openExternal` (static import added to both files):
|
||||
|
||||
1. `App.vue` line 435: `if (IS_DEMO && bootPath === '/' && !isCompanionApp()) replayRequested = true` — companion never requests the splash replay; with the mock backend reporting onboarded, `shouldShowIntroSplash` then suppresses the splash.
|
||||
2. `App.vue` post-splash block (~line 592): companion+demo routes directly to `/login` + `reveal()` (mirrors the seenOnboarding===true branch), avoiding the status-check retry ladder.
|
||||
3. `RootRedirect.vue` `proceedToApp()` (~line 87): companion+demo → `router.replace('/login')` instead of `demoRoute()`.
|
||||
4. `RootRedirect.vue` onMounted server-up branch (~line 160): same gate.
|
||||
|
||||
**Hard invariants verified:**
|
||||
- Zero storage writes on any skip path — RootRedirect skip paths intentionally do NOT call `log()` because it writes `sessionStorage.archipelago_boot_log`; diff grep for added `localStorage|sessionStorage` lines matched only a comment.
|
||||
- Non-demo builds: `isCompanionApp()` sits on the right of `IS_DEMO &&` / inside `if (IS_DEMO)` blocks — never reached when IS_DEMO is false (compile-time false in non-demo builds; demo scratch bundle confirmed dead-code folding of the non-demo path).
|
||||
- Browser/PWA demo: no bridge → `isCompanionApp()` false → all four sites behave byte-identically (intro replays on every fresh root boot).
|
||||
|
||||
New test `src/utils/__tests__/openExternal.test.ts`: 3 cases asserting bridge detection (no bridge → false; bridge with openInApp → true; bridge without callable openInApp → false).
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
- Full unit suite: **700 passed, 0 failed** (697 baseline + 3 new).
|
||||
- `npm run build` (vue-tsc + vite) green; `web/dist/neode-ui/assets/Web5-CB3C73UV.js` contains `xl:max-h-none` (fix 1 shipped).
|
||||
- Scratch `VITE_DEMO=1` build (scratchpad only, not committed): the plan's single-chunk co-occurrence grep did not match because Vite splits chunks — `demoRoute` lives in `RootRedirect-*.js` while `ArchipelagoNative` lives in the shared `index-*.js`/`Dashboard-*.js` chunks. Verified semantically instead (stronger): RootRedirect chunk contains both gated sites compiled as `if(E()){_.replace("/login")...;return}x();return` where `E` is imported from the index chunk whose `isCompanionApp` implementation checks `openInApp=="function"` on `ArchipelagoNative`.
|
||||
- `web/dist` is gitignored — left untouched per plan; no dist output committed.
|
||||
- Both commits path-staged, submodule guard run before each, no `indeedhub/` paths (`git show --stat` clean), `Co-Authored-By: Claude` trailer present.
|
||||
- Pre-existing untracked files from other agents (`.planning/phases/01-.../01-PATTERNS.md`, `scripts/resilience/.gitignore-reports.tmp`) left alone.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deviations from Plan
|
||||
|
||||
### Auto-fixed / adjusted
|
||||
|
||||
**1. [Verification method] Demo-bundle co-occurrence grep replaced with per-chunk semantic verification**
|
||||
- **Found during:** Task 3
|
||||
- **Issue:** The plan's heuristic (`grep -rl demoRoute ... | xargs grep -l ArchipelagoNative`) assumes both strings land in one JS chunk; Vite's code splitting puts them in different chunks.
|
||||
- **Fix:** Verified the actual gate in the RootRedirect demo chunk (minified `if(E()){replace("/login")}` at both sites, `E` = isCompanionApp import) and the `openInApp=="function"` detection in the index chunk.
|
||||
- **Files modified:** none (verification only).
|
||||
|
||||
No other deviations — plan executed as written.
|
||||
|
||||
## Known Stubs
|
||||
|
||||
None.
|
||||
|
||||
## Self-Check: PASSED
|
||||
|
||||
- FOUND: neode-ui/src/views/web5/Web5ConnectedNodes.vue (3 panes with flex-auto min-h-0 ... xl:max-h-none; footer shrink-0)
|
||||
- FOUND: neode-ui/src/utils/__tests__/openExternal.test.ts
|
||||
- FOUND: commit b80e7c34 (Task 1)
|
||||
- FOUND: commit d54517cf (Task 2)
|
||||
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ built and signed:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
SERVED=neode-ui/public/packages/archipelago-companion.apk
|
||||
GITEA_URL=https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/raw/branch/main/$SERVED
|
||||
GITEA_URL=http://146.59.87.168:3000/lfg2025/archy/raw/branch/main/$SERVED
|
||||
QR_URL=http://146.59.87.168:2100/packages/archipelago-companion.apk
|
||||
curl -sS -o /tmp/live-gitea.apk "$GITEA_URL"
|
||||
curl -sS -o /tmp/live-qr.apk "$QR_URL"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ class ArchyVpnService : VpnService() {
|
||||
* Pre-warm + keep-warm mesh sessions to every known node ULA.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Discovery + first session through the public tree can take 15s+
|
||||
* (from node diagnosis) — paying that cost here, the
|
||||
* (HANDOFF-2026-07-23 node diagnosis) — paying that cost here, the
|
||||
* moment the tunnel is up, means the connect probe and WebView hit an
|
||||
* established session instead of timing out on a cold one. The periodic
|
||||
* touch afterwards keeps the session from idling out. Failed connects
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ class FipsPreferences(private val context: Context) {
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Peer aliases feed the fips host map as `<alias>.fips` hostnames; anything
|
||||
* that isn't a valid DNS label ("Test Node" — the space) gets rejected and
|
||||
* that isn't a valid DNS label ("Framework PT" — the space) gets rejected and
|
||||
* silently drops the peer from name resolution. Slug it instead of losing it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
internal fun hostSafeAlias(alias: String): String =
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ object FlareServer {
|
||||
/** Outbound flares: plain HTTP to the peer's ULA — FIPS encrypts underneath. */
|
||||
object FlareClient {
|
||||
// Connect timeout must outlive cold mesh-session establishment (~15s via
|
||||
// the public tree); the attempt itself drives
|
||||
// the public tree per HANDOFF-2026-07-23); the attempt itself drives
|
||||
// session setup, same trick as the VPN service's session warmer.
|
||||
private val http = OkHttpClient.Builder()
|
||||
.connectTimeout(25, TimeUnit.SECONDS)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ fun ServerConnectScreen(
|
||||
port = "",
|
||||
)
|
||||
// Mesh discovery + first session can take 15s+ through the
|
||||
// public tree (per node diagnosis), and on a
|
||||
// public tree (HANDOFF-2026-07-23 node diagnosis), and on a
|
||||
// first-ever pairing the VPN consent dialog is on screen at
|
||||
// the same time — so probe patiently inside a 60s budget with
|
||||
// per-attempt timeouts wide enough to ride out TCP
|
||||
|
||||
Binary file not shown.
@@ -258,8 +258,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
"npub": "npub1abc",
|
||||
"alias": "My Archipelago",
|
||||
"addresses": [
|
||||
{"transport": "udp", "addr": "192.0.2.10:2121", "priority": 10},
|
||||
{"transport": "tcp", "addr": "192.0.2.10:8443", "priority": 20}
|
||||
{"transport": "udp", "addr": "192.168.1.228:2121", "priority": 10},
|
||||
{"transport": "tcp", "addr": "192.168.1.228:8443", "priority": 20}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}]"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
+17
-114
@@ -1,102 +1,5 @@
|
||||
# Changelog
|
||||
|
||||
## Unreleased
|
||||
|
||||
- **You can now replace your Lightning connection keys from Settings, without touching a terminal.** The tokens wallet apps like Zeus use to reach your node are bearer keys: anything that has ever seen one can spend from your node until they are replaced, and there is no way to cancel one individually. Replacing them was previously a script you had to SSH in and run, which in practice meant it never happened. Settings → Lightning credentials now shows when yours were issued, which node they belong to and how many channels must survive, then does the whole job behind your node password — with a step-by-step progress list, and a refusal to call it a success unless it has confirmed your node identity and every channel came back. Your coins and channels are not touched: nothing is closed, and the wallet is never re-created. Afterwards you re-pair Zeus by scanning the Lightning app's QR code again.
|
||||
- **Replacing those keys no longer silently breaks BTCPay Server.** BTCPay holds its own copy of the key, and that copy cannot repair itself — so a node that replaced its keys ended up with BTCPay running, healthy, and unable to take a single Lightning payment, with nothing anywhere saying why. The dashboard now updates BTCPay's copy as part of the run and restarts it around its existing data, and the Settings screen warns you if it finds a node already stuck in that state. The command-line script fixes the same gap.
|
||||
- **Lightning stops getting stuck locked on a busy node.** Lightning opens its databases before it will accept the password that unlocks the wallet, and on a loaded node that took nearly three minutes — longer than the node was willing to wait. Giving up restarted Lightning, which started the slow open again, so the wallet stayed locked forever and everything depending on it stayed broken. The node now waits as long as it takes. A genuinely wrong password still fails immediately.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.126-alpha (2026-08-07)
|
||||
|
||||
- **The most important fix in this release: the update button could take you backwards onto a version withdrawn for a security hole.** BTCPay Server published 2.4.2 to close a flaw that was being actively exploited — a way past two-factor authentication. Nodes that had already moved to 2.4.2 were then shown an "Update" button offering 2.3.9, the very release being withdrawn, and taking it would have rolled the node back onto the vulnerable version. The cause was that the node only asked whether the two version numbers differed, never which was newer, so any stale record anywhere could present a rollback as an upgrade. It now refuses to offer a lower version as an update, so a stale record fails safe instead of becoming a trap. BTCPay itself is on 2.4.2, and every place that still named the old version — including the fallback installer, which would have installed it outright — has been corrected.
|
||||
- **An app now reports its own version, not a helper's.** Where an app is made of several parts, the node could read the version of the wrong part: BTCPay showed as "15.17", which is the version of its database, while offering an update to 2.4.2. That is the number update decisions are made from, so a nonsensical pair was being presented as a legitimate upgrade. When the node cannot identify an app's own container it now says so rather than guessing at a neighbour.
|
||||
- **Your node issues its own certificate, so apps stop being flagged as insecure.** Each node now has its own certificate authority, with a one-step install from Settings, and app screens are served over the same secure connection as the dashboard rather than dropping back to an unprotected one. Apps answer on both the secure and plain address on the same port, so nothing that worked before stops working.
|
||||
- **An app that is still starting says "starting".** It previously reported "App not reachable", which reads as a failure when the app is simply warming up.
|
||||
- **Updates and app downloads now come from a proper domain name.** They previously used a bare numeric address over an unprotected connection. Downloads are now encrypted in transit, and the old address is kept as an automatic fallback for nodes whose clock or name lookup is off — the signature, not the address, is what makes either source safe.
|
||||
- Also in this release: the tool app developers run to check their app description no longer rejects every valid file (it needed a program most machines do not have, and reported the missing program as a broken file); and the node's own security audit, which had been reporting all-clear, now actually inspects the files where credentials had been sitting.
|
||||
- Housekeeping, disclosed rather than buried: this release removes Archipelago's own infrastructure details from the published source — machine names, addresses and internal working notes — ahead of the code being opened to the public. No behaviour changes for your node.
|
||||
- Known gaps, unchanged from the last release: three voice-assistant ports remain open without authentication. Non-browser clients — phone apps for Vaultwarden, Home Assistant or Jellyfin, and git over the web — meet the login page and need an access token. The 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.125-alpha (2026-08-06)
|
||||
|
||||
- **The Lightning, Bitcoin, Electrum and mesh screens work again behind the login gate.** Since the gate went up, those screens loaded their frame and then showed every number as unreachable. The gate was deliberately hiding your login from the apps it protects — right for third-party apps, wrong for the node's own screens, which need that login to fetch your data. The gate now removes only its own credential, and the node's own screens explicitly receive yours. The same mistake was also quietly signing you out of apps with their own logins — Vaultwarden, Nextcloud, Gitea — on every single request; that stops too.
|
||||
- **IndeeHub heals itself.** Three separate faults fixed: its database helper was recreated with permissions too tight to read its own files (it had crashed and restarted roughly ten thousand times on one node); on another node two of its seven parts could never be recreated at all because of how the node asked for their storage — it would remove the old part and then fail to build its replacement, leaving the app half-missing forever; and a regenerated password could lock the app out of a database that keeps the original. The storage fault fixes the same trap for every future multi-part app.
|
||||
- **A missing piece of a running app now gets put back automatically.** If one container of a multi-part app disappears while its siblings are still running, the node treats that as a hole to repair rather than a choice to respect, and rebuilds the missing piece. An app you actually uninstalled stays uninstalled.
|
||||
- **Send and Receive open clean every time.** Whatever you typed last — an address, an amount, and above all an armed "send all funds" toggle — no longer quietly carries over into the next payment. Choosing "send all funds" also shows the amount being swept instead of a confusing 0.
|
||||
- **A sweep that cannot happen now says why.** Trying to sweep a balance that is below Bitcoin's dust minimum (about 546 sats) or not yet confirmed used to fail with "check server logs"; it now explains that no transaction can be built from those coins.
|
||||
- **The camera scanner option no longer vanishes on desktop.** Browsers only allow the live camera on secure (HTTPS) pages, and the scan window silently hid the camera choice on plain connections — which read as "the scanner is gone". The option now stays visible and explains itself, and the photo and paste routes always work. The companion app's built-in scanner is untouched.
|
||||
- **App data folders can no longer be "repaired" into a state the app cannot use.** When the node fixed a folder's ownership through its fallback path, it wrote the container's raw user number instead of the translated one, so the fix reported success while the app still could not open its own files — one node's BotFights restarted every ten seconds over exactly this. The translation is now applied.
|
||||
- Also: the app login page uses the Archipelago mark and stays centred on phones with the keyboard open, app icons in the install window are no longer cropped, and when the node fails to build a container it now records the actual reason instead of a one-line stub that hid the cause of the IndeeHub fault for days.
|
||||
- Known gaps, disclosed rather than buried: three voice-assistant ports remain open without authentication. Non-browser clients — phone apps for Vaultwarden, Home Assistant or Jellyfin, and git over the web — meet the login page and need an access token. The 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.124-alpha (2026-08-05)
|
||||
|
||||
- **The most important fix in this release: some nodes were left switched off by their own update, and could not switch themselves back on.** The node replaces its program and then exits, expecting the system to start it again — but nodes installed from older images carried a setting that only restarts the program if it *crashes*. A clean, deliberate exit looked like success, so nothing restarted it, and the node sat dead showing "server starting" with nothing able to start it. One of ours was down for over two hours this way, and three of four checked had the same setting waiting to bite. Your node now repairs that setting itself the first time it starts, so it survives every future update.
|
||||
- **Portainer opens again.** Its screen reported the app as not responding because the app was quietly refusing to start: nodes have been running Portainer 2.39.1, their stored data was written by that version, and the app list pinned a version from two years earlier — so when the container was rebuilt it landed on the old one, which will not read newer data. The correct version is now pinned, older installs upgrade cleanly, and no data was touched.
|
||||
- **Bitcoin starts reliably again.** A leftover settings file in the Bitcoin folder — one the node itself kept rewriting and Bitcoin no longer reads — is treated as fatal by Bitcoin, so affected nodes restarted every few seconds forever. The node no longer writes that file, removes stale copies, and treats any that remain as harmless.
|
||||
- **Every app screen opens from My Apps again.** The login gate refused to be displayed inside another page at all, which is exactly how My Apps opens an app, so protected apps appeared broken. It now allows only your own node to display it, and refuses everyone else — a distinction the old setting could not express.
|
||||
- **The app login screen now looks like the node's own.** Same rotating artwork, the same panel, the Archipelago mark, and the app's real icon shown as a tile the way My Apps shows it, instead of a plain box with a letter.
|
||||
- **The Mesh screen uses wide displays properly.** On very large screens it stacked all five panels on top of each other, clipping three of the headings to a sliver and squeezing the map into a letterbox — more screen producing a worse view. It now shows one panel at a time, filling the space, with the map running edge to edge.
|
||||
- **You can choose how long you stay signed in.** Settings → Account now offers an inactivity timeout and a hard limit, plus an option to re-enter your password before sending funds. TV and kiosk screens are never signed out for sitting idle, because there is nobody there to sign them back in.
|
||||
- Updates now come from `source.archipelago-foundation.org` rather than a bare address, with the old one kept as an automatic fallback for nodes whose clock or name lookup is off. Also included: clearer wallet errors from ecash mints, and mesh peers reconnecting via their last known address before falling back to the wider network.
|
||||
- Known gaps, disclosed rather than buried: three voice-assistant ports remain open without authentication; the correct fix puts them on a private network with the assistant. Non-browser clients — phone apps for Vaultwarden, Home Assistant or Jellyfin, and git over the web — meet the login page and need an access token. The 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.123-alpha (2026-08-05)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Five more screens on your node were readable by anyone who could reach it, and the previous release's own check said they were fine.** The Bitcoin, Lightning, Electrum, FIPS mesh and Fedimint Guardian screens each answered on their port with no login. They were missed because they work differently from ordinary apps: they run directly on the node's network rather than behind its container plumbing, so there was no address to pin and their descriptions listed no port at all — and the node builds its list of what to protect from exactly those descriptions. It therefore neither protected them nor listed them as unprotected. A check that reports success while five screens are open is worse than no check, and this was found by scanning the node from another machine rather than asking the node about itself.
|
||||
- **What was actually readable was the page, not your money.** Every request on those ports that could have returned a credential — the Lightning connection details, the wallet passthrough, container logs, and every node command — already required a login and still refused without one. The Lightning macaroon fix from v1.7.120 was verified directly rather than assumed. What leaked was the screen itself: layout and code, no wallet data, no keys.
|
||||
- All five now serve only to the node itself, with the login gate in front of them, exactly like the twenty app screens closed in the previous release.
|
||||
- **Every port on the node now has a stated policy — there are no undecided ones left.** Eleven ports previously had no instruction either way and stayed open by default. The BotFights arena, the router screen and the Pine voice screen now require the node password. The ones that genuinely cannot take a login page stay open with a written reason: Fedimint's guardian and gateway connections (federation members authenticate to the federation), NetBird's management and dashboard ports (your VPN devices carry their own credentials and cannot hold a browser session, and its dashboard needs its own certificate), Pine's secure listener, and the Lightning REST port, which wallets reach with a macaroon exactly as before.
|
||||
- Fresh installs are covered too, not just existing nodes. The five screens are delivered as prebuilt images, so a newly flashed node would have come up open even after this fix. All five were rebuilt, published, and then pulled back and inspected to confirm the fix is really inside them.
|
||||
- Two delivery faults fixed alongside, either of which would have silently undone the above: two of the five screens were reaching nodes through no update path at all, so edits to them never arrived; and a fourth copy of the Bitcoin screen's configuration was being rewritten on every health check, which would have re-opened that port after everything else was corrected.
|
||||
- Known gaps, disclosed rather than buried: non-browser clients — phone apps for Vaultwarden, Home Assistant or Jellyfin, and git over the web — meet the login page and need an access token. Three voice-assistant ports remain open without authentication; the correct fix puts them on a private network with the assistant. The 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.122-alpha (2026-08-04)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Your apps now ask for your node password before they open — over your home network, Tailscale, the mesh and Tor alike.** Until now anyone who could reach your node could open Immich, Nextcloud, Vaultwarden, Jellyfin, Grafana and the rest simply by typing the address and port, with no login at all. Twenty app screens now sit behind the same login you use for the node, showing you which app you are opening, and honouring two-factor if you have it switched on. Logging in at an app address logs you into the dashboard too, so it is one password, not one per app. This completes the groundwork disclosed in v1.7.121.
|
||||
- **The things that must stay open stayed open.** Zeus and other remote wallets still reach your Lightning node directly, Electrum wallets still connect, and Bitcoin still talks to its peers — those connections carry their own proof of identity and a login page would simply break them. Every one of these seventeen exceptions now has to state in writing why it is safe to leave open, so the list is something you can read rather than something you have to discover.
|
||||
- **A private address on your node was answering the mesh without a password.** One app's port was marked as being for this machine only, and the part of the node that carries mesh traffic did not know that — it forwarded requests from the whole mesh straight to it. Found while verifying the work above on a real node, not in testing. That path now refuses anything marked machine-only, and the app is reachable only from the node itself, as intended.
|
||||
- **Tor addresses no longer skip the login.** An app published as a .onion address was handed straight to the app, because a Tor visitor carries no session cookie to check. The login gate now takes those addresses first, closing the last of the four routes that went around it.
|
||||
- Nodes fix themselves after this update. Apps installed before this system used its current container setup kept their old wide-open address even after the signed list told them to move, and each would otherwise have needed hand-holding on every node. Your node now notices the difference and rebuilds those apps itself, keeping their data, within about half a minute of starting. Verified by putting a node back into the old state deliberately and watching it repair.
|
||||
- The node had been reading two different sets of instructions about its own apps — the signed list it downloads, and older copies on disk — which is how a port meant to stay private was briefly opened on a test node. Both now come from the signed list, and a port withdrawn from the login gate is released without needing a restart.
|
||||
- **The key that signs these updates has been replaced.** The previous signing key was exposed where it should not have been, so it is treated as compromised and this release installs its replacement. This update is the last one signed with the old key, by necessity — it is the one that teaches your node the new one.
|
||||
- Known gaps, disclosed rather than buried: eleven app ports still have no stated policy — BotFights, the Fedimint gateway, NetBird, the voice assistant's own screens and the router screen — and remain reachable without a login until each is decided deliberately; the node reports them rather than guessing, because guessing at an unstated setting caused both incidents behind this work. Three voice-assistant ports are still open without authentication; the correct fix puts them on a private network with the assistant. Non-browser clients — phone apps for Vaultwarden, Home Assistant or Jellyfin, and git over the web — will now meet the login page and need an access token. The 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.121-alpha (2026-08-04)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Making another node "Trusted" now asks for your node password.** Trust was being handed out by machines rather than by you: any node able to reach yours could join and mark itself Trusted, because the check proved only that the caller owned the key it had just presented — never that you had approved it. Trust also spread on its own, since every peer a Trusted node advertised was added as Trusted too, so one grant quietly propagated across the whole federation. Uninvited joins are now capped at Observer, advertised peers arrive as Observers, and raising anyone to Trusted — whether by generating an invite or by changing the dropdown on a node — requires your password. Lowering trust deliberately does not, because the safe action must never be the inconvenient one. Existing peers are left exactly as they are rather than silently demoted, and each one now records how its trust was granted so you can review them.
|
||||
- **Nodes you have peered with can be messaged straight away.** Peering was not enough: you also had to be within LoRa radio range of the other node once before chat would work. The node picked how to send a message based on which radio was plugged in, and only one of those paths knew how to reach a peer over the mesh's internet transports — so on a node with a different radio, or no radio at all, messaging a peer you had just federated with simply failed until a radio contact happened to appear. Peered nodes are reachable without radio by definition, so that choice no longer depends on the hardware. Radio is still preferred when the other node is actually in range and the message fits.
|
||||
- The dashboard no longer flickers a vertical line across its cards. A rendering seam appeared at random while moving the mouse, because the two large cards used a background-blur effect that this system already disables everywhere else on the dashboard — that browser mis-draws it inside the dashboard's animated container, and these two cards had been missed when the workaround was written. Diagnosed from a single screenshot rather than by trying to reproduce it.
|
||||
- The Lightning screen will actually update from now on. Its image was set to "latest", and the container system will not re-fetch a label it already holds, so nodes kept the same Lightning screen forever no matter how many updates shipped. A separate copy of the same setting used only by brand-new installs also described the screen incorrectly, so fresh installs got a screen that never answered.
|
||||
- Apps that provide their own screens stop rebuilding themselves in a loop. On this system's own node one of them rebuilt every thirty-five seconds indefinitely, burning processor time and restarting the app each round. The node decided a rebuild was needed by comparing file dates against the image's creation date, but a rebuild that changes nothing reuses the existing image and leaves that date untouched — so the condition that triggered the rebuild was still true afterwards, forever. Nodes taking this update repair themselves the first time they check.
|
||||
- Groundwork you can see but that does not change access yet: the node can now tell you which of its app ports answer without a login, and every port that is deliberately open — Bitcoin's peer connections for syncing the chain, Lightning's wallet connections, the Electrum wallet protocol — now has to state in writing why it is safe, so the list of exceptions is something you can read rather than something you have to discover. The login gate that will sit in front of the rest is built and proven working end to end on a real node, but it is not yet closing any ports; that arrives with the signed app catalog that tells each app to hand its address over.
|
||||
- Releases can no longer ship an unsigned update file. Signing was skippable, and when it was skipped the release was still committed and tagged — producing an update that every node correctly refuses to install. It had been caught by hand every cycle; now the release simply stops.
|
||||
- Known gaps, disclosed rather than buried: the 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release. App ports other than the deliberate exceptions above are still reachable without a login — the gate reports them, and closing them needs the next signed catalog. Three voice-assistant ports are open without authentication and should not be; the correct fix puts them on a private network with the assistant instead, which needs testing on a node that runs both. Two nodes on the fleet still share SSH host keys (detection shipped, rotation remains a deliberate operator decision).
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.120-alpha (2026-08-02)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Security, and the reason to take this update: two ports on your node handed anyone who could reach them complete control of your money, with no password.** The Lightning app's port answered a plain web request with the LND admin macaroon, the TLS certificate and the node's onion address — everything needed to drain the wallet remotely, and the onion meant an attacker kept that ability even after losing access to your network. The Bitcoin app's port reached Bitcoin Core's control interface using credentials the node itself supplied on the caller's behalf, with a wallet loaded. Anything on your home network, your Tailscale network or the mesh could use either one. Both now require you to be logged in. If your node has been reachable by anyone you do not fully trust, treat the Lightning macaroon and the Bitcoin RPC password as known to them.
|
||||
- The Bitcoin and Lightning app screens can no longer be published as public Tor addresses automatically. They were one app-id away from being handed a worldwide, permanent address as a silent side effect of being installed — which would have re-opened the hole above to the entire internet. Turning Tor on for them deliberately still works; it just never happens on its own.
|
||||
- **Fixes shipped inside the program now actually reach apps that your system keeps running.** A container the node had been told to uninstall, but that the system service manager kept alive anyway, was quietly skipped by the part of the node that applies configuration — so it never received updates that shipped with the program. This was found the hard way: the Bitcoin control-interface fix above appeared to be installed and silently was not, while the Lightning half applied correctly, which is the most misleading way for a security fix to fail. Both halves are now proven to land on a real node.
|
||||
- The Lightning and Bitcoin node screens have been rebuilt to match what umbrelOS offers. Lightning gains Overview, Channels, Activity, Insights, Connect and Settings tabs with a sats/BTC switch; Bitcoin gains Insights, Peers, Connect and Sharing. Along the way: every copy button on those screens silently did nothing (the browser blocks clipboard access inside an embedded page) and now works; the channels link led to a dead page; and Node ID showed a bare key instead of the full address someone can actually connect to.
|
||||
- Updates to the Bitcoin screen show up without a hard refresh. The page was being cached by the browser, so a freshly updated screen kept rendering the previous one.
|
||||
- The AI sidebar loads again. It was asking for its program files at an address that pointed at the main app's files, where they do not exist, so it silently loaded nothing.
|
||||
- The navigation above the bottom bar no longer follows you between screens. Back buttons and the mesh tab bar stayed pinned over every other page once you had visited the screen that owns them. Keeping tabs loaded in the background — the change that made switching between them instant — means leaving a screen hides it rather than destroying it, and this floating navigation sits outside the screen it belongs to, so it was never being hidden with it. It is now tied to whether its own screen is on display. The speed is unchanged: the screens are still kept loaded, so returning to one is still instant.
|
||||
- Wallet: Lightning actions are now offered based on whether you actually have a usable channel rather than just a running node, sending is gated the same way, and an invoice you cannot yet receive offers to install a Lightning node instead of simply failing.
|
||||
- Onboarding and viewing fixes: the "I have written down my recovery words" tickbox is findable on short screens, paid pictures and videos open in the app's own viewer with a visible loading state instead of a blank browser tab, picture-in-picture survives changing tabs, and the FIPS/Tor labels on peer cards stay put instead of wrapping into the card below.
|
||||
- Key-material hardening across the node: a node that is already set up refuses to have its identity replaced by an unauthenticated request; first-boot secret generation now fails loudly instead of silently continuing with shared keys; the node proves its TLS certificate and key are actually a matching pair; the Bitcoin Core wallet path that kept a second copy of your spending key outside the encrypted store has been removed; and every place the node generates a key, token or nonce now names its source of randomness explicitly, enforced at build time.
|
||||
- Federation and mesh: a rotated gateway credential now reaches the already-running container instead of leaving the old one in place, sync failures are surfaced to you instead of being swallowed, and nodes can share their Lightning connection details with a chosen peer over the mesh — the groundwork for opening channels with nodes you already talk to.
|
||||
- Known gaps, disclosed rather than buried: the 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release. Two nodes on the fleet still share SSH host keys with each other (detection shipped, rotation is a deliberate operator decision and has not been performed). Bitcoin Core can now reach Tor from its container, but is not yet routed through it — the network mode is becoming a setting you choose, and until then Core's peers remain on the clear internet.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.119-alpha (2026-07-31)
|
||||
|
||||
- Wallet payments now work on nodes whose channels are private/unannounced. Every invoice-creation call site — the wallet's own Receive flow, and the seller-side paid-content/peer-files flow — only ever sent LND the amount and memo, so LND defaulted private to false and returned invoices with no route hints. Any node whose only usable channel is private or unannounced (the common shape for a channel someone opened to you) was silently unpayable through the wallet, and unpayable through paid file/content sales too. Both call sites now set LND's private flag correctly; this was broken in the field and is the main reason for this release.
|
||||
- Tor and the mesh's Tor fallback are reliable again. The node's background "doctor" health-checker was fighting Tor over the permission bits on its own hidden-service directory: it compared the directory's mode against the literal string "700", but Tor's own setgid hidden-service mode is 2700 — a value the doctor's check never recognized as correct. Every ~5 minutes it "corrected" the mode back to 700 and restarted Tor to apply it, and Tor immediately reasserted 2700 — a permanent restart loop that meant Tor could never hold onto its consensus/HSDir cache long enough to be useful, breaking the mesh's Tor fallback path entirely. The check now compares only the owner/group/other bits that actually matter (both 700 and 2700 pass; genuinely wrong modes like 750 or 2755 are still corrected and restart Tor), plus a 30-minute restart backoff so no future condition can reproduce the storm.
|
||||
- Wallet balances and your node's own FIPS identity key (npub) are no longer written to the browser's sessionStorage — caught by an audit of the page-caching work below. Every cache call site in the app now makes an explicit, reviewed decision about whether its data is allowed to persist across a reload, and a one-time migration purges any legacy, unaudited snapshot left behind by an older build.
|
||||
- Server, Home, Mesh, Chat/AI chat, and the secondary screens (app details, marketplace, cloud, federation, monitoring, router/OpenWrt) now load instantly from cache when you revisit them and refresh quietly in the background, instead of blanking and re-fetching everything on every tab switch — this closes out the page-performance work started back in v1.7.116/117.
|
||||
- App updates (including this one) now apply automatically in the background instead of waiting on a tap-to-update prompt, matching how kiosk/TV installs already behaved — the reload still waits for any in-progress splash/dashboard animation to finish first, so it won't land mid-motion. This was a direct, explicit decision made with the mid-payment-reload risk spelled out in advance; reverting to a confirmation prompt for beta is a one-line change if wanted later.
|
||||
- Known gap, disclosed rather than buried: the project's 5x production lifecycle gate (install/UI/stop/start/restart/reinstall/reboot-survive/archipelago-restart-survive/uninstall, run on a real node — CLAUDE.md's own definition of done before a release tag) was NOT run for this release, because its target node was unreachable and running it here would have required rebooting a shared, live build machine out from under other active work. This release's own automated gates (release-gate harness, strict catalog-drift check, the full cargo test suite, a mount-level ISO smoke test, and a headless QEMU boot test) all still ran and passed — this is specifically about the separate 5x real-node lifecycle gate, which is still outstanding and should be run as soon as the node is reachable again.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.118-alpha (2026-07-29)
|
||||
|
||||
- Fixes mesh radios dropping off on nodes that took the v1.7.117 update. Updates only ever replaced the main program, never the packaged radio helpers — so updated nodes were left running an older radio daemon that didn't understand a new option and quietly gave up, showing "device not connected" with a Connect button that did nothing. The node now checks what its radio daemon supports before using new options, and updates finally carry the radio helpers themselves, so every node gets current radio support with the update instead of only from a fresh install.
|
||||
@@ -466,14 +369,14 @@
|
||||
- Saleor storefront proxying now forwards `X-Forwarded-Host`, fixing Next.js Server Actions requests that compared the browser origin with the internal `storefront-app:3000` upstream host.
|
||||
- Saleor storefront media now routes `/thumbnail/` and `/media/` through the same `9011` proxy to the Saleor API, fixing product image optimizer failures caused by `localhost:8000` media URLs.
|
||||
- The Saleor storefront container receives an explicit internal media origin so rewritten media URLs resolve inside the Podman network without exposing private API ports to browsers.
|
||||
- Validation passed with `cargo fmt --all --check --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`, `cargo check -p archipelago --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`, and live checks on the staging node for storefront HTML, static assets, GraphQL, media redirects, and optimized product images.
|
||||
- Validation passed with `cargo fmt --all --check --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`, `cargo check -p archipelago --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`, and live checks on `100.114.134.21` for storefront HTML, static assets, GraphQL, media redirects, and optimized product images.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.81-alpha (2026-05-21)
|
||||
|
||||
- Saleor storefront installs now use the prebuilt registry image instead of building the Next.js app on-device, avoiding Podman build failures during stack installation.
|
||||
- Existing Saleor stacks are repaired on adoption by recreating missing storefront containers, forcing the storefront app to bind `0.0.0.0:3000`, and resolving nginx upstreams dynamically after container restarts.
|
||||
- The shipped Saleor storefront image now includes public assets and omits Vercel-only Speed Insights injection, fixing broken static asset responses and the local `/_vercel/speed-insights/script.js` browser warning.
|
||||
- Validation passed with `cargo fmt --all --check --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`, `cargo check -p archipelago --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`, and live checks on the staging node for `9011` storefront, static assets, and proxied GraphQL.
|
||||
- Validation passed with `cargo fmt --all --check --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`, `cargo check -p archipelago --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`, and live checks on `100.114.134.21` for `9011` storefront, static assets, and proxied GraphQL.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.80-alpha (2026-05-21)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -504,7 +407,7 @@
|
||||
- Saleor installs now create or repair the `admin@example.com` staff account idempotently after sample data loads, use the correct dashboard mount path, and re-check stack containers after startup so stopped containers are caught.
|
||||
- NetBird embedded login now uses the upstream-compatible IdP signing-key behavior and sends ID tokens from the dashboard to the management API, fixing the post-signup `Unauthenticated` state while preserving the unified local proxy/logout routes.
|
||||
- Transient unnamed Podman helper containers created during app install tasks are hidden from My Apps, so generated names like `eager_keldysh` no longer appear as user applications.
|
||||
- Validation passed with catalog/release JSON checks, `npm run type-check`, and `cargo fmt --all --check --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`; live checks on the staging node confirmed Saleor dashboard/API availability, generated Saleor admin login, NetBird OAuth availability, and NetBird logout redirects.
|
||||
- Validation passed with catalog/release JSON checks, `npm run type-check`, and `cargo fmt --all --check --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`; live checks on `100.114.134.21` confirmed Saleor dashboard/API availability, generated Saleor admin login, NetBird OAuth availability, and NetBird logout redirects.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.76-alpha (2026-05-20)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -513,7 +416,7 @@
|
||||
- NetBird's browser proxy now sends API, OAuth, relay, WebSocket, and management traffic through the stable host-published server port at `169.254.1.2:8086`, avoiding stale rootless Podman DNS/IPs after `netbird-server` restarts.
|
||||
- Mobile App Store category chips now stay visible above the tab bar, Discover is available on mobile, and category selection updates the page route/query so the selected category is actually shown.
|
||||
- Apps that require a real browser tab now open directly from the app icon tap instead of first entering an in-shell app-session route, including BTCPay, Grafana, Home Assistant, Vaultwarden, Nextcloud, Portainer, OnlyOffice, Tailscale, Uptime Kuma, Gitea, and Nginx Proxy Manager.
|
||||
- Validation passed with catalog JSON checks, `npm run type-check`, `cargo fmt --all --check --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`, and `cargo check -p archipelago --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`; live checks on a fleet node confirmed Saleor dashboard `9010`/API `8000` and NetBird API/OAuth routes survive `netbird-server` restart.
|
||||
- Validation passed with catalog JSON checks, `npm run type-check`, `cargo fmt --all --check --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`, and `cargo check -p archipelago --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml`; live checks on `100.70.96.88` confirmed Saleor dashboard `9010`/API `8000` and NetBird API/OAuth routes survive `netbird-server` restart.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.75-alpha (2026-05-19)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -535,7 +438,7 @@
|
||||
- Mobile app launches for iframe-blocked apps now open the direct app URL in a new browser tab immediately instead of landing in a broken in-shell webview that requires a second tap.
|
||||
- Mobile My Apps/Websites tabs now react to route query changes, App Store pages label the mobile view as Discover, mobile filters have safe bottom spacing, and App Store search ignores the current category so searches cover all available apps.
|
||||
- My Apps search now surfaces matching App Store entries when the app is not installed, making it possible to jump directly from a failed My Apps search to the installable app details.
|
||||
- NetBird self-host installs now prefer a `100.x` tailnet/CGNAT address for dashboard, management, relay, STUN, and auth redirect origins when one is present; live repair on a fleet node updated the existing stack from LAN origins to its tailnet address and restored `netbird-server`.
|
||||
- NetBird self-host installs now prefer a `100.x` tailnet/CGNAT address for dashboard, management, relay, STUN, and auth redirect origins when one is present; live repair on `100.89.209.89` updated the existing stack from LAN origins to `100.89.209.89` and restored `netbird-server`.
|
||||
- App-session iframe frames now focus automatically and wrap the iframe in a scroll host so wheel/touch scrolling works in the active right frame without requiring an initial click.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.72-alpha (2026-05-19)
|
||||
@@ -546,7 +449,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.71-alpha (2026-05-19)
|
||||
|
||||
- NetBird stack installs now pre-create `/var/lib/archipelago/netbird/data` before binding it into `netbird-server`, fixing the failed install/start path seen on a fleet node where Podman rejected the missing host directory.
|
||||
- NetBird stack installs now pre-create `/var/lib/archipelago/netbird/data` before binding it into `netbird-server`, fixing the failed install/start path seen on `100.70.96.88` where Podman rejected the missing host directory.
|
||||
- NetBird start/restart ordering now starts `netbird-server` before the dashboard container so lifecycle actions bring the control plane up before the UI.
|
||||
- App-session invalid IDs and panel-mode fallbacks now return to `/dashboard/apps`, avoiding the stale `/apps` route that could render a 404.
|
||||
- Mobile launches for apps that block iframes now stay inside the Archipelago app-session fallback instead of automatically opening an external browser tab.
|
||||
@@ -564,7 +467,7 @@
|
||||
## v1.7.69-alpha (2026-05-19)
|
||||
|
||||
- App installs now allow up to 10 minutes for the initial `package.install` RPC to return, matching slow container image pulls and preventing apps from disappearing from My Apps while the backend is still pulling or retrying mirrors.
|
||||
- Live diagnostics on a fleet node confirmed the Gitea install did not fail; the primary registry pull timed out after 300 seconds, the fallback mirror succeeded, and Gitea came up healthy on `3001` while the frontend had already timed out at 15 seconds.
|
||||
- Live diagnostics on `100.70.96.88` confirmed the Gitea install did not fail; the primary registry pull timed out after 300 seconds, the fallback mirror succeeded, and Gitea came up healthy on `3001` while the frontend had already timed out at 15 seconds.
|
||||
- Gitea and other Docker-image app installs now stay visible during slow registry pulls instead of being marked as failed by the browser before backend install progress can complete.
|
||||
- Gitea is now categorized as a known Data app in My Apps, so a running Gitea container appears with installed apps instead of being filtered into the Websites/Services split.
|
||||
- NetBird `0.71.2` is now available in the app catalog and fallback marketplace data as a recommended networking app using the official `docker.io/netbirdio/netbird:0.71.2` image.
|
||||
@@ -582,8 +485,8 @@
|
||||
- App session close buttons now return to the previous dashboard screen when possible and otherwise fall back to My Apps, avoiding the 404 page after closing an app launched from an invalid or stale history entry.
|
||||
- System Update confirmation and mirror modals now teleport to the document body with a full-screen overlay, so they cover the whole app instead of only the right-hand dashboard panel.
|
||||
- Mobile app launches stay inside Archipelago's app-session webview and hide desktop-only new-tab launch affordances, including apps such as Home Assistant that previously looked like they would leave the mobile shell.
|
||||
- Live recovery on a fleet node upgraded only the `btcpay-server` container to `docker.io/btcpayserver/btcpayserver:2.3.9`, preserved the existing datadir and Postgres database, and confirmed the container is healthy after a pre-upgrade backup.
|
||||
- Public validation confirmed ``the BTCPay host`/`www` redirect to BTCPay login over HTTPS and `the L484 host`/`www` serve the L484 page over HTTPS using the issued Let's Encrypt certificates.
|
||||
- Live recovery on `100.70.96.88` upgraded only the `btcpay-server` container to `docker.io/btcpayserver/btcpayserver:2.3.9`, preserved the existing datadir and Postgres database, and confirmed the container is healthy after a pre-upgrade backup.
|
||||
- Public validation confirmed `spay.tx1138.com`/`www` redirect to BTCPay login over HTTPS and `sapien.tx1138.com`/`www` serve the L484 page over HTTPS using the issued Let's Encrypt certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.67-alpha (2026-05-18)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -592,18 +495,18 @@
|
||||
- Settings What's New is filled through `v1.7.67-alpha`, including the missing historical `v1.7.44-alpha` through `v1.7.66-alpha` entries.
|
||||
- Bitcoin/Knots/Core shell lifecycle specs now match the Rust app config memory policy: 8 GiB on normal hosts, 4 GiB on low-memory hosts, and pruned Knots uses a larger dbcache on hosts with enough RAM to improve IBD throughput.
|
||||
- ElectrumX/electrs shell lifecycle specs now match the 4 GiB memory policy used by the Rust app config, reducing drift between first boot, reconcile, and app lifecycle paths.
|
||||
- Live assessment of a fleet node identified the current IBD bottlenecks as CPU/thermal/I/O pressure rather than RAM exhaustion, with follow-up work planned for existing-node swap repair, kiosk Chromium CPU reduction, and reconcile failure cleanup.
|
||||
- Live assessment of `100.70.96.88` identified the current IBD bottlenecks as CPU/thermal/I/O pressure rather than RAM exhaustion, with follow-up work planned for existing-node swap repair, kiosk Chromium CPU reduction, and reconcile failure cleanup.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.66-alpha (2026-05-18)
|
||||
|
||||
- Nginx Proxy Manager stale-port repair now detects stopped or `Created` Podman records by inspecting `podman ps -a` port metadata, covering records where `podman port nginx-proxy-manager` returns no mapping until start.
|
||||
- Live recovery on a fleet node removed only the stale Nginx Proxy Manager container record and recreated it with `8081:81`, `8084:80`, and `8444:443`, preserving `/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager` data.
|
||||
- Live recovery on `100.70.96.88` removed only the stale Nginx Proxy Manager container record and recreated it with `8081:81`, `8084:80`, and `8444:443`, preserving `/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager` data.
|
||||
- Validation confirmed Nginx Proxy Manager recovered as healthy and responds through direct admin port `8081`, host compatibility port `81`, and `/app/nginx-proxy-manager/`.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.65-alpha (2026-05-18)
|
||||
|
||||
- Orchestrator-backed app starts now run the same pre-start repairs as the legacy Podman path, so Nginx Proxy Manager stale `81:81` container metadata is removed and recreated before the orchestrator tries to start it.
|
||||
- Live diagnostics on a fleet node confirmed host nginx is healthy while Nginx Proxy Manager has no listeners on `8081`, `8084`, or `8444`, causing host nginx `502` responses for NPM proxy paths.
|
||||
- Live diagnostics on `100.70.96.88` confirmed host nginx is healthy while Nginx Proxy Manager has no listeners on `8081`, `8084`, or `8444`, causing host nginx `502` responses for NPM proxy paths.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.64-alpha (2026-05-18)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -628,7 +531,7 @@
|
||||
- Multi-container stack installs now keep their app card in the `Installing` state for up to 20 minutes while dependency containers are being pulled and prepared.
|
||||
- BTCPay Server installs no longer appear to vanish or fail after two minutes while Postgres and NBXplorer are still being created before the primary `btcpay-server` container exists.
|
||||
- The stale-transition escape hatch remains short for start, stop, restart, update, and removal operations, so genuinely wedged lifecycle actions still recover quickly.
|
||||
- Live validation on a fleet node confirmed BTCPay Server completed installation and responds on port `23000` with the expected HTTP redirect.
|
||||
- Live validation on `100.70.96.88` confirmed BTCPay Server completed installation and responds on port `23000` with the expected HTTP redirect.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.60-alpha (2026-05-18)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -636,7 +539,7 @@
|
||||
- Mesh radio auto-detection now skips known non-mesh serial devices such as Sierra Wireless LTE modems and Zooz/Z-Wave sticks, avoiding interference with production peripherals.
|
||||
- Meshtastic config sync now sends `want_config_id` with the correct protobuf wire type, fixing radio-side `ignore malformed toradio` errors and allowing node-info/contact ingestion.
|
||||
- The stable `/dev/mesh-radio` udev rule no longer claims every `ttyACM*` device; it only matches known mesh USB serial adapters and known USB CDC ACM radio vendors.
|
||||
- Live validation on a fleet node confirmed Archipelago selects `/dev/ttyUSB0`, identifies the Meshtastic node, and refreshes 103 mesh contacts.
|
||||
- Live validation on `100.70.96.88` confirmed Archipelago selects `/dev/ttyUSB0`, identifies the Meshtastic node, and refreshes 103 mesh contacts.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.59-alpha (2026-05-17)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -660,7 +563,7 @@
|
||||
- Host nginx now serves `/assets/*` hashed frontend chunks as immutable static files with a hard 404 on misses instead of falling back to `index.html`, preventing strict MIME errors when a browser has a stale pre-update HTML shell.
|
||||
- The SPA HTML shell and service-worker files now revalidate on every load, reducing stale frontend references after OTA updates.
|
||||
- OTA runtime promotion now installs the bundled `nginx-archipelago.conf` into `/etc/nginx/sites-available/archipelago` and reloads nginx after a successful config test, so frontend cache/fallback fixes reach existing nodes without a manual deploy.
|
||||
- Local validation passed with `cargo check -p archipelago`; live SSH testing against a fleet node was not completed because temporary public-key authentication was rejected on the target.
|
||||
- Local validation passed with `cargo check -p archipelago`; live SSH testing against `100.70.96.88` was not completed because temporary public-key authentication was rejected on the target.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.57-alpha (2026-05-17)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -741,7 +644,7 @@
|
||||
- Health monitor no longer pages "Auto-restart failed" for orphaned containers. After a variant switch (bitcoin-core ↔ bitcoin-knots) the previous variant's container could survive uninstall and the health monitor would try restarting it forever. Now skipped silently with a debug log.
|
||||
- Apps no longer disappear from My Apps when an install fails. The card stays visible with state=Stopped so the user can retry or uninstall, with the failure reason surfaced via the new install_progress.message field.
|
||||
- "Downloading…" progress now actually advances during multi-image stack pulls. Was sticking at 20% until all pulls finished; now interpolates 20%→70% based on which image of N has landed.
|
||||
- Pulled four docker.io images (bitcoin, gitea, nextcloud, valkey) into the lfg2025 registries on the registry mirrors. Removes a docker.io dependency from first-boot installs.
|
||||
- Pulled four docker.io images (bitcoin, gitea, nextcloud, valkey) into the lfg2025 registries on OVH and tx1138. Removes a docker.io dependency from first-boot installs.
|
||||
- Resilience harness improvements: install-fail entries no longer vanish, install/uninstall/probe cells are timing-tolerant (60s retry on ui_probe and auth_probe), dep snapshots no longer leak companion containers into the dependent app's "new containers" set.
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.7.45-alpha (2026-04-29)
|
||||
@@ -787,7 +690,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
|
||||
|
||||
### Infrastructure
|
||||
- CI pipeline added (.github/workflows/ci.yml) — cargo fmt, clippy, tests + frontend type-check, build
|
||||
- Update system now fetches from the release Gitea instance (configurable via ARCHIPELAGO_UPDATE_URL)
|
||||
- Update system now fetches from git.tx1138.com Gitea instance (configurable via ARCHIPELAGO_UPDATE_URL)
|
||||
- Cleaned up stale git branches (app-store, overnight/2026-03-12, overnight/2026-03-13)
|
||||
|
||||
## [1.3.0] - 2026-03-19
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,72 +1,84 @@
|
||||
# Archipelago — contributor guide
|
||||
# Archipelago — agent guide
|
||||
|
||||
This file orients anyone (human or AI) working in this repository: the
|
||||
invariants that must hold, how to build and verify, and where the deeper
|
||||
design docs live. The authoritative behaviour is always the code in `core/`.
|
||||
## ✅ Single-node production gate is GREEN (2026-06-23)
|
||||
|
||||
**Read [`docs/ROADMAP.md`](docs/ROADMAP.md) for where the project is going** and
|
||||
[`docs/README.md`](docs/README.md) for the full documentation index.
|
||||
`tests/lifecycle/run-gate.sh` is **5/5 on .228, 0 failures** — the single-node exit
|
||||
criterion is met and the priority banner is demoted. Next exit-criteria: the
|
||||
**multinode pass** (`docs/multinode-testing-plan.md`) and workstreams B/C/D.
|
||||
|
||||
The north star: a world-class, **developer-ready app platform** — every app
|
||||
manifest-driven, rootless, secure, and 100%-uptime-capable, with third-party
|
||||
developers publishing via an external/decentralized registry.
|
||||
**For day-to-day work, use `docs/UNIFIED-TASK-TRACKER.md`** — the consolidated,
|
||||
priority-ordered "what's left" list across the 1.8.0 OTA and master-plan docs
|
||||
(fastest/simplest tasks first). It supersedes hunting through the two source docs
|
||||
below for open items; those remain the narrative/history.
|
||||
|
||||
Detailed sub-plans:
|
||||
- App platform / packaging phases + security model → [`docs/APP-PACKAGING-MIGRATION-PLAN.md`](docs/APP-PACKAGING-MIGRATION-PLAN.md)
|
||||
- Registry-distributed manifests → [`docs/registry-manifest-design.md`](docs/registry-manifest-design.md)
|
||||
- External/decentralized marketplace for devs → [`docs/marketplace-protocol.md`](docs/marketplace-protocol.md)
|
||||
- App manifest schema → [`docs/app-manifest-spec.md`](docs/app-manifest-spec.md)
|
||||
- Production test gate → [`tests/lifecycle/TESTING.md`](tests/lifecycle/TESTING.md)
|
||||
**Read `docs/PRODUCTION-MASTER-PLAN.md` first** — it is still the authoritative plan
|
||||
for the north star: a world-class, **developer-ready app platform** where every app
|
||||
is manifest-driven, manifests ship via the **signed registry** (not OTA disk files),
|
||||
and **third-party developers publish apps via an external/decentralized registry** —
|
||||
all rootless, secure, robust, and 100%-uptime-capable. It no longer overrides all
|
||||
ad-hoc direction now that the gate is green, but it remains the source of truth for
|
||||
sequencing the remaining workstreams.
|
||||
|
||||
## Commit & push every unit of work
|
||||
Detailed sub-plans (all linked from the master):
|
||||
- App platform / packaging phases + security model → `docs/APP-PACKAGING-MIGRATION-PLAN.md`
|
||||
- Registry-distributed manifests (in progress) → `docs/registry-manifest-design.md`
|
||||
- External/decentralized marketplace for devs → `docs/marketplace-protocol.md`
|
||||
- Current per-app state → `docs/archive/app-registry-status-2026-06-21.md`
|
||||
- Production test gate (exit criterion) → `tests/lifecycle/TESTING.md`
|
||||
|
||||
Work is not "done" until it is committed **and** pushed. Finished work has been
|
||||
lost by sitting uncommitted in a shared tree across sessions. To prevent that:
|
||||
## Commit & push every unit of work (never violate)
|
||||
|
||||
**The #1 process rule: work is not "done" until it is committed AND pushed.** This
|
||||
exists because finished work has been lost/clobbered by sitting uncommitted in the
|
||||
shared tree across agents and sessions. To prevent that:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Commit each feature/fix the moment it works** — one focused, self-contained
|
||||
commit per logical change (it compiles and its targeted tests pass). Don't let
|
||||
commit per logical change (it compiles and its targeted tests pass). Do not let
|
||||
unrelated changes accumulate uncommitted.
|
||||
- **Push immediately after committing** so nothing lives only on one machine.
|
||||
- **Never leave a stack of finished work uncommitted** overnight or when handing
|
||||
off — if you must pause mid-change, commit a clearly-labelled WIP checkpoint
|
||||
rather than leaving the tree dirty.
|
||||
- **Stage explicitly by path** (`git add <paths>`) when another contributor's
|
||||
uncommitted work shares the tree — never `git add -A` / `git commit -a`, which
|
||||
clobbers or entangles their changes.
|
||||
- **Never commit secrets** (mnemonics, private keys, API tokens). Signing is done
|
||||
offline; artifacts (catalog/manifest) are signed, not the keys.
|
||||
- **Push immediately after committing** so nothing lives only on one machine. `main`
|
||||
is protected → push via `git push gitea-ai main` (account `ai`, see the memory
|
||||
note); feature branches push to their own remote.
|
||||
- **Never leave a stack of finished work uncommitted** overnight or when handing off
|
||||
between agents — if you must pause mid-change, commit a clearly-labelled WIP
|
||||
checkpoint rather than leaving it dirty.
|
||||
- **Stage explicitly by path** (`git add <paths>`) when another agent's uncommitted
|
||||
work shares the tree — never `git add -A` / `git commit -a`, which clobbers or
|
||||
entangles their changes.
|
||||
- **Never commit or push secrets** (mnemonics, private keys, API tokens). Signing is
|
||||
done offline; artifacts (catalog/manifest) are signed, not the keys.
|
||||
- Commit messages end with the `Co-Authored-By: Claude …` trailer.
|
||||
|
||||
## Invariants (never violate)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Rootless Podman only.** No rootful, no Docker-socket mounts, no privileged
|
||||
containers unless explicitly approved.
|
||||
- **No per-app Rust installers / no OS-level reliance.** Apps are declarative;
|
||||
the orchestrator owns the lifecycle. A hardcoded `podman run` + `sudo chown`
|
||||
installer is the anti-pattern being deleted, not a template.
|
||||
the orchestrator owns the lifecycle. `install_immich_stack` (hardcoded
|
||||
`podman run` + `sudo chown`) is the anti-pattern being deleted, not a template.
|
||||
- **Secrets are manifest-declared** (`generated_secrets`, materialised by
|
||||
`container::secrets`, 0600/rootless) — never hardcoded, per-app, or logged.
|
||||
- **Migrations never destroy data** — preserve `/var/lib/archipelago/<app>`,
|
||||
secrets, credentials, ports, and adoption container names; keep a rollback path.
|
||||
- **Verify on a real node before any release tag.**
|
||||
- **Verify on the real node .228 before any tag.** (Fleet-wide multinode
|
||||
verification is a separate plan: `docs/multinode-testing-plan.md`.)
|
||||
|
||||
## Build / verify
|
||||
|
||||
- Rust workspace root is `core/` (no Cargo.toml at repo root). Run `cargo` from `core/`.
|
||||
- Rust workspace root is `core/` (no Cargo.toml at repo root). `cargo` from `core/`.
|
||||
- If a `cargo test`/build hits `rust-lld: undefined hidden symbol`, it's
|
||||
incremental-cache corruption — rebuild with `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0`.
|
||||
- Frontend: `neode-ui/` → `npm run build` outputs to `web/dist/neode-ui/`.
|
||||
Grep the built bundle for new strings before shipping (the build can silently
|
||||
no-op).
|
||||
- App manifests are delivered inside the **signed catalog** (`releases/app-catalog.json`),
|
||||
whose entry overrides the on-disk `/opt/archipelago/apps/*/manifest.yml`
|
||||
(origin-wins; disk is the fallback). Editing a disk manifest alone does **not**
|
||||
change a catalog-covered app — regenerate and re-sign the catalog.
|
||||
Grep the built bundle for new strings before shipping (build can silently no-op).
|
||||
- App manifests load from disk on nodes at `/opt/archipelago/apps/*/manifest.yml`
|
||||
(today); the goal is to distribute them via the signed catalog instead.
|
||||
|
||||
## Production test gate (definition of done)
|
||||
|
||||
`tests/lifecycle/run-gate.sh` must be green across install / UI / stop / start /
|
||||
restart / reinstall / reboot-survive / archipelago-restart-survive / uninstall.
|
||||
**Run the gate on the node** (it uses local podman/systemctl/bitcoin probes), not
|
||||
via RPC from another host, and re-run it after any orchestrator/lifecycle change.
|
||||
Multinode / fleet testing is a separate pass. See
|
||||
[`tests/lifecycle/TESTING.md`](tests/lifecycle/TESTING.md).
|
||||
`tests/lifecycle/run-gate.sh` green across install / UI / stop / start / restart /
|
||||
reinstall / reboot-survive / archipelago-restart-survive / uninstall — **5× on
|
||||
.228** (`ARCHY_ITERATIONS=5`). **Run the gate ON the node** (it uses local podman/systemctl/bitcoin
|
||||
probes), not via RPC from another host. **✅ GREEN 2026-06-23 (5/5, 0 not-ok)** — keep it
|
||||
green (re-run after orchestrator/lifecycle changes); regressions are top priority again.
|
||||
**Multinode testing (.198 + the rest of the fleet) is a SEPARATE plan** —
|
||||
`docs/multinode-testing-plan.md` — not part of this single-node gate criterion, and is
|
||||
the next exit criterion now that single-node is green.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ Start with:
|
||||
- [App Developer Guide](docs/app-developer-guide.md)
|
||||
- [App Manifest Spec](docs/app-manifest-spec.md)
|
||||
- [Nostr Git Source Hosting Plan](docs/nostr-git-source-hosting.md)
|
||||
- [Operations Runbook](docs/operations-runbook.md)
|
||||
- [Troubleshooting](docs/troubleshooting.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Quick start
|
||||
@@ -83,9 +84,6 @@ python3 scripts/check-app-catalog-drift.py --release --strict
|
||||
|
||||
## Documentation map
|
||||
|
||||
The full, grouped index lives at **[docs/README.md](docs/README.md)**. The most
|
||||
common entry points:
|
||||
|
||||
| Doc | Purpose |
|
||||
|-----|---------|
|
||||
| [Architecture](docs/architecture.md) | System layers, crates, data paths, security model |
|
||||
@@ -96,7 +94,10 @@ common entry points:
|
||||
| [Nostr Git Source Hosting Plan](docs/nostr-git-source-hosting.md) | ngit/NIP-34 contribution workflow and maintainer model |
|
||||
| [Apps README](apps/README.md) | Packaged app catalog overview |
|
||||
| [Image Recipe](image-recipe/README.md) | Bootable image build flow |
|
||||
| [Operations Runbook](docs/operations-runbook.md) | Production operations and recovery |
|
||||
| [Open Source Readiness](docs/OPEN_SOURCE_READINESS.md) | Public-release cleanup checklist |
|
||||
| [Roadmap](docs/ROADMAP.md) | Shipped, in-progress, and planned work |
|
||||
| [Unified Task Tracker](docs/UNIFIED-TASK-TRACKER.md) | Launch hardening task list |
|
||||
| [Archive](docs/archive/) | Historical plans, audits, and handoffs |
|
||||
|
||||
## Contributing
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
|
||||
# Archipelago v1.0.0 Release Notes
|
||||
|
||||
**Release Date**: March 2026
|
||||
**Target Platform**: Debian 13 (Trixie) — x86_64 and ARM64
|
||||
|
||||
## What is Archipelago?
|
||||
|
||||
Archipelago is a self-sovereign Bitcoin Node OS. Flash it to a USB drive, install on any x86_64 or ARM64 machine, and manage your personal server through a modern web interface. Run Bitcoin infrastructure, self-hosted apps, and Web5 identity — all from hardware you control.
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Features
|
||||
|
||||
### Bitcoin Infrastructure
|
||||
- **Bitcoin Knots** full node with pruning support
|
||||
- **LND** Lightning Network daemon with channel management UI
|
||||
- **Electrs** Electrum server for wallet connectivity
|
||||
- **BTCPay Server** for accepting Bitcoin payments
|
||||
- **Mempool** block explorer and fee estimator
|
||||
- **Fedimint** federation guardian and gateway
|
||||
|
||||
### Self-Hosted Apps (20+)
|
||||
- **Storage**: File Browser, Immich, PhotoPrism, Nextcloud
|
||||
- **Productivity**: Penpot, OnlyOffice, Vaultwarden
|
||||
- **Media**: Jellyfin
|
||||
- **Search**: SearXNG (private search)
|
||||
- **AI**: Ollama (local LLMs with Claude, GPT, and open models)
|
||||
- **Network**: Tailscale VPN, Nginx Proxy Manager, Uptime Kuma
|
||||
- **Home**: Home Assistant
|
||||
- **Platform**: IndeedHub, Grafana monitoring
|
||||
|
||||
### Web5 Identity
|
||||
- DID-based digital identity (Ed25519 + secp256k1 dual key)
|
||||
- Verifiable Credentials issuance and verification
|
||||
- Decentralized Web Node (DWN) for data sync
|
||||
- Nostr relay integration for node discovery
|
||||
|
||||
### Federation
|
||||
- DID-authenticated peer-to-peer federation
|
||||
- Remote node monitoring and management
|
||||
- Bilateral trust with single-use invite codes
|
||||
- Tor hidden services for private communication
|
||||
|
||||
### Security
|
||||
- AES-256-GCM encrypted secrets at rest
|
||||
- Container isolation: read-only root, capability dropping, non-root user
|
||||
- TOTP two-factor authentication with backup codes
|
||||
- Session management: HttpOnly cookies, SameSite=Strict, CSRF tokens
|
||||
- Rate limiting on sensitive endpoints
|
||||
- AppArmor profiles for container confinement
|
||||
- Per-endpoint input validation
|
||||
|
||||
### System
|
||||
- Rust backend with JSON-RPC API (<1ms response time)
|
||||
- Vue 3 frontend with glassmorphism design
|
||||
- WebSocket real-time updates
|
||||
- Automated OTA updates with rollback
|
||||
- Tor hidden services for all apps
|
||||
- Goal-based onboarding wizard
|
||||
- Kiosk mode for dedicated hardware
|
||||
|
||||
## Supported Hardware
|
||||
|
||||
- **x86_64**: Any 64-bit PC, Intel NUC, mini PCs
|
||||
- **ARM64**: Raspberry Pi 5, other ARM64 SBCs
|
||||
- **Minimum**: 4GB RAM, 32GB storage (500GB+ recommended for Bitcoin)
|
||||
- **Recommended**: 8GB+ RAM, 1TB+ NVMe SSD
|
||||
|
||||
## Installation
|
||||
|
||||
1. Download the ISO for your architecture
|
||||
2. Flash to USB drive (use Balena Etcher or `dd`)
|
||||
3. Boot from USB on target hardware
|
||||
4. Follow the automated installer
|
||||
5. Access the web UI at `http://<device-ip>`
|
||||
6. Set your password and start the onboarding wizard
|
||||
|
||||
## Known Limitations
|
||||
|
||||
- Bitcoin initial block download takes 3-7 days depending on hardware
|
||||
- Some apps (BTCPay Server, Home Assistant) open in new tab due to X-Frame-Options
|
||||
- ARM64 builds may have slower container pulls due to less cached registry content
|
||||
- Tor hidden service generation takes 1-2 minutes on first boot
|
||||
|
||||
## Upgrade from Beta
|
||||
|
||||
If upgrading from v0.5.0-beta:
|
||||
1. Back up your data via Settings > Backup
|
||||
2. The OTA update system will handle the upgrade automatically
|
||||
3. If OTA fails, reflash with the v1.0.0 ISO (app data is preserved on separate partition)
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Model
|
||||
|
||||
Archipelago follows defense-in-depth:
|
||||
- **Network**: Nginx reverse proxy, Tor hidden services, VPN support
|
||||
- **Application**: Container isolation with Podman (rootless)
|
||||
- **Data**: AES-256-GCM encryption for secrets, 0600 file permissions
|
||||
- **Auth**: Argon2 password hashing, TOTP 2FA, session rotation
|
||||
- **Updates**: SHA-256 verified downloads with rollback capability
|
||||
|
||||
See `docs/adr/` for architectural decision records on security choices.
|
||||
|
||||
## Contributing
|
||||
|
||||
Archipelago is open source. To contribute:
|
||||
1. Fork the repository
|
||||
2. Create a feature branch (`feature/description`)
|
||||
3. Follow the coding standards in `CLAUDE.md`
|
||||
4. Submit a pull request with tests
|
||||
|
||||
## License
|
||||
|
||||
MIT License. See `LICENSE` for details.
|
||||
# 2026-04-18 ISO build trigger
|
||||
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# PreToolUse Bash guard: block dangerous shell commands.
|
||||
# Denies: rm -rf, git reset --hard, git push -f, git clean -fd, chmod -R 777,
|
||||
# fork bombs, block device overwrites, mkfs, paths escaping project root.
|
||||
# Uses python3 instead of jq for JSON (guaranteed on macOS).
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
INPUT=$(cat)
|
||||
CMD=$(python3 -c "
|
||||
import json, sys
|
||||
try:
|
||||
data = json.loads(sys.stdin.read())
|
||||
print(data.get('tool_input', {}).get('command', ''))
|
||||
except: pass
|
||||
" <<< "$INPUT")
|
||||
BASE="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-}"
|
||||
[[ -z "$BASE" ]] && BASE=$(python3 -c "
|
||||
import json, sys
|
||||
try:
|
||||
data = json.loads(sys.stdin.read())
|
||||
print(data.get('cwd', ''))
|
||||
except: pass
|
||||
" <<< "$INPUT")
|
||||
[[ -z "$BASE" ]] && BASE="$(pwd)"
|
||||
|
||||
# Normalize: collapse whitespace, strip leading/trailing
|
||||
CMD_NORM=$(echo "$CMD" | tr -s '[:space:]' ' ' | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//;s/[[:space:]]*$//')
|
||||
|
||||
deny() {
|
||||
local reason="$1"
|
||||
python3 -c "
|
||||
import json
|
||||
print(json.dumps({
|
||||
'hookSpecificOutput': {
|
||||
'hookEventName': 'PreToolUse',
|
||||
'permissionDecision': 'deny',
|
||||
'permissionDecisionReason': '$reason'
|
||||
}
|
||||
}))
|
||||
"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Dangerous patterns (case-insensitive where sensible)
|
||||
case "$CMD_NORM" in
|
||||
*"rm -rf"*|*"rm -fr"*|*"rm -f -r"*|*"rm -r -f"*) deny "Destructive rm -rf blocked by security hook" ;;
|
||||
*"git reset --hard"*) deny "git reset --hard would lose uncommitted work" ;;
|
||||
*"git push --force"*|*"git push -f"*|*"git push -f "*) deny "git push --force would rewrite history" ;;
|
||||
*"git clean -fd"*|*"git clean -f -d"*) deny "git clean -fd deletes untracked files" ;;
|
||||
*"chmod -R 777"*|*"chmod -R 0777"*) deny "chmod -R 777 is a security risk" ;;
|
||||
*":(){ :"*"};:"*) deny "Fork bomb pattern blocked" ;;
|
||||
*"> /dev/sd"*|*">/dev/sd"*) deny "Block device overwrite blocked" ;;
|
||||
*"mkfs "*|*"mkfs."*) deny "Disk format command blocked" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
# Check for path traversal escaping project root (../ outside project)
|
||||
# Only if we have a sensible base
|
||||
if [[ -n "$BASE" ]] && [[ -d "$BASE" ]]; then
|
||||
# Simple heuristic: command contains .. and would resolve outside project
|
||||
if echo "$CMD_NORM" | grep -qE '\.\./|/\.\.'; then
|
||||
# Extract plausible paths and check - allow ../ within project
|
||||
if echo "$CMD_NORM" | grep -qE '(rm|mv|cp|cat|chmod|chown)\s+.*\.\.'; then
|
||||
# Could be risky; be conservative for rm/mv/cp
|
||||
if echo "$CMD_NORM" | grep -qE '\brm\b.*\.\.'; then
|
||||
deny "Path traversal with rm blocked"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# PostToolUse Bash hook: detect git push/commit and prompt Claude to update PROGRESS.md.
|
||||
# Returns structured feedback with recent commits so Claude can write a session log entry.
|
||||
# Uses python3 instead of jq for JSON (guaranteed on macOS).
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
INPUT=$(cat)
|
||||
|
||||
# Extract command from JSON using python3
|
||||
CMD=$(python3 -c "
|
||||
import json, sys
|
||||
try:
|
||||
data = json.loads(sys.stdin.read())
|
||||
print(data.get('tool_input', {}).get('command', ''))
|
||||
except: pass
|
||||
" <<< "$INPUT")
|
||||
|
||||
# Only trigger on git push or git commit commands
|
||||
if ! echo "$CMD" | grep -qE '\bgit\s+(push|commit)\b'; then
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Gather context for the progress update
|
||||
BASE="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-$(pwd)}"
|
||||
BRANCH=$(git -C "$BASE" branch --show-current 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
|
||||
PROGRESS_FILE="$BASE/PROGRESS.md"
|
||||
TIMESTAMP=$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M')
|
||||
|
||||
# Get recent commits (branch vs main, or last 10)
|
||||
if git -C "$BASE" rev-parse --verify main &>/dev/null; then
|
||||
COMMITS=$(git -C "$BASE" log --oneline main..HEAD 2>/dev/null | head -15)
|
||||
if [ -z "$COMMITS" ]; then
|
||||
COMMITS=$(git -C "$BASE" log --oneline -10 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
COMMITS=$(git -C "$BASE" log --oneline -10 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Get changed files in recent commits
|
||||
CHANGED_FILES=$(git -C "$BASE" diff --name-only main..HEAD 2>/dev/null | head -20 || \
|
||||
git -C "$BASE" diff --name-only HEAD~5..HEAD 2>/dev/null | head -20 || \
|
||||
echo "unknown")
|
||||
|
||||
# Build the feedback message and output as JSON using python3
|
||||
python3 -c "
|
||||
import json, sys
|
||||
|
||||
message = '''Progress Update Needed
|
||||
|
||||
A git push/commit was detected on branch \`$BRANCH\` at $TIMESTAMP.
|
||||
|
||||
Recent commits:
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
$COMMITS
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
|
||||
Changed files:
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
$CHANGED_FILES
|
||||
\`\`\`
|
||||
|
||||
Please update PROGRESS.md:
|
||||
1. Add a session log entry under '## Session Log' with format: ### $TIMESTAMP — $BRANCH
|
||||
2. Summarize what was accomplished (2-4 bullet points based on the commits above)
|
||||
3. Update any roadmap checkboxes if tasks were completed
|
||||
4. Commit the PROGRESS.md update'''
|
||||
|
||||
output = {
|
||||
'hookSpecificOutput': {
|
||||
'hookEventName': 'PostToolUse',
|
||||
'progressUpdate': message
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
print(json.dumps(output))
|
||||
"
|
||||
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# PreToolUse Edit|Write guard: block edits outside project and to protected paths.
|
||||
# Denies: paths outside project, .git/, .env*, lockfiles, node_modules/
|
||||
# Uses python3 instead of jq for JSON (guaranteed on macOS).
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
INPUT=$(cat)
|
||||
FILE_PATH=$(python3 -c "
|
||||
import json, sys
|
||||
try:
|
||||
data = json.loads(sys.stdin.read())
|
||||
print(data.get('tool_input', {}).get('file_path', ''))
|
||||
except: pass
|
||||
" <<< "$INPUT")
|
||||
BASE="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-}"
|
||||
[[ -z "$BASE" ]] && BASE=$(python3 -c "
|
||||
import json, sys
|
||||
try:
|
||||
data = json.loads(sys.stdin.read())
|
||||
print(data.get('cwd', ''))
|
||||
except: pass
|
||||
" <<< "$INPUT")
|
||||
[[ -z "$BASE" ]] && BASE="$(pwd)"
|
||||
|
||||
# Resolve to absolute path
|
||||
if [[ -z "$FILE_PATH" ]]; then
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
ABS_BASE=$(cd "$BASE" 2>/dev/null && pwd) || true
|
||||
[[ -z "$ABS_BASE" ]] && ABS_BASE=$(python3 -c "import os,sys; print(os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(sys.argv[1])))" "$BASE" 2>/dev/null) || true
|
||||
[[ -z "$ABS_BASE" ]] && ABS_BASE="$BASE"
|
||||
# Ensure base has trailing slash for prefix check
|
||||
[[ "$ABS_BASE" != */ ]] && ABS_BASE="${ABS_BASE}/"
|
||||
if [[ "$FILE_PATH" != /* ]]; then
|
||||
ABS_PATH="$ABS_BASE${FILE_PATH#./}"
|
||||
else
|
||||
ABS_PATH="$FILE_PATH"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# Normalize path (collapse .. and ., no symlink resolution needed)
|
||||
ABS_PATH=$(python3 -c "import os,sys; print(os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(sys.argv[1])))" "$ABS_PATH" 2>/dev/null) || true
|
||||
[[ -z "$ABS_PATH" ]] && ABS_PATH="$ABS_BASE${FILE_PATH#./}"
|
||||
|
||||
deny() {
|
||||
local reason="$1"
|
||||
echo "Blocked: $ABS_PATH — $reason" >&2
|
||||
python3 -c "
|
||||
import json
|
||||
print(json.dumps({
|
||||
'hookSpecificOutput': {
|
||||
'hookEventName': 'PreToolUse',
|
||||
'permissionDecision': 'deny',
|
||||
'permissionDecisionReason': '$reason'
|
||||
}
|
||||
}))
|
||||
"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Protected patterns (path contains or equals)
|
||||
PROTECTED_PATTERNS=(
|
||||
".git/"
|
||||
".env"
|
||||
".env.local"
|
||||
"node_modules/"
|
||||
"package-lock.json"
|
||||
"pnpm-lock.yaml"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
for pattern in "${PROTECTED_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
|
||||
if [[ "$ABS_PATH" == *"$pattern"* ]] || [[ "$ABS_PATH" == *"/$pattern" ]]; then
|
||||
deny "Edit blocked: path matches protected pattern ($pattern)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# .env.*.local
|
||||
if [[ "$ABS_PATH" =~ \.env\..*\.local$ ]]; then
|
||||
deny "Edit blocked: .env.*.local files contain secrets"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Ensure path is under project root (ABS_BASE has trailing /)
|
||||
if [[ "$ABS_PATH" != "$ABS_BASE"* ]] && [[ "$ABS_PATH" != "$BASE"* ]]; then
|
||||
deny "Edit blocked: path is outside project directory"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"version": "0.0.1",
|
||||
"configurations": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "app",
|
||||
"runtimeExecutable": "bash",
|
||||
"runtimeArgs": ["packages/app/scripts/dev.sh"],
|
||||
"port": 5173,
|
||||
"autoPort": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# AIUI Project Memory
|
||||
|
||||
## Session Startup
|
||||
1. Run `preview_start` with name `"app"` immediately — runs both Vite (:5173) + Claude proxy (:3141) via `packages/app/scripts/dev.sh`
|
||||
2. Always commit work before ending a session
|
||||
3. Work on `development` branch, merge to `main` only when production ready
|
||||
|
||||
## User Preferences
|
||||
- NO worktrees, NO temporary branches — just `development` and `main`
|
||||
- Always use combined dev script (proxy + frontend), never bare `vite`
|
||||
- Commit frequently to avoid losing work
|
||||
|
||||
## Current State (2026-03-04)
|
||||
- Branch: `overnight/2026-03-03`, all committed and pushed to remote (git.tx1138.com)
|
||||
- Typecheck passes clean
|
||||
|
||||
## What's Been Built
|
||||
- Chat: AI streaming with stop generation, web search, article integration, paste & extract
|
||||
- Content panel tabs: Films, Music, Magazine, News, Books, TV Series, Images, Places, Code, Design System, Nostr, **Apps**
|
||||
- Detail views for each content type (side-by-side desktop, overlay mobile)
|
||||
- **Apps tab**: curated DB of ~30 Nostr/Bitcoin apps, AppsGrid + AppDetail with search/category filtering/how-to
|
||||
- Design system viewer (grid + detail) for tokens, colors, typography, components
|
||||
- Nostr feed scaffold with note/article/zap filtering
|
||||
- Content extraction: contentExtraction.ts + contentFiltering.ts (overhauled classifiers)
|
||||
- **Bare domain extraction** from AI text (e.g. "check out damus.io")
|
||||
- Banner fallback composable (primary → API → gradient)
|
||||
- Image fallbacks: Wikipedia + Google Books sources
|
||||
- Loading skeletons per content type variant
|
||||
- Project grid with breadcrumb nav and inline creation
|
||||
- Filesystem Vite plugin for local project browsing
|
||||
- PWA with star icon, TMDB proxy, Jamendo for music
|
||||
- **Slash command palette**: /code, /nostr, /design, /search show in palette with auto-send
|
||||
- **Chat action buttons**: wrapped in glass container (backdrop blur, border, shadow)
|
||||
- **Settings modal**: Memory + Advanced Settings via gear icon
|
||||
- **Chat history**: dedicated clock icon button
|
||||
- **Web search**: Brave API primary, SearXNG rotation fallback, DuckDuckGo fallback
|
||||
- iOS HIG mobile UX rules in `.cursor/rules/15-mobile-ux.mdc`
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Files
|
||||
- Dev script: `packages/app/scripts/dev.sh`
|
||||
- Launch config: `.claude/launch.json` (name: "app")
|
||||
- Main page: `packages/app/src/pages/ChatPage.vue`
|
||||
- Content panel: `packages/app/src/components/content/ContentPanel.vue`
|
||||
- Content grids: `packages/app/src/components/content/*Grid.vue`
|
||||
- Detail views: `packages/app/src/components/content/*Detail.vue`
|
||||
- **Apps**: `packages/app/src/data/apps.ts` (curated DB), `AppsGrid.vue`, `AppDetail.vue`
|
||||
- AI composable: `packages/app/src/composables/useAI.ts`
|
||||
- Content extraction: `packages/app/src/composables/contentExtraction.ts`
|
||||
- Content filtering: `packages/app/src/composables/contentFiltering.ts`
|
||||
- Content panel logic: `packages/app/src/composables/useContentPanel.ts`
|
||||
- Image fallbacks: `packages/app/src/composables/useImageFallback.ts`
|
||||
- Banner fallback: `packages/app/src/composables/useBannerFallback.ts`
|
||||
- Chat input: `packages/app/src/components/chat/ChatInput.vue`
|
||||
- Prompt palette: `packages/app/src/components/chat/PromptPalette.vue`
|
||||
- Chat message: `packages/app/src/components/chat/ChatMessage.vue`
|
||||
- Settings modal: `packages/app/src/components/chat/SettingsModal.vue`
|
||||
- Web search plugin: `packages/app/vite-web-search.ts`
|
||||
- Prompt templates store: `packages/app/src/stores/promptTemplates.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
## Recent Session Work (2026-03-04)
|
||||
See `session-2026-03-04.md` for details.
|
||||
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Code Mode UI — Future Work
|
||||
|
||||
## After content surfacing is complete, implement:
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Code Mode Visual Treatment
|
||||
- Colour the message container in orange (`#F7931A`) styling when in code mode
|
||||
- Change header text from "Message AIUI" to "Code"
|
||||
- Visual signal so user knows they're in coding context
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Design System Context Selection
|
||||
- All design system items should be selectable with a cursor/pointer icon on hover
|
||||
- Selecting a design system item provides that UI context to the code generation
|
||||
- Think of it as "code with this component/token in mind"
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. File Browser / Open File Context
|
||||
- File browser or open file in the content panel
|
||||
- Selected files provide context for coding
|
||||
- Pairs with the design system selection — user picks UI + files as coding context
|
||||
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Session 2026-03-04
|
||||
|
||||
## Completed This Session
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Chat UX Changes
|
||||
- **History button**: Changed from title-click dropdown to dedicated clock icon in ChatHeader
|
||||
- **Settings modal**: Created `SettingsModal.vue` — Memory + Advanced Settings behind gear icon, glass-card with backdrop blur
|
||||
- **PromptIndex fix**: Reverted to original behavior (current conversation only), fixed broken v-if/v-else chain where StreamingDots broke the template chain
|
||||
- **Chat action buttons**: Wrapped hover icons in proper glass container (`bg-black/60 backdrop-blur-md border border-white/10`) with divider between actions and thumbs
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. iOS HIG Integration
|
||||
- Created `.cursor/rules/15-mobile-ux.mdc` with comprehensive iOS HIG values
|
||||
- Updated CLAUDE.md Mobile UX section
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Web Search Fix
|
||||
- All SearXNG instances were returning 429, DuckDuckGo rate-limiting
|
||||
- Added Brave Search API as primary backend (`BRAVE_SEARCH_API_KEY` env var)
|
||||
- Expanded SearXNG pool to 8 instances with rotation
|
||||
- Added HTML response guard for captcha pages
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Content Detection Overhaul (MAJOR)
|
||||
- **Expanded all classifiers** in `contentFiltering.ts`: isNewsQuery, isMusicQuery, isBookQuery, isTVQuery, isPlaceQuery, isWebsitesQuery + response variants
|
||||
- **Added Nostr detection**: `isNostrQuery()`, `isNostrLikeResponse()`
|
||||
- **Added App detection**: `isAppQuery()`, `isAppLikeResponse()`
|
||||
- **Updated `filterTabsByContext()`**: new `hasNostr` + `hasApps` params, nostr/app query priority
|
||||
- **Updated `preferredFirstTab()`**: nostr + app checks
|
||||
|
||||
### 5. Bare Domain Extraction
|
||||
- `extractBareDomainLinks(text)` in contentExtraction.ts
|
||||
- Detects plain domains like "damus.io" not inside markdown/bold/URL patterns
|
||||
- Known TLDs whitelist, file extension blacklist
|
||||
|
||||
### 6. Apps Tab (NEW FEATURE)
|
||||
- **Database**: `packages/app/src/data/apps.ts` — AppEntry interface, ~30 curated apps
|
||||
- Nostr clients: Damus, Primal, Snort, Amethyst, Coracle, Iris, noStrudel
|
||||
- Lightning wallets: Phoenix, Breez, Zeus, Alby, Mutiny, WoS
|
||||
- Bitcoin wallets: Sparrow, BlueWallet, Nunchuk, Coldcard
|
||||
- Privacy: SimpleX Chat, Signal, Mullvad VPN
|
||||
- Node software: Start9, Umbrel, RaspiBlitz, myNode
|
||||
- Dev tools: NDK, nostr-tools, Nak
|
||||
- **Extraction**: `extractApps(text, userQuery)` — keyword matching against DB, surfaces with 1+ match for app/nostr/known-app queries, 2+ for general
|
||||
- **UI**: `AppsGrid.vue` (list with search/category filter), `AppDetail.vue` (gradient header, how-to steps, related apps, external link)
|
||||
- **Wired in**: useContentPanel.ts (panelApps ref, selectedApp, open/close), ContentPanel.vue (registered), PromptIndex badges
|
||||
|
||||
### 7. Slash Command Palette
|
||||
- `/code`, `/nostr`, `/design`, `/search` appear as commands in PromptPalette
|
||||
- Commands section above Templates section with `/slash` prefix styling
|
||||
- Auto-send on select (except `/search` which sets text for query input)
|
||||
- 8px side margins (`left-2 right-2`), no max-height scroll limit
|
||||
- `ChatInput.vue`: simplified `isPaletteMode` — no longer excludes command names
|
||||
|
||||
### 8. App Detection Fix
|
||||
- Queries mentioning known app names (e.g. "start9") now match via `queryMatchesApp` check
|
||||
- Previously required explicit app/nostr query patterns like "what app" or "best wallet"
|
||||
|
||||
## Known Issues / TODO for Next Session
|
||||
- User reported "start9" search shows Brief but Apps tab was empty — FIXED in last commit
|
||||
- The `/design` command was added to palette and ChatWindow handleSend
|
||||
- Consider adding more apps to the curated database over time
|
||||
- The plan file is at `.claude/plans/content-detection-overhaul.md` (all steps complete)
|
||||
|
||||
## Git State
|
||||
- Branch: `overnight/2026-03-03`
|
||||
- Latest commit: `f346992` — feat(chat): slash command palette, action button containers, app detection fix
|
||||
- Previous commit: `84ccdc7` — feat(app): content detection overhaul, apps tab, chat UX, web search
|
||||
- All pushed to origin
|
||||
@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Plan: Overhaul Content Detection + Add Apps Tab
|
||||
|
||||
## Context
|
||||
|
||||
The content surfacing system misses many common AI response patterns. Example: AI responds about Nostr (mentioning damus.io, primal.net, snort.social) but the Nostr tab never surfaces. Query/response classifiers use narrow regexes that miss natural language variations. There's no "topic detection" layer, no app detection, and bare domains in AI text aren't extracted as websites.
|
||||
|
||||
**Goals:**
|
||||
1. Fix content detection to handle how AIs actually respond
|
||||
2. Add Nostr tab surfacing (currently only via `/nostr` command)
|
||||
3. Add Apps tab with curated Nostr + Bitcoin ecosystem apps (local DB + AI extraction fallback)
|
||||
4. Extract bare domains from AI text (e.g. "check out damus.io")
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Part 1: Expand Query & Response Classifiers
|
||||
|
||||
**File:** `packages/app/src/composables/contentFiltering.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
### 1A. Add Nostr classifiers (new functions)
|
||||
|
||||
- `isNostrQuery(q)` — matches: nostr, npub, nip-\d, damus, primal, snort, amethyst, coracle, zap, relay, note1, nevent, nprofile, fiatjaf, nostrich, "decentralized social"
|
||||
- `isNostrLikeResponse(text)` — requires literal "nostr" OR 2+ Nostr-specific signals (npub, nip-, client names, relay+wss, zap+lightning)
|
||||
|
||||
### 1B. Add App classifiers (new functions)
|
||||
|
||||
- `isAppQuery(q)` — matches: app, client, wallet, tool, software, download, install, "what app", "best app for", "recommend.*app"
|
||||
- `isAppLikeResponse(text)` — matches: "you can use", "popular clients include", "I'd recommend", "available on", "download from"
|
||||
|
||||
### 1C. Expand existing classifiers with broader patterns
|
||||
|
||||
| Classifier | Add these patterns |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `isNewsQuery` | "what happened today", "any updates on", "trending", "catch me up", "brief me", "current events" |
|
||||
| `isMusicQuery` | "genre", "spotify", "bandcamp", "grammys", "billboard", "mixtape", "discography", "banger", "favorite jam" |
|
||||
| `isBookQuery` | "what should I read", "favorite reads", "reading list", "book club", "memoir", "audiobook", "goodreads", "worth reading" |
|
||||
| `isTVQuery` | "what's good on netflix", "anything to binge", "hbo", "disney+", "apple tv", "amazon prime", "docuseries", "limited series" |
|
||||
| `isPlaceQuery` | "hungry", "food near me", "best brunch spot", "happy hour", "speakeasy", "rooftop bar", "food truck" |
|
||||
| `isWebsitesQuery` | "point me to", "link me", "any good sites", "tools for", "platforms for" |
|
||||
| `isWebsitesLikeResponse` | "here are some resources", "I'd recommend checking", "you can visit", "useful resources" |
|
||||
| `isNewsLikeResponse` | "I can't access the web but", "having trouble reaching", "unable to browse but" |
|
||||
|
||||
### 1D. Update `preferredFirstTab()` — add nostr + app checks
|
||||
|
||||
### 1E. Update `filterTabsByContext()` — add `hasNostr` and `hasApps` params, integrate into tab ordering
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Part 2: Bare Domain Extraction
|
||||
|
||||
**File:** `packages/app/src/composables/contentExtraction.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
Add `extractBareDomainLinks(text)`:
|
||||
- Detect plain-text domains like "damus.io", "primal.net" not inside markdown links or bold patterns
|
||||
- Skip positions covered by existing extractors (markdown links, bold-domain, full URLs)
|
||||
- Require known TLDs (.com, .org, .io, .net, .social, .app, etc.)
|
||||
- Block file extensions (.js, .ts, .vue, .json, .css)
|
||||
- Use existing `normUrl()` for dedup
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Part 3: Apps Tab — Curated Database + AI Extraction
|
||||
|
||||
### 3A. Create app database
|
||||
|
||||
**New file:** `packages/app/src/data/apps.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
interface AppEntry {
|
||||
id: string
|
||||
name: string
|
||||
description: string // One-liner
|
||||
longDescription: string // Why use this, how it works
|
||||
category: 'nostr-client' | 'lightning-wallet' | 'bitcoin-wallet' | 'privacy' | 'node' | 'dev-tool' | 'relay'
|
||||
platforms: ('ios' | 'android' | 'web' | 'desktop' | 'cli' | 'nodeos')[]
|
||||
url: string
|
||||
icon?: string
|
||||
keywords: string[] // For matching AI responses
|
||||
howTo?: string[] // Getting started steps
|
||||
relatedApps?: string[] // IDs of related apps
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Initial curated apps (~25-30):**
|
||||
- Nostr clients: Damus, Primal, Snort, Amethyst, Coracle, Iris, Nostrudel, nos.social
|
||||
- Lightning wallets: Phoenix, Mutiny, Breez, Zeus, Alby, Wallet of Satoshi
|
||||
- Bitcoin wallets: Sparrow, Blue Wallet, Nunchuk, Coldcard, Green
|
||||
- Privacy tools: Tor, SimpleX Chat, Signal, Mullvad VPN
|
||||
- Node software: Start9, Umbrel, RaspiBlitz, myNode
|
||||
- Dev tools: NDK, nostr-tools, Nak
|
||||
|
||||
### 3B. Add app extraction
|
||||
|
||||
**File:** `packages/app/src/composables/contentExtraction.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
Add `extractApps(text, userQuery)`:
|
||||
1. Match AI text against known app names/keywords from database
|
||||
2. If app query detected OR 2+ known apps mentioned → return matched apps
|
||||
3. For unknown apps, create basic entries from context (name + URL if bare domain found)
|
||||
|
||||
### 3C. Create UI components
|
||||
|
||||
**New files:**
|
||||
- `packages/app/src/components/content/AppsGrid.vue` — Grid of app cards (icon, name, category badge, one-liner)
|
||||
- `packages/app/src/components/content/AppDetail.vue` — Detail: icon, name, platforms, long description, how-to steps, link, related apps
|
||||
|
||||
Follow existing grid/detail patterns (e.g. `BookGrid.vue`/`BookDetail.vue`).
|
||||
|
||||
### 3D. Register in ContentPanel.vue
|
||||
|
||||
Add rendering for `activeTab === 'app'`, add `'app'` to `ContentTab` type.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Part 4: Wire Everything Together
|
||||
|
||||
**File:** `packages/app/src/composables/useContentPanel.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
In `updatePanelFromText()`:
|
||||
- Call `extractBareDomainLinks(text)`, merge with website sources
|
||||
- Call `extractApps(text, userQuery)`
|
||||
- Compute `hasNostr = isNostrQuery(userQuery) || isNostrLikeResponse(text)`
|
||||
- Compute `hasApps = apps.length > 0`
|
||||
- Pass `hasNostr` and `hasApps` to `filterTabsByContext()`
|
||||
- Add `panelApps` ref, title logic for apps/nostr tabs
|
||||
|
||||
Same changes in `getContextualInlineContent()`.
|
||||
|
||||
Broaden magazine detection: add tech/protocol keywords, surface magazine for 3+ sections with no other structured content.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Part 5: PromptIndex badges
|
||||
|
||||
**File:** `packages/app/src/components/chat/PromptIndex.vue`
|
||||
|
||||
Add 'Nostr' and 'Apps' badge detection.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementation Order
|
||||
|
||||
1. `contentFiltering.ts` — classifiers + filterTabsByContext signature
|
||||
2. `contentExtraction.ts` — `extractBareDomainLinks()` + `extractApps()`
|
||||
3. `data/apps.ts` — curated app database
|
||||
4. `useContentPanel.ts` — wire everything
|
||||
5. `AppsGrid.vue` + `AppDetail.vue` — UI components
|
||||
6. `ContentPanel.vue` — register tab + components
|
||||
7. `PromptIndex.vue` — badges
|
||||
8. Typecheck + manual test
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
1. `pnpm typecheck` passes
|
||||
2. "tell me about Nostr" → Nostr + magazine tabs surface
|
||||
3. "best Nostr clients?" → Apps tab with Damus, Primal, Snort
|
||||
4. "recommend a bitcoin wallet" → Apps tab with Phoenix, Sparrow
|
||||
5. "what happened with BIP 110?" → Magazine tab (regression)
|
||||
6. "best movies of 2024" → Films tab (regression)
|
||||
7. Bare domains in AI text extracted as websites
|
||||
8. PromptIndex badges show Nostr/Apps
|
||||
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Plan: Code Mode UI — Orange Input, Design System Context, File Browser Context
|
||||
|
||||
## Context
|
||||
The user wants three connected features that enhance the coding experience in AIUI:
|
||||
1. Visual indication when in code mode (orange input container, "Code" label)
|
||||
2. Ability to select design system items as coding context
|
||||
3. Ability to select files from file browser as coding context
|
||||
|
||||
After this, the user wants to circle back and create a flawless version of content extraction/tab surfacing.
|
||||
|
||||
## Changes
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Orange Code Mode Input Container
|
||||
**Files**: `ChatWindow.vue`, `ChatInput.vue`
|
||||
|
||||
**ChatWindow.vue** (line 106-115):
|
||||
- Pass `activeTab` to ChatInput as a prop: `:active-tab="activeTab"`
|
||||
- Change placeholder logic: `activeTab === 'code' ? 'Code...' : isStreaming ? 'Waiting for response...' : 'Message AIUI...'`
|
||||
|
||||
**ChatInput.vue**:
|
||||
- Add `activeTab` prop (optional string, default `''`)
|
||||
- Conditionally style the container div (line 79-81):
|
||||
- When `activeTab === 'code'`: use `bg-accent/15 border border-accent/25 backdrop-blur-xl` instead of `path-glass-bubble`
|
||||
- Keep the `rounded-2xl px-4 py-3 flex items-end gap-2 transition-all duration-300` classes
|
||||
- Conditionally style the send button orange when in code mode
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Design System Item Selection for Coding Context
|
||||
**Files**: `useCodeContext.ts`, `DesignSystemGrid.vue`
|
||||
|
||||
**useCodeContext.ts**:
|
||||
- Add `selectedDesignTokens: ref<string[]>([])` to module state (stores item IDs)
|
||||
- Add `toggleDesignToken(id)` — adds/removes from selection array
|
||||
- Add `clearDesignTokens()` — clears selection
|
||||
- Add `isDesignTokenSelected(id)` — checks if item is in selection
|
||||
- Clear on `exitCodeMode()`
|
||||
- Export all new state/actions
|
||||
|
||||
**DesignSystemGrid.vue**:
|
||||
- Import `useCodeContext`
|
||||
- When `codeMode` is true, show a selection indicator (accent ring + checkmark) on items
|
||||
- `selectItem` should call `toggleDesignToken(item.id)` when in code mode (instead of `openDesignSystemItem`)
|
||||
- When NOT in code mode, keep existing behavior (open detail view)
|
||||
- Selected items get `ring-2 ring-accent/50 bg-accent/10` styling
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. File Browser Selection for Coding Context
|
||||
**Files**: `useCodeContext.ts`, `ProjectGrid.vue`
|
||||
|
||||
**useCodeContext.ts**:
|
||||
- Add `selectedFiles: ref<string[]>([])` — paths of files selected for context
|
||||
- Add `toggleFileSelection(path)` — adds/removes from selection
|
||||
- Add `clearFileSelection()` — clears all
|
||||
- Add `isFileSelected(path)` — checks if file in selection
|
||||
- Clear on `exitCodeMode()`
|
||||
- Export new state/actions
|
||||
|
||||
**ProjectGrid.vue**:
|
||||
- Import `useCodeContext`
|
||||
- When `codeMode` is true, file clicks toggle selection instead of (or in addition to) opening
|
||||
- Show visual selection state (accent highlight/checkmark) on selected files in FileTreeNode
|
||||
|
||||
## Files to Modify
|
||||
1. `packages/app/src/components/chat/ChatWindow.vue` — pass activeTab prop
|
||||
2. `packages/app/src/components/chat/ChatInput.vue` — conditional orange styling + "Code" placeholder
|
||||
3. `packages/app/src/composables/useCodeContext.ts` — add design token + file selection state
|
||||
4. `packages/app/src/components/content/DesignSystemGrid.vue` — toggle selection in code mode
|
||||
5. `packages/app/src/components/content/ProjectGrid.vue` — toggle file selection in code mode
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
1. `pnpm typecheck` — no type errors
|
||||
2. `pnpm lint` — no new lint errors
|
||||
3. Manual: `/code` command → input turns orange with "Code..." placeholder
|
||||
4. Manual: In code mode, design system tab → clicking items toggles selection (accent ring)
|
||||
5. Manual: In code mode, file browser → clicking files toggles selection
|
||||
6. Manual: Exiting code mode clears all selections
|
||||
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"hooks": {
|
||||
"PreToolUse": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"matcher": "Bash",
|
||||
"hooks": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"type": "command",
|
||||
"command": "\"$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR\"/.claude/hooks/block-risky-bash.sh"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"matcher": "Edit|Write",
|
||||
"hooks": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"type": "command",
|
||||
"command": "\"$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR\"/.claude/hooks/protect-files.sh"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"PostToolUse": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"matcher": "Bash",
|
||||
"hooks": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"type": "command",
|
||||
"command": "\"$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR\"/.claude/hooks/post-push-progress.sh"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: add-content-type
|
||||
description: Scaffold a complete new content type (tag, extraction, grid, detail, prompt)
|
||||
allowed-tools: Bash(*), Read, Edit, Write, Glob, Grep, Agent
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Add a complete new content type to AIUI. The user will provide the content type name (e.g., "event", "product", "video").
|
||||
|
||||
Follow ALL steps — this is the full pipeline for a content type:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Tag format**: Add a new `[[{type}_ext:Field1|Field2|...]]` regex to `packages/app/src/composables/contentExtraction.ts` alongside the existing ones (FILM_EXT_RE, SONG_EXT_RE, etc.)
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Type definition**: Add the TypeScript interface to `packages/core/src/types/content.ts` if it doesn't exist
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Extraction function**: Add `extractAll{Type}s(text, userQuery)` to `contentExtraction.ts` following the pattern of `extractAllFilms` or `extractAllBooks`
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Strip tags function**: Add `strip{Type}Tags()` and include it in `stripContentTags()`
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Query classifier**: Add `is{Type}Query()` and optionally `is{Type}LikeResponse()` to `contentFiltering.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
6. **ContentTab type**: Add the new tab name to the `ContentTab` union in `contentFiltering.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
7. **Tab filtering**: Update `filterTabsByContext()` and `preferredFirstTab()` in `contentFiltering.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
8. **Grid component**: Create `packages/app/src/components/content/{Type}Grid.vue` following the glass-morphism pattern of existing grids (BookGrid.vue is a good template)
|
||||
|
||||
9. **Detail component**: Create `packages/app/src/components/content/{Type}Detail.vue` following the pattern of BookDetail.vue
|
||||
|
||||
10. **Wire into ContentPanel.vue**: Add import, grid render block, detail render block, and panel state refs
|
||||
|
||||
11. **Wire into ContentGridView.vue**: Add import, props, and grid render block
|
||||
|
||||
12. **Wire into ChatPage.vue**: Pass the new panel data as props to ContentGridView
|
||||
|
||||
13. **Wire into useContentPanel.ts**: Add panel ref, selected ref, open/close functions, extraction call in `updatePanelFromText()`
|
||||
|
||||
14. **System prompt**: Add tag format instructions to the `SYSTEM_PROMPT` in `useAI.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
15. **Tab label**: Add to `TAB_LABELS` in `ContentPanel.vue`
|
||||
|
||||
16. **Verify**: Run `pnpm typecheck` and fix any errors
|
||||
|
||||
Report what was created and the tag format to use.
|
||||
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: add-tool
|
||||
description: Add a new AI tool (function call) to the Claude proxy for the AI to use
|
||||
allowed-tools: Bash(*), Read, Edit, Write, Glob, Grep
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Add a new tool that the AI model can call via Claude's tool_use API. The user will describe what the tool should do (e.g., "search local files", "get app status", "browse media").
|
||||
|
||||
## Steps
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Read the proxy**: Read `packages/app/server/claude-proxy.ts` to understand the existing tool_use loop and `SEARCH_WEB_TOOL` definition.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Define the tool**: Add a new tool definition following the Claude tool_use format:
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
const NEW_TOOL = {
|
||||
name: 'tool_name',
|
||||
description: 'What this tool does...',
|
||||
input_schema: {
|
||||
type: 'object',
|
||||
properties: { ... },
|
||||
required: [...]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Add handler**: In the tool_use loop (where `search_web` calls are handled), add a handler for the new tool name.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Implement backend**: If the tool needs a new API endpoint (e.g., `/api/media/scan`), create a Vite plugin or add a route to the proxy.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Update system prompt**: Add instructions in `useAI.ts` SYSTEM_PROMPT telling the AI when and how to use the new tool.
|
||||
|
||||
6. **Verify**: Run `pnpm typecheck` and test the proxy starts without errors.
|
||||
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: audit-prompts
|
||||
description: Deep audit of AI system prompts — find gaps, test extraction coverage, verify tag formats
|
||||
allowed-tools: Bash(*), Read, Glob, Grep, Agent
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Perform a comprehensive audit of AIUI's AI prompt system. Do NOT make changes — report findings only.
|
||||
|
||||
## Steps
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Read the full system prompt**: Read `packages/app/src/composables/useAI.ts` and reconstruct the complete system prompt including all dynamic sections (persona, Wavlake, memory, web search, Archy context, code context).
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Catalog all tag formats**: List every `[[type:...]]` and `[[type_ext:...]]` format defined in the prompt. Cross-reference with regexes in `contentExtraction.ts`.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Check for gaps**: For each content type in `ContentTab` (contentFiltering.ts), verify:
|
||||
- Is there a tag format in the system prompt?
|
||||
- Is there a matching extraction regex?
|
||||
- Is there a query classifier?
|
||||
- Is there a grid + detail component?
|
||||
- Is the tab wired in ContentPanel.vue and ContentGridView.vue?
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Test extraction coverage**: Read the seed prompts in `src/__tests__/fixtures/seedPrompts.ts`. For each seed, verify:
|
||||
- Does the extraction function find the expected number of items?
|
||||
- Are there edge cases that would break extraction?
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Analyze prompt quality**: Check for:
|
||||
- Conflicting instructions
|
||||
- Missing edge case handling (e.g., "what if the AI can't find a match?")
|
||||
- Overly vague instructions
|
||||
- Missing content types that should have tag formats
|
||||
|
||||
6. **Check proxy tools**: Read `server/claude-proxy.ts` and verify tool definitions match what the prompt claims.
|
||||
|
||||
7. **Report**: Create a structured summary with:
|
||||
- Content type coverage matrix (tag/extraction/grid/detail/prompt)
|
||||
- Identified gaps and inconsistencies
|
||||
- Priority recommendations
|
||||
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: check
|
||||
description: Run all quality checks (typecheck, lint, test) and auto-fix errors
|
||||
allowed-tools: Bash(*), Read, Edit, Glob, Grep, Agent
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Run all quality checks for the AIUI project and fix any issues found. Execute in order:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **TypeScript**: Run `pnpm typecheck`. If errors found, read the failing files and fix the type errors.
|
||||
2. **Lint**: Run `pnpm lint`. If fixable errors, run `pnpm lint --fix` first, then fix remaining manually.
|
||||
3. **Tests**: Run `pnpm --filter @aiui/app test -- --run`. For each failure:
|
||||
- Read the test file and the source file it tests
|
||||
- Determine if the test is wrong (outdated assertion) or the source has a bug
|
||||
- Fix whichever is incorrect
|
||||
4. Report a summary: pass/fail counts, what was fixed.
|
||||
|
||||
Important: Do NOT change test expectations just to make them pass — understand WHY they fail first.
|
||||
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: deploy
|
||||
description: Build and prepare AIUI for deployment to Archy node
|
||||
allowed-tools: Bash(*), Read, Edit, Glob, Grep
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Build AIUI for production deployment. Steps:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Pre-flight checks**:
|
||||
- `pnpm typecheck` — must pass
|
||||
- `pnpm lint` — must pass
|
||||
- `pnpm --filter @aiui/app test -- --run` — report failures but continue
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Build**:
|
||||
- `pnpm build`
|
||||
- Verify `packages/app/dist/` exists and contains `index.html`
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Bundle analysis**:
|
||||
- Report total dist size and gzip estimate
|
||||
- List the 5 largest chunks
|
||||
- Check against 250KB gzipped budget (warn if over)
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Verify nginx config**:
|
||||
- Read `packages/app/server/nginx-archy.conf`
|
||||
- Verify SPA routing (`try_files $uri $uri/ /aiui/index.html`)
|
||||
- Verify proxy paths for Claude API
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Container build** (if Dockerfile exists):
|
||||
- `podman build -t aiui:latest packages/app/`
|
||||
- Report image size
|
||||
|
||||
6. **Report**: Build status, bundle size, any warnings.
|
||||
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: fix-tab
|
||||
description: Diagnose and fix a broken content panel tab (extraction, routing, rendering)
|
||||
allowed-tools: Bash(*), Read, Edit, Glob, Grep, Agent
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Diagnose and fix a broken content panel tab. The user will specify which tab (e.g., "app", "code", "image", "nostr").
|
||||
|
||||
## Diagnostic pipeline — check each layer:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **System prompt**: Does `useAI.ts` SYSTEM_PROMPT tell the AI to use the tag format for this content type? If not, add instructions.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Tag regex**: Does `contentExtraction.ts` have a regex for this content type's tags? If not, add one.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Extraction function**: Does `extractAll{Type}s()` or `extract{Type}s()` exist and work correctly? Test with sample input.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Query classifier**: Do `is{Type}Query()` and/or `is{Type}LikeResponse()` exist in `contentFiltering.ts`?
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Tab filtering**: Is the tab included in `filterTabsByContext()` and `preferredFirstTab()`? Check the boolean flag is wired.
|
||||
|
||||
6. **useContentPanel.ts**: Is the extraction called in `updatePanelFromText()`? Is the panel ref populated? Is the tab added to `availableTabs`?
|
||||
|
||||
7. **ContentPanel.vue**: Is there a grid render block for `activeTab === '{tab}'`? Are imports present? Is the tab in TAB_LABELS?
|
||||
|
||||
8. **ContentGridView.vue**: Same checks for the wide desktop view.
|
||||
|
||||
9. **ChatPage.vue**: Are the panel data props passed to ContentGridView?
|
||||
|
||||
10. **Grid component**: Does the grid component exist and render correctly?
|
||||
|
||||
11. **Detail component**: Does the detail component exist?
|
||||
|
||||
Fix each broken layer. Run `pnpm typecheck` after all fixes.
|
||||
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: mock-archy
|
||||
description: Enable/configure mock Archy data for standalone dev testing
|
||||
allowed-tools: Bash(*), Read, Edit, Glob, Grep
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Set up or modify mock Archy data for testing the Archipelago integration without a real Archy host.
|
||||
|
||||
## How it works
|
||||
|
||||
Mock data is in `packages/app/src/mocks/archy.ts`. When enabled, `useArchy.ts` loads this data instead of waiting for the Archy bridge.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enable mock mode
|
||||
|
||||
Two ways:
|
||||
1. Add `VITE_MOCK_ARCHY=true` to `.env.local`
|
||||
2. Add `?mockArchy` to the URL: `http://localhost:5173/?mockArchy`
|
||||
|
||||
## Customization
|
||||
|
||||
The user may ask to:
|
||||
- Add/remove mock apps from the installed list
|
||||
- Change wallet balance or channel count
|
||||
- Add/modify files in the mock file list
|
||||
- Change system info or network status
|
||||
- Test specific scenarios (e.g., "node is syncing", "wallet offline", "no files")
|
||||
|
||||
Edit `packages/app/src/mocks/archy.ts` accordingly.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verify
|
||||
|
||||
After changes, check that `buildArchyContext()` in `useArchy.ts` produces the expected system prompt section by reading the function and tracing the mock data through it.
|
||||
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: new-detail
|
||||
description: Generate a detail view component following AIUI glass-morphism patterns
|
||||
allowed-tools: Read, Write, Edit, Glob, Grep
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Create a new detail view component at `packages/app/src/components/content/{Name}Detail.vue`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Read a reference**: Read `BookDetail.vue` or `PlaceDetail.vue` as a template.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Follow conventions**:
|
||||
- `<script setup lang="ts">` with single item prop
|
||||
- Back button at top (emits 'back' event)
|
||||
- Hero image/banner area with gradient overlay and fallback
|
||||
- Title, subtitle, and metadata section
|
||||
- Description/long text body with proper typography
|
||||
- Action buttons (external links, share, etc.) with glass-button styling
|
||||
- Dark/light mode via `useTheme()`
|
||||
- Smooth scroll, overflow-y-auto
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Props**: Accept single item of the content type
|
||||
4. **Emits**: `back` event for navigation
|
||||
5. **Responsive**: Full height, works in sidebar and mobile overlay
|
||||
|
||||
The user will specify the content type and which fields to display.
|
||||
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: new-grid
|
||||
description: Generate a content grid component following AIUI glass-morphism patterns
|
||||
allowed-tools: Read, Write, Edit, Glob, Grep
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Create a new content grid component at `packages/app/src/components/content/{Name}Grid.vue`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Read a reference**: Read `BookGrid.vue` or `PlaceGrid.vue` as a template — they show the standard pattern.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Follow conventions**:
|
||||
- `<script setup lang="ts">` with props and emits
|
||||
- Glass morphism styling (bg-white/5, rounded-xl, hover:bg-white/10)
|
||||
- Dark/light mode support via `useTheme()`
|
||||
- Search input at top (if the content type has enough items)
|
||||
- Grid of cards with image fallback, title, subtitle, metadata
|
||||
- Touch targets min 44x44px
|
||||
- Empty state message when no items match
|
||||
- Custom scrollbar class
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Props**: Accept array of items + title string
|
||||
4. **Emits**: `select-{type}` event when a card is clicked
|
||||
5. **Responsive**: Works on mobile (full width) and desktop (sidebar width)
|
||||
|
||||
The user will specify the content type and its fields.
|
||||
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: overnight
|
||||
description: Commit, branch, and start the overnight automation loop
|
||||
disable-model-invocation: true
|
||||
allowed-tools: Bash(*), Read, Write, Edit, Glob, Grep
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Prepare and launch the overnight automation loop. Do ALL steps in order, stopping on any failure:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Stage and commit all uncommitted changes: `git add -A && git commit -m "chore: pre-overnight snapshot"` (skip if working tree is clean)
|
||||
2. Push current branch to origin
|
||||
3. Get today's date as YYYY-MM-DD. Check if `overnight/$DATE` branch exists:
|
||||
- If yes: `git checkout overnight/$DATE`
|
||||
- If no: run `./loop/prepare.sh`
|
||||
4. Verify `loop/plan.md` has unchecked tasks (`grep -c '^\- \[ \]' loop/plan.md`)
|
||||
5. Commit plan files if modified: `git add loop/plan.md loop/prompt.md && git commit -m "chore: overnight plan $DATE"` (skip if clean)
|
||||
6. Push: `git push -u origin overnight/$DATE`
|
||||
7. Start the loop: run `caffeinate -i ./loop/loop.sh` with `run_in_background: true`
|
||||
8. Report: branch name, number of tasks, and confirm the loop is running in background
|
||||
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: pwa-icon-cache-fix
|
||||
description: Use when the user reports a PWA icon not updating, stale PWA icon, wrong icon after install, or any PWA caching issue. Also applies when changing PWA icons in a Vite + vite-plugin-pwa project.
|
||||
version: 2.0.0
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# PWA Icon Cache Fix
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
PWA icons are cached at FOUR independent layers:
|
||||
1. **Service worker cache** (Workbox precache)
|
||||
2. **Browser HTTP cache**
|
||||
3. **Browser manifest resources** (Chromium stores resized icons in its profile data, keyed by a permanent extension ID tied to the origin — NEVER re-fetched even after uninstall/reinstall)
|
||||
4. **macOS .app bundle** (`.icns` file baked into the `.app` in `~/Applications/`)
|
||||
|
||||
Query string cache busting (`?v=2`) and uninstall/reinstall do NOT fix this. Chromium reuses the same extension ID for the same origin, so it keeps the old cached icons.
|
||||
|
||||
## Fix Steps
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Verify icon files on disk and server are correct
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Visual check
|
||||
Read packages/app/public/pwa-192x192.png
|
||||
Read packages/app/public/pwa-512x512.png
|
||||
|
||||
# Hash match check
|
||||
curl -s http://localhost:5173/pwa-192x192.png | md5
|
||||
md5 -q packages/app/public/pwa-192x192.png
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Find the PWA's Chromium extension ID
|
||||
|
||||
Read the installed `.app` bundle's `Info.plist` to get the `CrAppModeShortcutID`:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
plutil -p "~/Applications/Brave Browser Apps.localized/AIUI.app/Contents/Info.plist" | grep CrAppModeShortcutID
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This returns an ID like `idemibpphagihbobmgmaojhjfidlfpdl`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Overwrite the cached icons in browser profile
|
||||
|
||||
Chromium stores resized icons at:
|
||||
`~/Library/Application Support/BraveSoftware/Brave-Browser/Default/Web Applications/Manifest Resources/{ID}/Icons/`
|
||||
|
||||
Overwrite every size using `sips`:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
ICON_DIR="~/Library/Application Support/BraveSoftware/Brave-Browser/Default/Web Applications/Manifest Resources/{ID}/Icons"
|
||||
SRC="packages/app/public/pwa-512x512.png"
|
||||
for size in 32 48 64 96 128 192 256 512; do
|
||||
sips -z $size $size "$SRC" --out "${ICON_DIR}/${size}.png"
|
||||
done
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Rebuild the macOS .icns in the .app bundle
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
ICONSET="/tmp/aiui.iconset"
|
||||
mkdir -p "$ICONSET"
|
||||
SRC="packages/app/public/pwa-512x512.png"
|
||||
sips -z 16 16 "$SRC" --out "$ICONSET/icon_16x16.png"
|
||||
sips -z 32 32 "$SRC" --out "$ICONSET/icon_16x16@2x.png"
|
||||
sips -z 32 32 "$SRC" --out "$ICONSET/icon_32x32.png"
|
||||
sips -z 64 64 "$SRC" --out "$ICONSET/icon_32x32@2x.png"
|
||||
sips -z 128 128 "$SRC" --out "$ICONSET/icon_128x128.png"
|
||||
sips -z 256 256 "$SRC" --out "$ICONSET/icon_128x128@2x.png"
|
||||
sips -z 256 256 "$SRC" --out "$ICONSET/icon_256x256.png"
|
||||
sips -z 512 512 "$SRC" --out "$ICONSET/icon_256x256@2x.png"
|
||||
sips -z 512 512 "$SRC" --out "$ICONSET/icon_512x512.png"
|
||||
cp "$SRC" "$ICONSET/icon_512x512@2x.png"
|
||||
iconutil -c icns "$ICONSET" -o "~/Applications/Brave Browser Apps.localized/AIUI.app/Contents/Resources/app.icns"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 5. Flush macOS icon cache
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
touch "~/Applications/Brave Browser Apps.localized/AIUI.app"
|
||||
killall Finder
|
||||
killall Dock
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 6. Bump PWA_CACHE_VERSION in main.ts
|
||||
|
||||
Increment the `PWA_CACHE_VERSION` constant — this nukes all SW caches on next page load for web-layer caching.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7. Delete stale build artifacts
|
||||
|
||||
Remove old `dist/` and `dev-dist/` SW/manifest files.
|
||||
|
||||
## Browser-Specific Paths
|
||||
|
||||
- **Brave**: `~/Library/Application Support/BraveSoftware/Brave-Browser/Default/Web Applications/`
|
||||
- **Chrome**: `~/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Web Applications/`
|
||||
- **PWA apps (Brave)**: `~/Applications/Brave Browser Apps.localized/`
|
||||
- **PWA apps (Chrome)**: `~/Applications/Chrome Apps.localized/`
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Insight
|
||||
|
||||
Chromium assigns a permanent extension ID per origin (e.g., `localhost:5173`). This ID persists across uninstall/reinstall. The icon cache in `Manifest Resources/{ID}/Icons/` is populated ONCE and never refreshed from the manifest. The only fix is to overwrite the files directly on disk.
|
||||
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: test-prompts
|
||||
description: Test AI prompt quality by simulating queries and checking extraction results
|
||||
allowed-tools: Bash(*), Read, Edit, Glob, Grep, Agent
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Test the AIUI AI prompt and content extraction pipeline end-to-end. This skill does NOT call the actual AI — it uses the seed prompts and extraction functions directly.
|
||||
|
||||
## Steps
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Read seed prompts**: Read `packages/app/src/__tests__/fixtures/seedPrompts.ts` to get all test cases.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Run extraction tests**: For each seed prompt, run the test via `pnpm --filter @aiui/app test -- --run -t "seed"` and report results.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Test edge cases**: Create and test these additional scenarios by calling extraction functions in a test:
|
||||
- Mixed content response (films + songs + books in one response)
|
||||
- App recommendation response (should trigger app tab)
|
||||
- News query with web search results
|
||||
- Place/restaurant recommendations
|
||||
- Code response with 3+ code blocks
|
||||
- Nostr-related query
|
||||
- Empty/minimal response
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Verify tab routing**: For each scenario, check that `filterTabsByContext()` returns the expected tabs in the expected order.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Report**: Summary of what works, what's broken, and what's missing. Include specific test cases that fail.
|
||||
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: trace
|
||||
description: End-to-end trace of a query through prompt, extraction, tabs, and rendering
|
||||
allowed-tools: Bash(*), Read, Glob, Grep, Agent
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Trace how a specific user query flows through the entire AIUI pipeline. The user will provide a sample query (e.g., "best nostr apps", "recommend some films", "bitcoin news").
|
||||
|
||||
## Trace each stage:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Query classifiers**: Run the query through each classifier in `contentFiltering.ts`:
|
||||
- `isNewsQuery()`, `isMusicQuery()`, `isBookQuery()`, `isTVQuery()`, `isImageQuery()`, `isPlaceQuery()`, `isRecipeQuery()`, `isCodeQuery()`, `isNostrQuery()`, `isAppQuery()`, `isWebsitesQuery()`
|
||||
- Report which ones return true
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Preferred tab**: What does `preferredFirstTab()` return for this query?
|
||||
|
||||
3. **System prompt**: What would `buildSystemPrompt()` include? Read `useAI.ts` and trace all dynamic sections.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Expected AI response**: Based on the system prompt instructions, what tags would the AI likely use? Construct a realistic sample response.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Extraction**: Run the sample response through each extraction function and report what gets found:
|
||||
- `extractAllFilms()`, `extractAllSongs()`, `extractAllPodcasts()`, `extractAllBooks()`, `extractAllTVSeries()`, `extractAllImages()`, `extractAllPlaces()`, `extractApps()`, `extractCodeBlocks()`, `extractRecipes()`
|
||||
|
||||
6. **Tab filtering**: What tabs would `filterTabsByContext()` return? In what order?
|
||||
|
||||
7. **Rendering**: Which grid component would render? Trace through ContentPanel.vue and/or ContentGridView.vue.
|
||||
|
||||
8. **Report**: Complete flow diagram showing: Query -> Classifiers -> Prompt -> Expected Response -> Extraction -> Tabs -> Grid
|
||||
Submodule aiui/.claude/worktrees/agitated-hofstadter deleted from 10e12a329f
Submodule aiui/.claude/worktrees/funny-hofstadter deleted from 1c5185a15c
Submodule aiui/.claude/worktrees/happy-colden deleted from 666e1232f4
Submodule aiui/.claude/worktrees/hardcore-beaver deleted from a817fa199f
Submodule aiui/.claude/worktrees/heuristic-raman deleted from e8e002debc
Submodule aiui/.claude/worktrees/priceless-colden deleted from aaaef7d710
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
description: Core development philosophy for AIUI - the foundational rules that govern all code and design decisions
|
||||
globs: "**/*"
|
||||
alwaysApply: true
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Master Philosophy
|
||||
|
||||
## Mission
|
||||
Build the next-generation AI content surface UI — a paradigm where AI responses are rendered as rich, interactive content, not plain text. Delivered as a reusable component library (@aiui/core) and a reference application (AIUI App).
|
||||
|
||||
## Philosophical Pillars
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Open Source Only
|
||||
Every dependency must be OSS (MIT, Apache-2.0, GPL-compatible). No proprietary SDKs, no vendor-locked services. Before adding any dependency, verify its license.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Decentralized-First
|
||||
No hard dependency on any centralized service. AI backends, messaging protocols, storage, search — all connect through pluggable adapter interfaces. Users choose their own providers.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Bitcoin Only
|
||||
Bitcoin is the only monetary unit. On-chain, Lightning, ecash (Cashu, Fedimint/Fedi). No fiat payment rails, no altcoins, no stablecoins — anywhere in the UI or codebase. AIUI is never a wallet and never handles funds directly. See `10-bitcoin-only.mdc` for full rules.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Cryptography for Everything Sensitive
|
||||
E2E encryption for messages, encrypted local storage, proper key management. Privacy is not a feature — it is a requirement.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5. Mobile-First, Everywhere-Perfect
|
||||
Every component works flawlessly on mobile, tablet, and desktop. Mobile is the foundation, not an afterthought. Touch targets, viewport management, and safe areas are first-class citizens.
|
||||
|
||||
### 6. Consistency is Sacred
|
||||
Mobile and desktop versions show identical content and functionality unless explicitly designed otherwise. Design tokens ensure visual consistency across all breakpoints.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7. Theme-First Architecture
|
||||
Theming is a core architectural decision from day one. Themes are CSS-based with reactive state management. Dark mode and light mode are equals.
|
||||
|
||||
### 8. Utility-First, Component-Second
|
||||
Tailwind CSS utilities in templates for maximum flexibility. Component classes only for truly reusable patterns. Extract components when you repeat, not before.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9. Performance as a Feature
|
||||
Initial load < 250KB gzipped. Lazy load everything that isn't immediately visible. CSS transforms for GPU acceleration. SVG over raster images. Code splitting by default.
|
||||
|
||||
### 10. Plugin-Everything
|
||||
Every external integration connects through a typed plugin interface. AI providers, media sources, messaging protocols, wallets, social embeds — all pluggable.
|
||||
|
||||
### 11. Accessibility is Not Optional
|
||||
WCAG AA compliance minimum. Keyboard navigation everywhere. Screen reader friendly. Color contrast tested and validated.
|
||||
|
||||
### 12. MCP-Native
|
||||
First-class Model Context Protocol support for AI tool interoperability.
|
||||
|
||||
## Anti-Patterns to Avoid
|
||||
|
||||
- Desktop-first thinking
|
||||
- Hardcoded values (use design tokens)
|
||||
- Premature abstraction (build three times before abstracting)
|
||||
- Magic numbers without comments
|
||||
- Invisible state (user should always know what's happening)
|
||||
- Handling funds or private keys
|
||||
- Loading third-party tracking scripts
|
||||
- Proprietary dependencies
|
||||
|
||||
## The Ultimate Goal
|
||||
|
||||
When someone uses AIUI, they should think: "This feels incredibly polished", "Everything just works", "My data is safe", "I control my own setup."
|
||||
|
||||
When a developer reads the code: "This is well organized", "I understand exactly what's happening", "Adding a new renderer is straightforward."
|
||||
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
description: Vue 3 Composition API conventions and best practices for AIUI
|
||||
globs: "**/*.vue,**/*.ts"
|
||||
alwaysApply: false
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Vue 3 Conventions
|
||||
|
||||
## Composition API with `<script setup>`
|
||||
Always use `<script setup lang="ts">`. Never use Options API.
|
||||
|
||||
## Component Organization Order
|
||||
1. Imports — external, then internal
|
||||
2. Props — with TypeScript-style validation
|
||||
3. Emits — explicitly defined
|
||||
4. State (refs and reactive)
|
||||
5. Computed — derived values, always pure
|
||||
6. Watchers — side effects only
|
||||
7. Methods — business logic
|
||||
8. Lifecycle hooks — ordered by execution
|
||||
9. Expose — public API (if needed)
|
||||
|
||||
## File Organization
|
||||
```
|
||||
src/
|
||||
components/
|
||||
ui/ # Primitives (Button, Card, Badge, Input)
|
||||
chat/ # Chat window, message list, input
|
||||
content-panel/ # Side panel for surfaced content
|
||||
renderers/ # Content type renderers
|
||||
layout/ # Shell, split-pane, responsive containers
|
||||
composables/ # Shared composition functions (useTheme, useMedia, useCrypto)
|
||||
stores/ # Pinia stores
|
||||
plugins/ # Plugin system
|
||||
types/ # Shared TypeScript types
|
||||
styles/ # Global CSS, themes, design tokens
|
||||
utils/ # Pure utility functions
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Naming Conventions
|
||||
- Components: PascalCase (`ProjectCard.vue`)
|
||||
- Composables: camelCase, prefixed with "use" (`useTheme.ts`)
|
||||
- Props: camelCase in JS, kebab-case in templates
|
||||
- Boolean props: prefix with `is`, `has`, `can`, `should`
|
||||
- Handler props: prefix with `on` (`onClick`, `onClose`)
|
||||
- Emits: explicit, kebab-case in templates (`project:updated`)
|
||||
|
||||
## Props — Always Validate
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
defineProps({
|
||||
title: { type: String, required: true },
|
||||
count: { type: Number, default: 0 },
|
||||
status: {
|
||||
type: String as PropType<'pending' | 'active' | 'complete'>,
|
||||
default: 'pending'
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Never use array-style props: `defineProps(['title', 'count'])`
|
||||
|
||||
## Reactive State
|
||||
- `ref` for primitives and single values
|
||||
- `reactive` for objects with multiple properties
|
||||
- `computed` for derived state (never side effects in computed)
|
||||
- `shallowRef` for large objects that change at top level only
|
||||
|
||||
## Templates — Keep Clean
|
||||
Move complex logic to computed properties or methods. No inline logic in templates. Use `v-if` for infrequent toggles, `v-show` for frequent ones.
|
||||
|
||||
## Composables
|
||||
- One responsibility per composable
|
||||
- Return only what's needed
|
||||
- Handle cleanup in `onUnmounted`
|
||||
- Make composables testable
|
||||
|
||||
## Performance
|
||||
- Lazy load heavy components: `defineAsyncComponent(() => import(...))`
|
||||
- Use `shallowRef` for large lists
|
||||
- Use `:key` with unique identifiers, never index
|
||||
- Avoid reactive objects in templates (create in script)
|
||||
|
||||
## Error Handling
|
||||
Use `onErrorCaptured` for component-level error boundaries. Always handle async errors with try/catch/finally pattern (loading, error, data states).
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Reference in New Issue
Block a user