# Release 1.7.121 — task list Opened 2026-08-03, immediately after v1.7.120-alpha shipped. Everything the operator has asked for since, plus the items v1.7.120 deliberately left open. Ordered by severity. Status key: **DONE** (committed) · **READY** (written, not yet committed/tested) · **OPEN** (not started) · **BLOCKED** (needs an operator decision) --- ## P0 — Security ### 1. App ports are reachable with no login, on every transport — **OPEN** > "if I'm logged out I can reach every app port on tailscale and LAN, this can not be > allowed… it must present the login to access the app with an app icon of what you're > accessing to confirm, and 2FA if present" — operator, 2026-08-03 - Applies to **Tailscale, LAN, Tor, FIPS** alike, and to "ssh access to that port or whatever". - Required behaviour: an unauthenticated request to any app port serves a **login page naming and showing the icon of the app being accessed**, then honours **2FA when set**. - **Research first:** how umbrelOS and StartOS gate app access (operator asked explicitly). Both are open source — `getumbrel/umbrel` and `Start9Labs/start-os`. Do not guess at their model; read it. - This is the same class as the v1.7.120 `/lnd-connect-info` + `/bitcoin-rpc/` leaks, but **fleet-wide across every app port** rather than two endpoints. Those two were closed by moving authorisation to the resource; this needs a general gate. - Scope note: `fips/app_ports.rs` holds the mesh allowlist; `is_peer_allowed_path` in `server.rs` holds the peer HTTP allowlist. Neither currently authenticates app ports. #### Research — umbrelOS (verified from their docs/source, 2026-08-03) umbrelOS solves this **architecturally, not per-app**: the app's own port is never published. Each app gets a sidecar `app_proxy` container that owns the published port and forwards to the app on the internal network. - `containers/app-proxy` is described as *"a transparent HTTP proxy to add authentication to Umbrel apps"* — **every** HTTP request and WebSocket upgrade passes through it and has its session token checked. - Tokens come from a separate `app-auth` service; the proxy talks to it over a local port (default 2000) with a shared secret (`UMBREL_AUTH_SECRET`). Two JWTs exist: an **API token** in localStorage (`{loggedIn: true}`) for the dashboard's own API, and a **proxy token** in an **HttpOnly cookie** (`{proxyToken: true}`) for app access. Both HS256, 7-day expiry. - Unauthenticated requests are redirected to the login screen. - Per-app escape hatches, all env vars on the proxy: `PROXY_AUTH_ADD` (bool, **default true** — so apps are protected unless opted out), `PROXY_AUTH_WHITELIST` (paths exempt, e.g. `/public/*`), `PROXY_AUTH_BLACKLIST` (paths that must be authed, e.g. `/admin/*`). - Known friction worth designing around: apps with their own login (Frigate, and the `PROXY_AUTH_ADD=false` tracker issue) end up double-authenticating, and non-browser API clients (Home Assistant hitting an app's API) break because they have no cookie. Any gate we build needs a story for machine clients, not just browsers. **The lesson for us:** the reason umbrel doesn't have this bug class is that there is no unauthenticated path to bind to in the first place. Our apps publish their own ports directly, so a gate bolted onto one transport leaves the others open — which is exactly the shape of the `/lnd-connect-info` + `/bitcoin-rpc/` leaks. The fix likely has to move the port binding, not just add a check. #### Reproduced ON archi-dev-box, 2026-08-03 — baseline before the fix No session cookie, over the Tailscale IP `100.69.68.39`: ``` port 18083 HTTP 200 LND - Archipelago port 8334 HTTP 200 port 8175 HTTP 200 Fedimint Guardian - Archipelago port 8336 HTTP 200 FIPS Mesh port 8090 HTTP 200 port 7777 HTTP 200 ``` `ss -tlnp` confirms these are bound `0.0.0.0`, so the same responses are served on the LAN IP and every other host address. Re-run this exact loop after the fix: every one must become the login page, and the ports listed as protocol exemptions (item 1b) must be the *only* ones still answering. #### Exposure map — how app ports are reachable TODAY (verified in source, 2026-08-03) All four transports converge on `127.0.0.1:`. This is the whole reason the fix is tractable: it is **one gate, not four**. | Transport | Path to the app | Code | |---|---|---| | LAN / Tailscale | container publishes the port on the host (`--network host`, so `0.0.0.0:`) — reachable on *every* host IP | `scripts/container-specs.sh`, `first-boot-containers.sh` | | FIPS mesh | daemon binds `[fips0-ULA]:` and raw-TCP-forwards to `127.0.0.1:` | `server.rs:1130` `app_port_v6_relay_loop` | | FIPS firewall | `tcp dport { …APP_LAUNCH_PORTS… } accept` drop-in opens them all | `fips/config.rs:274`, `fips/app_ports.rs` | | Tor | `HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:` per service | `api/rpc/tor/mod.rs:243` | #### Design decision (operator, 2026-08-03) **Gate app UIs + bearer tokens; protocol ports exempt.** HTTP app UIs get the login gate (app name + icon, 2FA honoured). Protocol ports (LND gRPC 10009 + REST, electrum 50002, bitcoin p2p 8333) stay open but MUST be declared `auth: none` with a rationale in the manifest, so the exceptions are a grep rather than a discovery — see item 1b. Per-app long-lived bearer tokens cover machine clients that speak HTTP (Home Assistant). **Zeus and electrum wallets keep working untouched** — that was the deciding constraint. The gate lives in the **daemon**, not a per-app sidecar container (umbrel's `app_proxy` model): rootless, no extra containers per app, one place to update, and it can reuse the existing `app_port_v6_relay_loop` rather than fight it. #### ⚠️ Trap found while designing — an nft-only gate FAILS OPEN The obvious implementation is an nft redirect of inbound app-port traffic to the gate. But `/etc/fips/fips.nft` is **provisioned out-of-band** and `fips/config.rs:290` treats its absence as a no-op (`if try_exists("/etc/fips/fips.nft")`). A gate shipped as a `fips.d` drop-in would therefore be **silently absent on every node without the hardening baseline** — i.e. it fails open, which is exactly the failure class this item exists to close. Two viable shapes, both fail-closed: - **(a) Apps bind loopback only**, daemon owns every external bind. Airtight, the true umbrel model, but requires touching each app's own listen config (nginx.conf etc.). Note you *cannot* half-do this: while an app holds `0.0.0.0:`, the daemon cannot bind `:` at all. - **(b) Daemon owns a dedicated `archipelago-appgate` nft table** with its own default-deny + redirect, independent of whether `fips.nft` exists, and refuses to start / alarms loudly if it cannot install it. Non-invasive to apps. #### Enabler found — `PortMapping.bind` already does half of (a) `core/container/src/manifest.rs:518` — `PortMapping` has a `bind` field, documented as *"Host address to bind the publish to. Empty = all interfaces (0.0.0.0). Set `127.0.0.1` to keep a port host-local"*. So for **bridge apps that declare `ports:`**, going loopback-only is a **manifest edit, not app surgery**, and the daemon can then own the external bind. That is most of the catalog. The exception is **host-networked apps** (`security.network_policy: host` — `lnd-ui`, `bitcoin-ui`, `electrs-ui`): host networking bypasses port mapping entirely, so `bind` has no effect and `ports:` is deliberately empty. Those bind whatever their internal nginx binds. We build those images ourselves, so the fix is a `listen 127.0.0.1:;` change in each `docker/*-ui/nginx.conf` — still no third-party surgery. Watch the rootless trap documented at `manifest.rs:532`: a publish bound to an address the host cannot actually bind crash-loops the whole unit (took bitcoin down fleet-wide on .228, 2026-07-09). Loopback binds are explicitly always accepted without probing, so this direction is safe. **Tor needs separate handling either way**: the onion connects *from* localhost, so a redirect that exempts loopback will not catch it. `HiddenServicePort` must be repointed at the gate, and since that mapping loses the original destination port, each app needs its own gate port (or an HTTP-level Host mapping). #### Primitives that already exist — do NOT build these from scratch The gate is mostly assembly, not invention: | Need | Existing API | |---|---| | Read the session cookie off a request | `session::extract_session_cookie(&HeaderMap) -> Option` (`session.rs:479`) | | Validate a session | `SessionStore::validate(&token) -> bool` (`session.rs:194`) | | **Honour 2FA** | Already modelled: `create_pending(totp_secret)` (`:176`) + `upgrade_to_full` (`:247`). A session still pending 2FA **fails `validate()`**, so the gate gets 2FA for free by calling `validate` — no TOTP code in the gate itself | | **Machine-client bearer tokens** | `device_tokens::create/verify` (`device_tokens.rs:63/:90`) — long-lived, minted from an authenticated session, only the SHA-256 persisted, plaintext returned once. Built for the companion pairing QR; needs **per-app scoping** added for this use | | Rate limiting | `device_tokens` verification already rides `auth.login`'s limiter | So the new code is: the listener/redirect, the app-identification step (which app is this port?), the login page render (app name + icon), and per-app scoping on `device_tokens`. #### Research — StartOS: **DROPPED** (operator, 2026-08-03) "don't need the startOS research we decided on a approach already." The umbrelOS read plus the design decision above settled it; no further prior-art work. ### 1b. Manifest declaration of unauthenticated ports — **DONE** (`0c4826f8`, pushed) `PortMapping` grew `auth` (`session` | `none`, defaulting to **`session`**) and `auth_rationale`. The default is the protected one, so exposure is now something a manifest has to ask for rather than something it gets by saying nothing. Validation is two-sided: `auth: none` without a rationale is rejected, **and** a rationale without `auth: none` is rejected — that combination means the author wrote an exemption and did not get one, and shipping it silently would leave them believing otherwise. **17 ports across 12 apps are exempt**, each with its reason: Lightning p2p (BOLT-8 noise), LND gRPC 10009 / REST 18080 and CLN gRPC 9835 (macaroon / mutual TLS — this is what keeps Zeus and remote wallets working), Bitcoin p2p 8333, electrum 50001, the three Wyoming voice ports, git-over-SSH 2222, and the UDP discovery protocols (mDNS 5353, SSDP 1900, STUN 3478). **The other 39 published ports now default to gated.** Bitcoin RPC 8332 is deliberately *not* exempted: it is already `bind: 127.0.0.1`, so the gate never sees it, and claiming an exemption it does not need would put a meaningless line in the audit list. If that bind is ever dropped it fails closed. Two corpus tests pin this: every shipped manifest must parse, and the exempt set is frozen at 17 so the node's unauthenticated surface cannot grow by accident. ### 1c. The gate itself — **IN PROGRESS** `core/archipelago/src/appgate/` — `identity.rs` (port → app id/name/icon, gated vs exempt, re-read from manifests so a catalog refresh applies without a restart), `mod.rs` (authorize + login page + TOTP step + reverse proxy), `listener.rs` (binds the external addresses, sweeps every 60s). Design points worth not re-deriving: - **It invents no auth policy.** `verify_password`, `totp::decrypt_secret`, `verify_code` + used-step replay protection, `SessionStore::create/create_pending/ upgrade_to_full`, and the *same* `LoginRateLimiter` instance as the JSON-RPC path. Only the transport differs (HTML form vs JSON-RPC), because a browser being redirected to an app cannot speak JSON-RPC. Sharing the limiter matters: otherwise an attacker gets a fresh budget of password guesses by moving to an app port. - **2FA is free.** A session still pending its TOTP step fails `validate()`, so the gate rejects it without knowing anything about second factors. - **Cookies ignore port.** The session cookie is host-only with no `Domain`, so one sign-in covers the dashboard and every app port on the same host. The corollary is that an app reached on a *different* host — its own onion — is a separate sign-in. - **401, not a redirect.** A redirect to a login page is indistinguishable from the app itself redirecting, and machine clients would follow it and parse HTML as their API response. - **The gate strips `Cookie` and `Authorization` before proxying.** The app has no use for the node session and must never be in a position to log or forward it. - **Machine clients**: `device_tokens` grew `apps: Option>` and `verify_for_app`. `None` = node-wide (what every existing companion token is — migrating them by guessing a scope would silently revoke access nobody asked to revoke); `Some(list)` restricts to those apps. An empty list is rejected rather than minted, since it would read as "unrestricted" while authorising nothing. #### ⚠️ The ordering constraint that shapes the rollout A published container port is bound `0.0.0.0:`, which claims **every** host address. While the app holds that, the gate **cannot** bind `:` at all. So the gate can only stand in front of an app whose publish has been pinned to loopback (`bind: 127.0.0.1`) and whose container has been recreated. Gate-first is not possible; all-apps-at-once would recreate every container on the node simultaneously. Therefore the rollout is **per app**, and the gate is built to be honest about being partially deployed: a port it cannot claim is logged at **warn** every sweep and recorded in `GateStatus::unprotected`. The failure mode this exists to prevent is a gate that binds nothing, logs at debug, and reports success while every app stays exactly as open as before — worse than no gate, because it stops anyone looking. (Same reasoning that killed the nft drop-in: `/etc/fips/fips.nft` is provisioned out-of-band and its absence is a silent no-op.) **Still open on this item:** pin the 39 gated ports to loopback app-by-app, repoint `HiddenServicePort` at the gate (Tor connects *from* loopback, so a loopback-exempt redirect will not catch it, and the mapping loses the original destination port), gate the FIPS relay path, surface `GateStatus` in the UI, and verify on a real node. ### 2. Filebrowser ships an insecure default login — **OPEN** - Change the default credential **without breaking the dashboard's Cloud view**, which authenticates to filebrowser on the user's behalf. - Related prior art: FED-07 rotated the shipped Fedimint gateway credential and had to recreate the running container for it to take effect (`06e0e695`) — the same trap applies here. ### 3. Federation trust escalation — **DONE** (`c0cfc72a`, pushed) Two independent fail-open paths granted `Trusted` without any operator decision: - `federation.peer-joined` is **unauthenticated** (middleware no-session list) and peer-reachable on `/rpc/v1`. Its ed25519 check verifies the caller against **the pubkey the caller supplied**, so it proves key possession, never authorisation. A join with no `invite_token` fell through to `TrustLevel::Trusted.min(claimed_trust)`, and `claimed_trust` defaults to `Trusted` — so anyone able to reach the node could self-grant Trusted. **Now capped at `Observer`.** - `merge_transitive_peers` added every peer advertised by a Trusted source as `Trusted`, making trust viral across the whole federation graph. **Now `Observer`** — which is what `NodeStateSnapshot.federated_peers`' own doc comment always said it should be ("adds them as Observers on her side… doesn't auto-promote to Trusted"). The code contradicted its own spec. - Added `FederatedNode.trust_source` (`invite` | `uninvited-join` | `transitive-merge` | `manual`, `None` = pre-existing/unknown) so existing grants are **auditable**. Per operator decision: existing peers are **left alone, not auto-demoted**. - `trust_source` is now **surfaced** in `federation.list-nodes` (as an explicit `null` when unknown, not omitted — "recorded before this was tracked" is the population that needs review, so the UI must be able to tell it apart from a field it didn't read) and rendered under the trust dropdown in the node detail modal as "Granted via:". ### 3b. Granting Trusted must require the node password — **DONE** (uncommitted at time of writing) > "to make someone trusted must require the node password to generate the code or change > in the modal dropdown when you click a node" — operator, 2026-08-03 Re-authentication on privilege escalation. Both entry points are covered: - **Minting a Trusted invite** (`federation.invite`) — gated on the **resolved** level, which matters because "Link Your Nodes" sends no `trust_level` at all and falls through to the `Trusted` default. The invite is a bearer grant of Trusted to whoever redeems it, so minting it *is* the escalation. Observer invites are untouched. - **Changing a node's level in the UI dropdown** (`federation.set-trust`) — gated only when the peer is **not already** Trusted, so the dropdown re-emitting its own value doesn't demand a password for a no-op. Demotion is NOT gated: making something less privileged must never be harder than leaving it, or the safe action becomes the inconvenient one. The operator path stamps `TrustSource::Manual`; `set_trust_level` grew an `Option` so automatic adjustments (the discovery-handshake demotion safety net) pass `None` and leave the recorded provenance alone rather than laundering an `uninvited-join` peer into looking operator-approved. Wiring: the backend is the sole authority on what counts as an escalation — it returns a `PASSWORD_REQUIRED:` prefixed error, and the UI prompts and retries only on that. The frontend never pre-judges, so the rule lives in exactly one place. `TrustPasswordModal.vue` (modelled on `RotateDidModal.vue`) serves both flows. `NodeDetailModal`'s select now snaps back to the node's real level on change, because a cancelled or failed promotion would otherwise leave the dropdown displaying a level the node never accepted. **Follow-up, deliberately not done here:** `federation.join` also grants Trusted (when redeeming someone else's Trusted invite) with no re-auth. It is an explicit operator paste rather than a UI toggle, and was outside the two entry points specified — but it is the third way a node reaches Trusted and should be reviewed. --- ## P1 — Correctness the operator hit directly ### 4. LND UI never updates over OTA — **DONE** (`5088aef5`, pushed) - `LND_UI_IMAGE` was `lnd-ui:latest` while `BITCOIN_UI_IMAGE` was pinned to `1.7.119-alpha`. Podman will not re-pull a tag it already holds locally, so nodes kept a stale lnd-ui forever. **Now pinned to `1.7.119-alpha`.** - `scripts/first-boot-containers.sh` declared lnd-ui as bridge `-p 18083:80`. That is the **third copy** of the declaration the UI agent already corrected in `scripts/container-specs.sh` and `apps/lnd-ui/manifest.yml` — so **fresh installs** still produced the reproduced `HTTP 000`. **Now `--network host`, ports empty.** - Root cause worth fixing separately: the same container spec is declared in three places. ### 5. Federated/peered nodes must message without a LoRa hop first — **OPEN** > "make it so federated/peered nodes can message without needing to connect on Lora first > once connected" - Investigate the split contact model (radio contact vs federation peer) — there is prior art in memory: `project_archy_lora_e2e_rootcause` ("split contact model; don't touch federation") and `mesh::seed_federation_peers_into_mesh` / `upsert_federation_peer`, which already mirror federation peers into the mesh table. - Likely the gap is addressing/route selection rather than transport availability. ### 6. In-app app updates, independent of OTA — **OPEN** > "we need app update to see updates in the registry, whether UI or not… show the update > mechanism in the app… a modal and update now / cancel… same in the detail page… the > update button should show 'see update' and a different graphic for just ui, app, or both > together. All pushed through the signed-catalog flow." … "This has to show independent of > OTA updates as a separate pipeline, I think we've done a lot of work on it." - **Operator says much of this already exists — research the codebase before building.** Known groundwork: the signed catalog (`releases/app-catalog.json`, `sign-catalog.sh`), catalog→manifest runtime reload, `package.update` RPC, `check-app-catalog-drift.py`, and `scripts/image-versions.sh` pinning. #### What already exists (verified in source, 2026-08-03) — the operator was right The whole update *pipeline* is built and is already independent of OTA: - `package.check-updates` (`api/rpc/package/update.rs:180`) refreshes the signed catalog and hot-reloads manifests when it changed — no daemon restart, no OTA involved. - `package.update` (`spawn_package_update`), `package.versions`, `package.set-config` version pinning, and `execute_update` (stop → pull → remove → recreate → verify). - Version awareness: `app_catalog::catalog_versions(app_id)` vs `installed_version()` (`api/rpc/package/set_config.rs:46`). - Frontend: `AppCard.vue` already renders an Update button off `pkg['available-update']` (`:48`, `:128`) and emits `update`. #### What is actually MISSING (this is the real scope of item 6) 1. **The UI-vs-app-vs-both distinction does not exist.** `available-update` is a single version string — nothing classifies whether the change is the app image, its `*-ui` image, or both. This is the core of the operator's ask ("a different graphic for just ui, app, or both together") and needs a backend change, not just an icon. ⚠️ Compounding factor: per `reference_app_ui_delivery_model`, `*-ui` apps are **not in the signed catalog** at all — so "is there a UI update" cannot be answered from the catalog today. That gap has to be closed first or the UI half is unanswerable. 2. **The modal** (Update now / Cancel) — the card currently updates on click, no confirm. 3. **The detail-page affordance** — same treatment as the card. 4. **Button copy**: "See update" rather than "Update". ### 6b. Multiversion for ALL apps + upstream release discovery — **OPEN** (operator, 2026-08-03) > "we also need a way to provide multiversion support for all apps and it automatically > pulls the latest versions from the source app repository, safely, and the user can > choose to update so we aren't always updating manually" #### Verified 2026-08-03: the schema and runtime already exist This is much less work than it sounds, because the multiversion machinery built for Bitcoin generalises as data rather than code: - `releases/app-catalog.json` entries already support a `versions[]` array of `{version, image, default?, deprecated?}`. - Runtime is complete: `catalog_versions(app_id)`, `catalog_default_version`, `catalog_image_for_version`, `package.versions`, version pinning through `package.set-config`, and `available_update_for_app` falling back to the `image-versions.sh` baseline pin. **It is populated for 2 of 66 apps** — `bitcoin-core` (9 versions) and `bitcoin-knots` (5). Every other app carries a single `version`. So "multiversion for all apps" is primarily a **catalog-generation and image-mirroring job**, not new runtime plumbing. #### What has to be built 1. **Populate `versions[]` fleet-wide.** Extend `scripts/generate-app-catalog.py` to emit a version list per app instead of a single pin. Needs a per-app policy for how many historical versions to carry and which is `default` (Bitcoin's list shows the shape, including `deprecated: true` for old-but-installable). 2. **Mirror the images.** A version in the catalog that is not in our registry is a broken promise — `package.update` would pull and fail. Use the existing skopeo path (`feedback_skopeo_source_selection`: prefer `.160`, concurrency ≤ 6). 3. **An upstream release-watcher.** 48 manifests already carry a `repo:` URL under `metadata`, so there is something to poll (GitHub releases / registry tags). It runs **off-node**, as part of catalog generation. 4. **Keep the signed catalog as the trust boundary.** This is the whole of "safely": the watcher **proposes** versions, the offline signing ceremony **admits** them, and nodes only ever install what the signed catalog carries. A node must never pull straight from an upstream repo — that would put an unsigned third party inside the supply chain, which is exactly what the signed-registry model exists to prevent. 5. **The user chooses.** Discovery must never auto-apply. `package.check-updates` already refreshes and hot-reloads without touching the running containers, so "a new version exists" and "install it" stay separate — which is also what item 6's modal is for. **Sequencing note:** 6b's step 1 and item 6's UI-vs-app classification want the same thing — `*-ui` images represented in the catalog. Doing that once unblocks both. --- ## P2 — Carried over from v1.7.120 ### 7. `create-release.sh` commits the manifest BEFORE signing — **OPEN** Release commit always carries an **unsigned** manifest; nodes fetch it from branch `main` and refuse to auto-apply. Caught manually this cycle. Fix the ordering so it cannot ship. ### 8. `gitea-vps2` remote is dead, and is the same server as `gitea-ai` — **OPEN** Stored token fails auth. `source.archipelago-foundation.org` == `146.59.87.168`, so `git push gitea-ai` already publishes to the "primary" OTA host. Ties into the existing "migrate VPS2 IP to domain" todo. ### 9. Fleet SSH host-key rotation — **BLOCKED** (operator decision) `archipelago-1`, `archy-x250-beta`, `archipelago` share all three SSH host keys; two also share a TLS private key. Detection shipped; rotation deliberately not performed. ### 10. 5× lifecycle gate — **OPEN** Not run for v1.7.120 (disclosed in its changelog). Needs repeated reboots of a live node. ### 11. `prod_orchestrator.rs:3181` unreachable code — **OPEN** `bitcoin_host()` returns unconditionally at :3171, so the podman container-name lookup below is dead on every path. Pre-existing; spotted in the v1.7.120 build warnings. --- ## Notes for whoever picks this up - A separate agent is doing **AIUI planning with GSD** — do not touch AIUI. - AIUI must always be built `VITE_BASE_PATH=/aiui/` (see the memory note); a hand-built bundle renders a black page. - Verify security claims on the node, not from the source. v1.7.120's headline bug was a fix that shipped in the binary and silently never reached the running container. --- ## RESUME HERE — next session **Landed this session (both pushed):** - `c0cfc72a` federation trust escalation (items 3) — 42/42 federation tests green - `5088aef5` lnd-ui OTA pin + host networking (item 4), and this task file **v1.7.120-alpha is SHIPPED** — signed, published, assets verified live. Do not re-cut it. ### Start with item 3b (password gate) — groundwork already located Everything needed to implement it, so the next session does not re-search: - **The helper to use:** `self.auth_manager.verify_password(password).await?` — returns `bool`. Existing callers to copy the shape from: `api/rpc/node.rs:176`, `api/rpc/totp.rs:18` / `:66` / `:121`. - **Entry point A — minting a Trusted invite:** `handle_federation_invite`, `api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs:58`. It reads `trust_level` from params and **defaults to `TrustLevel::Trusted` at :72**. Gate only when the resolved level is `Trusted`; leave Observer invites unchanged. - **Entry point B — the UI dropdown:** `handle_federation_set_trust`, `api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs:326`, dispatched as `"federation.set-trust"` (`api/rpc/dispatcher.rs:353`). Its parse is at `:342`. - **Rule:** gate PROMOTION to Trusted only. Demotion must stay ungated — making something less privileged must never be harder than leaving it. - Set `TrustSource::Manual` on the operator path so the audit trail distinguishes a deliberate grant from the capped automatic ones. - Frontend will need the password prompt in both places (invite modal, node dropdown). ### Then item 1 (app ports unauthenticated) — the big one Start with the research the operator explicitly asked for: how **umbrelOS** (`getumbrel/umbrel`) and **StartOS** (`Start9Labs/start-os`) gate app access. Read their model rather than inventing one. Only then design the gate. Give this a fresh session with real context — it is the largest item here and is the same bug class as the `/lnd-connect-info` + `/bitcoin-rpc/` leaks fixed in v1.7.120, but across every app port and every transport. ### Working notes - A separate agent is doing **AIUI planning with GSD** — do not touch AIUI. - The shared tree has concurrent agents: stage by explicit path, never `git add -A`. - Verify security claims **on the node**, not from source. v1.7.120's headline bug was a fix that shipped in the binary and silently never reached the running container. - A piped command's exit code is the pipe's, not the script's — redirect to a log file and read the content.