FED-07 was marked Complete when 01-11 landed, which was premature: the requirement text explicitly includes "existing installs with the default password get a migration path", and that migration has never been exercised on a node. Corrected to code-complete/verification-pending. Checkpoint step 1 was run read-only on archi-dev-box: the node is CLEAN (hash present, 600, service-owned, not the shipped default) and has NO gateway container — the app is installed but nothing runs and its data dir is empty. So rotation cannot fire naturally here, and the steps that matter most (data survives the recreate, new credential authenticates, old one rejected) have nothing to exercise without installing and seeding first. Deferred deliberately rather than run unattended: 30 containers are up with 4-8 days uptime (IndeeHub, Immich, BTCPay, netbird, strfry, …), the archipelago system service is active, and restarting it SIGKILLs containers until Quadlet is the default. The todo carries the full context plus two adjacent findings: fedimint-gateway is missing from handle_package_credentials (so a rotated password has no UI retrieval path), and photoprism ships a fixed admin password in its manifest. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
4.2 KiB
created, title, area, severity, files
| created | title | area | severity | files | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-01T09:45:00.000Z | Verify FED-07 gateway credential rotation on a real node (01-16 Task 2) | security | major |
|
Problem
FED-07's code is complete and pushed (42652547 removed every shipped credential,
9e2d2ef2 added detection + rotation for nodes already carrying one), but plan 01-16's
blocking Task 2 checkpoint has never been run, so the requirement is not closed. Two
things are unproven:
- That the recreate actually preserves the gateway's data. Rotation deliberately
avoids any teardown: it changes the credential, which changes
secret_env_hash, which the drift check reads as a container-label mismatch, which fires the platform's own recreate around the unchanged data directory, ports, volumes and container name. That chain is confirmed by reading the code (prod_orchestrator.rs:3309computes the hash,:3374compares the label) but has never been observed running. - That the rotated credential actually authenticates and the old shipped one is rejected.
Why it was deferred (2026-08-01)
Checkpoint step 1 was run read-only on archi-dev-box. Findings:
- The node is CLEAN — the hash file is present,
600,archipelago:archipelago, and is not the shipped default. The legacyfedimint-gateway-passwordfile also exists. - There is no
fedimint-gatewaycontainer. The app is installed at/opt/archipelago/apps/fedimint-gateway, but nothing is running and/var/lib/archipelago/fedimint-gatewayis empty.archy-fedimint-uiandfedimint-clientdare running, but they are not the gateway.
So the rotation path cannot fire naturally here, and steps 5–6 (data survived, gateway authenticates) have nothing to exercise. Proving it on this box means installing and starting the gateway first, then deliberately seeding the old value — which the plan's Planner Assumption already anticipates and requires be recorded.
The deploy itself is the blocker: 30 containers are running with 4–8 days uptime
(IndeeHub relay/minio/postgres/ffmpeg, Immich, BTCPay + nbxplorer, netbird, portainer,
strfry, searxng, the archy UI set), the archipelago system service is active, and
CLAUDE.md's standing rule is that restarting it SIGKILLs containers until Quadlet is the
default. Step 8 then wants tests/lifecycle/run-gate.sh on the same box, which cycles
install/stop/start/reinstall/reboot-survive. Dorian chose to hold rather than take that
blast radius unattended.
Solution
Run 01-16 Task 2's eight steps in a window where restarting archipelago on the target is
acceptable. Two viable routes:
- On archi-dev-box: install + start
fedimint-gateway, put some state in its data directory, seed the old hash into/var/lib/archipelago/secrets/fedimint-gateway-hash, deploy this build, restart, then run steps 3–8. Record that the affected state was seeded deliberately. - On a node that runs the gateway for real (.228 is the heavy 14-app node): the rotation path may exist naturally there, which is stronger evidence than seeding.
Either way, record in 01-16-SUMMARY.md: the affected-or-clean verdict, the exact deploy
command, whether the secret_env_hash recreate was observed firing, the gate result, and
the fact that archy-x250-dev was offline (single-node verification with the second-node
gap recorded honestly is the expected pattern).
Related, found while doing 01-16
- Operator recovery gap:
handle_package_credentials(core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/package/install.rs:2093) is a hardcoded if-chain covering onlyfilebrowserandphotoprism.fedimint-gatewayfalls through to an empty list, so after a rotation the operator has no in-UI way to get the new password — only the0600file the log line names. Adding one arm closes it; the UI already renders whatever the RPC returns. apps/photoprism/manifest.yml:35shipsPHOTOPRISM_ADMIN_PASSWORD=archipelago, and that same literal is handed to the UI. Same defect class as FED-07 on a different app — wants its own requirement.