268 lines
10 KiB
Rust

mod content;
mod dwn;
mod node_message;
mod proxy;
mod websocket;
use crate::api::rpc::RpcHandler;
use crate::config::Config;
use crate::monitoring::MetricsStore;
use crate::session::{self, SessionStore};
use crate::state::StateManager;
use anyhow::Result;
use hyper::{Method, Request, Response, StatusCode};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tracing::debug;
/// Build an HTTP response without unwrap. Falls back to a plain 500 if builder fails.
// Used by handler submodules after unwrap elimination
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub(super) fn build_response(status: StatusCode, content_type: &str, body: hyper::Body) -> Response<hyper::Body> {
Response::builder()
.status(status)
.header("Content-Type", content_type)
.body(body)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| Response::new(hyper::Body::from("Internal error")))
}
pub struct ApiHandler {
config: Config,
rpc_handler: Arc<RpcHandler>,
state_manager: Arc<StateManager>,
metrics_store: Arc<MetricsStore>,
session_store: SessionStore,
}
impl ApiHandler {
pub async fn new(
config: Config,
state_manager: Arc<StateManager>,
metrics_store: Arc<MetricsStore>,
) -> Result<Self> {
let session_store = SessionStore::new().await;
let rpc_handler = Arc::new(
RpcHandler::new(
config.clone(),
state_manager.clone(),
metrics_store.clone(),
session_store.clone(),
)
.await?,
);
Ok(Self {
config,
rpc_handler,
state_manager,
metrics_store,
session_store,
})
}
/// Access the RPC handler (for service initialization after construction).
pub fn rpc_handler(&self) -> &Arc<RpcHandler> {
&self.rpc_handler
}
/// Check if the request has a valid session cookie.
async fn is_authenticated(&self, headers: &hyper::HeaderMap) -> bool {
match session::extract_session_cookie(headers) {
Some(token) => self.session_store.validate(&token).await,
None => false,
}
}
/// Build a 401 Unauthorized JSON response.
fn unauthorized() -> Response<hyper::Body> {
let body = serde_json::json!({ "error": "Unauthorized" });
let body_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&body).unwrap_or_default();
Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)
.header("Content-Type", "application/json")
.body(hyper::Body::from(body_bytes))
.unwrap()
}
/// Allowed CORS origins derived from the config host IP.
fn allowed_origins(&self) -> Vec<String> {
let mut origins = vec![
format!("http://{}", self.config.host_ip),
format!("https://{}", self.config.host_ip),
];
if self.config.dev_mode {
origins.push("http://localhost:8100".to_string()); // Vite dev server
}
origins
}
/// Validate the Origin header against allowed origins.
/// Returns the matched origin if valid, None if cross-origin is not allowed.
fn validate_origin(&self, headers: &hyper::HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
let origin = headers
.get("origin")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())?;
let allowed = self.allowed_origins();
if allowed.iter().any(|a| a == origin) {
Some(origin.to_string())
} else {
None
}
}
pub async fn handle_request(
&self,
req: Request<hyper::Body>,
) -> Result<Response<hyper::Body>> {
let path = req.uri().path().to_string();
let method = req.method().clone();
// Handle CORS preflight for all routes
if method == Method::OPTIONS {
let mut builder = Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
.header("Vary", "Origin");
if let Some(origin) = self.validate_origin(req.headers()) {
builder = builder
.header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", &origin)
.header("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, OPTIONS")
.header("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, X-CSRF-Token")
.header("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true");
}
return Ok(builder.body(hyper::Body::empty()).unwrap());
}
// WebSocket upgrade — validate session before upgrading
if method == Method::GET && path == "/ws/db" {
if !self.is_authenticated(req.headers()).await {
tracing::warn!("401 WebSocket /ws/db — session invalid or missing");
return Ok(Self::unauthorized());
}
return Self::handle_websocket(req, self.state_manager.clone(), self.metrics_store.clone()).await;
}
// Convert body to bytes for non-WS routes
let headers = req.headers().clone();
let (parts, body) = req.into_parts();
let body_bytes = hyper::body::to_bytes(body).await
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to read body: {}", e))?;
let req_with_bytes = Request::from_parts(parts, hyper::Body::from(body_bytes.clone()));
debug!("{} {}", method, path);
match (method, path.as_str()) {
// RPC — auth is handled inside rpc handler per-method
(Method::POST, "/rpc/v1") => self.rpc_handler.handle(req_with_bytes).await,
// Health — unauthenticated, returns JSON with service status
(Method::GET, "/health") => {
let recovery_complete = crate::crash_recovery::is_recovery_complete();
let uptime = crate::crash_recovery::uptime_seconds();
let health_status = if recovery_complete { "ok" } else { "degraded" };
let status = serde_json::json!({
"status": health_status,
"crash_recovery_complete": recovery_complete,
"uptime_seconds": uptime,
"version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
"services": {
"rpc": true,
"sessions": true,
}
});
Ok(Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::OK)
.header("Content-Type", "application/json")
.body(hyper::Body::from(serde_json::to_vec(&status).unwrap_or_default()))
.unwrap())
}
// Node message — P2P endpoint (authenticated by source validation, not cookie)
(Method::POST, "/archipelago/node-message") => {
Self::handle_node_message(body_bytes).await
}
// Content serving — peers access shared content over Tor (no session auth)
(Method::GET, p) if p.starts_with("/content/") => {
Self::handle_content_request(p, &headers, &self.config).await
}
// Content catalog — list available content (no session auth, for peers)
(Method::GET, "/content") => {
Self::handle_content_catalog(&self.config).await
}
// Electrs status — unauthenticated (read-only sync status)
(Method::GET, "/electrs-status") => Self::handle_electrs_status().await,
// LND connect info — nginx validates session cookie (presence check),
// backend is bound to 127.0.0.1 so only nginx can reach it.
// No backend auth check here because the LND UI iframe fetches this
// endpoint and the session cookie flow is validated at the nginx layer.
(Method::GET, "/lnd-connect-info") => {
Self::handle_lnd_connect_info(self.rpc_handler.clone()).await
}
// Container logs — requires session
(Method::GET, path) if path.starts_with("/api/container/logs") => {
if !self.is_authenticated(&headers).await {
return Ok(Self::unauthorized());
}
let origin = self.validate_origin(&headers).unwrap_or_default();
Self::handle_container_logs_http(self.rpc_handler.clone(), path, &origin).await
}
// LND proxy — requires session
(Method::GET, path) if path.starts_with("/proxy/lnd/") => {
if !self.is_authenticated(&headers).await {
return Ok(Self::unauthorized());
}
let origin = self.validate_origin(&headers).unwrap_or_default();
Self::handle_lnd_proxy(path, &origin).await
}
// DWN health — unauthenticated
(Method::GET, "/dwn/health") => {
Self::handle_dwn_health(&self.config).await
}
// DWN message processing — peers access over Tor for sync (no session auth)
(Method::POST, "/dwn") => {
Self::handle_dwn_message(body_bytes, &self.config).await
}
_ => Ok(Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND)
.body(hyper::Body::from("Not Found"))
.unwrap()),
}
}
}
/// Validate that an app ID matches the safe pattern: lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens.
fn is_valid_app_id(id: &str) -> bool {
!id.is_empty()
&& id.len() <= 64
&& id.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_lowercase() || b.is_ascii_digit() || b == b'-')
&& id.as_bytes()[0] != b'-'
}
/// Validate that a pubkey is a 64-char hex string.
fn is_valid_pubkey_hex(s: &str) -> bool {
s.len() == 64 && s.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
}
/// Strip newlines and ANSI escape sequences from strings before logging.
fn sanitize_log_string(s: &str) -> String {
s.replace('\n', "\\n")
.replace('\r', "\\r")
.replace('\x1b', "")
}
/// Strip HTML-sensitive characters to prevent XSS when stored/rendered.
fn sanitize_html(s: &str) -> String {
s.replace('&', "&amp;")
.replace('<', "&lt;")
.replace('>', "&gt;")
.replace('"', "&quot;")
.replace('\'', "&#x27;")
}