archy/.planning/RELEASE-1.7.121-TASKS.md

Release 1.7.121 — task list

Opened 2026-08-03, immediately after v1.7.120-alpha shipped. Everything the operator has asked for since, plus the items v1.7.120 deliberately left open. Ordered by severity.

Status key: DONE (committed) · READY (written, not yet committed/tested) · OPEN (not started) · BLOCKED (needs an operator decision)

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P0 — Security

1. App ports are reachable with no login, on every transport — OPEN

"if I'm logged out I can reach every app port on tailscale and LAN, this can not be allowed… it must present the login to access the app with an app icon of what you're accessing to confirm, and 2FA if present" — operator, 2026-08-03

• Applies to Tailscale, LAN, Tor, FIPS alike, and to "ssh access to that port or whatever".
• Required behaviour: an unauthenticated request to any app port serves a login page naming and showing the icon of the app being accessed, then honours 2FA when set.
• Research first: how umbrelOS and StartOS gate app access (operator asked explicitly). Both are open source — getumbrel/umbrel and Start9Labs/start-os. Do not guess at their model; read it.
• This is the same class as the v1.7.120 /lnd-connect-info + /bitcoin-rpc/ leaks, but fleet-wide across every app port rather than two endpoints. Those two were closed by moving authorisation to the resource; this needs a general gate.
• Scope note: fips/app_ports.rs holds the mesh allowlist; is_peer_allowed_path in server.rs holds the peer HTTP allowlist. Neither currently authenticates app ports.

Research — umbrelOS (verified from their docs/source, 2026-08-03)

umbrelOS solves this architecturally, not per-app: the app's own port is never published. Each app gets a sidecar app_proxy container that owns the published port and forwards to the app on the internal network.

• containers/app-proxy is described as "a transparent HTTP proxy to add authentication to Umbrel apps" — every HTTP request and WebSocket upgrade passes through it and has its session token checked.
• Tokens come from a separate app-auth service; the proxy talks to it over a local port (default 2000) with a shared secret (UMBREL_AUTH_SECRET). Two JWTs exist: an API token in localStorage ({loggedIn: true}) for the dashboard's own API, and a proxy token in an HttpOnly cookie ({proxyToken: true}) for app access. Both HS256, 7-day expiry.
• Unauthenticated requests are redirected to the login screen.
• Per-app escape hatches, all env vars on the proxy: PROXY_AUTH_ADD (bool, default true — so apps are protected unless opted out), PROXY_AUTH_WHITELIST (paths exempt, e.g. /public/*), PROXY_AUTH_BLACKLIST (paths that must be authed, e.g. /admin/*).
• Known friction worth designing around: apps with their own login (Frigate, and the PROXY_AUTH_ADD=false tracker issue) end up double-authenticating, and non-browser API clients (Home Assistant hitting an app's API) break because they have no cookie. Any gate we build needs a story for machine clients, not just browsers.

The lesson for us: the reason umbrel doesn't have this bug class is that there is no unauthenticated path to bind to in the first place. Our apps publish their own ports directly, so a gate bolted onto one transport leaves the others open — which is exactly the shape of the /lnd-connect-info + /bitcoin-rpc/ leaks. The fix likely has to move the port binding, not just add a check.

Reproduced ON archi-dev-box, 2026-08-03 — baseline before the fix

No session cookie, over the Tailscale IP 100.69.68.39:

port 18083  HTTP 200  LND - Archipelago
port 8334   HTTP 200
port 8175   HTTP 200  Fedimint Guardian - Archipelago
port 8336   HTTP 200  FIPS Mesh
port 8090   HTTP 200
port 7777   HTTP 200

ss -tlnp confirms these are bound 0.0.0.0, so the same responses are served on the LAN IP and every other host address. Re-run this exact loop after the fix: every one must become the login page, and the ports listed as protocol exemptions (item 1b) must be the only ones still answering.

Exposure map — how app ports are reachable TODAY (verified in source, 2026-08-03)

All four transports converge on 127.0.0.1:<app_port>. This is the whole reason the fix is tractable: it is one gate, not four.

Transport	Path to the app	Code
LAN / Tailscale	container publishes the port on the host (--network host, so 0.0.0.0:<port>) — reachable on every host IP	scripts/container-specs.sh, first-boot-containers.sh
FIPS mesh	daemon binds [fips0-ULA]:<port> and raw-TCP-forwards to 127.0.0.1:<port>	server.rs:1130 app_port_v6_relay_loop
FIPS firewall	tcp dport { …APP_LAUNCH_PORTS… } accept drop-in opens them all	fips/config.rs:274, fips/app_ports.rs
Tor	HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:<local_port> per service	api/rpc/tor/mod.rs:243

Design decision (operator, 2026-08-03)

Gate app UIs + bearer tokens; protocol ports exempt. HTTP app UIs get the login gate (app name + icon, 2FA honoured). Protocol ports (LND gRPC 10009 + REST, electrum 50002, bitcoin p2p 8333) stay open but MUST be declared auth: none with a rationale in the manifest, so the exceptions are a grep rather than a discovery — see item 1b. Per-app long-lived bearer tokens cover machine clients that speak HTTP (Home Assistant). Zeus and electrum wallets keep working untouched — that was the deciding constraint.

The gate lives in the daemon, not a per-app sidecar container (umbrel's app_proxy model): rootless, no extra containers per app, one place to update, and it can reuse the existing app_port_v6_relay_loop rather than fight it.

⚠️ Trap found while designing — an nft-only gate FAILS OPEN

The obvious implementation is an nft redirect of inbound app-port traffic to the gate. But /etc/fips/fips.nft is provisioned out-of-band and fips/config.rs:290 treats its absence as a no-op (if try_exists("/etc/fips/fips.nft")). A gate shipped as a fips.d drop-in would therefore be silently absent on every node without the hardening baseline — i.e. it fails open, which is exactly the failure class this item exists to close.

Two viable shapes, both fail-closed:

• (a) Apps bind loopback only, daemon owns every external bind. Airtight, the true umbrel model, but requires touching each app's own listen config (nginx.conf etc.). Note you cannot half-do this: while an app holds 0.0.0.0:<port>, the daemon cannot bind <lan-ip>:<port> at all.
• (b) Daemon owns a dedicated archipelago-appgate nft table with its own default-deny + redirect, independent of whether fips.nft exists, and refuses to start / alarms loudly if it cannot install it. Non-invasive to apps.

Enabler found — PortMapping.bind already does half of (a)

core/container/src/manifest.rs:518 — PortMapping has a bind field, documented as "Host address to bind the publish to. Empty = all interfaces (0.0.0.0). Set 127.0.0.1 to keep a port host-local". So for bridge apps that declare ports:, going loopback-only is a manifest edit, not app surgery, and the daemon can then own the external bind. That is most of the catalog.

The exception is host-networked apps (security.network_policy: host — lnd-ui, bitcoin-ui, electrs-ui): host networking bypasses port mapping entirely, so bind has no effect and ports: is deliberately empty. Those bind whatever their internal nginx binds. We build those images ourselves, so the fix is a listen 127.0.0.1:<port>; change in each docker/*-ui/nginx.conf — still no third-party surgery.

Watch the rootless trap documented at manifest.rs:532: a publish bound to an address the host cannot actually bind crash-loops the whole unit (took bitcoin down fleet-wide on .228, 2026-07-09). Loopback binds are explicitly always accepted without probing, so this direction is safe.

Tor needs separate handling either way: the onion connects from localhost, so a redirect that exempts loopback will not catch it. HiddenServicePort must be repointed at the gate, and since that mapping loses the original destination port, each app needs its own gate port (or an HTTP-level Host mapping).

Primitives that already exist — do NOT build these from scratch

The gate is mostly assembly, not invention:

Need	Existing API
Read the session cookie off a request	session::extract_session_cookie(&HeaderMap) -> Option<String> (session.rs:479)
Validate a session	SessionStore::validate(&token) -> bool (session.rs:194)
Honour 2FA	Already modelled: create_pending(totp_secret) (:176) + upgrade_to_full (:247). A session still pending 2FA fails validate(), so the gate gets 2FA for free by calling validate — no TOTP code in the gate itself
Machine-client bearer tokens	device_tokens::create/verify (device_tokens.rs:63/:90) — long-lived, minted from an authenticated session, only the SHA-256 persisted, plaintext returned once. Built for the companion pairing QR; needs per-app scoping added for this use
Rate limiting	device_tokens verification already rides auth.login's limiter

So the new code is: the listener/redirect, the app-identification step (which app is this port?), the login page render (app name + icon), and per-app scoping on device_tokens.

Research — StartOS: NOT YET VERIFIED

Their public docs cover the addressing model (per-service .onion and .local addresses, an explicit "make public" opt-in for clearnet) but do not state whether a universal auth layer sits in front of service interfaces, and the source could not be read from this box (gh is not installed, and raw GitHub paths 404'd). Do not assume they delegate auth to each service — read Start9Labs/start-os before designing.

2. Filebrowser ships an insecure default login — OPEN

• Change the default credential without breaking the dashboard's Cloud view, which authenticates to filebrowser on the user's behalf.
• Related prior art: FED-07 rotated the shipped Fedimint gateway credential and had to recreate the running container for it to take effect (06e0e695) — the same trap applies here.

3. Federation trust escalation — DONE (c0cfc72a, pushed)

Two independent fail-open paths granted Trusted without any operator decision:

• federation.peer-joined is unauthenticated (middleware no-session list) and peer-reachable on /rpc/v1. Its ed25519 check verifies the caller against the pubkey the caller supplied, so it proves key possession, never authorisation. A join with no invite_token fell through to TrustLevel::Trusted.min(claimed_trust), and claimed_trust defaults to Trusted — so anyone able to reach the node could self-grant Trusted. Now capped at Observer.
• merge_transitive_peers added every peer advertised by a Trusted source as Trusted, making trust viral across the whole federation graph. Now Observer — which is what NodeStateSnapshot.federated_peers' own doc comment always said it should be ("adds them as Observers on her side… doesn't auto-promote to Trusted"). The code contradicted its own spec.
• Added FederatedNode.trust_source (invite | uninvited-join | transitive-merge | manual, None = pre-existing/unknown) so existing grants are auditable. Per operator decision: existing peers are left alone, not auto-demoted.
• trust_source is now surfaced in federation.list-nodes (as an explicit null when unknown, not omitted — "recorded before this was tracked" is the population that needs review, so the UI must be able to tell it apart from a field it didn't read) and rendered under the trust dropdown in the node detail modal as "Granted via:".

3b. Granting Trusted must require the node password — DONE (uncommitted at time of writing)

"to make someone trusted must require the node password to generate the code or change in the modal dropdown when you click a node" — operator, 2026-08-03

Re-authentication on privilege escalation. Both entry points are covered:

• Minting a Trusted invite (federation.invite) — gated on the resolved level, which matters because "Link Your Nodes" sends no trust_level at all and falls through to the Trusted default. The invite is a bearer grant of Trusted to whoever redeems it, so minting it is the escalation. Observer invites are untouched.
• Changing a node's level in the UI dropdown (federation.set-trust) — gated only when the peer is not already Trusted, so the dropdown re-emitting its own value doesn't demand a password for a no-op.

Demotion is NOT gated: making something less privileged must never be harder than leaving it, or the safe action becomes the inconvenient one. The operator path stamps TrustSource::Manual; set_trust_level grew an Option<TrustSource> so automatic adjustments (the discovery-handshake demotion safety net) pass None and leave the recorded provenance alone rather than laundering an uninvited-join peer into looking operator-approved.

Wiring: the backend is the sole authority on what counts as an escalation — it returns a PASSWORD_REQUIRED: prefixed error, and the UI prompts and retries only on that. The frontend never pre-judges, so the rule lives in exactly one place. TrustPasswordModal.vue (modelled on RotateDidModal.vue) serves both flows. NodeDetailModal's select now snaps back to the node's real level on change, because a cancelled or failed promotion would otherwise leave the dropdown displaying a level the node never accepted.

Follow-up, deliberately not done here: federation.join also grants Trusted (when redeeming someone else's Trusted invite) with no re-auth. It is an explicit operator paste rather than a UI toggle, and was outside the two entry points specified — but it is the third way a node reaches Trusted and should be reviewed.

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P1 — Correctness the operator hit directly

4. LND UI never updates over OTA — DONE (5088aef5, pushed)

• LND_UI_IMAGE was lnd-ui:latest while BITCOIN_UI_IMAGE was pinned to 1.7.119-alpha. Podman will not re-pull a tag it already holds locally, so nodes kept a stale lnd-ui forever. Now pinned to 1.7.119-alpha.
• scripts/first-boot-containers.sh declared lnd-ui as bridge -p 18083:80. That is the third copy of the declaration the UI agent already corrected in scripts/container-specs.sh and apps/lnd-ui/manifest.yml — so fresh installs still produced the reproduced HTTP 000. Now --network host, ports empty.
• Root cause worth fixing separately: the same container spec is declared in three places.

5. Federated/peered nodes must message without a LoRa hop first — OPEN

"make it so federated/peered nodes can message without needing to connect on Lora first once connected"

• Investigate the split contact model (radio contact vs federation peer) — there is prior art in memory: project_archy_lora_e2e_rootcause ("split contact model; don't touch federation") and mesh::seed_federation_peers_into_mesh / upsert_federation_peer, which already mirror federation peers into the mesh table.
• Likely the gap is addressing/route selection rather than transport availability.

6. In-app app updates, independent of OTA — OPEN

"we need app update to see updates in the registry, whether UI or not… show the update mechanism in the app… a modal and update now / cancel… same in the detail page… the update button should show 'see update' and a different graphic for just ui, app, or both together. All pushed through the signed-catalog flow." … "This has to show independent of OTA updates as a separate pipeline, I think we've done a lot of work on it."

• Operator says much of this already exists — research the codebase before building. Known groundwork: the signed catalog (releases/app-catalog.json, sign-catalog.sh), catalog→manifest runtime reload, package.update RPC, check-app-catalog-drift.py, and scripts/image-versions.sh pinning.

What already exists (verified in source, 2026-08-03) — the operator was right

The whole update pipeline is built and is already independent of OTA:

• package.check-updates (api/rpc/package/update.rs:180) refreshes the signed catalog and hot-reloads manifests when it changed — no daemon restart, no OTA involved.
• package.update (spawn_package_update), package.versions, package.set-config version pinning, and execute_update (stop → pull → remove → recreate → verify).
• Version awareness: app_catalog::catalog_versions(app_id) vs installed_version() (api/rpc/package/set_config.rs:46).
• Frontend: AppCard.vue already renders an Update button off pkg['available-update'] (:48, :128) and emits update.

What is actually MISSING (this is the real scope of item 6)

1. The UI-vs-app-vs-both distinction does not exist. available-update is a single version string — nothing classifies whether the change is the app image, its *-ui image, or both. This is the core of the operator's ask ("a different graphic for just ui, app, or both together") and needs a backend change, not just an icon. ⚠️ Compounding factor: per reference_app_ui_delivery_model, *-ui apps are not in the signed catalog at all — so "is there a UI update" cannot be answered from the catalog today. That gap has to be closed first or the UI half is unanswerable.
2. The modal (Update now / Cancel) — the card currently updates on click, no confirm.
3. The detail-page affordance — same treatment as the card.
4. Button copy: "See update" rather than "Update".

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P2 — Carried over from v1.7.120

7. create-release.sh commits the manifest BEFORE signing — OPEN

Release commit always carries an unsigned manifest; nodes fetch it from branch main and refuse to auto-apply. Caught manually this cycle. Fix the ordering so it cannot ship.

8. gitea-vps2 remote is dead, and is the same server as gitea-ai — OPEN

Stored token fails auth. source.archipelago-foundation.org == 146.59.87.168, so git push gitea-ai already publishes to the "primary" OTA host. Ties into the existing "migrate VPS2 IP to domain" todo.

9. Fleet SSH host-key rotation — BLOCKED (operator decision)

archipelago-1, archy-x250-beta, archipelago share all three SSH host keys; two also share a TLS private key. Detection shipped; rotation deliberately not performed.

10. 5× lifecycle gate — OPEN

Not run for v1.7.120 (disclosed in its changelog). Needs repeated reboots of a live node.

11. prod_orchestrator.rs:3181 unreachable code — OPEN

bitcoin_host() returns unconditionally at :3171, so the podman container-name lookup below is dead on every path. Pre-existing; spotted in the v1.7.120 build warnings.

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Notes for whoever picks this up

• A separate agent is doing AIUI planning with GSD — do not touch AIUI.
• AIUI must always be built VITE_BASE_PATH=/aiui/ (see the memory note); a hand-built bundle renders a black page.
• Verify security claims on the node, not from the source. v1.7.120's headline bug was a fix that shipped in the binary and silently never reached the running container.

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RESUME HERE — next session

Landed this session (both pushed):

• c0cfc72a federation trust escalation (items 3) — 42/42 federation tests green
• 5088aef5 lnd-ui OTA pin + host networking (item 4), and this task file

v1.7.120-alpha is SHIPPED — signed, published, assets verified live. Do not re-cut it.

Start with item 3b (password gate) — groundwork already located

Everything needed to implement it, so the next session does not re-search:

• The helper to use: self.auth_manager.verify_password(password).await? — returns bool. Existing callers to copy the shape from: api/rpc/node.rs:176, api/rpc/totp.rs:18 / :66 / :121.
• Entry point A — minting a Trusted invite: handle_federation_invite, api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs:58. It reads trust_level from params and defaults to TrustLevel::Trusted at :72. Gate only when the resolved level is Trusted; leave Observer invites unchanged.
• Entry point B — the UI dropdown: handle_federation_set_trust, api/rpc/federation/handlers.rs:326, dispatched as "federation.set-trust" (api/rpc/dispatcher.rs:353). Its parse is at :342.
• Rule: gate PROMOTION to Trusted only. Demotion must stay ungated — making something less privileged must never be harder than leaving it.
• Set TrustSource::Manual on the operator path so the audit trail distinguishes a deliberate grant from the capped automatic ones.
• Frontend will need the password prompt in both places (invite modal, node dropdown).

Then item 1 (app ports unauthenticated) — the big one

Start with the research the operator explicitly asked for: how umbrelOS (getumbrel/umbrel) and StartOS (Start9Labs/start-os) gate app access. Read their model rather than inventing one. Only then design the gate.

Give this a fresh session with real context — it is the largest item here and is the same bug class as the /lnd-connect-info + /bitcoin-rpc/ leaks fixed in v1.7.120, but across every app port and every transport.

Working notes

• A separate agent is doing AIUI planning with GSD — do not touch AIUI.
• The shared tree has concurrent agents: stage by explicit path, never git add -A.
• Verify security claims on the node, not from source. v1.7.120's headline bug was a fix that shipped in the binary and silently never reached the running container.
• A piped command's exit code is the pipe's, not the script's — redirect to a log file and read the content.