39c7ac1924
Rootless podman migration (TASK-11): - Remove sudo from all podman calls in PodmanClient + 8 backend files - Remove sudo from all podman/docker calls in deploy script - Restore full systemd security hardening: NoNewPrivileges, RestrictAddressFamilies, MemoryDenyWriteExecute, RestrictRealtime, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictSUIDSGID, SystemCallFilter, ProtectSystem=strict - Enable loginctl linger for rootless container persistence - Remove Ollama from auto-deploy (marketplace-only) Session & auth hardening: - Increase MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS 20→50 (prevents eviction storms) - Debounced 401 redirect in rpc-client.ts (prevents redirect storms) Boot stability: - optimize-debian.sh: adds chrony, swap, removes policy-rc.d - deploy script: pre-restart chrony + swap setup - ISO build: chrony package, swap file creation - BootScreen: no longer clears localStorage (prevents splash replay) - RootRedirect: sole owner of localStorage clearing on server ready UI fixes: - Sidebar opacity default changed from 0→visible (fixes missing sidebar after page-persistence login without entrance animation) - Console.log/error wrapped in import.meta.env.DEV guards - Remove unused route import from RootRedirect Beta tracking: - CLAUDE.md: beta freeze protocol added - MASTER_PLAN.md: TASK-11, TASK-17, phase structure - BETA-PROGRESS.md: initial tracking doc - Tagged v1.2.0-alpha.1 as pre-rootless baseline Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
18 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
18 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
## SSRF Analysis Complete
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Found **5 SSRF vulnerabilities** across the Archipelago backend:
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### Critical (2)
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- **SSRF-001**: `backup.upload-s3` — user-supplied `endpoint` URL passed directly to `reqwest` PUT with zero validation. Can reach any internal service (Bitcoin RPC, LND, Grafana). Response status + partial body leaked in errors.
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- **SSRF-002**: `backup.download-s3` — same pattern but GET, with **full response body saved to disk** and retrievable via backup APIs. Most dangerous finding — enables complete exfiltration of any internal HTTP endpoint.
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### High (1)
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- **SSRF-003**: `identity.resolve-name` (NIP-05) — user-controlled `domain` in `user@domain` identifier causes HTTPS GET to arbitrary domain. HTTPS-only limits impact but enables DNS rebinding, IP disclosure, and partial response exfiltration.
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### Medium (1)
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- **SSRF-004**: `content.download-peer` / `content.browse-peer` — weak `.onion` validation (suffix check only vs. strict 56-char base32 in `node_message.rs`). Mitigated by Tor SOCKS proxy which rejects invalid addresses, but defense-in-depth failure.
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### Low (1)
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- **SSRF-005**: `webhook.configure` — private IP validation exists but bypassed in dev mode, missing `0.0.0.0`, no DNS rebinding protection, no redirect protection.
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Report written to `loop/pentest/analysis/ssrf.md`. |