39c7ac1924
Rootless podman migration (TASK-11): - Remove sudo from all podman calls in PodmanClient + 8 backend files - Remove sudo from all podman/docker calls in deploy script - Restore full systemd security hardening: NoNewPrivileges, RestrictAddressFamilies, MemoryDenyWriteExecute, RestrictRealtime, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictSUIDSGID, SystemCallFilter, ProtectSystem=strict - Enable loginctl linger for rootless container persistence - Remove Ollama from auto-deploy (marketplace-only) Session & auth hardening: - Increase MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS 20→50 (prevents eviction storms) - Debounced 401 redirect in rpc-client.ts (prevents redirect storms) Boot stability: - optimize-debian.sh: adds chrony, swap, removes policy-rc.d - deploy script: pre-restart chrony + swap setup - ISO build: chrony package, swap file creation - BootScreen: no longer clears localStorage (prevents splash replay) - RootRedirect: sole owner of localStorage clearing on server ready UI fixes: - Sidebar opacity default changed from 0→visible (fixes missing sidebar after page-persistence login without entrance animation) - Console.log/error wrapped in import.meta.env.DEV guards - Remove unused route import from RootRedirect Beta tracking: - CLAUDE.md: beta freeze protocol added - MASTER_PLAN.md: TASK-11, TASK-17, phase structure - BETA-PROGRESS.md: initial tracking doc - Tagged v1.2.0-alpha.1 as pre-rootless baseline Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
26 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
26 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
Written to `loop/pentest/recon/attack-surface-analysis.md`. Here's the executive summary:
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## 3 Critical Findings
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1. **`/lnd-connect-info` exposes full LND admin macaroon** — unauthenticated, CORS `*`. Anyone on the LAN gets complete Lightning node control (send payments, drain channels). Confirmed live.
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2. **Bitcoin RPC proxy on :8334 with hardcoded creds** (`archipelago:archipelago123`) — confirmed full mainnet `getblockchaininfo` works. If wallet is loaded, attacker can send transactions and export keys.
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3. **Grafana default `admin:admin` on port 3000** — confirmed full admin access. Can query data sources and potentially pivot.
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## 3 High Findings
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4. **`/content` leaks personal file catalog** (names, sizes, UUIDs) without auth
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5. **Nginx Proxy Manager (port 81)** directly accessible with `setup: false` state
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6. **Multiple service ports (3000, 3001, 7777, 8080, 9000)** bypass nginx proxy auth
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## Key Positives
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- Login rate limiting works (triggers at 5 attempts)
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- CORS properly rejects unauthorized origins
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- Session management is solid (256-bit tokens, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict)
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- Path traversal mitigated (/.git, /.env not exposed)
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- Security headers comprehensive (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options)
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- Bcrypt + Argon2id + ChaCha20 crypto stack is production-grade
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The report covers **150+ RPC methods**, **30+ nginx proxy routes**, **10+ direct port services**, and all authentication mechanisms with confirmed live probes. |