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Rootless podman migration (TASK-11): - Remove sudo from all podman calls in PodmanClient + 8 backend files - Remove sudo from all podman/docker calls in deploy script - Restore full systemd security hardening: NoNewPrivileges, RestrictAddressFamilies, MemoryDenyWriteExecute, RestrictRealtime, RestrictNamespaces, RestrictSUIDSGID, SystemCallFilter, ProtectSystem=strict - Enable loginctl linger for rootless container persistence - Remove Ollama from auto-deploy (marketplace-only) Session & auth hardening: - Increase MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS 20→50 (prevents eviction storms) - Debounced 401 redirect in rpc-client.ts (prevents redirect storms) Boot stability: - optimize-debian.sh: adds chrony, swap, removes policy-rc.d - deploy script: pre-restart chrony + swap setup - ISO build: chrony package, swap file creation - BootScreen: no longer clears localStorage (prevents splash replay) - RootRedirect: sole owner of localStorage clearing on server ready UI fixes: - Sidebar opacity default changed from 0→visible (fixes missing sidebar after page-persistence login without entrance animation) - Console.log/error wrapped in import.meta.env.DEV guards - Remove unused route import from RootRedirect Beta tracking: - CLAUDE.md: beta freeze protocol added - MASTER_PLAN.md: TASK-11, TASK-17, phase structure - BETA-PROGRESS.md: initial tracking doc - Tagged v1.2.0-alpha.1 as pre-rootless baseline Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1020 B
1020 B
Report written to loop/pentest/security-assessment-report.md.
Summary: 27 findings (8 Critical, 10 High, 6 Medium, 3 Low)
The report includes:
- Executive summary with overall CRITICAL rating and top 3 recommendations
- Scope and methodology covering nmap, source review, and live exploitation
- Full findings table — 21 exploitation-confirmed + 6 recon-confirmed
- Detailed findings — each with evidence (curl commands + responses), impact, and OWASP mapping
- Critical attack chain — 7-step full compromise from any LAN device, zero auth
- Prioritized recommendations — 20 remediation items across P0/P1/P2
- Positive security controls — bcrypt, TOTP, session tokens, container security noted
- Appendices — port inventory, container list, root cause tree, OWASP mapping, non-exploitable exclusions
The root cause is AUTH-001 (no session management). Fixing it addresses 15 of 27 findings. Combined with credential lockdown and port binding, 23 of 27 are resolved.