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archy/aiui/.claude/hooks/block-risky-bash.sh
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archipelago 7ba3109b6d Add 'aiui/' from commit 'e30ac1d1069532fb6d652d87e2d4a2fe9d1b4773'
git-subtree-dir: aiui
git-subtree-mainline: 0c4826f8cc
git-subtree-split: e30ac1d106
2026-08-03 15:07:11 -04:00

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# PreToolUse Bash guard: block dangerous shell commands.
# Denies: rm -rf, git reset --hard, git push -f, git clean -fd, chmod -R 777,
# fork bombs, block device overwrites, mkfs, paths escaping project root.
# Uses python3 instead of jq for JSON (guaranteed on macOS).
set -euo pipefail
INPUT=$(cat)
CMD=$(python3 -c "
import json, sys
try:
data = json.loads(sys.stdin.read())
print(data.get('tool_input', {}).get('command', ''))
except: pass
" <<< "$INPUT")
BASE="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-}"
[[ -z "$BASE" ]] && BASE=$(python3 -c "
import json, sys
try:
data = json.loads(sys.stdin.read())
print(data.get('cwd', ''))
except: pass
" <<< "$INPUT")
[[ -z "$BASE" ]] && BASE="$(pwd)"
# Normalize: collapse whitespace, strip leading/trailing
CMD_NORM=$(echo "$CMD" | tr -s '[:space:]' ' ' | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//;s/[[:space:]]*$//')
deny() {
local reason="$1"
python3 -c "
import json
print(json.dumps({
'hookSpecificOutput': {
'hookEventName': 'PreToolUse',
'permissionDecision': 'deny',
'permissionDecisionReason': '$reason'
}
}))
"
exit 0
}
# Dangerous patterns (case-insensitive where sensible)
case "$CMD_NORM" in
*"rm -rf"*|*"rm -fr"*|*"rm -f -r"*|*"rm -r -f"*) deny "Destructive rm -rf blocked by security hook" ;;
*"git reset --hard"*) deny "git reset --hard would lose uncommitted work" ;;
*"git push --force"*|*"git push -f"*|*"git push -f "*) deny "git push --force would rewrite history" ;;
*"git clean -fd"*|*"git clean -f -d"*) deny "git clean -fd deletes untracked files" ;;
*"chmod -R 777"*|*"chmod -R 0777"*) deny "chmod -R 777 is a security risk" ;;
*":(){ :"*"};:"*) deny "Fork bomb pattern blocked" ;;
*"> /dev/sd"*|*">/dev/sd"*) deny "Block device overwrite blocked" ;;
*"mkfs "*|*"mkfs."*) deny "Disk format command blocked" ;;
esac
# Check for path traversal escaping project root (../ outside project)
# Only if we have a sensible base
if [[ -n "$BASE" ]] && [[ -d "$BASE" ]]; then
# Simple heuristic: command contains .. and would resolve outside project
if echo "$CMD_NORM" | grep -qE '\.\./|/\.\.'; then
# Extract plausible paths and check - allow ../ within project
if echo "$CMD_NORM" | grep -qE '(rm|mv|cp|cat|chmod|chown)\s+.*\.\.'; then
# Could be risky; be conservative for rm/mv/cp
if echo "$CMD_NORM" | grep -qE '\brm\b.*\.\.'; then
deny "Path traversal with rm blocked"
fi
fi
fi
fi
exit 0