1073d9fd2c
- Upgraded Fedimint version to v0.10.0 in docker-compose.yml and manifest.yml, adding support for the built-in Guardian UI. - Modified .gitignore to exclude deploy-config.sh script. - Enhanced onboarding process in AuthManager to persist onboarding state and validate password strength during user setup. - Updated API to handle onboarding completion and password change requests, ensuring a smoother user experience. - Improved configuration management to support Nostr discovery and Tor proxy settings, enhancing node identity features.
43 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
43 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
# Nostr Discovery – Security & Data Exposure
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## If Someone Saw the Published Data
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The Nostr discovery feature previously published node identity (DID, Tor onion address, version) to public relays. If someone saw that data, here’s what they could have and how to respond.
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### What Could Have Been Seen
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1. **Relay operators** (relay.damus.io, relay.nostr.info):
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- Your server’s **IP address** when it connected to publish
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- The **Tor onion address** you advertised
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- **Timing** of when you published
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2. **Anyone querying Nostr** for archipelago nodes:
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- Your **Tor onion address** (designed to be shareable)
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- Your **DID** (public identifier)
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- **Software version**
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### Mitigations
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| Exposure | Mitigation |
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|----------|------------|
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| **IP address** | Cannot be undone. If relay operators logged it, they still have it. Consider: moving to a new IP, using a VPN for future traffic, or treating the server as potentially identified. |
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| **Tor onion** | The revocation overwrites the Nostr event so new clients won’t see it. If someone cached the onion, they can still reach the node. To invalidate it: **rotate the Tor hidden service** (new onion, old one stops working). |
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| **DID** | Public by design; no mitigation needed. |
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| **Version** | Update to a newer version; old version info becomes less useful over time. |
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### Rotating the Tor Hidden Service (New Onion)
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To invalidate an exposed onion address:
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1. Stop the Tor container.
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2. Remove the hidden service directory:
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`rm -rf /var/lib/archipelago/tor/hidden_service_archipelago`
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3. Restart the Tor container so it creates a new onion.
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4. Update any peers or links that used the old onion.
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### Current Protections (Post-Fix)
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- **Revocation**: On startup, the backend publishes a replacement Nostr event with empty content, so normal discovery no longer shows your node.
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- **Tor proxy**: Nostr traffic uses Tor (127.0.0.1:9050) so relay operators no longer see your IP.
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- **Opt-in defaults**: Discovery is on by default but only uses configured relays and routes through Tor.
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