archy/core/archipelago/src/storage_crypto.rs
archipelago edd03e542d feat(storage): encrypt chat history + mesh contacts at rest, atomic writes, persist contacts (#12)
User: chat history (messages + mesh/Tor contacts) must persist and be
secure/encrypted per best practice. Root cause of the .198 loss was the B17
mount race writing empty stores over real data (B17 already fixes the trigger);
this hardens storage so it can never silently lose or expose data:

- storage_crypto: shared at-rest envelope mirroring credentials::store — key =
  SHA-256(domain ‖ node identity key) (seed-derived, per-store domain
  separation), ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD with a random 96-bit nonce, tamper-evident.
  Transparent migration of legacy plaintext files. Unit-tested (round-trip,
  wrong-key/tamper rejection, plaintext detection).
- messages.json: encrypted at rest + ATOMIC write (temp+rename) so a crash/
  reboot mid-write cannot corrupt history; decrypt-with-migration on load; a
  failed decrypt never overwrites the on-disk data.
- mesh contacts (alias/notes/pinned/blocked): were ONLY in memory and lost on
  every restart — now persisted to mesh-contacts.json (encrypted, atomic),
  loaded on MeshState startup, saved after contacts-save/contacts-block.

Explicit clear (mesh.clear-all) still wipes everything, as intended.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-16 08:54:37 -04:00

109 lines
4.2 KiB
Rust

//! At-rest encryption for local state stores (chat messages, mesh contacts).
//!
//! Best-practice envelope, matching `credentials::store`:
//! - **Key**: SHA-256(domain-separator ‖ node identity key). The node key is
//! seed-derived and never leaves the device, so each store is bound to this
//! node's identity — a stolen disk image is unreadable without it, and the
//! per-domain separator means one store's key can't open another.
//! - **Cipher**: ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD with a fresh random 96-bit nonce per
//! write (`nonce ‖ ciphertext` on disk). The Poly1305 tag makes it
//! tamper-evident — any on-disk modification fails to open.
//! - **Migration**: legacy plaintext JSON is detected and read transparently,
//! then re-written encrypted on the next save. No data is stranded.
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use std::path::Path;
/// Domain separators — one per store so keys never overlap.
pub const DOMAIN_MESSAGES: &[u8] = b"archipelago-message-store-v1";
pub const DOMAIN_MESH_CONTACTS: &[u8] = b"archipelago-mesh-contacts-v1";
/// Derive a 32-byte key bound to this node's identity for a given store domain.
pub async fn derive_key(data_dir: &Path, domain: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
let node_key_path = data_dir.join("identity").join("node_key");
let key_bytes = tokio::fs::read(&node_key_path)
.await
.context("reading node key for at-rest encryption")?;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(domain);
hasher.update(&key_bytes);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
key.copy_from_slice(&hasher.finalize());
Ok(key)
}
/// Encrypt `plaintext`, returning `nonce ‖ ciphertext`.
pub fn seal(plaintext: &[u8], key: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
use chacha20poly1305::aead::{Aead, KeyInit};
let nonce_bytes: [u8; 12] = rand::random();
let cipher = chacha20poly1305::ChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(key)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("cipher init: {e}"))?;
let ct = cipher
.encrypt(
chacha20poly1305::aead::generic_array::GenericArray::from_slice(&nonce_bytes),
plaintext,
)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("encryption failed: {e}"))?;
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(12 + ct.len());
out.extend_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
out.extend_from_slice(&ct);
Ok(out)
}
/// Decrypt `nonce ‖ ciphertext`.
pub fn open(data: &[u8], key: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
use chacha20poly1305::aead::{Aead, KeyInit};
if data.len() < 12 {
anyhow::bail!("ciphertext too short");
}
let (nonce, ct) = data.split_at(12);
let cipher = chacha20poly1305::ChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(key)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("cipher init: {e}"))?;
cipher
.decrypt(
chacha20poly1305::aead::generic_array::GenericArray::from_slice(nonce),
ct,
)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("decryption failed — key mismatch or corruption"))
}
/// Heuristic: does this look like legacy plaintext JSON (starts with `{`/`[`)?
/// Encrypted blobs start with a random nonce byte, so a `{`/`[` first byte is a
/// reliable migration signal.
pub fn is_plaintext_json(raw: &[u8]) -> bool {
matches!(raw.first(), Some(b'{') | Some(b'['))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn seal_open_round_trips() {
let key = [7u8; 32];
let msg = br#"{"messages":[{"m":"hi"}]}"#;
let sealed = seal(msg, &key).unwrap();
// Encrypted output must NOT be readable plaintext.
assert!(!is_plaintext_json(&sealed));
assert_ne!(&sealed[12..], &msg[..]);
assert_eq!(open(&sealed, &key).unwrap(), msg);
}
#[test]
fn open_fails_on_wrong_key_or_tamper() {
let sealed = seal(b"secret", &[1u8; 32]).unwrap();
assert!(open(&sealed, &[2u8; 32]).is_err());
let mut tampered = sealed.clone();
*tampered.last_mut().unwrap() ^= 0x01;
assert!(open(&tampered, &[1u8; 32]).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn detects_plaintext_vs_ciphertext() {
assert!(is_plaintext_json(b"{\"a\":1}"));
assert!(is_plaintext_json(b"[]"));
assert!(!is_plaintext_json(&seal(b"x", &[3u8; 32]).unwrap()));
}
}