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archy/docs/adr/007-did-federation-trust.md
Dorian f149586559 docs: finalize ADRs with 4 new records (FINALDOC-03) 
ADR-006: Nostr relays for decentralized marketplace discovery
ADR-007: DID-based bilateral federation trust
ADR-008: Dual key strategy (Ed25519 + secp256k1)
ADR-009: Manifest-level container security enforcement

Total: 9 ADRs covering all significant architectural decisions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-11 17:23:40 +00:00

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ADR-007: DID-Based Federation Trust

Status

Accepted

Context

Archipelago supports federation — multiple nodes forming a trusted group for remote monitoring, app deployment, and state synchronization. Federation requires a trust establishment mechanism:

  • Centralized PKI (Certificate Authorities): requires internet access, introduces third-party trust
  • Pre-shared keys: simple but doesn't scale, no identity verification
  • DID-based bilateral verification: each node verifies the other's cryptographic identity directly

Decision

Use bilateral DID-based verification with single-use invite codes for federation trust establishment.

How It Works

  1. Node A generates a single-use invite code containing its DID, .onion address, and a shared secret
  2. Node B receives the code (out-of-band: QR code, message, etc.) and submits it
  3. Both nodes verify each other's DIDs by exchanging signed challenges over Tor
  4. Trust is established — each node stores the other's DID and public key
  5. Ongoing communication uses DID-authenticated messages over Tor hidden services

Trust Levels

  • Trusted: Full access — can view status, deploy apps, sync state
  • Observer: Read-only access — can view status but not modify
  • Untrusted: Blocked from federation operations

Consequences

Positive

  • No third-party trust dependency (no CA, no central server)
  • Works fully offline/air-gapped for the verification step
  • Strong cryptographic identity (Ed25519 keys)
  • Granular trust levels for different access patterns
  • Invite codes are single-use (no replay attacks)

Negative

  • Requires out-of-band code exchange (can't auto-discover peers for federation)
  • No revocation mechanism beyond removing the peer from the local trust store
  • Key rotation requires re-establishing trust with all peers
  • Trust is bilateral — each node maintains its own trust decisions

Mitigations

  • Nostr-based node discovery (ADR-003) handles finding nodes; federation handles trusting them
  • Tor hidden services provide transport encryption and anonymity
  • State sync includes heartbeat/health checks to detect unreachable peers