fix: only trust proxy headers in rate-limit when TRUSTED_PROXY is set

X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, and CF-Connecting-IP headers were
blindly trusted, allowing attackers to bypass rate limiting by
spoofing different IPs. Now only trusted when TRUSTED_PROXY env
var is configured. Falls back to Node.js socket remoteAddress.

Add tests verifying proxy headers are ignored without TRUSTED_PROXY
and respected when it is set.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

server/src/middleware/rate-limit.test.ts

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ describe('rateLimit', () => {
     vi.resetModules()
     // Set production mode before importing so isDev = false
     process.env.NODE_ENV = 'production'
+    // Trust proxy headers in tests (like behind Cloudflare/nginx)
+    process.env.TRUSTED_PROXY = '1'
     const mod = await import('./rate-limit.js')
     rateLimit = mod.rateLimit
     cleanup = mod.cleanupInterval
@@ -16,6 +18,7 @@ describe('rateLimit', () => {
 
   afterEach(() => {
     process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test'
+    delete process.env.TRUSTED_PROXY
     clearInterval(cleanup)
     vi.restoreAllMocks()
   })
@@ -117,6 +120,42 @@ describe('rateLimit', () => {
     vi.useRealTimers()
   })
 
+  it('ignores proxy headers when TRUSTED_PROXY is not set', async () => {
+    // Re-import without TRUSTED_PROXY
+    vi.resetModules()
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'production'
+    delete process.env.TRUSTED_PROXY
+    const mod = await import('./rate-limit.js')
+    const rl = mod.rateLimit
+    cleanup = mod.cleanupInterval
+
+    const app = new Hono()
+    app.get('/test', rl(10_000, 2), (c) => c.json({ ok: true }))
+
+    // All requests use 'unknown' as key (no proxy headers trusted)
+    // so they share the same bucket
+    const res1 = await app.request('/test', { headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': '1.1.1.1' } })
+    expect(res1.status).toBe(200)
+    const res2 = await app.request('/test', { headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': '2.2.2.2' } })
+    expect(res2.status).toBe(200)
+    // 3rd request hits limit because all mapped to 'unknown'
+    const res3 = await app.request('/test', { headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': '3.3.3.3' } })
+    expect(res3.status).toBe(429)
+  })
+
+  it('trusts proxy headers when TRUSTED_PROXY is set', async () => {
+    const app = new Hono()
+    app.get('/test', rateLimit(10_000, 2), (c) => c.json({ ok: true }))
+
+    // Different X-Forwarded-For IPs are tracked independently
+    const res1 = await app.request('/test', { headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': '1.1.1.1' } })
+    expect(res1.status).toBe(200)
+    const res2 = await app.request('/test', { headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': '2.2.2.2' } })
+    expect(res2.status).toBe(200)
+    const res3 = await app.request('/test', { headers: { 'x-forwarded-for': '3.3.3.3' } })
+    expect(res3.status).toBe(200) // different IP, still allowed
+  })
+
   it('poll endpoint config: 429 after 30 requests in 1s window', async () => {
     const app = new Hono()
     // Matches the actual /poll endpoint configuration

server/src/middleware/rate-limit.ts

@@ -34,10 +34,21 @@ export const cleanupInterval = setInterval(() => {
 }, 5 * 60 * 1000)
 
 function getIp(c: Context): string {
-  return c.req.header('cf-connecting-ip')
+  // Only trust proxy headers when TRUSTED_PROXY is configured
-    || c.req.header('x-real-ip')
+  if (process.env.TRUSTED_PROXY) {
-    || c.req.header('x-forwarded-for')?.split(',')[0].trim()
+    const cfIp = c.req.header('cf-connecting-ip')
-    || 'unknown'
+    if (cfIp) return cfIp
+    const realIp = c.req.header('x-real-ip')
+    if (realIp) return realIp
+    const xff = c.req.header('x-forwarded-for')
+    if (xff) return xff.split(',')[0].trim()
+  }
+  // Fall back to connection IP from Node.js socket
+  const incoming = (c.env as Record<string, any>)?.incoming
+  if (incoming?.socket?.remoteAddress) {
+    return incoming.socket.remoteAddress
+  }
+  return 'unknown'
 }
 
 export function rateLimit(windowMs: number, maxHits: number) {