fix(bots): guard possibly-undefined route param, bump arena image to 1.2.11

tsc --noEmit (run standalone, not filtered through a shell wrapper that
silently swallowed the real exit code) caught what my own verification
missed the first time: c.req.param('name') is typed possibly-undefined
in this Hono router's inferred route map, and the podman build's own
`pnpm --filter server build` step (which runs the real tsc, unlike a
loosely-configured local check) failed on it — 1.2.10 was never
actually built with the :name/ai-config routes as a result. Added an
explicit guard (matches the 404 semantics of a missing param) to all
three new handlers.

Also bumps docker-compose.arena.yml to the 1.2.11 tag being built next.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

docker-compose.arena.yml

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 
 services:
   botfights-arena:
-    image: localhost:3000/lfg2025/botfights:1.2.9
+    image: localhost:3000/lfg2025/botfights:1.2.11
     container_name: botfights-arena
     restart: unless-stopped
     ports:

frontend/src/composables/useNostr.ts

@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ export function useNostr() {
     const res = await authFetch('/api/auth/update', {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-      body: JSON.stringify({ pubkey: pubkey.value, customization }),
+      body: JSON.stringify({ customization }),
     })
 
     if (!res.ok) {
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ export function useNostr() {
     const res = await authFetch('/api/auth/update', {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-      body: JSON.stringify({ pubkey: pubkey.value, webhookUrl: newUrl }),
+      body: JSON.stringify({ webhookUrl: newUrl }),
     })
 
     const data = await res.json()

frontend/src/composables/useWallet.ts

@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ export function useWallet() {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
       body: JSON.stringify({
-        pubkey: pubkey.value,
         method: 'nwc',
         connectionData: connectionString,
       }),
@@ -93,7 +92,6 @@ export function useWallet() {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
       body: JSON.stringify({
-        pubkey: pubkey.value,
         method: 'lnaddress',
         connectionData: address,
       }),
@@ -114,8 +112,6 @@ export function useWallet() {
 
     await authFetch('/api/payments/disconnect-wallet', {
       method: 'DELETE',
-      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-      body: JSON.stringify({ pubkey: pubkey.value }),
     })
 
     walletMethod.value = null
@@ -129,7 +125,7 @@ export function useWallet() {
   async function checkWalletStatus(): Promise<void> {
     if (!pubkey.value) return
 
-    const res = await authFetch(`/api/payments/wallet-status?pubkey=${pubkey.value}`)
+    const res = await authFetch('/api/payments/wallet-status')
     if (res.ok) {
       const data = await res.json()
       isWalletConnected.value = data.connected
@@ -148,7 +144,7 @@ export function useWallet() {
       const invoiceRes = await authFetch('/api/payments/create-invoice', {
         method: 'POST',
         headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-        body: JSON.stringify({ botId, pubkey: pubkey.value }),
+        body: JSON.stringify({ botId }),
       })
 
       if (!invoiceRes.ok) {
@@ -179,7 +175,7 @@ export function useWallet() {
             await authFetch(`/api/payments/confirm/${paymentId}`, {
               method: 'POST',
               headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-              body: JSON.stringify({ preimage, pubkey: pubkey.value }),
+              body: JSON.stringify({ preimage }),
             })
             paymentStatus.value = 'confirmed'
             return paymentId

frontend/src/pages/BotProfilePage.vue

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 import { ref, reactive, computed, onMounted, onUnmounted } from 'vue'
 import { useRoute, useRouter, RouterLink } from 'vue-router'
 import { useNostr, type NostrProfile } from '../composables/useNostr'
+import { authFetch } from '../lib/nostr-auth'
 import SpritePreview from '../components/SpritePreview.vue'
 import HumanPreview from '../components/HumanPreview.vue'
 import WalletConnect from '../components/WalletConnect.vue'
@@ -97,6 +98,17 @@ const showCustomize = ref(false)
 const isSaving = ref(false)
 const custError = ref('')
 
+// Claim winnings (Cashu payouts sitting unclaimed — see payments.ts payWinner:
+// mints a bearer token server-side when the winner has no NWC/Lightning-address
+// wallet linked, which is the common case for a Cashu-primary bot). Fetched
+// proactively (not behind a toggle) since this is the owner's own money.
+interface UnclaimedWinning { paymentId: string; amountSats: number }
+const unclaimedWinnings = ref<UnclaimedWinning[]>([])
+const claimingId = ref<string | null>(null)
+const claimError = ref('')
+const claimedTokens = ref<{ paymentId: string; amountSats: number; token: string }[]>([])
+const tokenCopiedId = ref<string | null>(null)
+
 // Webhook management
 const showWebhook = ref(false)
 const webhookInput = ref('')
@@ -106,6 +118,68 @@ const webhookTestResult = ref<{ reachable: boolean; validResponse: boolean; late
 const webhookError = ref('')
 const webhookSuccess = ref('')
 
+// AI-answer settings (existing bot — see /api/bots/:name/ai-config). Same
+// feature as JoinBoutPage's creation-time setup, but reachable afterward:
+// that flow only ever had the bot's own secret in hand at the moment of
+// creation, with nowhere to come back to later.
+const showAiConfig = ref(false)
+const aiConfigLoaded = ref(false)
+const aiConfigured = ref(false)
+const aiConfigProvider = ref<'anthropic' | 'openai' | null>(null)
+const aiProviderInput = ref<'anthropic' | 'openai'>('anthropic')
+const aiApiKeyInput = ref('')
+const aiConfigSaving = ref(false)
+const aiConfigError = ref('')
+
+async function loadAiConfig() {
+  if (!stats.value || aiConfigLoaded.value) return
+  try {
+    const res = await authFetch(`/api/bots/${encodeURIComponent(botName)}/ai-config`)
+    if (res.ok) {
+      const data = await res.json() as { configured: boolean; provider: 'anthropic' | 'openai' | null }
+      aiConfigured.value = data.configured
+      aiConfigProvider.value = data.provider
+    }
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.warn('[BotProfile] ai-config load failed:', err)
+  }
+  aiConfigLoaded.value = true
+}
+
+async function saveAiConfig() {
+  if (!aiApiKeyInput.value.trim() || aiConfigSaving.value) return
+  aiConfigSaving.value = true
+  aiConfigError.value = ''
+  try {
+    const res = await authFetch(`/api/bots/${encodeURIComponent(botName)}/ai-config`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ provider: aiProviderInput.value, apiKey: aiApiKeyInput.value.trim() }),
+    })
+    const data = await res.json()
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      aiConfigError.value = data.error || 'Failed to save API key.'
+      return
+    }
+    aiConfigured.value = true
+    aiConfigProvider.value = aiProviderInput.value
+    aiApiKeyInput.value = '' // never keep the raw key in page state longer than needed
+  } catch {
+    aiConfigError.value = 'Connection failed. Try again.'
+  } finally {
+    aiConfigSaving.value = false
+  }
+}
+
+async function removeAiConfig() {
+  try {
+    await authFetch(`/api/bots/${encodeURIComponent(botName)}/ai-config`, { method: 'DELETE' })
+  } finally {
+    aiConfigured.value = false
+    aiConfigProvider.value = null
+  }
+}
+
 // Setup guide
 const showSetupGuide = ref(false)
 const isRegenerating = ref(false)
@@ -240,6 +314,45 @@ async function saveCustomization() {
   isSaving.value = false
 }
 
+async function fetchUnclaimedWinnings() {
+  if (!stats.value || !isOwner.value) return
+  try {
+    const res = await authFetch(`/api/payments/winnings/${stats.value.id}`)
+    if (res.ok) {
+      const data = await res.json() as { unclaimed: UnclaimedWinning[] }
+      unclaimedWinnings.value = data.unclaimed || []
+    }
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.warn('[BotProfile] winnings fetch failed:', err)
+  }
+}
+
+async function claimWinning(paymentId: string, amountSats: number) {
+  if (claimingId.value) return
+  claimingId.value = paymentId
+  claimError.value = ''
+  try {
+    const res = await authFetch(`/api/payments/claim/${paymentId}`, { method: 'POST' })
+    const data = await res.json()
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      claimError.value = data.error || 'Claim failed.'
+      return
+    }
+    claimedTokens.value.unshift({ paymentId, amountSats, token: data.cashuToken })
+    unclaimedWinnings.value = unclaimedWinnings.value.filter(w => w.paymentId !== paymentId)
+  } catch {
+    claimError.value = 'Network error claiming winnings.'
+  } finally {
+    claimingId.value = null
+  }
+}
+
+function copyClaimedToken(paymentId: string, token: string) {
+  navigator.clipboard.writeText(token)
+  tokenCopiedId.value = paymentId
+  setTimeout(() => { if (tokenCopiedId.value === paymentId) tokenCopiedId.value = null }, 2500)
+}
+
 async function testWebhook() {
   if (!stats.value || isTestingWebhook.value) return
   isTestingWebhook.value = true
@@ -343,6 +456,10 @@ onMounted(async () => {
     }).catch(err => console.warn('[BotProfile] webhook test failed:', err))
   }
 
+  // Unclaimed Cashu winnings (non-blocking, owner only — fetchUnclaimedWinnings
+  // itself checks isOwner, but stats must be loaded first)
+  fetchUnclaimedWinnings()
+
   // Poll queue for "choose your fight"
   pollQueue()
   pollHandle = setInterval(pollQueue, 4000)
@@ -602,6 +719,56 @@ const tierClass = (t: number) => `tier-${t}`
               </div>
             </div>
 
+            <!-- Unclaimed Cashu winnings (owner only) — shown proactively, not
+                 behind a toggle: this is real money waiting on the winner.
+                 Payouts land here (instead of an auto-deposit) whenever the
+                 winner has no NWC/Lightning-address wallet linked, which is
+                 the common case for a Cashu-primary bot. -->
+            <div v-if="isOwner && unclaimedWinnings.length > 0" class="mt-2 border-2 border-neon-yellow/50 bg-neon-yellow/10 p-3">
+              <p class="font-display font-bold text-xs tracking-wider text-neon-yellow mb-2">
+                🏆 YOU WON {{ unclaimedWinnings.reduce((s, w) => s + w.amountSats, 0) }} SATS — CLAIM YOUR CASHU
+              </p>
+              <div v-for="w in unclaimedWinnings" :key="w.paymentId" class="flex items-center justify-between gap-2 mb-1.5 last:mb-0">
+                <span class="font-mono text-[10px] text-text-secondary">{{ w.amountSats }} sats</span>
+                <button
+                  class="px-3 py-1.5 bg-neon-yellow/20 border border-neon-yellow/50 text-neon-yellow
+                         font-display font-bold text-[10px] tracking-wider
+                         hover:bg-neon-yellow/30 transition-all
+                         disabled:opacity-30 disabled:cursor-not-allowed"
+                  :disabled="claimingId === w.paymentId"
+                  @click="claimWinning(w.paymentId, w.amountSats)"
+                >
+                  {{ claimingId === w.paymentId ? 'CLAIMING...' : 'CLAIM' }}
+                </button>
+              </div>
+              <p v-if="claimError" class="font-mono text-[10px] text-ko mt-1.5">{{ claimError }}</p>
+            </div>
+
+            <!-- Just-claimed tokens: bearer instruments, revealed once. Copy
+                 into any Cashu wallet (e.g. Minibits) to redeem — there's no
+                 "auto-deposit" for Cashu the way NWC allows for Lightning,
+                 since a bearer token has no destination address to push to. -->
+            <div v-if="claimedTokens.length > 0" class="mt-2 border border-neon-green/40 bg-neon-green/5 p-3 space-y-2">
+              <div v-for="c in claimedTokens" :key="c.paymentId">
+                <p class="font-display font-bold text-[10px] tracking-wider text-neon-green mb-1">
+                  ✓ CLAIMED {{ c.amountSats }} SATS — paste into your Cashu wallet
+                </p>
+                <div class="flex items-center gap-2">
+                  <p class="flex-1 font-mono text-[9px] text-text-secondary break-all bg-black/30 border border-border p-1.5">
+                    {{ c.token }}
+                  </p>
+                  <button
+                    class="px-2 py-1.5 border border-neon-green/40 text-neon-green
+                           font-display font-bold text-[9px] tracking-wider
+                           hover:bg-neon-green/10 transition-all flex-shrink-0"
+                    @click="copyClaimedToken(c.paymentId, c.token)"
+                  >
+                    {{ tokenCopiedId === c.paymentId ? 'COPIED' : 'COPY' }}
+                  </button>
+                </div>
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
             <!-- Wallet connection (owner only) -->
             <div v-if="isOwner" class="mt-3">
               <WalletConnect />
@@ -834,6 +1001,78 @@ const tierClass = (t: number) => `tier-${t}`
               </div>
             </div>
 
+            <!-- AI-answer settings (owner only, bots only): "let BotFights
+                 answer for me" via an operator-supplied Anthropic/OpenAI key.
+                 Same feature JoinBoutPage offers at creation time, now also
+                 reachable afterward — for changing/rotating the key, or
+                 turning it on for a bot that skipped it at creation. -->
+            <div v-if="isOwner && stats.archetype !== 'human' && !stats.isHuman" class="mt-4">
+              <button
+                class="w-full py-2 border border-border text-text-secondary font-display font-bold text-[10px]
+                       tracking-wider hover:border-neon-purple/40 hover:text-neon-purple transition-all text-center"
+                @click="showAiConfig = !showAiConfig; if (showAiConfig) loadAiConfig()"
+              >
+                {{ showAiConfig ? 'HIDE' : 'AI ANSWER' }} SETTINGS
+              </button>
+
+              <div v-if="showAiConfig" class="mt-3 border border-border bg-surface-raised/60 p-4 space-y-3">
+                <p class="font-mono text-[10px] text-text-muted">
+                  Let BotFights answer poll-mode fights for you using your own
+                  Anthropic or OpenAI API key — no script or webhook required.
+                </p>
+
+                <div v-if="!aiConfigLoaded" class="font-mono text-[10px] text-text-muted">Loading...</div>
+
+                <div v-else-if="aiConfigured" class="flex items-center justify-between p-2 border border-neon-green/30 bg-neon-green/5">
+                  <span class="font-mono text-[10px] text-neon-green">
+                    ✓ Configured ({{ aiConfigProvider }})
+                  </span>
+                  <button
+                    class="px-2 py-1 border border-ko/40 text-ko font-display font-bold text-[9px] tracking-wider hover:bg-ko/10 transition-all"
+                    @click="removeAiConfig"
+                  >
+                    REMOVE
+                  </button>
+                </div>
+
+                <div v-else class="space-y-2">
+                  <div class="flex gap-2">
+                    <button
+                      v-for="p in (['anthropic', 'openai'] as const)"
+                      :key="p"
+                      class="flex-1 py-1.5 border font-display font-bold text-[9px] tracking-wider transition-all"
+                      :class="aiProviderInput === p
+                        ? 'border-neon-purple/50 bg-neon-purple/10 text-neon-purple'
+                        : 'border-border text-text-muted hover:border-neon-purple/30'"
+                      @click="aiProviderInput = p"
+                    >
+                      {{ p.toUpperCase() }}
+                    </button>
+                  </div>
+                  <input
+                    v-model="aiApiKeyInput"
+                    type="password"
+                    placeholder="sk-..."
+                    class="w-full px-2 py-1.5 bg-black/30 border border-border font-mono text-[10px] text-text-primary
+                           placeholder-text-muted/50 focus:outline-none focus:border-neon-purple/50"
+                    @keyup.enter="saveAiConfig"
+                  />
+                  <button
+                    class="w-full py-1.5 bg-neon-purple/10 border border-neon-purple/40 text-neon-purple
+                           font-display font-bold text-[10px] tracking-wider
+                           hover:bg-neon-purple/20 transition-all
+                           disabled:opacity-30 disabled:cursor-not-allowed"
+                    :disabled="!aiApiKeyInput.trim() || aiConfigSaving"
+                    @click="saveAiConfig"
+                  >
+                    {{ aiConfigSaving ? 'SAVING...' : 'SAVE KEY' }}
+                  </button>
+                </div>
+
+                <p v-if="aiConfigError" class="font-mono text-[10px] text-ko">{{ aiConfigError }}</p>
+              </div>
+            </div>
+
             <!-- Setup guide download (owner only, bots only) -->
             <div v-if="isOwner && stats.archetype !== 'human' && !stats.isHuman" class="mt-4">
               <button

frontend/src/pages/JoinBoutPage.vue

@@ -717,10 +717,12 @@ async function fightRanked() {
     // don't create a duplicate Lightning invoice via payEntryFee().
     const paymentId = cashuPaymentId.value ?? await payEntryFee(bot.value.id)
     cashuPaymentId.value = null
+    // Ownership is verified server-side from the Bearer JWT that authFetch
+    // attaches automatically — no client-supplied pubkey needed (or trusted).
     const res = await authFetch(`/api/queue/join-ranked/${bot.value.id}`, {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-      body: JSON.stringify({ paymentId, pubkey: pubkey.value }),
+      body: JSON.stringify({ paymentId }),
     })
     if (res.ok) {
       const data = await res.json()

server/src/lib/validators.test.ts

@@ -132,14 +132,22 @@ describe('registerHumanSchema', () => {
 })
 
 describe('updateBotSchema', () => {
-  const base = { pubkey: 'a'.repeat(64) }
+  const base = {}
-  it('accepts pubkey only (no updates)', () => { expect(updateBotSchema.safeParse(base).success).toBe(true) })
+  it('accepts empty body (no updates)', () => { expect(updateBotSchema.safeParse(base).success).toBe(true) })
   it('accepts webhook update', () => {
     expect(updateBotSchema.safeParse({ ...base, webhookUrl: 'https://new.com/hook' }).success).toBe(true)
   })
   it('rejects file:// webhook', () => {
     expect(updateBotSchema.safeParse({ ...base, webhookUrl: 'file:///etc/passwd' }).success).toBe(false)
   })
+  // SECURITY REGRESSION: pubkey must never be a schema field here. POST
+  // /api/auth/update derives identity from the verified JWT
+  // (extractPubkeyFromAuth), not from client body — see server/src/routes/auth.ts.
+  // A pubkey field in this schema previously let an unauthenticated caller
+  // claim any bot as their own and hijack its webhook/customization.
+  it('does not declare a pubkey field (identity comes from the JWT, not the body)', () => {
+    expect('pubkey' in updateBotSchema.shape).toBe(false)
+  })
 })
 
 // --- Fight schemas ---

server/src/lib/validators.ts

@@ -42,8 +42,13 @@ export const registerHumanSchema = z.object({
   avatarSeed: z.string().min(1).max(50).optional(),
 })
 
+// pubkey is intentionally NOT part of this schema: POST /api/auth/update
+// derives the caller's identity from their verified JWT (extractPubkeyFromAuth),
+// never from the request body — a client-supplied pubkey here would let any
+// caller act as any other bot owner. Kept accepting-but-ignoring the field
+// would be more confusing than just not declaring it; the frontend no longer
+// sends it either.
 export const updateBotSchema = z.object({
-  pubkey: pubkeySchema,
   webhookUrl: httpUrlSchema.max(2048).optional(),
   profilePicUrl: httpUrlSchema.max(2048).optional(),
   customization: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).optional().nullable(),
@@ -83,14 +88,15 @@ export const withdrawSchema = z.object({
 // --- Payment schemas ---
 
 export const connectWalletSchema = z.object({
-  pubkey: pubkeySchema,
   method: z.enum(['nwc', 'lnaddress', 'cashu_mint']),
   connectionData: z.string().min(1),
 })
 
+// pubkey is intentionally NOT part of this schema — see connect-wallet /
+// create-invoice / claim / disconnect-wallet in payments.ts, which all
+// derive ownership from the verified JWT, never a client-supplied field.
 export const createInvoiceSchema = z.object({
   botId: idSchema,
-  pubkey: pubkeySchema.optional(),
 })
 
 export const submitCashuSchema = z.object({
@@ -104,9 +110,7 @@ export const zapSchema = z.object({
   amountSats: satsSchema,
 })
 
-export const disconnectWalletSchema = z.object({
+export const disconnectWalletSchema = z.object({})
-  pubkey: pubkeySchema,
-})
 
 // --- Tournament schemas ---
 
@@ -129,9 +133,11 @@ export const startTournamentSchema = z.object({
 
 // --- Queue schemas ---
 
+// pubkey is intentionally NOT part of this schema — ownership is verified
+// server-side via verifyBotOwner (JWT-derived pubkey or bot-secret), never
+// from a client-supplied field. See queue.ts.
 export const joinRankedSchema = z.object({
   paymentId: idSchema,
-  pubkey: pubkeySchema.optional(),
 })
 
 // --- Docs schemas ---

server/src/middleware/bot-auth.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto'
 import { db, schema } from '../db/index.js'
 import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm'
 import type { Context } from 'hono'
+import { extractPubkeyFromAuth } from './jwt.js'
 
 export interface BotAuthContext {
   botId: string
@@ -68,3 +69,40 @@ export async function authenticateBot(c: Context): Promise<BotAuthContext | Resp
     webhookUrl: rows[0].webhookUrl,
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * Verify the caller owns `botId`, for routes that must accept BOTH audiences:
+ * nostr-signed-in owners (web UI's JWT session) and anonymous poll-mode bots
+ * (Authorization: Bot <id>:<secret>, which never have a publicKey — see
+ * BOTFIGHTS.md). This is the ONLY correct way to check the nostr side: it
+ * derives pubkey from a verified JWT (extractPubkeyFromAuth), never from a
+ * client-supplied `pubkey` field. A bare `body.pubkey === bot.publicKey`
+ * comparison is not an ownership check at all — pubkeys are public by
+ * design in nostr (shown on every bot's own profile page), so anyone who's
+ * viewed a bot's page could pass that same auth-check with zero secret
+ * material. (This exact bug, at POST /api/auth/update, was found and fixed
+ * in 09-06 — see auth.ts. Same class, same fix, applied everywhere ownership
+ * is checked by pubkey.)
+ */
+export async function verifyBotOwner(c: Context, botId: string): Promise<true | Response> {
+  const auth = c.req.header('Authorization')
+  if (auth?.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
+    const pubkey = extractPubkeyFromAuth(auth)
+    if (!pubkey) {
+      return c.json({ error: 'Invalid or expired session.' }, 401)
+    }
+    const rows = await db.select({ publicKey: schema.bots.publicKey })
+      .from(schema.bots).where(eq(schema.bots.id, botId)).limit(1)
+    if (rows.length === 0 || rows[0].publicKey !== pubkey) {
+      return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 403)
+    }
+    return true
+  }
+
+  const botOrRes = await authenticateBot(c)
+  if (botOrRes instanceof Response) return botOrRes
+  if (botOrRes.botId !== botId) {
+    return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 403)
+  }
+  return true
+}

server/src/routes/ai-config.test.ts

@@ -2,11 +2,13 @@ import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest'
 import { Hono } from 'hono'
 
 // Mock DB: authenticateBot looks up a bot by id via db.select(...).from(...).where(...).limit(...)
+const TEST_PUBKEY = 'b'.repeat(64)
 const mockBotRow = {
   id: 'bot_test123',
   name: 'testbot',
   secretHash: 'aa'.repeat(32), // placeholder; overridden per-test via crypto mock below
   webhookUrl: 'http://poll.local/',
+  publicKey: TEST_PUBKEY,
 }
 
 vi.mock('../db/index.js', () => ({
@@ -52,11 +54,13 @@ const REAL_SECRET = 'test-bot-secret-1234567890'
 mockBotRow.secretHash = createHash('sha256').update(REAL_SECRET).digest('hex')
 
 const { botsRouter } = await import('./bots.js')
+const { createJwt } = await import('../middleware/jwt.js')
 
 const app = new Hono()
 app.route('/api/bots', botsRouter)
 
 const AUTH = { Authorization: `Bot ${mockBotRow.id}:${REAL_SECRET}` }
+const OWNER_JWT_AUTH = { Authorization: `Bearer ${createJwt(TEST_PUBKEY)}` }
 
 beforeEach(() => { store.clear() })
 
@@ -131,3 +135,66 @@ describe('bots ai-config routes', () => {
     expect(res.status).toBe(401)
   })
 })
+
+// --- Existing-bot owner settings page: /api/bots/:name/ai-config ---
+// These exist because the routes above require the bot's own secret, which
+// is only ever available at the exact moment of creation (JoinBoutPage) —
+// there was previously no way to add/change/remove an AI key for a bot
+// after that moment, even for its nostr-logged-in owner.
+describe('bots :name/ai-config routes (existing-bot owner settings)', () => {
+  it('GET /api/bots/:name/ai-config with a valid owner JWT returns configured status', async () => {
+    const res = await app.request('/api/bots/testbot/ai-config', { headers: OWNER_JWT_AUTH })
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200)
+    expect(await res.json()).toEqual({ configured: false, provider: null })
+  })
+
+  it('POST /api/bots/:name/ai-config with a valid owner JWT sets the config', async () => {
+    const res = await app.request('/api/bots/testbot/ai-config', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { ...OWNER_JWT_AUTH, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ provider: 'anthropic', apiKey: 'sk-ant-fake-key-value' }),
+    })
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200)
+    expect(await res.json()).toEqual({ configured: true, provider: 'anthropic' })
+
+    // Same underlying storage as the bot-secret path — visible either way.
+    const check = await app.request('/api/bots/ai-config', { headers: AUTH })
+    expect(await check.json()).toEqual({ configured: true, provider: 'anthropic' })
+  })
+
+  it('DELETE /api/bots/:name/ai-config with a valid owner JWT removes the config', async () => {
+    await app.request('/api/bots/testbot/ai-config', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { ...OWNER_JWT_AUTH, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ provider: 'openai', apiKey: 'sk-openai-fake-key-value' }),
+    })
+    const del = await app.request('/api/bots/testbot/ai-config', { method: 'DELETE', headers: OWNER_JWT_AUTH })
+    expect(del.status).toBe(200)
+    const check = await app.request('/api/bots/testbot/ai-config', { headers: OWNER_JWT_AUTH })
+    expect(await check.json()).toEqual({ configured: false, provider: null })
+  })
+
+  it('rejects a JWT for a DIFFERENT pubkey than the bot owner (403)', async () => {
+    const wrongOwnerJwt = { Authorization: `Bearer ${createJwt('c'.repeat(64))}` }
+    const res = await app.request('/api/bots/testbot/ai-config', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { ...wrongOwnerJwt, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ provider: 'anthropic', apiKey: 'sk-ant-fake-key-value' }),
+    })
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403)
+  })
+
+  it('rejects requests with no auth at all (401)', async () => {
+    const res = await app.request('/api/bots/testbot/ai-config')
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401)
+  })
+
+  it('also accepts the bot\'s own secret (Authorization: Bot id:secret) via verifyBotOwner', async () => {
+    const res = await app.request('/api/bots/testbot/ai-config', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { ...AUTH, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ provider: 'openai', apiKey: 'sk-openai-fake-key-value' }),
+    })
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200)
+  })
+})

server/src/routes/auth-update.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
+import { Hono } from 'hono'
+import { authRouter } from './auth.js'
+import { generateSecretKey, getPublicKey } from 'nostr-tools'
+import { createJwt } from '../middleware/jwt.js'
+import { db, schema } from '../db/index.js'
+import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm'
+import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'crypto'
+import { nanoid } from 'nanoid'
+
+const app = new Hono()
+app.route('/api/auth', authRouter)
+
+async function seedBot(pubkey: string, overrides: Partial<typeof schema.bots.$inferInsert> = {}) {
+  const id = overrides.id || nanoid(12)
+  const secret = randomBytes(32).toString('hex')
+  await db.insert(schema.bots).values({
+    id,
+    name: overrides.name || `t${Date.now().toString(36).slice(-8)}`,
+    webhookUrl: overrides.webhookUrl || 'http://poll.local/',
+    avatarSeed: overrides.avatarSeed || 'seed',
+    archetype: overrides.archetype || 'standard',
+    secretHash: createHash('sha256').update(secret).digest('hex'),
+    publicKey: pubkey,
+    profilePicUrl: overrides.profilePicUrl ?? null,
+    customization: overrides.customization ?? null,
+    createdAt: overrides.createdAt || new Date().toISOString(),
+  })
+  return id
+}
+
+// SECURITY REGRESSION SUITE for POST /api/auth/update.
+//
+// This route previously trusted a client-supplied `pubkey` field in the
+// request body with no verification against the caller's actual identity —
+// any unauthenticated caller could pass a victim's pubkey and hijack their
+// bot's webhook/profilePicUrl/customization. Found live during 09-06
+// (ai-config UI work) by contrast with GET /me and POST /regenerate-secret,
+// which both correctly derive identity from the verified JWT via
+// extractPubkeyFromAuth. Fixed to always derive pubkey from the JWT; the
+// body no longer even has a pubkey field (see updateBotSchema).
+describe('POST /api/auth/update — identity comes from the JWT, not the body', () => {
+  it('rejects an unauthenticated request (no Authorization header)', async () => {
+    const res = await app.request('/api/auth/update', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ customization: { archetype: 'tank' } }),
+    })
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401)
+  })
+
+  it('rejects a garbage/tampered Bearer token', async () => {
+    const res = await app.request('/api/auth/update', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: 'Bearer not-a-real-jwt' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ customization: { archetype: 'tank' } }),
+    })
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401)
+  })
+
+  it('cannot hijack another bot by passing its pubkey in the body', async () => {
+    const victimSk = generateSecretKey()
+    const victimPk = getPublicKey(victimSk)
+    const victimId = await seedBot(victimPk, { webhookUrl: 'http://victim.local/original' })
+
+    // Attacker has their own valid session (their own JWT) but a DIFFERENT
+    // bot — no bot row at all, in this case.
+    const attackerPk = getPublicKey(generateSecretKey())
+    const attackerToken = createJwt(attackerPk)
+
+    const res = await app.request('/api/auth/update', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${attackerToken}` },
+      // Old exploit shape: claim to be the victim via a body field.
+      body: JSON.stringify({ pubkey: victimPk, webhookUrl: 'http://poll.local/attacker-controlled' }),
+    })
+
+    // Attacker has no bot of their own -> 404, NOT a successful update of
+    // the victim's bot.
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404)
+
+    const rows = await db.select({ webhookUrl: schema.bots.webhookUrl })
+      .from(schema.bots)
+      .where(eq(schema.bots.id, victimId))
+      .limit(1)
+    expect(rows[0].webhookUrl).toBe('http://victim.local/original')
+  })
+
+  it('updates the caller\'s own bot, derived from their JWT, ignoring a body pubkey', async () => {
+    const sk = generateSecretKey()
+    const pk = getPublicKey(sk)
+    const id = await seedBot(pk, { webhookUrl: 'http://poll.local/' })
+    const token = createJwt(pk)
+
+    const someoneElsesPk = getPublicKey(generateSecretKey())
+    const res = await app.request('/api/auth/update', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
+      // Even if a stale client sends an unrelated pubkey, the server must
+      // still act on the JWT-derived identity, not this field.
+      body: JSON.stringify({ pubkey: someoneElsesPk, customization: { archetype: 'shark' } }),
+    })
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200)
+
+    const rows = await db.select({ customization: schema.bots.customization })
+      .from(schema.bots)
+      .where(eq(schema.bots.id, id))
+      .limit(1)
+    expect(JSON.parse(rows[0].customization || '{}').archetype).toBe('shark')
+  })
+})

server/src/routes/auth.ts

@@ -324,11 +324,25 @@ authRouter.post('/register-human', rateLimit(600_000, 10), async (c) => {
 
 // Update bot webhook and/or customization (requires pubkey match)
 authRouter.post('/update', rateLimit(60_000, 10), async (c) => {
+  // SECURITY: pubkey MUST come from the verified JWT, never from the request
+  // body. This handler previously trusted a client-supplied `pubkey` field
+  // with no cross-check against the caller's actual authenticated identity —
+  // any unauthenticated caller could POST an arbitrary victim's pubkey plus
+  // a malicious webhookUrl/profilePicUrl/customization and silently hijack
+  // that bot (e.g. redirect its webhook to an attacker-controlled endpoint).
+  // Found live during the ai-config UI work (09-06) by contrast with
+  // /regenerate-secret and GET /me, which both correctly derive pubkey from
+  // extractPubkeyFromAuth and never trust a client-claimed identity.
+  const pubkey = extractPubkeyFromAuth(c.req.header('Authorization'))
+  if (!pubkey) {
+    return c.json({ error: 'Authentication required.' }, 401)
+  }
+
   const parsed = updateBotSchema.safeParse(await c.req.json().catch(() => ({})))
   if (!parsed.success) {
-    return c.json({ error: 'Invalid pubkey.' }, 400)
+    return c.json({ error: 'Invalid request body.' }, 400)
   }
-  const { pubkey, webhookUrl, profilePicUrl, customization: rawCustomization } = parsed.data
+  const { webhookUrl, profilePicUrl, customization: rawCustomization } = parsed.data
 
   const rows = await db.select({ id: schema.bots.id, customization: schema.bots.customization })
     .from(schema.bots)

server/src/routes/bots.ts

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { isAllowedWebhookUrl } from '../engine/orchestrator.js'
 import { testWebhook } from '../engine/webhook-test.js'
 import { rateLimit } from '../middleware/rate-limit.js'
 import { botNameSchema, httpUrlSchema } from '../lib/validators.js'
-import { authenticateBot } from '../middleware/bot-auth.js'
+import { authenticateBot, verifyBotOwner } from '../middleware/bot-auth.js'
 import { setAiBotConfig, getAiBotConfig, deleteAiBotConfig, type LlmProvider } from '../engine/ai-bot-config.js'
 
 export const botsRouter = new Hono()
@@ -193,6 +193,80 @@ botsRouter.delete('/ai-config', async (c) => {
   return c.json({ configured: false })
 })
 
+// --- Same feature, for an EXISTING bot's owner settings page ---
+// The routes above require the bot's own secret (Authorization: Bot
+// <id>:<secret>), which only the JoinBoutPage bot-creation flow has in hand
+// at the moment of creation — it's never persisted anywhere the browser can
+// re-fetch it. Before this, there was no way for an existing bot's owner to
+// add, change, or remove their AI key later; they'd have to still be on the
+// exact creation tab. These are owner-scoped by :name + nostr JWT
+// (verifyBotOwner also accepts the bot's own secret, so an AI agent that
+// happens to hold both could use either path — no harm either way).
+//
+// MUST be registered before GET /:name below for the same reason as
+// /ai-config above (Hono resolves same-segment-count routes in registration
+// order) — but :name/ai-config is a DIFFERENT segment count than :name, so
+// it can't actually collide with it; kept adjacent for readability, not
+// because ordering is load-bearing here.
+botsRouter.get('/:name/ai-config', async (c) => {
+  const name = c.req.param('name')
+  if (!name) return c.json({ error: 'Bot not found.' }, 404)
+  const rows = await db.select({ id: schema.bots.id })
+    .from(schema.bots)
+    .where(eq(sql`LOWER(${schema.bots.name})`, name.toLowerCase()))
+    .limit(1)
+  if (rows.length === 0) return c.json({ error: 'Bot not found.' }, 404)
+
+  const ownerCheck = await verifyBotOwner(c, rows[0].id)
+  if (ownerCheck !== true) return ownerCheck
+
+  const config = getAiBotConfig(rows[0].id)
+  return c.json({ configured: !!config, provider: config?.provider ?? null })
+})
+
+botsRouter.post('/:name/ai-config', rateLimit(60_000, 10), async (c) => {
+  const name = c.req.param('name')
+  if (!name) return c.json({ error: 'Bot not found.' }, 404)
+  const rows = await db.select({ id: schema.bots.id })
+    .from(schema.bots)
+    .where(eq(sql`LOWER(${schema.bots.name})`, name.toLowerCase()))
+    .limit(1)
+  if (rows.length === 0) return c.json({ error: 'Bot not found.' }, 404)
+
+  const ownerCheck = await verifyBotOwner(c, rows[0].id)
+  if (ownerCheck !== true) return ownerCheck
+
+  const body = await c.req.json().catch(() => ({})) as { provider?: string; apiKey?: string }
+  const provider = body.provider
+  const apiKey = body.apiKey?.trim()
+
+  if (!provider || !AI_PROVIDERS.includes(provider as LlmProvider)) {
+    return c.json({ error: `provider must be one of: ${AI_PROVIDERS.join(', ')}` }, 400)
+  }
+  if (!apiKey || apiKey.length < 8 || apiKey.length > 512) {
+    return c.json({ error: 'apiKey is required (8-512 chars).' }, 400)
+  }
+
+  setAiBotConfig(rows[0].id, { provider: provider as LlmProvider, apiKey })
+  return c.json({ configured: true, provider })
+})
+
+botsRouter.delete('/:name/ai-config', async (c) => {
+  const name = c.req.param('name')
+  if (!name) return c.json({ error: 'Bot not found.' }, 404)
+  const rows = await db.select({ id: schema.bots.id })
+    .from(schema.bots)
+    .where(eq(sql`LOWER(${schema.bots.name})`, name.toLowerCase()))
+    .limit(1)
+  if (rows.length === 0) return c.json({ error: 'Bot not found.' }, 404)
+
+  const ownerCheck = await verifyBotOwner(c, rows[0].id)
+  if (ownerCheck !== true) return ownerCheck
+
+  deleteAiBotConfig(rows[0].id)
+  return c.json({ configured: false })
+})
+
 // Get single bot profile
 botsRouter.get('/:name', async (c) => {
   const name = c.req.param('name')

server/src/routes/payments.test.ts

@@ -56,6 +56,16 @@ vi.mock('../middleware/rate-limit.js', () => ({
 const { paymentsRouter } = await import('./payments.js')
 const { db, schema } = await import('../db/index.js')
 const { createEntryInvoice, checkPaymentStatus } = await import('../engine/payments.js')
+// jwt.js is intentionally NOT mocked — connect-wallet, disconnect-wallet,
+// wallet-status, winnings, and claim all derive identity from a real,
+// verified JWT (see 09-06 IDOR fix), so tests that exercise the
+// authenticated path need a real token, not a stubbed one.
+const { createJwt } = await import('../middleware/jwt.js')
+
+const TEST_PUBKEY = 'a'.repeat(64)
+function authHeader(pubkey = TEST_PUBKEY) {
+  return { Authorization: `Bearer ${createJwt(pubkey)}` }
+}
 
 function makeApp() {
   const app = new Hono()
@@ -68,12 +78,22 @@ describe('payments routes', () => {
     vi.clearAllMocks()
   })
 
-  it('connect-wallet returns 400 when missing fields', async () => {
+  it('connect-wallet returns 401 with no Authorization header', async () => {
     const app = makeApp()
     const res = await app.request('/api/payments/connect-wallet', {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-      body: JSON.stringify({ pubkey: 'abc' }),
+      body: JSON.stringify({ method: 'nwc', connectionData: 'x' }),
+    })
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401)
+  })
+
+  it('connect-wallet returns 400 when missing fields', async () => {
+    const app = makeApp()
+    const res = await app.request('/api/payments/connect-wallet', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...authHeader() },
+      body: JSON.stringify({}),
     })
     expect(res.status).toBe(400)
     const json = await res.json() as { error: string }
@@ -85,9 +105,8 @@ describe('payments routes', () => {
     // db.select will return empty array by default
     const res = await app.request('/api/payments/connect-wallet', {
       method: 'POST',
-      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...authHeader() },
       body: JSON.stringify({
-        pubkey: 'a'.repeat(64),
         method: 'nwc',
         connectionData: 'nostr+walletconnect://test',
       }),
@@ -160,14 +179,14 @@ describe('payments routes', () => {
     expect(json.error).toContain('Missing')
   })
 
-  it('disconnect-wallet returns 400 when missing pubkey', async () => {
+  it('disconnect-wallet returns 401 with no Authorization header', async () => {
     const app = makeApp()
     const res = await app.request('/api/payments/disconnect-wallet', {
       method: 'DELETE',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
       body: JSON.stringify({}),
     })
-    expect(res.status).toBe(400)
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401)
   })
 
   it('disconnect-wallet wipes connection data and sets hasWallet=false', async () => {
@@ -184,8 +203,8 @@ describe('payments routes', () => {
     const app = makeApp()
     const res = await app.request('/api/payments/disconnect-wallet', {
       method: 'DELETE',
-      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...authHeader() },
-      body: JSON.stringify({ pubkey: 'a'.repeat(64) }),
+      body: JSON.stringify({}),
     })
     expect(res.status).toBe(200)
     const json = await res.json() as { success: boolean }
@@ -314,9 +333,8 @@ describe('payment security — attack vectors', () => {
     const app = makeApp()
     const res = await app.request('/api/payments/connect-wallet', {
       method: 'POST',
-      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...authHeader() },
       body: JSON.stringify({
-        pubkey: 'a'.repeat(64),
         method: 'paypal',
         connectionData: 'malicious://data',
       }),

server/src/routes/payments.ts

@@ -6,17 +6,32 @@ import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm'
 import { createEntryInvoice, checkPaymentStatus, redeemCashuToken } from '../engine/payments.js'
 import { encrypt, decrypt } from '../engine/crypto.js'
 import { rateLimit } from '../middleware/rate-limit.js'
-import { connectWalletSchema, createInvoiceSchema, submitCashuSchema, disconnectWalletSchema, zapSchema, formatZodError, sanitizeError } from '../lib/validators.js'
+import { connectWalletSchema, createInvoiceSchema, submitCashuSchema, zapSchema, formatZodError, sanitizeError } from '../lib/validators.js'
+import { extractPubkeyFromAuth } from '../middleware/jwt.js'
 
 export const paymentsRouter = new Hono()
 
 // POST /connect-wallet
+//
+// SECURITY: pubkey MUST come from the verified JWT, never the request body.
+// This handler previously trusted a client-supplied `pubkey` field with NO
+// ownership check at all — any unauthenticated caller could attach an
+// attacker-controlled NWC connection string or Lightning Address to ANY
+// victim bot by pubkey (public by design in nostr), silently redirecting
+// all of that bot's future fight-winnings payouts to the attacker's own
+// wallet. Direct fund theft, not just profile hijacking. Found and fixed
+// alongside the identical pattern at POST /api/auth/update (09-06).
 paymentsRouter.post('/connect-wallet', async (c) => {
+  const pubkey = extractPubkeyFromAuth(c.req.header('Authorization'))
+  if (!pubkey) {
+    return c.json({ error: 'Authentication required.' }, 401)
+  }
+
   const parsed = connectWalletSchema.safeParse(await c.req.json().catch(() => ({})))
   if (!parsed.success) {
-    return c.json({ error: formatZodError(parsed.error, {}, 'Missing pubkey, method, or connectionData') }, 400)
+    return c.json({ error: formatZodError(parsed.error, {}, 'Missing method or connectionData') }, 400)
   }
-  const { pubkey, method, connectionData } = parsed.data
+  const { method, connectionData } = parsed.data
 
   // Look up bot by publicKey
   const botRows = await db.select({ id: schema.bots.id })
@@ -59,9 +74,11 @@ paymentsRouter.post('/connect-wallet', async (c) => {
   return c.json({ success: true })
 })
 
-// GET /wallet-status
+// GET /wallet-status — read-only, but still derives identity from the JWT
+// rather than a query-string pubkey, so this can't be used to enumerate
+// whether an arbitrary victim pubkey has a wallet connected.
 paymentsRouter.get('/wallet-status', async (c) => {
-  const pubkey = c.req.query('pubkey')
+  const pubkey = extractPubkeyFromAuth(c.req.header('Authorization'))
   if (!pubkey) return c.json({ connected: false, method: null })
 
   const botRows = await db.select({ id: schema.bots.id })
@@ -85,12 +102,14 @@ paymentsRouter.get('/wallet-status', async (c) => {
 paymentsRouter.post('/create-invoice', rateLimit(60_000, 10), async (c) => {
   const parsed = createInvoiceSchema.safeParse(await c.req.json().catch(() => ({})))
   if (!parsed.success) return c.json({ error: formatZodError(parsed.error, { botId: 'Missing botId' }, 'Missing botId') }, 400)
-  const { botId, pubkey } = parsed.data
+  const { botId } = parsed.data
 
-  // In production, verify bot ownership
+  // In production, verify bot ownership via the verified JWT — never a
+  // client-supplied pubkey field (same fix class as connect-wallet above).
   if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
-    if (!pubkey || typeof pubkey !== 'string' || pubkey.length !== 64) {
+    const pubkey = extractPubkeyFromAuth(c.req.header('Authorization'))
-      return c.json({ error: 'Missing pubkey' }, 400)
+    if (!pubkey) {
+      return c.json({ error: 'Authentication required.' }, 401)
     }
     const botRows = await db.select({ publicKey: schema.bots.publicKey })
       .from(schema.bots).where(eq(schema.bots.id, botId)).limit(1)
@@ -130,7 +149,7 @@ paymentsRouter.post('/confirm/:paymentId', rateLimit(60_000, 20), async (c) => {
     return c.json({ error: 'Invalid paymentId' }, 400)
   }
 
-  const { preimage, pubkey } = await c.req.json<{ preimage?: string; pubkey?: string }>().catch(() => ({ preimage: undefined, pubkey: undefined }))
+  const { preimage } = await c.req.json<{ preimage?: string }>().catch(() => ({ preimage: undefined }))
 
   const rows = await db.select().from(schema.payments)
     .where(eq(schema.payments.id, paymentId)).limit(1)
@@ -143,15 +162,19 @@ paymentsRouter.post('/confirm/:paymentId', rateLimit(60_000, 20), async (c) => {
   // Must be an inbound entry payment
   if (payment.direction !== 'in') return c.json({ error: 'Cannot confirm outbound payments' }, 400)
 
-  // Verify caller owns this payment's bot
+  // Verify caller owns this payment's bot — pubkey comes from the verified
-  if (pubkey && typeof pubkey === 'string' && pubkey.length === 64) {
+  // JWT, never a client-supplied field (same fix class as connect-wallet
+  // above: a bare body.pubkey === bot.publicKey check is not an ownership
+  // proof, since pubkeys are public by design in nostr).
+  const pubkey = extractPubkeyFromAuth(c.req.header('Authorization'))
+  if (pubkey) {
     const botRows = await db.select({ publicKey: schema.bots.publicKey })
       .from(schema.bots).where(eq(schema.bots.id, payment.botId)).limit(1)
     if (botRows.length === 0 || botRows[0].publicKey !== pubkey) {
       return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 403)
     }
   } else if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
-    return c.json({ error: 'Missing or invalid pubkey' }, 400)
+    return c.json({ error: 'Authentication required.' }, 401)
   }
 
   // In production, also verify payment via NWC lookup (belt and suspenders)
@@ -204,18 +227,42 @@ paymentsRouter.post('/submit-cashu', async (c) => {
 })
 
 // GET /winnings/:botId
+//
+// SECURITY (critical): this handler previously had NO auth check at all AND
+// returned the raw, spendable Cashu bearer token in the list response.
+// botId is public (appears in every fight/profile URL), so anyone could
+// list ANY bot's unclaimed winnings and get the live token back —
+// no ownership proof needed whatsoever. Whoever holds a Cashu token can
+// redeem it, so this leaked real, spendable sats to any caller who beat the
+// legitimate winner to the request. Fixed: require JWT-derived ownership of
+// botId, and never include the token itself in the list — only reveal it
+// via the explicit POST /claim/:paymentId below, which also clears it from
+// storage (single-use reveal, correct claim semantics).
 paymentsRouter.get('/winnings/:botId', async (c) => {
   const botId = c.req.param('botId')
 
+  const pubkey = extractPubkeyFromAuth(c.req.header('Authorization'))
+  if (!pubkey) {
+    return c.json({ error: 'Authentication required.' }, 401)
+  }
+  const botRows = await db.select({ publicKey: schema.bots.publicKey })
+    .from(schema.bots).where(eq(schema.bots.id, botId)).limit(1)
+  if (botRows.length === 0 || botRows[0].publicKey !== pubkey) {
+    return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 403)
+  }
+
   const unclaimed = await db.select({
     paymentId: schema.payments.id,
-    cashuToken: schema.payments.cashuToken,
+    hasToken: schema.payments.cashuToken,
     amountSats: schema.payments.amountSats,
   }).from(schema.payments)
     .where(eq(schema.payments.botId, botId))
 
-  // Filter in JS since drizzle doesn't easily combine multiple conditions
+  // Filter in JS since drizzle doesn't easily combine multiple conditions.
-  const filtered = unclaimed.filter(p => p.cashuToken)
+  // Never include the raw token here — see comment above.
+  const filtered = unclaimed
+    .filter(p => p.hasToken)
+    .map(p => ({ paymentId: p.paymentId, amountSats: p.amountSats }))
 
   return c.json({ unclaimed: filtered })
 })
@@ -223,7 +270,6 @@ paymentsRouter.get('/winnings/:botId', async (c) => {
 // POST /claim/:paymentId
 paymentsRouter.post('/claim/:paymentId', async (c) => {
   const paymentId = c.req.param('paymentId')
-  const { pubkey } = await c.req.json<{ pubkey?: string }>().catch(() => ({ pubkey: undefined }))
 
   const rows = await db.select().from(schema.payments)
     .where(eq(schema.payments.id, paymentId))
@@ -233,7 +279,11 @@ paymentsRouter.post('/claim/:paymentId', async (c) => {
 
   const payment = rows[0]
 
-  // Verify caller owns this payment's bot
+  // Verify caller owns this payment's bot — pubkey comes from the verified
+  // JWT, never a client-supplied field. See GET /winnings above for the
+  // severity rationale (this route hands back a live, spendable bearer
+  // token — the single most sensitive check in this file).
+  const pubkey = extractPubkeyFromAuth(c.req.header('Authorization'))
   if (pubkey) {
     const botRows = await db.select({ publicKey: schema.bots.publicKey })
       .from(schema.bots).where(eq(schema.bots.id, payment.botId)).limit(1)
@@ -241,7 +291,7 @@ paymentsRouter.post('/claim/:paymentId', async (c) => {
       return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 403)
     }
   } else if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
-    return c.json({ error: 'Missing pubkey' }, 400)
+    return c.json({ error: 'Authentication required.' }, 401)
   }
 
   if (!payment.cashuToken) return c.json({ error: 'No Cashu token to claim' }, 400)
@@ -255,9 +305,10 @@ paymentsRouter.post('/claim/:paymentId', async (c) => {
 
 // DELETE /disconnect-wallet
 paymentsRouter.delete('/disconnect-wallet', async (c) => {
-  const parsed = disconnectWalletSchema.safeParse(await c.req.json().catch(() => ({})))
+  const pubkey = extractPubkeyFromAuth(c.req.header('Authorization'))
-  if (!parsed.success) return c.json({ error: formatZodError(parsed.error, {}, 'Missing pubkey') }, 400)
+  if (!pubkey) {
-  const { pubkey } = parsed.data
+    return c.json({ error: 'Authentication required.' }, 401)
+  }
 
   const botRows = await db.select({ id: schema.bots.id })
     .from(schema.bots)

server/src/routes/queue.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { joinQueue, leaveQueue, getQueueSize, getQueueSnapshot } from '../engine
 import { joinRankedQueue, getRankedQueueStatus } from '../engine/ranked-queue.js'
 import { rateLimit } from '../middleware/rate-limit.js'
 import { joinRankedSchema, sanitizeError } from '../lib/validators.js'
-import { authenticateBot } from '../middleware/bot-auth.js'
+import { verifyBotOwner } from '../middleware/bot-auth.js'
 
 export const queueRouter = new Hono()
 
@@ -57,7 +57,14 @@ queueRouter.get('/ranked-status', (c) => {
 // Join ranked queue — requires confirmed payment + bot ownership.
 // Ownership can be proven either way, since ranked/staked fights are for
 // BOTH audiences (not just nostr-signed-in humans):
-//   1. pubkey (nostr-authenticated bots, the web UI's own JWT session flow)
+//   1. Authorization: Bearer <jwt> (nostr-authenticated bots, the web UI's
+//      own JWT session flow) — verified via verifyBotOwner, which derives
+//      pubkey from the JWT itself, never from a client-supplied field. A
+//      bare `body.pubkey === bot.publicKey` comparison (the previous
+//      implementation here) is not an ownership check: pubkeys are public
+//      by design in nostr, shown on every bot's own profile page, so it let
+//      anyone who'd seen a bot's page join ranked queue as that bot. Found
+//      and fixed alongside the identical bug at POST /api/auth/update (09-06).
 //   2. Authorization: Bot <id>:<secret> (anonymous poll-mode bots — the
 //      primary registration path for AI agents per BOTFIGHTS.md, which
 //      never have a publicKey at all: confirmed live, publicKey is null
@@ -69,25 +76,12 @@ queueRouter.post('/join-ranked/:botId', async (c) => {
   if (!parsed.success) {
     return c.json({ error: parsed.error.issues[0]?.message || 'Missing paymentId' }, 400)
   }
-  const { paymentId, pubkey } = parsed.data
+  const { paymentId } = parsed.data
 
   // Verify bot ownership in production
   if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
-    if (pubkey && typeof pubkey === 'string' && pubkey.length === 64) {
+    const ownerCheck = await verifyBotOwner(c, botId)
-      const botRows = await db.select({ publicKey: schema.bots.publicKey })
+    if (ownerCheck !== true) return ownerCheck
-        .from(schema.bots).where(eq(schema.bots.id, botId)).limit(1)
-      if (botRows.length === 0 || botRows[0].publicKey !== pubkey) {
-        return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 403)
-      }
-    } else {
-      // No pubkey supplied — fall back to bot-secret auth (Authorization
-      // header or ?bot_id=&secret= query params, same as /api/fights/poll).
-      const botOrRes = await authenticateBot(c)
-      if (botOrRes instanceof Response) return botOrRes
-      if (botOrRes.botId !== botId) {
-        return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 403)
-      }
-    }
   }
 
   try {